With profound gratitude, we dedicate this document to the valiant freedom fighters of Bangladesh, whose

unwavering commitment to establish a nation-state based on equality, human dignity, and social justice paved
the way for the current generation to continuously strive for equitable governance through the best use of
what they have.

Message from Team Academics

Team Academics of DUNMUN 2023, upholding the spirit of equitable governance, cordially invites delegates
to participate in the revolutionary domain "Towards Equitable Governance: Embracing Data-Driven Transfor
mation for an Inclusive World." We cordially invite you to investigate the impact of data-driven approaches in
addressing global challenges and their role in inclusive policymaking. We must use the power of information
and diplomacy to shape a more inclusive and sustainable future. Prepare for a journey of a lifetime at
DUNMUN 2023, where intellectual discourse and diplomatic brilliance converge

Regards
Team Academics

AGENDA

Evaluating The Existing National Data

Security Policies and Their Vulnerabilities to
Restrict Misuse Against Marginalised
Communicites
Table of Contents
Chapter One – Introduction to the Committee: United Nations General Assembly Third Committee
1 1.1. Background and Context: United Nations General Assembly Third Committee UN-SOCHUM 2 1.2.
The Mechanization and the Mandate: United Nations General Assembly Third Committee UN-SO CHUM
2 Chapter Two-The Agenda at Hand: Evaluating the Existing National Data Security Policies and
Their Vulnerabilities to Restrict Misuse Against Marginalised Communities 5 2.1.A Brief Overview of
the Agenda 6 2.2. Definition of the Critical Terminologies 6 Data Security Policy 6 National Data Security
Policy 6 Chapter Three – Some Historical Examples of Misuse of ‘National Secrecy and Security Laws
against marginalised communities 8 3.1. Japanese-American Internment during World War II: Exploring
the Misuse of Secrecy 9 3.2. McCarthyism and the Red Scare: Surveillance, Privacy Laws, and the Targeting
of Marginalized Com munities during the Cold War Era 11 3.3. Apartheid-era South Africa: Secrecy Laws
and Systemic Discrimination: Analyzing the Role of Privacy Legislation in Concealing Human Rights
Abuses 12 3.4. Stasi Surveillance in East Germany: Privacy Erosion and the Stasi State: Examining the Misuse
of Secrecy Laws for Repression 14 3.5. Operation Condor in Latin America: Covert Collaboration and State
Violence: Investigating the Exploitation of Secrecy Laws in Targeting Marginalized Communities 16
Chapter Four – Current Examples of Data Security Policies in the Digital Sphere: Evaluating the
Vulnerabilities 18 4.1. Cybersecurity Law in China and the ‘Social Credit System in China: Balancing
National Security and Freedom of Expression in the Digital Sphere 19 4.2. Social Media Law in Russia: Data
Localization and Digital Control: Examining the Implications for Marginalized Voices 19 4.3. Aadhaar in
India: Assessing the Probable Impact on Freedom of Speech and Marginalized Communities 20 4.4. Online
Content Regulation in Turkey: State Control and Freedom of Expression: Unraveling the Impact on
Marginalized Communities: 21 4.5. Digital Security Law and Upcoming ‘Data Protection Act’ in Bangladesh:
Freedom of Expression and Marginalized Communities: Assessing the Impact of the Digital Security Act 21
4.6. Internet Regulations in Iran: Online Censorship and Marginalized Voices: Exploring the Effects of Inter
net Controls on Dissent 22
4.7. Online Surveillance Laws in Australia: Privacy, Security, and Marginalized Communities: Analyzing the
Implications of Digital Surveillance Measures 23 4.8. Social Media Regulations in Singapore: Balancing
Control and Expression: Examining the Effects on Marginalized Communities 24 4.9. Data Retention Laws
in Germany: Privacy Rights and Minority Communities: Evaluating the Impact of Data Retention Legislation
25 Chapter Five- Some case studies on digital data securities with fewer controversies and
vulnerabilities 27 5.1.Switzerland: Decentralized data governance and individual privacy rights: examining:
Switzerland’s data security policies: 28 5.2. New Zealand: privacy act and individual consent: safeguarding
citizens’ privacy rights in the digital age 28 5.3. German: robust data protection laws and transparency: a
comparative analysis of the German data security framework: 28 5.4. Iceland: data protection act and
privacy-friendly policies: assessing Iceland's commitment to individual privacy rights: 29 5.5. Canada:
PIPEDA and privacy commissioner: Balancing privacy rights and data usage in the Canadian context: 29
Chapter Six – Previous Examples of SOCHUM and UN taking steps against Laws with Vulnerabilities
to restrict misuse against marginalised communities 30 Chapter Seven – Conclusion 33 7.1. Executive
Summary 34

01
Introduction to the
Committee
The United Nations General Assembly Third Committee (also known as the Social, Humanitarian and
Cultural Committee or SOCHUM or C3) is one of six main committees at the United Nations General
Assembly. It deals with human rights, humanitarian affairs and social matters.

The Third Committee meets every year in early October and aims to finish its work by the end of November.
All 193 member states of the UN can attend. As in previous sessions, an important part of the work of the com
mittee will focus on the examination of human rights questions, including reports of the special procedures of
the Human Rights Council which was established in 2006. [1]

1.1. Background and Context: United Nations General Assembly Third

Committee UN-SOCHUM
The Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly was established in 1945 as a response to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The committee focuses on issues dealing with fundamental human
rights in the international community. SOCHUM’s authority derives from the original United Nations
Charter, and its mission is to design nonviolent resolutions for a wide range of social, humanitarian, and
cultural compli
cations within the international community. The committee promotes and enforces fundamental freedoms and
ideals meant to be enjoyed by the entire international community, such as the right to life, freedom of cultural
expression, freedom of political participation, protection of children’s rights, and promotion of social develop
ment, among many others. SOCHUM initiates studies that encourage recommendations for the promotion of
international cooperation and basic freedoms for all. [2]

1.2. The Mechanization and the Mandate: United Nations General Assembly
Third Committee UN-SOCHUM
1.2.1. Mandate:

SOCHUM's mandate derives from the provisions of the UN Charter regarding human rights, social develop

2
ment, and cultural preservation. It discusses a vast array of social, humanitarian, and cultural issues. Poverty
erad ication, gender equality, indigenous rights, infant protection, human trafficking, and drug control are the
primary focuses of the committee. In addition, it addresses humanitarian issues such as refugees, displaced
persons, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance.
1.2.2. Key Responsibilities:

Human Rights Promotion and Protection: SOCHUM promotes and protects human rights globally. It assesses
the implementation of international human rights treaties and addresses violations through dialogue, resolu
tions, and recommendations. The committee also addresses emerging human rights challenges, such as privacy
in the digital age, freedom of expression, and the rights of marginalized groups. In 2022, SOCHUM adopted a
resolution calling on all countries to protect the rights of journalists and media workers. The resolution was
adopted in response to the increasing number of journalists being killed, imprisoned, or harassed for their
work.

