Evaluation of Political Corruption and Strategies for Its

Reduction in Nigeria

JUDE DANDISON

A thesis submitted to the Department of Criminal Justice System of the University of

Portsmouth in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Doctor

of Philosophy, September, 2020

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Acknowledgements

I thank the Almighty God who gave me the grace and inspiration that led me to study the possible

strategies to reduce political corruption in Nigeria. I am extremely grateful to the University of

Portsmouth for giving me the privilege to undertake this research. I would like to thank all the

supporting staff of the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies,

in particular Geoff Smith, Barry Loveday, Mark Button and Dean Blackbourn.

There are many persons without whom this thesis would not have been possible. First, I

offer my sincere appreciation to my supervisory team, Dr Branislav Hock and Dr David Shephard,

for their unlimited advice, guidance, suggestions and feedback, encouragement and unwavering

support they have provided me throughout the time of completing my Ph.D research.

I am very grateful for the support of the research staff at my entire research host

organisation, especially His Lordship, Peter Oyin Affen, Hon Judge High Court of the Federal

Capital Territory Abuja and the entire staff of the F.C.T High Court twelve, Abuja and all the

lawyers and prosecutors who gave their time to be interviewed for this research.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to Mrs. Beatrice Dandison, Joshua Dandison

and Ata Dandison, all of whom had been incredibly supportive over the past four years and have

always had faith that I would complete this project.

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 Declaration

“Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other

research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named

candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award.”

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 ABSTRACT

Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon with debilitating effects on any society and its economy.

Corrupt practices have led to the breakdown of law and order, insecurity, and failed states.

Corruption in Nigeria is endemic, systemic and structural in nature. It occurs in every sector of the

economy, and at different levels of society. This phenomenon began in pre-colonial times and has

subsisted through different regimes, military and civilian, until the present. Politically exposed

persons (PEPs) engage in grand and political corruption, which impacts heavily upon the country.

The corollary to this is electoral corruption, through which PEPs hold on to power to enable them

access to the commonwealth at the expense of the citizenry. Successive governments have enacted

bills such as the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA) and established anti-

corruption agencies such as the Code of Conduct Bureau 1979 (CCB), Economic and Financial

Crime Commission 2003 (EFCC) and Independent and Corrupt Practice Commission 2000

(ICPC), including presidential panels, to fight the menace of corruption in the country. This study

evaluates political corruption and the effectiveness of strategies devised by different Nigerian

governments to reduce it in the nation.

The thesis is underpinned by four theories of corruption in the state, which were considered

relevant for the work. These are the Agent–Principal, Collective–Action, Institutional and Game

theories, which were used to explain the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria. The

phenomenological approach was chosen for this work, whereby the qualitative method was

adopted to source data. A triangulation method that comprises semi-structured interviews, focus

group discussions and documentary evidence (case studies) was used to harvest relevant primary

and secondary data. A total of 68 respondents, which consist of professional lawyers, judges and

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political office holders, participated in the FGDs and interviews held. While the interviews were

held in Abuja, the federal capital city of Nigeria, the FGDs took place in four clusters in different

parts of the country. Validated interview and FGD guides were used on the respondents. Data

gathered were coded thematically and analysed according to research questions asked. Interviews

were used to seek perceptions of respondents on causes of corruption and suggestions on strategies

that have been used to fight it. Discussants in the FGDs examined the effects of electoral

corruption, which is a trajectory to political corruption. Case studies were conducted on

government corruption, involvement of politically exposed persons in international bribery

scandals, corrupt acts, and forms of electoral corruption from Independence in 1960 to the present

time.

Several ideas were adduced to combat political and electoral corruption, which include the

use of E-voting technologies, the proper education of members of the electorate, the setting up of

electoral tribunals, electing credible candidates with good records, restructuring the electoral

processes, sanctions for political offenders, and a reduction of the influence of culture in political

processes. Others include the application of the anti-money-laundering compliance regulation and

the appointment of compliance officers in ministries, agencies and departments; the imposition of

sanctions on corrupt PEPs; and making anti-corruption agencies independent to enable them to

execute their duties without undue political influence.

The study concluded that corruption can be wiped out from the country when patriotic

leaders are in government, and when political offices are made less attractive. Further autonomy

should be granted to anti-corruption agencies to enable them function properly, while stringent

punishment should be meted out for corrupt practices. Also, states should institute good criminal

justice systems and introduce technological developments that should be used to spot fraudulent

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acts and other forms of corruption. It was recommended that credible leaders should be appointed

to oversee anti-corruption bodies, and sound policies should be enacted to effectively run these

anti-corruption agencies. Finally, it is recommended that diplomatic criminal disclosure services

be put in place between the country and other countries’ embassies that will stop corrupt PEPs

from travelling out of Nigeria to hide the proceeds of crime.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 2

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................... 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 7
List of Cases Consulted ............................................................................................................. 12
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 14
List of Tables and Figures ......................................................................................................... 17

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 18

1.0 Background of the Study ..................................................................................................... 18
1.1 Statement of the Problem .................................................................................................... 24
1.2 Aim of Study ....................................................................................................................... 28
1.3 Research Questions ............................................................................................................. 28
1.4 Objectives of the Studies ..................................................................................................... 29
1.5 Significance of the Study .................................................................................................... 30
1.6 Scope of the Study............................................................................................................... 31
1.7 Operational Definition of Terms ......................................................................................... 31
1.8 Structure of the Thesis......................................................................................................... 33
1.9 Conclusion of Chapter One ................................................................................................. 41

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 43

2.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 43
2.1 Conceptual Review ............................................................................................................. 43
2.1.1 Concept of corruption ................................................................................................... 44
2.1.2 Concept of politics ........................................................................................................ 45
2.1.3 Concept of politically exposed persons ........................................................................ 47
2.2 Review of Related Literature .............................................................................................. 48
2.2.1 The offence of corruption ............................................................................................. 48
2.2.2 Kinds of corrupt practices............................................................................................. 49
2.3 Causes of Corruption in a Society ....................................................................................... 51
2.4 Historical Evolution of Political Corruption in Nigeria ...................................................... 55
2.4.1 Definition of political corruption.................................................................................. 55
2.5 Successive Nigerian Governments and Corruption ............................................................ 57
2.6 Overview of Anti-Corruption Legislations and Strategies in Nigeria................................. 63

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 2.7 Features of Anti-Corruption Strategies and Agencies in Nigeria from 1960 to Date ......... 66
2.7.1 Traditional strategies used to check corruption in Nigeria. .......................................... 66
2.7.2 Strategies used against corrupt practices in the colonial and post-colonial periods. .... 67
2.7.3 The Code of Conduct Bureau ....................................................................................... 73
2.7.4 Enabling law ................................................................................................................. 73
2.7.5 The Code of Conduct Tribunal ..................................................................................... 78
2.8 Electoral Processes and Political Corruption in Nigeria ..................................................... 87
2.8.1 Evaluation of corruption indices dataset in Nigeria ..................................................... 94
2.8.2 Control of corruption .................................................................................................... 97
2.9 Consequences of Corruption in Nigeria .............................................................................. 98
2.9.1 Analysis of Nigeria’s anti-corruption performances .................................................. 104
2.9.2 Review of related empirical studies............................................................................ 106
2.10 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................... 109
2.10.1 Principal–agent theory .............................................................................................. 110
2.10.2 Collective action theory ............................................................................................ 111
2.10.3 Institutional theory.................................................................................................... 113
2.10.4 Game theory ............................................................................................................. 114
2.11 Summary of Literature Review ....................................................................................... 115

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 117

3.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 117
3.1 Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 119
3.2 Research Design ................................................................................................................ 119
3.3 Population of the Study ..................................................................................................... 121
3.4 Instrumentation.................................................................................................................. 122
3.4.1 Semi-structured interviews ......................................................................................... 122
3.4.2 Documentary evidence ............................................................................................... 123
3.4.3 Focus group discussions ............................................................................................. 124
3.4.4 Sampling respondents ................................................................................................. 125
3.5 Validity of Research Instruments ...................................................................................... 125
3.6 Data Collection Procedure ................................................................................................ 126
3.6.1 The limitation of this methodology ............................................................................ 128
3.7 Focus Group Discussions Sessions ................................................................................... 129
3.7.1 Discussion guide ......................................................................................................... 130
3.8 Methods of Data Analysis ................................................................................................. 131
3.9 Ethical Consideration and Confidentiality ........................................................................ 132

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION ............................................ 134

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 4.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 134
4.1 Methodological Approaches of Chapter Four ................................................................... 134
4.2 Summary of Semi-Structured Interviews with Respondents ............................................ 136
4.2.1 Respondents’ perception of causes of political corruption ......................................... 137
4.2.2 Respondents’ perception of factors fuelling political corruption ............................... 140
4.2.3 Corruption sanctions and impunity............................................................................. 141
4.2.4 Selective prosecution of corruption ............................................................................ 145
4.2.5 Complexities of corruption ......................................................................................... 148
4.2.6 Respondents’ perceptions of nepotism and political corruption ................................ 150
4.2.7 Strategies to reduce corruption ................................................................................... 152
4.2.8 Importance of education and training ......................................................................... 153
4.3 Summary of Semi-Structured Interviews .......................................................................... 155

CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS ..................................... 159

5.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 159
5.1 Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 160
5.2 Data Collection Method .................................................................................................... 160
5.3 Focus Group Discussion Procedure .................................................................................. 163
5.4 Responses from Focus Groups .......................................................................................... 163
5.4.1 Perceptions of electoral processes in Nigeria ............................................................. 163
5.4.2 Perceptions of the effectiveness of sanctions ............................................................. 168
5.4.3 Perceptions of the influence of culture on corruption ................................................ 171
5.4.4 Perceptions of penalties for political corruption ........................................................ 173
5.4.5 Perceptions on use of electoral violence to rig elections ............................................ 174
5.4.6 Suggestions on strategies to reduce political corruption ............................................ 178
5.4.7 Perceptions of INEC’s re-run of elections in cancelled communities ........................ 184
5.5 Thematic Analysis of Focus Group Responses ................................................................. 186
5.5.1. Perceptions of electoral processes in Nigeria ............................................................ 186
5.5.2. Perceptions of the effectiveness of sanctions ............................................................ 188
5.5.3. Perceptions of the influence of culture on corruption ............................................... 188
5.5.4. Perceptions of penalties for political corruption........................................................ 189
5.5.5. Perceptions on use of electoral violence to rig elections ........................................... 189
5.5.6. Suggestions on strategies to reduce political corruption ........................................... 190
5.6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 191

CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDIES OF POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL CORRUPTION ..... 196
6.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 196
6.1 Procedure for Selection of Case Studies ........................................................................... 198
6.2 Criteria for Case Studies ................................................................................................... 198
6.3 Case Studies of International Bribery ............................................................................... 199
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 6.3.1 The Halliburton case ................................................................................................... 199
6.3.2 Malabu international bribery scandal ......................................................................... 203
6.4 Case Studies of Government Corruption .......................................................................... 206
6.4.1 Dasukigate scandal ..................................................................................................... 206
6.4.2 James Ibori case .......................................................................................................... 208
6.4.3 Diezani Alison-Madueke case .................................................................................... 211
6.5 Case Studies of Political Corruption ................................................................................. 215
6.5.1 Plea bargaining by corrupt government officials ....................................................... 215
6.5.2 Cronyism, corruption and government power ............................................................ 218
6.5.3 Political power and money laundering ....................................................................... 218
6.5.4 Abuse of constitutional immunity and legal procedures ............................................ 221
6.6 Case Studies of Electoral Malpractices ............................................................................. 223
6.6.1 Nigerian electoral officers sentenced for taking bribes .............................................. 225
6.6.2 Lack of integrity of electoral officers in 2019 general elections ................................ 226
6.7 Case Studies of Election Malpractices in Nigeria Between 1964 and 2019 ..................... 229
6.7.1 Federal elections of 1964............................................................................................ 229
6.7.2 Western Nigeria elections of 1965 ............................................................................. 230
6.7.3 General elections of 1979 ........................................................................................... 231
6.7.4 General elections of 1983 ........................................................................................... 231
6.7.5 The 1993 general elections ......................................................................................... 231
6.7.6 The 1999 general elections ......................................................................................... 232
6.7.7 The 2003 general elections ......................................................................................... 232
6.7.8 The 2007 general elections ......................................................................................... 233
6.7.9 The 2011 general elections ......................................................................................... 233
6.7.10 The 2015 general elections ....................................................................................... 233
6.7.11 The 2019 general elections ....................................................................................... 234
6.8 Summary of Chapter Six ................................................................................................... 235

CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ............................................................ 239

7.0 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 239
7.1 Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 239
7.1.1 Defining the construct ................................................................................................ 240
7.2 Discussion of Findings ...................................................................................................... 242
7.2.1 Semi-structured interviews ......................................................................................... 242
7.2.2 Discussion of focus group conversations ................................................................... 253
7.2.3 Discussions of case studies conducted ....................................................................... 257
7.3 Summary of the Chapter ................................................................................................... 266

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............... 271

8.0 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 271

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 8.1 Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 276
8.2 Policy recommendation ..................................................................................................... 282
8.3 Limitations of the Research............................................................................................... 284
8.4 Suggestions for Further Studies ........................................................................................ 285

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 287

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................ 315
Appendix 1: Participant Information sheet ............................................................................. 315
Appendix 2: Application for fieldwork letter .......................................................................... 320
Appendix 3: Interviewee letter ................................................................................................ 322
Appendix 4: Letter from host organization ............................................................................. 324
Appendix 5: Participant consent form ..................................................................................... 325
Appendix 6: Interview schedule .............................................................................................. 327
Appendix 7: Focus Group Discussions List of Questions ...................................................... 328
Appendix 8: Research Ethics Review Checklist ..................................................................... 329

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List of Cases Consulted

1. Agi v. PDP (2017) 4 NWLR (pt. 1595) 439 VS

2. Bello Goronyo v. President Goodluck Jonathan (2015) NWLR

3. Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 1 WRN 1 at 200

4. Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 1 WRN 1 at 200

5. Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 50 WRN 1 at 313

6. EFCC v. Erastus Akingbola suit no FHC/L/443C/2009

7. EFCC v INEC 2016

8. Ehindero v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 5 NWLR (pt. 1612) 258 S.C

9. Femi Gbajamila v. President Jonathan & others (2015)

10. Herero Habib v. Attorney General of the Federation

11. Ikuforiji v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 6 NWLR (pt. 1614) 142 S.C

12. James Onanefe Ibori v, Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors (2008) LPELR-CA/K/81C/2008

13. Kalu v. EFCC, 2020

14. Kalu v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Others (2016) SC.215/2012

15. Kayode Fayemi v. Kolapo Ulusola (29/03/2019)

16. Komolafe v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 15 NWLR (pt. 1643) 503 S.C

17. Komolafe v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 15 NWLR (pt. 1643) 503 S.C

18. Lima v. Mohammed (1999) LPELR-1973 (Supreme Court)

19. Magu v. National Assembly of Nigeria (2016)

20. Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (pt. 1646)

21. Obasanjo v. Buhari (2007)

22. Ofili-Ajumogobia v. EFCC (Nov 2016), suit No LD/367/C/16

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23. Oke v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) 4 NWLR (pt. 1556) 473 VS

24. Orji Uzor Kalu v. EFCC (31/10/16), SC.215/2012 [2016] NGSC 34

25. Oshomole V PDP (2007) 18 NWLR

26. Oyetola v. Ademola Adeleke (26/3/2019)

27. R v. James Ibori and Others (2018) EWCA 2291 (Crim)

28. R v John-Ayo Mofeyishola (2008) EWCA Crim 1651

29. R v Rebecca Swanston (2013)

30. Sanusi v. Jonathan Goodluck (02/25/2014),

31. Saraki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) 16 NWLR, (pt. 1646) 405 S.C

32. Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003). SC. 193/2003, 16 NWLR pt. 847 p532

33. Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2005) 18 NWLR (PT 956) 96

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List of Abbreviations

1. AGF ----------------Attorney General of the Federation

2. APC ----------------All Progressives Congress

3. ACJA --------------Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015

4. AMLR -------------Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Regulation

5. AU -----------------African Union

6. AU Convention---African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption

7. CBN----------------Central Bank of Nigeria

8. CCB ----------------Code of Conduct Bureau

9. CCT ----------------Code of Conduct Tribunal

10. CFT ----------------Combating the Financing of Terrorism

11. DCOCR -----------Data Collection of Criminal Records

12. DPA ----------------Data Protection Act

13. AML ---------------Anti Money Laundering

14. AGF ----------------Attorney General of the Federation

15. ECOWAS ---------Economic Community of West African States

16. EFCC --------------Economic and Financial Crime Commission

17. EITI ----------------Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

18. FATF --------------Financial Action Task Force

19. FBI -----------------Federal Bureau of Investigation

20. FGD ----------------Focus group discussion

21. FIU -----------------Financial Intelligence Unit

22. FRN ----------------Federal Republic of Nigeria

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23. GIABA ------------Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West
Africa

24. ICPC ---------------Independent Corrupt Practices Commission

25. INEC ---------------Independent National Electoral Commission

26. INTERPOL -------International Criminal Police Organization

27. MLPA -------------Money Laundering Prohibition Act

28. MLTFR ------------Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Miscellaneous Amendments)

Regulations 2018

29. NCCT --------------Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories

30. NDDC -------------Niger Delta Development Commission

31. NNA ---------------Nigerian National Alliance

32. NDLEA------------National Drug Law Enforcement Agency

33. NFIU ---------------Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit

34. NNPC --------------Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

35. NSA ----------------National Security Adviser

36. OECD--------------Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

37. PDP ----------------People’s Democratic Party

38. PEP-----------------Politically Exposed Person

39. SAN ----------------Senior Advocate of Nigeria

40. TI -------------------Transparency International

41. UNCAC -----------United Nation Convention against Corruption

42. UNODC -----------United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

43. UPGA--------------United Progressive Grand Alliance

44. UK -----------------United Kingdom

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45. USA ----------------United States of America

46. WGI ----------------Worldwide Governance Indicators

47. WJP ----------------World Justice Project

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List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Frequency of Professions of Interview Respondents................................................... 135

Table 2: Number of FGDs held and participants ....................................................................... 160

Figure 1: Voice and Accountability Ranking, Nigeria ................................................................. 94

Figure 2: Political Stability Ranking............................................................................................. 95

Figure 3: Government Effectiveness ............................................................................................ 96

Figure 4: Regulatory Quality ........................................................................................................ 96

Figure 5: Rule of Law ................................................................................................................... 97

Figure 6: Corruption Control ........................................................................................................ 98

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 CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background of the Study

The endemic nature and spread of corrupt practices in different sections and sectors of Nigeria

represents a burden for the discerning scholar who wants to examine the complexities and

intricacies through which this situation started and to suggest ways to reduce corruption or ensure

measures that are enshrined through legislations can be effectively carried out. Corruption is

considered endemic as it pervades in different sectors of the country, at both the formal and

informal sub-sectors, and in public and private practices. Endemic corruption is corruption that is

primarily due to organisational weaknesses. In these cases, corruption is the norm and not the

exception. Also known as systemic corruption, it implies a situation where corruption is an integral

part of a state’s economic, social and political system, and where most people have no alternatives

to dealing with corrupt officials (Smith, 2007). It is a phenomenon that pervades in different arms

of government, and that has eaten so deeply into the fabric of society that it has become systemic

and a part of the culture of the people.

Indeed, corruption is a worldwide phenomenon that at various times affects different areas

of any given society and leads to underdevelopment and the rapid deterioration of the infrastructure

and values that hold society together (Heywood, 2014). It occurs in every society, whether they

are developed or not, and in different forms. In Nigeria it is a major socio-political issue that has

affected every sector of the country. Citing Salawu (2007), Moyosore (2015) further observed that

the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria has made it impossible for Nigerians to enjoy the

dividends of democracy, and indeed the gifts of nature with which the country is greatly and

18
abundantly endowed. It is a social malaise that has eaten deep into the fabric of the society and has

been found to occur even at the highest level of governance in the country as a result of insatiable

greed, man’s inhumanity to man, and the quest for political powers.

Official corruption exists, whereby public officers use their positions, facilities or resources

for personal advantage for themselves or their cronies (Shover & Wright, 2001). It includes the

misappropriation of public funds for personal gains or to set public interests at abeyance with

personal profits, which is perversion of public affairs. Corruption in this sense includes bribery,

kickbacks, misappropriation, misapplication or the use of one’s position to gain undue advantage

and violate public interest. Gibbons and Rowat (1976) see corruption in terms of politics and

believe that political corruption has to do with the way public office forsakes public interest,

measured in terms of mass opinion, in order to ensure that some form of political advantage is

achieved.

According to Transparency International, Nigeria is perceived as one of Africa’s most

corrupt countries; Nigeria’s ranking – 146 out of 180 countries surveyed worldwide – is little

changed from years past (Campbell, 2020). As a result of the depth of corruption in government,

electoral violence and malpractices are witnessed, as political office holders do everything to win

political offices through which corrupt practices can be perpetuated. Corruption can be seen as

dubious acts that take place when people try to get what they do not deserve by using money, tribal

connections, religion, family name, threats, harassment, and other negative means to achieve it.

Corruption exists in and is encouraged by every capitalist economy, driven by the competition for

private profit and accumulations.

Since the public sector is the fulcrum through which development projects are carried out

and through which funds are channelled in most developing countries; corruption seem to be

19
endemic and subsist in the different ministries, agencies and departments that oversee such

functions. This is because the struggle to participate in sharing the state patrimony is high (G.

Simmel, 2004, p. 357.).

Central to different forms of corrupt practices is political corruption through which power

is possessed, and the commonwealth of the people harnessed by a few people at the expense of

others. Political corruption as defined by the World Bank is ‘the misuse or abuse of public office

for private and personal gain’ (World Bank, 1997). The term is used both narrowly to designate

the manipulation of due processes, policies, institutions, and rules in the financing of political

parties and in electoral campaigns, and also more broadly as a synonym for ‘grand corruption’, or

corruption taking place at the highest levels of government where policies and rules are formulated

and executive decisions are made. These define political corruption from the perspective of the

behaviour of public officers who violate the political system and are perceived as doing so by the

public.

As the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in the Foreword to the

United Nations Convention against Corruption through the United Nations Assembly Resolution

58/4 of October 31, 2003, ‘Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive

effect on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violation of human

rights…’. This reveals the danger to which societies are open as a result of corruption. The danger

posed by it is such that societies can become theatres of war and terrorism as a result of corruption

and the inability of governments to control its weakening of their nations.

The Preamble to the United Nations Convention (2003) noted its concerns about the

seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies,

undermining the institutions of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardising sustainable

20
development and the rule of law. Related to this, Article 8 stipulates that ‘in order to fight

corruption, each state party shall promote inter alia integrity, honesty and responsibility among its

public officials’. Stressing this, Article 8 (2) stated that each state party shall endeavour to apply

within its own institutional legal system, codes or standards of conduct for the correct, honourable

and proper performance of public institutions. By implication, corruption is a global problem that

reduces states from attaining their full potentials in every sphere of sustainable development.

Article 8 further recognises that where political corruption can be stemmed, then potentials for

growth and progress can be attained.,

To further stress the seriousness attributed to corruption in states, David Cameron in 2016

organised an anti-corruption summit in London, at which Nigeria was ably represented (BBC 12,

May, 2016). The communiqué that arose from the summit stressed that corruption is at the heart

of a great many of the world’s problems. It erodes public trust in governments, undermines rule of

law, and gives rise to political and economic grievances that may, in conjunction with other factors,

fuel extremism. Tackling corruption is vital for sustaining economic stability and growth,

maintaining the security of societies, protecting human rights, reducing poverty, protecting the

environment for future generations and addressing serious and organised crime (Jones, 2002).

As in other countries and societies, corruption in Nigeria is as old as the country and existed

before the creation of the polity by the British colonial masters. Traditional institutions that existed

prior to the coming of the colonial government were also enmeshed in corrupt practices whereby

the traditional ruler is allowed to accumulate wealth and influence at the expense of the subjects.

Colonial rule further entrenched corrupt practices, which was manifested in the establishment of a

fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system that facilitated the appropriation of huge profits

extracted by short-changing the Nigerian peasant farmers, petty producers, workers and others

21
through exorbitant firm prices and exclusive rights of exploitation granted to British and other

European firms over Nigerian minerals and other natural resources (Adaja & Talabi, 2017). With

independence, corruption in every sphere continued as members of the political class developed

the attitude of using state power and treasuries to foster their political power and influence, as well

as enriching themselves and their acolytes. This was the period in which the pervasive

phenomenon of ‘ten percent kickbacks’ became entrenched (Ehindero v. FRN, 2018).

Corruption witnessed a phenomenal metamorphosis from 10% in 1970s, to the ‘50–50

percent sum agreement’ between contractors and public officials in the 1980s, to the extent that

money became a powerful tool of influence across all strata of the Nigerian society (Ikuforiji v.

FRN, 2018). The return to democratic rule in 1999 did not stem corrupt practices in Nigeria; rather,

there was an increased spate of corruption. This was symbolised by incidents of ‘Ghana-must-go’

bags loaded with Naira notes that changed hands regularly to get legislations passed, ministers

confirmed and the abortive Third Term Agenda of former President, Olusegun Obasanjo (BBC

News, 16/05/2006).

Presently corruption is endemic in Nigeria, and it cuts across every facet of life in the

polity, especially in the political class. According to Olorode (2015), ‘in the past, corrupt officials

are the exception who had to transact their illegal businesses in a corner and under the table, now

it is not only open, and on the table but is with respect’ (p. 13). Corruption has become endemic

and systemic to the extent that the World Corruption Monitoring Agency, Transparency

International (TI), in 1996 and 1997 listed Nigeria as the most corrupt country among countries

studied in the world. Further, in 1999, Nigeria was listed as the second most corrupt nation in the

world, with Cameroon (another African country) being the first (TI, 1999).

22
 Political corruption as defined by the World Bank is ‘the misuse or abuse of public office

for private and personal gain’ (World Bank, 1997). Political corruption consists mainly of

extracting money from the country; this means bringing in money for the ruling class/elites.

However, political corruption is not only to make profit for private gain but also includes re-

investing these looted funds to keep the politically exposed persons in power. It occurs whenever

decision makers abuse their power for private benefit. Private benefit in this case does not only

mean filling up their pockets but also re-investing themselves to power.

For this thesis the operational definition of political corruption will be taken as ‘the misuse

or abuse of public office for private and personal gain’ (World Bank, 1997). This definition

highlights the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Although this is the most common

definition, other definitions exist. These other variations nevertheless include three common

elements: abuse (misuse, violation) of entrusted power (duty, office, etc.) and private benefit.

Elections in Nigeria are plagued by violence, fraud and rigging, and the ruling classes

continually use state funds to purchase power either through electoral malpractices or abuse of

court processes. There is thus a link between financial crime corruption and electoral fraud

corruption. In Nigeria these two dynamics of political corruption are intertwined and cannot be

separated; these variables create the need for more investigations into these aspects of political

corruption.

Since the early 1990s, literature on political corruption in developing countries has

increased significantly (Doig & Riley, 1999). International institutions such as the United Nations

Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD), as well as INGOs such as Transparency International (TI), have proposed

various strategies to reduce corruption in general.

23
1.1 Statement of the Problem

Political corruption is a huge problem globally, but in Nigeria it has assumed pandemic proportions

and comes in various forms. These are many and include bribery of government officials,

prebendalism, embezzlement, money-laundering, extortion, nepotism, cronyism and electoral

malpractices (Komolafe v. FRN, 2018). There are many types of corrupt practices: the first is that

which relates to financial crime committed by people in high authority (Sutherland, 1949), while

the second is political corruption that deals with electoral malpractices committed by people in

high levels of authority (politically exposed persons), either those in seats of power or those who

can influence political power (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002). This research will attempt to

examine the relationship between the two kinds of corruption identified and environmental factors

that encourage their occurrence.

Nigeria at present is ranked at the bottom of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

published by Transparency International (TI). For decades Nigeria has been perceived as one of

the most corrupt countries in the world. The 2019 Transparency International Index ranked Nigeria

144 out of 175 countries in the list of corrupt nations. It therefore becomes imperative to examine

reasons why the country continues to regress as far as corruption in different levels is concerned

despite the establishment of anti-corruption agencies by several governments and the

implementation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) and the Administration of Criminal

Justice Act 2015 (ACJA) by Jonathan’s administration in 2015 to ensure exposure of corrupt

elements in the seat of power and as a judicial instrument to ensure speedy realisation of justice.

The development of strategies to reduce political corruption in Nigeria has not reduced the increase

in such practices, which therefore points to a need for an investigation into reasons why expected

24
results have not been achieved, and for the development of assumptions that could explain the

phenomenon and what more can be done (Kochan & Goodyear, 2011).

Examination of forms and patterns of corruption in Nigeria leads to it being described as

political corruption for the following reasons. First, political corruption seems to be running on the

principles of prebendalism; for instance, PEPs feel they have the right to a share of government

revenue. Second, PEPs such as the President, Vice-President, states’ governors and deputy

governors are covered by constitutional immunity under section 308 of the 1999 Constitution as

amended. Presently this immunity clause prevents corrupt persons from being prosecuted for

criminal offences; such power is often used to shield PEPs from repercussions for corrupt acts

committed. For instance, James Ibori, who was accused of financial crimes in Nigeria and

convicted in a British court, served as a governor of Delta State from 1999 to 2007. In December

2009, the Federal High Court sitting in Asaba Delta State acquitted him of all 170 charges brought

against him by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). A few years later, the

Court of Appeal sitting in Benin City set aside the ruling of the High Court and ordered that James

Ibori be made to stand trial (James Onanefe Ibori v FRN 2008). This order has not been set aside;

hence there is a valid and subsisting court order to make him stand trial on the basis of the 170

corruption charges brought against him in 2008.

James Ibori could not be prosecuted effectively in Nigeria because of undue political

influence; however, in May 2010, James was arrested in Dubai and extradited to the UK to face

corruption charges. In February 2012, he was convicted in the UK for fraud and corruption

committed in Nigeria and the UK as part of the charges that he was discharged and acquitted of in

Nigeria. In December 2016, James Ibori was released from UK prison, and in 2017 he faced a

confiscation trial in the UK Court. Unfortunately, in Nigeria he has not faced any charges.

25
Ironically, many of his colleagues with whom he was charged of corruption since they left their

positions as governors in 2007 were not only exempted from prosecution, but some were elected

as legislators into the National Assembly as senators.

In James Ibori’s case, it is observed that he (Ibori) was politically exposed, being the former

Governor of Delta State. In the case of Retd. Col. Dasuki, it is known that he was also a highly

politically exposed person (Chief Security Officer to the President); meanwhile Alison Deziani

was involved in a corruption scandal when she was the Petroleum Minister. Former Governor of

Abia State Orji-Uzor Kalu is also a politically exposed person who was sued by the EFCC for

financial crimes committed against the state. Fortunately, he has been convicted after a decade of

legal tussles. Many cases of corruption are reportedly committed by political office holders and

appointees within the ruling class. Empirical evidence exists of a pattern of corruption that is

committed by politically exposed persons who were serving in governments at different levels at

the time of their offences. It can be stated that there is a link between political corruption and

financial crimes such as money-laundering, embezzlement, international bribery, fraud and other

abuses of powers. It shows further that only serving politically exposed persons can divert public

funds meant for government projects to private gains (Sutherland, 1949). This further begs the

question of the reasons and that of how politically corrupt leaders continue to perpetuate

themselves in power and influence political processes in the country despite legal actions against

them (Barak, 2015).

Nigeria has been under the diverse influence of both the military and the political parties,

with both groups constantly struggling for power throughout the years (Frank & Coma, 2017). In

this struggle, there has been a significant factor that has allowed the different entities to capture

26
power (Corentin, 2016). Methods of elections have always been exploited to capture power by

rigging the election results.

With this link, the definition of political corruption in Nigeria could be taken as ‘the misuse

or abuse of public office for private and personal gains’ (World Bank, 1997). The 1983 elections

were particularly significant in this regard (Akinkugbe, 2018). In that election, many malpractices

were carried out to capture power, and when these were unsuccessful, acts of arson, hooliganism

and looting were committed to disrupt the process (Adegbola & Gearhart, 2019). Besides other

forms of electoral malpractice, vote buying is also widespread, and these acts are largely

uncontrolled. This is partly due to lack of institutionalised electoral offence tribunals to prosecute

electoral crimes recorded by the police during elections. It is estimated that over 2,000 arrests for

electoral malpractices made in the 2019 elections could not be prosecuted for lack of a special

court for electoral offences. This gap, it can be assumed, has enabled politically exposed persons

to engage in the rigging of elections. As rigging costs money, state funds may be diverted through

many forms of corruption to sponsor or buy votes. For instance, it is alleged that the Dasukigate

scandal, which culminated in the misuse of $2billion from state coffers, was committed to provide

funds for the 2015 general elections. This study considers electoral malpractices to be a major

cause of political corruption because of loopholes in the electoral system. Further, the poorly

managed electoral system in Nigeria has been identified as a potentially weak link that can be used

by criminal elements and members of outlawed interest groups to capture power, divert state funds

and launder money for self-gain. Such a loophole can be exploited by politically exposed persons

to perpetuate themselves in power irrespective of the consequences to the polity.

27
 As a result of these factors, this study will critically examine various reasons why political

corruption is perpetuated in the polity, and, from these, make recommendations on strategies

through which political corruption can be curbed or controlled (Button & Brook, 2009).

1.2 Aim of Study

This research study identifies that political corruption in Nigeria occurs on the premise of

exploitation of its weak electoral process to capture power; through this, politically exposed

persons (PEPs) hold on to power to enable them to access the commonwealth at the expense of the

citizenry. Therefore, the aim of this research is to explore various strategies that can be used to

reduce political corruption. Further, this research will examine various forms of corruption that are

prevalent, such as prebendalism, embezzlement, money laundry, bribery, abuse of power and

various electoral malpractices that are perpetrated. Based on the aim of this research, the following

research questions will be examined.

1.3 Research Questions

The main research question is: How effective are strategies used to reduce political corruption

in Nigeria? Others are:

1. To what extent has political corruption occurred in Nigeria since the establishment of

democratic rule in 1999?

2. What strategies have been used to curb political corruption in Nigeria?

3. How successfully have these strategies been used against political corruption in Nigeria?

28
 4. What challenges have been faced in applying these strategies against political corruption

in Nigeria?

1.4 Objectives of the Studies

The main objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies used to reduce

political corruption in Nigeria. To achieve this, the following will be done:

i. Ascertain the extent of political corruption that has occurred in Nigeria since the

establishment of democratic rule in 1999, by way of semi-structured interviews, focus

group discussion and case studies.

ii. Examine kinds of strategies used to curb political corruption in Nigeria with the new

democratic dispensation by investigating the relevant legislation from 1999 to 2019

and case laws of convicted criminals.

iii. Determine the level of success achieved through strategies applied against political

corruption in Nigeria by examining the works of relevant anti-corruption agencies from

1999 to 2019.

iv. Examine challenges faced in the application of strategies against political corruption in

Nigeria through research instruments such as semi-structured interviews, focus group

discussion and case studies.

29
1.5 Significance of the Study

Lack of the political will and fiscal discipline to achieve development objectives has been a major

hindrance to many developing nations, and Nigeria is no exception. Several factors are responsible

for this, among which is political corruption. Hence, there has been a huge amount of money

laundering and diversion of state funds for personal gain (Corentin, 2016). Further, to help enable

stakeholders including INGOs, international organisations such as the United Nations, the Bretton

Woods organisations such as IMF and the World Bank, public lenders such as the Paris club and

the London club, and so on to succeed in their partnership with Nigeria, this study will be important

as it will provide a framework that will create the necessary environment to stimulate growth that

will correlate with the objectives of these stakeholders.

This study will be of importance to anti-corruption agencies that have been established in

the country including the EFCC, ICPC, and Code of Conduct Bureau, CCB, among other bodies

that perform related functions. This study, through the findings made, will provide options through

which investigations and processes used in pursuing justice against political corruption can be

handled. Taking into cognizance expert and insider views and opinions provided in the course of

the study, recommendations made will further enhance the quality of investigations, while in the

long term suggestions made will mitigate practices that are encouraged through political corruption

in the Nigerian polity.

Relevant government ministries, departments and agencies, besides anti-corruption

agencies, will be beneficiaries of reports from this study. Reasons for this are not farfetched, as

the findings will provide innovative angles that will further enhance mechanisms put in place to

mitigate financial corruption that draws primarily from political corrupt practices. It will also assist

in providing rational legislations that will discourage prebendalism and cronyism, which are the

30
twin planks on which political corruption is built. These recommendations make it easier to reduce

criminal opportunities and factors that lead to political corruption.

This study will also be beneficial to members of the academic community in Nigeria, the

UK and other parts of the world, especially scholars and students of political economy,

development studies, economics and others who intend to carry out further studies on politics in

Nigeria. This study will guide future research into political corruption studies.

1.6 Scope of the Study

Several studies have been done in the area of political economy, international jurisprudence, and

related fields. For this study our focus is mainly on political corruption in Nigeria, and the

timeframe covered is from 29 May 1999, when Nigeria returned to democratic rule, till 29 May

2019, when President Muhammadu Buhari ended his first term in office. High-profile political

corruption cases against politically exposed individuals that took place within the period will be

used as case studies in the research. Other scholarly works, newspapers and recorded materials

will be used in the course of the study.

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

Certain words and terms that are important to this study are hereby defined operationally as they

will be used in the course of the work. These include the following:

Political corruption

The operational definition of political corruption in Nigeria will be taken as ‘the misuse or abuse

of public office for private and personal gain’ (World Bank, 1997). It is also seen as behaviour that

31
violates the formal standards or rules of behaviour set down by a political system for its public

officials.

Politics

Politics has been defined as activities that are carried out in the governance of a country or a state

in the country, as it relates to being vested with powers to provide leadership for either of these at

every point in time through elections and voting into power representatives of political parties who

have contested elections for different seats of power in the polity. For the Nigerian public, it

includes being a card-carrying member of either of the major political parties – i.e., the All

Progressives Congress, APC, or the People’s Democratic Party, PDP – who have held political

power either as an elected representative, or as a person appointed to head a ministry, agency or

department by reason of being a member of the political party.

Corruption

This can be defined as dishonest and fraudulent conduct by those in power, which typically

involves bribery of various sorts. It deals with sharp practices or criminal offences carried out by

people who are entrusted with a position of authority to acquire illicit benefits or to abuse their

power for their private or group interests. Political corruption takes place when an office holder or

other government functionary acts in an official capacity for personal gain. Political corruption is

found mainly in oligarchies, autocratic regimes, developing nations and others with weak political

and democratic structures. Corruption from our perspective includes the use of political powers to

embezzle public funds with the intent of perpetuating oneself or others in power.

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Strategies

These are specific methods through which an action is carried out, or a plan of action. A strategy

is defined as a plan of action to achieve a long-term or overall aim. Strategies involve setting goals,

determining actions to achieve the goals, and mobilising resources to execute the actions.

Accordingly, a strategy explains how the objectives will be achieved through the available

resources or means. Its purpose is to diagnose near-term challenges so that a plan of action will be

implemented in order to overcome an impediment or challenge.

Politically exposed

Being politically exposed means a situation whereby a person may be a member of a political party

or have been in government at the highest levels, including President and Vice President, State

Governor, Deputy State Governor, Minister or Head of an Agency, legislator or a member of the

Judiciary in a nation that has been entrusted with public office. A politically exposed person is

someone who has been entrusted with a prominent public function. Such persons have a higher

risk of being potentially involved in cases of bribery and corruption on a large scale, as a result of

the position and influence they wield.

1.8 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter two

This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature prior to outlining the research questions

and methodology in chapter three. The chapter begins with a historical backdrop explaining

political corruption in Nigeria and how it operates. Although there is limited literature on how to

reduce political corruption in Nigeria, the small amount of relevant literature that does exist is

33
explored both in theory and practice, and the chapter considers the available anti-corruption

legislations and evaluations of the criminal justice system.

This chapter examines works including research studies, news reports, documented

records, and other sources that deal with corruption and political corruption. It begins with an

examination of concepts that are related to the study, and these include terms such as corruption,

politics and politically exposed persons, which will dominate the work. Further review of related

literature was carried out; this consists of an examination of works on the taxonomy of corruption,

and kinds of corruption such as petty corruption, grand corruption and financial crime corruption.

There is also a review of the history of political corruption in Nigeria that examines the

definitions attributed to political corruption. Incidents of corruption that took place in successive

governments in Nigeria have been examined, as have anti-corruption legislations and other

strategies that different governments have put in place to curb and control incidents of corrupt

practices from 1999 to 2019. Attempts to curb financial corruption, which include an attempted

legislation by the Babangida Government, the EFCC and ICPC established by President Obasanjo,

have been interrogated. Related to this, the chapter looks at electoral processes in Nigeria, within

which the types of political corruption that have become strongly enmeshed in the system have

been examined.

Reviews of related empirical studies that are relevant to this study have been carried out,

and academic thoughts on white-collar crimes have been looked at which deal with other aspects

of corruption. Differences between authors’ perspectives were examined, along with definitions

of white-collar crime, differential associations and measurements of fraud and corruption. Finally,

a theoretical framework was created of different models and theories that explain and predict

political (public sector) corruption. Theories such as principal–agent, collective action,

34
institutional and game theory were analysed to strongly position the study within the appropriate

framework.

Chapter three

This chapter provides a description of the methods that were used to conduct the empirical research

that forms the basis of this thesis. We begin by stating the research question that was outlined in

the introduction chapter and is addressed throughout this thesis. Further to this, an explanation is

provided for both the research design and the choice of methods. This includes a justification of

the choice of respondents, and of the use of semi-structured interviews, focus groups and

documentary evidence (case studies) for triangulation. The sample approach taken and the

rationale behind it were then outlined, and the details of the final sampling of people who were

selected for this research is provided. The next section provides an honest account of the research

process. This includes a discussion of the challenges faced in both conducting the interviews and

gaining access to the host organisations. This research involves interviews with anti-corruption

practitioners, including prosecutors, lawyers, High Court judges and legislators. It therefore goes

on to discuss in detail both the ethical issues and the safeguards that were put in place. Chapter

three ends by explaining the way in which the interviews were analysed, which leads in to the first

empirical chapter.

Chapter four

This chapter explains the study that was done using qualitative research methods, which include

semi-structured interviews, to seek data on strategies to use to reduce political corruption in

Nigeria. A total of 24 respondents were interviewed, and themes covered varied topics as the

researcher sought to provide background information before answers were sought to other

questions asked. It was observed that different elements are important for a reduction of political

35
corruption, such as undue political influence (patronage or party affiliation), judicial corruption

and impunity; issues examined include the importance of the electronic voting system, compliance

and regulation and the education and re-education of stakeholders in criminal justice and political

corruption. Suggestions on ways to apply the Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Regulation

(AMLR) in all federal government agencies were examined.

It was observed that lack of compliance in a government department is a channel to

uncontrolled corruption. Seemingly, the lack of a financial compliance service in government

institutions dedicated to preventing corruption at all levels has fuelled political corruption. First,

such a service will use a range of approaches and legislative powers to protect public funds, to

investigate corruption and to ensure strict compliance with the rules of law. Second, it will also

identify and exploit opportunities to remove government assets from criminals using a broad range

of powers and special capabilities. Third, it will also work in conjunction with the wider law

enforcement communities to tackle fraud and corruption, and will ultimately deter, disrupt and

remove such assets from criminals. Finally, it will serve as part of the national network of a special

branch of a crime team supporting both civil and criminal operations from a financial perspective

with the aim of maximising the recovery of assets both locally and internationally. Concerning the

adequacy of corruption sanctions, it is believed that, if the sanction is applied strictly irrespective

of the political class, and without political, government and religious interference, it will reduce

political corruption.

Chapter five

This chapter looks at focus group discussions, which showed that discussants agreed with each

other regarding most of the questions asked. As a result of corruption in electoral processes, a lot

of politically exposed persons still hold onto power, especially given that the electoral system is

36
weak and is open to manipulations as much as the electoral umpire which is used by ruling parties

to do their biddings. Some of the recommendations made by participants include the agreement

that electoral violators should be prosecuted and punished severely to dissuade others from

repeating such offences. Another way to curb such malpractices is by the introduction of e-voting

or electronic voting, which will greatly reduce the issue of vote buying/selling and the rigging of

elections.

Participants further agreed that new electoral offence tribunals should be put in place to try

electoral offenders. Also, it was agreed that politically exposed persons should not be allowed to

influence socio-cultural leaders, including traditional leaders and leaders of faith-based

organisations, since they could influence members of the electorate through such people. To

further reduce their influence, politically exposed persons who have been convicted for crimes

should not be allowed to participate in elections or have any influence on them.

Members of other groups suggested that it is important to have free and fair elections to

enable the country to elect credible leaders, and that this should be paramount in the minds of

members of the electorate. As such, they called for an overhaul of the electoral laws to ensure that

constitutional positions are protected from electoral corruption, which impacts political corruption

in the country. They further surmised that INEC (the Independent National Electoral Commission)

should not set up their own tribunals in election matters since this goes against the 1999

constitution and opens up the electoral umpire to manipulations by desperate politicians.

Still others called for non-involvement of the military in election processes in the country.

It was observed that this is unconstitutional and there have been rulings against their involvement

in federal, appeal and Supreme Court rulings. However, successive governments have ignored

these rulings and involved the military and other security personnel in elections. Participants also

37
advised that there is a need to implement recommendations made by the different electoral reform

panels set up by different governments. Further, the cultural influence of expecting and accepting

gifts should be curtailed as it leads to manipulations; this reform could be achieved by an increase

in awareness and the use of various means to communicate this to members of the electorate.

Chapter six

In this chapter, case study analysis was carried out, including an examination of high-profile

corruption cases that involved well-known Nigerians who are politically connected and the

strategies used to resolve them. Legislative and judicial forms of corruption, including abuse of

power and impunity by holders of executive powers, are discussed. The other section of the chapter

deals with kinds of electoral case studies that took place in Nigeria; it noted the need for politically

exposed persons to perpetuate themselves in power or become ‘godfathers’ to enable them to

manipulate instruments of power to continue to corruptly enrich themselves at the expense of the

state and the people.

Among the cases studied were those of Haliburton and Malabu International – bribery

scandals that revealed the need for a political will by governments in power to pursue corruption

cases to their logical conclusions and ensure that adequate sanctions are enacted for convicted

individuals and corporations, including banks, which serve as holders of corrupt benefits. The need

for counter-fraud policies and strategies is discussed. Regarding government corruption, the cases

of Sambo Dasuki, James Ibori and Diezani Alison-Maduekwe are studied, and it is concluded that

colluding banks should be sued, while competent prosecutors and proper due diligence should be

abided by while prosecuting such cases. It was further observed that plea bargaining has gained a

threshold through which former political office holders get off the hook, while impunity is also

used to remove judicial officers, such as the former CJN Justice Onnoghen, without due procedure.

38
 Different kinds of legislative corruption have been analysed, including issues of budget

padding by members of the legislative body, and it was suggested that a counter-fraud and

corruption investigative service be instituted to investigate corruption by the legislative bodies. It

was also concluded that ICPC should set up a constituency project tracking unit to monitor

constituency projects carried out by legislators obtained through their constituency funds. Issues

of abuse of immunity and electoral procedures are further examined. The review calls for a

criminal barring service to be set up to monitor corrupt officers who may have won governorship

elections so as to stop them from contesting elective positions.

An overview has been formed of the kinds of electoral malpractices that occurred in Nigeria

from Independence till the 2019 General Elections. Cases studied include massive bribing of

electoral officers and the use of public funds to perpetuate politically exposed persons in office.

Further issues of lack of integrity of electoral officers, especially returning officers, were seen. It

could be said from the overview that nearly all the elections conducted in Nigeria from the time of

independence till now are marred by electoral malpractices.

Chapter seven

This chapter explores selected case studies of election malpractices. The aim is to use multiple

case studies related to electoral malpractices to verify the empirical data through triangulation with

chapter five. The selected cases are chosen because they have gone through court trials and can be

cited as case laws in the Nigerian Law Report and other online case law report search engines.

Some of the cited case studies have led to major academic debate, and some are still ongoing in

the court. The selection of cases can be justified because they are reported in international journals.

Some have been reported in the national newspaper after successful prosecution; others are not

successful either because allegations are dropped, proceedings have been stayed or investigation

39
has been stalled, but these can still be verified in law journals and national online news. The aim

of the case studies chapter is to validate and correlate whether the information obtained from the

focus group interviews corresponds with academic literature through triangulation. The case

studies are then used to address the research question. This chapter’s aim, then, is to consider the

patterns and trends in election malpractices and to draw on the themes arising from analyses of the

case studies to address the research question. It considers that the first step in reducing electoral

malpractices is electoral reform by introducing an electronic voting system. The chapter concludes

by arguing that an electronic voting system will take care of rigging, electoral violence and power

capture by the plutocrats.

Chapter eight

This chapter responds to the gaps in academic research on political corruption. It concludes by

stating that it is when the incentives outlined in chapters four, five, six and seven are met that

politically exposed persons go on to commit money laundering. Therefore, this chapter examines

the concept of political corruption through three lenses: first, how political leaders extract money

from the country; second, what they do with the corrupt money; and third, how they launder the

proceeds of corruption to offshore accounts. Finally, this chapter sets out various strategies to help

reduce political corruption through interpreting the respondent’s experiences. The main

theme/themes that arise from this chapter’s analysis set out the recommendation to restructure the

political systems to make them fit for purpose, which could help reduce political corruption.

This chapter concludes by demonstrating that the anti-corruption measures introduced in

2000 are not sufficient to address the issue and are not geared towards addressing political

corruption in Nigeria. Nevertheless, considering the decade of military rule in Nigeria, it is

extremely positive that the government has started taking the issue of corruption seriously;

40
however, it is worth noting that corruption will continue unless the government addresses the issue

of political (grand) corruption. As noted above, bureaucratic corruption, institutional corruption

and police corruption could be stopped with the help of legislation and financial technology

(fintech), but in order to counter political corruption (embezzlement) a country needs a political

structure that can eliminate the criminal opportunities that lead to corruption. This thesis suggests

some strategies not only to improve existing anti-corruption measures but to re-structure the

political system and, more importantly, change the mentalities of politically exposed persons. This

is more important than changing the law.

