SS307: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDY GUIDE

Lesson 1: Introduction
Lesson objectives: Understand what international relations (IR) is as an academic discipline and
why it is an important subject for future Army officers. Understand the policies, requirements,
and expectations of the course. Develop familiarity with the main theoretical traditions that
dominate the contemporary study of international relations.
Readings:
 SS307 Syllabus
 No Electronics
 Instructor guidance
 Stephen Walt. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy,
Spring 1998. Person FIR, pages 5-19.
 Everyone must have a theory or worldview (FIR 5)
 Best viewed through the following three mindsets:
i. Realism
ii. Liberalism
iii. Radical Traditions
 Realism: “Depicts International affairs as a struggle for power among self-
interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating
conflict and war” (FIR 7)
 Classical Realism: “Human beings had an innate desire to dominate others” (FIR
7)
 Neo Realism: Focused on survival, proponents argue “the system is anarchic,
each state has to survive on its own” (FIR 7)
 Offense-Defense Theory: War is likely when victory will be easy; however,
when defense is the better option there is more cooperation (FIR 7)
 Defensive Realists: “States merely sought to survive and great powers could
guarantee their security by forming alliances” (FIR 7)
 Liberalism: The belief that international efforts can overcome individual
selfishness IOT promote the greater good (FIR 8)
 Radical Approaches: Beliefs in contrast with Realism and Liberalism (FIR 8)
 Orthodox Marxist: Believed that capitalism in the case of international
disagreement (FIR 8)
 Neomarxism: Believes that capitalist countries created wealth divides in
developing countries (FIR 8)
 Deconstructionism: Believes that theories are not reliable (FIR 9)
 Domestic Politics: Focused on internal factors as causes of behavior. This is in
contrast with International Theory. (FIR 9)
 Realism Redux:
 a) Realism has been called a dying tradition
b) New beliefs state: “If one state reaps larger gains than its partners, it will
gradually become stronger, and its partners eventually become more
vulnerable” (FIR 10)
c) Many believe that countries do not act out of selfishness; instead, an
unrealistic sense of fear for security (FIR 10)
 Democratic Peace Theory: The belief that democracies rarely fight other
democracies but often fight other forms of government.
i. States are more prone to fight when they are in the midst of a democratic
transition
ii. The ideas of less wars is relative as there are conflicting democratic views
iii. Evidence is limited
 Economic Liberal Theory: The belief that financial institutions are the solution
 Constructivism: Focus on the societal beliefs of states and their discourse as
indicators of action
Lesson 2: The Theory and Science of Politics
Lesson objectives: What is ‘theory’ and why is it important in IR? What makes political science
‘scientific?’ How do social scientists use the scientific method to develop and test theories? What
are the levels of analysis (‘images’) in IR theory, and how do we use them to understand why
states do what they do?
Readings:
 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. “Leaving theory behind: why hypothesis testing
has become bad for IR.” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013).
Person FIR, pages 23-33.
 BLUF: “de-emphasizing theory and privileging hypothesis testing is not the best
way to gain new knowledge about international politics” (FIR 26)
 The increase of empirical research over grand theory is furthering the divide
between the ivory tower and the normal citizenry by making International
Relations study less applicable
 Theory: A simplified picture of reality built on simplifying assumptions that
explain why certain hypothesis are true (FIR 27-28)
 Instrumentalism: Believe that a theory is only valuable if there are observable
results
 Theory Evaluation:
i. Logical Soundness
ii. Covariation (Testing)
iii. Process Tracing
 Kenneth R. Hoover and Todd Donovan. The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking.
Cengage Learning, 2011. Handler CCR, pages 18-27.
 “Knowledge is socially powerful only if it is knowledge that can be put to use”
(CCR 19)
 Variable: A name for something that is thought to influence another
 Hypothesis: Proposes a relationship between two or more variables (CCR 22)
 Hypothesis Requirements:
i. Variables must be clearly specified and measurable
ii. The relationship between variables must be the same
iii. The hypothesis must be testable
 Kenneth N. Waltz. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Columbia
University Press, 2001. Handler CCR, pages 29-32.
Lesson 3: Classical Realism
Lesson objectives: What is ‘anarchy’ in international system? Why, according to classical
realists, do states seek power in the international system? What is power, and how much is
‘enough’ power according to classical realists like Morgenthau? How are the basic tenets of
realism reflected in the Melian Dialogue? What is the realist view of morality in international
relations?
Readings:
 Thomas Hobbes. “On the Nature and Condition of Man.” Chap. XIII in Leviathan. 1651.
Handler CCR, pages 33-35.