Social Development: SOCHUM aims to advance social development worldwide by focusing on social and eco
nomic issues. It strives to enhance social welfare, reduce poverty, and promote sustainable development. Topics
discussed include education, healthcare, employment, social inclusion, and other aspects of social development
essential for creating equitable and inclusive societies. In 2021, SOCHUM adopted a resolution calling for
increased investment in education for girls and women. The resolution highlighted the importance of
education for women's empowerment and economic development.

Cultural Development: Recognizing the importance of cultural diversity, SOCHUM promotes dialogue and
cooperation among nations to preserve and protect cultural heritage, combat cultural discrimination, and foster
intercultural dialogue. It addresses issues related to the protection of cultural property during armed conflicts.
In 2020, SOCHUM adopted a resolution condemning the destruction of cultural heritage during armed
conflicts. The resolution called on all countries to take steps to protect cultural property, including museums,
libraries, and religious sites.

1.2.3. Mechanization:

The mechanization of SOCHUM involves several key elements that facilitate its work and decision-making
processes.
 3
Annual Sessions: SOCHUM convenes annually during the UNGA's main session, typically held from Septem
ber to December. Member states engage in formal discussions, debates, and negotiations on agenda items
related to the committee's mandate.

Resolutions: Member states submit draft resolutions on various topics within SOCHUM's purview. These reso
lutions reflect the collective stance of member states and provide recommendations for action. Draft resolutions
undergo discussions, amendments, and eventual adoption through voting processes.
Side Events and Expert Panels: SOCHUM organizes side events and expert panels on specific issues to facilitate
in-depth discussions. These events offer opportunities for stakeholders, including civil society organizations,
academic institutions, and experts, to contribute their expertise and perspectives.

Coordination with UN Bodies and Special Rapporteurs: SOCHUM collaborates with other UN entities,
including specialized agencies, funds, programs, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR). It interacts with relevant special rapporteurs and independent experts who provide valuable
reports, studies, and recommendations on human rights issues.

Collaboration with Civil Society: SOCHUM encourages active participation from civil society organizations
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in its work. Accredited NGOs can attend sessions, provide
inputs, and engage in dialogues with member states. This inclusive approach promotes transparency and
ensures a diverse range of perspectives are considered.[3]

Reference

1. UN General Assembly - Third Committee - Social, Humanitarian & Cultural. https://www.un-

.org/en/ga/third
2. SOCHUM: Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Committee | IMUNA | NHSMUN | Model UN. (n.d.).
IMUNA | NHSMUN | Model UN. https://imuna.org/nhsmun/nyc/committees/sochum-social-humani
tarian-cultural-committee/
3. The GA Handbook A practical guide to the United Nations General Assembly (2nd ed.). (2017). New
York: Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations

4
02
The Agenda at Hand: Evaluating the Existing
National Data Security Policies and Their
Vulnerabilities to Restrict Misuse Against
Marginalised Communities
2.1.A Brief Overview of the Agenda

The agenda begins by focusing on data security policies as they are significant in safeguarding sensitive infor
mation and promoting trust in the digital ecosystem. And then finally focuses on marginalized communities,
emphasizing their unique vulnerabilities and the potential harm they may face due to data misuse of these data
security policies. The agenda demands an evaluation of the existing national data security policies, inviting
participants to explore and compare the approaches taken by different nations. The evaluation seeks to identify
strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in these policies specifically focusing on the misuse of this against the marginal
ised communities. By critically assessing existing frameworks, delegation representatives of the countries are
expected to identify these drawbacks and then build on the better alternative concerning the problems

2.2. Definition of the Critical Terminologies

Data Security Policy
Data security policy regulates the operation and monitoring of data in an association. The protection of all data
used, managed, and stored by a company is the aim of the policy. Data security policies are generally not a
requirement of the law but they can facilitate associations to avoid data protection standards and protocols. Key
Elements of a Data Security Policy
a) Inventory of data stored by the organization.
b)The goals of the security policy.
c) Which background events and authority have led to the creation of the policy?
d) The planned scope of the policy.
e) The stakeholders impacted by the security policy.
f)Organizational roles responsible for implementing the policy.
g)Means and methods for implementing and enforcing the policy, including security tools and storage equip
ment.

National Data Security Policy

6
In this agenda, the term data security policy has been used as an inclusive umbrella term. Including the
organiza tional or majorly national data security laws and regulations. These policies may also include the
digital security acts of different countries. As they regulate the protection and circulation of data of the mass
citizens in the digi tal ecosphere. And obviously, the data security policies that are applied by governments of
different bodies are included. So to sum up, a national data security policy is a comprehensive set of rules
created by a government or governing body to protect sensitive data within a country. It outlines the
principles and practices that guide how data should be handled, stored, shared, and disposed of across different
industries and sectors. The goal is to ensure that data remains confidential, safe, and accessible when needed.
Vulnerability:
Vulnerability, in a general sense, refers to the quality or state of being exposed to the possibility of being
harmed, attacked, or negatively affected.

Vulnerabilities can exist in various contexts, including individuals, systems, organizations, or even broader soci
etal structures. Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities is crucial for mitigating risks, enhancing resilience,
and safeguarding against potential harm or adverse outcomes.

Vulnerability in Data Security Policy:

Vulnerabilities within a data security policy pertain to weaknesses or deficiencies present in the policy that can
be leveraged by malicious individuals or lead to unauthorized access, disclosure, or loss of sensitive data. These
vulnerabilities have the potential to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data, resulting in
substantial risks and adverse implications for an organization.

Marginalized Communities:

Marginalized communities refer to those groups that experience political, economic, and social disadvantages,
rendering them unable to access services and opportunities due to discrimination, persecution, geographical
remoteness, or the deprivation of essential facilities. These communities are situated below the standard of the
latest human development index, as determined by relevant legislation. The term "marginalized communities"
also encompasses groups that face severe marginalization and are on the brink of extinction.

Reference
1. Marginalized Communities Definition | Law Insider. (n.d.). Law Insider. https://www.lawinsider.com/dic
tionary/marginalized-communities

https://web.archive.org/web/20210118111731/https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/vulnerability
Vulnerabili ty. (n.d.). Lexico Dictionaries |
7
2. Vulnerability | Definition of Vulnerability by Oxford Dictionary on Lexico.com also meaning of
English.
https://web.archive.org/web/20210118111731/https://www.lexi co.com/en/definition/vulnerability

3. Satori Cyber. (2022, December 5). Data Security Policy: Why It’s Important & How to Make It Great.
Satori.
https://satoricyber.com/data-security/data-security-policy-why-its-important-and-how-to-make-it-great/

03
Some Historical Examples of Misuse of
‘National Secrecy and Security Laws against
marginalised communities
3.1. Japanese-American Internment during World War II: Exploring the
Misuse of Secrecy

Laws and Privacy Rights in the Violation of Civil Liberties

 During World War II, over 120,000 Japanese-Americans, the
majority of whom were U.S. citizens, were forcibly relocated
and incarcerated. This policy was motivated by prejudice and
fear, resulting in the violation of civil liberties and the abuse
of secrecy laws and privacy rights.