1.9 Conclusion of Chapter One

The key outcome of this research is its recommendation for the introduction of an electronic voting

system to take care of all the criminal activities associated with political corruption in terms of

electoral malpractices. Chapter eight goes on to make other recommendations as follows:

a) Introduce a ‘Visa barring system’ (barred in one country barred in all) to make it

difficult to launder money to safe havens.

b) Introduce a ‘counter-fraud and corruption’ syllabus in both primary and post-primary

institutions as a long-term goal.

c) Introduce an independent special office for corruption prosecutors.

d) Introduce an Unexplained Wealth Act 2020, a bill to carry out prosecution on the

basis of unexplained wealth amongst politically exposed persons.

41
 Regarding electoral malpractices, this thesis recommends the establishment of an electoral

malpractices tribunal to take care of electoral violence and electoral frauds offences, and the

introduction of an electronic voting system.

42
 CHAPTER TWO:

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews works and studies that are relevant to this research paper. Other relevant news

and write-ups that provide additional information and broaden perspectives on political corruption

and strategies used in its evaluation were also examined. This chapter will provide a brief history

of political corruption in Nigeria and covers legislative frameworks to counter corruption. It will

also examine legal and institutional frameworks for combating corruption (Okogbule, 2006;

Nwaobi, 2017). Other studies on the war against corruption (Nyoni, 2018) will also be examined.

As Awoniyi, Aderanti and Tayo (2011) observed, ‘literature review is gathering and examination

of valuable topical and pertinent issues which tend to modify and add weight to your study’ (p. 34).

Therefore, concepts and issues that are relevant and which will further enhance the study and

provide insights were examined.

2.1 Conceptual Review

Concepts have been defined as ideas of how something is or how something should be done. They

are mainly ephemeral in nature – a general idea of something. They are abstract thoughts, ideas or

general notions that occur in the mind, in speech and in writings. They are building blocks of

thoughts and beliefs. In this section, several concepts that are significant to this study will be

examined, together with scholarly writings and opinions on these concepts.

Some of the concepts that will be examined are listed in the following subsections.

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2.1.1 Concept of corruption

Corruption is derived from the Latin word, corruptus, an adjective that means rotten, decayed,

infected, degenerate or contaminated. Corrumpere is the conjugation of the above, which is to

damage, infect, spoil, mar, bribe or destroy, among other words. It can be deduced that corruption

connotes a negative impact that takes place in an organisation, a society or a nation. Accordingly,

corruption is defined as dishonest behaviour by those in positions of power, such as managers or

government officials. Corruption can include giving and accepting bribes or inappropriate gifts,

double-dealing, under-the-table transactions, manipulating elections, diverting funds, laundering

money and defrauding investors. Furthermore, Transparency International states that corruption

erodes trust, weakens democracy, hampers economic development and further exacerbates

inequality, poverty, social division and the environmental crisis (TI, 2019). It illustrates the many

ways corruption takes place, which include public servants demanding or taking money or favours

in exchange for services, politicians misusing public money or granting public jobs or contracts to

their sponsors, friends and families, and corporations bribing officials to get lucrative contracts

and business deals. As previously discussed, political corruption as per the definition of the World

Bank can be stated as ‘the misuse or abuse of public office for private and personal gains’ (World

Bank, 2017). Government corruption is defined as ‘the sale by government officials of government

property for personal gain’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). However, Bardhan (1997, p. 1321)

elaborates on this when he says that in most cases, ‘corruption ordinarily refers to the use of public

office for private gains, where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the

public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult

to monitor for the principal.’ By this definition, the practice of corruption in Nigeria can be

analysed. This definition could be linked to the ‘principal—agent theory’ that was explained in the

44
introduction of this thesis. Different kinds of corruption in Nigeria have pervaded both the public

and private sector, which has influenced political corruption and electoral corruption.

. In political corruption, public officials abuse office for personal enrichment through

bribery, extortion, embezzlement of government resources, violation of campaign laws and

electoral fraud. Citing Nye (1967, 419), Ogundiya (2009) conceived political corruption to mean

an act that deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regards (personal,

close family, private cliques), pecuniary or status gains. It is also perceived as the misuse or

improper use of power and influence, deliberately and consciously for personal aggrandisement or

group advantage (Ogundiya, 2009). It is usually associated with regimes that are described as neo-

patrimonial or kleptocratic, as seen with Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu Sese Seko

of the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) and General Sani Abacha of Nigeria. In

politically corrupt regimes, the ruler treats the country as his personal estate or property, and every

resource therein is owned by him. Political corruption continues to be a major obstruction to the

growth and advancement of the economy whilst decreasing international business investments.

Several major factors have been linked to political corruption in Nigeria, e.g. money laundering,

international bribery, embezzlement, abuse of power, nepotism and electoral malpractices.

2.1.2 Concept of politics

The term ‘politics’ is taken from the Greek word Politika which means ‘affairs of the cities’. The

word ‘politics’ is known to have multiple competing definitions given to it by political scientists

and scholars. Different scholars, philosophers and social scientists have defined politics as the art

or science of government; the art or science concerned with guiding or influencing governmental

policy; or the art or science concerned with winning and holding control over a government.

Aristotle has four conceptions of politics: it is seen as an art, which provides service to others; it

45
could also be seen as an education that seeks to provide virtue in citizens, it can be conceived as a

law to provide protection for citizens; and finally it can be viewed as a reward to do justice to the

people. It can therefore be seen as either an activity or an instrument. Politics has also been defined

as ‘actions or activities concerned with achieving and using power in a country or society’ (Collins,

2021). It deals with the practice or study of the art and science of forming, directing and

administering states and other political units, and complex and aggregated relationships of people

in society, especially those relationships involving authority or power. Politics is also defined as

‘that which concerns the state’. The state is distinct from the government and comprises permanent

institutions that provide public services, enforce laws and ensure security, and in this way provide

governance of persons and administration of things. Government, on the other hand, is composed

of politicians who temporarily run the state because they have been elected.

Defined in that way, politics includes activities that either involve or in some ways directly

affect the institutions of the state, individuals who are directly involved in the institutions of the

state, individuals or the business of governance, and the places in which these activities and people

are present. Research also indicates that politics is much older than government because it is the

process through which individuals and groups reach agreement on a course of common or

collective action. Nigeria started the present democratic era in 1999 when former general Olusegun

Obasanjo was elected president for eight years. He was succeeded by Shehu Musa Yaradua, then

Goodluck Jonathan, and then the current president of Nigeria, Muhammed Buhari, who was just

re-elected again in 2019. Research further indicates that democratic politics and good governance

did not fare better in the Second Republic or the Third Republic, and since 29 May, 1999, when

the Fourth Republic was ushered in, perceptions of politics, politicians and attempts at governance

46
have been those of apathy, disappointment and misgiving at the perceived larceny and corruption

executed mindlessly by the political class.

2.1.3 Concept of politically exposed persons

This concept is critical and is used significantly in this study, as it is the trajectory on which the

work is based. Politically exposed persons are people who have been entrusted with a prominent

function. They face higher risks for potential involvement in bribery and corruption as a result of

the position and influence that they wield. The term ‘politically exposed persons’ is also used to

refer to customers in the financial sector. The term is mainly associated with the former Nigerian

dictator General Sani Abacha, who was responsible for massive and systematic theft of Nigerian

state assets by himself and members of his immediate family and cronies. Succeeding governments

over the years have made efforts to recover the monies stolen, which were commonly referred to

as ‘the Abacha loot’.

The concept of ‘politically exposed persons’ developed in 2000 when the United Nations

organised a committee that led to the October 2003 resolution of United Nations against

Corruption and became operative in 2005 with annual reviews of implementation and asset

recovery. A PEP is generally defined as any individual who maintains a prominent public position

or important function in any government body, either inside or outside of their home country.

Further, any close associate or family members of such persons will also be added to the PEP list.

Politically exposed persons consist of those in the following roles: members of legislative bodies,

executive bodies, diplomatic roles, judiciary bodies or state-owned enterprises. Others consist of

persons in central financial institutions, Armed Forces, or International Sports Committees. Close

associates of PEPs are those with whom they have close business relationships or joint beneficial

ownership of legal entities, or anyone who has the sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity that

47
is known to have been set up for the benefit of the PEP. Immediate family members who are

considered PEPs include parents and children of the PEP, spouse or partner, siblings, uncles and

aunts or even indirect family members such as in-laws.

2.2 Review of Related Literature

To provide a deeper context for this study, relevant literature on the historical evolution of political

corruption in Nigeria, the political backdrop of the introduction of the relevant legislations from

independence to date, and anti-corruption legislations and strategies designed to reduce political

corruption will be examined. Additionally, literature on the policy development of Nigeria’s

criminal justice systems in relation to anti-corruption practices will be reviewed.

2.2.1 The offence of corruption

There are three types of corruption: grand, petty and political corruption. These labels depend on

the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. Grand corruption consists of acts

committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state

and enable leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good. Petty corruption refers to everyday

corruption by low-level public officials in their everyday interactions with citizens. These low-

level officials often demand or compel citizens to pay bribes when trying to access basic goods or

services in places such as local government councils, hospitals, schools, police departments and

other agencies, even though these services are free.

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2.2.2 Kinds of corrupt practices

Petty corruption

Petty corruption involves relatively small amounts of money and a relatively small level of

distortion of government policies. Petty corruption occurs when the defendant wilfully neglects to

perform his duty and/or wilfully misconducts himself in a way that amounts to an abuse of the

public trust in an office if he/she does so without reasonable excuse or justification. For example,

in R v John-AyoMofeyishola, the defendant, an immigration officer, was convicted of corruption

for selling immigration materials that enabled illegal immigrants to travel into the country (the

UK). Here, the elements of the offence are the abuse of office for financial gain and the loss of

documents caused to his employee (HM Immigration). By contrast, in R v Rebecca Swanston, the

defendant, a police officer, provided police intelligence to her criminal boyfriend; although she

did not make financial gain, it was an abuse of position and there was harm suffered by her

employer, the Police Department.

Grand corruption

Grand corruption is the type of corruption whereby policy-making decisions are designed,

implemented and compromised through corrupt practice. Grand corruption involves high-level

officials who carry out either large-scale theft from public treasuries or large-scale-bribery (Pope,

1996, p. 23). Grand corruption happens when officials in high positions, in the process of making

decisions of significant economic value, routinely demand bribes or kickback to ensure that tender

or contracts are awarded to specific contractors. This most often occurs in finance departments,

administrative arms of government and political decision-making (Harriss-White and White,

1996).

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Financial crime corruption

There are several types of financial corruption in Nigeria, such as brown-envelope journalism and

money laundering, which create an impact on the transparency of the system (Hackett, 2016). The

cooperative relations between bureaucratic and legislative corruption are exemplified by white-

elephant projects such as Nigeria’s three space agencies, which affect an uneven share of

governmental reimbursements (Ogbeidi, 2012). Corruption is widespread across Nigeria’s

economic sectors, which include trade, agriculture, petroleum, power, banking, electrical and

environmental sectors. Combined, these types of corruption wipe out billions of dollars from

Nigeria’s revenue and keep it from realising its great economic and human potential. Moreover,

in the security sector, corruption in the defence and police forces are raising considerable concerns

in conflict areas (Agbiboa, 2015).

Apart from petty and grand corruption, other terms used include incidental corruption,

systematic corruption and administrative corruption. The difference between incidental corruption

and systematic corruption is said to be parallel to grand and petty corruption; the difference here,

however, is not the magnitude but the frequency or level. The terms ‘incidental’ and ‘systematic’

corruption are used to measure the level of corruption in a country. Corrupt practices could be

incidental if the occurrence is a deviation from the norms of practice; by contrast, corruption could

be systematic if it is widespread within an institution or a country and it has become the norm even

though it is not acceptable. This is distinct from administrative corruption, where the

implementation of laws and regulations is fixed in advance to favour those who bribe the system

(Nye, 1967).

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2.3 Causes of Corruption in a Society

Several reasons have been adduced for the increase of corrupt practices in different sectors of the

country, or as it pertains in most developing nations. These include historical, leadership-related

and societal reasons as well as sheer greed and other motives found in individuals and the nation

at large.

For Ogbeidi, several factors have been linked to the causes of corruption in Nigeria; these

include ‘poor economies, poor educational empowerment of the citizenry, entrenchment of

dictatorial government and ‘the politics of the belly’’ (Ogbeidi, 2012). For Dandago, there are five

causes of corruption: economic factors, political factors, socio-cultural factors, soft punishment

and poor accountability (Dandago, 1997). In recent time academic scholars have argued that poor

salary structure and poor infrastructure services could not support a fair standard of living

considering the level of inflation in the country. That said, it could be argued that the causes of

corruption are numerous and they have political and cultural variables. Similarly, a few scholars

have linked the causes of corruption to societal diversity (Lipset & Lenz, 2000). Dike argued that

the political system and the culture of a society could make the citizens more prone to corrupt

activities, because corruption differs with the society and its culture to enable the poor to survive

(Dike, 2008; Okojie & Momoh, 2007; Osoba, 1996). It has also been argued that endemic

corruption in Nigeria is encouraged by the cultural, organisational, and individual factors

(Agbiboa, 2012; Ijewereme, 2015; Olowu, 1993, p. 227).

Adebayo states that the salary ratio of the highest to the lowest paid civil servants in Nigeria

is about 30:1. meaning that low public servants’ salaries could be attributable to corruption in the

country; where this is the case, public resources are embezzled by a few in the public service arena

to the detrimental of the lower-level public servants who often receive their salaries in arrears, if

51
at all (Adebayo, 1972, p. 235). This position represents the principal–agent theory. Here, desire

for personal gain has always been seen as primary motive for public-sector corruption, which

simplifies the complex relationship between individuals and the State. Principal–agent is one of

the theories that deconstructed this relationship. The key premise of the principal–agent model is

that agents (in this case, public officials) protect the interests of the principal (either the public,

parliament, or supervisors). However, in reality, the agents often serve their own interests, which

are frequently different from the interests of the principal. The principal can to a certain extent

prescribe the rules regarding pay-off in the principal–agent relationship, the agent holds an

information advantage over the principal, which he can use to advance his personal interests

(Groenendijk, 1997). When the agents choose to take part in corrupt practices to further their own

interests, to the detriment of the interests of the principal, this constitutes an agency problem. The

principal can reduce the agent’s potential abuse by designing various schemes and incentives, such

as monitoring, bonding and oversight, to limit this agency problem. This theory is relevant for this

study as it takes into consideration one of the aims, which is to examine the extent to which

corruption has taken place in institutions that serve the citizenry by those who were trusted to

manage the commonwealth. As Leon states, ‘public servants exposed to endemic and systemic

corruption could be prone to corruption to make ends meet’ (Hope and Chikulo, 2000; Osei-

Hwedie, 2000).

To summarise, some of the causes of corruption identified by these authors include the

following, but are not limited to them:

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Low salary/wages

Because of the low wages and salaries in the government and private sectors, some employees

have moved towards corruption for more income. Higher salaries, combined with exemplary

punishment for corrupt offences, could exclude corruption.

Low job opportunities

Because of the deficiency of job opportunities based on merit, there are many people who have

had to choose corruption as a way of getting income. Such people are willing to pay lump sums of

money to buy jobs in higher official or political positions (Josephson, 2017).

Lack of strictness and fast punishment

When a person is found guilty, they receive only a minor punishment. Sometimes a corrupt ex-

convict regains political appointments or higher-level jobs, which means ex-convicts are given the

license to continue their corrupt practices. The government needs to make corruption offences a

strict liability and one that attracts permanent disqualification or long-time barring from

employment opportunities; then corruption would be reduced (Imhonopi et al., 2016).

Lack of sanctions

Corrupt politically exposed persons are celebrated and sometimes given prominent positions, such

as Members of Parliament or higher positions, instead of being banned and defamed (Hurlbut,

2018).

Lack of unity among people in the society

The public openly criticise corruption, but they lack unity to stop corruption. Public unity against

corruption can stop corruption (Gonzalez, 2016).

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Lack of an independent investigation agency

Nigeria has no independent investigation agency that can investigate with full power and freedom

to expose corrupt practices. The existing agencies, such as the EFCC and ICPC, are seen as biased

and used in witch-hunting against the opposition party. Hence, convicted criminals can always join

the ruling party to escape criminal prosecution (Gonzalez, 2016).

Lack of an independent judicial system

The judiciary is not totally independent, as judges are appointed by the president; therefore, the

government exercises undue political influence on judicial matters and can derail or delay judicial

process (Abubakar & Yahaya, 2018).

Theoretical contributions to identifying causes of corruption in Nigeria are diverse, as these

causes can be categorised into different theories. As Breit, Lennerfors and Olaison (2015) observe,

multiple theorisations may revitalise understandings of corruption as a complex phenomenon, and

the different theoretical bases constructed could be a way to grasp the different dimensions and

mechanisms of corruption. With regard to this, significant theoretical contributions made include

the theory of Godfatherism which impacts in the different causes examined. According to

Ogundiya (2009), the politics of godfatherism can help explain endemic corruption in Nigeria.

‘Godfatherism in a broad sense is an ideology which is constructed on the belief that certain

individuals possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who gets party ticket to run for

an election and who wins in an electoral contest’ (p. 286). This construct also has implications in

different kinds of causes of corruption, as it impacts on the political, judicial and economic lives

of Nigerians.

Going further, the principal–agent and collective action theories can also be used to explain

corruption in Nigeria. Citing Marquette and Peiffer (2015), Mudasiru (2017) suggests that the

54
principal–agent theory underscores corruption when public officers lack transparency and

accountability in the discharge of their mandates. However, given the endemic and systemic nature

of corruption in Nigeria, the principal–agent theory appears inadequate given the collective action

problems where corruption is viewed as the norm more than the exception. As Mudasiru continues,

‘this circumstance has been the bane of corruption in Nigeria, as both public officials and

individuals have been enmeshed in corruption because of the view that others cannot be trusted to

disengage from corruption’ (p. 184).

It can be deduced from the foregoing that several causes can be adduced for corruption,

and these cannot be categorised using a specific theory, as such universal and home-grown theories

can be used to support the spread of corruption in a society.

2.4 Historical Evolution of Political Corruption in Nigeria

2.4.1 Definition of political corruption

According to Heidenheimer (1970), political corruption as a phenomenon has not been neatly

measured. Similarly, the concept of corruption has a history of different meanings and

connotations in different cultures and languages. There are thus no specific definitions of

corruption as different authors provide definitions to suit their purposes and contexts, but for the

purpose of this study, political corruption is taken as defined by the World Bank: ‘the misuse or

abuse of public office for private and personal gains’ (World Bank, 1997).

Political corruption has always existed in one form or the other from pre-colonial Nigeria

onward. It is known that Yoruba Obas in times past were considered sole owners of their

kingdoms, which created room for corruption tendencies to manifest. Further, the Slave Trade era

witnessed the use of force, bribery and inducements for traditional rulers to attack neighbouring

55
communities, sell their fellow men and cede land to Europeans. Under colonial rule the country

fared no better, as this was characterised by autocratic and authoritarian rule of few British colonial

officials. It is noteworthy that the colonial administration established a fraudulent and corrupt

accumulation system that facilitated the appropriation of huge profits extracted by short-changing

the Nigerian peasant farmers, petty producers, workers, etc. through exorbitant firms and exclusive

rights of exploitation granted to British and other European firms over Nigerian minerals and other

mineral resources (Adaja and Talabi, 2017).

With independence, the Nigerian elite that took over power also used state power and the

state treasury to foster their political power and influence as well as enriching themselves and their

acolytes. This was the period in which the pervasive influence of ‘ten percent kickbacks’ became

entrenched. Corruption is considered a way of life in Nigeria presently. According to Olorode

(2015), ‘in the past, corrupt officials are the exception who had to transact their illegal businesses

in a corner and under the table, now it is not only open and on the table but is with respect’ (p. 13).

Types of political corruption vary, but mostly it includes bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism,

parochialism, patronage, influence peddling, graft, and embezzlement (Lührmann, 2018).

Corruption facilitates criminal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human

trafficking, though it is not restricted to these alone, but much more. The misuse of government

authority/power for purposes other than assigned duties, including repression of political

opponents and general police brutality, is also considered political corruption (Lindberg and Van

Ham, 2016). The activities that compose political corruption vary depending on the country or

jurisdiction. For example, a particular political practice that is legal in one jurisdiction may be

illegal in another (Lawal, 2018). In some cases, a government official has broad or ill-defined

powers, which makes it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal actions.

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2.5 Successive Nigerian Governments and Corruption

Nigeria has witnessed the misuse of its wealth over the years, and not a lot has been spent on the

growth and development of the citizenry or structures of democracy. The first civilian government,

a parliamentary one that had as President Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa

as the Prime Minister, was affected by corruption. A free hand was given to government officials

to rob public funds (Gonzalez, 2016). It was recorded that the wealth of ministers and federal

representatives touched the skies and they were irresponsible and corrupt. In the first republican

government, it was believed that ‘there were no men of good character’. It was alleged that the

thrust of the thinking of members of the political class pertained to personal benefits, living well

and making money through corruption. This gave room for a middle-ranked group of officers from

the army to take down the Republican government (Newell, 2018).

On 15 January 1966, a coup d’état was carried out by those officers on the basis of

corruption. According to an editorial in the Daily Times newspaper of January 16, 1966, ‘with the

transfer of authority from the Federal Government to the Armed Forces, we reached a turning point

in our national life’ (Ogbeidi, 2012). The rebellion by the military force was mainly because of the

mounting corruption by the leaders of the Nigerian Republic, and the rebellion was supported by

the public as the level of corruption was beyond their tolerance (Pierce, 2016). The public of

Nigeria was anxiously waiting for the spring of change as they were weary of the corruption. The

murder of some Republican leaders did not provoke any significant measure of disappointment or

grief among the public; in fact, there was a wave of happiness amongst the Nigerian citizens

(Anyanwu, 2017). After the Republican government was taken down, the military government

under the leadership of General Thomas Aguiyi Ironsi, which took over the country, formed

several auditing and anti-corruption committees. This was done for the investigation of corruption

57
by Republican government officials and the corruption caused by the trend that was set by

the corrupt leaders (Okonkwo, 2016). According to a report on government-owned

institutions such as Nigerian Airways, Nigeria Ports Authority and Electricity Corporation

of Nigeria, ministers of the republican government had their private companies as

competition and used their influence to get contracts for their private companies

(Josephson, 2017). This caused other companies to become financially destabilised while

the ministers’ own private companies were gaining profits because of this financial

corruption. In addition to this, they were also found guilty of manipulation of funds and

awarding contracts unjustifiably during ministerial biddings (Deckard & Pieri, 2017).

When politicians of the First Republican government were freed, the enthusiasm to

punish the culprits died in the Gowon-led government (Hope, 2017). The institutions

suffered severe consequences from this development as new heads were appointed over

white-elephant projects in reference to the financial endeavours and causing those projects

to be sabotaged. This resulted in other ways of looting public funds (Aleyomi & Bakar,

2018). This made it clear that the military leadership was not different or better than the

sacked civilian government. In the 1970s, when oil was discovered in commercial

quantities in Nigeria, the country was under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon

(Neudorfer, 2016). Under the government of General Yakubu Gowon, not only did Nigeria

go through an economic downturn but also the government was deeply involved in

corruption. In 1974, various newspapers in Nigeria published reports about the undeclared

wealth of Yakubu’s governors and other government officials. Therefore, as expected, the

government of General Yakubu was taken over by another rebel group under the leadership

of General Murtala Mohammed by coup d’état (Akanle & Adesina, 2015).

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 The attack on the government in 1975 was a quest to get rid of corruption in Nigeria.

General Murtala first started by declaring all his assets publicly and asking all government officials

to conduct the same task. Ten out of twelve governors of the military government were found

guilty of corruption based on the investigation conducted by the Federal Assets Investigation Panel

1975 (Chine & Nnedum, 2018). The governors who were guilty of corruption charges were

dismissed from the military services with disgrace. In addition to this, they were also forced to

return all the properties to the government that had been bought with the proceeds of corruption.

The Belgore Commission of Inquiry was established in the same year to investigate what

was known as the ‘Cement Armada’ (Okonkwo, 2016). The commission revealed that the Gowon

government had handed over huge contracts of cement under the name of the Ministry of Defence

in order to earn personal profits whilst declaring huge losses to the country (Nwaobi, 2017). The

commission further revealed that the ministry acquired a total of sixteen million metric tons of

cement, which cost them around NGN 557 million, whilst they needed only three million tons of

cement, which would have cost them around NGN 52 million (Harmon, 2016). This resulted in

the removal of many government officials, whilst all of the accused were forced to return all the

properties they had built from the proceeds of corruption.

After just six months in office, General Murtala’s Chief of Staff assassinated him. Then

came the new regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo, who did not share the same enthusiasm as

General Murtala to end corruption (Okunola, Umaru, & Hassan, 2019). In addition, the Obasanjo

regime in 1979 ensured that the government was returned to civilians. Under the leadership of

Shehu Shagari, the rebirth of corruption occurred. The President at that time did nothing to stop

corruption, and hence the looting of the public coffers started to increase (Ellis, 2016).

59
 As a result of the oil boom, the economy was robust, which also increased

corruption amongst the political leadership. During the presidency of Shehu Shagari, it is

claimed that oil reserves having a worth of more than sixteen million dollars were lost

during 1979 and 1983. It became popular for government offices to catch fire, especially

just before an audit of a government project, which made it nearly impossible to prove

fraud and corruption (Markovska & Adams, 2015). President Shagari appeared incapable

of leading Nigeria. Shagari was incapable of stopping his corrupt ministers and federal

officers from stealing state funds. During his regime, none of the ministers could compare

with the level of corruption set by his transport minister, Alhaji Umaru Dikko, who

reportedly stole public funds to the tune of NGN 4 billion, which was allocated for rice

importation.

On 31 December 1983, another popular coup d’etat initiated by officers led by

General Muhammadu Buhari rescued Nigeria from the financial crisis (Adebanwi, 2012).

This movement had the aim of restoring integrity, discipline and dignity in Nigeria,

finishing corruption in the country and punishing those involved in corruption. General

Buhari promised the nation that it could hold him accountable for those involved in

corruption. In order to maintain discipline, the government of General Buhari hardly

showed any respect for human rights. In part for this reason, a palace coup took place on

27 August 1985 led by General Ibrahim Babangida.

Thirteen years later, sincere steps had not been taken to end corruption. Corruption

in Nigeria at this time reached its highest levels, and all the institutions were drawn into it.

It could be said that corruption was institutionalised under the Babangida government. All

the political leaders who were imprisoned during Murtala Mohammed’s and Muhammadu

60
Buhari’s regimes were freed and they recovered all of their seized properties (Ijewereme, 2015).

Following token gestures paid to address corruption, General Babangida faced massive

public outrage and was forced to hand over the government by stepping aside for an interim

government that was to hold another election in order to hand over to a civilian government. From

26 August 1993, the interim government was led by civilian Ernest Shonekan; it was a government

formed with a combination of civilian and military leaders (Nyoni, 2018). This government was

not able to hold office for long and was thrown out of office by another intervention from the

military on 17 November 1993 under the leadership of General Sani Abacha.

Abacha’s government was no different from previous governments (Obamuyi & Fapetu,

2016). In fact, under his leadership, corruption was carried out systematically. Moreover, he also

legalised many practices such as fiscal laws which ensured that corruption became easier and made

it complicated to hold culprits accountable. Such corrupt practices dealt with the economy of

Nigeria in such a way that it nearly became impossible to overcome the damages. According to a

report, it is estimated that General Sani, alongside his family and cronies, looted more than 4 billion

dollars from public funds (Ocheje, 2018).

The general elections held in 1999 resulted in General Olusegun Obasanjo being elected

as the Nigerian president. This was after the 16th consecutive year of military leadership following

the second Republican government, which was formed in 1983 (Nurudeen, 2015). This

government focused on strengthening democratic rule in Nigeria instead of getting rid of

corruption. It can be surmised that the various leaderships in Nigeria since independence did not

differ from each other in terms of corruption. Almost all of the leaders were involved in corrupt

practices and engaged in self-interests rather than developing Nigeria. On the other hand, the

civilian government led by Obasanjo in 1999 improved the anti-corruption regulations and formed

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two essential anti-corruption commissions, namely the Independent Corrupt Practices

Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which

were formed in 1999 in order to deal with corruption in the private and public sectors

(Gonzalez, 2016).

President Obasanjo established the ICPC on 29 September 2000 with the aim of

curbing corrupt practices such as gratification, bribery, abuse and misuse in federal offices,

under the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000. Meanwhile, the EFCC

was established in 2003 to investigate cases of advanced fee fraud and money laundering.

This commission was established mainly due to pressure from the Financial Action Task

Force on Money Laundering (FATF) (Obamuyi & Fapetu, 2016). The EFCC investigated

all the people who could not justify their wealth, which was way beyond their earnings.

Both commissions helped the government to bring down the corruption ratio in Nigeria.

The economic downfall of Nigeria occurred mainly because of the corrupt

leadership in Nigeria. Even with all these efforts, there have not been great improvements

to the economy of Nigeria. Currently, in the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index reported

by Transparency International, Nigeria is ranked 146th out of 180 countries, whilst having

a nominal GDP of 2.26 and a PPP GDP of 3.41, which makes Nigeria 33rd in the global

money-laundering rankings (Nurudeen, 2015).

From the above, it can be deduced that corruption in Nigeria is mainly due to the

corrupt political leadership. Both civilian and military leaderships in Nigeria were equally

responsible for the collapse of the Nigerian economy. Leadership in Nigeria never acted

sincerely in the interests of the people and only looted public funds instead of spending

them for the wellbeing of the population. On the other hand, elections in Nigeria have

62
always been affected by the malpractices and rigging that have allowed a certain group of people

to hold elective positions that perpetuate corruption. From the first elections after Independence,

the political structure of Nigeria has been influenced mostly by the military coups, which disrupted

democratic growth in the country.

This overview has provided insights and analyses of different forms of political leadership

Nigeria has experienced since Independence and the debilitating influence of corruption in these

regimes.

2.6 Overview of Anti-Corruption Legislations and Strategies in Nigeria

Over the last decades, various attempts have been made by different concerned stakeholders to

reduce political corruption both internationally and nationally. An overview of works on these will

further broaden perspectives of political corruption. One of the reasons for the 15 January 1966

coup d’état and counter-coup was as a result of corruption; for instance, the federal minister of

finance in the first republic was described as a ‘byword for luxury and ministerial corruption’, and

to charges of corruption levelled against him, he retorted with a biblical verse that, ‘to those that

have more shall be given; and from those that do not have even the little shall be taken from them.’

Little wonder that the late Maj. Patrick Kaduna Nzeogwu, the leader of the coup, noted that, ‘our

enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes

and demand 10 percent...’

When Gen. Murtala Muhammed took over power in 1976, he blamed corruption, among

other ills of leadership and society, for his intervention. He engaged in a corruption clean-up,

dismissing hundreds of civil servants and public officials from work while recovering thousands

of dollars that were proven to be illegally gotten from their offices. Gen. Muhammadu Buhari’s

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government, which took over in 1983, was known for its severity, sternness and uncompromising

stance on corruption. The Babangida government that overthrew the government in 1985 was

accused of entrenching corruption in different sectors of the economy and altering the civil service

structure, which removed institutional checks and balances which were the bulwark of ethical

behaviour amongst civil servants. However, given public outcry and criticism of his government,

he set up a committee on corruption and economic crimes, with the objective of finding out the

causes and extent of corruption in both the public and private sectors, to identify deficiencies in

the existing legislation and to suggest improvements. The Corruption and Economic Crimes

Decree 1990 was drafted as a result of the committee’s work, but it was not promulgated until

Babangida left office in 1993.

It is worth taking into cognizance that political corruption has been linked with financial

corruption, major contributors to which have been those who were in power. Accordingly, the

1999 Nigerian Constitution, Section 15.5, abolished all corrupt practices and abuse of power

(Ocheje, 2018). Similarly, the Nigerian Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC)

criminalises the act of corruption. Corruption includes misuse of authority, but it is a much more

severe and substantial concept than the misuse of governmental authority for personal gains

(Agbiboa, 2015). Corruption in this case refers to acts in which the authority of the public office

is used for personal benefits in a way that violates the rules of the country. With the passage of

time, Nigeria has earned a bad reputation because of corrupt practices (Akanle & Adesina, 2015).

President Obasanjo established the ICPC on 29 September 2000. This targeted corruption

in public sectors such as gratification, bribery, abuse and misuse of federal offices under the

Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000. Meanwhile, the EFCC was inaugurated

in 2003 to investigate cases of money laundering. This commission was established primarily due

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to pressure from the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) (Obamuyi &

Fapetu, 2016). The EFCC investigated all the people who could not justify their wealth, which was

way beyond their earnings. Both commissions greatly helped the government to bring down the

corruption ratio in Nigeria.

Also in 1999, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development introduced

the OECD Anti-bribery Convention, with the aim of controlling and reducing money laundering

by public officials from developing countries. The effect of the OECD’s move was that 30

contracting parties enacted anti-bribery laws in their local jurisdictions making it illegal to bribe

any foreign interest, as a way of reducing corruption. However, this has been flouted as PEPs now

make payments to family members, agents or close friends instead of directly to the culprit (Moran

2006, p. 3). In 2002, in a further attempt to reduce political corruption, the London-based Global

Witness (GW) initiated ‘Publish What You Pay’ (PWYP), meaning that multinational oil and gas

companies have the responsibility to disclose how much is being paid to nations’ governments so

that the public can hold their governments accountable (Shaxson 2009, p. 1). In an effort to reduce

political corruption, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was launched in 2002. The

aim of the EITI was to promote transparency at country level. Its focus is the importance of

transparency by both state and non-state actors and the need to collaborate between public and

private sectors and civil societies to ensure accountability and good governance (EITI, 2011).

By frustrating efforts to ensure transparency and accountability, politicians also

contravened democratic principles and values in Nigeria. Corruption has led to situations whereby

choices are made based on an individual’s connections in society and not on merit (Neudorfer,

2016). Efforts to combat corruption were sabotaged by the policy-makers, as policies were

politicised and turned into tools for creating hindrances in the anti-corruption services. This not

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only allowed a certain group of people to engage in financial corruption while using public offices,

but also allowed them to get personal gains. The main obstacle against free and fair elections in

Nigeria is political corruption. Effects of corruption in the country include political violence,

economic underdevelopment, weak political institutions, lack of ideology of the party and crises

of legitimacy (Anyanwu, 2017).

2.7 Features of Anti-Corruption Strategies and Agencies in Nigeria from 1960 to Date

2.7.1 Traditional strategies used to check corruption in Nigeria.

Over the years, Nigeria has seen its wealth withered away with little to show for it in terms of the

living conditions of the citizens. The efforts to curb corruption in Nigeria can be traced to the pre-

colonial period, to various regimes and governments. In other words, before Nigeria became

independent in 1960, and after Independence, which has seen military and civilian governments

piloting the affairs of the country, one or the other form of strategy has always been being put in

place with the aim of prosecuting the menace of corruption in Nigeria. In the words of Ezenwaji:

In Nigeria, the war against corruption could be traced back to the pre-colonial era. The

various pre-colonial societies had had in palace institutions or policies that were pre-set

to fight corrupt practices. The Yoruba Alaafin stood to commit suicide or be banished on

any gross abuse of his office. (2000, p. 3)

This measure no doubt checkmated the activities of the Alaafin, who was the head of the traditional

political Yoruba society, from indulging in corrupt acts. The Alaafin was equally saddled with the

mandate of ensuring that those working closely with him did not abuse their office.
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 Similarly, Okonkwo (2007) says that the origin of corruption in Nigeria predates the

colonial era. According to a colonial government report (CGR) of 1947, ‘The African’s

background and outlook on public morality is very different from that of the present-day Briton.

The African in the public service seeks to further his own financial interest’ (Okonkwo, 2007).

Before independence, there were cases of official misuse of resources for personal enrichment

(Storey, 1953, cited in Ogbeidi, 2012).

In the south-eastern part of Nigeria, which is dominated by the Igbo-speaking people,

integrity was the watchword of all the people. In practice, the Igbo political arrangement did not

give power or authority to an individual, possibly for fear of abuse of office (Nwaodu et al., 2014).

In the North, the Emir was checked by the collective efforts of his officials against corrupt practices

(Nwaodu, 2012, p. 76) The Sharia Laws were the standard for all the faithful, including the Emir,

and these are replete with punishments for corrupt acts. In the early years of British rule, there

were complaints that emirs and chiefs were difficult to trust with money, and very quickly the

administration issued a proclamation on how to deal with this, which was essentially that corrupt

officers would have their appointments terminated and go to jail. Detailed accounting and auditing

guidelines were also circulated to assist and warn all officers (Mbaku, 1998). There were also

traditional anti-corruption bodies such as the traditional police and courts that were formal and

informal in structure.

2.7.2 Strategies used against corrupt practices in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

However, these institutions were weakened following their infection by the same vice they were

expected to fight, which made it necessary for the colonial government to devise other means of

fighting corruption. Awareness of the need to combat corruption by the colonial administration

was awakened by the motion moved on 26 February 1952 by the Emir of Gwandu at the floor of

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the Northern House of Chiefs: ‘That this House, agreeing that bribery and corruption are widely

prevalent in all walks of life, recommends that Native Authorities should make every effort to trace

and punish offenders with strict impartiality and to educate public opinion against bribery and

corruption’ (Johnston, 2017).

By the 1950s the colonial administration had moved away from just the use of the

traditional anti-corruption machineries to the use of Commissions of Inquiry. On July 24 1956, the

Justice Strafford Forster-Sulton Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate allegations that

Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe had abused his office as Premier of Eastern Region by allowing public funds

to be invested in business establishments where he had an interest. This was done by the colonial

administration, since the premier who governed the Eastern region was not competent to make

inquiry into issues to which he was culpable. The Commission’s report indicted Dr Azikiwe, and

on 6 January 1957 he transferred all his rights in the bank to the Eastern Nigeria Government

(Chukwudum, 2004).

As Chukwudum (2004) reiterated:

The post-independence Federal Government also adopted the use of Commission of

Inquiry in fighting Corruption in the Country. On June 20 1962, it appointed a Commission

headed by Justice G.B. Coker to investigate the allegations that Chief Obafemi Awolowo

had also abused his office as premier of the Western Region in his relationship with a

private enterprise, the National Investment and Property Company (NIPC). The

Commission’s report indicted Chief Awolowo; consequently the Western regional

government acquired all the property owned by the National Investment and Property

Company.

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 In 1967, another Commission of Inquiry was instituted to investigate assets of fifteen

public officers in the defunct Mid-Western region. The panel indicted all the public officers of

corruptly enriching themselves. The panel recommended that they should forfeit such ill-gotten

gains to the government.

Going further, Ogbeidi (2012) posits that:

The First Republic under the leadership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime

Minister, and Nnamdi Azikwe, the President, was marked by widespread corruption.

Government officials looted public funds with impunity. Federal Representative and

Ministers flaunted their wealth with reckless abandon. In fact, it appeared there were no

men of good character in the political leadership of the First Republic. Politically, the

thinking of the First Republic Nigerian leadership class was based on politics for material

gain; making money and living well.

(p.6)

The situation described above, among other factors, provided the pretext for a group of

young middle-ranked army officers to sack the Nigerian First Republic politicians from power

through a coup d’état on 15 January 1966 on the ground of corruption.

The general Aguiyi Thomas Ironsi’s military government that replaced the sacked civilian

regime instituted several commissions of inquiry to investigate the activities of some government

parastatals and to probe the widespread corruption that characterised the public service sector of

the deposed regime. The report on the parastatals, especially the Nigeria Railway Corporation,

Nigeria Ports Authority, and the defunct Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and Nigeria Airways,

revealed that a number of ministers formed companies and used their influence to secure contracts.

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Moreover, they were found guilty of misappropriation of funds as well as disregarding laid-down

procedures in the award of contracts by parastatals under their ministries (Okonkwo, 2007;

Ogbeidi, 2012). The military administration of General Ironsi could not survive corruption

allegations as a result of the way they assumed power (Onoja, Itodo & Bebenimibo, 2017). Prior

to that, Major Nzeogwu, who led the first coup, stated in his speech that the coup of 15 January

1966 was against ‘the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek

bribes and demand 10 percent… those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian

political calendar back by their words and deeds.’ He further decreed in his speech that ‘looting,

arson… embezzlement, bribery or corruption… trying to escape with documents, valuables,

including money or other assets vital to the running of any establishment’ would be severely

punished.

The zeal to punish the wrongdoers of the First Republic died with the Gowon coup of July

1966, which ousted the Ironsi government because all the politicians in detention were freed. This

development had serious implications for the polity as this new set of rulers embarked on white

elephant projects, which served as a means of looting public funds. The ensuing development

clearly showed that the military rulers were not better nor different from the ousted civilian leaders.

General Yakubu Gowon ruled the country at a time when Nigeria experienced

unprecedented wealth from the oil boom of the 1970s. Apart from the mismanagement of the

economy, the Gowon regime was enmeshed in deep-seated corruption. By 1974, reports of

unaccounted wealth of Gowon’s military governors and other public office holders had become

the crux of discussion in the various Nigerian dailies. One of the consequences was that in July

1975, the Gowon administration was toppled by General Murtala Mohammed through a coup

d’état. The coup of 1975, among other things, was an attempt to end corruption in the public

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service. General Murtala Mohammed began by declaring his assets and asking all government

officials to follow suit. He instituted a series of probes of past leaders. The regime decided to purge

corruption from the civil service and in the armed forces. The ideas of a corrupt practices

investigation bureau and special tribunals to handle cases of corruption were mooted. An

ombudsman system, to be known as the public complaints commission, was set up by the regime.

The Federal Assets Investigation Panel of 1975 found ten of the twelve state military governors in

the Gowon regime guilty of corruption. The guilty persons were dismissed from the military

services with ignominy. They were also forced to give up ill-acquired properties considered to be

in excess of their earnings (Gboyega, 1996, p. 3).

In the same vein, the Belgore Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the

‘Cement Armada.’ The Commission indicted the Gowon government of inflating contracts for

cement on behalf of the Ministry of Defence for private profit at a great cost to the government. In

its report, the Commission noted that the Ministry of Defence needed only 2.9 million tons of

cement at a cost of NGN 52 million, as against the 16 million metric tons of cement it ordered, at

a cost of NGN 557 million (Afolabi, 1993). Similar commissions of inquiry were established by

the new state governments, which resulted in the immediate dismissal of several corrupt officials,

many of whom were in turn ordered to refund the money they had stolen.

In response to the continued agitation for change, the military government under General

Murtala Mohammed who had overthrown Gen. Gowon launched the first military-sponsored anti-

corruption campaign – Operation Purge the Nation – which he said would rid the nation of

political/administrative incompetence and of corrupt and morally delinquent civil servants and

politicians and bring back respectability and professionalism to the country’s public services

(Nwaodu, 2012, p. 80). He also set up the Federal Assets Investigation Panel on 16 September

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1975 to probe the assets of former governors, the administrator of East Central State and some

Federal Commissioners who served in the Gowon’s regime. Apart from Mobolaji Johnson and

Oluwole Rotimi, who were acquitted, others were found guilty of gross abuse of office. Their

confiscated assets at the time were worth NGN 10 million.

General Murtala was assassinated after being in office for six months. He was succeeded

by his Chief of Staff, General Olusegun Obasanjo, who did not show the same zeal as his erstwhile

boss in the prosecution of wrongdoers. Obasanjo rather promulgated decree No. 11 of 1976 (Public

Officers Protection against False Accusation), and as a result, corrupt officials assumed and acted

as if they were above the law. The retroactive decree provided cover and immunity for corrupt

public servants and stopped the public from exposing such public figures. It is of note that before

he was assassinated, Murtala Mohammed disagreed with Obasanjo over his handling of the

contract for the design, construction, equipping and furnishing of the International Trade Fair

complex in a NGN 45,216,000.00 contract (No. 13/1731). Three weeks after Murtala’s death, and

regardless of his position on the contract, it was reviewed upwards to NGN 95,820,000.00, and

further to NGN 116,257,893 by Obasanjo’s regime (Nwaobi, nd). His regime was also enmeshed

in the scandal surrounding NGN 2.8 billion missing from coffers of the Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation, NNPC.

However, the Obasanjo-led administration ensured that the rein of government was

transferred to civilians in October 1979. Further, other commissions of inquiry were constituted

by new states’ governments which led to the dismissal of several corrupt officials, who were also

ordered to refund monies they had stolen.

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2.7.3 The Code of Conduct Bureau

The Code of Conduct Bureau was established in Nigeria towards the twilight of the military

government of the Murtala/Obasanjo administration in 1979 before the commencement of the

Second Republic. According to the CCB, its mandate is ‘to establish and maintain a high standard

of public morality in the conduct of government business and to ensure that the actions and

behaviour of public officers conform to the highest standards of public morality and

accountability’ (CCB, n.d.). The 1979 Constitution provided a list of Codes of Conduct for public

officers. The military administration of Murtala/Obasanjo inaugurated a board which would

oversee the codes of conduct laid out for public officers before handing over power to Shehu

Shagari in 1979. But the bureau could not make appreciable impact because the National Assembly

could not pass an enabling law to empower it. The Bureau got its legal mandate through the law

enacted by the National Assembly of Nigeria under the Babangida regime to enable it to carry out

its mandate. Further, it obtained a permanence of some sort by being in the fifth schedule of all

successive constitutions including the 1989, 1993, 1995, 1999 and the current 1999 constitution

(as amended).

2.7.4 Enabling law

Mandate and powers of the bureau

Under the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Chapter 58 LFN 1990, the Bureau is

mandated to ‘establish and maintain a high standard of public morality in the conduct of

government business and to ensure that the actions and behaviour of public officers conform to

the highest standards of public morality and accountability’ (CCB, n.d.). Section 3, of the third

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schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, implements this

mandate by providing an enabling legal environment for the bureau to:

1. Receive declarations by public officers under paragraph 12 of part 1 of the fifth

schedule to the constitution;

2. Examine the declaration in accordance with the requirements of the code of conduct or

any law;

3. Retain custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by any

citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may

prescribe;

4. Ensure compliance with, and, where appropriate, enforce the provisions of the code of

conduct or any law relating thereto;

5. Receive complaints about non-compliance with or breach of the provision of the code

of conduct or any law in relation thereto, investigate complaints and, where appropriate,

refer such matters to the code of conduct tribunal.

6. Appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over staff of the code of

conduct bureau in accordance with the provisions of an act of the National Assembly

enacted in that behalf; and

7. Carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by the National Assembly.

(CCB, n.d.)

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 Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who led the Second Nigerian Republic (1979–1983), had expressed

worries at the scale on which bribery, corruption, dishonesty and other vices were occurring in

Nigeria. Early in his administration, Shagari had responded to controversy associated with

Obasanjo’s regime that he had succeeded. He instituted a probe panel headed by Justice Ayo

Irekefe to get to the root of the scandal (Chukwudun, 2004, p. 24). His regime, however, tried to

combat corruption. He later proclaimed an ethical revolution, which he felt would be effective in

fighting corruption.

The 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions also provided a code of conduct for public servants

with a Code of Conduct Bureau to enforce the prescribed behaviours. The government also

appointed a cabinet minister of National Guidance to provide moral leadership against corruption.

Yet the measures were ineffective in combating corruption. While Shehu Shagari enjoyed a

reputation for financial honesty, the same cannot be said for ministers and government

functionaries that served in his government. Having been re-elected to a second four-year term,

Shagari felt politically strong to make a campaign against corruption in the new administration.

According to him, ‘all government functionaries, especially ministers, special advisers, and top

government officials will be expected to demonstrate an exemplary standard of probity and

integrity,’ as he announced in his inauguration speech. Continuing, he stated that proven cases of

abuse of office and corruption would attract immediate sanctions (Blackburn, 1983). Nominees

were required to bring in tax clearance certificates as well as letters of approval from the Code of

Conduct Bureau.

Irrespective of efforts by the incoming administration to curb corruption, it could not stem

it, given its impact on the economy of the country that had led to non-payment of salaries, an

austerity measure that was instituted as a result of failing oil prices, and clamour of Nigerians for

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the return of the military. As a result of this, the military, led by Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde

Idiagbon, took overpower with the promise that it would combat corruption by introducing ‘War

against Indiscipline’ (WAI) in 1984. The idea was to promote and emphasise discipline and

professionalism among civil servants as a way of improving political and administrative efficiency.

Unfortunately, the programme eventually degenerated into policing against disorderly behaviours.

Like its predecessors, the new programme failed to engage the Nigerian people in genuine state

reconstruction to establish more effective structures for corruption control. The consequence was

a continued increase in the level of corruption in the country (Mbaku, 1998). However, many

Nigerians praised the good results of the WAI. At this time, the country had almost relapsed into

lawlessness, environmental pollution, and economic embezzlement, among other vices. While

some viewed it as autocratic, others argued that it would have been more effective if the military

administration had brought in a coalition of professionals both at the design stage and also during

its implementation.

As part of the Buhari/Idiagbon-led anti-corruption crusade, a special military tribunal, the

Public Property Decree and the Public Officers (special provision) Decree of 1984 were introduced

to reduce corruption in the country at the time. The Buhari/Idiagbon regime took drastic measures

to prosecute corrupt officers, who were forced to cough up the millions of naira they had

embezzled. These decrees were set up to recover public properties from the politicians of the past

civilian government, and those found guilty were handed stiff prison terms which were longer than

a normal human lifespan. This programme was, however, criticised on the grounds that the military

rulers subverted national laws in their efforts to imprison or deal with public servants suspected of

engaging in corrupt activities.

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 The new Buhari/Idiagbon regime, which showed scant respect for human rights in its bid

to entrench discipline and sanity in public life, was toppled in a palace coup led by General Ibrahim

Babangida on 27 August 1985. His government set up the National Orientation Movement in 1986

and the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice in 1987. Part of their objectives were to inculcate the

sense of responsibility to eschew all vices such as corruption, dishonesty, electoral and census

malpractice, ethnic parochial and religious bigotry in public life, and to propagate the virtues of

hard work, honesty, loyalty, self-reliance and commitment and the promotion of national

integration. Other objectives included re-orientation for Nigerians to shun waste and vanity and to

shed all pretences of affluence in their lifestyle, to propagate the need to eschew all vices in public

life. These were mainly cosmetic in nature and paid lip service to the goal of ending corrupt

practices in the country. The Babangida administration did not show any commitment to probing

the preceding one that it overthrew, nor did it show the kind of commitment to anti-corruption as

they had done. The next thirteen years saw no serious attempt to stop corruption. If anything,

corruption reached an alarming height and became institutionalised during Babangida’s regime.