 This is written from a First Image perspective
 All people generally have the same mental and physical faculty or the ability to
compensate for them (CCR 33)
 Because people have the same abilities, they have the same desires and this leads
to conflict (CCR 33)
 People are inherently self-interested and solely out to benefit themselves (CCR
34)
 There are three principle causes of quarrel and actions for:
1. Competition (Gain)
2. Diffidence (Safety)
3. Glory (Reputation)
 The state of nature is a state of war (CCR 34)
 Justice is not a natural construct and is solely derived from the state. When there
is not state, there are no morals. Morals exist solely in society, not in nature
(CCR 35)
 Peace only exists for the following three reasons
1. Fear of Death
2. Desire for Comfort
3. Hope that Peace Provides
 Hans Morgenthau. “A Realist Theory of International Politics.” In Politics Among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. McGraw Hill, 2006. Handler CCR,
pages 41-44.
 Six Principles of Political Realism
1 There are objective laws rooted in human nature
2 Action is determined by interest in terms of power
3 There seems to be an objective “good” in regards to power
4 There are no universal moral principles that apply to states
5 There is no assumption of good within nations
6 Everything comes back to power when examining action

 Joseph Nye. “The Peloponnesian War.” In Understanding International Conflicts, 6th ed.
Pearson, 2007. Handler CCR, pages 45-46.
 Thucydides. “The Melian Dialogue.” In The History of the Peloponnesian War. 431
BCE. Handler CCR, pages 159-162.
Lesson 4: Neorealism
Lesson objectives: According to neorealists, how does the structure of the international system
influence state behavior? Why does anarchy compel different types of states to behave similarly?
What is the difference between security and power? How much power is ‘enough’ according to
defensive realists (Waltz) vs. offensive realists (Mearsheimer)? Under what conditions do states
cooperate according to neorealists? How is security competition under anarchy both cause and
consequence of nationalism?
John Mearsheimer. “Realism.” In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Second edition. New
York: WW Norton & Company, 2014. Person FIR, pages 45-48.
 Three Rules of Realism
i. States are the principal actors in world politics
ii. The behavior of great powers is determined by external, as opposed to
internal, factors
iii. Power controls state action
 Human Nature Realism: Humans are hard wired with a “will to power” at birth
that is meant to combat anarchy and achieve power
 Defensive Realism: States merely seek survival and believe that power is the best
method to do so
 Offense-Defense Balance: There is a balance between military offensive and
defensive power that states seek to achieve for security
 Security and power can only be gained through war

Human Nature Defensive Realism Offensive Realism

Realism
Cause for wanting Inherent lust for Structure of system Structure of system
power? power
How much power is All they can get About what they have Enough to achieve a
desired? stable hegemon

Kenneth N Waltz. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 18, no. 4 (1988). Handler CCR, pages 47-50.
 Neo-Realism applies theory to state structure
 In dire situations, security outweighs power
 Neo-Realism believes that traditional realism is incomplete and needs to incorporate a
study of how structure effects state action
 War is caused by the international system’s structure
 Causes of Conflict Under Neo-Realism
i. States in anarchy must provide their own security
 ii. Threats to a state’s security are seemingly everywhere
John Mearsheimer. “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power.” In The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, 1st ed. W.W. Norton, 2001. Handler CCR, pages 51-58.
 Great powers are always searching for power over their opponents through hegemony
 Assumptions of Realism:
i. The international system is anarchic
ii. Great powers possess some offensive military capability
iii. States can never be sure of other states intentions
iv. Survival is the primary goal of great powers
v. Great powers are rational actors
 States inherently fear other great states due to their ability to detract form their own
security
 Security Dilemma: As a state gains security, it inherently threatens another states
security
 Types of Power
i. Relative Power: Concern over the distribution of material goods
ii. Absolute Power: Concerned with the size of a states’ own gains
 When there are two equal states, there is a switch from offense to defense as states want
to maintain what they have
 States rarely ac on non-security goals and generally fall back on realism
 Inhibitors of Cooperation:
i. Considerations about relative gains
ii. Fear of cheating by other states
 Summary: It is the structure of the international system and not the internal structure of
the state that causes offensive action in the hopes to achieve hegemony
B.R. Posen. “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power.” International Security 18, no. 2
(1993). Person FIR, pages 175-184.
 We fear Nationalism due to its association with the destructive warfare of the 20 th
Century
 “In this article I argue that Nationalism increases the intensity of warfare, and specifically
the ability of states to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of
millions of soldiers.” (FIR 176)
 Nationalism: The propensity of individuals to identify with a group that is too large to
meet in person
Lesson 5: Balance of Power in Realism
Lesson objectives: How do different distributions or ‘balances’ of power (number of great
powers in the system) affect the likelihood of conflict in the international system? Explain how
internal balancing, external balancing, and preventive war are responses to shifts in the
distribution of power. How does Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory differ from traditional ‘balance
of power’ theory? Why do states tend to prefer to balance against the most threatening state
rather than bandwagon with threatening states?