After the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,

there was pervasive dread and suspicion among Japa
nese-Americans residing on the West Coast of the United States. Racism and the belief that these individuals
posed a security threat to the nation fueled this anxiety. As a consequence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
authorized the internment of Japanese-Americans by signing Executive Order 9066 in February 1942.

To justify the internment, the government invoked secrecy laws and the need to safeguard sensitive
information under the pretence of national security. There was no credible evidence to support the claim that
Japa nese-Americans were involved in espionage or sabotage, so this was an abuse of such laws. Rather than
genuine security concerns, ethnic prejudice and political expediency drove the government's actions.

The internment procedure entailed forcibly relocating Japa

nese-Americans from their residences to remote internment
centres, predominantly located in desolate regions of the
western United States. Families were given little time to
gather their belongings before being compelled to
vacate their homes, enterprises, and property. The
overcrowding and absence of fundamental amenities
in these centres caused significant hardships for the
interned individuals and their families.

Moreover, Japanese-Americans' privacy rights were

violated
9
by the internment. Their residences were searched without warrants, and their possessions were seized or sold
at a fraction of their value. They were denied fundamental constitutional rights, such as due process, and their
bank accounts were suspended. The internees were subject to constant surveillance, and their correspondence
was censored to prevent any potentially subversive communication.
The internment of Japanese-Americans lasted until the conclusion of World War II in 1945.
Not until decades later, in the 1980s, did the United States recognize the inequity of the
internment and apologize formally. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 was enacted to
compensate surviving Japanese-American internees and their families. The internment of
Japanese Americans is a stark reminder of the perils of allowing fear and prejudice to trump
justice, equality, and respect for civil liberties. In times of crisis, it functions as a cautionary
tale about the misuse of secrecy laws and the erosion of privacy rights. The internment
experience demonstrates the significance of protecting the rights and liberties of all
individuals, regardless of race or ethnicity, particularly during times of national security
concerns.

References
1) Japanese-American Incarceration During World War II. (2022, January 24). National
Archives. https://w ww.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation
2) MarshallV. (2018). Japanese American Incarceration. The National WWII Museum |
New Orleans.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japanese-american-incarceration
3) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (n.d.). Why were Japanese Americans interned
during World War II? Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/question/Why-were-Japanese-Ameri
cans-interned-during-World-War-II
4) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2023, May 17). Japanese American internment
| Definition, Camps, Locations, Conditions, & Facts. Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/event/Japa nese-American-internment
5) Yamamoto, E. K. (2013, May 10). Chapter 1: Prologue and Chapter 8: Epilogue: Race,
Rights, and Repa ration: Law and the Japanese American Internment.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab stract_id=2285830

10
3.2. McCarthyism and the Red Scare: Surveillance, Privacy Laws,
and the Targeting of Marginalized Communities during the
Cold War Era

Because of widespread fear of communism and the

accompanying targeting of vulnerable populations,
McCarthyism and the Red Scare evolved as a time of
strong political repression in the United States
during the Cold War era. Civil liberties were
violated and
privacy regulations were broken during this period.

To purge the United States of communists and their support

ers, Senator Joseph McCarthy and others launched a campaign
known as McCarthyism. As a consequence, people's political
ideas or connections were used as grounds for investigating them, blacklisting them, and
even firing them from their jobs.
 Extensive monitoring was one of the main methods used at the time. The government
conducted thorough surveillance via organizations like the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), keeping tabs on their
whereabouts, whom they associated with, and what they said to one another. Wiretapping,
infiltrating groups, and creating in-depth profiles of people were all part of this monitoring.

During the height of the Red Scare,

privacy rules were
often broken or disregarded. For the sake
of national secu
rity, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitu
tion is often disregarded. Targeting people
based on their
political opinions rather than on proof of
criminal
behaviour, surveillance operations were conducted with
out adequate warrants or judicial supervision.

11
Leftist activists, labour organizations, intellectuals, and
those working in the entertainment business were hit
particularly hard by McCarthyism's repercussions. Accusa
tions of communism were used to silence the activities and voices of people of colour, the
LGBTQ community, and other marginalized groups. Many people who were falsely
accused of being communists or communist sympathizers lost their employment, endured
public humiliation, and found themselves socially isolated as a consequence.
As public opinion shifted and McCarthyism's excesses were exposed, the period of the Red Scare and McCar
thyism faded away by the late 1950s. The government's capacity to outlaw political opinions has been limited
due to legal challenges, such as the 1957 Supreme Court decision Yates v. United States.

The lasting effects of McCarthyism and the Red Scare are a prime illustration of the dilution of individual
liberty in the United States. Especially in times of political stress and national security concerns, it serves as a
warning of the perils of political repression, the need to maintain privacy rights, and the necessity of
upholding the values of free speech, freedom of association, and due process.

References

1) Achter, P. J. (2023, May 18). McCarthyism | Definition, History, & Facts. Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/event/McCarthyism
2) Martin, R. (2023, April 18). Red Scare | Definition, U.S. History, & Causes. Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Red-Scare-politics
3) McCarthyism and the Red Scare | Miller Center. (2017). Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presi
dency/educational-resources/age-of-eisenhower/mcarthyism-red-scare

3.3. Apartheid-era South Africa: Secrecy Laws and Systemic Discrimination:

Analyzing the Role of Privacy Legislation in Concealing Human Rights
Abuses

During the apartheid era in South Africa, secrecy laws were

instrumental in concealing violations of human rights and
perpet
uating systemic discrimination against non-white
communities.
To maintain a veil of secrecy, suppress dissent, and prevent the
exposure of its oppressive policies, the government enacted
strin
gent legislation.

From 1948 to 1994, the National Party-led government enforced a system of racial
segregation and discrimination called apartheid. The government utilized secrecy laws,
such as the Official Secrets
 12
Act, to criminalize the disclosure of classified information and regulate the flow of information to the general
public. Human rights violations against black South Africans and other marginalized groups were concealed
by these laws.
From 1948 to 1994, the National Party-led government enforced a system of racial
segregation and discrimination called apartheid. The government utilized secrecy
laws, such as the Official Secrets Act, to criminalize the disclosure of classified infor
mation and regulate the flow of information to the general public. Human rights
violations against black South Africans and other marginalized groups were con
cealed by these laws.