According to Maduagwu in Ogbeidi (2012), leaders found guilty by tribunals under the Murtala

Mohammed and Muhammadu Buhari regimes found their way back to public life and recovered

their seized properties (p. 9).

Continuing, Maduagwu in Ogbeidi states that:

Not only did the regime encourage corruption by pardoning corrupt officials convicted by

his predecessors and returning their seized properties, the regime officially sanctioned

corruption in the country and made it difficult to apply the only potent measures,

long prison terms and seizure of ill-gotten wealth, for fighting corruption in Nigeria in the

future. (p.9)

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 The interim national government, led by Ernest Shonekan, that succeeded Babangida’s

regime had a short tenure and did not settle down to combat corruption. However, to his credit,

Shonekan contributed to the fight against corruption by making proposals to the National

Assembly, although these never saw the light of the day. The administration of General Sani

Abacha removed Shonekan in a coup d’état and made efforts to curb corruption. The most popular

programme credited to the general is the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC). He

had also reconstituted the National Orientation Agency (NOA) by replacing the Mass Mobilization

for Self Reliance, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) with it. His regime signed

the Anti-Fraud Code into law. This was done to curb the advanced fee fraud (419) that had

flourished during and after Babangida’s exit from power. His administration also set up many

probe panels to investigate several government agencies and parastatals. For instance, Customs,

Nitel (Nigerian Telecommunications Limited) and Nigerian Airways were probed. The activities

of the Failed Banks Tribunal were also credited to Abacha’s administration. Nevertheless, the

administration’s crusade against corruption was not seen as credible because some members of the

cabinet had been indicted by probe panels in the past. Again, top government functionaries did not

declare their assets as required by the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB).

2.7.5 The Code of Conduct Tribunal

According to Olisa Agbakoba Legal (2019), the Code of Conduct Tribunal was established by the

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 1999. The Tribunal is empowered to put on trial

any public officials who breach of the provisions of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal

Act. The Tribunal may impose any of the following punishments:

a. Vacation of office or seat in any legislative house, as the case may be;

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 b. Disqualification from membership of a legislative house and from the holding of any public

office for a period not exceeding ten years; and

c. Seizure and forfeiture to the State of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office.

Appeals may be made to the Court of Appeal against the Tribunal’s decision. The decision of the

Tribunal does not either exclude or preclude the accused person from being prosecuted on a

criminal charge before a competent court of law (OAL, 2019). The Code of Conduct Tribunal is

not conferred with judicial powers but was established to be an administrative court, independent

of control from both the executive and the judiciary, exercising jurisdiction over public officers.

Next was the government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who came into power in May 29,

1999. Determined to fight corruption, the administration began by establishing a panel to review

various contract awards and appointments made during the administration of his predecessor.

Among other things, the panel pruned down from over 500 to a mere 13 the national awards

bestowed indiscriminately on some Nigerian citizens. There was also a Commission of Inquiry,

headed by Alhaji Iguda Inuwa, set up by Obasanjo’s government to examine the performance of

major projects in the Federal Capital Territory. The Idris Kuta panel was saddled with the

responsibility of knowing the number of contracts awarded by the Senate from June 11, 1999 to

July 17, 2000. There was also the Oluwole Rotimi Panel on Federal Government Assets.

Furthermore, the Obasanjo-led civilian government strengthened existing anti-corruption

laws and established two important anti-corruption institutions – the Independent Corrupt Practices

Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) – to tackle the

phenomenon of corruption in public and private life squarely. The ICPC was inaugurated on 29

September 2000 by the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The Commission was

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established to tackle corruption in the public sector, especially in cases of bribery, gratification,

graft, and abuse or misuse of office (Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act, 2000).

For the first time in the history of the nation, the Corrupt Practices Act of 2000 established

a statutory body that is answerable to the National Assembly with the main purpose of fighting

corruption. The Act grants the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) substantial

powers to investigate, arrest and prosecute suspected persons. The Act stipulates that the ICPC

shall consist of a chairman and twelve other members, who will be selected from each of the six

geo-political zones of Nigeria. The ICPC Act provides that the chairman and members of the

Commission, who should be persons of proven integrity, should be appointed by the President

upon confirmation from the Senate and should not begin to discharge their duties until they have

declared their assets and liabilities as prescribed by the Nigerian Constitution. Section 6 (a–f) of

the ICPC Act 2000 sets out the duties of the Commission as stated herewith:

a. To receive and investigate complaints from members of the public on allegations of

corrupt practices and in appropriate cases, prosecute the offenders;

b. To examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where such

systems aid corruption, to direct and supervise their review;

c. To instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency, or parastatals on ways by which fraud

or corruption may be eliminated or minimised by them;

d. To advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practice, systems or procedures

compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of public bodies to reduce the

likelihood or incidence of bribery, corruption and related offences;

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 e. To educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences;

f. To enlist and foster public support in combating corruption.

(ICPC, 2000)

The ICPC chairman is also vested with additional powers, including the power to seize

movable property in the custody or control of a bank or financial institution, where the property is

the subject matter of any investigation under the Act; the power to obtain information from any

person including relatives, associates and their banks suspected of having committed an offence

under the Act; and the power to make an application to Court to prohibit any person dealing with

any property that is the subject matter of an offence under the Act, where the property is held or

deposited outside Nigeria. Further, the Act collectively established and redefined nine offences

relating to corrupt practices and abuse of office, among which are:

i. Accepting gratification (section 8)

ii. Fraudulent acquisition of property (section 12)

iii. Fraudulent receipt of property (section 13)

iv. Making a false statement or return (section 16)

v. Bribing a public officer (section 8)

vi. Use of office or position for gratification (section19)

vii. Bribery in relation to auction (section 21)

viii. Bribery in relation to contracts (section 22)

ix. Failure to report bribery transactions (section 23).

(ICPC, 2000)

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 Three years after the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission

(ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), was established in 2003. This

was done partially in response to pressures from the Financial Action Task Force on Money

Laundering (FATF), which named Nigeria among twenty-three non-cooperative countries

frustrating the efforts of the international community to fight money laundering (EFCC

(Establishment) Act, 2002). Unlike the ICPC, the EFCC investigates people in every sector who

appear to be living above their means. It was established as a law enforcement agency that

investigates financial crimes such as advanced fee fraud and money laundering. The EFCC is an

inter-agency commission comprising a twenty-two-member board drawn from all Nigerian law

enforcement agencies (LEAs) and regulators. The Commission is empowered to investigate,

prevent and prosecute offenders who engage in money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting

and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms dealing, smuggling, human trafficking, child labour,

illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including

counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, and

dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods (EFCC (Establishment) Act of 2004).

The Commission is also responsible for identifying, tracing, freezing, confiscating, or

seizing proceeds derived from terrorist activities. The EFCC is host to the Nigerian Financial

Intelligence Unit (NFIU), vested with the responsibility of collecting suspicious transaction reports

(STRs) from financial and designated non-financial institutions, analysing and disseminating them

to all relevant government agencies and Financial Intelligent Units all over the world. The

Commission is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of other laws and

regulations relating to economic and financial crimes, including:

a. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act (2004)

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 b. The Money Laundering Act 1995

c. The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004

d. The Advanced Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 1995

e. The Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994

f. The Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991; and

g. The Miscellaneous Offences Act.

Presently, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent and

Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Code of Conduct

Bureau (CCB) are the three functioning anti-corruption agencies. While the CCB has the singular

responsibility of assets declaration among other things, the ICPC and the EFCC have overlapping

functions.

According to the EFCC and ICPC, their gains since inception include an increased societal

confidence, and they have been involved in the investigation of cases including high-profile

corruption cases, advanced fee fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, contract scams, identity theft,

illegal oil bunkering, bribery, looting and foreign exchange malpractices. Although both bodies

have helped immensely in the fight against corruption in the country, their efforts have not resulted

in the eradication of the phenomenon.

President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua took over in 2007 promising to intensify the anti-

corruption fight, kicking reforms off with a seven-point agenda. He began by declaring his assets

publicly. He continued on the anti-corruption agencies set up by Obasanjo, as described by Ukase

and Audu (2015, p. 184): ‘The swearing in of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua […] raised hopes

that the war against corruption would be re-energised and strengthened. The President himself

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promised to take the fight against corruption to a new height, vowing to run a clean government

based on the rule of law.’

Similarly, while receiving the visiting World Bank Vice-President for Africa, Mrs Oby

Ezekwesili, the President assured the world that he would not seek to politicise the anti-corruption

agencies. ‘I have given all the institutions a free hand. I have told them I won’t interfere, because

I am strongly in support of the fight against corruption. No hurdle has been put on their paths. The

only thing I have made very clear is that they must follow the rule of law and due process’ (David,

2010, p. 14).

The government of Goodluck Jonathan, which came into office after the death of

Yar’Adua, continued with the anti-corruption strategies and agencies already on the ground. His

administration introduced the ‘Rebranding Nigeria’ concept aimed at giving the country a good

image and encouraging Nigerians to shun corruption in its entirety. As part of efforts to combat

the scourge of corruption, the administration set up several audit committees to investigate corrupt

individuals and organisations. One of the organisations whose financial dealings were audited was

the NNPC. Despite these measures, corruption persisted under the Jonathan government.

In 2015, Muhammadu Buhari was elected the country’s President. One of Buhari’s

campaign promises was to fight corruption to a standstill. Alongside the EFCC, ICPC, CCB, CCT

and other anti-corruption bodies, which he met on the ground and continued with, his

administration introduced the ‘Change Begins with Me’ policy and ‘Whistle Blowing’ strategy, to

minimise corruption in Nigeria. The ‘Change Begins with Me’ policy, launched on 6 October,

2016, according to the President is a value re-orientation campaign geared towards reminding

Nigerians that true change actually begins with the self. The values espoused are discipline,

integrity, dignity of labour, social justice and patriotism (Awojulugbe, 2016). The Whistle

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Blowing policy, for its part, is an anti-corruption programme that encourages people to voluntarily

disclose information about fraud, bribery, looted government funds, financial misconduct,

government assets and any other form of corruption or theft to Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of

Finance.

Furthermore, the government of President Muhammadu Buhari also set up various

committees aimed at checking financial misconduct. For example, there is the Presidential Panel,

headed by Justice Ayo Salami, which was set up to investigate allegations that Mr Ibrahim Magu,

EFCC Chairman, had abused his office by diverting recovered looted funds for his personal use

and selling recovered assets to persons close to him, among other allegations.. Again, the Buhari

administration inaugurated an audit committee to look into the financial activities of the Niger

Delta Development Commission (NDDC), among others.

From the foregoing, it may be seen that Nigeria has carried out efforts to check corruption

in different ways, including the establishment of anti-corruption agencies according to the recent

dictates of the FATF. From pre-colonial times, corruption among rulers and elite members of the

society have had checks, to reduce their incidence. Despite these efforts, incidents of grand

corruption had continued unabated, and are carried out with impunity within government circles.

These failings can be blamed on certain factors that hampered the agencies charged with curbing

corruption.

According to the Mauritius Communique of 2018, factors required for the effectiveness of

anti-corruption agencies and Financial Intelligence Units include the following: a) the

development of a national anti-corruption policy and strategy that will provide a framework for

fighting corruption; b) consolidation of the anti-corruption legal framework, which needs to be

reviewed to plug legal loopholes through which corruption can be checked in public and private

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sectors. Such should be customised to suit different countries’ needs; c) strengthening of political

will, not only from the President or Prime Minister, but from a wide spectrum of national political

leadership, in words and actions, and by policy makers (UNODC, 2018).

Other measures to combat ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies include: i) enhancing

operational effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies through a review of internal systems,

processes and procedures, to eliminate undue bureaucracies; ii) transparency, independence and

accountability of ACAs, as it is important that Anti-corruption agencies should be autonomous

and transparent; iii) sustained Anti-corruption campaigns; iv) comprehensive audit of systems,

practices and work processes; v) putting an end to impunity; vi) building and sustaining public

trust; vii) establishing a specialised court for corruption cases; viii) regulation of the source of

political funding; vix.) Freedom of Information Act and New Assets Declaration Act; ix) effective

role modelling and x) development of effectiveness indicators (UNODC, 2018).

Added to these indices which will ensure the effectiveness of Anti-corruption agencies are

the models proposed by McCusker (2006) in Matei and Matei (2011). The first model is

interventionism, whereby relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to take place and then

intervene. The next is managerialism, in which those individuals or agencies seeking to engage in

corrupt behaviour can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing appropriate

systems, procedures and protocols. In this case, it is advocated that there should be a reduction and

elimination of opportunities for those who benefit from corrupt practices. The final model is

organisational integrity, which involves the integration of an organisation’s operational systems,

corruption control strategies and ethical standards so that a norm of ethical behaviour is created.

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2.8 Electoral Processes and Political Corruption in Nigeria

From available records, it can be seen that the focus of most Nigerian politicians is towards

individual interests or ethnic groups (Avgerou et. al., 2019). The focus is towards the enrichment

and prosperity of individuals rather than the wellbeing of the general public or the country

(Aririguzoh, 2019). Elections are an integral part of any democracy. This is the system that allows

the electorate to choose their preferred leader for the country (Aririguzoh, 2019). The years

following Independence in Nigeria were filled with the constant interchange between the military

and democratic governments, along with countless coups and revolts that the country has

experienced over the passage of time (Corentin, 2016). The first election in Nigeria was held in

the year of 1922 under the Clifford constitution, which directed procedures for the election

(Flesken & Hartl, 2018). However, the election that proceeded was filled with electoral

malpractices, which occurred throughout the whole electoral process (Dumbili & Sofadekan,

2016).

Election malpractices provide significant barriers for the credibility of a good government

(Lührmann, 2018). These election malpractices, such as harassment of the voters, rigging,

declaration of false results and other factors including bias, are witnessed during elections

(Skovoroda & Lankina, 2017). There have been many practices that have led to problems within

election processes. These include the voting of underage civilians and impersonations of

individuals. It also includes the diversion of election materials as well as the switching or theft of

ballot boxes (Salihu & Gholami, 2018).

Electoral malpractices are common and have been a frequent practice through all the

elections that have been held in the country (Lührmann, 2018). In elections, most of the time the

processes are faulty and do not abide by the constitutional requirements of the time. In the 1964

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federal elections, there was no election held in the Eastern Region, which resulted in the boycott

of the elections by the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) (Paul et. al., 2018). Despite

this, the elections proceeded as scheduled in other parts of the country. The results from this

election were favourable to the Northern People’s Congress, which as a result had a majority of

seats to form the federal government. The election was marked by intimidation, manipulation and

violence, was biased in nature, and ensured that the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) gained

power in a very comfortable manner (Skovoroda & Lankina, 2017).

The elections that were held after this were in 1965, and in more oppressive conditions;

there was significant tension in the political atmosphere of the country. One of the common

malpractices observed in the elections was rigging of the results brought about through biased

counting of the votes and burning of ballot boxes, which were replaced by the votes of the

perpetrators’ personal choice (Anyanwu, 2017). At the end, the NNDP were the winners of the

election, with a margin of a whopping 88 seats out of 98 (Abdulwaheed et al., 2018).

The results of the 1965 western elections had serious consequences in terms of the political

wellbeing of the country. Adegbenro, leader of the UPGA party, claimed the party had won 68

seats and declared its own government, while the NNDP also claimed victory and formed its own

government. The situation of having two different governments within the country gave rise to

violence, killings and arson, and this led to the army taking control (Lührmann, 2018). The

emergence of two governments in the western region revealed a very chaotic and critical situation

in Nigeria. This resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, where it is reported that as many as

five thousand houses were burned and many individuals were either killed or critically injured

(Akanji, 2018).

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 As a result of electoral malpractices witnessed in the former Republic, a new Presidential

system of government was introduced in the 2nd Republic in Nigeria to remedy problems of

electoral corruption. However, during the elections in 1979, a lot of violence and rigging occurred

in every part of the country. This designated election was plagued with problems and malpractices,

which were observed in the overall electoral system of the country (Adekola & Olumide, 2019).

There was a high amount of smuggling in of fake votes and changing of poll results, which led to

one of the most controversial elections in the political history of the country. The results of this

election were also very unusual. Of all the candidates that contested, none was able to gain the

majority. Therefore, based on available results, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of

Nigeria, NPN, was declared the president after securing 25% of votes in 12 states of Nigeria

(Ezeonu, 2017).

The elections that followed were also full of corruption and had hallmarks of instability.

The elections that ushered in the Fourth Republic that took place in 1999 were marked by non-

violence, but they were marred by varying degrees of electoral irregularities and outright fraud.

These elections saw the emergence of General Olusegun Obasanjo as the president of the country

with the People’s Democratic Party, though the results were contested by Olu Falae of the Alliance

for Democracy, AD. The 2003 general elections, which pitted incumbent Olusegun Obasanjo of

the PDP against Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP, were also marked by irregularities. Factors

that characterise elections in Nigeria, including ethnicity and religion, played major roles in the

voting patterns by the electorate. There were allegations of multiple voting by millions of people,

pre-stamped votes and false ballots being used to rig the elections. Most opposition parties did not

recognise the final results. The ruling party, PDP, was accused of massive rigging of the elections.

Issues of snatching of ballot boxes, underaged voters, political killings and general violence

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characterised these elections. It was alleged that the overall results were manipulated to ensure the

victory of this party. Despite the protests and challenges faced by the ruling party, PDP, the party

won the general elections along with the presidential elections (Lührmann, 2018).

The 2007 general election was considered one of the most controversial elections in the

history of Nigeria. According to Olusegun Obasanjo, the outgoing president heralded it as a ‘do or

die’ affair, thereby setting the tone for electoral fraud. The elections were considered as pitting the

former vice president, Atiku Abubakar of Action Congress, against the PDP candidate, Umaru

Yar’Adua and Muhammadu Buhari of ANPP. It was also significant as it was the first civilian-to-

civilian change of government in the country. Electoral violence was recorded in different parts of

the country. The elections were marred by ballot fraud and violence. Electoral observers, most

notably the European Union Mission and the Transition Monitoring Group (which deployed

50,000 observers), were unanimous in underlining irregularities in the voting process. Both stated

that the elections were not credible and fell far short of basic international standards (Iruonagbe,

Imhonopi and Ahmadu, 2013, p. 15). This led the president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, to set up an

electoral reform committee to suggest measures that would improve the conduct of elections,

restore electoral integrity and strengthen democracy.

The 2011 general elections were held with the backdrop of the question over whether a

northerner or a southerner should be voted into power, given that the elected president Umaru

Musa Yar’Adua died in office and was succeeded by a southerner, Goodluck Jonathan. His main

opponent was Muhammadu Buhari, who ran under the political party Congress for Progressive

Change, CPC. Dr Goodluck Jonathan under the PDP was elected into office. The presidential

elections were adjudged to be relatively fair and free, more so than the legislative elections.

However, electoral fraud and irregularities such as vote rigging and buying, underage voting, ballot

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stuffing, late openings and overcrowding of polls, insufficient voting materials and intimidation

and political violence were witnessed. The emergence of Dr Jonathan as president led to post-

electoral violence in the northern states, where there were violent riots, including mass protests,

machete attacks, prison breaks and burning of businesses, places of worship, houses and

government offices. Rioters targeted local opponents, political rivals and innocent bystanders.

Many lives were lost and an estimated 65,000 persons were displaced.

The 2015 elections were significant because it was the first time that an opposition

candidate had won a presidential election in Nigeria. The opposition candidate General

Muhammadu Buhari of All Progressive Congress, APC, won over Dr Goodluck Jonathan of

People’s Democratic Party, PDP. Votes were cast mainly across the ethnic and religious patterns

of the two main candidates. Despite the security threats posed by Boko Haram insurgency, the

election was considered the most credible election the country had witnessed. The elections had

few elements of harassment and malpractices as compared to preceding elections (Gonzalez,

2016). However, some lapses were observed, including logistical lapses, electoral irregularities,

and outbreaks of violence, which could not be entirely avoided. This was nonetheless a major

improvement on the level of electoral corruption that has been experienced throughout the history

of the country (Imhonopi et al., 2016). Social media platforms played major roles, as they were

deployed by the two main political parties, APC and PDP, to generate information,

misinformation, and distribution of fake news about opponents while amplifying values of their

principals.

The 2015 general elections have been termed as the fairest and the most credible elections

since the time of Independence. However, it is simply impossible for any of the elections to be

held without a certain amount of corruption. There were some cases of electoral corruption

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experienced; however, the intensity was minimal, and it did not have any major impact overall in

the election.

Unfortunately, the 2019 general election was claimed to be rigged and was full of violence.

The main contenders for presidency were the incumbent Muhammadu Buhari of APC and Alhaji

Atiku Abubakar, who contested under the People’s Democratic Party, PDP. The elections

witnessed low voter turnout, apathy as a result of the disappointment of the government of

President Muhammadu Buhari, gross mismanagement of state resources and incompetence.

Electoral violence was witnessed in these elections, with killings in different parts of the

Federation. The elected president was accused of complicity with the electoral body to ensure his

re-election. Incidents of violence were rife in these elections, and people voted along party lines.

Alhaji Atiku Abubakar won most of the South-south and Southeast votes as a result of the

popularity of his party, PDP, in those parts, as voters from these areas were denied their

entitlements by the Buhari-led APC. Late voting, stuffing of ballot boxes, killings and other

electoral fraud were commonplace during the elections, as was underage voting, which took place

mainly in the northern states of the Federation.

Following the overview, it can be deduced that electoral fraud has become a common factor

of elections in Nigeria, which mostly produces leaders who are less answerable to the state than to

their political party, family, friends, cronies, and other interests, creating room for political

corruption. Overall, it could be argued that the main reason for political corruption in Nigeria can

be linked to corrupt electoral processes that produce leaders who are not preferred by the majority

of the people, and who owe allegiance to ethnic, religious and political parties rather than to the

country they vowed to serve patriotically.

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 The fragile nature of the Nigerian state has made elections more challenging than they

might have been, especially with the perceived preference for the ruling party, APC by the electoral

body, INEC, which is led by Prof. Mahmood Yakubu. Unfair appointment of key government

officials by the Buhari-led administration, the perceived neglect of certain sections of the country,

and insecurity of lives and properties have further deepened the division in the polity and increased

the stakes and quest for political power between the two major parties, APC and PDP. The role of

the electoral umpire has become more significant and critical. However, with the spate of electoral

corruption found in the body, its impartiality, integrity and neutrality has often been called to

question. As Lawal (2015) observed, ‘Nigeria (sic) electoral system over time has been clouded

by corrupt practices. The fraudulent subversion of electoral process has made it difficult for the

conduct of participatory, competitive and acceptable conduct of free and fair elections in Nigeria’

(p. 270). Further, the entrenchment of political godfathers, or the concept of godfatherism has

become more pronounced as several powerful national leaders have anointed themselves as

successors to the Buhari-led government. According to Lawal (2015), ‘among the politicians,

business partners and party faithful there emerged powerful individuals known in Nigeria (sic)

politics as godfather. Godfather refers to an individual of wealth and followership who financed

politicians in [the] election and even manipulated the result to get their candidate into position’

(p. 267).

It can be deduced that electoral processes in Nigeria have not fundamentally changed, and

despite efforts at the introduction of electronic voting, certain logistical factors, including lack of

funding and supply of inferior equipment, affect these processes. On a positive note, fraudulent

electoral officers are being punished through the rule of law for misconduct. This may significantly

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reduce a repeat of the excesses witnessed in previous elections by such returning officers, in

collusion with political parties and their godfathers.

2.8.1 Evaluation of corruption indices dataset in Nigeria

The dataset for the quantitative analysis is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). This

dataset consists of six aggregate indicators for investigating the governance practices across

different countries for the years 1996 to 2017 (World Bank, 2021). The WGI summarise the

governance quality of countries based on the data collected from large enterprises, expert survey

samples and the general public of developing and developed counties. The dataset is collected

from non-government organisations, survey institutes, and private and international firms. The

purpose of this dataset is to investigate the quality of governance within Nigeria using six

dimensions of governance such as political corruption, regulatory quality and political stability.

This investigation of governance quality will help in eliminating the criminal opportunities that

lead to political corruption.

Voice and accountability

Voice and Accountablity Ranking, Nigera

40.00
35.00
30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Figure 1: Voice and Accountability Ranking, Nigeria

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The ranking of Nigeria in terms of voice and accountability shows an increasing trend, with a

negligible decreasing trend in the year 2016. This illustrates that in Nigeria there is accountability

and the voice of the general public is heard. More accountability means fewer corrupt practices

and crimes. Naik & Chattopadhyay (2019) recognised that when people are heard, they do not

engage in criminal practices because they perceive the system to be accountable and transparent.

Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism

Political Stablity Ranking

30.00

25.00

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00

2015
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

2016
2017
Figure 2: Political Stability Ranking

Political stability is another dimension used for investigating governance quality. Political stability

in Nigeria illustrates a decreasing trend. This means the political governance policies are not well

designed and executed. However, there is an absence of terrorism and violence, which is a good

indicator of a lower crime rate (Gwyer, 2015).

Government effectiveness

The elimination of corruption depends on government effectiveness and will to fight corruption

(McKim, 2017). The WGI dataset illustrates constant variations in the government effectiveness

ranking.

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 Government Effectiveness
25.00

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Figure 3: Government Effectiveness

Regulatory quality

This quality dimension investigates the government’s ability to formulate and execute the

comprehensive regulations that motivate economic growth and reduce corrupt practices. In terms

of quality of regulation, the ranking of Nigeria shows continuous up- and downtrends while

reducing sharply from the year 2000. Subsequently after 2004 the reporting quality goes up,

followed by a gentle decrease till the year 2017.

Regulatory Quality
30.00

25.00

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00
2009
2010
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Figure 4: Regulatory Quality

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Rule of law

Rule of law means the limitation of the subjective exercise of power with well-established laws

that will overrule in any case. There are continuous fluctuations in the rule of law within Nigeria,

with slight decreases and sharp increases.

Rule of law
20.00
18.00
16.00
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
2006
1996
1998
2002
2003
2004
2005

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Figure 5: Rule of Law

2.8.2 Control of corruption

This chart illustrates the efforts of government and judicial bodies in controlling corrupt practices.

In accordance with the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset, there is steep decline in

the corruption control till the year 2002, followed by a dramatic increase in corruption control till

the year 2008. However, the country then experienced gentle downfall in effectively controlling

corrupt practices.

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 Corruption Control
25.00

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00

2009

2016
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

2017
Figure 6: Corruption Control

2.9 Consequences of Corruption in Nigeria

Corruption in Nigeria has been found to be pervasive and endemic at all levels, and in most sectors.

The harmful nature of corruption has led to abuses in both corporate and government circles; it has

with time seeped into areas such as the judiciary, which was upheld as the last hope of the common

man. It has become so deeply entrenched that it has begun to numb the sensibilities of ordinary

citizens in the society, who in some cases applaud and defend the actions of perpetrators along the

line of ethnicity and gender. Corruption in the political circle is mindboggling as the

commonwealth is looted mindlessly and with near impunity. In recent times, under the guise of

oversight functions, members of the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives)

have forced agencies, departments and ministries they oversee to award contracts to themselves

without executing the jobs. Even anti-corruption agencies have become mired with corrupt

practices, as in the case of Mr Magu, who was appointed the head of EFCC, the nation’s prime

anti-corruption agency, but became enmeshed with stories of sleaze and corrupt practices that led

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to the setting up of a presidential panel on corrupt practices led by Retd. Justice Ayo Salami to

probe these allegations.

Corruption of all kinds has dire consequences on every aspect of the society, and in some

cases leads to breakup of society or wars. According to TI (2020), ‘corruption hurts everyone…

corruption erodes the trust we have in the public sector to act in our best interests. It also wastes

our taxes or rates that have been earmarked for important community projects – meaning we have

to put up with poor quality services or infrastructure, or we miss out altogether.’ Examples of the

impacts of corruption abound in the country, including lack of potable water, poor infrastructure,

lack of good public schools, lack of quality hospitals, lack of power, poor standards of living and

lack of basic amenities of life; these are some of the consequences of corrupt practices, besides the

fact that the nation has become a laughing-stock in the polity of nations. It is known that former

British Prime Minister David Cameron described Nigeria as being ‘…fantastically corrupt’ (BBC,

2016).

In a report titled ‘Impact of Corruption on Nigeria’s Economy’ by PricewaterhouseCoopers

(n.d.), Mr. Uyi Akpata, Country and Regional Senior Partner West Market Area, states that ‘results

of the study show that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) by 2030 if it’s not dealt with immediately.’ He continues:

The report noted that corruption is a pressing issue in Nigeria which affects public

finances, business investment as well as standard of living. It listed three dynamic effects

of corruption to include: Lower governance effectiveness, especially through smaller tax

base and inefficient government expenditure […] weak investment […] also lower human

capital as fewer people especially the poor are unable to access healthcare and education.

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 The implications of these findings reveal that corrupt practices have a negative impact on

public finances through which government business is done, as poor-quality services will be

delivered at outrageous cost to the government. This is made manifest by the low quality of

services provided by governments at all levels for the society. Further is the issue of lower or poor

governance, which implies poor delivery of goods and services including moral, civic and social

services. The group that suffers the most from corruption is the poorest; this is the case in any

nation, including Nigeria, as they are not able to access quality healthcare and education which

ordinarily should push them up through the socio-economic levels in society. This was noted in a

study by Nwankwo (2014), when he observed that corruption has been the reason for many

unresolved socio-economic problems in Nigeria, and for reduced development in all sectors of the

economy. According to him, ‘In Nigeria, the level of corruption, poor state of our electricity,

transport sector, health sector, education and communications is the major problem of economic

growth and it is a major handicap for doing business in the country’ (p. 42). From findings made,

he concluded that Nigeria has the potential to build a prosperous economy, reduce poverty

significantly and provide the health, education, and infrastructure services its population needs.

However, available evidence indicates that these resources have not been judiciously used to meet

the needs of the population in terms of human capital development because of the high level of

corruption in the country.

Continuing, Ibenegbu (2017) confirmed Nwankwo’s findings in an analysis when he noted

that ‘the dynamic impact of corruption in Nigeria is felt by every layer of the population. The most

fragile social layer is poor households and small firms.’ In this sector of the economy, corruption

has reduced the chance of an increase in human investment and capital. Issues of corruption in

Nigeria are usually associated with poor public finance management, which reduces opportunities

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for small firms to do business. Besides this, foreign direct investment has also decreased as a result

of corrupt practices; while investors will want to invest, do business and make profits while

extending the value chain, this is not happening as they do not want to invest in vain. Furthermore,

as a result of corruption, governments’ ability to intervene is weakened as most officials are

culpable in corrupt practices. As Ibenegbu noted, ‘Government effectiveness is also damaged due

to the situation with corruption. The officials on high levels in of Nigeria also get bribes. It means

that their interests in creating laws can be strictly lobbied by price’. The implication of this is that

the masses that make up about 80% of the population are poor by international standards of living.

Effects of corruption hit this class harshly, as the distribution of financial resources in Nigeria is

inadequate. This leads to an increase in the number of those who are classified as low-income

earners. Another effect is that the middle class is almost non-existent and cannot have an influence

in policies nor in politics of the country. The gap between the poor and the rich is extremely wide

and creates distance and apathy of every kind in the nation. The situation in Nigeria is drastic.

Citing American financial research, Ibenegbu observed:

If the corruption in Nigeria does not slow down, then by the year 2030 it will cover about

37% of the GDP. It means that every citizen starting from today will lose about $1000 to

corruption every year. By the year 2030, this number will increase up to $2000 per person.

Moyosore (2015) itemised some effects of corruption in a study titled Corruption in

Nigeria: Causes, Effects and Probable Solutions. Some of the effects listed are paraphrased below:

1. Corruption perpetuates social, economic and political inequality, and thus aggravates

mass poverty as poor people on average pay higher proportions of their incomes in

bribes. This reduces economic growth. Millions of Nigerians have been rendered poor,

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 unemployed and uneducated as a result of misappropriation and mismanagement by

successive governments, whether they are civilian or military. He called it ‘oil that

worsens factors related to overall human development’. Citing Osoba (1996), he

observed that it is an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to

legal and moral norms, and which undermine attempts to improve the living conditions

of the people.

2. Corruption also diverts public expenditure from sectors that benefit the poor the most,

away to the sectors and projects where kickbacks can readily be obtained by public

officials. The implication is that priorities are misplaced, and public resources that

could have been beneficial to all, while enhancing productivity to increase the

effectiveness and efficiency of government’s performances, are diverted for selfish

interests. Such acts endanger the fiscal viability of the state, as substantial amounts of

monies are not remitted to coffers of the government as the system is designed for

leakages.

3. Corruption can also cause a reduction in the quality of goods and services available to

the public, as some companies will cut corners by producing poor-quality goods to

make profits, while producing what they were contracted to do. Citing Khan in

‘Problems of Democracy: Administrative Reform and Corruption’, the author noted

that it generates allocative inefficiency by allowing the least efficient contractor or most

costly supplier with the highest ability to bribe those who award government contracts

to give the contracts to their cronies or companies where they have interests. Such acts

in the long run undermine the reputation of government agencies and make them

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 ineffective and inefficient, and they also impact negatively on the wellbeing of the

people.

4. Corruption also impacts negatively on the efficient mobilisation and management of

human and material resources. It can also estrange civil servants with world-class views

or lead them to withdraw from the service and leave the country for ‘greener pastures’

overseas, as most Nigerians perceive working abroad more profitable than serving in

the country.

5. Corruption is also a cause of low investment in the country, which results in reduced

economic growth at the domestic and foreign levels. Economies that are undermined

by corruption discourage foreign investors and public donors from investing in such

countries. The effect of this is a shortage of funds for productive investment. Corruption

hinders direct foreign investment.

6. Corruption also has a negative impact on the human rights of the citizenry. A country

with a corrupt government will have no regard for the fundamental human rights of its

people. As such, there will be the desecration of the rule of law, distortion of decision-

making processes, and undermining of the credibility and legitimacy of government.

Even those who try to expose those culpable in corrupt practices are blamed for

exposing corrupt activities, while the guilty ones walk away as free men and women.

This encourages the maxim, if you can’t beat them, join them.

7. Finally, corruption causes political decay and economic downturn of the nation, and it

has led to social conflict and violence as competing groups vie for state power which

is the source of distribution of resources and other amenities in the country. As a result,

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 politics has become more attractive and an all-comers job that is reserved for the rich

and powerful, and it becomes the surest way of becoming influential and earning

respect and recognition.

From the foregoing, corruption pervades in different sectors of the country and has

led to different kinds of manifestations that impact most on the masses. It has impacted the

political, social, administrative, and economic life of the nation. It is seen in decaying

infrastructure, inadequate medical services, falling standards of education, loss of

resources, neglect of basic needs of the people, electoral malpractices, insecurity,

prebendalism, nepotism and poor governance generally.

2.9.1 Analysis of Nigeria’s anti-corruption performances

This section reviewed Nigeria’s performance as reported by various international organisations

and not-for-profit organisations’ publications relating to corruption in Nigeria. It helps us to

understand the depth corrupt practice has gone to in Nigeria, especially through the use of unbiased

methods to evaluate findings by these organisations.

International treaties and organisations have demonstrated how serious the issue of political

corruption in Nigeria is. For example, Nigeria has remained at the bottom of the corruption

perception index (CPI) published annually by Transparency International (TI) since 2003, and it

is seen as one of the most corrupt nations in the world (TI, 2016). The World Bank Worldwide

Government Indicators ranked Nigeria low in terms of controlling corruption (percentile rank

among all countries ranges from 0 lowest to 100 highest) (World Bank, 2021). In the ADB Country

Performance Assessment Rating 2021, Nigeria is rated low in terms of ‘Transparency,

Accountability and Corruption in the public sectors’; the average score for countries is 3.4 (ADB,

2021). Similarly, in 2012 the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) regarding political corruption,

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and more specifically corruption between administration and business and between administration

and foreign business, was low (World Bank, 2012). In the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index,

Nigeria scored 46.9 points out of 100 in 2020; this mean that little progress has been achieved on

corruption and ethics issues. However, Nigeria scores low in the entire index, meaning there is a

serious corruption problem. In the World Justice Project’s (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2019, in

relation to absence of corruption, Nigeria’s score was -1.0 % (WJP, 2019). Nigeria further scores

low (0.50) in relation to having no corruption in the judiciary, scoring ranging from 0 (lower) to 1

(higher); the overall International Organisation publication demonstrates that Nigeria suffers from

systematic corruption in both national and local-level politics.

The analysis in relation to the military transaction to civil rule demonstrates that since the

military regime, both the political and administrative apparatus has been thoroughly corrupted in

terms of struggle for power and wealth. Regarding grand corruption, analytically, it could be

viewed that the military junta, their families and associates are deeply involved in grant corruption

and economic activities, and that they control the multi-billion-dollar revenue, which is weakly

regulated. The dominance of political appointments, appointments of the judiciary, and the

appointments of the heads of security services suggests a strong link between the ruling class and

the organised crime groups, which function with unrestrained impunity. In civil service and

political office settings, decisions concerning recruitment, transfer, and promotion are influenced

by political patronage. High-level jobs are reserved for political supporters, and political parties

play a role in the selection process; here we see a link between corruption and a corruption culture

of public officials favouring their relatives and patrons. What this means is that to reduce political

corruption one needs to eliminate the corruption culture between political elites and patrons.

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2.9.2 Review of related empirical studies

Challenges encountered in the fight against fraud and corruption have led many researchers to

investigate kinds of political corruption and potential solutions to the phenomena. Some scholars

who have carried out empirical studies in this area, and whose works will be studied, include the

following.

Okogbule (2006) in his study examined the adequacy of existing legal and institutional

mechanisms for combating fraud in Nigeria. His findings revealed that the statutory enactments

have proved ineffective in combating corruption in contemporary Nigeria. He suggested the need

to have a useful strategy for achieving an effective anti-corruption practice.

Omotayo Bolodeoku (2009) studied the war against corruption, and his findings confirmed

that the main anti-corruption power conferred on the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) is

similar to powers conferred on the two main anti-fraud and -corruption agencies, EFCC and IICPC.

This means that the systems to counter fraud and corruption are repetitive and lack preventive

strategies.

Aigbovo and Atsegbua (2013) wrote about Nigeria’s anti-corruption status and in their

research focused on how to assess the impact of Nigeria’s anti-corruption provisions aimed at

curbing corruption by public officers. Their findings stressed that Nigeria’s anti-fraud reforms

have not had any substantial impact on curbing corruption in the respective sectors that they cover;

hence, there is an urgent need for an effective preventive strategy to be put in place.

Doig and Riley (1999) also reviewed corruption in the developing world. They found that

patterns of corruption differ from country to country. They recommended that counter-fraud

strategies be used and tailored to the social environment where the corruption occurs.

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 Gbegi and Adebisi (2015) researched on fraud detection and prevention in the Nigerian

public sector. Their findings suggested that the ultimate responsibility for preventing fraud and

corruption rests with the government, who need good and effective fraud and corruption preventive

policies in place. They also recommended effective training of key personnel and other strategies

for preventing fraud and corruption in Nigeria.

Markovska and Adams (2015) found that the corruption of the political elite has led to the

abuse of the constitutional immunity clause, granted under Section 508 of the 1999 Constitution.

This significantly impairs fraud detection and prevention activities of agencies against money

laundering and other financial crimes. These findings raised questions on the need to alter the law

by abrogating the immunity provision under S. 508 of the 1999 constitution, which shields

politically exposed persons from criminal prosecution.

In a study on ‘Corruption in Nigeria: A Culture or Retrogressive Factor?’ by Nmah (2017),

the author identified corruption as a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that

affects all facets and fabrics of Nigerian society. The study adopted descriptive and

phenomenological approaches in the study and used primary and secondary sources to obtain data.

The researcher called for a total overhaul of the nation’s psyche through ethical and moral

orientation programmes. He also recommended that various anti-corruption agencies, including

the EFCC and the ICPC, should be repositioned and revamped in structure and resources to be

truly anti-corruption agencies. He further called for a review of the functions of the EFCC as an

investigating, prosecuting and recovering agency.

In a 2016 qualitative study on corruption by Ipadeola, which was done in the Federal

Capital Territory, FCT and in Rivers state, the researcher used the interview and focus group

discussion techniques to harvest data. Respondents were convinced that corruption can be uprooted

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if right approaches and attitudes are adopted and changes are made individually and collectively

to bring about change in society. Findings include that more is required from the presidency to win

the battle against corruption. They also viewed the judiciary and Nigerian Bar Association as

frustrating anticorruption efforts through delayed judgements and prolonged legal proceedings.

Findings further indicate that leaderships in both the private and public sectors can deter

corruption. It was a general consensus that stringent punishments will serve as deterrents to

perpetrators.

In a study by Osimen, Adenegan and Balogun (2013), the authors examined the impact of

corruption in the public sector, carrying out the study in Akure South Local Government Area of

Ondo state. The survey method was applied to the study, and FGDs were used to corroborate

findings from the survey. They found out that weak government institutions, moral laxity,

unemployment, and poverty were responsible for corrupt practices in the public sector. They

further recommended that governments in all sectors should strengthen institutions established to

fight corruption.

Saha (2009) in ‘Causes of Corruption: An Empirical Investigation in a Cross-Country

Framework’ tested the reliability of recent quantitative innovations in the study of corruption in

terms of the Corruption Perception Index constructed by Transparency International. Through the

use of theoretical and empirical analysis, panel data from 100 countries of hypotheses of corruption

and its determinants were studied. He found out that through the subjective indexing process,

corruption perception eventually converges to a common consensus. In the relationship between

economic development and corruption, the results suggest that income per capita, education,

unemployment, income inequality, economic freedom and democracy are among the factors that

determine and help explain the cross-country differences in corruption, and the assessment of the

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relationship between democracy and corruption shows that an ‘electoral democracy’ represented

by ‘political rights’ is not in itself sufficient to reduce corruption; rather, for lower levels of

corruption to exist, the presence of an advanced, fully formed, mature democracy is required.

Finally, in a study titled ‘Corruption in Empirical Research – A Review’, Lambsdorff

(1999) reviewed a variety of studies on the consequences of corruption. He concluded that

corruption goes along with policy distortion, inequality of income and lack of competition.

Corruption may be the cause of these variables or the consequence. Again, cultural determinants

may drive corruption and the variables at the same time. He suggested that there is strong evidence

that corruption lowers a country’s attractiveness for making investments. This reduces capital

accumulation and lowers capital inflows. Also, the productivity of capital suffers from corruption,

which leads to the weakening of welfare to the people. He noted that press freedom and the

independence of the judiciary appeared to be important elements in reducing corruption. Also, an

increased role of women in society strongly reduces levels of corruption. An abundance of natural

resources increases levels of corruption. Some other cultural determinants of corruption include a

mentality of accepting hierarchies, which increases corruption. On the international front, he

discovered that in globalised markets, corruption occurs in cross-border activities. He noted that

some exporters and donors tend to favour countries perceived to be corrupt, which suggests that

some global players contribute more than others to high levels of corruption.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

Several corruption theories exist that have been used to explain and make connections between

relationships that lead to corruption at different levels and how it occurs in different situations and

countries. Through these theories, explanations and predictions are made from the principles and

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theses that dominate them. Further to the examination of different theories, this theoretical

framework explains how the selected theories are considered most relevant for this thesis. Further,

these theories underpin the research questions asked as they provide ideas and concepts that are

pertinent to questions asked, and through which explanations can be made. Given the different

levels of corruption that take place in Nigeria, the different theories considered relevant were

judiciously selected and triangulated to provide the foundation upon which the study is built;

through them, interpretations will be made to findings obtained from the study. The theories that

underpin the study include principal–agent theory, collective action theory, institutional theory

and game theory. These were examined with the view to use these for predictive purposes. In the

end, principal–agent theory has been selected, and this will be used to explain the principles that

guided the study.

2.10.1 Principal–agent theory

Desire for personal gain has always been seen as primary motive for public-sector corruption;

however, this is to oversimplify the complex relationship between individuals and the State.

Principal–agent is one of the theories that may be used to deconstruct this relationship. The

principal–agent model is based on the assumption that agents (public officials) are appointed to

protect the interests of the principal (either the public, parliament, or supervisors). In reality,

however, the agents often have their own interests, divergent from the interests of the principal.

The principal may be able to set the rules regarding the agent’s pay-off, but nonetheless the agent

holds an information advantage over the principal, which he can use over the principal for his

personal benefit (Groenendijk, 1997). In such a case, the agent may choose to further his interests

by engaging in corrupt transactions, going against the principal’s interests when doing so and

thereby constituting an agency problem. The principal can limit this problem by designing

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incentives and schemes (for example, monitoring, bonding and oversight) to reduce the agent’s

potential abuse (UNODC, 2019). This theory is relevant for this study as it takes into consideration

one of the aims, which is to examine the extent to which corruption has taken place in institutions

that serve the citizenry by those who were trusted to manage her commonwealth.

This theory is based on an economic concept called the principal–agent problem. It

assumes that the problem of corruption is one of bureaucrats and other public employees (‘agents’)

not following the rules and failing to fulfil the expectations of their leaders (‘principals’). Agents

are delegated the responsibility to implement and enforce rules and regulations, but they can

choose to pursue their private interests instead of the public interest represented by the principal.

They can do this because principals in complex organisations don’t necessarily have access to all

the information about what goes on, and agents can withhold key information, so principals are

not fully able to monitor and control what agents do. This ‘information asymmetry’ creates

opportunities for corruption. In other words, not participating in corrupt actions is assumed to be

the normal state of affairs as mandated by principals, and corruption is a deviation from this norm.

The solution, in this way of thinking, is for policymakers (the principals) to change the rules and

the monitoring enforcement mechanisms to limit the room for deviation and assure that

bureaucrats’ behaviour will stay closer to the expected norms of clean management. This thinking

gave rise to a number of ‘technical’ reforms, including measures aimed explicitly at corruption,

and those that are assumed to implicitly alter incentives for corruption through controls and

monitoring of important government processes where corruption can take place.

2.10.2 Collective action theory

This is a more recent theory than principal–agent theory. Collective action theory emerged as an

explanation of systemic corruption despite laws making it illegal, which is quite applicable to the

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Nigerian context, and also why corruption resists other anti-corruption efforts in some countries.

The emphasis in collective action theory is on trust and on individuals’ perception of others’

behaviour. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) state that systemic corruption is a collective

problem, because of people’s tendency to use their perception of how others would behave in the

same situation to rationalise their own behaviour. When corruption becomes endemic to a society

as a whole, people end up believing that it is normal and just a part of how the society works, and

that ‘it doesn’t make sense to be the only honest person in a corrupt system’ (Marquette and Peiffer,

2015). When people have this belief, they are likely to engage in corruption themselves, regardless

of the societal consequences. This phenomenon renders anti-corruption measures based on the

principal–agent model ineffective, since this model relies on the existence of ‘principled

principals’ to enforce norms of anti-corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell,

2013). When such a culture of corruption exists at an institutional or organisational level, corrupt

practices become normalised at both a societal and an individual level, while those who ignore or

break formal anti-corruption rules are able to do so with impunity (Appolloni and Nshombo, 2014).

In such a situation, collective and coordinated approaches are required in order to combat

corruption; such approaches are often called ‘collective actions’, and examples include reform

coalitions and proactive alliances of like-minded organisations (UNODC, 2019). Within a

Nigerian context, there are anti-graft agencies that are statutorily established to curb corrupt

practices; however, the endemic nature of corruption has rendered these organs powerless, and

their usage has been subsumed to political interests which, more often than not, muzzle these

agencies, or they are used mainly to score political points by politicians.

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2.10.3 Institutional theory

A third theoretical framework is institutional theory, also known as institutionalism. This theory

explains public-sector corruption in terms of countries’ and governments’ institutional

characteristics, such as pre-existing rule of law, well-defined anti-corruption norms and

independent anti-corruption institutions with enforcement powers. It ‘examines the processes and

mechanisms by which structures, schemas, rules, and routines become established as authoritative

guidelines for social behaviour’ (Scott, 2004). Institutional theory adds in the factor of social

context to aid in understanding corruption and how it becomes endemic within organisations,

institutions and societies as a whole, and to explain how this occurs even when anti-corruption

frameworks exist (Luo, 2005). Institutional theory’s viewpoint is that corruption is influenced by

the political system’s character, design and transparency, and that of its institutions. Nevertheless,

the relationship between corruption, institutions, political systems, culture and gender is an

extremely complex one, and institutional theory acknowledges this aspect (Debski et al, 2018;

Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson, 2015; UNODC, 2019).

The importance of this theory to this study is seen in the way it underpins the premise that

the ineffectiveness of political strategies put in place by successive governments is a result of the

systemic nature of corrupt practices, despite the efforts of anti-corruption agencies in the country.

Further, the ineffectiveness of these bodies has helped to further entrench corrupt practices in

different sectors of the nation. It further shows how corruption has become endemic in national

organisations such as NNPC, NDDC, NIMASA and other bodies that are tasked to provide

services for the people but have been largely ineffective due to corruption.

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2.10.4 Game theory

This is another theory that explains the prevalence of public-sector corruption. Borrowing from

economic literature, game theory seeks to explain why public officials decide to engage in

corruption. A key proponent of this theory is Macrae (1982), who posits that corruption ‘is part of

a rational calculus and an integral and often deeply rooted method by which people take decisions’

(UNODC, 2019). This is illustrated by the so-called ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, which ‘illustrates a

conflict between individual and group rationality’ (Kuhn, 2017). A individual who refuses to

engage in corrupt practices will be disadvantaged if other individuals do engage in them, and

through fear of this disadvantage, all individuals choose to engage in corruption. By doing so, they

all obtain a benefit – however, this is always less of the benefit than they each would have gained

if they had all refused to act corruptly. An example of this is in public procurement, where

individuals who participate in corruption include private-sector actors. Each is distrustful of the

others’ actions, and so the fear that their competitors will outcompete them through

illegal/unethical actions motivates otherwise companies that might otherwise be ethical to engage

in corruption on their own part. Furthermore, various situational and psychological factors could

induce individuals to act unethically, sometimes even despite their best intentions (UNODC,

2019).

This theory underpins Research Question 4, which seeks to examine the different

challenges that hinder anti-corruption agencies, including strategies adopted from achieving

outstanding successes in areas of fighting corruption. Its systemic and endemic nature seems to

make it impossible to effectively fight the scourge, as the political will and resources to fight

corruption effectively are not available to achieve enduring success.