Kenneth Waltz. “Balance of Power.” In Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, IL:
Waveland Press, 2010. Person FIR, pages 53-55.
 States are unitary actors who seek self-preservation and at the worst domination
 Means:
i. Internal Means: Increasing economic and military strength
ii. External Means: The strengthening of alliances
 Self-Help System: A system in which a state that does not provide for itself will not
receive help from outside states and will fail to prosper
 Balance of Power Theory: A theory about the results of the uncoordinated actions of
states through the making of assumptions about the interests and motives of states
 Bandwagoning: The tendency of states to latch on to strong states instead of challenging
them and their unbalanced power
 Secondary states flock to the weaker of two powers because they are less of a threat
John Mearsheimer. “The Causes of Great Power War.” In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
Second edition. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2014 . Person FIR, pages 67-83.
 Bipolar systems are the most peaceful, unbalanced multipolar the least, and balanced
multipolar lie somewhere in between
 The main causes of war are found in the structure of the international system and the
distribution of power within the system
 Unbalanced System: A system in which there is an aspiring hegemon
 Balanced System: One in which there is no aspiring hegemon
 Types of Systems:
i. Unbalanced Bipolar:
ii. Balanced Bipolar: Governed by two great pow1ers of similar to equal strength
and power
iii. Unbalanced Multipolar: Three or more great powers with at least on possible
hegemon
iv. Balanced Multipolar: Three or more great powers with no aspiring hegemon
 Why War is Likely in Multipolar Systems:
i. More opportunities for war
ii. Imbalance of powers is more likely
iii. Potential for miscalculation is greater
Stephen M. Walt. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security
9, no. 4 (1985). Handler CCR, pages 202-207.
 Causes for alliances amongst nations:
i. Balance: States align with nations IOT oppose the most powerful state
ii. Bandwagoning: States ally with the state that poses the largest threat to their own
security
 Sources of Threat:
i. Aggregate Power: The control of resources and capital
ii. Proximate Power: The closeness of other states provide more of a threat
iii. Offensive Power: States with strong militaries look for alliances more than those
with weak militaries
iv. Offensive Intentions: When there are offensive states, others are more likely to
align IOT curb their power
 History has shown that more states form alliances out of balance over bandwagoning due
to fear that a powerful state may become less benevolent and the weaker state will lose
freedoms and power
Jack S. Levy. “Preventive War and Democratic Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 52, no.
1 (2008). Handler CCR, pages 192-196.
 Preventive Wars: Wars started with the intention of preventing a major shift in power
 Preemption: The addressing of issues at the root before occurrence
Recommended: William C. Wohlforth. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International
Security 24, no. 1 (1999). Person FIR, pages 87-96.
Lesson 7: Liberalism
Lesson objectives: What do political scientists and economists mean when they use the term
‘institution?’ What is the difference between international institutions and international
organizations, and what is the relationship between the two? What are the functions or
mechanisms by which institutions facilitate cooperation? What are the key critiques of neoliberal
institutionalism that have been put forward, often by realist IR theorists?
Scott Silverstone. “The Liberal Tradition and International Relations.” 2017. Person FIR, pages
99-104.
 The split between liberalism and realism is the liberals belief that the international order
and search for power/security can be changed
 Common Interdependence: The belief that states must be financially tied to prevent
conflict
 Neoliberal Institutionalism: The belief that there must be an enforceable universal moral
code
Douglass C. North. “An Introduction to Institutions and Institutional Change.” In Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, October 26, 1990.
Person FIR, pages 105-107.
 Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure
 A central function of institutions is that they punish noncompliance
Robert O. Keohane. “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy, no.
110 (1998). Person FIR, pages 109-118.
 Superpowers need rules because they force international change
 International institutions are necessary as they provide a means of communication
 Critics:
i. States yield real power, not institutions
ii. The threat of anarchy keeps states in balance
iii. Cooperation is itself divisive
Immanuel Kant. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In Essays and Treaties on Moral,
Political, and Various Philosophical Subjects. 1798. Handler CCR, pages 71-74.
 Nature is a state of conflict or the possibility thereof
 Articles for Perpetual Peace:
1. “The Civil Constitution of Every State Should be Republican”
2. “The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States”
3. “The Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal
Hospitality”
Lesson 8: Liberalism II
Lesson objectives: Why, according to economic liberalism, does economic interdependence
decrease the likelihood of conflict between trading partners? Why, contrary to the liberal vision
of economic interdependence, do realists believe that economic interdependence might actually
increase conflict among states? How does ‘trade expectations theory’ unify the insights of the
liberal and realist views of interdependence? Explain how the use of economic sanctions reflects
both realist and liberal approaches to influencing state behavior.