Media censorship and control were two of the most important methods by which
secrecy laws were implemented. Publications critical of the apartheid regime were
extensively censored or explicitly prohibited, denying the public access to informa
tion about the regime's discriminatory policies and human rights violations. When
journalists and activists attempted to expose these violations, they were frequently
arrested, harassed, or intimidated.

In addition, privacy laws were utilized to target and monitor individuals deemed subversive or critical of the
apartheid regime. The government employed organizations such as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to
con duct extensive surveillance on anti-apartheid activists, political opponents, and anti-apartheid movement
mem bers. This surveillance included eavesdropping, organization infiltration, and the monitoring of private
com munications.

The apartheid regime sought to maintain a climate of

terror
and stifle dissent by suppressing information and
regulating
privacy rights. The government was able to continue
human
rights violations, forced removals, racial segregation, and the
denial of fundamental rights to non-white South Africans
due to the lack of transparency.

enacted, enabling increased transparency and access to information held by the government. These measures

Brave individuals and organizations were able to document

and expose apartheid-era atrocities despite the oppressive
13
climate. The efforts of anti-apartheid activists, investigative journalists, and international pressure progressively
drew attention to the systemic discrimination and violations of human rights occurring in South Africa. This
intensified international condemnation of apartheid eventually led to the system's demise in the early 1990s.

After the 1994 transition to democracy, South Africa adopted a new constitution that enshrines the
preservation of privacy rights and freedom of speech. In 2000, the Promotion of Access to Information Act
(PAIA) was
were intended to eradicate the culture of secrecy and establish a legal framework for accountability and the
pres ervation of human rights.

The period of apartheid in South Africa is a stark reminder of the perils of secrecy laws and the suppression of
privacy rights. It emphasizes the essential role that transparency, freedom of expression, and access to informa
tion play in protecting human rights, fostering accountability, and challenging oppressive systems.

References
1) Nightingale, E. O. (1990). Apartheid medicine. Health and human rights in South Africa. JAMA, 264(16),
2097–2102. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.264.16.2097
2) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2023b, June 8). Apartheid | South Africa, Definition, Facts,
Beginning, & End. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid 3) United Nations.
(n.d.). The Struggle against Apartheid: Lessons for Today’s World | United Nations.
https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/struggle-against-apartheid-lessons-todays-world

3.4. Stasi Surveillance in East Germany: Privacy Erosion and the Stasi State:
Examining the Misuse of Secrecy Laws for Repression
The Ministry for State Security (Stasi) in East Germany established one of
the
most extensive surveillance systems in history during the Cold War, which
resulted in the violation of personal privacy and the abuse of secrecy laws
for
political repression. The operations of the Stasi, which used secrecy laws to
maintain control and crush opposition, were a violation of the rights and
free
doms of East German inhabitants.

The Stasi's surveillance system relied on a vast informant network and

cutting-edge technology. A vast number of civilians
worked unofficially with the agency as "IMs," or
"Informal Members," by spying on their neighbours,
acquaintances, and coworkers and reporting any signs
of disloyalty or opposi tion. Everyone was suspicious of
one another since they didn't know whether their
every move and conversation was being recorded.

The Stasi's capacity for repression and monitoring was

greatly aided by regu

14
 lations mandating secrecy. The Stasi was able to operate under the cover of the 1950 Law on State Security. It

Wiretapping, concealed microphones, and telegram and letter

interceptions
were only some of Stasi's methods of monitoring. They also
gathered a
great deal of private information about people and used it to
compile dossiers that revealed people's political leanings,
social connections, and even the most private aspects of their
lives. The Stasi was able to maintain order and silence dissi
dents by using the massive amounts of data they amassed to
blackmail them into submission.

The opposition was stifled, free expression was stifled, and independent media was stifled due to the
application of secrecy laws. Journalists who were critical of the dictatorship were harassed, jailed, and
sometimes even exiled. All types of media were under official censorship, and dissidents were either suppressed
or sidelined. The public conversation was stifled as a result of widespread monitoring and strict confidentiality
regulations.

Negative psychological, social, and economic effects

were
felt throughout East German society as a result of the
Stasi's
operations and the loss of personal privacy. Mistrust and
dread drove people to turn on one another, fracturing
fami
lies and communities. Many individuals held back from
voicing their genuine ideas, which stifled innovation,
creativity, and political engagement. Constant monitoring
made it difficult for groups representing the public interest
to function freely.

The Stasi state began to collapse once the Berlin Wall came
down in 1989. As a result, people were able to get access to and face their own Stasi files, revealing the full scope
of the monitoring and persecution. Post-reunification Germany desperately needed a period of reckoning and
principles.
15
truth-seeking like this to begin the process of healing and reconciliation.

Stasi's surveillance system is a sobering example of what can go wrong when governments are given too much
authority, when individual liberties are violated, and when confidentiality rules are abused. It's a sobering exam
ple of how authoritarian regimes may use laws like these to silence critics, spread terror, and trample on basic
freedoms and liberties. The events in East Germany highlight the need for strong legal safeguards, openness,
and public responsibility to ensure the preservation of personal information and the maintenance of
democratic
References
1) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (n.d.-a). Stasi summary. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://ww
w.britannica.com/summary/Stasi
2) Cameron, J. D. (1998, July 20). Stasi | Meaning, Facts, Methods, & Files. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://w
ww.britannica.com/topic/Stasi
3) Amnesty International. (2021). Lessons from the Stasi – A cautionary tale on mass surveillance. Amnesty
International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/lessons-from-the-stasi/ 4) Prerna.Mathur.
(2021). East Germany’s Stasi Surveillance: Tactics and Impact. Wondrium Daily. https://w
ww.wondriumdaily.com/east-germanys-stasi-surveillance-tactics-and-impact/

3.5. Operation Condor in Latin America: Covert Collaboration and State

Violence: Investigating the Exploitation of Secrecy Laws in Targeting
Marginalized Communities

During the 1970s and 1980s, Operation Condor was a clandestine i n - telligence-sharing and coordination
operation conducted by several
Latin American dictatorships. It involved military and intelligence
agencies from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and
Bolivia working together to suppress political opposition and target
marginalized communities. The operation utilized confidentiality laws
to carry out state violence and violations of human rights.

Operation Condor's primary objective was the elimination of perceived Marxist threats and political dissidents
in the participating nations. The intelligence agencies coordinated e ff o r t s , shared information, and
conducted cross-border operations to monitor, capture, and eradi- cate sub versive individuals. This included
activists, union leaders, students, journalists, and anyone suspected of attempt
ing to overthrow the dictatorial regimes in power.

16
The secrecy laws played a crucial role in facilitating Operation Condor's collaboration and violence. The
partic ipating governments enacted legislation that permitted intelligence agencies to operate in secret,
shielded infor mation from public scrutiny, and made the disclosure of classified information a criminal
offence. These laws effectively shielded the intelligence agencies' activities, ensuring that their operations
remained hidden from public view.