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2.11 Summary of Literature Review

Corruption as an area of study attracts a lot of interest from scholars in different fields, and when

the focus is on political corruption, different views are seen that express perspectives and contexts

from different disciplines.

This chapter has examined works including research studies, news reports, documented

records, and other views that deal with corruption and political corruption. We began with an

examination of concepts that are related to the study, which include terms such as corruption,

politics and politically exposed persons, which will dominate the work in later chapters. Further,

a review of related literature was conducted. This consists of an examination of works on the

taxonomy of corruption and kinds of corruption such as petty corruption, grand corruption and

financial crime corruption.

There was also a review of history of political corruption in Nigeria, in which definitions

attributed to political corruption were given. Incidents of corruption that took place in successive

governments in Nigeria were examined, as were anti-corruption legislations and other strategies

that different governments have put in place to curb and control incidents of corrupt practices.

Attempts to curb financial corruption were investigated, including an attempted legislation by the

Babangida government, the EFCC and the ICPC established by President Obasanjo. Related to

this, we looked at electoral processes in Nigeria, within which, types of political corruption were

examined, along with how it has become so strongly enmeshed in the system.

A review of related empirical studies that are relevant to this study was conducted, whereby

works of scholars who wrote in related areas were analysed. Further, features and establishment

of anticorruption legislations, either by decrees or acts of the national assembly, were examined.

It was found that functional legislations were enacted by the Murtala/Obasanjo government of

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1975 and Obasanjo’s administration of 1999, which statutorily established the ICPC and EFCC to

curb corruption in different sectors of the polity. The consequences of corruption on the nation

were analysed, and it was realised that the impact is felt more by the general population, who are

denied public services as a result of corruption. Other manifestations include lack of rule of law,

social unrest and impunity by those in government. Also, there was an evaluation of the corruption

indices dataset of Nigeria, which provided an overview of different determinants of corruption in

the country. The variables examined include voice and accountability, political stability and

absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and

control of corruption. Finally, a theoretical framework of different models and theories that explain

and predict political (public sector) corruption was established. Principal–agent, collective action,

institutional and game theories were analysed to strongly position the study within the appropriate

framework.

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 CHAPTER THREE:

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

While chapter two of this study provided an overview of relevant literature and theories that are

fundamental to this study, this chapter examined methods used to gather analyse and present data

harvested in a systematic and coordinated manner. The research design represents the framework

of the research project. In order to develop the research design, the researcher needed to clarify

which methodological approach is appropriate for the research questions asked. There are three

key decisions within a research design: at least the examination level (micro vs. macro), secondly

the examination form (experimental vs. non-experimental) and, thirdly, the frequency of data

collection (once vs. multiple times). Through research questions, concept specifications,

hypotheses formulation and operationalisation, the decision of the investigation level met

(implicitly) is already met. According to Sileyew (2019), ‘a research methodology is the path

through which researchers need to conduct their research. It shows the path through which these

researchers formulate their problem and objective and present their result from the data obtained

during the study period’.

On the other hand, research methodology has been identified as, ‘the specific procedures

or techniques used to identify, select, process, and analyse information about a topic. In a research

paper, the methodology section allows the reader to critically evaluate a study’s overall validity

and reliability. The methodology section answers two main questions. How was the data collected

or generated? How was it analysed?’ (Research Methodology, 2020).

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 With regard to research methods, this study adopted an interpretivism approach. In this

case, with the recognition that political corruption affects every member of the Nigerian society,

who live in different parts of the country, the approach was adopted so that from their experiences

the researcher could get in-depth insights into attitudes and perceptions of issues of corrupt

practices in the country, and how respondents think these can be tackled effectively. Despite

perceptions held by most respondents, it was also important to juxtapose their views with

documentary evidence obtained from case studies on different aspects of corruption including

grand and political corruption. Using qualitative methods, the researcher was able to interpret and

make deductions from data obtained through different techniques to enable research questions

raised in chapter one of the study to be answered. Drawing from empirical data relating to the

perceptions of respondents, it could be argued that this strategic method is used for stimulation,

organisation, interpretation, and recall of the experiences of respondent perception in fighting

corruption. Why respondent perception? Perceptions of respondents in the empirical data were

studied as a method of apprehending reality and experience through the senses, thus enabling

deduction or discernment of pattern, behaviours, and actions of politically exposed persons in

relation to political corruption. Perceptions gathered from the empirical data were then

corroborated against the facts in the selected case studies, the aim being to verify truth: a fact is

proven and recoded truth, whereas perceptions are personal views that represent the opinion of the

respondent, which might not be based on facts, but depends on the validity of the statements. By

this triangulation, the researcher was able to understand multiple realities that are socially

constructed based on perception.

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 To provide support for different aspects of this chapter – including the selection of the

methods to be used, instrumentation, and the methods of data collection to be employed – this

research will hereby restate the Research Questions that were stated earlier in Chapter One.

3.1 Research Questions

The main question is: How effective are strategies used to reduce political corruption in Nigeria?

Specific questions are:

1. To what extent has political corruption occurred in Nigeria since the establishment of

democratic rule in 1999?

2. What strategies have been used to curb political corruption in Nigeria?

3. How successfully have these strategies been used against political corruption in Nigeria?

4. What challenges have been faced in applying these strategies against political corruption in

Nigeria?

3.2 Research Design

To carry out this study, the researcher adopted a qualitative approach while utilising

phenomenological traditions. Phenomenology has been described as the ways human beings see

or experience the world through their direct experiences. From different experiences of the

population in the research area, including those of the researcher, interpretations and conclusions

were drawn and analysed. As Littlejohn and Foss (2008) observe, ‘we construct an interpretation

of an event or experience and then test that interpretation by looking closely at the specifics of the

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event once again – a continual process of refining our meanings’ (p. 38). This we were able to

achieve by using various techniques in which the researcher harvested data from the experiences

of study participants. Through the use of explanatory techniques, the researcher was able to source

data from written and spoken words of relevant individuals’ responses to queries that used

qualitative analytical techniques to investigate the phenomenon of political corruption and

strategies that can be used to control it in Nigeria. As a part of enriching the phenomenological

traditions, this study sought to further corroborate whether perceptions held are in fact confirmed

by the findings of the documentary evidence studied. As consequence, findings obtained from

focus group discussions and interviews, which are mainly perceptions of participants, will be held

up to documentary evidence obtained in the course of this study to confirm whether the views held

align with the facts.

The researcher also employed the triangulation method, which consists of the use of mixed

methods or data sources in the qualitative research approach used for the study. Triangulation

means using more than one method to collect data on the same topic. This is a way of assuring the

validity of research through the use of a variety of methods to collect data on the same topic, which

involves different types of samples as well as methods of data collection. Schuh (2009) defines

triangulation as ‘using multiple sources of data, data collection methods or both and multiple

investigations to collect data’. According to Dezin (1978), the logic of triangulation is based on

the premise that ‘no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival causal factors […]

Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of

observation must be employed.’ To put more simply, triangulation refers to the use of more than

one approach in the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the

resulting findings (Patton, 2002). According to Prokopowicz (2020), ‘triangulation of data in

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qualitative research is one key determinant of improving the methodology for conducting

qualitative research. In essence, triangulation is defined as the method used in social research to

ensure higher quality of research and reduce measurement error.’

The methods used include focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and

documentary evidence (case studies). These were proposed and used bearing in mind the

qualitative method through which the study was conducted and data harvested. To achieve the

aims set out for the study and to answer the research questions, these research tools were deemed

the most appropriate to generate data required for the study.

3.3 Population of the Study

The population of the study is made up of lawyers with expertise in white-collar crime, and others

from the criminal justice system and purposively selected judges from the FCT Federal High

Court, Abuja and legislators from the National Assembly. The research population includes adults

between the ages of 25 and 70, male and female, from the Criminal Justice System, the judiciary

and the legislators (government officials). This is the target population for the study. While

different respondents were purposively selected for interview, others were randomly selected for

the focus group discussions; 68 respondents were used in total for the different kinds of

information gathered for this study. These are in addition to documentary data, which forms part

of the population of the study. These include records, news reports, judgements, and financial

reports, among others.

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3.4 Instrumentation

A semi-structured interview guide, focus group discussion guide and documentary evidence were

used as measuring instruments through which data was got for the study.

3.4.1 Semi-structured interviews

Interviewing is a technique that aims to obtain information from an interviewee about a particular

subject or problem – in other words, the technique of interviewing means gathering information

from a primary source via conversation. The interview provides information needed for the study

when carried out on entities and personalities with experience or experts from the research area.

For Archibald (2016), ‘the interview makes it possible to obtain data regarding the most diverse

aspects of social life and these data are susceptible to classification and quantification’.

A semi-structured interview allows for a uniform interview guide to be used in all

interviews, but it allows the researcher to deviate from the guide and ask questions in a different

order and follow up on interviewees’ responses by asking additional questions that are not included

in the interview guide (Bryman, 2008). In this study, the flexibility of this method allowed the

interviewer to follow up on interviewees’ initial responses; it further enabled the researcher to

explore other sets of information that helped to enrich the study by making it more comprehensive

and robust.

For the study, semi-structured interview sessions were held with lawyers, legislators and

politicians with experience in governance and legal practices. These interviewees live in Abuja

and were purposively selected to enable the researcher draw from their experiences and expertise.

As a result of the experience that the researcher has had from the period he spent as an

intern within the Government of Nigeria, he was able to know at close range some of the

interviewees who were engaged in the exercise. Insider-researchers are those who choose to study

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a group to which they belong, while outsider researchers do not belong to the group under study.

It is common, but of course not necessary, for researchers using qualitative methodologies to study

a group, organisation, or culture they belong to, and in doing so, they begin the research process

as an insider or ‘native’ (Breen, 2007, p.163). Moreover, as a result of the research interest, the

researcher became more familiar with the workings in the EFCC and the judiciary in the country.

Through this, he was able to purposively select those officers who are not only knowledgeable but

can provide information required for the study. To guard against the potential disadvantages of his

quasi-insider status, the researcher officially sought and obtained consent of the interviewees in

compliance with the ethical considerations of the university, and ensured that the participant

consent form and information sheet were approved by the interviewees before they were selected.

3.4.2 Documentary evidence

Documentary research, which is also called cabinet research, was used for this study. This is a

research technique that consists of collecting data in written documents that can be collected either

at the time when the event is happening or after it has happened. Through documentary research,

knowledge about the problem is obtained from information drawn from graphic and sound

materials. The objective of documentary research is to collect, analyse and interpret existing

theoretical contributions, facts, records, opinions, subjects or idea. According to Naik &

Chattopadhyay (2019), such information includes written and unwritten materials from

appropriate agencies, that can serve as sources of information for the research. The documentary

study examined laws, constitutional norms, records in public archives and other sources. For

Hesse-Biber (2015), this technique consists of collecting and reviewing secondary sources.

Case studies of electoral and political corruption were gathered as evidence to corroborate

findings from other research instruments used in the study. The case studies were selected from

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documents and records that include existing court cases on election malpractices in the election

tribunals. Further, data was sourced from books, records, journal articles and news reports.

3.4.3 Focus group discussions

Focus group discussions were held with four different groups at different locations and settings.

The focus group discussion method was selected for the study to provide views and insights of

participants about political corruption including electoral corruption without bias, prejudice and

sentiments. To ensure that a high number of opinions were obtained, ten professionals were

selected to participate in each of these discussions, and these were recorded with audio recorders

before they were transcribed by record keepers.

In selecting participants for the focus group discussions, those selected were those who did

not participate in the semi-structured interviews in our research. The following factors were taken

into consideration while choosing participants: their geographical locations, professional

competence, experience and time. They were selected without bias or prejudice and were made up

of men and women discussants. The FGD discussants were selected from across different

geographical locations so as to obtain responses that cut across ethnic, religious and cultural

boundaries and to achieve Nigerian representativeness without bias or prejudices. This will ensure

that findings will represent the views of most Nigerians, rather than those of a specific group based

on language or religion.

Through the focus group discussions, the researcher was able to validate information got

from the semi-structure interviews. This triangulation of empirical data and case studies was done

to validate, correlate and corroborate research findings obtained from the different techniques used

in the study.

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3.4.4 Sampling respondents

This research aimed to utilise the in-depth understanding, perception and experience of anti-

corruption practitioners, and therefore sampled a range of practitioners within the criminal justice

system and private practices, rather than taking a representative or probability sample. Therefore,

this research is not representative, but it intends to provide an insight into the topic. The researcher

has chosen a purposive sampling approach, which is a common strategy used in conducting

qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Purposive sampling is based on the need to

interview respondents who are relevant to the research question posed.

Further, the snowball sampling method was also adopted for interviews and discussions.

Snowball sampling is a method in which the researcher collects data on a few members of the

target group; the researcher locates the experts in this field, and then asks these volunteer

individuals to provide information that will lead to other members of the group that they know

(Babbie, 2007, p. 185). The researchers then ask the appropriate interview question to the target

experts on political corruption, and, based on the participants’ recommendations, target

respondents are selected.

3.5 Validity of Research Instruments

To ensure the validity of the instruments used for this study (the Interview Guide and Focus Group

Guide) and ensure that they measure exactly what they were supposed to measure, the researcher

utilised different validity techniques. According to Awoniyi et al. (2011), ‘the most important

consideration is validity, which pertains to the question “what does this test/instrument measure?”;

validity is the extent to which a test or an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure’

(p. 64). Meanwhile, Ogunbameru (2003) describes face validity as whether the instrument is really

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measuring the kind of behaviour the investigator assumes it is, and whether it provides an adequate

sample of that kind of behaviour (p 89). Bearing these definitions in mind, copies of the

instruments were given to academic mentors, supervisors and senior colleagues in the school and

in Nigeria to assess their utility and ability to achieve their objectives. They were tested to affirm

whether the questions address the objectives and research questions asked. They were assessed for

ambiguity and comprehension, and corrections pointed out were made while the instruments were

revised accordingly.

To test for content validity, the researcher studied various literatures that dealt with

political and electoral corruption. Related studies were also reviewed, and constructs used were

adapted accordingly to suit the purposes of this study. Lawyers and political news correspondents

and reporters were consulted to ensure the appropriateness and applicability of language and terms

used in the instruments. Observations and corrections made by these experts were incorporated

into the instruments to make them more effective and consistent.

3.6 Data Collection Procedure

Taking into cognizance that three different instruments were used for the study, different kinds of

data collection procedures were used. Interviews were conducted on lawyers and politicians on

themes of political and electoral corruption. These interviews lasted between 15 and 20 minutes

and were recorded (digitally) so that they could be analysed later. Coverage of questions asked

includes:

1. Views on motivation for political corruption.

2. Difficulties encountered in fights against corrupt practices.

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3. Ways in which their professional activities and anti-corruption activities have helped in the

reduction of corruption in Nigeria.

Before engaging participants, the researcher ensured that they had an interest in political

corruption and were willing to share their experiences and details in a manner that would not

incriminate them.

During the fieldwork, a total of ten lawyers from the Federal High Court, ten law

enforcement officials from the Economic and Financial Crime Commission, two judges from the

FCT High Court and two legislators from the National Assembly were interviewed.

i. The interviewees who are knowledgeable and interested in political corruption were

interviewed at comfortable and serene locations where they provided answers that were

used for analysis in the study.

ii. Consent letters were sent and received from the organisations these respondents work

with, to enable them to participate in the interviews, and to ensure that they were

applicable. The Interview Guide was sent to the organisations for verification.

iii. Face-to-face in-person interviews were scheduled: all interviews were recorded and

transcribed, but all interview data was made anonymous and untraceable (the invitation,

consent, information sheet and interview schedule, together with the target response

list and semi-structured interview questions, are all attached in the appendices).

iv. Participation was on a voluntary basis: participants were not paid but refreshments

were provided by the researcher. Participants also benefited from the knowledge gained

from the research; this might promote further strategies in the fight against corruption.

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3.6.1 The limitation of this methodology

Occasionally, it can be difficult to obtain the co-operation of respondents, and when eventually

obtained, it can be hard to judge or ascertain the theoretical knowledge of the respondents. In

addition, a highly qualified interviewer is required for conducting this interview because

interviews are subjective in nature. Other constraints of conducting this empirical research are

related to the time factor: ample time is needed or required, because interviewees may be less

reliable in nature, and it can also be difficult to manage shy and hesitant people who are reluctant

to undergo the interview process freely.

The researcher has sought to use semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and

documentary evidence (case studies) to remedy the limitations of the research by way of

triangulation. Triangulation means using more than one method to collect data on the same topic.

This is a way of assuring the validity of the research using a variety of methods to collect data on

the same topic, which involves different types of samples as well as methods of data

collection. The purpose of triangulation is not merely to cross-validate the data but also to capture

different dimensions of the same phenomenon. The aim of this methodology is to strengthen the

validity of the empirical data. For example, the information obtained from the semi-structured

interviews is used to confirm and support the statements gathered from the focus group

discussions, and both empirical findings are then used to witness or corroborate the evidence

obtained from the case study analysis to draw out themes, identify emerging themes and measure

patterns and trends of political corruption from 1964 to 2019.

Drawing from the perception of respondents from the empirical data, it could be argued

that this strategic method is used for the stimulation, organisation, interpretation, and recall of the

experiences of respondents and their perception regarding fighting corruption. The reason why

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respondents’ perception is important in the empirical data is that gathering these is a method of

apprehending reality and experience through the senses, thus enabling deduction or discernment

of patterns, behaviours, and actions of politically exposed persons in relation to political

corruption. Perceptions identified from the empirical data were then corroborated against the facts

in the selected case studies; the aim of this is to verify the truth. A fact is a proven and recorded

truth, whereas perceptions are personal views that represent the opinion of the respondent, which

might not be based on facts, but depend on the validity of the statements. By this triangulation, the

study was able to understand the multiple realities that are socially constructed based on

perception.

3.7 Focus Group Discussions Sessions

A focus group is a group of people with certain characteristics, brought together to generate

narrative data in a focused discussion (Morgan, 1996). The elements of interaction and group

dynamics are essential to widen the range of responses, activate forgotten details, and release

inhibition (make people feel more comfortable). The focus group is useful for characterising social

and cultural norms, sharing and comparing (Morgan, 1996), revealing how people talk about the

issue, and exploring potentially sensitive topics. With regards to focus group design, the group size

per session consisted of 10 discussants, which enabled them to participate freely and have enough

time for questions asked.

Taking into cognizance that discussants who made up the FGD groups were knowledgeable

of governance issues and involved with litigations and legislations concerning political and

electoral corruption, the researcher believed that they had background information necessary to

participate in the sessions. Also, questions asked were in line with the research questions and

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constructed to elicit answers that would be used to answer the research questions. Further,

preliminary questions asked were familiar to what discussants had information on, before other

questions were discussed. The researcher ensured that discussants were comfortable and provided

feedback required for the study.

Regarding group composition, it, was important to ensure that discussants were not

intimidated by others, as they were each allowed to speak at an allotted time, and seating

arrangements were made in a way to enhance equality and friendliness.

3.7.1 Discussion guide

For the focus group, the researcher developed a guide with the following structure:

a. 10 questions were asked;

b. 7-10 minutes were allocated to answer each question;

c. The duration was one hour and thirty minutes.

The sequence adopted took into consideration the arrangement of questions to achieve goals of the

discussions: introductory questions were asked first, followed by the more serious and thematic

ones. The structure of the questions was clear, simple and conversational to ensure understanding

and active participation by group members. Participants to the focus group discussions remained

largely anonymous, as they work for sensitive and security-conscious organisations such as the

EFCC, ICPC and judicial systems in Nigeria. This anonymity further enhanced their confidence

to participate in the sessions.

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3.8 Methods of Data Analysis

Data analysis was conducted taking into consideration that this is a qualitative study that used the

mixed methods of semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and documentary evidence

to source data. As a result, analysis was carried out based on research objectives and questions

from which data was analysed for thematic purposes. Tables were also used to present information

on the numbers of interviewees and discussants consulted in the study. This was done to achieve

ease of representation and interpretation. The analysis of the qualitative data would be inspired by

the approaches proposed by Bitter et al. (2019) and Galimberti et al. (2015). This research will

favour an approach of the type ‘analysis of content’.

With the letter of agreement from the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,

an overt observation of court processes and records was done by the researcher. The researcher

took notes from court trials, decided court cases and other instruments of judicial interpretation.

(Please find attached in Appendix 4 a letter of authorisation from the host organisation to cover

the period of my court observation). The Economic and Financial Crime Commission cases and

their anti-corruption strategies/practices were also observed. Content was analysed, and pertinent

information was organised into major themes of the study and into different categories for ease of

interpretation and analysis.

Face-to-face semi-structured interviews were held. All interviews were recorded and

transcribed. These were studied severally, after which they were analysed and interpreted for the

purposes of the study. These were also organised into the major themes determined by the research

questions raised and were then used to answer these questions accordingly.

Taking into consideration the voluminous quantity of words and sentences obtained from

respondents through the interview and focus group discussions, we codified the findings according

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to the themes and issues raised, and in most cases their discussions were paraphrased and

summarised in different sections for ease of understanding, and to achieve cohesion and precision

among those who will study and use this thesis in the future.

Methods used for this study ensured validity, completeness, precision, integrity and

appropriateness. The following were then analysed: content, thematic coding, summary statistics,

and comparison of multiple jurisdiction legislations and different convention treaties.

3.9 Ethical Consideration and Confidentiality

Ethical issues are based on guidelines issued by the British Psychological Society (BPS) which

have to do with confidentiality in the collection of information, integrity in the use of the same and

maintaining the anonymity of persons and obtaining their consent where their names are mentioned

(BPS, 2018; 2021). The researcher is aware that disclosure should not cause harm to participants

or their organisation; the researcher ensured that all participants are experienced and professional

volunteers, who were trained to maintain confidentiality; the researcher carried out a risk

assessment before engaging participants, where the issues of conflict of interest, bias and undue

influence was addressed. The following were taken into consideration:

a. Engaging participants of professional status with appropriate fiduciary position.

b. Verbally seeking consent of focus group participants and assuring them of their

anonymity in the use of data obtained from them. We also reminded participants of

what purposes the interview, focus group discussion and any related methods are for.

We also advised them that information obtained would be published but would be

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 untraceable to them, while being anonymous. Also, we obtained signed consent and

provided participants with details to make a complaint if required.

All data were stored and managed in compliance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

All original field data was collected electronically or through digital post collection. All electronic

data was stored on a laptop and backed up onto an external hard drive, both encrypted and

accessible only by the researcher. No data will be located on any server. None of the original data

will be shared. Participants have the right to access their own data and will be able to withdraw

permission at any time during the data gathering, at which time they will be contacted to confirm

their permission (BPS, 2021, p. 13). The original data will be destroyed by withdrawal of

permission or six years after completion of thesis, unless permitted by consent form that it could

be stored for 30 years (UK DPA 1998).

The University’s guidelines for the retention of data were observed in this research; they

are listed as follows:

The University is committed to keeping and disclosing all personal data in a responsible

and secure manner and will therefore keep data for the minimum time necessary to fulfil

its purpose […] Personal data that is no longer required will be destroyed in as secure as

possible a manner. Paper-based records will, at the least, be put in a confidential base

sack or confidential waste bin for collection as soon as possible by the secure waste

collection contractor, or preferably, shredded. Electronic records will be deleted if

hardware such as hard drives, laptops or smart phones, are decommissioned.

(University of Portsmouth, 2018, p. 16.)

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 CHAPTER FOUR:

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.0 Introduction

This study was conducted to evaluate political corruption and strategies that have been put in place

to control it. The study was domiciled in Abuja, which is the seat of power, and various qualitative

research methods which include semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and

documentary evidence were used to generate data to answer research questions asked, in a bid to

achieve the objectives of the study. It is believed that from findings obtained, attempts may be

made to provide answers to strategies which may be used to reduce political corruption. The main

research question is: How effective are strategies used to reduce political corruption in Nigeria?

Findings that emerged from the fieldwork interviews, notes and investigations will be used to

answer questions asked. Validation and verification of data was majorly corroborated by existing

court cases in the Nigerian Law reports. As a result of the experience that the researcher has had

during the period he spent as an intern within the Government of Nigeria, he was able to know at

close range some of the interviewees who were engaged in the exercise. Moreover, as a result of

the research interest, the researcher became more familiar with the workings in the EFCC and the

judiciary in the country.

4.1 Methodological Approaches of Chapter Four

In a bid to elicit pertinent responses that will generate data for the study, which is on evaluation of

strategies to reduce political corruption, a qualitative research approach was adopted to address

research questions asked. To answer the research questions, it was important to use methods that

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would enable respondents to provide their professional views, perceptions, experiences and expert

opinions as members of the criminal justice system, the judiciary and legislators in Nigeria. The

researcher strongly believes that the use of a quantitative approach would not have been

appropriate, nor provide the opportunity to generate the required responses, which include

respondents’ opinions and insights which are important for this study. As a result, semi-structured

questions were used to generate data, as this approach is flexible and gives respondents the

opportunity to digress and provide other substantial information pertinent to the study.

Further, there was the use of focus group discussions and documentary evidence, which

aimed to provide data from other approaches to corroborate findings obtained from the semi-

structured interviews. Focus group discussions were held with different groups at different

locations and settings. The FGDs were carried out to provide divergent views from participants

about political corruption, including electoral corruption, without political bias, prejudice or

sentiments. Meanwhile, the objective of the documentary research was to collect, analyse and

interpret laws, constitutional norms, records in public archives and other sources.

Table 1: Frequency of Professions of Interview Respondents

Categories of respondents Planned Actual

1 Legal practitioners 10 10

2 Anti-corruption practitioners/prosecutors 10 10

3 Chief Judges of FCT High Court 4 2

4 Members of the National Assemblies 4 2

Total 28 24

Source: Field Survey, 2019

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4.2 Summary of Semi-Structured Interviews with Respondents

A total of 24 respondents were interviewed in the course of generating data for the study. Out of

this number, the researcher was able to interview ten anti-corruption participants from the criminal

justice system, which is made up of prosecutors and law enforcement agents. Further, ten legal

practitioners of white-collar criminal law, two judges of the FCT High Court Abuja and two

members of the National Assembly were interviewed.

In the first research interview, the researcher asked participants about their experiences

with corruption cases and strategies that could help reduce political corruption. Using a series of

open-ended questions, the study sought to understand what was important to the respondents in

making up their conclusions on how to reduce political corruption. From their responses, the

researcher could compare their experiences with other authorities that were interviewed, including

judges, lawyers and legislators of the National Assembly.

The approach taken was to ask participants from the criminal justice system of their

experiences in the practice. Firstly, the researcher sought to know about their first cases and

favourite corruption cases, before moving on seek their opinions of strategies to reduce political

corruption. The researcher asked them how the cases they have dealt with helped reduce corruption

and their perception of the many corruption cases in Nigerian Courts; the research specifically

sought to know if any approach of combating corruption was better than others, and the reasons

for this. This approach enabled the researcher to explore the extent of experience anti-corruption

practitioners have, and their perceptions of political corruption and how it can be reduced.

From this point, the questions moved on to enquire about participants’ interactions with

politically exposed persons in their practice. Specifically, they were asked what politically exposed

persons thought of corruption prevention and their views of opinions raised by them. The majority

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of the anti-corruption practitioners viewed the criminal justice system as not being adequately

prepared to prevent corruption because of political influence or state pardon from higher

authorities. One of the major themes identified by the criminal justice lawyers was the issue of

state pardon, which comes in the forms of prerogative power, power of patronage or political

affiliation. Drawn from this is the fact that state pardon and forgiveness of criminal offences

committed has actually fuelled corruption culture, given that most criminals with party affiliations

or connections with traditional rulers and/or religious leaders use their connections to seek state

pardon. It was presumed that preventing government interventions with criminal sanctions and

investigations could greatly reduce political corruption in Nigeria.

For a majority of the participants, that the Nigerian government could not adequately

address political corruption and corruption prevention is a major frustration. They felt that the

government has not invested adequately in departmental anti-corruption compliance services and

national anti-corruption measures. This was a point noted by Button and Tunley (2015) when they

insisted that fraud and corruption can be unlocked by mandating its measurement to help

understand the scale. Participants also preferred government departments to invest in developing

counter-fraud and corruption service to avoid uncertainty and unnecessary cost of litigation, which

will reduce political corruption effectively.

4.2.1 Respondents’ perception of causes of political corruption

Seeking to provide answers to research questions raised, participants were interviewed about their

perception of how to reduce political corruption. The research then went on to discuss sanctions

and the culture of political corruption. What emerged strongly was, first, that vote buying and the

high cost of buying political patronage amongst politically exposed persons, coupled with the high

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cost of election rigging, was a factor responsible for political corruption. According to Prosecutor

1:

If vote buying could be prevented, it could reduce political corruption, because not

criminalising vote-buying and selling could mean licensing it, and over time it has become

customarily accepted norms and [is] gradually becoming a corruption culture.

This inability to criminalise vote-buying and selling has encouraged political corruption,

to the extent that during election periods, some indigent persons are taking advantage to

make money for self-gain. Currently, it is a cultural practice which might come to stay if

no legal action is taken to prevent it. Second, because political officers in Nigeria earn

very attractive eye-watering sums: for example, politically exposed people such as

members of parliament earn about $1 million annually. Such exorbitant income attracts

political corruption.

Respondents also referred to the fact that politically exposed persons enjoy luxurious

facilities, such as fleets of official cars, a special budget called the security vote which is paid

monthly, and a minimum of two police officers attached to each MP as security details. In addition,

special staff are provided by the government to work full time as cook, gardener, drivers and civil

security men at the MP’s residence. Besides these, MPs receive about $37,500 monthly as an

allowance or in expenses payments (Ross, BBC News, 12/03/2018). It is such incentives that

motivate and breed criminal culture by incentivising politically exposed persons to engage in state

capture at all costs, thereby engaging in corrupt devices to buy power. Respondents argued that

rationalising political incentives would reduce extravagant payments, which could reduce political

corruption, as excessive payments encourage abuse of power.

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 When asked how excessive payments can encourage corruption, Lawyer 2 replied:

Too much illicit money in the hands of the politically exposed person means too much funds

to be used in buying votes and much funds for election malpractices eventually capturing

the state.

They argued that any strategy to reduce political corruption must include restructuring or

overhauling the political system to make political positions less attractive and vote buying

impossible.

Judge 2 observed that attractive payments and other luxuries associated with political

offices lead to desperation to capture political power. First, politically exposed persons can use

any means, including laundered money, to fund violence and other forms of intimidation to rig the

electoral processes. This is what they call moneybag politics. Such ‘moneybags’ are often used to

tamper with the results of the polls, and when the results are eventually secured, there is a tendency

to loot government funds to recoup or recover money spent on their elections. Secondly, apart

from vote buying, political criminals also engage in bribing electoral officials and security officials

to influence election results in their favour.

Lawyer 3 observed that election funding with looted money could be likened to money

laundering. Unfortunately, this set of politically exposed persons perceive ‘politics as a business’;

thereby their illegal acts become investments and winning of polls become profit. It is this notion

of perceiving politics as a business that drives political corruption. In responding to interview

questions asked, respondents observed that restructuring could make it difficult for politically

exposed persons to gain access to unauthorised government funds, which could perhaps reduce

political corruption.

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 Regarding corruption sanctions, it was observed that because of political connections,

criminals could easily use political party affiliation or connection to exempt themselves from

criminal sanction. It was the view that in a corrupt criminal justice system, criminals are not

intimidated by penalties or sanctions, because a weak criminal justice system will produce a weak

sanction. They said access to government funds and proceeds of crime are often used to buy

judgement. This made a real connection with the reason why there is impunity and a sense of

exemption from punishment.

4.2.2 Respondents’ perception of factors fuelling political corruption

With regards to factors that facilitate political corruption, respondents noted that at the local

government level, political positions/offices are made quite attractive, and with the country’s level

of unemployment and low wages, people do everything possible to secure these political positions

for two major reasons: first, to secure well-paid employment opportunities; second, to gain

financial power that might eventually secure them profitable businesses for the rest of their lives.

One respondent, a former local government chairman and a legislator, said that local government

councillors and chairmen receive huge benefits including payments of overseas medical fees,

payment for a private driver, fleets of cars and many other incentives. These in his opinion fuel

corruption. He observed that local government chairmen seek to secure long tenure, because

remunerations and packages for political offices are too attractive to ignore. On the question of

how a luxurious lifestyle will fuel corruption, legislator 1 said:

When politically exposed persons are adapted to exorbitant lifestyles whilst in office, they

are tempted to loot the system to maintain that standard of lifestyle after office, hence the

connection between luxurious lifestyle and political corruption. If they are not able to

secure long tenure, they might invest in other culprits as a political godfather and still keep

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 some percentages of income derived from that office so long as they are still gaining illegal

control as an incumbent.

By contrast, an employer in the private sector who commits such a financial crime is tagged

as a thief with serious sanctions; this inconsistency in jurisprudence has created gaps in what the

participant sees as ‘fairness’ in the eyes of such political office holders.

This inconsistency regarding different sanctions between white-collar crimes and blue-

collar crimes has resulted in inconsistency in criminal sanctions. Hence, politically exposed

persons could hide criminal behaviours under the privilege of political corruption rather than the

crime of theft. There was a general consensus that devaluation of flamboyant elective positions

might reduce political corruption.

Unfortunately, two challenges could hinder the attempt to reduce political corruption; first,

whilst section 308 of the 1999 constitution guarantees immunity for some politically exposed

persons, it means that they could not possibly be prosecuted for corruption allegation (Constitution,

1999, Sec. 308). Second, some politically exposed persons are observed to enjoy the power of

patronage arising from party affiliation in the forms of exemption from punishment and state

pardons. This area required further research as this could raise the issue of ‘indirect discrimination

law’, which requires fairness, justice and equity in terms of employment opportunities.

4.2.3 Corruption sanctions and impunity

With the background of a history of cases of politically exposed persons who secured different

forms of sanctions and exemptions from charges held against them by the state or anti-corruption

bodies, it is observed that these have derailed the criminal justice system. Respondents were

questioned about such corruption sanctions and their implications for the criminal justice system.

A dominant example is the case of Peter Odili, a former governor of Rivers State who was neither

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covered by the immunity clause under Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution nor granted state

pardon, which would have granted him exemption from criminal prosecution, but he was not

charged, which amounted to corruption of law. Further, it remains questionable that neither the

state prosecutor nor the EFCC has contested such court order to the present day.

Another issue on which this research sought views of respondents is that of how lawyers

petition criminal orders or injunctions against judges who granted such orders, on the grounds that

a criminal suspect cannot be prosecuted. This is unconstitutional and goes against the Nigerian

judicial system.

Also, although initially it may seem that the ACJA has taken control of frivolous or sharp

corrupt practice, on the contrary, corruption is fighting back. The reasons why corruption ‘fights

back’ is that politically exposed persons tend to be in control of ludicrous fortunes from the

proceeds of crime, so they are quite comfortable to pay for expensive corruption litigation. Again,

the nexus here suggests that illicit proceeds of crime in the hands of politically exposed persons

have become a weapon for corruption. Participants were asked why some of the alleged corrupt

officials have not been convicted. According to Judge 2:

When there is [a] corruption allegation involving some high profile politically exposed

person, they simply spend a huge amount of money to buy the best lawyer to defend their

wrongdoing. Lawyers are also guilty of frivolous application to buy time, hence lengthy

adjournment and unreasonable stay of prosecutions, which obstruct the dispens[ation] of

justice to the criminals.

The general consensus of the respondents is that politically exposed people engage in

corruption by using the proceeds of corruption extracted while in power to engage in judicial

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corruption to secure judgement, or prevent sanctions and prolong impunity. According to

Prosecutor 3:

…one of the principal challenges in reducing political corruption is that where proceeds

of corruption are in huge sums, the accused can simply hire 15 senior lawyers, Senior

Advocates of Nigeria (SANs), paying them ridiculous amounts [of] money. Sometimes

defence lawyers can be paid as much as NGN 150 million (£330,000) each. Meanwhile on

the prosecution side is a small lawyer with a small pay of NGN 70,000 (£150) monthly. By

comparison, the defence will always outclass the prosecuting lawyer; you already have an

idea of the outcome of the case.

Participants’ perception is that judges could be intimidated, and sometimes they can be

manipulated, influenced or even bribed. The question raised in this scenario is: first, what is the

source of income of the accused, and second, does his income accord with the huge amount of

money paid to his senior lawyers (SANs)?

Perhaps one way of reducing political corruption could be by querying excessive payment

of litigation fees, and querying unexplained wealth of politically exposed persons in general. An

unexplained source of payment towards litigation is by legal standards money laundering as

prescribed under the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Miscellaneous Amendments)

Regulations 2018 (MLTFR, 2018). Thereby, where PEPs fail to reasonably explain their sources

of income, this could amount to the offence of money laundering.

As Prosecutor 7 observed:

[The] Government could work closely with the Nigerian Bar Association, the Court

Registry team and bank accounts to ensure that the sources of funds for ridiculous

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 payments for corruption litigation are legitimate, and if not, raise internal suspicious

activities reports (SARs) to anti-money laundering teams where suspicious money

laundering activities had been identified, then further legal considerations. This process of

stealing big money from the government to pay for expensive legal costs if caught is called

‘corruption fighting back’.

Respondents perceived that there are a high number of corrupt criminals who use proceeds

of their crimes to fight back at corruption litigation. Judges 1 and 2 stressed that if this situation is

not checked, anti-corruption efforts will be frustrated and set back. Arguably, what this could mean

is that illicit funds in the hands of politically exposed persons have empowered the politicians to

fight against anti-corruption policies, and they do so by corrupting justice, which shows why there

is slow progress in the fight against corruption. This analysis substantially corresponds with

corruption prosecution statistics obtained in the qualitative data that show that most corruption

litigations concerning highly placed politically exposed persons are mired by frivolous court

application. Eventually this either triggers adjournment upon adjournment or stay of execution

because money speaks volume at criminal corruption litigation (Kalu v. EFCC and ors., 2016).

For instance, Falana, a senior advocate of Nigeria, observed before the introduction of the

ACJ Act 2015, ‘We have witnessed cases that have been in court for 14 years and more as results

of the frivolous application of court orders. Therefore, to reduce political corruption, not all kinds

of frivolous court applications must be allowed.

Further, in response to an interview question that sought to know how the corruption culture

affects anti-corruption efforts, the respondents agreed that the culture of total disobedience to the

law is a factor in why corruption is so high in Nigeria. They also agreed that how far criminals can

get away with corruption depends on the administration in power. The general perception is that

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under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, people were looting or embezzling

mind-blowing sums of money because they felt they could get away with such crimes. However,

when the administration changed, there was evidence that those who had stolen from the state

started returning stolen money because they felt that the current administration had a zero-

tolerance approach to corruption and fraud matters. This shows that if a government has a culture

of tolerance towards corruption, it could strengthen the corruption culture; conversely, it could be

argued that zero tolerance on the part of the government could be an effective strategy for reducing

corruption.

4.2.4 Selective prosecution of corruption

Further, respondents agreed that reducing political corruption depends on strategic measures and

the political will of the government. They all recalled that in 2005, Olusegun Obasanjo, former

Nigerian President, sacked his Inspector General of Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun, on corruption

charges. His government also sacked the Senate President Adolphus Wabara and several ministers,

including Fabian Osuji, S.M Afolabi, Hussein Akwanga and Tim Menakaya, among others, for

corruption offences; these were confirmed by verifiable evidence (BBC News, 04/04/2005). This

government intolerance to political corruption was evidence of the Government’s will to combat

political corruption.

In a similar spirit of fighting corruption, late President Umaru Yar’Adua, who took over as

President from Obasanjo in 2007, sacked Prof. Mrs Adenike Grange as Minister of Health for

administrative infringement of the anti-corruption regulations; this evidence was verified as

reported by Sahara Reporters (Sahara Reporters, March 24, 2008). Under President Jonathan’s

administration, Stella Oduah, one of the most powerful ministers in his cabinet, was sacked on

corruption charges. President Jonathan also sacked Mr Abdulrasheed Maina as Chairman of the

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Presidential Task Force on pension reforms for corruption (The Guardian, 07/11/2017), while

President Buhari sacked Babachir Lawal on allegations of corruption infractions; the Director-

General of National Intelligence Agency, Ayo Oke, was also sacked in connection with the

discovery of $43million in cash, foreign and local currencies in his residence (F. Onuah, 2018).

Most of the respondents commended governments who sacked and prosecuted politically exposed

persons found to be corrupt and to have violated their oaths of office. However, according to

Lawyer 8:

In my experience, dismissal of government officials found corrupt contrasts sharply when

some government officials who were previously sacked in 2013 for corruption allegations,

following the recommendation of the Office of the Head of Service, were reinstated by the

new administration in 2015, as against the protests of lawyers and civil society. Some also

gained promotion to the position of Director of Human Resources in the Ministry of

Interior. Also, Professor Usman Yusuf, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)

boss, was accused of squandering over NGN 997 million from the scheme’s intervention

fund. The investigation was carried out and the former Minister of Health, following an

allegation of gross misconduct, sacked him. His reinstatement has raised a question of

nepotism (corruption). The rules of law must be applied to all, irrespective of political class

or interference with the criminal justice system.

The two judges observed that the laws relating to siphoning funds, squandering money and

embezzlement are grey areas because squandering of public funds, for example, attracts state

pardon, especially when it involves PEPs, and is easily classified as an error. For example, Mallam

Ahmed Saleh, who was the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court, with two others, was alleged to

have stolen NGN 2.2 billion belonging to the Apex Court. Mallam Saleh was sacked but was later

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reinstated and promoted to the Secretary of the Legal Council of Nigeria because the offence was

said to have been committed in error (Okakwu, Premium Times, 07/02/2017). As such, fighting

corruption requires more than sacking corrupt officials; it also requires putting policies in place to

reduce political corruption. On how to reduce political corruption, the participants believed that

Data Collection of Criminal Records may be a solution; because had the government had the

resources for DCOCR, it would have applied a disclosure barring mechanism to reduce the

incidence of perverse, corrupt politically exposed persons re-emerging in the political space.

In the case of Magu V National Assembly of Nigeria (2016), the National Assembly’s

Screening Committee rejected the appointment of Ibrahim Magu, the acting chairman of the

Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), as the head of the EFCC following a criminal

disclosure report. Based on the report from the Department of State Security (DSS), the National

Assembly refused to approve his appointment; however, the government insisted on his

appointment against recommendations of both houses of the National Assembly and Civil Society,

who maintained that a corrupt person should not head an anti-corruption agency. The rejection of

Ibrahim Magu as EFCC Chairman was also confirmed by the Federal High Court, which held that

section 2 (3) of the EFCC Act 2004 is to the effect that appointment of EFCC Chairman by the

President is dependent on confirmation by the Senate. The court further states that by the provision

of the EFCC Act, the Senate has the constitutional authority to ensure suitability and credibility of

who becomes the Chairman of the EFCC (Channels Television, 01/02/2018).

The themes that emerged from the interview explain that, first, the absence of Data

Collection of Criminal Records (DCOCR) and a criminal disclosure service, and the lack of

mandatory requirements for criminal disclosure vetting before any political position or

appointments are taken up, has exacerbated political corruption. Secondly, the absence of an anti-

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corruption criminal disclosure service has enabled these criminals to re-emerge in positions for

which, under the constitutional provision, they should be legally and ethically disqualified given

previous fraud and corruption convictions (CCT Act 2004). Thirdly, different rules of laws for the

political class, lack of redress to impunity and sense of exemption from criminal sanction on the

part of politically exposed persons has encouraged the culture of corruption. Hence the need for

an urgent anti-corruption criminal disclosure service as a way of vetting competent and honest

candidates for political offices or appointments.

4.2.5 Complexities of corruption

Different kinds of political corruption have emerged, which merge and cascade in different forms

but which involve the same set of politically exposed persons and are categorised into: squandering

of public funds, siphoning off of public funds, and looting of public funds. The majority of

respondents interviewed wanted clarifications on the position of the law concerning when

politically exposed persons are said to have squandered public funds, siphoned public funds and

looted public funds. All these offences fall under the banner of political corruption, but one certain

thing is that squandering public funds might be without the intention to make personal gains or

with the intention to cause loss to the state; as such, squandering of public funds could be difficult

to prosecute. According to Legislator 1:

Like you know if a politically exposed person invested public funds intended for a hospital

to build a fish farm at a high[er] cost than say building a hospital, that could be

squandering public fund. However, if he/she does not have the intention of making a

personal gain or cause loss, he could not be convicted if he lacks mens rea, but to reduce

corruption of politics, the law must shift from the offence to the behaviour of the persons.

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 Whether the defendant under such circumstances should be convicted for error or loss of

government funds entrusted to his/her care is a question for the court to interpret. So far, there has

not been any conviction for corruption made in error or loss, and possibly the law questions the

financial conducts of politically exposed persons in relation to squandering of funds in error or

loss. It would be interesting to see the law will punish offences for error or loss of public funds

and how the offences and sanctions for such behaviour will be set by legislation.

The challenge under the Nigerian constitution is that, first, corrupt offences such as

squandered public funds, siphoned public funds and looted public fund are not explicitly captured.

Second, to be convicted of corruption, the burden of proof lies on the prosecutor to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that the defendant has made personal gains from the proceeds of crime. Third,

the test of an honest politically exposed person is a factor when determining behaviour or when

differentiating criminal corrupt behaviour from error or loss.

It suffices that the political corruption script is about the honesty and integrity of politically

exposed persons, the importance of which cannot be overemphasised, because the honesty of PEPs

shapes the honesty of government and eventually reduces political corruption. Lawyer 2 gave an

example of how Umaru Dikko, a former Minister of Transport in 1983, fled Nigeria to London,

United Kingdom after stealing $1bn of government money (Last, BBC World Service, 12/11/12).

He said there are several examples of governors who have siphoned state funds to fund election

campaigns. Having won such elections, although civil society and international organisations have

provided evidence of their corrupt practice, the government has not successfully prosecuted them,

despite protests of civil society, public opinion and requests for investigation and prosecution.

This link to the trustworthiness of authorities is an important factor in determining whether

political corruption could be reduced. It was observed that 50% of respondents used words such

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as squandering, siphoning and looting of public funds interchangeably, which shows that there is

limited research on the offence of squandering, siphoning and looting of public funds in Nigeria.

These words have always contradicted the interpretation of corruption going by their literal

meanings. Respondents argued that ‘siphoning or looting’ is a crime of direct intent against the

state and a deliberate act against the state. However, they perceive squandering public funds with

no intention to make personal gains to be more of a behavioural crime compared to siphoning and

looting. This suggests that a Serious Offence Act be raised to address it equally. It further suggests

that a more robust AMLR legislation be enacted that will impose a duty of care in respect to

government funds entrusted to the care of government gatekeepers as a way of forestalling the

illicit flow of money.

4.2.6 Respondents’ perceptions of nepotism and political corruption

A large number of respondents perceived that nepotism is a major factor that influences political

corruption. They observed that when people are appointed to political positions through undue

influence peddling or nepotism, there is a tendency for them to be subdued through the power of

patronage by serving their principal or political party as opposed to serving the country. They made

references to how an appointed Inspector General of Police oppressed the opposition party,

members of the National Assembly and non-supporters of the ruling party. Members of the

National Assembly who were perceived not to support the government were accused of corruption

through the state’s instruments of police, fraud investigators and courts. Legislators 1 and 2

perceive injustice, intimidation, political persecution and criminalisation of all opponents of the

ruling party as a form of corruption. The effects of this include gestation of tyranny, victimisation,

harassment and political desperation.

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 The second observation of nepotistic political corruption is the ‘promoter and candidate’

relationship (‘godfather and godson’). Here the promoter funds the candidate by paying for the

candidate’s expression of interest and nomination form. For example, a Presidential position’s fee

is about NGN 10m; for a governor, NGN 5m; for the Senate, NGN 3.5m, and so on. The promoter

also pays for the candidate’s campaign materials, including TV, radio, website, social media, mail

and volunteer activities. The substance here is that after a successful election, the promoter, just

like every other promoter, wants his money back with interest (Adetula, 2015). These promoters

are usually high-level politically exposed persons (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Most politically

exposed persons have accepted the offence of wilfully causing unlawful corporate and

departmental contributions or funding, and of making such a contribution at the request of the

candidate or political group. As Legislator 2 said:

Some politically exposed persons have accepted that there is agreement between the

promoter and the candidate to reimburse the election funding with interest, once the

election is won.

The participant’s view is that political corruption in Nigeria is about ‘converting political

rules into money’. They also contended that politics in Nigeria is money-centric. It suffices to say

that such illegal transactional funding or requests for illegal campaign contribution should be

brought to trial (Electoral Act 2010). Here there is a demonstration of campaign finance rules being

knowingly broken and other rules replacing them which are not accepted electoral rules. In

conclusion, because party leaders, promoters, campaign managers and candidates sometimes break

these electoral rules at the direction or orders of the sitting president and/or politically exposed

persons, there is a prima-facie case of guilt subject to the constitution.

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4.2.7 Strategies to reduce corruption

Concerning strategies for reducing political corruption, respondents insisted that the rules of law

seems to be the best method of tackling corruption. One respondent, a registrar of the Federal High

Court of Abuja, said that there are national anti-corruption laws on the ground, but bending the

rules makes them ineffective to counter corruption. His observation is that to combat corruption

effectively, the rules of law, character and capacity are the best instruments for preventing political

corruption. The perception of the respondent is that people without capacity should not be

appointed into judicial positions or criminal justice office.

Lawyer 1 cited cases where:

In his establishment, where staff with low or no qualifications have been appointed to

positions or appointments with little or no knowledge and technical skills to deal with

financial management and compliance and with no knowledge of what constitutes

misconduct at the place of work, in some instances, such officers have been accused of

squandering public funds with little or no sanctions, because by squandering such funds

they showed no intention to make a personal gain, [and] therefore lack the ‘mens rea’ for

a corruption conviction. Such an officer will fail to understand serious anti-corruption

legislation.

The point here is that such appointments were usually not based on merit but political

patronage or settlement. It is the assumption that an appointment to high government offices should

be based on merit; similarly, continuous regulatory and compliance training is needed to keep staff

up to date with current anti-corruption legislations and punitive measures thereof. Lack of

technicality in the process of delivering justice seems to have brought about much delay in the

criminal justice system. Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary,

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politically exposed leaders have managed to assert undue influence on the judiciary; hence, the

judiciary remains prone to political pressure from the executive and legislative arms of the

government.

