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Labor Law Case Digest

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48 views8 pages

Labor Law Case Digest

Law

Uploaded by

lenmarss
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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Marlen N.

Roxas
2017400087

Slord Development Corporation vs. Benerando M. Noya


G.R. No. 232687, February 04, 2019

Facts:

Bernardo Noya worked as a welder for SLORD Development Corporation, a


local company. Noya's job was protected under a CBA between SLORD and
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa-Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan), the only
authorized representative for all regular employees. The CBA includes a provision
that mandates SLORD's employees to be members in good standing of NLM-
Katipunan and states that failure to do so could result in dismissal upon written
demand from NLM-Katipunan. Noya then established a fresh labor association
called the Bantay Manggagawa sa SLORD Development Corporation (BMSDC),
officially enrolling it with the DOLE on February 20, 2014.

Afterwards, NLM-Katipunan sent a letter to SLORD, requesting the termination


of Noya from his job in accordance with the union security clause of the CBA.
Following the union's decision to expel him, Noya was informed and his
employment was terminated on March 19, 2014. As a result, he lodged a complaint
for unlawful termination against SLORD with the NLRC. Noya's appeal was
approved by the CA, deeming his dismissal as unjustified. There was no valid
reason to fire Noya because there was not enough evidence to justify the union's
decision to remove him for collecting signatures on a blank yellow paper, which
was not against labor rules.

Issue:
Whether or not Bernado Moya was illegally dismissed?

Law Applicable:
Article 259 of the Labor Code (formerly Art.248)

Ruling:
No, While not explicitly mentioned in the Labor Code, case law recognizes that
dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in
the CBA is another just cause for termination of employment. retain union
membership as a condition affecting employment

To validly terminate the employment of an employee through the enforcement of


the union security clause, the following requisites must concur: (1) the union
security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the
union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support
the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. Case law states
that in order to effect a valid dismissal of an employee, both substantial and
procedural due process must be observed by the employer. An employee’s right
not to be dismissed without just or authorized cause, as provided by law, is covered
by his right to substantial due process. On the other hand, compliance with
procedure provided in the Labor Code constitutes the procedural due process right
of an employee.

Opinion:

I agree with the decision of the court. It is when certain workers are required to be
part of a specific union in order to keep their job, such as with Union Security
Clauses, it is a legitimate limit on the choice to not join any labor group, as it
supports union membership. Additionally, documents indicate that NLM-
Katipunan asked for the implementation of the union security provision by
requesting the termination of Noya from his job for being disloyal and going
against the CBA's union security clause.
Finally, there is enough proof to back up the union's choice to remove Noya from
his employment.

CHRONOLOGY:

• September 9, 2008- Noya was employed as a welder by petitioner, a domestic


corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and processing of
sardines and other canned goods.
• February 27, 2014- Notice of expulsion was issued by NLM-Katipunan

• March 16, 2014 – Letter was sent by NLM-Katipunan to


petitioner,demanding his termination from employment
• August 27, 2014 - the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit
• September 30, 2014 - the NLRC affirmed the LA Decision

• January 25, 2017 - the CA granted respondent's petition, finding his dismissal
to be illegal.
• February 04, 2019 - the SC rendered the petition meritorious.

Justice was not delayed.

PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Taneca


G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010

Facts:

The case involves PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI) and its employees who were
members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL).The employees filed a complaint against PRI for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, and money claims. The collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) between PRI and NAMAPRI-SPFL included a union security
clause, which required employees to maintain their membership in the union as a
condition of continued employment.

NAMAPRI-SPFL sent a letter to PRI demanding the termination of employees


who allegedly campaigned for and supported another labor union, the Federation
of Free Workers (FFW), during the effectivity of the CBA. PRI issued a
memorandum to the concerned employees, asking them to explain why their
employment should not be terminated. Some employees submitted explanations,
while others did not. After evaluating the explanations, PRI terminated the
employment of 31 employees, including the respondents in the case.The
employees filed a complaint, alleging that their dismissal was illegaland
constituted unfair labor practice.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees,
declaring their dismissal illegal and ordering their reinstatement and payment of
backwages.The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, declaring the dismissal legal.The employees then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a just cause to terminate the employment of respondents?
Law Applicable:
Article 253 of the Labor Code and Article 256 of the Labor Code

No. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that there was insufficient evidence to
support the decision to terminate the employees. Mere signing of an authorization
letter to file a petition for certification election, which the employees did before the
freedom period, was not sufficient ground for termination.