Operation Condor committed a variety of human rights violations, including enforced disappearances, extraju
dicial murders, torture, and unlawful detentions. The participating governments targeted marginalized groups,
such as indigenous peoples, trade unionists, and rural farmers,
who
were viewed as challenges to the existing power structures. By
exploiting secrecy laws, governments were able to avoid
account
ability for their actions and operate with impunity.

The impact of Operation Condor's repression on Latin

American
societies was devastating. As family members forcibly disappeared
or were murdered, a legacy of sorrow and anguish was left behind.
The pervasive fear of persecution led to self-censorship and the sup
pression of dissenting voices. The violence committed during this period resulted in the loss of innumerable
lives and the massive violation of human rights.

Not until the 1990s and 2000s did the truth about Operation Condor become apparent. As democracies were
restored in several Latin American nations, investigations were launched and efforts were made to determine
the extent of collaboration and violations of human rights. Crucial to shedding light on the atrocities
committed during Operation Condor were declassified documents, witness testimony, and the work of
human rights orga
nizations.

Exploration and documentation of the activities of Operation Condor have contributed to transitional justice
initiatives and the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations. Governments have recognized
the need for reparations and truth-seeking processes to address the atrocities committed during this period and
have brought some of the perpetrators to justice.

Operation Condor exemplifies the exploitation of secrecy laws to carry out state violence, repress dissent, and
target marginalized communities. It emphasizes the significance of transparency, accountability, and the preser
vation of human rights in preventing the abuse of power in society. The legacy of Operation Condor serves as
a reminder of the never-ending struggle for justice and the necessity of upholding the rights of all people,
particularly the most marginalized and vulnerable.

References
17
1) Operation Condor: Officials of Amnesty International Targeted for “Liquidation.” (2016, December 14).
National Security Archive. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/south
ern-cone/2016-12-14/operation-condor-officials-amnesty-international-targeted-liquidation 2)
Esparza, M. (2015). State violence and genocide in Latin America. Jjay-cuny. https://www.aca
demia.edu/11748449/State_violence_and_genocide_in_Latin_America
 04
Current Examples of Data Security Policies in the
Digital Sphere: Evaluating the Vulnerabilities
4.1. Cybersecurity Law in China and the ‘Social Credit System in China:
Balancing National Security and Freedom of Expression in the Digital
Sphere

In June 2017 the Cybersecurity Law of China became operational. Enacted by the National People's Congress,
its goal is to increase data protection, data localization, and cybersecurity. The Law allows the government to
monitor activities, put restrictions on certain contents, and get access to companies' authorized data. Critics
contend that the law has been employed to quash opposing views, suppress political discourse and restrict con
tent that diverges from the government's ideological stance. The lack of clarity of this law along with the
unde fined concepts of national security and public interest found in the law, brings more reasons to justify
conduct ing investigations.

China's Social Credit System is a broad approach to evaluating an individual or a company's trustworthiness. In
the Social Credit System, the protection of privacy is important. But it collects data from different public or
private sectors. While it plays an important role in scoring and maintaining Chinese citizens it also collects
many sensitive data without the permission of the data subjects. Therefore it is a violation of privacy and many
debates are going on regarding how much it violates privacy.

References
Lee, Y. (2019). THE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM AND PRIVACY PROTECTION IN CHINA. Univie.
https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/40700264
The Diplomat. (2017, June 1). China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know. https://thediplo
mat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know
Wagner, D., & Wagner, D. (2018b, June 25). China’s cybersecurity law is biased and open to abuse, but it may
not stop others from copying it. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opin
ion/china/article/2152347/chinas-cybersecurity-law-biased-and-open-abuse-it-may

4.2. Social Media Law in Russia: Data Localization and Digital Control:
Examining the Implications for
Marginalized Voices:

19
In Russia, internet censorship is implemented through various laws and mechanisms. In March 2019, a bill was
passed that imposes fines on individuals spreading fake news or demonstrating signs of disrespect towards the
government.

Russia implemented laws concerning data localization and digital control that can affect social media sites and
those who use them. Among these is the "Russian Data Localization Law" or the "Personal Data Law," which
mandates companies to keep the personal data of Russian citizens within Russia's borders. Russia's data
localization and digital control laws, along with social media regulations, can significantly affect marginalized
communities. The law mandates companies to store the personal data of the inhabitants of Russia.
Under the Digital Control Law, some websites may be restricted or blocked which may seem dangerous to the
government's ambitions but marginalized communities who depend greatly on those sites for regular interac
tion may face difficulties.

References
Staff, R. (2019, March 18). Russia’s Putin signs a law banning fake news, insulting the state online. U.S.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-fakenews-idUSKCN1QZ1TZ

4.3. Aadhaar in India: Assessing the Probable Impact on Freedom of Speech

and Marginalized Communities
Aadhaar is a unique 12-digit identification number issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India
(UIDAI) to the residents of India. Aadhaar's main objective is to authenticate and validate the identity of indi
viduals, granting them a reliable and verifiable identification credential.

Regarding the impact on freedom of speech, Aadhaar doesn't seem to have any direct impact on it. Aadhar was
initially implemented to promote inclusivity and guarantee the direct delivery of government benefits to the
rightful beneficiaries. There have been discussions about how marginalized communities may face difficulties
in acquiring Aadhaar or accessing services that necessitate Aadhaar verification, which could potentially lead
to their exclusion.

The NRC is a proposed registry of all individuals residing in India, which would necessitate the submission of
documents like birth certificates and land records to establish citizenship. CAA offers a route to citizenship for
non-Muslim migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh who arrived in India before December 31,
2014. According to the critics, the NRC and CAA are not constitutional and create discrimination. The NRC
mandates the submission of documentation as evidence of citizenship, which can pose challenges for numerous
individuals, particularly marginalized groups like Muslims and Dalits. Here the data policy loophole of the
collective NRC CAA system can easily be used to even cut off any of the citizens of the marginalized group
especially Muslims from their citizenship rights directly by law. References

20
Admin. (2019, May 16). Beyond the poll rhetoric of BJP’s contentious Citizenship Amendment Bill. ORF.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/beyond-poll-rheto
4.4. Online Content Regulation in Turkey: State Control and
Freedom of Expression: Unraveling the Impact on Marginalized
Communities:

In 2018, the Turkish Parliament approved new legislation that mandates that online video
and streaming plat forms Smart take a licence before providing content to Turkish internet
users.
On October 13, 2022, the Turkish Parliament approved a series of amendments commonly
referred to as the "Censorship Law." These amendments introduce stricter criminal speech
offences and it leads to increased online censorship and limited access to information. The
law grants the government extensive control over online news websites, further
consolidating its authority in this domain.