What was observed is that major factors that affected judiciary inefficiency include

underfunding, understaffing, lack of continuous professional training and lack of internal control

and supervision; these are major factors affecting anti-corruption trials. The wages of court

officials are low, they often lack proper training and equipment, and there are complains that

judges frequently fail to appear for court trials. On top of this is the widespread perception that

judges are easily bribed and claimants cannot trust the courts to deliver unbiased judgements. In

assumption, the judiciary must be properly reformed to be truly independent and free from political

interference. Challenges that were deduced from this interview include: low wages for the

judiciaries, underfunding, understaffing, lack of internal supervision, lack of continuous anti-

corruption training for staff and unavailability of modern court equipment.

4.2.8 Importance of education and training

With regards to education and training, it is revealed that the lack of a counter-corruption

curriculum is a major impediment; therefore, it is recommended that a counter-corruption

curriculum should be introduced in Nigeria institutions. Respondents observed that most counter-

fraud and -corruption practitioners, including members of the judiciary, politically exposed

persons and officeholders, have never had the opportunity to undergo counter-fraud or anti-

corruption training to understand the seriousness of corruption crime. They are also not pre-

informed of punishments, sanctions and the implications of corruption offences before or at the

start of their employment or tenure, hence the systematic corruption. It was observed that, if

politically exposed persons have mandatory anti-corruption training before elections, perhaps it

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would be a helpful deterrent or at least a corruption reduction strategy. Besides, the lack of counter-

fraud and -corruption departments in government institutions is a hindrance to an effective

corruption reduction strategy. If there were a special department dedicated to countering fraud and

corruption, such an office or department would be responsible for monitoring compliance,

regulating due diligence, data mining, management, risk and security control, and could be held

responsible for any irregularities arising. Essentially, the call for counter-fraud departments across

all government departments is a requisite in reducing political corruption. According to Prosecutor

5:

In our establishment, there is no department responsible for compliance and due diligence.

The lack of a counter-fraud and -corruption service in the establishment is a huge factor

in the massive corruption in the organisation because there are no officers responsible for

monitoring of financial crime. Perhaps if there were counter-fraud services, then whistle-

blowers could report fraud and/or corruption including bogus contracts.

The respondent, a fraud investigator, also said that one of the difficulties in stopping fraud

and corruption in many establishments across the nation is the lack of compliance officers in

government departments. If there were compliance officers, they could be held liable for any

malfeasance, including failure to protect the financial interests of an organisation. For example, in

2017, Western Union was convicted by US authorities for company oversight for certain agents

and whether their anti-fraud programmes, as well as their anti-money laundering control,

adequately prevented misconducts by his agents and third parties. This case is a demonstration of

the US government’s goal to control money laundering. Similarly, the Nigerian government could

introduce compliance and hold compliance agents liable when they are found in breach of anti-

corruption laws.

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4.3 Summary of Semi-Structured Interviews

This study was done using qualitative research methods, which include semi-structured interviews,

focus group discussions and documentary evidence (case studies), to seek data on strategies to use

to reduce political corruption in Nigeria. A total of 24 respondents were interviewed, and themes

covered varied topics as the researcher sought to provide background information before answers

were sought to other questions asked.

Several interview quotes were deduced from various participants in a bid to fully analyse

this chapter. In Interview 1, a lawyer quoted, ‘Reduce vote buying’; in Interview 2, ‘Too much

illicit money in the hands of PEPs’ was deduced. In Interview 1, a legislator spoke of ‘illicit money

in the control of government functionaries’. Further, a judge in Interview 2 quoted ‘illicit money

in the hands of PEPs’. In Interview 7, a prosecutor said ‘illicit money could fuel endemic

corruption’. In Interview 8, a lawyer quoted that ‘the rules of law must be applied’ to reduce

corruption. In Interview 2, a legislator stated, ‘The rule must shift from law to individual

behaviour.’

It was observed that different elements that are important for reduction of political

corruption were discussed, such as undue political influence (patronage or party affiliation);

judicial corruption and impunity; the importance of an electronic voting system; compliance and

regulation; and education and re-education of stakeholders in criminal justice and political

corruption. Suggestions on ways to apply the Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Regulation

(AMLR) in all federal government agencies were examined. Where fraud and corruption have

occurred, compliance officers could be responsible for investigation and prosecutions arising from

corruption; to ensure an effective approach in tackling most serious fraud and corruption.

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 Lack of compliance in a government department is a channel to uncontrolled corruption.

Seemingly, the lack of financial compliance services in government institutions dedicated to

preventing corruption at all levels has fuelled political corruption. Compliance officers comprise

a wide range of people with a variety of skills and professional backgrounds, including

accountants, cybercrime specialists and criminal justice professionals. First, compliance will use

a range of approaches and legislative powers to protect public funds, to investigate the corrupt and

to ensure strict compliance with the rules of law. Second, it will also identify and exploit

opportunities to remove government assets from criminals using a broad range of powers and

special capabilities. Third, it will work in conjunction with the wider law enforcement

communities to tackle fraud and corruption, and it will ultimately deter, disrupt and remove such

assets from criminals. Finally, compliance will serve as part of the national network of a special

branch of a crime team supporting both civil and criminal operations from a financial perspective

with the aim to maximise the recovery of assets both locally and internationally. Concerning how

adequate corruption sanctions are, it is believed that, if the sanctions are applied strictly

irrespective of political class, and without political, government and religious interference, they

will reduce political corruption.

Findings corroborated with aspects of institutional theory, which considers that corruption

is influenced by the character, design and transparency of the political system and its institutions.

At the same time, it acknowledges that the relationship between corruption, institutions, political

systems, culture and gender is highly complex (Debski et al., 2018; Stensöta, Wängnerud and

Svensson, 2015). Given the government’s inability to effectively handle corruption, there is an

increase in such practices, especially as politicians do their best to retain power by using the

proceeds of corruption to entrench themselves and their acolytes in power. There is a significant

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relationship between those in power in different levels of government and corruption’s

entrenchment in the Nigerian polity.

Aspects of game theory are also seen from findings obtained from the semi-structured

interviews. There is the involvement of most people in government in corrupt practices, which

agrees with Macrae’s (1982) suggestion that corruption is part of a rational calculus and an integral

and often deeply rooted method by which people take decisions. In this context, individuals face a

‘prisoner’s dilemma’, which ‘illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality’

(Kuhn, 2017). The individual fears a disadvantage if he refuses to engage in corrupt practices while

other individuals do not refuse to do so in the same situation. As a result, all individuals obtain

some sort of benefit, which, however, is always less than the benefit that each of them would have

obtained if they refused to engage in corrupt practices. Several corruption cases, especially in

government agencies, show complicity among public officers to defraud the nation through corrupt

practices. A good example is what occurs between members of the legislature who have taken over

functions of ministries under the oversight functions of members to further engage in corrupt

practices.

Variables identified are by no means comprehensive, and as such, further research is

required to investigate factors that determine a government’s decision to invest in anti-corruption

strategies. The focus primarily is analysis of data obtained through semi-structured interviews with

anti-corruption practitioners and dealing with political corruption: different types, reasons for it,

and ways it can be controlled. Accounts of judges and members of the National Assembly were

revealing on ways to reduce political corruption.

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 The next two chapters examine focus group discussions held and selected case studies that

will be presented and analysed. Following this, these different forms will be discussed and

conclusions will be drawn on strategies to use to reduce political corruption in Nigeria.

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 CHAPTER FIVE:

ANALYSIS OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

5.0 Introduction

From chapter four it was revealed that political corruption essentially includes extracting money

from the commonwealth of the nation, which specifically means siphoning money meant for the

development of the state, and for everybody’s benefit, to the ruling class/elite. Different kinds of

political corruption and strategies to tackle them were examined, which include electoral practices

that perpetuate politically exposed people in power.

This chapter sought to use focus groups to assess discussants’ understanding of issues

concerning political corruption, specifically from the perspectives of electoral malpractices and

ways through which they can be resolved, from their views, opinions, perceptions and depth of

understanding of issues raised. The discussants were purposively selected to address the different

themes that were raised from research questions asked at the beginning of the study. To reach a

diverse group of discussants, a range of members of the public were reached out to, from across

different classes of Nigerians of different ethnic groups, professions and diverse political

perspectives. This aspect of the study is not representative but aims to offer an in-depth insight

from discussants’ views and perceptions in different parts of Nigeria. The focus group discussion

clusters covered a range of Nigerians who are politically aware and know about happenings and

trends in Nigeria.

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5.1 Methodology

The primary method used for this study is the qualitative method and the use of focus group

discussions (FGDs), during which four focus group meetings were held at a particular venue but

at different times. The breakdown revealed that 44 discussants were used for the study, which

comprise men and women, with a total of 17 women and 27 men. The discussants represented the

six regions of Nigeria who participated in the political processes leading up to the 2019 General

Elections as they come from the six geo-political zones of Nigeria.

5.2 Data Collection Method

Table 2: FGDs held and participants

Zones Participants group Planned Actual Nos.

North Central Participants 12 10

South Participants 12 12

North East and South East Participants 12 12

North West and South West Participants 12 10

Total 48 44

Source: Field Survey 2019

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Table 3: Demographic information of participants

S/N Demographic Characteristics Variables Frequency TOTAL

1 Gender of participants Male 28

Female 16 44

2 Ethnic groups of participants Hausa/Fulani 08

Igbo 12

Yoruba 10

Others 14 44

3 Professions of participants Businesspeople 10

Lawyers 08

Civil servants 14

Politicians 06

Others 06 44

4 Work experience of participants 5–10 years 09

11–15 years 16

16–20 years 10

21 years and above 09 44

Source: Field survey, 2019

The purposive sampling method was used in the selection of the clusters. Working with my

supervisor, experts in qualitative research methods and scholars in political science, criminology

and political economy, besides other academics, were used to determine the sample size and cluster

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design and develop a standard baseline questionnaire, while a timetable was also scheduled for the

exercise. Discussions were carried out at different times with the help of tape recorders to record

the communication that took place in the course of the meetings. Notes were also taken to back up

audio recordings taken.

The principal investigator provided leadership and guidance, which were required to ensure

the quality of each exercise. A total of four (4) FGDs were conducted in the communities over a

four-week (one month) period. Discussants were made up of adults (35 and above), including

businesspeople, lawyers, civil and public officers, and others.

Open-ended questions were asked, whereby discussants were not restricted to predefined

categories but were allowed to express themselves freely and share their experiences without being

constrained or restrained by such categorisations. This is appropriate given the qualitative

approach adopted for the study. The findings were aimed at answering research questions asked

on strategies that are adopted against political corruption. The researcher believed that valid

conclusions could be drawn from discussants’ experiences as their responses were given as

truthfully and openly as they could. Ordinary Nigerian citizens who make up members of the

electorate in the polity were selected because their responses would ordinarily be objective and

neutral without undue partisanship.

The researcher sought for different individuals with different political biases; these were

reached through the focus groups for the sake of gleaning truths which can be properly analysed

for findings for the study. As such, participants’ opinions are likely to differ in certain respects.

For example, some participants’ opinions might be subjective given their political interests. To

reach across to the different kinds of respondents required for the focus groups discussions, it was

important to engage people in at least four different geopolitical zones of Nigeria, as this would

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give the researcher access to a larger number of potential interviewees. However, it took far longer

than we had initially anticipated to recruit discussants and conduct the study.

5.3 Focus Group Discussion Procedure

Each meeting for the discussants’ interviews began with icebreakers, exploring trending issues

over snacks and drinks. The normal meeting/interview period was one hour and 45 minutes, but

they could last between one and two hours. The sizes of each group were between ten and twelve

participants, but most groups had ten members. All the groups were presented with similar opening

comments, but follow-up questions were different depending on the dialogue itself.

The focus group interviews were moderated by the researcher. The participants were

introduced and the processes and procedure explained to them. The consent form was signed by

the participants and they were told how and who to complain to should they wish to do so. The

recording equipment and refreshments were all set up. Afterwards, a brief introduction was given

which included a background, ground rules and interview decorum.

5.4 Responses from Focus Groups

Views and opinions of participants in the different focus groups that are relevant to the different

themes raised are stated below, and relevant contributions from different contributors will be used

to answer research questions raised earlier in chapter one.

5.4.1 Perceptions of electoral processes in Nigeria

In Focus Group 1, it was unanimously agreed that as long as violators of electoral laws are not

prosecuted and punished/penalised we will continue to have issues with election malpractices and

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electoral fraud. It is the loopholes in the electoral process that criminals use to rig the process of

credible elections to secure political advantage which eventually leads to opportunities to commit

political corruption whilst in office. According to Participant 3, Group 1:

Electoral laws guiding elections are good, but the problem is with their implementation.

Our politicians are very greedy, and they can go to any extent to win elections, or those of

their own people. They do not want to hear anything apart from winning, in fact, stealing

the votes of the people. As such, genuine electoral ballot box votes do not guarantee

winners of elections; what guarantees winners of elections in Nigeria is somewhat who

spends the highest money to buy votes or elections.

Some other participants said it is important to review the electoral framework in order to have a

free and fair election in Nigeria, because the electoral process in Nigeria has been adjudged as

being skewed throughout Nigeria’s political history. They further observed that the electoral

process has witnessed violence in different parts of the country. For the country to enjoy the

benefits of democracy, then, the country must have an electoral reform. According to Participant

4, Group 1:

For elections to be free and fair, and for the common Nigerian to enjoy benefits of

democracy which have eluded us since the inception of democratic rule in 1999, there is

the need for a change of attitude by political office holders, their agents, and those nursing

such ambitions. Laws and guidelines need to be examined to stop unpatriotic politicians

from gaining or continuing in power.

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According to Participant 10, Group 1:

To my mind, there should be a radical change to laws and systems guiding elections at

all levels in the country. Greedy politicians only wait for elections to make fake promises

which they do not fulfil. And though the laws are there, they are not obeyed. Something

radical needs to be done. Those charged with the elections, and any government in power

at the time, should attempt to be democratic and allow the people’s will to prevail.

According to Participant 5, Group 4:

From 1999, rigging of elections has gone unstoppable and uncontrolled. Even INEC is

struggling with conducting credible elections. If INEC cannot conduct free and fair

elections, then there is a need for a change. A new electoral system is needed in the form

of restructuring or reform of the current electoral system, given the complicated nature of

the electoral system in Nigeria. Apart from rigging, there is also the issue of interference

by the ruling political elite or cartel, by tampering with election results.

According to Participant 4, Group 2:

An example of the need for electoral reforms is seen in the case of Ihedioha v. Uzodinma

and INEC (2019); the electoral body decided to declare the PDP candidate Ihedioha the

winner of the 2019 governorship elections in Imo state, having disregarded the complaint

by the defendant Uzodinma that 388 electoral units were not counted amongst the declared

results. This claim was not disputed at the electoral tribunal; the tribunal upheld the

election results. The case went on to the Appeals Court, and at the Appeals Court there

was a split judgment of two judges to one, so it was the majority decision of the Court of

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 Appeal that upheld the election of Mr Emeka Ihedioha. However, at the Supreme Court,

the minority decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld; in other words, the results from

the 388 units that were ignored by the electoral body (INEC), and ignored by the electoral

tribunal as the court of first instance, which was further ignored by the Appeals Court, was

the basis of the Supreme Court judgment which overturned the election results. It was held

that the missing 388 units’ results should have been calculated and that the electoral body

illegally ignored the results of 388 units that were not included amongst the declared

results. Interestingly, the defendant brought witnesses to tender evidence for those 388

electoral units; a policeman was also brought to tender the original result held by the local

police at the first instance court and at the Appeals Court which was ignored. So in

electoral disputes, when the evidence and facts are laid before the court, the court has no

choice but to arrive at a conclusion based on the evidence before the court. Had the

electoral process been done electronically, the reverse would have been the case, whereby

the entire votes would have been collected electronically without any dispute.

Members of Group 3 were united in their condemnation of the use of the military to rig elections.

According to Participant 1, Group 3:

The foundation to the use of the military and other security personnel in elections was laid

in 2007. In 2007, we had a worst situation of the military involvement in elections. In the

case of Obasanjo vs Buhari (2007), the Supreme Court pointed out, particularly Justice

Acholonu, that what happened was not an election but a horrendous intimidation of

Nigerian people, and that the military should have nothing to do with our elections. In this

judgment, by common law, the Supreme Court had set precedents by banning the military

from interfering with all electoral process. Similarly, in 2014/2015, the APC as an

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 opposition party went to court in three cases (Abuja, Sokoto and Lagos) and recorded

judgments to the effect that the military should not be involved in our elections.

Continuing, Participant 4, Group 3 observed that:

In Femi Gbajabiamila vs President Jonathan & others (2015), the Federal High Court

sitting in Lagos, Southwest Nigeria restrained the President Goodluck Jonathan-led

Federal Government from deploying the military to supervise the coming general elections.

The Presiding Judge, Justice Ibrahim Buba, in his ruling, declared that it is

unconstitutional to deploy military for the supervision of elections without the approval of

the National Assembly. The ruling of the court was sequel to a suit filed by Femi

Gbajabiamila, a member of the House of Representatives representing Surulere Federal

Constituency 2 under the platform of All Progressive Congress, APC, against President

Goodluck Jonathan, Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Chief of

Naval Staff and the Attorney General of the Federation.

According to Participant 2, Group 3, the military has no place in elections, as several judgments

have been obtained that have ruled that they should not be involved in elections:

In the case of Bello Goronyo vs President Goodluck Jonathan (2015), the Federal High

Court in Sokoto, Northwest Nigeria had on Thursday 29 January, 2015, outlawed the use

of the military for election duty across Nigeria. The court ruled on the lingering

controversy and declared the use of soldiers as unconstitutional. Justice Mohammed

Rilwanu Aikawa ruled that other than for the purposes of protecting the nation’s territorial

integrity, no constitutional provision allows for the deployment of the military for elections.

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 The suit challenging the deployment of the military for election duties was instituted by the

Deputy Speaker of the House of Assembly, Bello Goronyo, representing Goronyo

Constituency in Sokoto State. Justice Rilwan added that for the Federal Government to do

so, it must have taken recourse to the National Assembly, which would enact such laws.

Further, Justice Aikawa restrained the President and INEC ‘from engaging the service of

the Nigerian Armed Forces in the security supervision of elections in any manner

whatsoever in any part of Nigeria without an Act of the National Assembly’. Similarly,

Justice Abdul Aboki, in his lead judgment in the Ekiti State Governorship Elections appeal

delivered on February 16, 2015, held that ‘even the President of Nigeria has no powers to

call on the Nigerian Armed Forces and to unleash them on peaceful citizens, who are

exercising their franchise to elect their leaders’.

5.4.2 Perceptions of the effectiveness of sanctions

On the issue of sanctions for electoral offenders, participants were asked their views and

recommendations concerning such issues. Most observed that as part of reforms of the key

components of the Electoral Act, they would like to see an effective sanction of those who violate

the electoral laws of the country. Most of the participants agreed that the first step to reduce

political corruption in general is to find a way of penalising electoral offenders so that impunity

can at best be reduced or even eliminated completely. As Participant 2, Group 1 observed:

There is the need for a change in the electoral system, either at the political parties’ levels,

the electoral umpire and polling centres. There is a need for a change and offenders should

be punished. If some lessons are taught to offenders, maybe others will learn and some

changes will be made in the system. Any country that does not penalise electoral offenders

is open to criminals who use electoral crimes as a first step to capture power for self-gain.

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Different participants from all the focus groups reiterated that by listening to the majority of

Nigerians, it was clear that a review of the Electoral Act, and other electoral legal frameworks in

general, must be directed towards combating incidents of violation and sundry malpractices in the

electoral process. It is also important that electoral violators or violators of electoral laws are

effectively punished. They also suggest that the government must develop and deploy technology

in electoral processes. According to Participant 9, Group 1:

Part of the problems we have is that our politicians never retire! They do everything they

can to remain in power. And they are very desperate and go to any length for it.

Governments should be made less attractive for the kind of rulers we have now. There

should be reforms which will enable INEC and the Judiciary to ban certain corrupt

politicians. To make sure that this is achieved, the laws should be changed, and if the

technology can be improved to make sure that votes count, that should be done.

All the participants in Group 2 agreed that the extent of political corruption is attributed to vote

buying and vote selling. According to Participant 6, Group 2:

Buying of votes is tantamount to buying of elections results and is a great danger to

democracy. For example, the International Election Monitoring Committee expressed

concern over the recent increase in the visibility of ‘vote buying’ in the country, especially

in the recently concluded elections in Ekiti State, Nigeria. Vote buying is an electoral

offence; it undermines the legitimacy of an election and weakens democracy. Many polling

units across the country witnessed vote buying and bribery on Election Day.

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As Participant 8, Group 2 observed:

Poverty, deception, frustration, low performance of electoral representatives and low

awareness among voters contributed to the increase in vote buying since 2015. The lack of

punishment and enforcement for this offence has contributed to an increase in vote buying.

Honestly, vote buying is a frightening development in recent elections.

Participant 3, Group 2 pointed out:

The electoral laws will strengthen anti-corruption laws. The court has consistently held

that until the link is established between the winner of the elections and those who took

money from agents, candidates or political party, it will stall conviction of suspected vote-

buying (political party, agents and candidates). With regards to sanctions on electoral

malpractices, no conviction so far has been recorded, despite the more than 2000 arrests

recorded by the Nigerian Police, so it is difficult to make an honest judgment as regards

sanctions in electoral malpractices.

According to Participant 11, Group 2:

In the case of Falana V Obasanjo (1999), the Appeal Court held that even though there

was evidence that money, bags of rice and bags of salts were allegedly distributed by the

PDP, there was no evidence to prove that the beneficiary of the inducements (Obasanjo)

directed the party to distribute any form of gift for the elections. Since then, the onus of

proof of vote buying has been shifted to the claimant, to prove that the beneficiaries of the

inducement directly gave instruction for inducement; so as to establish guilt. Under

Statutory Law, by virtue of section 124 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), any form

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 of inducement, be it money, gifts or even promise for inducements, is a criminal offence.

However, since 1999 till now no convictions for inducement have been secured, despite all

the political inducements witnessed during general elections.

As observed by Participant 5, Group 4:

Because of loopholes in the electoral system in Nigeria, politicians use such to help

themselves to national patrimony and loot the national treasuries and fund elections in

order to capture power. In African countries a regime or group of politically exposed

persons can remain in power for as long as possible; it then became necessary to loot the

system and invest the proceeds of crime in electoral malpractices to retain power.

Therefore, to reduce political corruption it could be necessary to address first reform [of]

the electoral process to [an] electronic voting system.

Most participants were of the view that the introduction of an electronic voting system is something

the political elites have consistently rejected because it will eliminate the loophole that keeps them

in the position to corrupt the electoral system.

5.4.3 Perceptions of the influence of culture on corruption

The majority of the focus group discussants agreed that politically exposed persons and their

agents are responsible for large-scale malpractices, widespread corruption and violence that mar

general elections in the country. They noted that politically exposed persons continue to invent

methods of compromising electoral processes through vote buying and selling, buying up

Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs) of registered voters in the political ‘safe haven’ of their opponents

before the elections, and compromising security agents and the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC), who turn a blind eye while all these malpractices are being executed.

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According to Participant 6, Group 1:

We have witnessed moneybag politically exposed persons buying over agents of other

political parties who compromised and betrayed their own political parties for cash at the

election polling units. Further, there are instances where members of the electorate were

made to surrender their PVCs to intermediaries as a prerequisite for accessing government

amenities and facilities in their constituencies.

There are instances where politically exposed persons compromise traditional rulers, religious

leaders and community leaders by persuading them to sway voters under their command or control

in a particular way.

According to Participant 4, Group 1:

Part of the problems is that politicians use people’s attitudes to culture to corrupt us. It is

common for people to expect and receive gifts and money from ‘big men’ and other rich

people. So, when these politicians give, some people don’t know that it is for votes, and

during elections, their conscience will not allow them to vote for their people. Sometimes,

hunger will make us blind!

According to Participant 1, Group 4:

The culture of the indigenous people can influence corruption for the following reasons:

first, gift [giving] is built in to the cultural practice of the local people. So when politicians

present money in exchange for votes, honestly speaking, for the poor people and most

indigent people, they would not recognise such practices as corrupt practice unless there

is proper orientation and anti-corruption education to inform the local communities about

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 the negative effect and, more importantly, the legal implications and sanctions of such

offences.

According to Participant 6, Group 3:

Politicians are found to be persuading INEC ad-hoc staff to abandon the use of smart card

readers in exchange for social amenities and cash close to the Election Day. Politically

exposed persons corrupt INEC ad-hoc staff that are charged with the conduct of elections

on election days.

As a follow-up to this response, participants were asked if politicians carry money about on

election days. According to Participant 1, Group 1:

Yes, that is what is called moneybag politicking. Some of the offenders petitioned are before

the Electoral Tribunal; how the Tribunal will handle these petitions shall expose gaps,

pending on the establishment of a designated body for the purpose of prosecuting electoral

offences.

5.4.4 Perceptions of penalties for political corruption

According to Participant 7, Group 1:

The prescribed penalties for electoral offences are not strong enough to deter electoral

offenders; for example, it is absurd where the law prescribed NGN 500,000.00 as

punishment for persons caught with unlawful possession of firearms and other dangerous

weapons during elections.

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Some participants observed that the immunity clause that governors enjoy enables them to commit

political crimes and corruption without punishment. As a result, they are able to avoid any form

of punishment the law prescribes. According to Participant 1, Group 1:

Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution provides immunity for a sitting governor and their

deputies when they commit [an] offence – for example, in Rivers and Kano States where

sitting governors committed electoral infractions during the governorship elections but

could not be prosecuted because of constitutional immunity protecting them from

prosecution as prescribed under section 308 of the 1999 constitution.

5.4.5 Perceptions on use of electoral violence to rig elections

All the focus group participants agreed that electoral violence is currently a major form of political

corruption in Nigeria. According to Participant 3, Group 1:

Another problem that I observed is that law enforcement agents, such as members of the

police force on election duty, lack the constitutional right to bear firearms around polling

units. This makes it impossible for police personnel on election duties to confront armed

political hoodlums who attack voters and disrupt the election process in some parts of the

country during general elections.

As Participant 4, Group 1 noted:

Take for an example Mr Rochas Okorocha, a former governor who contested for the Senate

under the APC. During the collation and announcing of the election results of 23 February

2019, Mr Okorocha was recorded on audiotape violently assaulting the electoral returning

officer over declaring him the winner, regardless of the election results. This unlawful

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 action constitutes an election malpractice; consequently, the Independent National

Electoral Commission (INEC) had to remove Mr. Okorocha from the list of Senators Elect,

citing that the latter was declared winner of the election ‘under duress’ without further

punishment. Surprisingly, INEC is not talking about prosecuting Mr Rochas Okorocha for

electoral violence, [nor] many other electoral violence suspects that have been reported to

the police and other law enforcement agents across the country.

From Focus Group 2, Participant 3, while reflecting on election scenes in Rivers State and some

other states, said:

You would think a war was going on. I think this cannot be what the Constitution had

expected to be a free exercise of the franchise of our people. But again, it doesn’t seem to

be totally taken aback because we had repeatedly maintained that unless you combat and

deal with official impunity that characterises our society and elections in particular, you

cannot get out of this monumental mess. Some of those who are now shouting and alleging

electoral malfeasance were in power until recently. And they enjoyed extremely the

manipulation of the electoral system. We can all recall in this country when some persons

said they were going to be in power for 100 years. They knew that Nigerians were not

going to vote for them, they knew that it was impossible, but they felt they were going to

continue to manipulate the electoral system to keep them perpetually in power. That did

not happen in 2015 elections. Nonetheless for sixteen years under the previous government

(PDP), elections were made do-or-die affairs. In fact, it was pronounced by a sitting

President that elections were going to be do-or-die affairs for the ruling party. And indeed,

it was, because in 2003 over two hundred persons were killed in the 2003 elections.

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According to Participant 3, Group 3:

Soldiers were deployed in violation of existing, valid and subsisting court judgments. It is

laughable when the Chief of Army Staff said he was setting up a panel to investigate the

military involvement in the 2019 elections, particularly in Rivers State and all the affected

states of the Federation where the military were heavily deployed for electoral processes.

In Rivers State, for example, military involvement led to the killing of about 21 persons

including soldiers. The question raised here is: does the Army have any business in

elections?

According to Participant 1, Group 4:

Election violence has been a political tool in Nigeria for decades. In 1999, the general

elections were marred by violence, intimidation, rigging, and announcing of false results.

Election violence has been more brutal in developing countries, despite the shift from

military to civil regimes. Generally, election violence has been facilitated by unemployment

and the wide spread of armed groups who are willing to be hired by politically exposed

persons to intimidate opponents. In the absence of serious legislations against electoral

violence, it has gradually become part of the accepted or allowed form of political

competition in almost all parts of the country.

According to Participant 4, Group 4:

The low turnout of voters can be attributed to threats to the opposition party and to

innocent citizens, who do not feel safe to come out to vote, ultimately leading to boycotting

of polls, hence the resulting elections never reflect the overall voice of the electorate. There

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 are serious and growing concerns about the government’s inability to criminalise political

violence, because occasionally both leading politicians and innocent victims, including

women and children, are the ones that suffer most.

According to Participant 2, Group 4:

Throughout the thirty years of military rule in Nigeria, on no occasion was the military

involved in the conduct of elections. Security was provided by police and other

paramilitary forces, so to now have a situation where the military will be used for an

election or take over election collation centres, as was recorded in many general elections

in Nigeria, is clearly disturbing.

According to Participant 3, Group 1:

It’s part of the malpractices which take place during elections. When a godfather or

politician is desperate to win a seat or position, they go all out by any means to engage in

vote rigging, either through bribes or violent means. These are acts of desperation carried

out by desperate politicians at every level in the country.

From participants’ responses, it is obvious that in constituencies where politicians or their patrons

are not winning or going to win as it is, they think the best action is to disrupt the elections in those

areas, so that the election in those parts of the constituencies will be cancelled. Once it is cancelled,

then a rerun will give them an advantage to rig the elections or go to the election tribunals to rig

the election through judicial process.

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5.4.6 Suggestions on strategies to reduce political corruption

According to Participant 8, Group 1:

We need a total restructuring of the electoral system in the country. For example, law

enforcement agents lack the spirit of nationalism and patriotism; conversely, politically

exposed persons who are beneficiaries of electoral malpractices lack the political will to

make the required electoral reforms. Succinctly, this situation calls for an urgent electoral

reform, to prescribe stiff electoral penalties for electoral offences.

Like her, all other participants in this group called for a restructuring of the electoral system and

adherence to laws guiding such by electoral officers and the government. They suggested that the

government lacks the political will to implement the laws to the letter as they are also beneficiaries

of the corruption.

On what can be done to make election processes better, Participant 5, Group 2 said:

The INEC Chairman has raised the need to have a conversation on the issue of election

management. Look at the outcome of many elections, including the 2019 General

Elections: that it has been extremely worrisome because we never thought in our wildest

imagination when we were in the barricades fighting to get the military off our back. We

thought that electoral process would be conducted in accordance with the law. From what

we are seeing since 1999, the Nigerian political class appears determined to capture power

using the electoral process, and destroy the future of our youths, and expose Nigeria as a

country to ridicule before the comity of nations.

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According to Participant 1, Group 2:

I mean, you had elections monitored by people from all over the world, and what did they

witness? Vote buying, snatching of ballot boxes, reckless killings, unwarranted

intimidation and harassment of voters and the populace at large were witnessed by the

international election monitoring community.

Most participants in Group 1 felt that there were really no ways that political corruption can be

reduced or stopped without the strengthening of the different institutions that deal with it, such as

INEC and the judiciary. According to Participant 7, Group 1:

Having known that votes will count in their success, to occupy political positions and to

capture states or communities, politically exposed persons have resorted to vote buying

from indigent voters. Their targets are vulnerable civil servants, particularly teachers in

some states who earn as little as NGN 7,000.00 as monthly income, and some vulnerable

voters who do not have sources of income; in such situations, indigent voters could not

resist a financial offer for a vote, regardless of law or morality. Here, politically exposed

persons have taken advantage of the poor, the law and the system.

Continuing in the same vein, Participant 5, Group 1 noted that:

Such a situation is saddening because members of the electorate cannot hold their leaders

accountable since they are compromised. Further, a compromised electoral process

cannot produce transparent and competent leaders or good governance. On the other end,

the Elections Tribunal and courts are helping the matter by condoning electoral petition

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 practice, where billions of NGN are spent on election matters as against the provision of

the Electoral Act 2010.

According to Participant 2, Group 1:

Drawing from electoral experiences in Nigeria, it could be said that electoral reforms

which include electronic voting is necessary at this point – particularly, sections 149 and

150 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which particularly dealt with electoral offences

and create additional offences that were not prescribed by law to create a robust anti-

electoral offences framework. A new electoral offences bill must be urgently drafted to

include provision for the creation of electoral offences tribunals or a special court of

tribunals for the prosecution of electoral offences. With hope, this new electoral reform

bill will give Nigerians a renewed assurance that on election days, votes will be counted.

According to Participant 6, Group 4:

It is important to review the electoral framework in order to have free and fair elections in

Nigeria. The electoral process has witnessed violence in different parts of the country. So,

for the country to enjoy the benefit of democracy, the country must have an electoral

reform. Electoral reforms which include electronic voting [are] necessary at this point.

Particularly, sections 149 and 150 of the Electoral Act 2010 which particularly dealt with

electoral offences and create additional offences that were not prescribed by law to create

a robust anti-electoral offence framework. A new electoral offences bill must be urgently

drafted to include provision for the creation of electoral offences tribunal or a special court

of tribunals for the prosecution of electoral offences. With hope, this new electoral reform

will give Nigerians a renewed assurance that on elections days, votes will be counted.

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According to Participant 12, Group 2:

It has been generally agreed that to stop electoral offences and collusion between electoral

offenders and the government, either at the Federal level or State level, we should have an

electoral offences tribunal that deals with electoral offenders. But the government has not

shown any interest in establishing [an] electoral offences tribunal, hence electoral offences

are on the increase. So that to reduce corruption of election there is a need for

restructuring or electoral reforms going forward.

According to Participant 8, Group 3:

The best way to reduce election malpractice is to introduce an electronic voting system,

because the electronic voting system will remove all forms of political violence associated

with politicking; it will remove election malpractices and more importantly it will remove

the military from participating in politics because in the past the military has been used to

subvert elections and the court in their wisdom overturned the result by INEC and declared

the defendant the legitimate winner of a rigged election (Oshiomhole V PDP, 2007, 18

NWLR).

But according to Participant 10, Group 1:

The people have been taken for granted for a long time. There is the need for members of

the electorate, including the media, civil societies and everybody, to stand up for what is

right. When everybody does, irrespective of the violence and intimidations faced, political

corruption can be curbed. The country belongs to all of us, and not to those in government

who take us for granted.

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All the participants in focus group 2 agreed that free and fair electoral process is the best way to

keep the political criminals out of government. According to Participant 5, Group 2:

Electoral malpractice is being redefined through supplementary elections, reruns or

cancellations, which are meant to occur as a result of [an] Act of God or other things

beyond the control of INEC. But it is being used as a political weapon and a strategy of

politically exposed persons to capture power, especially the ruling party. The parties and

politicians now use it when they suspect they will lose elections in any state or constituency.

People see the cancellation of the February 23, 2019 presidential elections barely five

hours before the polls, and the subsequent cancellation of elections in seventeen states of

the Federation, as rigging because these were done in the opposition parties’ strongholds.

Continuing, he made the following observation:

If consideration is given to the sizes of the cancelled states in the stronghold and a strong

military presence to influence the elections results in favour during the re-run elections, it

will be realised that the elections were rigged. With the shift in the way supplementary, re-

run or even cancellation of elections is used to rig elections, it is clearly an abuse of the

constitutional provision of the law. Therefore, to reduce political corruption in terms of

electoral malpractices in Nigeria, this must be the starting point, seeking for a way to

redefine the provisions of the electoral laws in order to protect positions that could be used

to commit corrupt practices. As a result, there is an urgent need to introduce [an]

electronic voting system where political criminals cannot tamper or buy people’s votes.

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According to Participant 8, Group 3:

Under the leadership of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the late President Yardua

did admit publicly in 2007 that the election that brought him into office was highly flawed

and that Nigeria as a nation must address the manipulation of the election process. He set

up [the] Mohammed Uwais Electoral Reform Panel. The panel did come up with a

profound recommendation, but the recommendation was not implemented. President

Jonathan set up a Sheikh Lemu Electoral Reform Panel after the post-election violence in

2011. Again, the panel reiterated the recommendations of the Uwais report and made

further recommendations given the fact that over 800 persons were killed in the North and

in 2011 by election violence. However, these recommendations were abandoned.

According to Participant 2, Group 3:

President Buhari set up the Ken Nnamani Panel for Electoral Reforms; the Panel

reiterated the earlier recommendations of Uwais and Lemu and made additional

recommendations. The report has also been ignored. All the recommendations have been

put aside by the PDP and APC governments. So, if we want to get out of these crises of

monumental dimension, we need to go back to these recommendations going forward. The

recent deliberate deployment of soldiers for election duties in states controlled by the

opposition parties (PDP) to subvert electoral process has further damaged the credibility

of the military. Such conduct by the military to subvert the express will of the electorates

can amount to political corruption or coup. In the eyes of the law, this could be corruption;

first in Rivers State, the military were not deployed to maintain law and order or to protect

the integrity of the election, because there was no security threat; second, there were no

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 anticipated threats to the electoral process considering that the ruling party has been

barred by the Court from participating in the election process, thus removing the

possibility of violence. It was clear that since the ruling party had been barred from fielding

any candidate for the Governorship and state’s House of Assembly election, the ruling

party (APC) has adopted another party (AAC) by proxy and has colluded with the military

to subvert the election in favour of the AAC, who will later decamp to the ruling party

(APC), who will control the state.

According to Participant 6, Group 3:

In Oyetola V Ademola Adeleke (26/3/2019), the claimant contested for Governorship

election in Osun state having lost the election on 22 September 2018, brought an action in

the election tribunal seeking the tribunal to declare him the winner because the ruling party

have used the military and other security forces to subvert and rigged the electoral process

in their favour. Held; the Tribunal by majority judgment voided the election of Oyetola

(APC) and pronounced Adeleke (PDP) winner having found evidence of election

malpractices.

5.4.7 Perceptions of INEC’s re-run of elections in cancelled communities

According to Participant 4, Group 1:

The political corruption is systemic because there are loopholes in the electoral system

and the politically exposed persons are taking advantages of such gaps, one of such being

moneybag politics, which is prevalent and unchecked. Candidates indicted for corruption

and electoral-related offences by election petition tribunals or a competent court are

allowed to take part in an election process. It seems inequitable to allow criminals who

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 have pending corruption trials or those indicted for electoral offences to take part in polls;

such is tantamount to rewarding criminality. You could see that all the former governors,

former House members all who have pending corruption trials were allowed to re-run

election, because being head of government they are able to loot the treasury and use the

fund to invest in retaining power.

According to Participant 3, Group 2:

Legally speaking, INEC cannot on its own cancel an election. If an election was conducted

and there were malpractices then an electoral tribunal has the constitutional power to

cancel the election; that is the legal position. It was wrong when INEC tampers with the

integrity and process by setting an agenda that is not allowed in the electoral process run

according to the constitutional proviso or having the institution run with integrity.

All the participants in Group 2 argued that the legal process of conducting elections fell

short in the 2007, 2015, and 2019 general elections. According to Participant 4, Group 2:

INEC should have truly been independent and competent in managing the elections in

compliance with the Electoral Act of 2010. What INEC has done concerning supplementary

elections, and all its acts and barrages, shows that it has been bought over. Currently, civil

societies and lawyers are suggesting that supplementary elections should be scrapped from

the electoral process. Regardless, INEC shouldn’t have tried to fix what was wrong with

the electoral process because the law ‘presumes that there will be non-compliance or

malfeasant or reversal of process that was not done according to the law’. Therefore, INEC

should stop being a court of justice before such matters are taken to the tribunal; otherwise,

INEC should conduct an election whether it is free and fair or not, and let the aggrieved

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 parties seek remedies in the election tribunal, rather than being the court by cancelling the

election and seeking a rerun election. Cancelling the election can indict the managers of

the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) with a severe penalty.

All the participants agreed that this is a grey area that needs an urgent reform or restructure in

order to reduce political corruption.

5.5 Thematic Analysis of Focus Group Responses

This section attempts to identify the key themes that arise from the focus group interviews.

Findings from interviews are usually presented under headings that reflect the main themes that

have guided the analysis. These themes also align with the objectives or research questions

(Rowley, 2012). Chapters four and five are the empirical chapters of the thesis. Selected quotes

that are significant and most representative of the research findings are reviewed and used to

explore the evidence from the groups interview. For Merriam (2009), qualitative research lays

emphasis on the significance of context, and in making sense of the data the analysis must take

cognizance of the experiences, understandings, and interpretations of the participants’ accounts

(King & Horrocks, 2010; Merriam, 2009).

5.5.1. Perceptions of electoral processes in Nigeria

With regards to the research question on electoral process in Nigeria, according to Participant 3,

Group 1, lack of the implementation of electoral laws and guidelines has led to the abuse of

electoral processes. For Participant 4, Group 1: ‘For elections to be free and fair, and for the

common Nigerians, there is the need for a change of attitude by political office holders and their

agents.’ This assertion could be backed up by the literature review: according to Dumbili, the

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election that proceeded was filled with electoral malpractices, which occurred throughout the

whole electoral process (Dumbili & Sofadekan, 2016: 82.).

Further, according to Participant 10, Group 1, there should be a radical change to laws and

systems guiding elections at all levels in the country. These views were further echoed by

Participant 5, Group 4: who stated that ‘from 1999, rigging of election has gone unstoppable and

uncontrolled. Even the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) is struggling with

conducting credible elections.’ An example of the need for electoral reforms was cited by

Participant 4, Group 2 in the case of Ihedioha v Uzodinma and INEC (2019); in this case the

electoral body decided to declare the PDP candidate Ihedioha the winner of the 2019 governorship

elections in Imo state, having disregarded the total vote cast in the constituency. For Salihu,

electoral malpractices also includes the diversion of election materials as well as the switching or

theft of ballot boxes (Salihu & Gholami, 2018). Here we can see a clear link with the literature,

where Luhrmann claims that election malpractices provide significant barriers for the credibility

of a good government (Lührmann, 2018).

The view of this group is that had the electoral process been done electronically, the reverse

would have been the case, whereby all the votes would have been collected electronically without

any dispute. Participant 1, Group 3, further deduced that the legal position with regards to use of

the military and other security personnel in elections was laid in 2007, citing the case of Obasanjo

vs Buhari (2007), where the Supreme Court banned the military from interfering with all electoral

process. It was also reiterated by Participant 3, Group 3, that the deployment of soldiers in elections

in violation of existing, valid, and subsisting court judgments is a concern and could make the

elections voidable. This was corroborated by Participant 2, Group 3, who further cited that several

judgments had been secured against military involvement in elections: for example, in the case of

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Bello Goronyo vs President Goodluck Jonathan (2015), the Federal High Court in Sokoto,

Northwest Nigeria had outlawed the use of the military for election duty across Nigeria. Similarly,

in the Ekiti State Governorship Elections appeal delivered on February 16, 2015, it was held that

‘even the President of Nigeria has no powers to call on the Nigerian Armed Forces and to unleash

them on peaceful citizens, who are exercising their franchise to elect their leaders’.

5.5.2. Perceptions of the effectiveness of sanctions

Following the question on sanctions, Participant 2, Group 4, stated, ‘There is the need for a change

in the electoral system either at the political parties’ levels […] and polling centres’. According

to Participant 9, Group 1, there should be electoral reforms which will enable INEC and the

judiciary to ban certain corrupt politicians. For Participant 6, Group 2, buying of votes is

tantamount to buying of elections results and is a great danger to democracy. As Luhrmann points

out, electoral malpractices are common and have been a frequent practice through all the elections

that have been held in the country (Lührmann, 2018). The perception of Participant 8, Group 2, is

that ‘The lack of punishment and enforcement for this offence has contributed to an increase in

vote buying’. According to Participant 3, Group 2, ‘The electoral laws will strengthen anti-

corruption laws’. Participant 5, Group 4: said that ‘the loopholes in the electoral system in Nigeria

could be exploited for self-gain and personal interest’. It could be argued that all these assertion

and quotes have been reflected in the literature on pages 82, 83 and 84.

5.5.3. Perceptions of the influence of culture on corruption

In terms of corruption culture, according to Participant 4, Group 1: ‘Part of the problems is that

politicians use people’s attitudes to culture to corrupt us’. This was further supported by

Participant 1, Group 4, who reiterated that ‘the culture of the indigenous people can influence

corruption’ through the culture of gift giving, which is part of indigenous cultural practice.

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5.5.4. Perceptions of penalties for political corruption

According to Participant 7, Group 1: ‘The prescribed penalties for electoral offences are not strong

enough to deter electoral offenders.’ According to Participant 1, Group 1: ‘Section 308 of the 1999

Constitution provides immunity for a sitting governor and their deputies when they commit

offence’, which could be used as a shield for corruption prosecution; this assertion is backed up in

the work of Markovska, when he finds that the corruption of the political elite has led to the abuse

of the constitutional immunity clause, granted under Section 508 of the 1999 Constitution

(Markovska and Adams, 2015).

From this and the preceding section, it could be deducted that the culture of gift giving and

the continuous abuse of constitutional immunity legislation are parts of a culture that is perceived

to influence corruption.

5.5.5. Perceptions on use of electoral violence to rig elections

Various academic literature has established that most elections that were held after 1965 were in

more oppressive conditions. It was cited in the literature that the most common malpractices

observed in the Nigerian elections was rigging of the results brought about through biased counting

of the votes and burning of ballot boxes, which were replaced by the votes of personal choice

(Anyanwu, 2017). According to Participant 3, Group 1: ‘law enforcement agents […] lack the

constitutional right to bear firearms around polling units’, which is a challenge for the security

agents at the polls. For Participant 4, Group 1, electoral violence is a challenge that needs to be

addressed. From Focus Group 2, Participant 3, reflecting on election scenes in Rivers State and

some other states, said that the government needs to deal with the official impunity that

characterises our society and elections. As noted in the literature, Adekola and Olumide emphasise

that elections in Nigeria have had many problems and rigging, which were observed in the overall

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electoral system of the country; there was a high amount of smuggling in of fake votes and

changing of poll results, which led to one of the most controversial elections in the political history

of the country (Adekola & Olumide, 2019).

According to Participant 1, Group 4, ‘Election violence has been a political tool in Nigeria

for decades’ and ‘has been facilitated by unemployment and the wide spread of armed groups’.

This theme could be linked to Participant 4, Group 4, who opined that violence has prevented

indigent people who ‘do not feel safe to come out to vote’ on election day, ultimately leading to

election boycotts in many regions. From the foregoing, it could be deduced that the emergence of

electoral violence since 1964 has resulted in a very chaotic and critical situation in Nigeria. This

has led to the deaths of thousands of people: it is reported that as many as five thousand houses

were burned and many individuals were either killed or critically injured (Akanji, 2018).

5.5.6. Suggestions on strategies to reduce political corruption

To elicit answers to this research question, various opinions and quotes have been deduced to

interpret empirical data obtained concerning strategies that could be used to reduce corruption

from the perspective of electoral malpractices. According to Participant 8, Group 1: ‘We need a

total restructuring of the electoral system in the country’. This quote was echoed further by

Participant 5, Group 2 who stated: ‘The INEC Chairman has raised the need to have a conversation

on the issue of election management’ going by ‘the outcome of many elections, including the 2019

General Elections’. According, to Participant 1, Group 2: ‘Vote buying, snatching of ballot boxes,

reckless killings, unwarranted intimidation and harassment of voters’ needs to be addressed. For

Participant 5, Group 1, ‘a compromised electoral process cannot produce transparent and

competent leaders or good governance’. According to Participant 2, Group 1: ‘Drawing from

electoral experiences in Nigeria it could be said that electoral reforms which include electronic

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voting is necessary at this point’. Further, Participant 6, Group 4 added: ‘It is important to review

the electoral framework in order to have free and fair elections in Nigeria’. According to

Participant 12, Group 2, there is a need to ‘have an electoral offences tribunal that deals with

electoral offenders’. It was evident in various literature reviewed that the government has talked

much about electoral reform but has not taken reasonable steps to promulgate the electoral reform

laws necessary for these changes.

According to Participant 8, Group 3: ‘The best way to reduce election malpractice is to

introduce an electronic voting system’. All the participants in focus group 2 agreed that free and

fair electoral process is the best way to keep the political criminals out of government. According

to Participant 5, Group 2, the use of ‘supplementary elections, re-runs or cancellations’ should be

redefined to avoid being exploited by PEPs.

Findings obtained from focus group discussions and interviews, which are mainly

perceptions of participants, have been corroborated with documentary evidence gathered during

this study, which has confirmed such views held as true.

5.6 Conclusion

In an attempt to seek answers to the research questions asked, these focus group discussions were

held. Questions were asked to assess perceptions of participants on strategies that can be used to

reduce political corruption. The transcripts from the open-ended questions were coded and

analysed for themes, and three major themes arose, which are stated below:

Focus group themes

i. Introducing an electronic voting system

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 ii. Introduction of electoral offence tribunals

iii. Barring the military from participating in elections in Nigeria.

In summary, findings from the focus group discussions showed that discussants agreed

with each other to most of the questions asked. As a result of the corruption of electoral processes,

a lot of politically exposed persons still hold onto power, especially given that the electoral system

is weak and is open to manipulations, as is the electoral umpire, which is used by ruling parties to

do their bidding. Some of the themes deducted from participants include the agreement that

electoral violators should be prosecuted and punished severely to dissuade others from repeating

such offences. Another theme with reference to curbing electoral malpractices is the introduction

of e-voting or electronic voting, which will reduce to a large extent the issues of vote buying and

selling, rigging of elections and violence during elections.

Participants further agreed that new electoral offences tribunals should be put in place to

try electoral offenders. Also, it was agreed that politically exposed persons should not be allowed

to influence socio-cultural leaders, including traditional leaders and leaders of faith-based

organisations, since they could influence members of the electorate through such people. To

further reduce their influence, politically exposed persons who have been convicted for crimes

should not be allowed to participate in elections nor have any influence on them.

Members of other groups suggested that it is important to have free and fair elections to

enable the country to elect credible leaders, and that this should be paramount in the minds of

members of the electorate. As such, they called for an overhaul of the electoral laws to ensure that

constitutional positions are protected from electoral corruption, which impacts political corruption

in the country. They further surmised that INEC should not set up their own tribunals in elections

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matters since this goes against the 1999 constitution and opens up the electoral umpire to

manipulations by desperate politicians.