Opinion

I agree with the decision of the court. The mere signing of the authorization in
support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21,
or before the “freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the
employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed
during the freedom period. Nothing in the records would show that respondents
failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union

• February 13, 2001 – The respondents filed a Complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner.
• March 16, 2001 - the Labor Arbiter declared the respondents’ dismissal
• October 8, 2001 - NLRC reversed the Decision
• July 25, 2003 - the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed
Resolutions of the NLRC
• August 9, 2010 - SC ruled petitioner's argument is untenable.

Justice was delayed

Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. Secretary of Labor and


Employment
G.R. 91915, September 11, 1992

Facts:
The Divine Word University of Tacloban (petitioner) and the Secretary of Labor
and Employment along with the Divine Word University Employees Union-ALU
(respondents) are involved in the case.On September 6, 1984, Med-Arbiter
Bienvenido C. Elorcha certified the Divine Word University Employees Union
(DWUEU) as the exclusive bargaining agent of the University.DWUEU submitted
its collective bargaining proposals on March 7, 1985. The University requested a
preliminary conference for May 28, 1985, but it was canceled after DWUEU's
vice-president, Brigido Urminita, withdrew the CBA proposals unilaterally.
On March 11, 1988, DWUEU, now affiliated with the Associated Labor Union
(ALU), requested to resume collective bargaining negotiations.The University did
not respond, leading DWUEU-ALU to file a notice of strike on April 25, 1988,
citing bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices. On August 25, 1988,
Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute,
directing striking workers to return to work. Med-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado
ordered a certification election, which DWUEU-ALU sought to enjoin.The
University's motion for reconsideration was denied by Acting Secretary of Labor
Dionisio L. de la Serna on January 17, 1990. The University filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction on February 9, 1990.

Issue:
Whether or not there was there a deadlock or an impasse in the collective
bargaining process?

Law Applicable:

Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code and Art. 252 of the Labor Code

Ruling:

A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining" specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent
towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to
arrive at an agreement.

This is a clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art250 (a) of which states:
a.) when a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than 10 calendar days from receipt of such notice. Hence,
petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's proposals may not be unilaterally
imposed on it on the ground that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract
wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit.

Opinion:
The Secretary of Labor did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
orders The Court added in the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side
of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposal of the other.
But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to
schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures

CHRONOLOGY:

• May 10, 1988 - University filed a petition for certification election


• May 19, 1988 - Union submitted its collective bargaining proposals
• August 25, 1988 - University’s petition for certification election
• September 20, 1988 - Labor Secretary granted said motion
• October 17-18, 1988 - Hearings on the case were conducted.
• May 5, 1989 - Union filed a second notice of strike.
• November 24, 1989 - Union pursued its second notice of strike.
• January 17, 1990 - Acting Labor Secretary dismissed the motion for lack of
merit.

Justice was not delayed.

Kiok Loy, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE
CREAM PLANT, vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
Pambansang Kilusan Ng Paggawa (KILUSAN)
G.R. L-54334, January 22, 1986

Facts:
·
The Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and
was subsequently certified in a resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant.
·
The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective
bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter
proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the
Company. Thereafter, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective
bargaining.Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory
cooling-off period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed.The case
was brought to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. But the Company
requested for a lot of postponements. NLRC ruled that respondent Sweden Ice
Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article
248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.

Issue:

Whether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to
bargain

Law Applicable:

Article 249 of the Labor Code

Ruling:

Yes. Petition dismissed for lack of merit .Collective bargaining is one of the
democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the
relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable
industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is
characterized as a legal obligation. Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with
respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an
agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by
either party.
Opinion:

I agree with the court. Unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that
the respondent employer, after having been served with a written bargaining
proposal by the petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply
to the said proposal A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in
relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith since the Union's
request for a counter proposal is left unanswered.

CHRONOLOGY:

• October 3, 1978- Certification election was held


• February 14, 1979 - Union filed a notice of strike to the BLR
• April 29, 1979 - Initial hearing of the case.
• May 24, 1978 - Company’s counsel request for postponement.
• June 4, 1979 - Company’s representative failed to appear.
• July 18, 1979 - Labor arbiter submitted his report to the NLRC
• July 20, 1979 - NLRC rendered its decision.
• August 4, 1980 - Court dismissed Company’s motion forreconsideration for
lack of merit.

Justice was not delayed.

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