The stringent control over online content in Turkey has resulted in a curtailment of
freedom of expression, particularly for marginalized communities. Individuals from
minority groups, activists, and human rights defenders encounter barriers when attempting
to voice their opinions and openly share their experiences. The blocking and filtering of
websites and social media platforms have further restricted access to information for these
marginalized communities.

Online content regulation can increase discrimination and stigmatization against minorities.
It can also be threatening to the privacy and protection of minorities and limit them from
advocating for their rights effec tively.

Turkish authorities should ensure the right to freedom of expression and free flow of
information pact on Mar ginalized Communities

References
Turkey: Dangerous, Dystopian New Legal Amendments. (2022, October 14). Human
Rights
Watch.https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/14/turkey-dangerous-dystopian-new-legal-ame
ndments

of the Digital Security Act

21
 4.5. Digital Security Law and Upcoming ‘Data Protection Act’ in
Bangladesh: Freedom of Expression and Marginalized
Communities: Assessing the Impact

The ‘Digital Security Act 2018’ is a digital law in Bangladesh. It was enacted to prevent
racism, extremism, sectarianism and hate speech against religious and other minority
groups. Under this Act, sharing inappropriate content on any media platform could be
punished. It was passed to provide cyber security to Bangladeshi citizens.
According to human rights defenders, this act can be used to silence opposing views and practice freedom of
expression. The act is dangerous because it considers a large number of offences as crimes and declares them as
non-bailable. This act permits police officers to arrest without a warrant. According to Article 19, this act is a
violation of human rights and is a threat to the exercise of freedom of speech in Bangladesh.

The Digital Security Act's section which deals with religious sentiment is not by the ICCPR (International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Because of this section minority communities are charged more with
the allegation of hurting religious sentiment. This act restricts the freedom of expression of the marginalised
communities.

The proposed 'Data Protection Act 2022' issues citizens’ data to be kept within the borders of Bangladesh. The
localization of data is allowing the government to collect the personal data of people without permission which
is definitely of violation of privacy. According to the new draft of the law, the government can get any data it
needs from the people associated with data processing.

The United Nations expressed concern over this provision and stated that the passing of this law will bring all
data centres under government vigilance. Therefore it will be a violation of privacy to the marginalized com
munity living in Bangladesh against whom the government may have some issues. It will be a threat to their
free expression of thought and privacy

References
The Diplomat. (2018, October 10). Bangladesh Enacts New Law That Could Silence Dissenters. https://the
diplomat.com/2018/10/bangladesh-enacts-new-law-that-could-silence-dissenters/

4.6. Internet Regulations in Iran: Online Censorship and Marginalized

Voices: Exploring the Effects of Internet Controls on Dissent
 22
According to 'Online Content Filtering' law, The Iranian government employs advanced filtering systems to
restrict access to certain websites and content. This includes blocking social media platforms, news websites
crit ical of the government, and websites with content deemed inappropriate or immoral.

Iran has a significant Internet filtering system that is known for its extensive censorship. The filtering primarily
targets political and religious minority sites, as well as those advocating for gender equality and women's
rights. The Iranian government actively monitors and filters six main categories of Internet sites, including
political and religious content, ethnic minority groups, women's rights, sexual content, and links to
international orga
nizations. The government has effectively implemented this filtering mechanism with the help of international
Internet companies, enabling them to track millions of Internet users who seek uncensored news and informa
tion.

Blogs have emerged as a crucial platform for personal, social, and political expression in Iran, and the govern
ment's control over this content aligns with its broader strategy of Internet censorship. The filtering of Internet
content has a direct and profound impact on NGOs, minority groups, religious communities, and other mar
ginalized voices within the country, thereby undermining citizens' civil liberties. It also exacerbates the gender
digital divide by impeding women's access to information technology. This divide is particularly evident as the
number of special interest group websites continues to grow. These groups and individuals use the Internet to
voice their concerns and exert pressure on Iranian policymakers.

The government of Iran claims that the restrictions imposed on information and communication technology
(ICT) tools and services are necessary to protect national security from the perceived corruption and
immorality imposed by Western countries. However, this argument suggests that these restrictions are
politically motivat ed.

References
Shirazi, F. (2010). The emancipatory role of information and communication technology. Journal of Informa
tion, Communication and Ethics in Society, 8(1), 57–84. https://doi.org/10.1108/14779961011024819

4.7. Online Surveillance Laws in Australia: Privacy, Security, and

Marginalized Communities: Analyzing the Implications of Digital
Surveillance Measures

The Assistance and Access Act 2018, also known as the "Encryption Bill," grants law enforcement and intelli
gence agencies in Australia the authority to request or compel technology companies to assist in accessing

23
encrypted communications. The legislation has faced criticism from international privacy groups and
technolo gy companies.

The law establishes frameworks for both voluntary and mandatory industry assistance to aid government
access to the content of encrypted communications. It aligns with the stricter stance on regulating online
communica tions taken by the Five Eyes nations, of which Australia is a part. The bill emphasizes the "mutual
responsibility" of information and communications technology vendors and service providers to offer further
assistance to law enforcement agencies.
Critics argue that the expansive powers granted by the Assistance and Access Act could set a troublesome prece
dent for the rest of the world. Australia, unlike countries such as the US or Canada, lacks constitutional protec
tion for human or privacy rights. The proposed powers of the bill, including the potential requirement for
tech nology and telecommunication companies to create methods for intercepting emails or text messages,
could
have significant implications for online security both domestically and internationally.
Technology companies are urged to resist a government that shows a strong interest in intercepting private
communications without providing a convincing rationale for these new powers.

References
Mann, M. W. a. M. (2017, September 10). Here’s how much access the Australian police already have to your
data. The Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/technology/heres-how-much-access-aus
tralian-police-already-have-to-your-data-20170911-gyeq6g.html

Stilgherrian. (2019, January 19). No backdoors for Australian encryption, just a riddling of ratholes. ZDNET.
https://www.zdnet.com/article/no-backdoors-for-australian-encryption-just-a-riddling-of-ratholes/

Bogle, A. (2018, October 1). Australia’s surveillance laws could damage internet security globally, overseas crit
ics say. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-10-02/proposed-sur
veillance-laws-draw-international-criticism/10300170

4.8. Social Media Regulations in Singapore: Balancing Control and

Expression: Examining the Effects on Marginalized Communities

Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore guarantees certain rights to its citizens, including
freedom of speech and expression, peaceful assembly, and association. However, these rights can be restricted by

24
laws enacted by the Parliament of Singapore, as stated in Article 14(2) of the Constitution.

The Singapore government has implemented social media regulations to maintain social harmony, safeguard
national security, and address challenges related to online content.
While freedom of speech and expression is indeed guaranteed in the Singaporean constitution, it is subject to
limitations in specific situations. Restrictions can be imposed if they are necessary to uphold Singapore's securi
ty, maintain friendly relations with other countries, preserve public order or morality, protect parliamentary
privileges, and prevent contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to offence.
Penalties for exceeding the limits of freedom of speech and expression vary depending on the specific laws
violated and the associated penalties.