Still others called for non-involvement of the military in election processes in the country.

Such involvement firstly is unconstitutional, and there have been rulings against military

involvement in Federal, Appeal and Supreme courts’ rulings. However, successive governments

have ignored these rulings and involved the military and other security personnel in elections. This

suggests that there is impunity on the part of the ruling government. Participants also advised that

there is a need to implement recommendations made by the different electoral reform panels set

up by different governments. Further, the cultural influence of expecting and accepting gifts should

be curtailed as it leads to manipulations. This can be achieved by the creation of awareness and

use of various means to communicate the message to members of the electorate.

Findings from this section of the study are supported by the theses’ guiding principal–agent

theory. This recognises that corruption can be systemic despite laws that make it illegal, and

despite resistance against anti-corruption efforts by offenders; we see this take place in electoral

corruption which is perpetuated by politically exposed persons who want to entrench themselves

and their stooges in power so they can continue to milk the commonwealth of the citizenry in

Nigeria.

It was also observed that electoral fraud and political corruption are endemic, which is also

recognised by the principal–agent theory. Bearing in mind that these politically exposed persons

are looked up to by the citizenry, most people assume that their behaviours of corrupt enrichment

are normal, and they do not see any moral problem with it; this is reflected in their responses to

issues of corruption at different levels in society. Such a viewpoint not only makes corruption

attractive, but it also makes people disregard the consequences, or even the laws that are put in

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place to reduce corrupt practices. Principles guiding the principal–agent theory were reflected in

the malfeasance that takes place in the electoral processes, and which is made manifest the most

in the squandering of government funds to perpetuate political office-holders in power. It would

seem that there are no ‘principled principals’ to control electoral and political corruption given that

members of the executive and legislative arms of government are vigorously enmeshed in such

corruption, and in some cases use the judiciary to sanction such corruption, or to delay justice.

The perspective of principal–agent theory can also be recognised in findings obtained

through the focus group discussions. Political parties and governments in Nigeria are enmeshed in

corruption. Laws and statutes exist that should be used against political and electoral corruption,

yet endemic corruption persists in the country despite anti-corruption agencies such as EFCC and

ICPC and the Code of Conduct Bureau, which are meant to guide against deviant behaviour among

every citizen including political office holders. Despite the electoral anti-corruption agenda of the

President, Muhammadu Buhari, most institutions under his government are entrenched in

corruption. A case in point is the prosecution of the chairman of the EFCC by the Judicial

Commission of Inquiry led by Retd. Justice Ayo Salami (The Cable, August 2020). Another is the

scandal involving the management of the NDDC and involvement of members of the National

Assembly in proceeding with contracts from agencies they carry out oversight functions on (Erezi,

Guardian News, 20/07/2020). The principle that situates corrupt practices alongside political

systems, institutions and culture was underpinned in this chapter, as the implications of politically

exposed persons having influence on religious, traditional and community leaders are perceived in

this study. These public office holders use members of these institutions to engage in electoral

corruption, and the culture of giving and receiving gifts is also exploited by politicians in the

country in their bid to perpetuate themselves in power.

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 CHAPTER SIX:

CASE STUDIES OF POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL CORRUPTION

6.0 Introduction

This chapter examined selected case studies and correlated them with data obtained from

respondents through other methods used in the study to answer research questions that dealt with

strategies to reduce political corruption. While chapters four and five qualitatively presented data

collected through interviews and focus group discussions, this chapter will examine documentary

evidence on cases of political corruption that have taken place in Nigeria since Independence. This

chapter uncovers the link between political corruption and electoral malpractices and will examine

how corruption has taken place in different forms politically and during elections. The chapter

reveals how politically exposed persons entrench themselves in power, which characterises

political corruption; it further looks at how the faulty electoral system is exploited by politicians

to perpetuate themselves in power(electoral malpractices).

As defined, the case study method enables the researcher to closely examine data from

within a specific context and time. Case studies by their nature explore and investigate

contemporary real-life phenomena through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of

events or conditions and their relationships (Zainal, 2007: 2). In this case, the multiple-case

approach is used whereby different cases of political and electoral corruption that have taken place

in Nigeria are examined for data. As Yin (1984) observed, the case study research method is ‘an

empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when

the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple

sources of evidence are used’ (p. 23).

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 This chapter provides us with an in-depth analysis of political and electoral corruption.

Several cases will be discussed and analysed to compare and validate empirical findings from other

approaches used in previous chapters. It further analyses the dynamics of political corruption in

Nigeria, in order to address research questions asked. The researcher adopted the case study

method because it provides a means to mine deeper into the realities of a single organisation’s

arrangements for countering fraud and corruption and to expose features of the organisation’s

structure, culture and method that supports its effectiveness (Robson, 1993, p.146). The study

looks at some case studies within the UK and other jurisdictions as comparative evidence of

different jurisdictions to see if there are similarities, patterns and trends. These case studies

demonstrate that politically exposed persons and citizens alike construct a network to ‘get things

done’ through practices that informally re-distribute access to public resources; this explains

persistent political corruption and collective collusion.

To focus the perspective for the study, research questions asked in Chapter 1 are re-stated

here as they will determine the scope and types of case studies that will be studied in this section.

Research questions

The main research question is: How effective are strategies used to reduce political corruption in

Nigeria? Others are:

1. To what extent has political corruption occurred in Nigeria since the establishment of

democratic rule in 1999?

2. What strategies have been used to curb political corruption in Nigeria?

3. How successfully have these strategies been used against political corruption in Nigeria?

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4. What challenges have been faced in applying these strategies against political corruption in

Nigeria?

6.1 Procedure for Selection of Case Studies

The researcher used the multiple case studies approach to corroborate empirical data obtained from

other research methods. The selected case studies include cases of international bribery,

embezzlement, money laundering, government corruption, impunity and abuse of power,

legislative corruption and electoral malpractices. The selected case studies were chosen because

they had gone through court trials and can be cited as case laws in the Nigeria Law Reports and

other online case law reports search engines. Some of the case studies cited in this work are still

ongoing in the courts. The selection of these cases is justified because they represent the common

law definition of their type of corruption and they have set precedents to be followed by the court

of law. A few of these cases are not successful, either because allegations are dropped, due to stay

of proceedings, or because allegations and investigations have stalled, but they can still be verified

in law journals and national online news.

6.2 Criteria for Case Studies

1. Whom are we studying?

We are studying a group of politically exposed persons: the government, executives, legislators,

the judiciary and the media who are supposed to hold the government accountable and responsible

on the anti-corruption fight (Sec.22 of 1999 Constitution), and also the role of the citizens.

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2. What are we studying?

Cases of political corruption across different arms of government, from allegations, investigations

and convictions or acquittals, to provide answers to research questions.

3. Why are we studying these groups of people and cases?

We are studying them because they share similar characteristics of political corruption which are

addressed in the research questions.

4. Where are we doing the case studies?

The case studies were carried out mainly in Nigeria by way of court cases and documentary

evidence across litigation about political corrupt practices, taking into consideration the laws

governing jurisdictions.

6.3 Case Studies of International Bribery

6.3.1 The Halliburton case

The Halliburton case is a classic example of grand corruption that affected different Nigerian

administrations and revealed that most were complicit in the corrupt acts, which began in 1994

when TSKJ (a partnership of M. W. Kellogg owned by Dresser Industries before it merged with

Halliburton), Technip of France, Snamprogetti of Italy and Japan’s Gasoline Corp sought to win

an LNG contract to build a natural gas plant with a bid of $2 billion. They engaged in massive

bribery and corruption with senior government officials including General Sani Abacha, the head

of state, and Mr. Dan Etete, his oil minister.

The Halliburton case is used to illustrate strategies used to reduce political corruption. For

example, the case was taken to court by the former Attorney General Mr. Mohammed Adoke in

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2010, while the prosecution team was led by the former President of the Nigerian Bar Association,

Joseph B. Daudu, but after one year of trial, the court struck out the case for want of diligent

prosecution; presumably the Jonathan administration was not willing to prosecute the matter.

Similarly, Mr Dick Cheney, a former vice-president of the US, who was in charge of Halliburton,

was charged in the Nigerian court for corruption, but the case was never mentioned, and

subsequently it was thrown out of court. Although several foreign involvements in the matter have

been prosecuted and convicted in their home countries, in Nigeria, senior government officials

who allegedly received over $180 million in bribes have not been charged in court. Failure to

prosecute her citizens’ involvement in the scandal demonstrates that the government lacked the

political will to prosecute the political ‘big men’.

The argument in this case study corroborated findings obtained from interviews and focus

group discussions which suggested that lack of political will is a factor against corruption

reduction. Why the lack of political will to fight corruption? Perhaps this is because government

officials are complicit in the crime. The Haliburton corruption case took place between 1994 and

2004 and involved retired generals, former presidents and super-ministers such as General Sani

Abacha, Gen. Abdulsalami, President Olusegun Obasanjo, Dan Etete and other politically exposed

persons who were involved in the corrupt practices. This led to the case not being resolved, at least

in Nigeria, to date. Findings obtained from the semi-structured interviews confirm what was

unearthed in this case study. The lack of an anti-corruption compliance service and national

corruption measures impacted the lack of conviction of the major actors in this instance of grand

corruption. The case also reveals corruption of the law through criminal orders and injunctions

obtained in prosecutions carried out. Criminals got away with the corruption due to the

governments which were in power. We also see a confirmation of theses from the principal–agent

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and institutional theories in this case. The principal–agent theory underscores that corruption

occurs when there is a lack of transparency and accountability in the discharge of duties, as was

the case with the Halliburton scandal. There is a display of divergent interests by the agent, whose

interests differ the from desires of the principal, the Nigerian public. And while there should have

been a display of transparency, accountability and probity, rules were violated and there was no

political will to execute justice while the system was exploited due to institutional weaknesses.

Despite anti-corruption laws and institutions, such a case of grand corruption, among others, took

place because of the systemic nature of corruption. Different administrations took advantage of

the political system to corruptly enrich themselves at the expense of the people.

To contribute to an understanding of how to reduce political corruption, it could be argued

that Nigerian authorities could also prosecute those found corrupt under Nigerian civil law for

equitable remedies and claim fines as well as criminal sanctions. For example, the US government

made about $1.3 billion from fines imposed on those who bribed government officials for contracts

abroad under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In the USA all the suspects relating to

the Halliburton case were prosecuted, but in Nigeria, nobody was prosecuted. If there was political

will on the part of different Nigerian governments, the matter could be re-opened for trials, as time-

barring is inapplicable.

Apart from recovery of assets from the criminals who stole them, the government can

equally sue those banks involved for warehousing stolen money. Criminal actions can be taken

against these banks as collaborators in crimes against the state, and they should be made to pay

compensation to the coffers of the government and face other regulatory penalties from the CBN

and NDIC. The prosecutor must also challenge the banks and, if abroad, specific countries’ banks

should be sued for warehousing stolen money. For instance, some of the monies stolen under the

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$2.1billion military defence scandal in Nigeria (‘Dasukigate’) between 2013 and 2015 under the

watch of President Goodluck Jonathan were found in other countries. These were transferred

through national banks and have been located in some foreign banks abroad. However, under the

Money Laundering Act 2012, the law prescribes that a transfer to and from a foreign country of

cash exceeding $10,000 shall be declared to either the Nigerian customs or the Central Bank.

Apart from getting court orders to repatriate such monies, prosecutors could also challenge

those banks that were involved with such criminal transactions. The guilty bank could be sued for

violating money laundry laws of that country by not knowing the identities of the customers. In

logical terms, recovery of stolen funds should include equitable remedies to the victims of

corruption. Outside of the government, there is perception and a collective demand for the

prosecution of all cases of corruption where there is no timeline, because all those cases of

corruption that have been prosecuted in other countries must be reopened given that corruption

cases should not be allowed to go unchallenged. It is morally wrong that a government cannot ask

a foreign country to assist in the recovery of looted funds, whilst turning a blind eye to internal

corruption which exists within the country.

This case study helps to answer the research questions asked earlier. It was discovered that

there is in fact an increase in political corruption with the establishment of democratic rule. There

is an obvious transfer of the corrupt practices seen in military dictatorship to the democratic

regime. In this case, political actors, including successive Presidents, sought to benefit from the

corrupt monies that accrued from the Halliburton contract scandals. This reveals that, rather than

reduce or mitigate, corrupt practices continued unabated. Different administrations benefitted from

the bribery that was carried out through HSBC bank, as did Tesler, the English lawyer who handled

the distributions among other services rendered. The case study further revealed that anti-

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corruption agencies have been generally ineffective when it comes to cases of grand corruption

that take place in government and political circles.

6.3.2 Malabu international bribery scandal

The Malabu international bribery scandal borders on grand corruption which spanned four

Nigerian administrations, beginning with the military regime of Abacha in 1998, through

Obasanjo’s administration to Musa Yar’Adua/Jonathan and Goodluck Jonathan/Sambo

administrations. It dealt with corporate fraud that involved the Nigerian government and its

officials in 1998, through the son of the head of state, Mohammed Abacha, and the finance

minister, Dan Etete, who awarded an oil block, OPL 245, to Malabu Oil and Gas in April 1998,

with stakes in the company. The licence was to produce billions of barrels of oil, but there was no

scrutiny of the company. The business involved collusion between different administrations and

their officials, politicians, middlemen and businessmen and Italy’s Eni and Royal Dutch Shell. In

2001, the licence was cancelled by the Obasanjo administration and an auction was held, which

Shell won with $210 million for the oil block. But, in 2006, Obasanjo pushed Shell out of OPL

245 and gave it back to Malabu for a $210 signature note. In 2011, with the payment of a $210

signature note as a bonus to the Nigerian government, and an agreement to pay $1.1 billion by

Shell and Eni, the monies were transferred to Dan Etete, the owner of Malabu Oil and Gas, through

JP Morgan to Nigerian banks in two batches of $400 million and $520 million. It was alleged that

those who are beneficiaries include the President, Goodluck Jonathan, the petroleum minister,

Diezani Allison-Madueke, and the former Attorney General, Mohammed Adoke.

The Shell and Eni corruption scandal is also one of the biggest corruption scandals ever, involving

over $1.3 billion. In the trial of the Malabu oil field scandal, the Italian prosecutors alleged that a

total of $1.3 billion fees paid by Shell and Eni for the oil field was paid to the Nigerian oil minister

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Dan Etete, and was distributed as bribes and kickbacks to a network of the well-connected political

class including the former president Goodluck Jonathan. The scale of the corruption was said to

be more than the entire national healthcare budget for 2018 (Chapman, Independent, 16/09/2018).

The significance of this case underlines actions of multinational companies in bribing public

officials, and their involvement in money laundering. In a wider trial the defendants, including

Eni’s Chief Executive Officer, Claudio Descalz, Paolo Scaroni his predecessor and former Royal

Dutch Shell’s Executive Board member Malcolm Brinded and Peter Robinson a former Shell Vice-

President. Impliedly, grand corruption involves the collusion of two or more persons; here

Nigerian officials, Eni and Shell officials having paid money to private individuals, without due

diligence could be complicit in the corruption charges. Therefore such could be found guilty of

both the men rea and actus rea of corruption. They could be guilty of a deal struck under their

watch (Chapman, Independence, 16/09/2018).

Like the case study on Halliburton, the Malabu Oil and Gas case reveals complicity of different

governments’ administrations, officials of Eni and Shell, politicians, businesspeople, banks and

middlemen involvement. The corruption that took place in this case was monumental and spread

across a long period of time. It confirms what earlier findings revealed: examples of political

corruption when politicians and state agents who are supposed to make and enforce laws are

themselves corrupt. As Heidenheimer (1993) in Amundsen (1999) observed, ‘political corruption

is any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are

illegitimately converted into private – regarding payoff’ (p. 3). For instance, despite the fact that

President Obasanjo set up both the EFCC and ICPC, anti-corruption agencies, his administration

was deeply involved and complicit in the Malabu scandal. Like findings revealed, in this case,

there is a lack of compliance with anti-corruption services and national corruption measures. The

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case further proves the principal–agent and collective action theories right. In this case, there are

no ‘principled principals’ to enforce anti-corruption norms. As Appolloni and Nshombo (2014)

observe, ‘an institutional or organizational culture of corruption leads to normalisation of corrupt

practices at a societal as well as individual level, and impunity for violating or ignoring formal

anti-corruption rules.’

Like the Halliburton corruption scandal, this case study also answered question three of the

research questions asked in chapter one. Strategies that were designed to overcome or reduce grand

corruption or government corruption did not achieve the goals they were supposed to achieve.

Several of the state actors, including former Nigerian presidents and other state officials, were not

arraigned for the bribery scandal. Further, there were no effective anti-corruption or compliance

measures with which these PEPs would have been convicted, and other officials and businessmen

involved in the case have been freed by the Milan court that judged it. We can conclude that

research question three was answered through this case study.

So how do we reduce this type of political corruption? Increasingly, counter-fraud and anti-

corruption organisations have moved from making hopeful statements and have begun to introduce

formal anti-money laundering compliance programmes to ensure behaviours of PEPs are lawful

and ethical (Treviño and Weaver, 2003). Cochran (in Jones, 1995) has argued that the most

important strategies for reducing political corruption are to ensure the quality and management of

leaders. This is often referred to as ‘tone from the top’ (Holloway, 2012). Such an ethical rule that

specifies ethical values and expected standards of behaviour must be incorporated into legislation

with sufficient details of strict compliance and financial conduct regulations (Schnatterly, 2003).

Explicit counter-fraud policies and procedures, which are a fundamental requirement for counter-

fraud strategies, must be included in the adopted strategy.

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6.4 Case Studies of Government Corruption

6.4.1 Dasukigate scandal

The Dasukigate scandal was a $2.1 billion arms deal procurement that resulted in the alleged

embezzlement of $2.1 billion. Retd Col. Sambo Dasuki who was the National Security Adviser to

the President, Goodluck Jonathan, was accused of embezzling the funds after an investigation by

a Committee on Arms Procurement which was instituted by the succeeding Government of

President Mohammadu Buhari.

For the fight against Boko Haram, Retd. Col. Sambo Dasuki had been given $2.1bn to

procure arms, along with 12 helicopters, four fighter jets and ammunition. but none of these were

purchased. Rather, the monies were shared among different cronies of the President Goodluck

Jonathan and members of the political party, PDP, to which the President belonged. Reports

suggested that part of the embezzled money was diverted for the funding of the re-election of

President Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 elections in Nigeria. Additionally, among other things,

the money was used for re-election of members of House of Representatives, purchase of

apartments, prayers for spiritual intervention in the war against Boko Haram, payments to the PDP

chairman of the Contact and Mobilization Committee, and governorship candidates, among others.

Retd Col. Dasuki was arrested by the Buhari government in 2015; he was detained for four years,

and despite court orders that granted him bail, including an ECOWAS court judgment in 2016, the

Federal Government did not honour their requests. But he was released on 24 December 2019.

Dasuki’s defence, led by Joseph Dauda (SAN), refused to appear in court before Justice

Husseini Baba-Yusuf for the trial of his client, who was arraigned for corruption to the sum of

about $2.1 million. The defence lawyer refused to enter an appearance in the court, claiming that

the government had refused his client bail, which was granted by competent courts of law.

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 Despite two years of repeated adjournments, the prosecutors were not able to present a

single prosecution witness. This hampered the prosecution process of the Dasuki case, which

reveals the need for state prosecutors to be competent and willing to justify allegations.

Investigations carried out into Dasukigate reveal that parts of the money for the purchase of

military arms were found in private bank accounts in other countries. Such banks could be sued

for warehousing proceeds of crime, or assisting others to retain benefits of crime, failure for not

knowing your customers (KYC) and lack of disclosure of knowledge or suspicion of money

laundering under the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds Regulation

(2017 UK). However, this law has not been transposed on Nigerian laws, but it could be directly

applicable and effective given that Nigeria is a contracting party to UNCAC.

Findings from the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions corroborated this

case study. Bearing in mind that there is really no department that is responsible for compliance

and ensuring that due diligence is observed in withdrawal of funds from public coffers, the NSO

had free access to $2.1 bn for the fight against Boko Haram. Further, as an interviewee observed,

political corruption means that incompetent persons are saddled with jobs they are not qualified

for. It is obvious that Retd. Col. Dasuki was not financially competent to access and implement

the expenditure of such amounts, and these funds were used for political patronage among cronies

and members of the political party, PDP, and not to achieve the purpose for which the money was

taken. From discussions from members of the focus groups, it relates to moneybag politicking

whereby funds were stolen to fund campaigns of PDP candidates, through their leaders. As further

observed by participants, the system is looted to perpetuate candidates of the party, including the

President, Goodluck Jonathan, in power.

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 This case study is supported by the principal–agent theory, as it proves the lack of

transparency and accountability in the agent who should protect the interests of the principal, i.e.

Nigerians. The actions of Retd. Col. Sambo Dasuki reflect happenstance in Nigeria whereby the

political elite are enmeshed in patronage sharing and primitive accumulation. Such actions have

further overwhelmed the anti-corruption agencies that are responsible for stopping or reducing

incidents of corrupt practices in the country.

The case study further provides answers to research questions one and four of the study. It

reveals that political corruption has continued to thrive in Nigeria, even in democratic rule, and

strategies that have been put in place such as the establishment of the EFCC, ICPC, CCB and other

institutions have not to a significant extent mitigated corruption, especially that carried out in

government.

6.4.2 James Ibori case

James Ibori, the two-term Governor of Delta State in Nigeria (1999–2007), was estimated to have

stolen about £250 million from the state within this period. In 1991, he was convicted of stealing

from a DIY store in London. The British police became interested in him again when he bought a

private jet through his solicitor in 2005. The Nigerian anti-graft agency could not do anything to

him then because he had immunity. In 2007, he tried to bribe the head of the agency, Nuhu Ribadu,

with USD$15 million. Afterwards, Ribadu was sacked for his role in charging Ibori. He was

arrested in December 2007 by the Nigerian authorities on corruption charges. In 2009, a Nigerian

judge struck out 170 corruption charges against him. In April 2010, Ibori escaped Nigeria for

Dubai. He was arrested in Dubai and extradited to the UK, where he was convicted on 10 counts

of fraud worth nearly £50 million in 2012. On 27 February 2012, James Ibori appeared at

Southwark Crown Court, London, accused of stealing USD$250 from Nigeria’s public purse and

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conspiracy to defraud. He was convicted of money laundering and sentenced by the court to 13

years in prison for his crimes. Court documents listed several bank accounts owned by Ibori, as

well as more than 10 properties around the world ranging from flats on London’s famous Abbey

Road to a £5 million mansion in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital. The documents also listed a Bentley car

and a Bombardier Challenger jet valued at just under £17 million. Mr Ibori pleaded guilty to ten

offences related to conspiracy to launder money from Nigeria. Evidence from the court estimated

that Ibori embezzled about $250m of Nigerian public funds. He was convicted for corruption

totalling £50m in 2012 and was sentenced to about 13 years after admitting to the crime.

In 2020, prosecutors in a UK court asked a judge to make a confiscation order against Ibori

of £117.7million. This case exposed the roles of western ‘enablers’ in facilitating Ibori’s

defrauding of Delta State. Multiple accounts, including those with Barclays, HSBC, Citibank and

Abbey National, were used to launder millions of pounds for him. Since his return to Nigeria in

2017, the EFCC are yet to probe him, except for the confiscation of the $15 million bribe he offered

to Ribadu, which was seized and deposited in the CBN in 2013.

This case raises a global question of financial due diligence over whether banks carried out

due diligence on Ibori and his cronies. What this means is that the banks that failed to tackle

financial crime such as money laundering should face penalties or exemplary damages that are

proportional to the offence, otherwise nothing will change.

What was striking during the trial of Mr Ibori is that documents emerged suggesting

evidence that one of the Metropolitan Police officers investigating the case had taken thousands of

pounds in bribes. Mr Gohil, a solicitor in the trial case, said he tried to inform the prosecutor of

police corruption but nothing was done. ‘I brought this case to the attention of the Metropolitan

Police, the Commissioner of the Met Police Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe; I brought it to the attention

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of Alison Saunders, the head of the CPS. I also drew it to the attention of the then Home Secretary

Theresa May. Unfortunately, no one did anything about this.’

Furthermore, evidence revealed that the police officer received payment for information in

respect of the Ibori case. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) did admit that they had found

substantial material supporting the allegation. Ibori’s case raised a question of the abuse of power

and process, following allegations that the police took bribes and prosecutors covered it up, which

eventually led to the collapse of the case. This raised the question of how the UK maintains its

status as a global leader on the issues of fighting corruption to ensure that they are at the forefront

of the international agenda. If fully engaged leaders and financial crime agents sincerely

implement counter-fraud and corruption litigation process, this could reduce international

corruption by making it hard for police or other law enforcement agents to rationalise prohibited

behaviours (Cressey, 1986; Schnatterly, 2003).

The Ibori case study can be analysed using the principal–agent and institutional theories of

corruption. Rather than serve the interest of Delta State indigenes, Ibori engaged in deliberate

corrupt enrichment of himself, his family members and cronies in the state; thus, his interests

diverged from the interests of the people. Ibori stole millions in US dollars and British pounds

which could have been applied to the betterment and development of Delta State. For him to have

achieved this, the capacity of regulators to effectively monitor his actions was lacking, which calls

to attention the defective legal frameworks within which his actions should have been checked or

reduced. Ibori was able to engage in these actions because the public did not have the information

nor the ability to hold him accountable, or to check what he did within the period he served as the

governor of the state. Institutional theory becomes relevant in this case as the political system that

exists in Nigeria was able to bring forth a convicted criminal to become a governor of one of the

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richest states in the country. The political system is built on moneybag politics without recourse

to what anti-corruption bodies such as EFCC and ICPC may have found out about such political

actors. It further reveals the inability of these bodies to effectively carry out their duties and

functions as a result of the kinds of political administrations that hold power in the country.

The Ibori case study provided answers to research questions asked. It is seen that moneybag

politics led to the retention of power by Ibori, and with that he was able to influence political

decisions and even judicial ones. His influence limited the powers of the anti-corruption body,

EFCC, which is charged to investigate and convict PEPs who engage in corrupt practices. That

body could not effectively carry out its functions, which answers Research Question 4. Further,

the political system itself poses a challenge to the effectiveness of the body, which invariably

reveals the difficulties there are in the fight against political corruption in Nigeria.

6.4.3 Diezani Alison-Madueke case

Diezani Alison-Madueke, a Howard University-trained architect, worked with Shell Petroleum

Development Company before she joined public service. She was a former Minister of Transport,

Mines and Steel Development before becoming the Minister of Petroleum Resources when

President Goodluck Jonathan took over with the demise of President Musa Umaru Yar’Adua. With

the necessity to run for the presidency in 2011, there was the need to source funds from the

Ministry of Petroleum Resources, which has been the practice since 1999. To achieve this, there

was the necessity to replace the incumbent minister, Rilwanu Lukman, with Diezani Alison-

Madueke, who used her discretionary powers to run the Ministry as enshrined in the Petroleum

Act of 1969, and who engaged in questionable awards of oil blocks and crude lifting. Her

relationships with Kola Aluko, Mr. Omokore and Donald Chidi Amamgbo led to business dealings

in which Nigeria lost billions in dollars. Seven Energy, an oil trading company in which Kola

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Aluko, Omokore and a third man, Philip Iheanacho, had stakes in, struck a Strategic Alliance

Agreement, SAA with NPDC through its subsidiary, Septa Energy, in 2011 for OMLs 4, 38 and

41 which had been divested by Shell to the NNPC, which thereafter transferred the shares to the

NPDC at the value of $1.8 billion – out of which only $100 million was paid into NNPC coffers

under the watch of Mrs. Alison Diezani. Another SAA was signed with Atlantic Energy Drilling

Concepts (AEDC) Ltd for OMLs 30 and 34. These companies were registered in tax havens like

the British Virgin Islands and the UK, limiting revenue payable to Nigeria. In violation of Nigeria’s

Public Procurement Act, the contracts were awarded by single-source procurement. Mrs. Alison-

Madueke also contravened the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010 that

mandated companies that intend to lift crude oil from Nigeria to show records of involvement in

the industry for 10 years. Mandatory payments were not paid, nor the required capital outlay

provided by these companies. The companies used the platform of NPDC for the financial and

technical capacity they were required to provide, and made gross profits from oil lifting, at the

expense of Nigeria. Also, in profit sharing, the ratio was 30% to NPDC while Atlantic made 70%

in profit from oil and gas. It was obvious that Alison-Madueke and her cronies used her position

as the Minister of Petroleum Resources to engage in grand corruption against the country. No due

process or diligence was done in these businesses, from which she made a lot of monies.

Mrs. Alison-Madueke relocated to London as soon as President Buhari took over from

Goodluck Jonathan. More than N47.2 billion and $487.5 million has been recovered from her in

cash, properties and precious stones such as gold, diamond and silver jewelleries. There have been

judicial pronouncements ordered the forfeiture of allegedly ill-gotten wealth from her to the

Federal Government of Nigeria. Also, $100 million was traced to the accounts of several INEC

officials, which were allegedly paid by her for them to compromise the 2015 general elections in

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favour of her principal, Goodluck Jonathan. Mrs. Alison-Madueke is currently facing allegations

of bribery and money laundering in the UK and Nigeria. The British probe has not yielded any

charges, while the EFCC has pending corruption charges against her. Furthermore, the case to

extradite her is also in court.

Cases against Diezani Alison-Madueke, former petroleum minister in the Goodluck

Jonathan government, pulled in investigations from Nigeria, Houston (USA), London and the

Dominican Republic. In Lagos, Nigeria, she is being investigated for alleged embezzlement to the

tune of about $23 billion. The ex-minister, between 2011 and 2012 when she was still a minister,

allegedly purchased a $37.5 million apartment on Banana Island, Lagos, of which property a Lagos

court ordered the forfeiture. The court’s order demonstrates how forfeiture can be used as a strategy

for asset recovery and to eliminate criminal opportunities that lead to corruption.

In the United States, Alison-Madueke is facing a suit by the Department of Justice (DOJ)

seeking to claim assets worth about $144 million, believed to be connected to proceeds of

corruption. The US court reveals how Alison-Madueke, Mr Aluko and Mr Omokore were listed

as persons of interest. The trio laundered millions of dollars, which were invested in properties in

the USA and UK for her family, in return for oil contracts to Atlantic Energy Drilling Ltd and

Atlantic Brass Development Ltd, two shell companies owned by Mr Omokore (Ibekwe, Premium

Times, 16/7/17). Consequently, Mr Aluko, an oil businessperson and top officer of the Nigerian

National Petroleum Company (NNPC), is facing nine counts of charges of criminal diversion of

about $1.6 billion from the sale of Nigerian Petroleum products.

In the Diezani Alison-Madueke case, there is the deliberate institutionalisation of

corruption because of the discretionary powers that she had, and the behaviour was legitimised

and became normalised within the period she was the petroleum minister. This begins with her

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appointment, which bordered on prebendalism as she is alleged to be related to the then President,

Goodluck Jonathan. The case also confirmed findings from the semi-structured interview and

focus group discussions held. Moneybag politics was engaged in, as Mrs. Alison-Madueke paid

INEC officials to swing the elections in favour of the incumbent President. There is evidence of

looting of the national treasury to retain office by the PDP in the 2015 general elections. The

looting was carried out to retain and perpetuate those in power, besides the primitive acquisition

she engaged in to further enrich herself and her cronies. As has become a noticeable trend,

impunity was used in this grand corruption, as due diligence was not followed in any of the

contracts given, laws guiding these were ignored, and Nigeria was defrauded by Diezani and her

cronies. Further, departments that were supposed to be involved in the transactions were ignored.

This grand corruption involved the political party in power, the presidency and state actors,

including middlemen, businessmen and banks, both local and international.

The case study further helped to answer research questions 2 and 3 raised in chapter one.

Different strategies used to curb corruption were described in this case. The law courts and the

anti-corruption agencies were used to seek judgment against Diezani, but the actions were

retroactive as she had left office and is living in exile in the UK. This may be due to lack of

instruments of due diligence to check the corrupt activities she engaged in within the period she

served as the petroleum minister. Through the different recoveries made and the confiscation of

monies and properties using judicial means and the instrumentation of the EFCC, moderate success

can be attributed to the strategies applied in the fight against political corruption in Nigeria.

This case study is anchored on principal–agent and game theories on corruption. Some of

the postulations of game theory are that corruption is a part of a rational calculus and an integral

and often deeply rooted method by which people take decisions. It could be suggested that corrupt

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actions carried out by Mrs. Diezani Alison-Madueke were well thought out and carried out with

the objective of self -enrichment and perpetuation of her political party and the president in power.

There was also the involvement of private-sector actors, such as Messrs Aluko, Omokore and

Amamgbo, in the corrupt actions, using shell companies which were floated in tax havens to

defraud Nigeria. Like other case studies done, principles guiding the principal–agent theory were

made manifest, whereby the agent, Mrs. Alison-Madueke, used information she had to her

advantage against Nigerians, who are the principal in this case. She deliberately furthered her own

interests to the detriment of the people.

These case studies suggest that these shady dealings by politically exposed persons were

not checked whilst they are in office, and they were not subject to corporate or enhanced due

diligence. This argument reflects arguments raised in participants’ interviews and focus group

discussions, during which respondents said that if this illicit behaviour were subject to due

diligence perhaps the criminal opportunities that lead to such massive corrupt practices would have

been averted or reduced. Another interesting point to note is that both Alison and Ibori’s cases

went through UK courts, because both were arrested and tried in the UK.

6.5 Case Studies of Political Corruption

6.5.1 Plea bargaining by corrupt government officials

Plea bargaining is seen in criminal cases. According to Adetomiwa (2018), ‘The concept of plea

bargaining is one of the most controversial tools used in the disposition of criminal trials. It is

deeply entrenched in the criminal justice system of the United States of America.’ It is simply a

negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a defendant (commonly referred to as an ‘accused’

in the larger part of Nigeria except Lagos) whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offence

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or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usually a more

lenient sentence, or a dismissal of the other charges. In this regard, some corruption cases involving

politically exposed persons have gone through plea bargaining, at which stage political party

affiliates or patrons can compromise the case with undue-influence peddling.

In Orji Uzor Kalu v EFCC (31/10/16), the defendant was charged with 34 counts of fraud

involving NGN 3.2 billion and diversion of public funds for private gains. Mr Kalu was the

governor of Abia State in Nigeria (1999–2007); the Economic and Financial Crime Commission

(EFCC) arraigned him in court following an investigation into corrupt practices and misconduct

in office whilst he was the governor of the state. Kalu allegedly embezzled NGN 2 billion, an

offence encompassing diversion of public funds, fraud and embezzlement contrary to Section 477

of the Criminal Code Law of the Federation, 1990. Further hearings before Justice Mohammed

Idris of the High Court of Lagos reveal that compliance officers with the First City Monument

Bank were complicit and failed to comply with their statutory duty of due diligence to politically

exposed persons. A compliance officer, Mr Olusegun Adesomoju, gave evidence that several

millions were paid into the account of Slok Nigerian Ltd, a company owned by the former

governor, during the period in which he governed the state. Further evidence provided before the

court suggested that the accused was alleged to have diverted over NGN 3.2 billion from the state

government treasury during his tenure in office (Premium Times, 22/01/2018). The said offences

in principle contravened provisions of Sections 15(6), 16 and 21 of the Money Laundering

(Prohibition) Act 2005.

What should have been the right procedure for effective anti-corruption control is the best

practice in applying the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds Regulation

2017. Surprisingly, Mr Kalu, who was in the opposition party, PDP, and a critic of the ruling party

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(APC), cross-carpeted (decamped) to the ruling party and the case was suspended. The undue

influence peddling by the ruling party in this case represented a ‘shield’ against criminal

investigation so that political associates are beyond the reach of the law, as in this instance.

On the other hand, Lt- General Azubuike’s corruption allegation presents a good example

of how to apply the Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds Regulation

2017. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission put Lt-General Azubuike Ihejirika, the

former Chief of Army Staff, under investigation over an alleged NGN 13 billion in arms cash

traced to him and his relations. Gen. Azubuike was asked to account for a £132,000 transfer to his

relatives, who allegedly did a contract job for the army, whilst he was the Chief of Army Staff.

Under the new Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds Regulation, his

relatives could face charges for assisting him to retain the benefit of his crime. He was also accused

of unlawfully awarding contracts to five of his relatives, to the tune of NGN 13 billion, using two

companies owned by his brother-in-law Onyekwere Chinedu. Following a plea bargain with

General Azubuike, the EFCC was able to recover some stolen money; so far, the EFCC have

recovered about NGN 29 billion from him, money that was intended for the purchase of military

equipment.

This matter was settled by way of plea bargain. Section 494 (1) of the ACJA defines ‘plea

bargain’ as ‘the process in criminal proceedings whereby the defendant and the prosecutors work

out a mutually acceptable disposition of the case; including the plea of the defendant to a lesser

offence than that charged in the complaint or information’ (ACJA, 2015).’ Plea bargaining is most

often used by the EFCC. The disadvantage with plea bargaining is that it defeats the aim of the

criminal prosecution; on the other hand, it is good because it could stop further corruption during

court trials and unnecessary delay of justice in an already corrupt system.

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6.5.2 Cronyism, corruption and government power

Complex political corruption occurs in the executive arm of the government; it is corruption from

the top to the bottom. Corruption at the top is wrapped with using state instruments to propel

corrupt practices. For example, the Chief Justice of the Federation was forced out of office by the

ruling class for fear that he was running an independent judiciary. Here the judiciary and legislators

are subjected to the gunboat and the dictatorship of the Executive. The media under section 22 of

the Constitution is meant to hold the government accountable and responsible to the people for

misconduct. However, it is held under the dictatorship of the ruling class and hijacked by gunboat

machinery. Similarly, various opposition parties and opposing voices are silenced by brute force

and the power of absolutism and dictatorship of the ruling party and are hijacked by the Executive

gunboat (Falana O, 2016).

6.5.3 Political power and money laundering

Cronyism corrupts both the political spectrum and businesses; usually the criminal acts through

some form of a business, or a way to earn illegal money regularly or briefly but repeatedly. A

quick scan of court cases reveals that political positions sometimes serve as instruments to corrupt

the financial and economic system (Simpson, 2014). For example, on 13 March 2019 in EFCC V

Erastus Akingbola suit no FHC/L/443C/2009, the Federal High Court was told how loans running

to billions of NGN were advanced to the Senate President Bukola Saraki by the defunct

Intercontinental Bank PLC, which led to the prosecution of the bank’s former Managing Director

Dr Erastus Akingbola. Evidence before the court reveals a list of Senate President Saraki’s

companies whose loans were written off: Joy Petroleum Limited, with a loan of NGN 3.932 billion;

Linker Limited with NGN 3.6 billion; SkyView Properties with a written-off loan of NGN 2.8

billion; and Dice Trade Limited with NGN 1.832 billion. Saraki and his companies had NGN 7.915

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billion total loan written off by Intercontinental Bank PLC before it collapsed (Sahara Reporters,

06/04/2019a).

A witness, Jimoh, who was the Chief Inspector in Intercontinental Bank at the time the

loans indebted to the bank were written off, told the court that the loans were written off in the

interests of the ‘power that be’ (the ruling class). Here the matter was first heard in the Federal

High Court Lagos in 2010. Two years later, the charges were struck out by Justice Archibong for

want of diligent prosecution. However, in 2015, the Court of Appeal, Lagos overturned the Federal

High Court decision striking out the charges against Akingbola. Dissatisfied, the claimant went to

the Supreme Court, but the apex court judgement delivered on 18 May 2018 ordered all the accused

in the matter to return to the Federal High Court to answer all the charges against them by the

Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), citing that the appeal lacked merit.

First, there was a conspiracy or collusion to defraud a functioning bank by undue political

influence from a high-ranking member of the ruling class (Senate president). Secondly, there was

an attempt to secure a judgment from the Federal High Court. Thirdly, there was an attempt to

strike off the matter completely at the court of appeal. However, by the wisdom of the apex court,

the matter was reversed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit in striking off the matter, given

the verifiable evidence and the gravity of the corruption.

This research has attempted to explain how politically exposed persons can engage in

political racketeering, by creating a misleading business activity to launder money. Hence the

defendant is complicit, irrespective of the undue political influence, for recklessly granting credit;

he could also be guilty of recklessly granting facilities amounting to billions to a firm without

adequate security, in violation of section 15 (1) (a) of the Failed Bank (Recovery Debts) and

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Financial Malpractices in Bank Act, Cap F2, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004. Such

an offence is punishable under section 16 (a) of the same Act (Agbo, 2019).

On 6 April 2019, Ibrahim Magu, the acting Chairperson of the Economic and Financial

Crimes Commission (EFCC), whilst addressing a conference in Port Harcourt said; ‘Banks are

aiding and colluding with criminals to perpetrate financial crime’. He reiterated that fraudsters are

assisting politically exposed persons to steal and launder public funds, adding that there are ‘bad

eggs’ in the financial crime agencies. However, apart from colluding with corrupt politicians and

terrorists, he faulted banks for helping politically exposed persons to steal and launder public funds

(Sahara Reporters, 06/04/2019b). There seems to be a readily available criminal partnership with

some fraudulent elements within the banks to perpetuate certain fraudulent activities and money

laundering.

Although the criminal justice system is associated with international best practices,

evidence shows that politically exposed persons have proactively built a network of a political

party based on loyalty and trust to effectively promote personal interests. How did they organise

their network? Over a long period, the plutocrats co-opt strategic individuals based on tribal

leadership, regional leadership, constituency, local government and world leaders. The criteria for

these selections are the ability to mobilise constituencies and resources to encourage cohesion and

galvanise support for the ruling class to capture the government. Once they have captured power,

they recruit their trusted lieutenants into positions of power and influence in exchange for impunity

and exploitation of public resources for private gain (Baez-Camargo et al., 2020).

Similarly, politically exposed persons recruit friends and members of the business

community into their ruling network, which is known as ‘horizontal co-optation’. Here the

business class can fund an election campaign in exchange for a large government contract or

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unwarranted benefits. Whilst this arrangement is unconstitutional, the network leaders have

become obliged to protect the interest of the network, which meanwhile shows a lack of political

will in the fight against corruption (Lababidi, 2007). With an increase in such informal networks,

more political opponents have to be co-opted, which means that the financial cost of contesting for

elections has increased substantially. Similarly, the multi-party system is more associated with

high-level corruption, because of the formation of similar networks or political structures. The

conflict of interest between the political network and those who seek to combat corruption has thus

caused unintended consequences such as armed conflict and political violence (Baez-Camargo et

al., 2020).

6.5.4 Abuse of constitutional immunity and legal procedures

Although the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 was introduced to remedy the mischief

of frivolous adjournments, section 306 prohibits stay of proceedings on criminal trials, whilst

section 396 (3) allows a maximum of five adjournments with not more than 14 days’ interval. The

effect of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, sections 306 and 396, is that the

prolonging of criminal trials due to adjournments is no longer possible; however, as observed, this

is an issue of concern.

Over fifteen ex-governors in Nigeria who later went on to become senators have been

indicted for corruption including money laundering and misappropriation of public funds with

cases filed against them. The list of ex-governors and elected senators who are facing corruption

charges against them includes Bukola Saraki, Adamu Aliero, Theodore Orji, Orji-Uzo Kalu, Sam

Egwu, Joshua Dariye, Danjuma Goje and Abdullahi Adamu. The problem with prosecuting these

individuals is the immunity clause under section 308 of the 1999 Constitution which protects the

President, Vice-President, governors and their deputies from prosecution whilst in office (Sec. 308

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of the 1999 Constitution). Warped with the cultural lens of executive and legislative undue

influence on the judiciary, the criminal justice system has been effectively jeopardised (Aleyomi

& Bakar, 2018).

Out of the fifteen ex-governors who the EFCC filed fraud charges against, only two have

been successfully convicted: Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State, who was found guilty of embezzling

NGN 3.5 billion, and Bala Ngilari, ex-governor of Adamawa State, who was convicted and jailed,

but a few days later the Appeal Court invalidated his conviction and he was freed. What is clear

here is that corruption charges that were filed back in 2010 are still ongoing; ex-governors are still

on corruption trial a decade after suits were filed in court (Nwabufo, The Cable, 12/10/17). It is

disturbing that some of these governors and high-profile politically exposed persons are even

serving as senators, with most of them in charge of the budget and financial services, even while

facing corruption charges.

Mr Bala Mohammed, who has been facing trial arising from land racketeering involving

NGN 1.6 trillion, receipt of a bribe of NGN 550 million and NGN 314 million in separate

suspicious payments from Aso savings. Recently in 2019, after emerging as the governor-elect,

the EFCC suspended his multi-billion NGN corruption trials. What Bala Mohammed’s case

reveals is that he escaped prosecution through political immunity, which means that as long as he

serves as the governor of a state, he is immune from criminal trials. If there were a constitutional

provision for a speedy trial, he would have been convicted, given the verifiable evidence against

him (Ogundipe, Premium Times, 28/03/2019). His case has been in court since 2016 and should

have been reasonably concluded within a reasonable time. Here the Constitution has been eroded

by stipulating periods for the conclusion of corruption trials, coupled with lawyers’ frivolous

applications for court adjournments as discussed earlier. However, whilst section 308, of the 1999

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Constitution prevents prosecutors from bringing charges against a sitting Governor, it does not

prevent them for proceeding with the investigation on their own.

In Bala Mohammed’s case, he was elected on 9 February 2019 and was due to be sworn

into office on 29 May 2019 – between February and May is enough time to get a conviction.

However, according to EFCC spokesperson Tony Orilade, in reality it was ‘practically impossible

to get a conviction before May 29th’, and the moment he was sworn in as a governor, the immunity

clause in Sec. 308 of the 1999 Constitution became automatically invoked (Ogundipe, Premium

Times, 28/03/2019). On the other hand, if the trial had been fast-paced it could have been seen as

politically motivated given the fact that he was in the opposition party. Once sworn in, he could

subvert his corruption trials with his undue political influence, and he could potentially reoffend

given his narrow escape from the law.

Two things can be argued: first; Criminal Barring Services could have prevented Bala

Mohammed from contesting an election. Second, speedy trials could also have helped to get a

judgment. In the knowledge that, after 29 May 2019, a newly elected state government would

sworn in, and those governors whose tenures had elapsed stopped enjoying constitutional

immunity protecting them from criminal trials under Section 308, as of April 2019 the EFCC set

teams of prosecutors to probe some governors accused of corruption.

6.6 Case Studies of Electoral Malpractices

These case studies are very important for the prediction of this research as they will help to measure

the pattern and trend of election malpractices and associated violence. This section will be used to

answer the research question, ‘What strategies have been used to curb political corruption?’ The

answers will then use to identify the gaps in the electoral system and how these gaps could be

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mitigated. Therefore, the following case studies provide examples of how politically exposed

persons spend corrupt money to hold on to power in Nigeria. The selected cases provide good

illustrations of how politically exposed persons invest looted funds in election malpractices to keep

themselves in power. Similarly, the chosen cases form the basis of political corruption with regards

to why political leaders engage in corruption and what they do with the proceeds of corruption.

In any democratic country, elections are an essential element that direct the system of

governance of a country based on honest leadership. In 1914, Nigeria was an amalgamated entity,

gaining its independence in 1960; soon after, in 1963, it was given the status of a Republic

(Okonkwo & Smith, 2018). Nigeria repeatedly went through coups and counter-coups but

eventually returned to civilian leadership, which was affected by electoral malpractices. The

Clifford Constitution introduced the elective clause which brought about the first elections in

Nigeria, held in September 1922 (Bamidele, Olaniyan & Ayodele, 2016). It has been witnessed

that after the first elections, Nigerian elections have always been marred by electoral malpractices.

Electoral malpractices in Nigeria have proven to be a significant hindrance to good governance.

Any commission, omission and act that partially or directly affects an electoral process in order to

favour a particular individual is known as an election malpractice. The following can be considered

electoral malpractices (Gonzalez, 2016):

1. Harassment of voters

2. Bias by election officers

3. Voting of underage civilians and impersonation

4. Diversion of electoral materials

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5. Theft of ballot boxes

6. Electoral violence

7. Rent seeking by political patronage

8. Multiple thumb printing and smuggling of ballot boxes

9. Falsification of election results.

6.6.1 Nigerian electoral officers sentenced for taking bribes

The following case study is relevant for the purpose of addressing Research Question 3, ‘How

successfully have these strategies been used against political corruption in Nigeria?’, and Research

Question 4, ‘What challenges have been faced in applying these strategies against political

corruption in Nigeria? Answers obtained from this case study will generate legal views that could

be used to corroborate the empirical data in chapters four and five. In this case study, the researcher

felt that court cases would be appropriate as they are documented in law reports and are used in

court proceedings.

In the case of EFCC v INEC 2016, the court held that Christopher Nwosu and Tijani Inda

were both guilty of accepting bribes from the former Petroleum Minister, Diezani Alison-

Maduekwe, during the 2015 elections. The investigation reveals that the duo accepted $735.777

in bribes from the former petroleum minister to use their office of electoral commission to subvert

election results to keep the government in power. In this case, the third employee of the

Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) also pleaded guilty of accepting bribes amounting to

$194,495. In the United Kingdom, the National Crime Agency arrested the former Nigerian

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petroleum minister in connection with international corruption investigations, and she was accused

of embezzling $6 billion from the Nigerian treasury.

The question is, how do politically exposed persons embezzle or extract state funds for

private gains? Part of the answer is that they award large contracts to their sham companies without

due process, as well as squandering government funds recklessly. The term ‘spending government

funds recklessly’ is not criminalised. This is a shortcoming in corruption litigation, which requires

further inquiry.

This case study is considered important for this study as it is a major case that illustrates

how politically exposed persons invest the proceeds of their crimes. Further, it indicates that

criminalising ‘reckless spending of government funds’ by political leaders could help reduce

political corruption.

6.6.2 Lack of integrity of electoral officers in 2019 general elections

This case study aims to address the impunity associated with electoral malpractices. It will be used

to answer the main research question, ‘How effective are strategies used to reduce political

corruption in Nigeria?’ This case study will attempt to explain various electoral malpractices that

have been recorded during elections, including impunities, fraud, violence, military intervention

in an election, underage voting, stuffing of ballot boxes and declaration of false results. The

continuation of the political corruption crisis is prolonged because electoral integrity has been

under siege, captured, undermined and compromised by gate-keepers who have control over

electoral processes.