In summary, the right to freedom of speech and expression exists in Singapore, but its scope is limited to
protecting the overall interests of Singaporean society.

References
Yahoo is part of the Yahoo family of brands. (n.d.). https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/freedom-speech-ex
pression-singapore-myth-022430505.html

4.9. Data Retention Laws in Germany: Privacy Rights and Minority

Communities: Evaluating the Impact of Data Retention
Legislation
Section 113 of the German Telecommunications Act (TKG) is titled "Manual information procedure" and out
lines the process for telecommunication providers to share customer data with authorized entities. However,
this section was invalidated by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2020. Nevertheless, understanding
its content remains important.

Under Section 113 TKG, German security authorities can request personal customer data, known as
Subscriber Data, from telecommunication service providers. Subscriber Data includes details like a subscriber's
name, date of birth, telephone number, address, bank details, login information, or assigned IP address.

The section applies to telecommunication providers with over 100,000 customers. These providers must estab
lish a secure electronic interface to receive information requests and share the requested data.

The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Section 113 TKG violates the fundamental rights of informational
self-determination and privacy of telecommunications users. The court found the section to be excessively
broad, allowing for the collection of unnecessary data for law enforcement purposes.
 2
5
While the court's decision invalidated Section 113 of the TKG, it did not prohibit telecommunication
providers from sharing subscriber data with authorized bodies. However, providers now require the explicit
consent of the subscriber before disclosing such data.

Hardinghaus, A. (2022e, January 20). The highest German Court invalidates Section 113 of the German Tele
communications Act and abandons service providers’ obligation to grant authorities access to subscriber data |
Technology Law Dispatch. Technology Law Dispatch. https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2020/07/-
regulatory/high -
est-german-court-invalidates-section-113-of-the-german-telecommunications-act-and-abandons-service-pr
oviders-obligation-to-grant-authorities-access-to-subscriber-data/
References
Lee, Y. (2019). THE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM AND PRIVACY PROTECTION IN CHINA. Univie.
https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/40700264

The Diplomat. (2017, June 1). China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know. https://thediplo
mat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know

Wagner, D., & Wagner, D. (2018b, June 25). China’s cybersecurity law is biased and open to abuse, but it may
not stop others from copying it. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opin
ion/china/article/2152347/chinas-cybersecurity-law-biased-and-open-abuse-it-may

Staff, R. (2019, March 18). Russia’s Putin signs a law banning fake news, insulting the state online. U.S.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-fakenews-idUSKCN1QZ1TZ

Turkey: Dangerous, Dystopian New Legal Amendments. (2022, October 14). Human Rights Watch.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/14/turkey-dangerous-dystopian-new-legal-amendments

The Diplomat. (2018, October 10). Bangladesh Enacts New Law That Could Silence Dissenters.
https://thedip lomat.com/2018/10/bangladesh-enacts-new-law-that-could-silence-dissenters/

Admin. (2019, May 16). Beyond the poll rhetoric of BJP’s contentious Citizenship Amendment Bill. ORF.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/beyond-poll-rheto -
ric-bjps-contentious-citizenship-amendment-bill-50499/?amp

26
 05
Some case studies on digital data securities
with fewer controversies and
vulnerabilities
5.1.Switzerland: Decentralized data governance and individual privacy
rights: examining: Switzerland’s data security policies:

Switzerland's primary legislation governing data protection is the Federal Data Protection Act. It sets out the
principles and regulations for the processing of personal data and aims to strike a balance between protecting
individual privacy rights and allowing for legitimate data processing. Also the DPIA
Describes data processing that is planned, evaluates the risks of personality or the fundamental rights of the
data subjects and indicates the measures required to protect those rights.

References
1. Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC). (n.d.). Retrieved from https://ww
w.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home.html

5.2. New Zealand: privacy act and individual consent: safeguarding citizens’
privacy rights in the digital age:
In New Zealand, the Privacy Act 2020 governs the protection of personal information and the privacy rights
of individuals. The act sets out the principles that organizations must follow when collecting, storing, using,
and disclosing personal information. These principles are designed to safeguard citizens' privacy rights in the
digital age.
1.(N.d.-a). Retrieved from https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html

5.3. German: robust data protection laws and transparency: a comparative

analysis of the German data security framework:
Germany has a robust data protection framework that underlines strong data security and transparency. Ger
many's data protection framework is primarily governed by the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdaten
schutzgesetz or BDSG) and the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The BDSG provides addi

References
28
tional provisions specific to Germany, complementing the GDPR's requirements.

Germany - Data Protection Overview. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/germa

ny-data-protection-overview
5.4. Iceland: data protection act and privacy-friendly Policies: assessing
Iceland's Commitment to individual privacy rights:

The primary legislation governing data protection in Iceland is the Act on the Protection of Personal Privacy
and Processing of Personal Data (No. 90/2018), commonly referred to as the Icelandic.
1.https://www.personuvernd.is/log-og-reglur/log-um-personuvernd

5.5. Canada: PIPEDA and privacy commissioner: Balancing privacy rights and
data usage in the Canadian context:

The Privacy Commissioner plays a crucial role in balancing privacy rights and data usage. They guide
organiza tions to ensure compliance with PIPEDA and promote best practices in protecting personal
information. Under PIPEDA, organizations are required to obtain consent from individuals before collecting,
using, or disclosing their personal information. Also, OPC is responsible for overseeing data compliance with
PIPEDA.
References
1. Branch, L. S. (2023a). Consolidated federal laws of Canada, Personal Information Protection and Elec
tronic Documents Act. Retrieved from https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/page-1.html#h-416888

2. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2018). Retrieved from

https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/for-individuals/

References
1.https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/en/home.html
2.https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html
3.https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/germany-data-protection-overview
4.https://www.personuvernd.is/log-og-reglur/log-um-
personuvernd
5.https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/page-1.h
tml#h-416888
6.https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/for-individuals/

29
06
 Previous Examples of SOCHUM and UN taking steps
against Laws with Vulnerabilities to restrict misuse
against marginalised communities
In 2016, the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee (SOCHUM) took a significant stand against the
death penalty as it pertains to marginalized communities. The committee firmly stated that the imposition of
the death penalty is not only cruel but also inhumane and degrading, particularly when it is disproportionately
applied to these marginalized groups. Individuals in impoverished conditions face a significantly higher impact
from the death penalty due to various factors. They are often targeted by law enforcement due to their vulnera
bility, lack of the financial resources to hire competent legal representation, and encounter subpar quality free
legal assistance. Obtaining expert evidence becomes an unaffordable burden, and the costs associated with locat
ing and securing witnesses present further challenges.