Many respondents in the interviews and focus groups have argued that electoral returning

officers acted with disgraceful conduct in the credibility failings of the 2019 general elections.

Before the elections, the returning officers went through an integrity test set up by INEC.

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Academics such as vice chancellors of universities were mainly used as returning officers because

of their perceived credibility, and the vital duties of university lecturers become essential to

announcing results. Both the INEC and members of the public had expected that members of the

academia would discharge their duties with utmost integrity and unwavering commitment of the

highest standards, as required for free and fair elections. However, it seemed the academia deviated

from such commitments and became complicit, given patterns of falsified figures which were

targeted to sway results in favour of a particular candidate, which eventually resulted in

inconclusive polls (Fatunde, University World News, 17/04/2015).

For example, in Kogi State’s general assembly elections, the returning officer added a

‘zero’ to skew the election result in favour of a particular candidate. Fortunately, the prompt and

vigilant intervention of party agents and electoral observers prevented an ‘illegal victory’ from

being declared and awarded. In Plateau State, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Agriculture

was alleged to have attempted to escape with the election results. He ‘scampered into a waiting

car bearing government plate numbers’, but the crowds present were quick to intervene and

blocked the get-away car, forcing the Vice Chancellor to return, shame-faced, to his post

(Ajeluorou, The Guardian, 25/04/2019).

In Gombe State, the Vice Chancellor of Federal University, Gusau, Prof. Andrew Haruna,

as returning officer of Adamawa State, declared the governorship elections inconclusive, when

there was no constitutional ground to do so. In Bauch State, the Vice Chancellor of Moddibo

Adama University of Technology, Adamawa State, also declared the election results inconclusive;

this required the intervention of the court, who voided the inconclusive election and ordered the

winner to be announced after days of violent protest. In Benue State, the Vice Chancellor of the

University of Jos, Prof. Sebastian Maimako, also declared the election in Benue State inconclusive,

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for unknown reasons. In Sokoto State, Prof. Fatima Murktah, Vice Chancellor of the Federal

University of Jigawa, also declared the elections in Sokoto State inconclusive for unverified

reasons in a similar fashion to Kano State.

However, in Rivers State, Prof. Teddy Adias of the Federal University of Otuoke was

considered justified in declaring the election results in the state inconclusive, as this was largely

because of violence and killings of members of the electorate that characterised the election

process. Legally, where there is serious violence and threats to lives of persons and properties,

elections could be cancelled. Therefore, the cancellation of election in River State could be

justified under INEC Bylaws (Ajeluorou, The Guardian, 25/04/2019).

In Imo State, INEC’s returning officer, Prof. Innocent Ibeabuchi, declared Rochas

Okorocha winner in the senatorial elections. However, Ibeawuchi has since claimed that he was

held hostage and forced to declare Okorocha the winner under duress. Based on that allegation,

INEC refused to reward bad behaviour and Okorocha was denied a certificate of return. Okorocha,

has since approached the court to overturn INEC’s decision (Ajeluorou, The Guardian,

25/04/2019). How this played out in an election tribunal could have been interesting and set the

stage for what constitutes a crime of kidnapping or keeping a returning officer hostage until a result

is announced in one’s favour, which is a criminal behaviour. Obviously, there have been many

unreported cases of similar incidents, for which complainants have not approached the court for

redress, because of lack of funds or fear of reprisal attacks. Therefore, this case had the potential

to, first, serve as a deterrent and a precedent, and second, prescribe punishment for a combined

crime of ‘electoral malpractice, kidnapping or unlawful detention of electoral officers’. However,

the Federal High Court in Abuja led by Justice Okon Abang ordered INEC to issue Rochas

Okorocha his certificate of return, and awarded a total of NGN 900,000.00 to Mr. Okorocha while

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he declared that INEC had no authority to withhold his certificate of return given that he has been

declared the winner of the election (Okakwu, Premium Times, 07/06/2019).

Conversely, in Abia State, Prof. Benjamin Ozurumba, the Returning Officer of the Abia

North senatorial district, declared Orji Uzo Kalu the winner of the election, which clearly breached

the electoral law and INEC guidelines. In that election, the margin between Kalu and Mao

Ohuabunwa was 10,400 votes, whereas cancelled votes amounted to 38,000 votes, which would

have warranted an inconclusive election and the results to be declared inconclusive, but Prof

Ozurumba went ahead and declared Kalu the winner. Arguably, the mens rea of this offence could

be difficult to prove, assuming it is a strict liable offence to ignore INEC guidelines; the next

question will be what the gravity of the offence is, as against the gravity of the penalty. Again,

where collusion is found between the candidate and the defendant, what will be the position of the

court – perhaps a conviction for both culprits?

6.7 Case Studies of Election Malpractices in Nigeria Between 1964 and 2019

6.7.1 Federal elections of 1964

From evidence in the empirical chapters, it can be deduced that electoral malpractices have

frequently been cited as major theme in this thesis. This paragraph will now consider the level of

electoral malpractice that has been recorded in general elections; in doing so it is necessary to

overview case studies of electoral malpractices from 1964 to 2019. The aim is to help predict the

pattern and trend of electoral malpractices – information that may be used in answering Research

Question 1, ‘To what extent has political corruption occurred in Nigeria since the establishment of

democratic rule in 1999?’ and Research Question 2, ‘What strategies have been used to curb

political corruption in Nigeria?’

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 When the electoral campaigns began, all types of unethical and absurd tactics were used as

electoral campaigning strategies (Jatula, 2018). All kinds of irregular methods were used to

nominate a candidate when the Federal Election Commission declared the nominations open for

the elections. On 20 December 1964, when the election commenced, the United Progressive Grand

Alliance (UPGA) boycotted it; hence, no voting was conducted in the Eastern Region (Clark &

Phil, 2016). However, in the northern and western parts and some parts of the mid-western region,

elections were conducted properly, though in Lagos voting was conducted only in one ward. This

resulted in the victory of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) by a very comfortable margin

(Uwak & Udofia, 2016). Therefore, the 1964 elections cannot be said to be free and fair.

6.7.2 Western Nigeria elections of 1965

Before the elections of 1965, in the Assembly of Western House, the Nigerian National

Democratic Party (NNDP) was in power. The opposition in the house was UPGA under the

leadership of Alhaji D.S Adegebenro, whilst NNDP represented the NNA alliance. The elections

of 1965 took place on 11 October in a tense environment. During the elections, there were many

electoral malpractices such as illegal counting of votes, burning of ballot boxes of the opposition

and smuggling ballot papers into ballot boxes (Ololajulo, 2016). At the end of the elections, NNDP

were announced as the winners after securing 88 out of 98 seats. In reaction to this, Adegbenro

called a press conference at the house of the imprisoned Chief Awolowo in Ibadan to claim that

UPGA had won 68 seats out of 98 and declared his party as the ruling party of the western region.

He appointed eight ministers of his own and declared himself as the head of the region (Josephson,

2017). This situation, which was created due to two governments in the same region, resulted in

chaos and political crisis in the country. Reportedly, around a thousand people lost their lives, and

more than 5000 houses were burned down because of this chaos (Olarinmoye, 2017).

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6.7.3 General elections of 1979

The elections of 1979 were different because of the newly introduced presidential system of

government. The elections witnessed all sorts of electoral malpractices such as smuggling of ballot

boxes, rigging and electoral violence. Amongst all, perhaps the most controversial elections were

the presidential elections. None of the candidates could secure a 1/3 majority or 25% of the total

votes. Eventually, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria, NPN was declared the

President of the country after securing 25% of votes in 12 states of Nigeria (Olarinmoye, 2017).

6.7.4 General elections of 1983

The elections conducted in 1983 were significant as they were the first elections to be conducted

solely under a civilian leadership without any military intervention. This was the first instance

after thirteen years that an election was not conducted under the eye of military leadership

(Hackett, 2016). On the other hand, these elections can be categorised as one of the most

controversial elections and were filled with electoral malpractices. Ondo and Oyo states witnessed

a high level of electoral malpractice, rigging and violence. Incidents such as hooliganism, arson,

looting and violent rioting were at full swing during these elections.

6.7.5 The 1993 general elections

After the long hold of military leadership in the politics of Nigeria, two major political parties

emerged: namely, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention

(NRC). These elections were considered as the first free and fair elections in Nigeria, but the

outcome was not what was expected. General Babangida declared the results of the elections

inconclusive, though they were widely believed to have been won by the MKO Abiola. This

became a major reason for public outrage and extremely violent demonstrations, which left the

nation in a dilemma (Agbo, 2019). Soon after this, General Babangida had to step aside after

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setting up an interim government led by Chief Ernest Shonekan after much pressure by the public.

Although no significant cases of electoral malpractices were recorded, the chaos was majorly due

to military intervention (Dumbili & Sofadekan, 2016).

6.7.6 The 1999 general elections

Soon after the death of General Sani Abacha in 1998, General Abdusalami Abubakar took over

power as the Nigerian head of state, with the promise that the leadership of the country would soon

hand over power to a civilian leadership (Yagboyaju, 2017). The self-claimed winner of the 12

June 1993 presidential elections, Chief MKO Abiola, also died in prison on 7 July 1998. Despite

this, three political parties contested the elections to assume political power in the country. These

parties were the Alliance for Democracy, the All People’s Party and the People’s Democratic Party

(Ojo, 2019). With the help of widespread rigging, cheating and looting of ballot boxes, Olusegun

Obasanjo of the PDP won the presidential elections of 1999. These elections were considered one

of the most rigged elections of the country (Arowolo & Olaniyan, 2018).

6.7.7 The 2003 general elections

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the candidate of the People’s Democratic Party and incumbent

president, changed the structure of political campaigns by introducing the infamous ‘do or die’

politics which were witnessed in the 2003 elections. The whole government machinery was

involved in helping candidates of the PDP to completely rig the elections. Incidents such as

snatching of ballot boxes, multiple thumb printing and smuggling of ballot boxes occurred on an

exponentially large scale. Moreover, harassment of candidates from opposition parties went on

full swing. PDP candidates won most of the seats in states’ Assemblies, local councils and the

Federal house. In addition to this, the PDP also won the presidential elections. In these elections,

more than 45 political parties were involved (Fatai, 2017). These malpractices in the election raised

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several questions over the government, its ability to allow a truly independent electoral umpire and

its willingness to hold free and fair elections.

6.7.8 The 2007 general elections

If the 2003 general elections were full of electoral malpractices and intrigues of all kinds, the 2007

general elections were much worse. In these elections, new strategies were used to rig the elections,

which included activities such as creating violence, snatching of ballot papers and stuffing of ballot

boxes. The level of snatching of ballot papers that occurred in 2007’s elections was one of a kind,

and according to the genealogy of general elections, these were termed as the most rigged elections

of Nigerian history. Sixty-two political parties contested in these elections, but Umaru Musa

Yar’Adua of the People’s Democratic Party was elected as the 13th President of Nigeria (Corentin,

2016).

6.7.9 The 2011 general elections

The elections of 2011 were held on three different dates. Separate polls were held to elect members

of the National Assembly, Governors and the President. The first round of electoral procedure was

held on 9 April after being initially fixed for 2 April. The delay was mainly because of the logistical

problems and lack of election materials. When compared to the elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007,

the elections of 2011 could be considered free and fair; there were still some electoral malpractices

such as harassment and barring of voters, but these were on a small scale when compared with

previous elections (Omede and Mu’awiyya, 2016).

6.7.10 The 2015 general elections

On 28 March 2015, the general elections were held. These elections have been analysed and termed

as the best elections in the history of Nigeria. Both domestic and international observers, because

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of the comprehensive preparations made and peaceful and proper conduct of the polls by INEC,

rated this election as highly transparent (Owen & Usman, 2015). However, in some northern parts

of the country, some operational and managerial failings were recorded, such as failure of card

readers, manipulation of the results, crowded election booths and voting by the under-aged

(Okafor, 2015). These incidents were considered to be the result of mismanagement rather than

declaring it as an effort to rig the elections and change the results.

6.7.11 The 2019 general elections

In 2019, the general elections were held on 16 February in order to elect the members of National

Assembly alongside the Presidential elections. In these elections, Muhammadu Buhari was elected

as the President of Nigeria after securing 56 percent of votes (Olowojolu et al., 2019). On the other

hand, the leader of the opposition Atiku Abubakar got 42 percent of the votes. Atiku Abubakar

rejected the results of the elections, as it was believed that the victory of Buhari was nearly

impossible in some states of Nigeria. He further threatened to take the case to the courts. If the

environment of the elections is considered, it was affected by violence and rigging (Olowojolu et

al., 2019).

The February 23 and March 9 general elections were flawed, as noted by observers and

commentators, because of impunity in the political space. The 2019 general elections ought to

have ended on March 9, 2019, and then been followed by post-election petitions. But what

happened was that there were inconclusive elections in ten states of the Federation for various

reasons, and in some states, there was the suspension of the electoral process because of

unwarranted military intrusion and inability to conduct elections due to hostile and violent

behaviour by hoodlums, militants, the military and key political players. Such unlawful actions

triggered the mayhem and disorderliness that characterised the 2019 general elections. It has been

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argued that the political atmosphere was not ripe for credible elections; so much focus was on

money politics rather than building institutions for a stable democracy (Adekola, 2018).

6.8 Summary of Chapter Six

In this chapter, case study analyses were conducted which include examinations of corruption

cases that involved high-profile Nigerians who are politically connected, strategies that were used

to resolve them, and legislative and judicial forms of corruption including abuse of power and

impunity by holders of executive powers. The final section of the chapter dealt with kinds of

electoral case studies that took place in Nigeria; it noted the need for politically exposed persons

to perpetuate themselves in power or become ‘godfathers’ to enable them to manipulate

instruments of power to continue to corruptly enrich themselves at the expense of the state and the

people.

Among cases studied were those of the Haliburton and Malabu International bribery

scandals, which revealed the need for a political will by governments in power to pursue corruption

cases to their logical conclusions and ensure that adequate sanctions are issued for erring

individuals and corporations, including banks that serve as holders of corrupt benefits. The need

for counter fraud policies and strategies was noted. Regarding government corruption, the cases

of Sambo Dasuki, James Ibori and Diezani Alison-Maduekwe were studied, and it was concluded

that colluding banks should be sued, while competent prosecutors and proper due diligence should

be abided by while prosecuting such cases. It was further observed that plea bargaining represents

a threshold through which former political office holders get off the hook, while impunity is also

used to remove judicial officers such as the former CJN Justice Onnonghen without due procedure.

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 Different kinds of legislative corruption were analysed, which included issues of budget

padding by members of the legislative body, and it was suggested that a counter fraud and

corruption investigative service be instituted to investigate corruption by the legislative bodies. It

was also concluded that ICPC should set up a constituency project tracking unit to monitor

constituency projects carried out by legislators through their constituency funds. Issues of abuse

of immunity and electoral procedures were further examined, and the call was issued for a criminal

barring service to be set up to monitor corrupt officers who may have won governorship elections

so as to stop them from contesting elective positions.

An overview was carried out of the kinds of electoral malpractices that occurred in Nigeria

from Independence till the 2019 General Elections. Such cases, which include humungous bribing

of electoral officers and use of public funds to perpetuate politically exposed persons in office,

were studied. Further issues of lack of integrity of electoral officers, especially returning officers,

were observed. It could be said from the overview that nearly all the elections conducted in Nigeria

from the time of Independence till now are mired by electoral malpractices.

In this chapter, there is an interplay of the different theories on corruption that were

proposed in the literature review: principal–agent theory, collective action theory, institutional

theory and game theory. Examples that reflected the principal–agent theory abound from the case

studies done. These include the Haliburton and Malabu scandals, which involved several

governments, starting with military regimes that had been in power since before Nigeria was

returned to democratic rule. We see the situation where personal gain by public office holders (the

agent) took precedence over the people (the principal). The interests of the public were not taken

into consideration by the governments. High-profile individuals such as the last military ruler,

Abdulsalami, Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan were linked with the Haliburton scandal,

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just as powerful ministers such as Dan Etete were complicit in the scandals that took place.

Principles guiding collective-action and institutional theories were reflected in several of the case

studies done. Clear cases of impunity by governments are manifest in different ways in the study.

Politically exposed persons such as James Ibori, Col. Sambo Dasuki retd and Diezani Allison-

Madueke engaged in corrupt practices. These individuals, among many, engaged in corruption

despite the anti-corruption laws. These persons were trusted with public funds, but they embezzled

these even while they were serving government officials. The thesis that guides institutional theory

– which states that a government’s institutional characteristics, including the rule of law and its

anti-corruption institutions, should guide social behaviour – were manifest in some case studies

examined in this chapter. Ways and manners in which corrupt practices coalesce between

politically exposed persons and different institutions in the land are complex and involve every

arm of the government, while private sector businesses including banks are also involved.

The prevalence of public-sector corruption, which is seen as a calculated and an integral

part of how people take decisions, is a major principle of game theory, which is seen played out in

some cases studied. Cases held against former governor of Abia State Orji Uzor Kalu and former

Chief of Army staff Lt. Gen Ihejirika reflect aspects of game theory. Further acceptance of bribes

from government officials by electoral officers also reflects how principles guiding game theory

are played out. Officers such as those named above engaged in corruption to gain some benefits

because ‘everyone is doing it’. Most corrupt officers display unethical behaviour as a result of

situational and psychological factors which they have found themselves in, especially when they

find themselves in positions of public trust.

Further corruption in government, money laundering and legislative corruption also reflect

different aspects of collective-action and institutional theories, as there is impunity seen from the

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government, corruption of the public sector, and abuse of power by public officers. An example is

the case against the former Senate President, Bukola Saraki – who defrauded a bank and has not

been punished for his crimes – and legislative corruption in the oversight functions they oversee.

Corruption in this case is endemic and systemic, and it is a collective problem that needs to be

overcome.

From the data presented in previous chapters up to this one, further analysis shall be done

in Chapter Seven, while Chapter Eight will provide a summary of the findings, conclusion and

recommendations from the study.

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 CHAPTER SEVEN:

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

7.0 Introduction

This chapter will provide an analysis of findings obtained from the in-depth interviews, focus

group discussions and case studies analysed. The chapter will seek support from secondary data

such as journals, reports, case studies and published articles. The relationship of the theoretical

framework to the findings will be examined and interpreted in a meaningful manner. From this

analysis, answers will be sought to research questions asked on strategies that are used to reduce

political corruption. Although four theoretical frameworks were identified in the literature review

chapter as significant to this study (principal–agent theory, collective action theory, institutional

theory and game theory) the principal–agent theory is the foundation theory of this research.

7.1 Analysis

The empirical approach was adopted as a research technique, whereby the knowledge is gained

through indirect or direct observations. The empirical approach uses recorded data collected

through primary or secondary sources. Data was collected using a qualitative approach, namely

the semi-structured interviews that were carried out on judicial and legal officers. Focus group

discussions were also held with four groups, which consisted of discussants from at least four of

the six regions, made up of businessmen and -women, government workers and others who are

politically aware regarding political and electoral issues in the country. Finally, case studies were

conducted that include reports of notable political and electoral cases covering a period between

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1999 and the present. However, cases of electoral violence were examined from the 1960s to the

present.

7.1.1 Defining the construct

Further to the introduction and preamble, it is pertinent to examine the construct that plays a

significant role in this study: that is, the word ‘corruption’. It has had several meanings attributed

to it, and these definitions will explain it better. According to the UN Convention, corruption

terrorises a lot of people all over the world; it prevents them from getting the jobs they need, the

safety they deserve, the security they need, the life they need and the justice they want. Corrupt

individuals extract natural resources that do not only belong to them (Raimondo & Newcomer,

2017). They steal the natural resources that should be for others, detract from the infrastructure

that should be in place and decimate the public services that should be there; its victims are always

ordinary citizens. Corruption is the obstruction against so many things people want to achieve.

As previously noted, political corruption as defined by the World Bank is ‘the misuse or

abuse of public office for private and personal gain’ (World Bank, 1997). Raimondo &

Newcomer’s (2017) definition of corruption is a broader one, covering not just political corruption

in this sense but also corruption in public servants that had the least interest in politics; it also

encompasses corruption in the private sector, for example, a company director who takes kickback

or bribes instead of awarding the contract on merit. Subsequently Radicchi (2017) elaborated on

the term ‘corruption’ or ‘corrupt’, which most often includes a broad range of unethical or illegal

behaviour: ‘When a person stole something from the government he is corrupt’ and such action

becomes a crime; ‘when he stole from his brother or a private person then it is theft.’ Corruption

involves two parties – the government and the civilians – so basically where corruption exists it is

because both parties are in agreement and happy with the corruption. In a corrupt system, a civilian

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uses an illegal way to manipulate the system, while government officials use it for their own self-

interested gains.

The form of corruption that disturbs the function of the government is political corruption.

This type of practice can be seen in various forms such as vote-buying, selling votes, electoral

rigging, and unfair donations from private means, putting a politician’s interest (greed) first to

damage the public interest (Raimondo & Newcomer, 2017).

Political corruption is a much wider prospect. It covers all criminal activities and unethical

behaviour that elected persons or politically exposed persons might do, or that anyone might do in

connection with the electoral system: for example, bribery of electoral officials influencing

election results, bribing of legislators, parcelling campaign contributions to avoid donation limits

or bribing executives for help to obtain a contract. Political corruption and politics are similar both

in functionality and characteristics. Concisely, political corruption is a system that restricts

government and leadership; it depends solely on the structure of the system, a corruption culture

and the literacy perception of citizens.

Indeed, there are government agencies that have been designed statutorily to fight

corruption, and of these, the most prominent is the EFCC. As mentioned in the literature, in

compliance with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the government enacted the

Economic and Financial Crime Act 2003, to fight all kinds of economic crimes, including

corruption, and to punish offenders. The main objectives of the law are to eradicate bribery and

corruption as a national problem, to ensure good governance, to promote transparency and

accountability, to prevent the impairment of state properties, and to take effective action against

those who commit corruption of all kinds and bribery. The law also includes some provisions

regarding recovery of properties obtained by bribery and corruption.

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 One of the main legislative innovations of the law consists under Paragraph 11 of part 1 of

the Fifth Schedule of Bureau of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as

amended, which requires all public officials to declare their properties, money, liabilities and assets

they own to the Bureau of Conduct Tribunal before the commencement of any appointment. Also,

section 15 of the Code of Conduct Tribunal Bureau Tribunal Act of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

makes similar provision. This reflects Article 8 of the UNCAC, which stipulates that public

officials ‘make declaration to appropriate authorities regarding their outside activities,

employments, investments, assets, and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest

may result with respect to their function’ (UNODC 2004, 11). The EFCC Act also establishes the

confiscation of money and properties obtained by bribery, and section 5 (b) of the EFCC Act 2002

also allows the EFCC to investigate bank accounts relating to the accused. This reflects to Article

31 of the UNCAC (UNODC 2004, 24) which will certainly help to reduce corruption.

7.2 Discussion of Findings

7.2.1 Semi-structured interviews

Several issues were raised during the interviews that were held. Going further, discourse on how

to reduce political corruption in Nigeria is already discussed in the secondary sources with the

identification of numerous dimensions that are essential for combating corruption (Kayode-

Adedeji et al., 2019). Most of the interviewees were of the view that prevention of politically

exposed criminals from government needs to be addressed if issues of political and electoral

corruption are to be controlled. As identified by this study, the three situations that lead to political

corruption include the following. The first situation is when there is an improper distribution of

power, lack of opportunity and poverty, which means that the rich and powerful thrive at the

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expense of the weak; leaders rule for the benefit of themselves rather than the people. Corruption

here could be viewed in light of ‘principal–agent theory’, which provides taxonomy for

understanding how corruption might become entrenched in organisations, in institutions and in

society, despite the existence of an anti-corruption framework (Luo, 2005). Principal–agent theory

considers that corruption is influenced by the character, design and transparency of the political

system and its institutions.

The second situation is when people lack decision power and autonomy in their day-to-day

lives and have little control or say about who governs them and how they need to be governed

(Adegbola & Gearhart, 2019). Third is when there is a lack of transparency in how the government

operates. Information is withheld and propaganda put out to mislead the public. These elements

are found in most corrupt countries, and perhaps less obviously in corruption-free countries – but

it is hard to find countries in which these criteria do not significantly apply (Adekola & Olumide,

2019).

In terms of reducing and ending political corruption, it was observed by some respondents

that the criminal justice system cannot fully operate as it has come under political influence;

various examples were given where political leadership has influenced judgments to favour party

members or seek reductions in punishments meted out to offenders. Some other forms of influence

include state pardons, prerogative power, and power of patronage or political affiliation whereby

politically exposed persons switch political parties to ruling ones to secure mild punishments or a

slap on the arm (Kalu v. EFCC, 2020). Similarly, the rise of political corruption in Nigeria can be

attributed to the attitude of state pardon. The idea of ‘forgiveness’ is a big challenge in an anti-

corruption campaign setting such as Nigeria; the culture of a prominent citizen or member of the

elite demanding pardon or forgiveness for convicted corruption criminals is an alarming situation

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(Gonzalez, 2016). This issue raises some concerns over the system, as some criminals who have

already committed corrupt acts hope or look for an opportunity to get a ‘pardon from the state’

through high-level contacts, often from the ruling party and government. This characterises

institutional theory; it considers that corruption is influenced by the character, design and

transparency of the political system and its institutions. At the same time, it acknowledges that the

relationship between corruption, institutions, political systems, culture and gender is highly

complex (Debski and others, 2018; Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson, 2015). Based on this

theory it could be deducted that the way institutions have been set up in Nigeria can easily be used

as an instrument of corruption.

Interviewees argued that there is a need for state and federal governments to invest in

departmental anti-corruption measure compliance services and to adopt national corruption

measures. They suggested that government departments, agencies and ministries should develop

counter-fraud and corruption services, which will help to reduce the cost of unnecessary litigations

that will witness long periods of adjournments despite the instrument of the ACJA Act that should

ordinarily quicken the judicial processes. Buttressing this further, they called for the establishment

of counter-fraud and -corruption departments in government institutions to help reduce corrupt

practices, as these will help the government to mine data on corrupt practices, monitor compliance,

and regulate due diligence, management, risk, and security control, all of which will help reduce

corrupt practices. As scholars of criminology and other related areas of study observed,

institutional checks and balances are equally important in evaluating the anti-corruption strategy

(Smith, 2007). This evaluation means considering the influence it has on the development of public

policies and regulating the judiciary system and political administration. The distribution of

powers to the judiciary, the legal system design, the authority of lawyers and the tax regime all

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define the level of corruption in the country. There should be checks and balances on the regulatory

aspects of government institutions, checks on the personal holdings of executive officers of the

government and checks on how the constitutional reforms are made; these could reasonably be

expected to influence the risk of corruption (Markovska & Adams, 2015). Such knowledge will

be significant to the government when designing strategies to counter corruption (Lührmann,

2018).

Fraud and corruption have generated a lot of economic tension within both the country and

the international community. As a result of this tension, in July, 2017, Egmont Group, a global

network of 152 nations’ Financial Intelligent Units (FIUs), suspended the Nigerian Financial

Intelligence Unit (NFIU), which was part of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission

(EFCC), for leaking sensitive information to the media and blackmailing individuals with

confidential information. The suspension followed repeated failure to address these concerns and,

more importantly, leakage of information derived from international exchanges; it also took into

account a lack of clarity regarding the NFIU’s independence from the EFCC. A consequence to

this suspension was the creation of an independent Nigerian Financial Intelligent Unit (NFIU),

which was created as a precondition of membership to Egmont Group (Ibekwe, Premium Times

05/02/2018).

It could be argued that the formation of the independent Nigerian Financial Crime

Intelligence Unit (NFIU) was because of the leakage of a recent major corruption investigation.

Similarly, it could also be said that this observation emerged from the interaction between the

Egmont Group and the dysfunctional domestic anti-corruption regime.

What, then, is the way forward? The best prospect would be if public demand could link

up with a strong judiciary to forestall fraud and corruption. In Nigeria, the public has been

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demanding trials of all politically exposed persons found to be corrupt, but only a few have been

successfully prosecuted.

Further, interview respondents called for sanctions to be applied without undue

interference from political, religious or government influences, given the kind of influence

politically exposed people wield in such circles; they therefore called for an independent judiciary

that will expend justice without being arm-twisted by such influences. They were of the view that

the judiciary should be truly independent to expose politically exposed leaders and resist executive

and also legislative influences they may mount on them to cause them to act partially in their

dispensation of justice. Related to this, respondents called for proper funding, adequate staffing,

continuous training, internal control, and supervision in the judicial sector. They believe that there

should be true internal reforms for it to be independent.

According to respondents, political corruption is caused by vote-buying, the high cost of

political patronage by PEPs and election rigging. To reduce this, some respondents hold that

political incentives should be rationalised, as this will reduce the urge to fight for political offices

at all costs and by all means. When political offices are made less desirable and attractive it will

also reduce the political fraud and corruption PEPs engage in. By restructuring the political system,

it will be difficult for politically exposed persons to gain access to government funds, which will

also reduce political corruption. An offshoot of this is to have a strong criminal justice system, to

ensure that harsh sanctions are employed when politically exposed people are convicted for corrupt

practices. A consideration regarding this is that when people are employed into the police,

judiciary and others security services by those who are politically exposed, they lose their idealism,

probably because their employment is tied to political connections; their promotions are tied to

political affluence and job security is tantamount to their political loyalty. Soon their loyalty is tied

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to their patrons’ and they would rather do their bosses’ bidding and think in terms of what their

political bosses want, rather than what the law demands; examples include Sanusi’s case,

Onnoghen’s case and many other cases. There is a deep-rooted threat of ‘VIP culture’. VIPs,

particularly politically exposed persons, are given special treatments of all kinds, such as

policemen given as security details to politically exposed persons. Most of the time, even when

there is no real threat of violence towards the politically exposed persons, gunmen are given as

status symbols. Over time these practices have become a culture, and eventually they foster a desire

to hold offices that will give such VIP treatment.

The above research findings could be linked to collective action theory, which emphasises

the importance of factors such as trust and how individuals perceive the behaviour of others.

Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) regard systemic corruption as a collective problem, because

people rationalise their own behaviour based on the perception of what others would do in the

same situation. When corruption becomes a social norm, everyone sees it as simply the way things

are done. People engage in corrupt actions, even if they are aware of the widespread consequences,

as they believe that ‘it doesn’t make sense to be the only honest person in a corrupt system’

(Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). In such an environment, anti-corruption measures based on the

principal–agent model will not be effective, as there no ‘principled principals’ who will enforce

anti-corruption norms (Klitgaard, 1988; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2013). An institutional or

organisational culture of corruption leads to normalisation of corrupt practices at a societal as well

as individual level, and to impunity for violating or ignoring formal anti-corruption rules

(Appolloni and Nshombo, 2014). To combat corruption in such circumstances there is a need for

collective and coordinated approaches, such as reform coalitions or proactive alliances of like-

minded organisations. These approaches are often called ‘collective actions’. Within Nigeria’s

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context, there are anti-graft agencies that are statutorily established to curb practices; however, the

endemic nature of corruption has rendered these organs powerless, and their usage has been

subsumed to political interests which, more often than not, muzzle these agencies, or they are used

mainly to score political points by politicians.

Interviewees observed that as a result of the stupendous wealth they had accrued through

corruption, political office holders are able to hire the best lawyers, to whom they pay millions of

naira to further engage in judicial corruption through the strategies they adopt when seeking

redress for corrupt politicians who have been convicted of corrupt practices. On the other hand,

government lawyers are not adequately motivated to handle such cases against the better-

motivated SANs and lawyers that PEPs can afford. To help reduce this practice, interviewees

suggested that there should be an inquiry into the sources of the huge fees that are paid for

litigation, and such lawyers and politicians can also be sued for money laundering. At the same

time, respondents were of the view that courts should not entertain the frivolous cases that lawyers

of corrupt politicians also engage in to win reprieve for their clients. Respondents believed that an

administration with zero tolerance for corruption will also reduce corrupt practices. They gave

examples of certain amounts of monies that were alleged to have been returned when President

Muhammadu Buhari assumed power because of how he was perceived to have zero tolerance for

corruption.

More seriously, in the past lawyers have applied for perpetual injunctions barring anti-

corruption agencies from prosecuting or bringing criminal charges against politically exposed

persons, which allow them to keep running from criminal prosecution for years. It doesn’t happen

anywhere else that a political ‘big man’ can ask for a stay of proceedings to suspend his trials

indefinitely for years (as in Peter Odili’s case). If this frivolous injunction is allowed, what this

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practice means is that in future, criminals can apply to the court for a perpetual injunction to stop

government agencies from investigating or prosecuting them irrespective of the offence.

Such practices directly call into question the integrity of the judiciary and the legal

profession. The normal procedure would be that if a defendant is invited for investigation, the

lawyer should assist his client through the bail application first in the police station; if it is refused

then they may apply for bail in the court. What a lawyer must not do is apply for a preventive order

to stop a criminal investigation of the suspect, and the court also must not grant such a preventive

order in the case of a criminal trial, because the danger is that, in future, a terrorist, a kidnapper or

an armed robbery suspect could go to court to apply for the same preventive order. That is not the

intention or the spirit of the criminal justice system and it should not be part of our legal practices

(Aluko & Aderinola, 2019).

Frivolous court orders or injunctions have been derailing the judicial process, which raises

questions over the legitimacy of such orders (Bokun, 2016); in some cases, a lawyer has requested

a criminal order or injunction against the judges who have granted such order that a criminal

suspect cannot be prosecuted (Bitter et al., 2019). Clearly, that is corruption of the law; the Court

of Appeal has made it clear to sworn judges not to shield anybody from criminal trials. As a result

of this kind of corruption of the law, the Jonathan government passed a bill into law on May 13,

2015 called the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 to take care of judicial corruption.

Under section 2493 of the ACJ Act 2015 a judge can no longer stay proceedings in a criminal trial,

and judges can no longer suspend any trial, meaning that all and any objection to trials will now

be considered with the main case (Agbiboa, 2015).

Interview respondents also called for proper strategic measures and political will of

governments to effectively fight corruption. They believe that this would greatly reduce corrupt

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practices. One of the ways this can be done is to remove and prosecute politically exposed persons.

For instance, in the course of this study, it was found that, to varying degrees, fighting corruption

is totally dependent on the will of the government; for example, in the Presidency of Olusegun

Obasanjo, the ex-governor of Bayelsa State of Nigeria, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, was found

guilty of corruption and eventually jailed in the UK. Tafa Balogun, an ex-Inspector General of

Police, was also charged for corruption (Lawal, 2018). The degree of criminality we have

witnessed in recent times has been sustained by impunity of the worst order; we have a predatory,

savage, and extremely primitive way of running the government. The only hope on the part of the

government is that there is some degree of political will in the fight against corruption, but this has

been missing since 2007. Under President Yar’Adua, the government took a different approach in

the fight against corruption by stopping the EFCC, which was instituted to fight corruption.

The EFCC was decapitated with the removal of Nuhu Ribadu from its leadership, with

Laborde as his replacement, who dismissed cases against highly placed criminal suspects such as

James Ibori and Lucky Igbinedion. At the same time, the Minister of Justice and the Attorney

General of the Federation Aaondokaa frustrated the efforts of the EFCC and ensured that the

former head was demoted, which led to his fleeing Nigeria until the coming of the Jonathan

administration. It was alleged that the former President, Musa Yar’Adua, was not decisive enough

to take actions against highly placed governors and ex-governors because they sponsored his

elections.

Under President Goodluck Jonathan, corruption was tackled differently from the other

administration in that the President was willing to the lead the fight against corruption. However,

corruption increases when the president who is meant to lead the fight against it starts to encourage

unacceptable behaviours (Aigbovo, et al., 2013). Under President Jonathan, James Ibori was

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imprisoned for corruption. It was also during his administration that $458 million of Abacha loot

was forfeited by the United States of America; it had not been repatriated because the Obama

regime simply decided not to remit that money. Similarly, from the Halliburton case, the Siemens

scandal and others, through plea bargaining, the Jonathan government recovered about $120

million (Adebanwi, 2012). Under the same regime, three ministers were sacked for various

corruption allegations, one of them on the ground of conflict of interest.

However, under President Buhari, Godswill Akpabio, a former governor who was accused

of corruption under the PDP government, decamped from the PDP to the APC and gained state

pardon. Similarly, Orji Uzor Kalu, who was facing corruption charges under the PDP government,

cross-carpeted to the APC in 2018 and was forgiven; his corruption trial was abandoned and he

successfully joined the presidential re-election campaign team (Lindberg and Van Ham., 2016).

Anti-corruption advocacy groups have cited a governor of a state who was caught on CCTV

collecting bribes; he was not even prosecuted or investigated (TI 2009). The fight against

corruption is determined by the character of the person who is leading the country at the time. This

is more so when the head of the EFCC can be removed within 24 hours as the President pleases

since they are not thoroughly independent.

Respondents recommended that data collection of criminal records is important as it will

bar corrupt political figures from being involved in political activities. They suggested that there

should be a mandatory requirement for criminal disclosure vetting before any political position or

appointment is given. They believe that if this is done, it will discourage engagement of political

practices by political office holders, and it will also keep away politically exposed persons from

being involved in political processes so that they will not unduly influence such offices.

Respondents called for the amendment of the laws to specify punishments for squandered public

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funds, siphoned public funds and looted funds. They called for the enactment of a Serious Offence

Act which should be aimed at politically exposed persons to try them for offences that they have

carried out.

Besides this, respondents called for the appointment of political officers with merit and

who are trustworthy in their characters. Related to this, they called for compliance with rules of

law, character and capacity, which are needed as strategies to combat political corruption. Such

officers are expected to engage in regulatory and compliance training to keep themselves up to

date with anti-corruption legislations. Besides, respondents stressed the need for anti-corruption

training for politically exposed persons, while judicial officers should undergo counter-fraud or

anti-corruption training on the implications of corrupt practices (Button & Gee, 2013).

There is a strategy to reduce political corruption: transparency and compliance.

Transparency means where the money came from, who paid it, why, and how it was paid .

Everything needs to be on the record, and all politically exposed persons, government officials and

agencies should publicise their financial records and blacklist persons who have been convicted in

regard to corruption (Khan & Cheri, 2019). Finally, there must be a clear separation of power

between judiciary, executives, legislators and even the media. Preventing corruption is not

something you can achieve as a short-term goal; preventing corruption is a systematic application

of a long-term goal. It depends entirely on the structure of the system. Accountability and

transparency are certainly a good approach to reduce corruption, but more important than that is

the structure of the criminal justice system (Kerr, 2018).

Respondents also suggested that counter-corruption topics should be added to the

curriculum for institutions in the country to build up students’ consciousness of the cost of

corruption. Importantly, corruption ‘rewards’ only the individual who betrays the society; in order

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to fight corruption, the society needs to act as a whole. That means efforts should be made to create

a strong bond between people to support mutual thinking and strong orientation, and measures

enforced to counter fraud and corruption across all institutions and the public (Kayode-Adedeji et

al., 2019). International development partners and donors can play an important role in developing

the capability for anti-corruption education. For example, the World Bank has many educational

projects focusing on providing access to basic education, improving the quality of secondary

education, or promoting higher education and research.

Major stakeholders and international development partners can invest in an anti-corruption

curriculum by supporting the development of anti-corruption educational capability across all

institutions. This is a long-term goal, but the outcomes will be effective and will help in reducing

corruption. The first step to fight against corruption is to instil a core belief that corruption is evil;

without this, any attempt to fight it will be a failure (Imhonopi et al., 2016). A core belief in the

stabilisation of political conditions is the best competency to prevent corruption. Switzerland,

Sweden, and most of the Scandinavian countries have very low corruption rates; that is because

they enjoy political stability, which is not seen in developing countries where political conditions

are unstable and corruption rates are extremely high (Hurlbut, 2018).

7.2.2 Discussion of focus group conversations

Four focus group discussions were held in the course of this study, and several themes emerged

that dealt with political corruption, strategies to use to reduce it, and electoral corruption.

Several conclusions were arrived at from answers obtained from discussants during the

meetings. To questions regarding strategies that can be used to reduce political corruption with

regards to electoral practices, most participants were of the view that there is a need for severe

punishments for electoral offenders. They also called for review of the electoral framework to

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ensure that free and fair elections are held so that political office holders who are of good character

will gain office for the benefit of the electorate. A significant number of discussants saw a need

for electoral reforms to stop such corruption. They agreed that a robust anti-electoral offences

framework should be developed for electoral offenders. They also suggested that new electoral

offences tribunals or a special court of tribunals should be created to prosecute electoral offenders.

Members of other groups agreed that free and fair elections are the best way to keep

criminals from government. They also agreed that there is a need to reduce supplementary

elections, re-runs or cancellation of elections, as these are bound to be abused by politicians. They

stressed that politicians use these to rig elections in collusion with desperate or compromised

electoral officers. Participants also voiced their support for electronic voting to curb or drastically

reduce incidents of rigging during elections. They further stressed that the Independent National

Electoral Commission (INEC) should not cancel elections nor have its own tribunals since it is not

empowered by law to carry out such functions. Rather, such matters should be referred to election

tribunals, whose duty it is to oversee such functions.

Still other groups observed that electoral laws should have strengthened anti-corruption

laws, but for the clause raised by several judgments that there should be a manifest link between

the giver and the receiver of bribes or other gifts to rig elections, and such a link has not been

established in the various cases treated (apart from the bribe of millions of naira given by former

petroleum minister Diezani Alison-Madueke to electoral officers during the 2015 general

elections). They also reiterated suggestions made by earlier groups that there should be an electoral

offences tribunal that deals with the electoral offender, and they called for a restructuring of

electoral processes. These views were also expressed by members of the last group of discussants.

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 From these findings we can agree that the importance of electoral reforms is tied to rooting

out or curbing political corruption, even if it is only to an extent. From these views and those

obtained from the semi-structured interviews, the federal government has the duty to reform

electoral processes to ensure that politically exposed persons are prevented from seeking political

offices or from influencing the election of their chosen candidates through whom they will further

entrench their corruptive influences. It is therefore suggested that the government should embark

on electoral reforms to achieve this. It is further advised that various reports that had been provided

by different electoral reform panels set up by Messrs Musa Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan and the

incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari, which includes Mohammed Uwais, Sheik Lemu and

Ken Nnamani’s panels, should be implemented. Besides these, governments should allow electoral

bodies to be truly independent without putting them under undue influence to do their bidding,

which defeats their democratic and good governance positions. The importance of electoral

offence tribunals or special courts of tribunal for the prosecution of electoral offences should also

be considered as ways through which political corruption can be curbed.

Another issue that was examined in the course of the focus group discussions held was that

of the effectiveness of sanctions in curbing political corruption. Members of the first group called

for effective sanctions against those who violate electoral laws, as these persons soon become

political or public office holders. To reduce political corruption, it is important to bar politically

corrupt persons from contesting elections. Focus group participants called for such persons to be

effectively punished; they said that one of the ways to prevent such people from assuming office

is through the political will of the government to develop and deploy technology in electoral

processes. They surmised that to reduce political corruption, it is important to reform electoral

processes.

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 Members of another group concluded that electoral corruption sanctions might not be

enough to control or reduce political corruption given that Nigerians are impoverished and

desperate to survive. They rather pointed out the need for good governance, which will ensure that

people are provided with basic amenities, reducing the desire for handouts from corrupt politically

exposed persons who ironically perpetuate their poor state. Group members further alleged that

politically exposed persons and their agents buy up the electorate and INEC officials. They agreed

that Personal Voter Cards, PVCs, should be surrendered by members of the electorate in order for

them to access government amenities and facilities in their constituencies. They also alleged that

traditional leaders, community leaders and religious leaders are compromised. They suggested that

the culture of corruption such as the reception of gifts should stop, and they called for proper

orientation and anti-corruption education to inform local communities of the negative effects of

such offences and their legal implications. Concerning education, the UNCAC emphasised the

importance of educating the public about the negative effects of corruption. However, Nigerian

anti-corruption legislation contained limited provisions for educating the public. Article 10 of the

UNCAC provides that states publish information on the risk of corruption (UNODC 2004, 13),

while Article 13 encourages the participation of individuals, civil society, not-for-profit

organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations in public education on corruption. It

was also noted that the culture of gift-giving as an important custom has contributed to the culture

of widespread corruption. Therefore, the public should be educated about the pervasive effects of

gifts as corruption with the aim to discourage pervasive gift-giving. This could be an effective

strategy to reduce corruption.

Continuing, a significant number of discussants in other groups pointed out that military

interference in elections has always resulted in having corrupt politicians elected. This continues

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to occur despite Supreme Court rulings barring the involvement of military personnel in elections

on several occasions. Group members posited that internal security and ensuring law and order is

within the purview of the Nigerian Police or NSCDC, and not the military. This may be related to

views that hold that the military corrupted the political framework before they handed over power

to civilians, and that they still wield huge influence in different aspects of the economy including

the civil service. Regarding grand corruption, analytically, it could be viewed that the military

junta and their families and associates are deeply involved in grant corruption and economic

activities while controlling multi-billion-dollar revenues which are weakly regulated. The

dominance of political appointments, appointments of the judiciary and the appointments of the

heads of security services suggests a strong link between the ruling class and the organised crime

groups that function with unrestrained impunity. In civil service and political office settings,

decisions concerning recruitment, transfer and promotion are influenced by political patronage.

High-level jobs are reserved for political supporters, and political parties play significant roles in

the selection process. Here we see a link between corruption and the culture of public officials

favouring their relatives and patrons. What this means is that to reduce political corruption one

needs to eliminate the corruption culture between political elites and patrons.

7.2.3 Discussions of case studies conducted

In the sixth chapter of the study, case studies were carried out regarding different kinds of

corruption including international bribery scandals, government corruption, and legislative and

judicial corruption including electoral malpractices.

Some such cases studied were the Haliburton and Malabu Oil scandals, and among what

was found out was that in both cases there was a lack of political will to tackle the corrupt practices

given that government officials were deeply involved in the cases. High-ranking political office

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holders, including former military officers, were involved in the matters. To effectively tackle the

cases, it was found out that the offences could be dealt with through the use of civil laws, while

equitable remedies including payment of fines could be used to punish the banks that were used to

perpetuate fraud and launder money from Nigeria to different parts of the world. On the Malabu

scandal it was concluded that there was a need to employ those who are high-quality, competent

and good managers of people. An ethical rule that emphasises standards of behaviour was what

was needed to avoid the corrupt practice, which took place over a period of time. It was also found

out that the corruption could have been avoided with the incorporation of counter-fraud policies

and procedures, which would have served as strategies to overcome what was done.

On issues of government corruption, some cases examined included those of Retd. Col

Sambo Dasuki, James Ibori and Diezani Alison-Madueke; these cases formed the fulcrum on

which this review was conducted. One significant factor was that these are politically exposed

persons and served as public officials at the federal and state levels. Another case was that of the

misuse of US$2.3billion by the former National Security Adviser for the re-election of the

president, Goodluck Jonathan, rather than to purchase firearms to fight the insurrection against

Boko Haram insurgents. It was found out that competent state prosecutors should have been used

in these cases by the new governments, while banks that were used to warehouse the funds should

have been sued for complicity and illegally keeping stolen funds.

On the case of James Ibori, a former governor of Delta State, it was discovered that there

was a need for due diligence to be done on the banks that were complicit in the illegal transfer of

funds by the Ibori government for the period that he was the governor. Questions were also raised

on the complicity of the UK police, who remained silent despite evidence that some investigating

officers took bribes from Mr. Ibori. It was concluded that there was a need for leaders and financial

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crime agents to honestly implement counter-fraud and -corruption litigations. On the case of

Alison-Madueke, a former petroleum minister who allegedly stole billions of dollars from the

coffers of the Nigerian government, it was agreed that no machinery was used to check the

excessive corruption that was carried out by Alison-Madueke and her collaborators. Again, it was

found out that there was neither corporate nor enhanced compliance done on her activities or

person.

Another form of corruption discovered is the used of plea bargaining, which has been used

by several corrupt politically exposed persons including Orji Uzor Kalu and Lt. Gen. Azubuike

Ihejirika, who were found guilty of enriching themselves corruptly from public coffers. In the case

of Orji Uzor Kalu, a former governor of Abia state who is accused of corrupt enrichment of

NGN 3.2 billion but who arrived at a plea bargain with the EFCC, it was found that best practices

in applying the money laundering, terrorist financing and transfer of funds regulations 2017 were

not applied. This was because the ruling party, APC, to which the offender crossed, enabled him

to make such negotiations. He was ‘shielded’ by the ruling party to have the penalty for the offence

lessened through the plea bargain. This was also used in the case against the relatives with NGN 13

billion.

In terms of reducing political corruption, section 5(b) of the Economic and Financial Crime

Commission Act 2002 empowered the EFCC to investigate financial crimes and prescribed that

the EFCC should collaborate with international and regional organisations and other foreign

bodies. Sections 26, 28 and 29 of the EFCC Act 2002 empower the tracing and attachment of the

assets of a person arrested or under investigation. Section 44 (2) (k) of the 1999 Constitution

empowers the court to grant an interim order to the EFCC to seize criminal bank accounts. This

reflects Article 5 of the UNCAC, which promotes collaboration between contracting parties of the

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Convention and participation in international anti-corruption programmes and projects (UNODC

2004, 6). This means that developing strong collaboration between the judiciary and legal

practitioners will strengthen the reduction of political corruption and will help stop frivolous

applications that derail criminal trials as discussed above.

Nigerian anti-corruption legislation covers most forms of bribery in the public sector,

extortion, attempted corruption and abuse of office. However, it does not cover agents, or banks

who facilitate the laundering of money from Nigeria to offshore accounts, which is a common

thing in Nigeria and which should be criminalised. Regarding using a political party’s influence to

facilitate political appointment and contracts, it remains unclear how these provisions will be used

in conjunction with the EFCC Act 2002.

Regarding penalties for corruption, if convicted, the defendant could be liable to a fine

and/or imprisonment for a term of up to 14 years for corruption offences, depending on the

circumstances of the case. However, extending penalties for corruption offences could deter the

offence and reduce corruption only if it is properly enforced.

There was also the case of the use of impunity to remove the former Chief Justice of

Nigeria, Walter Samuel Onnoghen; this was seen as an abuse of state power, or corruption on the

part of the executive arm of government, which did not respect the separation of power as designed

by the Nigerian Constitution. There was a clear violation of the rule of law, and cronyism,

corruption and government power were cited as what was used to remove the CJN unlawfully by

a lower court which had neither the jurisdiction nor the statutory functions to do so. This case was

seen as one of impunity and political corruption by the executive arm of the government.