In response to this grave concern, SOCHUM made a resolute call to all nations worldwide, urging them to
abolish the death penalty and work towards a more just and equitable society for all individuals, regardless of
their social or economic background.

In 2017, the Third Committee, also known as the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, expressed
concern regarding the use of National Security Laws against marginalized communities. The committee urged
all states to pass and implement legislation aimed at safeguarding girls from various types of violence, discrimi
nation, exploitation, and harmful practices. They emphasized the importance of aligning these laws with inter
national human rights principles and standards. Essentially, the committee called upon states to protect margin
alized communities

In 2018, the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural (SOCHUM) Committee adopted a resolution concerning
the safeguarding of human rights about national security. This resolution urged nations to implement
measures that prevent the misuse of national security laws which particularly limit the rights of marginalized
groups.

In addition to adopting a resolution on human rights protection in the context of national security in 2018,
SOCHUM has undertaken initiatives to address the issue of marginalization and advance the rights of
marginal
ized communities. Notably, in 2019, SOCHUM organized a significant gathering focused on this topic. The
Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the use of blasphemy laws to restrict freedom of expression.
31
meeting attracted participation from government officials, civil society organizations, and representatives from
the United Nations system. Through such actions, SOCHUM aimed to raise awareness about marginalization
and foster collaborative efforts to promote the rights of marginalized groups.

The United Nations (U.N.) has repeatedly denounced blasphemy laws. Blasphemy laws are a threat to
freedom of expression. They are often vague, broad, and prone to arbitrary enforcement, which can lead to
their use to target religious minorities, political opponents, and people with minority viewpoints In 2012, the
U.N. Human
References
1) OHCHR. (n.d.). Death penalty disproportionately affects the poor, UN rights experts warn. https://ww
w.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/10/death-penalty-disproportionately-affects-poor-un-rights-experts-warn

2) Third Committee Approves 14 Draft Resolutions on Human Rights Defenders, Migrants, Girl Child amid
Contentious Votes over Agreed Language, Additional Costs | UN Press. (2017, November 20).
https://press.un- .org/en/2017/gashc4223.doc.htm

3) OHCHR. (n.d.-b). Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. https://ww
w.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-freedom-of-assembly-and-association
 32
07
Conclusi
on

7.1. Executive Summary

The misuse of data against marginalised communities remains a main concern. There is a pressing need to
assess the efficacy of these policies in safeguarding the rights of marginalised communities.

To restrict the misuse of data against marginalised communities, it is crucial to address these vulnerabilities.
National data policies should be reviewed and revised to explicitly recognize and protect the rights and
interests of marginalised communities. This includes incorporating provisions that address unique risks,
ensuring informed consent processes are robust and fair, implementing strong safeguards against
re-identification and data linkage, and establishing transparent and accountable data governance frameworks.
By doing so, national data policies can contribute to a more inclusive and equitable society, where the rights
and well-being of all individuals, particularly marginalised communities, are safeguarded.

Also by implementing some global actions, such as multilateral collaboration, international standards and guide
lines, comparative analysis, stakeholder engagement, impact assessment, knowledge sharing, advocacy and
awareness, it is possible to evaluate existing national data policies and their vulnerabilities and take steps to
restrict misuse against marginalised communities.

In conclusion, by prioritising the evaluation of existing national data policies and their vulnerabilities,
SOCHUM and the global community can contribute to the creation of a fair and just digital landscape

Further Reading
https://www.academia.edu/40700264/THE_SOCIAL_CREDIT_SYS
TEM_AND_PRIVACY_PROTECTION_IN_CHINA

https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/social-credit-system-in-china-and-its-implications-9956ccd8dc4b

3
 4
https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-10872-aadhar-challenges-and-concerns.html
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguard
ian.com/world/2022/mar/21/russia-bans-facebook-and-instagram-under-extremism-law

https://www.article19.org/resources/regulation-of-social-media-platforms-in-turkey-internet-law/

https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/case-against-the-digital-security-act-2018-329116

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-12-07_en.pdf

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=-
j&url=https://munuc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/SOCHUM_FINAL.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwis0J3g3sr_Ah
WUCIgKHTcpAM8QFnoECDAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3PESuRWFJcptm2NFit5pfd

http://www.urjcmunnews.com/sochum.html

References

Lee, Y. (2019). THE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM AND PRIVACY PROTECTION IN CHINA. Univie.
https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/40700264

The Diplomat. (2017, June 1). China’s Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know. https://thediplo
mat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know

Wagner, D., & Wagner, D. (2018b, June 25). China’s cybersecurity law is biased and open to abuse, but it
may not stop others from copying it. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/in
sight-opinion/china/article/2152347/chinas-cybersecurity-law-biased-and-open-abuse-it-may

Staff, R. (2019, March 18). Russia’s Putin signs a law banning fake news, insulting the state online. U.S.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-fakenews-idUSKCN1QZ1TZ

https://jsis.washington.edu/news/russian-data-localization-enriching-security-economy/

Turkey: Dangerous, Dystopian New Legal Amendments. (2022, October 14). Human Rights Watch.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/14/turkey-dangerous-dystopian-new-legal-amendments

35
The Diplomat. (2018, October 10). Bangladesh Enacts New Law That Could Silence Dissenters. https://the
diplomat.com/2018/10/bangladesh-enacts-new-law-that-could-silence-dissenters/

Admin. (2019, May 16). Beyond the poll rhetoric of BJP’s contentious Citizenship Amendment Bill. ORF.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/beyond-poll-rheto
ric-bjps-contentious-citizenship-amendment-bill-50499/?amp

OHCHR. (n.d.). Death penalty disproportionately affects the poor, UN rights experts warn. https://ww
w.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/10/death-penalty-disproportionately-affects-poor-un-rights-experts-warn

Third Committee Approves 14 Draft Resolutions on Human Rights Defenders, Migrants, Girl Child amid
Contentious Votes over Agreed Language, Additional Costs | UN Press. (2017, November 20). https://-
press.un.org/en/2017/gashc4223.doc.htm
OHCHR. (n.d.-b). Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. https://ww
w.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-freedom-of-assembly-and-association

6) Japanese-American Incarceration During World War II. (2022, January 24). National Archives.
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation
7) MarshallV. (2018). Japanese American Incarceration. The National WWII Museum | New Orleans.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japanese-american-incarceration
8) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (n.d.). Why were Japanese Americans interned during World
War II? Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/question/Why-were-Japanese-Ameri
cans-interned-during-World-War-II
9) The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2023, May 17). Japanese American internment | Definition,
Camps, Locations, Conditions, & Facts. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/event/Japa
nese-American-internment
10) Yamamoto, E. K. (2013, May 10). Chapter 1: Prologue and Chapter 8: Epilogue: Race, Rights, and
Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2285830

36