Another case study which was done could be termed a cartridge of cases that were held

against the legislative body, the National Assembly, in the past. These cases rocked the entirety of

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the nation given that it was a grand-scale scam embarked upon by the legislative arm of the

government. The first is the issue of budget fraud and corruption, while the second is the issue of

constituency-funding corruption that takes place in the National Assembly. To forestall the

situation whereby members of the National Assembly pad budgets of ministries, agencies and

departments they carry out oversight functions on, so such monies can be paid out to members of

committees, the researcher resolved that there is a need to create a counter-fraud or anti-corruption

investigative unit in the National Assembly. It was further revealed that there is a need for

proactive corruption prevention measures that will frustrate the efforts of leadership and members

of the two legislative houses to engage in corrupt practices. On the issue of constituency funding

corruption by members of the two houses, it was resolved that the ICPC Constituency Projects

Tracking group should be properly motivated to ensure that projects should be carried out

regarding which constituencies are awarded to legislators.

Some other forms of corruption that affected members of the legislative bodies include

issues of political power and money laundering. In such situations, politically exposed legislators

have used their positions to ensure that monies borrowed from banks were written off by the banks.

It was found out that, as a result of their positions in the legislative bodies, loans taken were written

off, which makes both the defendant and the guilty party culpable and complicit in the matter. This

is an aspect of legislative corruption whereby political power was used for corrupt purposes, but it

requires due diligence, competence and rule of law to ensure that justice is delivered. In another

case reviewed, it was discovered that corrupt governors used the immunity clause to their

advantage and thereafter were elected as senators of the Federal Republic, where they continue to

amass wealth unheeded. It was discovered that such persons engage in abuse of the immunity

clause after engaging in corrupt practices as governors, and thereafter use their positions to seek

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offices as senators in the legislative arm of government. Another form of abuse or corruption is

that of legal procedures by these politically exposed persons, whereby they manipulate legal

procedures for their own gain through the use of frivolous adjournments and a weakened justice

system. It was suggested that a criminal barring service should be put in place which will stop

convicted criminals from running for political or public offices. With proper documentation and

enactment of legislations, office holders who should be in custody or barred from contesting office

would be so.

Further, case studies of electoral malpractices were examined. It was discovered that

several kinds of actions depict what electoral malpractice is; these include but are not limited to

electoral violence, rigging of elections, underage voting, harassment of voters and theft of ballot

boxes, among other actions. One of the cases examined was that of the bribing of INEC officials

by the former petroleum minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke, and their subsequent conviction for

bribe-taking. It is important to note that it was the opposition party that was able to ensure that

justice was done and not the party in power at the time. Furthermore, it was observed that, as a

result of their position, politically exposed persons engaged in reckless spending of public funds.

It was also at the time of the 2015 elections that the issue was raised of the use of $2.3 billion for

electioneering rather than for the execution of the war against Boko Haram. Thereafter, the

squandering of public funds to perpetuate political officers in power was criminalised.

On issues of the integrity of electoral officers, a common pattern was discovered which

showed that most returning officers in general elections across the nation were vice-chancellors of

universities, and most of these elections were defective as a result of issues that arose in a

significant number of them. Such issues include inconclusive results, addition of figures to increase

the votes of particular parties, smuggling out of results sheets and many other actions that are

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inimical to positions of trust held by such public officers. These are forms of electoral malpractices

and corruption that helped to put politically exposed persons in power. The study revealed that

those officers who were trusted to deliver justice as they ought to lack in integrity, especially as

far as the 2019 elections were concerned. This research finding could be linked to collective action

theory, which emphasises the importance of factors such as trust and how individuals perceive the

behaviour of others. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) regard systemic corruption as a

collective problem, because people rationalise their own behaviour based on their perception of

what others would do in the same situation. When corruption becomes a social norm, everyone

sees it as simply the way things are done. People engage in corrupt actions, even if they are aware

of the widespread consequences, as they believe that ‘it doesn’t make sense to be the only honest

person in a corrupt system’ (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015). In such an environment, anti-corruption

measures based on the principal–agent model will not be effective, as there no ‘principled

principals’ who will enforce anti-corruption norms (Klitgaard, 1988; Persson, Rothstein and

Teorell, 2013).

Finally, an overview was done of types of electoral malpractices that took place from 1964

to 2019. Among other things, it was discovered that electoral malpractices took place and led to

the fracturing of the Nigerian polity in the ’60s. In the 1964 elections, UPGA boycotted the

elections in the Eastern region, which led to the victory of NNA. And as a result of electoral

malpractices and violence that took place in the Western region, a state of emergency was declared

which allowed the army in on governance and climaxed with the first coup and countercoup which

occurred in Nigeria in 1966. Some consequences included the genocidal Nigeria–Biafra civil war

that led to loss of more than 3 million lives within the course of a three-year conflict.

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 The next elections, which took place in 1979, had the controversy of two-thirds of 12,

which nearly marred the elections between the conservative NPN and the radical UPN. That

election also witnessed violence and electoral manipulations and lawsuits; however, at the end,

Shehu Shagari’s NPN won and took over the government from the military. The next elections, in

1983, were violent and controversial; they witnessed a lot of violence, especially in parts of the

western states in Nigeria. It is sometimes stated that these elections led to the intervention of the

military into Nigerian politics for another fifteen years. Then in 1993, the general elections were

declared inconclusive by the military head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, whose government

midwifed the electoral processes. Howbeit, it was declared the fairest elections to take place in the

country. That declaration of its inconclusiveness was seen as government interference at a high

level.

The military junta made attempts to return the country back to civilian rule, which was to

be done through the transmutation of the dictator from a military head of state to a civilian

president. Four of the political parties he created had made him their sole candidate, and others

were not registered. However, General Abacha suffered cardiac arrest, and that gave room for the

1999 elections, which were overseen by Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar’s government. It is of note

that the elections were mainly between Retd. General Olusegun Obasanjo’s PDP and Olu Falae’s

APP/AD alliance. It was not free of electoral malpractices, as there was massive rigging of the

electoral processes, but it was not seen to be violent as previous elections had been.

The 2003 elections, which returned Olusegun Obasanjo for a second term, were rigged and

were marked by violence, as even the president declared it was a ‘do-or-die election’. Cases of

rigging, multiple thumb printing, and snatching and stealing of ballot boxes, among other

malpractices, were witnessed.

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 The elections of 2007 were worse in terms of the malpractices witnessed. These involved

the use of underage voters, violence, killings and other kinds of electoral malpractices. The

elections of 2011, when compared to previous ones, could be tagged fair, with modest malpractices

taking place. There was still evidence of rigging and underage voting; however, it was not

significant when compared to what occurred in the 2003 or 2007 elections. The president at the

time, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, pleaded with Nigerians that his being elected was not worth the life

of any Nigerian. This set the tone for comparatively peaceable elections to take place. However,

the 2015 elections saw many electoral malpractices take place, with rigging, snatching of ballot

boxes, underage voting, killings and so on. The 2019 elections were not as violent in some regions

when compared to that of 2015, but what played out were structural electoral malpractices that

were systematically carried out and involved the executive arm of government, the military and

the so-called umpire, INEC. Impunity reigned supreme and there was involvement of the military

in the elections, with militants and other hoodlums involved in the process. It led to postponement

or incomplete processes in some states, and there were underaged voting, multiple thumb printing

and other electoral malpractices in other areas.

On the whole we can say that electoral malpractices, which are corruption through electoral

practices, have been a strategy used by politically exposed persons to perpetuate themselves in

power or to put their stooges in power, who will keep playing by their rules perpetually. This

practice has been used in different ways by both militarily and civilian-organised elections from

the time the country became independent till the present times.

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7.3 Summary of the Chapter

The purpose of this chapter of the study was essentially to analyse the various findings obtained

from the semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and case study analysis carried out.

To begin, there was an examination of the construct ‘corruption’, which played out in several

aspects of the study. Its definition, types and consequences were examined. Also, different

statutory institutions that are used to fight corruption were examined.

From the semi-structured interviews, several conclusions were drawn, which include the

fact that efforts should be made to exclude politically exposed persons from politics if they have

corrupt records, which will ensure that honest politicians with good character will be in power at

every level of government. Another conclusion is that political offices should be made less

attractive with fewer appurtenances, unlike what they receive presently. It was also resolved that

sanctions should be used objectively so that the appropriate punishments are served by erring and

corrupt political and public office holders.

To further discourage corrupt practices in Nigeria, it was resolved that anti-compliance

offices or departments be established in ministries, departments or agencies which will engage in

monitoring officers or reporting corrupt acts; from these, data can be collected on corrupt officers

which can be used to deter them from aspiring to government appointments or political office. It

was also agreed that strong strategic and political will should be exhibited by leaders where they

are determined to fight corruption. With such strategies it is expected that crime and corrupt

practices will be reduced, especially among politically exposed persons and those who hold

influential positions in governments.

Calls for reformation of the criminal justice system were made by interviewees. It is

believed that with such influence, politicians can easily be brought to book without delay, while

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justice will be served. Related to this, it was observed that PEPs easily corrupt the judiciary and

lawyers who defend them through paying enormous fees to them. There were calls that such

lawyers and their principals should be investigated to determine the sources of such funds, as

participants believed that these are the rewards of corruption and laundered monies stolen from

the public coffers. Though they believed that the ACJA is a legal instrument to fast-track justice,

they observed that its instrumentality is ignored in some cases by influential SANs of PEPs so

justice will be delayed.

Discussants in the focus group discussions supported the call for severe punishments for

political and electoral offenders. Most of them believed that such severity would discourage

similar behaviours from electoral officers. Further to that, they asked for an electoral framework

that will ensure free and fair elections in every election held in the country. They reasoned that,

through free and fair elections, corrupt PEPs will be defeated and credible individuals will be

elected to ensure good governance for the people. They further observed that intrigues and antics

used by politically corrupt persons should not be used to determine election results. Besides these

points, they concluded that with electronic voting, PEPs would not be able to rig themselves into

power nor put their protégés in their place. It can be deduced that interviewees and discussants

agreed on principles that should be carried out to reduce political and electoral corruption, and

from such we can suggest that through these strategies, corruption can be reduced in the polity,

and among politicians.

We can also surmise through the findings that there is a need to strengthen electoral laws

and put in place reforms that will reduce violence and stop corrupt PEPs from continually

perpetuating themselves or their ‘godsons’ in power. Participants reiterated the fact that corrupt

politically exposed persons should be sanctioned and denied participation in politics. They further

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called for the political will to stop the electoral and political corruption that has bedevilled the

country. They agreed that to eschew corruption there is a need for good governance. They believed

that with this, members of the electorate would not be tempted to engage in electoral violence or

to do anything that will perpetuate corrupt politicians in power. In the short run, they called for

educating Nigerians, including politicians, on the effects of corruption, and they suggested that

such criteria should be added into the education curriculum. This is with the view for children and

young adults to become acquainted with the negative impacts of corruption on the environment

and the nation at large, and to forestall it before they take over power.

An overview of the case studies revealed that the military has played significant roles to

influence the election of corrupt politicians and perpetuate them in power. It can be deduced that

this is so as they handed over power to civilians on two occasions and retired military generals

have also become presidents and governors on several occasions.

As a part of the case studies conducted, several types of corruption were seen, which

include international scandals, such as those of Haliburton and Malabu Oil, and government

corruption including cases of high-profile politically exposed persons such as Retd. Col Sambo

Dasuki, James Ibori, Diezani Alison-Madueke, Orji-Uzor Kalu, Retd. Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika

and so on. On government corruption and international bribery there is a clear link with the

principles of principal–agent theory. This deals with agents who represent state officials and are

charged with protecting and investing the principal’s (state’s) funds and resources but divert this

for their own personal and selfish gains and interests. It was further found that governments’ anti-

corruption agencies such as the EFCC entertain plea bargaining as a means to conclude matters

and also secure rewards of corruption from such persons.

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 Impunity and the use of political power to corrupt were other examples revealed in the case

studies. The manner in which the Code of Conduct Tribunal was used to unseat a sitting CJN,

Chief Justice Walter Samuel Onnoghen, was seen as corruption, as was the manner in which a

former Senate president, Bukola Saraki, used his office and influence to have loans he took from

a bank written off by the Chief Executive of the bank Erastus Akingbola. Corrupt practices in the

National Assembly were used as case studies, which include budget padding by committee

members and those of constituency funding. Suggestions on ways to reduce such cases were made,

which include having a constituency tracking unit that will evaluate the extent of works

implemented, and an in-house anti-corruption unit to monitor corrupt practices in the National

Assembly.

Different forms of election malpractices were also examined, and it was resolved that more

severe punishments should be put in place for offenders, and the military should not be engaged

in any way in the electoral processes. It was further suggested that special tribunals be constituted

that will handle matters of the abuse of the immunity clauses that corrupt government officials use

to escape from being put on trial. The roles of vice-chancellors in declaring unfit persons as

winners in elections, suspension of elections or declaring them incomplete were also examined,

and it was concluded that on issues of integrity, those who should serve as role models have been

found lacking. Finally, an overview of electoral malpractices from 1964 to 2019 was taken, and it

can be concluded that malpractices have been the bane of elections in Nigeria. They come in

different forms such as rigging, stuffing of ballot boxes, government interference, violence,

killings, and the like. It was suggested that more needs to be done, including the use of electronic

voting, special tribunals, disqualification of corrupt candidates and a new framework for elections,

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because when such things are done, it will lead to the eschewing, reduction, or control of corruption

within the political space.

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 CHAPTER EIGHT:

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.0 Summary

This study, with the title, ‘Evaluation of Political Corruption and Strategies for its Reduction in

Nigeria’, dealt with the need to empirically examine issues of political and electoral corruption in

Nigeria, especially from 1999 to the present time. Four research questions were asked, and semi-

structured interviews, focus group discussions and case studies were used to seek answers to these

questions. There were no hypotheses raised as the approach used for the study was the qualitative

method. In the summary of findings, the research arrived at answers to research questions asked

that were derived from the objectives of the study.

Answers to research question one, which sought to know the extent to which political

corruption has occurred in Nigeria since the establishment of democratic rule in 1999, were

deduced from findings obtained from available data. Results from the study revealed that to a large

extent corruption has astronomically increased and there is a great deal of capital flight and

disincentives for people to invest in Nigeria as a result of the extent of corruption, which existed

even before the last military head of state, General Abdulsalami, handed over the government to

Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, who incidentally was the military head of state who handed power over

to civilians in 1979. From findings, it is seen that political corruption that involves politically

exposed persons, government corruption and international scandals have grown exponentially in

the country and poses a national security risk without being effectively controlled by leaders in

power. There are certain corruption cases that have begun with the military and continued until

such scandals were prosecuted internationally. Some of these include the Haliburton scandal and

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the Malabu Oil scandal, which involved highly placed government officials from one regime to

another. This study sought to look at the ways in which political corruption transpires in relation

to financial crime committed by politically exposed persons, either elected, nominated or self-

nominated. At the moment there are many properties in the UK, Dubai, the British Virgin Islands

and Jersey that are owned by corrupt foreign officials, most of whom are politically exposed

persons from Nigeria (Ijewereme, 2015). Allegedly, millions of pounds and dollars of aid money

from the US, the UK and other nations that has been flown in to Nigeria has ended up overseas in

property and other assets. What this reveals to us is that Nigeria is a country with systematic

corruption, but more importantly, it is a country with a state-capture (criminal syndicate) cabal

system, in which money flows through the purchase of an office, or as kickback in return for

permission to extract resources. The weak system has fuelled the illicit quest for wealth, and this

is what drives people to political and religious extremism with infinite effect (Harmon, 2016).

Pertaining to research question two, which asks what strategies have been used to curb

political corruption in Nigeria, this study found out that in line with UNCAC’s provisions the

government of Olusegun Obasanjo statutorily created the EFCC in addition to the ICPC to liaise

with CCB, an anti-corruption agency that had earlier been established in 1979 by Murtala

Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo’s government to combat corruption in Nigeria, but which

obtained its legal backing during the reign of Ibrahim Babangida in 1989. The Code of Conduct

Tribunal is a special anti-corruption court; it has the constitutional and legal right to try those

against whom allegation of fraud and corruption have been made, and it has the legal right to order

the forfeiture of illegally acquired wealth of public officials and to bar persons found guilty of

corruption for up to ten years. It was found out that the EFCC became the most effective given the

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extent and kinds of financial corrupt practices that are taking place in governments at various levels

including federal, state and local governments.

Further, President Jonathan’s administration introduced the Administration of Criminal

Justice Act 2015, which is a revolutionary law; the law has now provided that trials of criminal

cases will now be conducted on a day-to-day basis. What this means is that cases of corruption,

terrorism and all other criminal cases will no longer be stayed from prosecution longer than

necessary, and where it is absolutely required, an adjournment will not be longer than 14 days in

between. This is a revolutionary law because it means no more stays of proceedings, so cases can

now be decided in between six and twelve months; it also puts a high standard of responsibility on

the prosecutor. It means the investigator must conduct a thorough investigation before prosecuting,

so that anti-corruption agencies will not rush to the court without adequate evidence, because once

charges are pressed and the plea is taken, trials commence and take place on a day-to-day basis.

However, it was discovered that different approaches are used to curb corruption in

different cases. For instance, the plea bargain is a tactic that is used in several corruption cases

whereby politically exposed persons release rewards of their corruption to the state and get off

lightly. In some cases, some high-profile persons in government have been imprisoned, as have

those who served in financial circles. Sanctions are also used in some cases, and these occur mainly

when persons who belong to political parties in power are able to get off lightly for offences

committed.

The third research question sought to know how successful the strategies have been in

curbing political corruption in Nigeria. Specifically, it looked at how the government’s approach

to corruption prevention plays out, which includes various stages from allegation to prosecution

to conviction. The historical evolution of political corruption was studied, as was types of

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corruption that occur in the Nigerian environment, the patterns and trend,s and roles of anti-graft

commissions to mitigate corrupt practices, which include anti-corruption awareness activities and

remediation efforts.

The study found out that, despite the statutory nature of the various anti-corruption

agencies, there is no clear-cut approach to strategies used in the anti-corruption campaign.

Different governments use these agencies in different ways either to achieve political gains or for

functional altruistic purposes. Indeed, heads of these agencies are subject to the whims and caprices

of any incumbent president in the country, and they lack the independence they need to function

effectively. Also, most presidents the country has had have lacked the political will to handle the

corruption issues to the extent that is required. While Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo instituted the EFCC

and ICPC, and these made high-profile arrests and even imprisoned some PEPs, it could be argued

that they were used to fight against opposition party members; the presidency of Musa Yar’Adua

decapitated the EFCC, and high-profile political criminals were freed, such as James Ibori who

laundered and corruptly enriched himself while he was the governor of Delta state; this continued

until the baton swung to Goodluck Jonathan. However, financial crimes in the banking sector were

pursued comprehensively by the former government under Farida Waziri. The current government

under Muhammadu Buhari, who won elections based on his zero-tolerance anti-corruption stance,

has been criticised because the presumed ethnic and political nature the fight against corruption

has assumed. There is also a perceived lack of a cohesive and unified approach in the fight against

corruption. Agencies that are expected to cooperate with each other act in independent fashions to

achieve a common national cause. However, there have been many confiscations of monies and

properties of corrupt persons. There are reports, however, that these have also been diverted by

some of the anti-corruption bodies, especially the EFCC under Ibrahim Magu.

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 The fourth research question sought to know what challenges have been faced in applying

anti-corruption strategies against political corruption in Nigeria. From findings obtained, the

conclusion is that different formidable challenges face the fight against corruption.

The study discovered that Nigerian anti-corruption legislation is unlikely to perform

effectively because governments have not demonstrated strong political will to combat corruption

and anti-corruption agencies lack political independence, impartiality and accountability. The key

outcome of the research suggested that the failure of anti-corruption measures could be attributed

to the fact that politically exposed persons (PEPs) such as ministers, governors, members of

Parliament and other high authorities play the anti-corruption rule differently, by taking advantage

of the vulnerable electoral system to rig themselves into power and authority; thereafter they

further exploit the treasury for self-gain and re-invest themselves in power through electoral

corruption.

Desire for personal gain has always been seen as primary motive for public-sector

corruption, which simplifies the complex relationship between individuals and the State.

Principal–agent is one of the theories that deconstructed this relationship. In the context of this

study, public officials are the ‘agents’; they are supposed to protect the interests of the public,

parliament, or their supervisors, i.e. the ‘principal’. As per principal–agent theory, though, the

interests of the agents are frequently different from the interests of the principal, and so the public

officials in reality seek to promote their own interests. The principals’ advantage is that they can

prescribe the pay-off rules in the relationship; however, the agent holds an information advantage

over the principal. Public officials thus use this advantage over those they are supposed to serve,

to promote their own personal benefit instead (Groenendijk, 1997). They do this by engaging in

corrupt transactions, which goes against the interests of the principal (i.e. the public, parliament or

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their supervisors), who lose out financially. This is known as an agency problem. The principal

can seek to mitigate this problem by designing incentives and schemes to reduce the agent’s

potential abuse – examples in this case include legislation and regulatory bodies. This theory was

relevant for this study as it takes into consideration one of the aims, which is to examine the extent

to which corruption has taken place in institutions that serve the citizenry by those who were

trusted to manage her commonwealth

A cursory observer may ask the question: Why it is difficult to reduce corruption in

Nigeria? Perhaps it may seem simplistic to argue that to eliminate corruption is difficult because

the people live with it. In simple terms, it could be said that people desire to get things done quickly

by offering bribes to authority; for example, when applying for a license, permit or qualification,

the people prefer to engage in corrupt practices by cutting corners than being straightforward about

what they are doing. Due to such attitudes and practices, corrupt mindsets have become deeply

ingrained in the culture. When people commit corruption on minor things to ‘get things done’ then

it is not a surprise to see corruption reflected at the top levels of political leadership, where it

becomes a case of grand corruption (Lindberg and Van Ham, 2016).

8.1 Conclusion

This study evaluated political corruption and strategies that can be used for its reduction in Nigeria.

It discovered that political corruption is tied to electoral corruption. Corruption is also found to be

systemic and exists in different levels of the country. An implication of corruption is that it has

adverse effects on socio-economic indices of the country. Corruption is seen as a global

phenomenon and several governments in different countries have put in place frameworks and

mechanisms to fight it. Some effects of corruption are that it leads to extremism and break-up of

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countries if care is not taken and adequate measures employed to mitigate it. Corruption in Nigeria

began from colonial times, and with Independence it continued, but the introduction of military

rule exacerbated it, and it became systemic and affected every facet of the country.

The study dealt with how through political power, politically exposed persons who oversee

power on behalf of the people engage in political corruption. Different kinds of political corruption

are carried out by people in government, either military or civilian, to the detriment of the country.

These actions lead to poor infrastructural development, poor education, lack of good hospitals, and

the creation of a socio-economic schism between citizens of the country. These debilitating effects

have also led to the need for the establishment of different anti-corruption strategies by succeeding

governments to control or eradicate corruption in its entirety. Persons in government in Nigeria

have over time robbed the public coffers through various means to perpetuate themselves and their

cronies in power. As a result of their need to cover their deeds, they ensure that either they

themselves or their protégés are in power, and through this they can continue to enjoy the proceeds

of corruption. Military regimes had always overthrown civilian governments with the excuse that

they were excessively corrupt, but they had turned out to be more corrupt and entrenched

corruption in Nigeria, destroying its ethos of fiscal discipline through their cavalier attitude to

governance and management of the public coffers.

The theoretical foundation for this study is derived primarily from principles of principal–

agent theory. This deals with agents who represent state officials and are charged with protecting

and investing the principal (states) funds and resources, but divert this for their own personal and

selfish gains and interests. This thesis prevailed in most of the persons who were studied in this

research; some examples include Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke, late Gen. Sanni Abacha, Mr.

James Ibori, Orji-Uzor Kalu and a host of others. Other theories utilised include collective action

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theory, which is found to be applicable to what pertains in Nigeria, whereby despite laws and rules

to guide against corrupt practices, these are entrenched in a systemic manner in the country.

Instances abound such as budget padding and constituency fund scandals by members of the

National Assembly. Different forms of electoral corruption can be categorised into the kind of

corruption that this theory considers. The institutional theory, meanwhile, is considered

appropriate for the study because despite laws, legislations, rules and norms guiding against

corruption, it is systemic. This theory deals with the complex interplay between political systems,

structures, cultures and gender. Further is the issue of impunity which reflects corruption, whereby

the executive arm of the government used an inferior court (CCB) to remove the Chief Justice of

the Federation, Walter Onnoghen. This was found pertinent because despite the existence of anti-

corruption agencies such as the EFCC, ICPC, and CCB among others, differentials exist in

relationships between these and the fight against corruption and roles of different governments to

actually utilise the powers of these institutions to fight corrupt practices. The last theory

underpinning the study is the game theory, which deals with corruption in the public sector

whereby agencies become involved in corrupt practices because others are doing them, but in the

end they do not benefit as much as they would have if they did the right things. This dealt with the

need for ethical behaviours among corporations and public organisations, which is also pertinent

for us in this study. The need for public officers and organisations to be truthful, objective and

ethical is imperative to curb corrupt practices in every sector of the Nigerian economy. The

endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria has been made manifest in the four theories that were used

to underpin the study.

Individuals need to be conscious of the need to sacrifice rather than seek for convenience

in their actions and behaviours. However, if ordinary citizens are involved in cutting corners then

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it reflects the effectiveness of the government, who are meant to protect finance. Therefore, the

researcher supports investment in educating people from time to time on anti-corruption ethics

(Khan & Cheri, 2019). Also, serious disciplinary measures should be taken for breaches of anti-

corruption legislations, such as heavy penalties, fines and imprisonment. If states introduce good

criminal justice systems, they can effectively fight against corruption. Furthermore, governments

should embrace technological advancements in government sectors as a vital tool to fight fraud

and corruption (Kerr, 2018). It was observed that the issue of impunity gave rise to an increase in

crime rate and corrupt practices; therefore, proactive strategies should focus on a wide range of

preventive measures (Imhonopi et al., 2016).

A key finding is that the elites play the anti-corruption rule differently. Political leaders

encourage corruption by consistently recruiting their loyalists and families to head viable

departments, ministries and agencies. They use political influence to peddle corruption. Traditional

and religious leaders also play active parts in influencing recruitment into delicate and sensitive

positions, thereby disregarding requirements for top employment; as such, relevant experience and

qualifications are no longer relevant but what counts is connections to members of the political

class, religious leaders and traditional leaders. As a result of prebendalism and nepotism, when

certain people are recruited by this means into public offices, they have expectations to meet; they

no longer think in terms of serving their country, but they think in terms of what their political

‘godfathers’ want. For the sake of their jobs, promotions and future, they turn blind eyes when

their political godfathers commit corruption. Their hands become tied and they even cover up for

their political godfathers who had secured them the employment in the first place; and with the

guarantee of their employment, impunity becomes entrenched.

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 The study revealed that reducing political corruption could be possible if anti-corruption

agencies operate independently of political or government influence. Some factors deduced to

perpetuate corruption in Nigeria are poverty, a poor reward system, and primitive accumulation of

wealth by political leaders, which breaks up core moral values amongst citizens. It was also

observed that constant court injunctions and other strange adjournments of corruption cases reduce

the seriousness of crimes committed by politically exposed persons, which strengthens their

resolve to continue with such behaviours and further emboldens them to carry out more corrupt

acts.

Further, it was observed that defunct military regimes did not have a strong desire to tackle

corruption; those regimes, such as those of Murtala Mohammed and Idiagbon/Buhari, that

demonstrated the desire to tackle corruption were brought down through coup d’etat by elements

who were not interested in stopping corruption. Currently, as observed, there is a strong demand

from the international community, civil societies, and the general public to end corruption.

However, there is the need for political will and a demonstration of compliance with anti-

corruption legislations and agencies to achieve this. The primary challenge is to summon the

necessary political will and anti-corruption initiatives and implement them to be successful.

Certainly, the international declaration of UNCAC has provided a guideline on procedures that

require anti-corruption agencies to perform effectively. For example, the UNCAC declaration,

adopted by Nigerian authorities, advises that anti-corruption agencies must function with the

necessary independence, secured and stable funding and special staff with professional training,

so as to operate in a way that is effective and free from any undue influence. However, this is not

the case in Nigeria, as government appointees head the anti-corruption agencies; they appoint the

280
policy-makers and officers of such agencies, pay their wages and direct the operations of the

agencies, in contrast to the UNCAC requirements (UNCAC, 2005).

The researcher agrees with Amundsen (2019) that restructuring the political system is the

prerequisite to guaranteeing effective anti-corruption measures, particularly where corruption is

systemic. Restructuring in this context means that those anti-graft agencies must be operationally

autonomous and have the capacity to carry out their missions without political interference, be it

political, religious, or ethnic. It must be free from influence as recommended by Article 36 of the

UNCAC (UNODC, 2004). However, as noted by commentators, it is entirely impossible for any

government agencies to be totally free from political interference so long as the government is the

head of or appoints who heads the agencies; the government determines who controls operations

and policy; it nominates who directs the agencies (Amundsen, 2017). In the final analysis, it could

be argued that as the government is responsible for appointing heads of these agencies, the

operational mind of the agencies is equal to the mind of the government. Therefore, where these

government agencies carry out actions that threaten political interests, they will inevitably suffer

from political pressure. Widespread political interference in the work of anti-corruption agencies

and a weak judiciary could make such agencies ineffective, because they will not be able to

prosecute corrupt government officials. As observed in the findings, government interferences

have weakened corruption prosecution. Therefore, in order to reduce political corruption, total

independence must be granted to anti-corruption agencies, the Judiciary and prosecutors. The

EFCC and ICPC and other related agencies must be allowed to prosecute all public officials

irrespective of their rank and political influence, and this can only be achieved by restructuring the

current system.

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8.2 Policy recommendation

Finally, it was discovered that there is an intractable relationship between political and electoral

corruption, which further agrees with principles guiding the institutional theory. As a result of the

desperation of politically exposed persons to perpetuate themselves in power or ensure that their

‘godsons’ are placed highly in political offices, they engage in various kinds of electoral

manipulations and use every intrigue to maintain their political status. Other structures of

governance, including the military, the electoral body and her officers, are used to achieve this

end. And such PEPs use different clauses, including the immunity clause, and injunctions to ensure

that they are not criminalised and walk about as free citizens. These people are also guilty of

involvement in international corporate scandals as a result of their being in control of policies and

decisions that should be beneficial to common Nigerians. An offshoot of these includes electoral

violence which has marred elections in Nigeria from the 1960s when the country became

independent till the present. And as a result of such violence and other forms of rigging, the right

persons are not elected into office, which reduces the ability to check both electoral corruption and

political corruption in the long run.

Further, observation from the focus group discussion and documentary evidence suggests

the difficulty of introducing radical policy changes in a that which is systemically corrupt (i.e. how

can we persuade corrupt politicians to introduce new measures to remove the corruption that keeps

them in power?). For example, under the leadership of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the

late President Yardua did admit publicly in 2007 that the election that brought him into office was

highly flawed and that Nigeria as a nation must address the manipulation of the election process.

He set up Mohammed Uwais’ Electoral Reform Panel. The panel did come up with a profound

recommendation, but the recommendation was not implemented by the electorate who benefited

282
from this flaw. President Jonathan set up a Sheikh Lemu Electoral Reform Panel after the post-

election violence in 2011. Again, the panel reiterated the recommendations of the Uwais report

and made further recommendations given the fact that over 800 persons were killed in the north

and in Akwa Ibom State in 2011 by election violence. However, these recommendations were

abandoned.

President Buhari set up the Ken Nnamani Panel for Electoral Reforms; the Panel reiterated

the earlier recommendations of Uwais and Lemu and made additional recommendations. The

report has also been ignored. All the recommendations have been put aside by the PDP and APC

governments. So, if we want to get out of these crises of monumental dimension, we need to go

back to these recommendations going forward. In 2010, the deliberate deployment of soldiers for

election duties in states controlled by the opposition parties (PDP) to subvert electoral process has

further damaged the credibility of the military. Such conduct by the military to subvert the express

will of the electorate can amount to political corruption or coup. In the eyes of the law, this could

be corruption; first, in Rivers State, the military were not deployed to maintain law and order or to

protect the integrity of the election, because there was no security threat; second, there was no

anticipated threat to the electoral process considering that the ruling party has been barred by the

Court from participating in the election process, thus removing the possibility of violence. It was

clear that since the ruling party had been barred from fielding any candidate for the Governorship

and state’s House of Assembly election, the ruling party (APC) has adopted another party (AAC)

by proxy and has colluded with the military to subvert the election in favour of the AAC, who will

later decamp to the ruling party (APC) who will control the state.

It is also worth exploring the effectiveness in globalisation of anti-corruption and criminal

justice. It could be deduced from this research that while international anti-corruption law and

283
agencies are not yet integrated to co-oporate with transnational corrupt practice (Pasculli & Ryder,

2019), it was observed from the participant interviews that in the cases of Diepreye Alamieyeseigh

(£1.8m), James Ibori and Diezani Alison-Madueke, Nigerian high profile corruption cases have

been successful prosecuted in the UK, whilst every attempt to prosecute these cases in Nigeria has

failed. It was also observed from the research case studies that the Halliburton International bribery

scandal could not be successfully prosecuted in Nigeria; however it was successfully prosecuted

in the US. Similarly, politically exposed persons found linked with the Malabu International

bribery scandal jumped trials in Nigeria whilst the matter was successfully prosecuted in Italy. The

research agreed with Pasculli that despite limited harmonisation of international anti-corruption

efforts, a significant improvement has been recorded between the UK and Nigerian regimes. This

is a welcome development; however, international law should pilot prosecutorial directions in

cases of serious financial crime to prevent impunity. This study also reveals that 80% of the

participants argued in favour of a radical paradigm shift that is required to prosecute justice; with

this trajectory, it has become necessary to rethink anti-corruption that goes beyond national

boundaries (Pasculli & Ryder, 2019).

8.3 Limitations of the Research

This thesis set out to discover strategies that can help to reduce political corruption. The explorative

nature of the thesis using qualitative research methods suggests that there is a need for more studies

using quantitative methods to substantiate findings made in this paper. Findings generated from

this study give room for further research. Variables identified are not a comprehensive list of

corruption preventive measures; therefore, further research is required to measure the saliency of

these variables that could further influence and reduce corruption effectively. This study was

284
further constrained by the researcher’s inability to verify claims made by respondents,

interviewees, and discussants at the time of using the different methods to generate data. As such,

more needs to be done to verify and substantiate such claims made by the respondents, which

however served to reach conclusions made in the study.

8.4 Suggestions for Further Studies

From the study that has been done, areas can be suggested that other scholars can carry out research

on, given that much academic studies have not been done in those areas. Such scholars will provide

new perspectives that were not exhaustively examined by this study.

1. There is not much research that examines how politically exposed people secure exemptions

(discharge) from corruption sanctions through political influence or power of patronage to stop

investigations or criminal proceedings against them because of vested interest. Such exemption

orders or injunctions have been perceived to derail the criminal justice process, as seen in the

case of Peter Odili. For example, the case against Peter Odili raises the question of the

legitimacy of court orders exempting a defendant from corruption criminal prosecution. In the

case, he was not covered by the immunity clause under Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution,

neither was he granted state pardon. Therefore, granting him exemption from criminal

prosecution amounted to corruption of the law. It is because of this kind of corruption of the

law that the Jonathan administration passed a bill into law on May 13, 2015, called the

Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA), to take care of judicial corruption. The

introduction of the ACJ Act 2015 is aimed to take back the law from members of the political

class that have hijacked and made a mockery of the legal system. Further studies are

recommended to determine how well the application of ACJA has been done, and how

285
 effectively the instrument has been used to curb corruption among politically exposed persons

in Nigeria.

2. Speedy electoral reforms are important, as these will help to meet the challenge of corruption

that is triggered by unreformed electoral processes. Further, the failure of successive

governments to reform the electoral process has created an overwhelming number of legal

petitions. For example, Buhari, who was declared the winner of the 23 February 2019 election,

had challenged elections results in the court over the 2003, 2007 and 2011 presidential

elections, which he lost. Adams Oshiomhole, APC’s National Chairman, had sought for a

redress in the court, from which he eventually claimed his mandate. However, the frustration

of electoral tribunals has been made more complicated by several judicial decisions. For

example, some judicial decisions held that ‘an election cannot be questioned on ground of

corrupt practices’, as in Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003). Such cases raised the issue of substantial

compliance, and the doctrine of substantial compliance has upheld several fraudulent elections.

It is recommended, therefore, that further studies be done on issues of electoral reforms,

substantial compliance and how it is used to perpetuate electoral corruption.

286
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 APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Participant Information sheet

Adapted from: NRES (May 2009), Information Sheets & Consent Forms. Retrieved Sept 1, 2010, from
http://www.nres.npsa.nhs.uk/applications/guidance/consent-guidance-and-
forms/?esctl1431725_entryid62=67013

Participant Information Sheet

Study Title: Political Corruption in Nigeria

I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. Before you decide we would like you
to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Talk to others
about the study if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear.

What is the purpose of the study?

I am intending to research in Political Corruption in Nigeria and develop the strategies to reduce
criminal opportunities that lead Fraud and corruption in Nigeria. With high level fraud and
corruption in Nigeria and the International fraud and corruption barometer rating Nigeria as the
24th most corrupt nation in the world. The risks can be identified, recorded, mitigated and
eliminated through strategies. Going forward, is this process encompassed within a Risk
Assessment of the criminalities that lead to fraud and corruption? and if so what are the
strategies to prevent fraud and corruption from occurring?
Alternatively, if another method could be use what is the aim and will it work?

315
Whatever method is used does it have an impact on corruption reduction in Nigeria or is there
another document, formula, strategies undiscovered or unread?
The Nigerian government report suggests that the potential losses to fraud, corruption and error
could be up to $148bn per annum.

Why have I been invited?

The intention is to interview a number of key members of the Nigerians, members of the criminal
justice systems, as well as representatives from the judiciary and the Legislators. These interviews
and any supporting documents will provide evidence to ascertain whether or not counter-fraud
and corruption prevention strategies could prevent fraud and corruption from occurring, if so
what are the likely strategies to put in place and what impact could they have had in reducing
Fraud and corruption.

I am keen on identifying any best practice which could assist government policies as a whole. Are
there any quick wins?

Do I have to take part?

Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide to join the study. If you
agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent form.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you consent to taking part, I will submit the Research Proposal to the University of Portsmouth
Ethics Committee for consideration of granting approval to proceed.

If approval is granted my aim is to conduct interviews and gather secondary material between
April and June 2017. I then intend to write up my dissertation in by September 2017, with a
deadline of September 2018.

In relation to the interviews these will be conducted at a time and location convenient to you. I
will be conducting the interviews alone and if you agree I will be taking notes. The interview will
not be audio or tape recorded. You will have the opportunity to read over my notes and sign
them at the end of the interview if you require. Each interview will take no longer than 2 hours
maximum.

During the interviews I am looking to also obtain from you any useful documentation to support
your views. This may consist of Risk Assessments or examples of best practice etc. I will only take
documentation if you consent and if they have been sanitised so that any privileged or sensitive
information has been removed under the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 and the Nigerian Data
Protection Act 2004.

Ideally I would like to name you and attribute your quotes and views in my dissertation. If you
consent to be interviewed but do not want to be named or have your quotes attributed please
record this on the Consent Form. Your wishes will be respected. However please do be aware
that it may be obvious to someone who knows you or your views if published anonymously.

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The contents of your interviews and supporting material will form the basis of my research and
the content of my dissertation. A significant amount of work will be involved in preparing this so
please bear this in mind if you decide to withdraw at a late stage, though this is your prerogative
to do so if you wish.

Your details and all of the material gathered will be retained securely by me and will only be
released if required by the University of Portsmouth for marking, validation or further research.

Not only will this research fulfil my requirements to achieve my Ph.D. but it may identify good
practice for counter-fraud and corruption strategies. Reducing Fraud and subsequent losses of
government asset is an important factor to consider in this research. I am therefore keen to
make my dissertation report available to all participants and the counter-fraud and corruption
Agencies. If you object to this please record this on the Consent Form.

Expenses and payments

I have no budget for additional expenses or payments but I will pay for refreshments i.e. tea,
coffee, biscuits during the interview if required. This will be from my own personal funds.

What will I have to do?

I will require between 1 to 2 hours of your time to talk through this subject in the interview. I will
be ascertaining your role, responsibilities, involvement in the counter-fraud and corruption and
knowledge of the Fraud problem and impact of Fraud reduction measures within your area of
responsibility.

I am happy to disclose my list of questions before the interview if you request these.

I am also looking to obtain from you any supporting material.

I will then keep you updated with progress and unless there are objections from another
participant I intend to give you a copy of the final dissertation report or its findings if you request
this.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

The main disadvantage of taking part is that you may provide a view that is contrary to that of
your organisation with the knock-on risk of criticism from your employer or a negative effect on
your work. You are all senior professionals and I appreciate that you will be aware of this.

My position is that I want to ascertain the honest position so that I can take a view within my
dissertation. I would like you to be open as far as possible and to present your own views.
However if you do have concerns please do let me know and we can discuss and agree a solution.

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What are the possible benefits of taking part?
It is possible that this research may identify best practice which may impact positively on
Corruption reduction. I am keen situate a change in the way we counter fraud and corruption
within the government agencies or departments unless there are restrictions in doing so. Fraud
and corruption is growing so new strategies need to be adapted.

Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?

Any information or material that you provide during this research will be held securely and will
be quoted in the dissertation report unless confidentially is requested.

This will be available however to the University of Portsmouth or other approved persons for the
purposes of marking, validating or auditing the research.

Interview notes and supporting material will be disposed of securely once permission is granted
by the University of Portsmouth. I anticipate that this will be after the completion of my Ph.D.

Participants have the right to check the accuracy of data held about them and correct any errors.

What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?

Participation in this research is voluntary. If you do participate you can withdraw at any time up
to the analysis of the data supplied.

If you do withdraw any notes or supporting documentation will be retained securely and will be
disposed of securely at the conclusion of my Ph.D.

If withdrawal is before the analysis of your data supplied it will not be further used in the research
or dissertation report.

What if there is a problem?

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact me in the first instance at
jude.dandison@port.ac.uk. Alternatively you can contact my Dissertation Supervisor Geoff Smith
at Geoff.smith@port.ac.uk if you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this
by contacting Dr Phil Clements, Head of Department Institute of Criminal Justice System at
Phil.Clemets@port.ac.uk.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

Participants often want to know results of a study they have been in. The results could be
summarised into a form which would be accessible to participants. You should tell the
participants what will happen to the results of the research, whether it is intended to publish the
results and how the results will be made available to participants. You should add that they will
not be identified in any report/publication unless they have given their consent.

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Who is organising and funding the research?
This research study is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth. It is not funded or sponsored
by any other body. I am undertaking this study with the sole aim of obtaining a Ph.D. qualification
and I will not be receiving any financial reward for undertaking it.

Who has reviewed the study?

Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, called an
Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. Before it proceeds this study will be reviewed by and
must be given a favourable opinion by the University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee.

Concluding statement
I would like to thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet regardless of whether
you decide to participate in this research study or not.

If you agree to participate please can you complete the attached Consent Form and return a
signed scanned copy to me at jude.dandison@myport.ac.uk. I will collect the original when we
meet for the interview.

Jude Dandison
9th May 2017

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 Appendix 2: Application for fieldwork letter

The Secretory
Economic and Financial Crime
Commission
No 5, Fomella Street, Off
Adetokumbo Ademula Crescent,
Wuse II,
Abuja Nigeria

Researcher: Jude Dandison

Ph.D. Research Student
Jude.dandison@port.ac.uk
24th March, 2016 Supervisor: Dr Geoffrey
Smith
Institute of Criminal Justice
Studies
St George’s Building
141 High Street, Portsmouth,
PO1 2HY. United Kingdom
Geoff.smith@port.ac.uk
Tel: +44 (0)23 8284 3933

Dear Sir,

Application for fieldwork with the Economic and Financial Crime Commission in Abuja

I am a Ph.D. candidate with the University of Portsmouth, Centre for Counter Fraud and
Corruption Studies. As part of my Ph.D. program I am expected to carry out a field work
(attachment), to observe fraud and corruption investigation/litigation in your organisation.
The aim of my research is to develop strategies that will prevent Corruption from occurring by
eliminating all the criminal opportunities that leads corruption in Nigeria. Thereby, saving the
unnecessary coast associated with corruption.

I am applying for a two-month fieldwork (attachment/ observation) with your organisation.

Please, kindly grant me the consent to come for an observation to cover the period of two months
starting from May to May 2017.

Should this my application be granted, please kindly sent me a consent letter to allow me come
for observation with the Economic and Financial Crime Commission in Abuja.

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A favourable ethical opinion confirms that the research has complied with the necessary ethical
protocols and requirements. I appreciate that conducting research in one’s own organisation can
bring about ethical issues as well as conflicts of interest. It is my responsibility to mitigate such
issues that may arise which include:

▪ Coercion of participants:
Participants will be randomly selected and the semi-guided Interview will be conducted.
Participants’ consent will be sought and they will remain anonymous. There will be no
disclosure of any personal data in the research.

▪ Cost to the organisation:

The semi-guided interview will take only 10 minutes to complete and the information
sought will not have any negative reputational impact on the organisation

▪ Conflict of interest:
I will undertake this research as a student of the University of Portsmouth and all my
access to data will be through relevant data custodians within the organisation. I will have
no direct contact with the participants

The research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth and the raw data belongs to the
University and the student. Your organisation will have no access to the raw data and cannot use
the raw data for human resources or performance issues. Your organisation can however, have
access to the findings of the research. All raw data will be stored under password encryption.
Upon completion of my degree, all raw data shall continue to be securely stored and eventually
destroyed in accordance with the Data Protection Act conditions.

I would like to thank you for the opportunity. You can contact me or my supervisor for any
clarification. I look forward to your favourable consideration.
Sincerely,

Jude Dandison
(Ph.D. Political Corruption)

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Appendix 3: Interviewee letter

9th May 2017

To: Interviewee

Study Title: Political Corruption in Nigeria

Dear

I am studying for a Ph.D. in Political Corruption in Nigeria at the University of Portsmouth. My

dissertation project will be researching on strategies to eliminate all the criminal opportunities that
lead to political corruption in Nigeria. I am looking for your views in relation to this research
subject.

If you are willing to participate you can be anonymous if you require, or you can be quoted. The
latter is better for me but what do you feel comfortable with? The final dissertation report will be
submitted by me to the University in early 2018 but if you wish you may have a copy. It may be
of use to you. This is again a matter for you.

I have attached a Consent Form and Information Sheet for your information. If you are happy to
proceed please can you complete the Consent Form and return a scanned copy via Email to me. I
will collect the original when we meet if that is acceptable. Participation in this research is entirely
voluntary and you can withdraw at any stage up to the analysis of the data.

If you do consent, once I have your completed Consent Form, I will seek approval from the
University Ethics Committee to proceed. I will then schedule a time to meet with you to ask you
questions and obtain any relevant documents which support your answers, which you are not
restricted. The interview is likely to take place between May and August 2017, but this will be at
an agreed convenient time and location to suit you.

If you have any queries please do not hesitate email myself at jude.dandison@myport.ac.uk or
Geoff Smith, my Dissertation Supervisor at Geoff.Smith@port.ac.uk.

The University of Portsmouth has an Independent Complaints Procedure. If any participant feels
that this is necessary it can be assessed by contacting Dr Phil Clements, Head of Department,
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at phil.clements@port.ac.uk.

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I hope that you will take part and I look forward to meeting with you.

Yours sincerely,

Jude Dandison

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Appendix 4: Letter from host organization

324
Appendix 5: Participant consent form

Consent Form

Study Title: Political Corruption in Nigeria

Name – Jude Dandison Please initial box

Email – up675628@myport.ac.uk

Name of Dissertation Supervisor: Geoff Smith

Email – Geoff.Smith@port.ac.uk

1) I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated
the 12th May 2017 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to
consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered
satisfactorily.

2) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to

withdraw at any time, up to the analysis of data without giving any reason.

3) I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by

individuals from the University of Portsmouth. I give permission for these
individuals to have access to my data.

4) I agree to my interview being recorded by use of written notes, which

I will have the opportunity to read and agree if I require.

5) I agree to being a named participant and being quoted verbatim.

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6) I consent to the circulation of the completed dissertation within the
Anti-Corruption Commission, Court and Government Agencies so that
any learning or best practice identified can be circulated.

7) I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant: Date: Signature:

Name of Person taking consent: Date: Signature:

When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher‘s file.

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Appendix 6: Interview schedule

1. How long have you served as judicial officer/legislator in the country?

2. Have you handled or had experiences with corruption cases?

3. Did such cases you handled deal with members of the political class?

4. Have you also been involved with cases that involved elections in the Country?

5. To what can you relate the growth of corruption in the Country?

6. What are your views about cases of corruption which involved the judiciary?

7. What will you say are causes of political corruption in the Country?

8. Will you consider the squandering of public funds as acts of corruption?

9. What are your views on Godfatherism in Nigeria’s political scene?

10. What suggestions can you give on how Governments can effectively curb corruption in
the Country?

11. Have the EFCC and ICPC been effective in the fight against corruption in the Country?

12. Do you think issuance of state pardons by the government means well in the fight against
corruption?

13. How effective do you think that the introduction of ACJA has been in the fight against
corruption?

14. Would you think that education and training on counter-fraud or anti-corruption will
assist in the fight against corrupt practices in the Country?

15. Any last words?

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Appendix 7: Focus Group Discussions

List of Questions

Introduction: The main topic for discussion is on ways political corruption can be reduced in
Nigeria. Please feel free to contribute to this as you deem fit. Thank you.

1. What are the strategies that can be used to reduce political corruption in Nigeria, in
relation to electoral malpractices?

2. What is the effectiveness of sanctions?

3. Are corrupt sanctions adequate to reduce political corruption in Nigeria?

4. How does culture influence corruption?

5. Do they (politicians) carry money about on election days?

6. What do you have to say about the prescribed penalties for political corruption?

7. Why the attack on the electorate?

8. What could be done in this regard?

9. Are you saying that electoral violence is used to rig elections?

10. Was INEC wrong in cancelling elections and arranging a re-run election in the cancelled
communities?

11. Describe issues of tampering with election results or interference by another nation.

Thank you for your honest contributions and for your time.

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Appendix 8: Research Ethics Review Checklist

329