Richard Rosecrance. “The Worlds of International Relations.” In The Rise of the Trading State.
Basic Books, 1986. Handler CCR, pages 85-87.
 BLUF: As interdependence grows, states shift from a military-political focus to a trade
focus as it enables economic growth
 Military-Political: Nations are ranked in terms of power
 Trading World: Nations are valued for their varying functions on an economic level
 Willing to form alliances
 Decreased propensity for war
Dale C. Copeland. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.”
International Security 20, no. 4 (1996). Handler CCR, pages 88-90.
 BLUF: Trade politics fails to account for a states fear that their reliance upon another for
vital resources could result in a loss of important resources and drive states to war IOT
secure the resources for themselves.
Edward Fishman. “Even Smarter Sanctions: How to Fight in the Era of Economic Warfare.”
Foreign Affairs 96, no. 6 (2017). Online:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/evensmarter-sanctions
 US has two assets for sanctions:
1. Sheer economic size
2. Flexibility of legal authorities
 Sanctions have been treated as reactionary; which, limits their effectiveness
 When to use sanctions:
1. When there is enough money to actually cause change
2. Will the country actually change
3. Is the US willing to enforce the sanctions long term
4. The receiving country must be able to save face
 BLUF: The US needs to revamp its sanctions process to include other countries and
ensure max effectiveness
Lesson 9: Liberalism III
Lesson Objctives: Why, according to ‘democratic peace theory’ are democracies unlikely to go
to war with other democracies? How does causal logic offered by the the ‘culturative-normative’
model differ from the ‘structural-institutional model’ of the democratic peace? What are the
limits and critiques of democratic peace theory? Why are new democracies more war-prone than
other regime types?
Bruce Russett. “The Fact of the Democratic Peace.” In Grasping the Democratic Peace.
Princeton University Press, 1993. Handler CCR, pages 257-266.
 BLUF: In modernity, democracies almost never fight each other because they have other
methods of conflict resolution and hold the belief that they should not fight each other.
 The reading establishes the following:
1) Democratic institutions have more restraints when acting with other democracies
2) Democracies are less likely to use force against other democracies against other
democracies then other forms of government are against any system
3) Democracy as a whole is responsible for this peace, not just economic and
geopolitical factors
 People within a democracy do not want to fight others they view as following a similar
system; however, this does not apply to other systems
 Developing democracies are inherently unstable and do not necessarily follow general
practice
 The Cultural/Normative Model:
1) Decision makers try to follow internal processes
2) Decision makers expect other countries to subscribe to the same beliefs
3) Violence between democracies is rare because:
1. It is expected that democracies will use diplomacy
2. Democracies hold each other accountable
3. When conflict does occur, generally at least one of them is politically insecure
4) Violence between other forms is more confident because:
1. People expect violence
2. Preempt violence with violence
3. It is easy to exploit democracies
 Democracies are constrained from going to war due to their need for large scale support
 The Structural/Institutional Model
1) Violent conflict between democracies will be limited due to:
1. Internal checks to excessive offensive measures
2. Leaders of democracies are viewed as constrained
3. Democracies view each other as having checks and balances that will prevent
surprise attacks
2) Violent conflict by non-democratic states is more likely due to:
1. Non-constrained leaders
 2. More probable first strike
3. Non-democracies walk over democracies
4. If 3 occurs, democracies are more likely to instigate large scale violence
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. “Democratization and War.” Foreign Affairs, May/June
1995. Handler CCR, pages 267-272.
 BLUF: Democratic peace has been used to justify expansionism
 Causes of Democratic War:
1) Imperialistic coalitions
2) Inflexible interests
3) Competition for popular support
4) Weakened central authority
5) Prestige strategies
 States are particularly vulnerable during periods of transition where there is a lack of
central authority
 Must offer elites “golden parachute” during transitionary periods
John M. Owen IV. “Iraq and the Democratic Peace.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005). Online:
https: //www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2005-11-01/iraq-and-democratic-peace
Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa. “Polities and Peace.” International Security 20, no. 2 (1995).
Handler CCR, pages 273-275.
 BLUF: There is little evidence of the democratic peace theory
Lesson 10: Constructivism
Lesson objectives: According to constructivists, how do norms, values, and identities shape state
behavior? How does the constructivist explanation of state behavior differ from the materialist
approach taken by the realist and liberal traditions of IR theory? What do constructivists mean
when they say that ‘anarchy is what states make of it?’ What is meant by the insight that
‘meaning is socially constructed,’ and how does that influence our understanding of international
relations?
Ian Hurd. “Constructivism.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, edited by
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal. Oxford University Press, 2008. Person FIR, pages 121-
128.
 There are four features of Constructivism:
1) An Alternative to Materialism: People act based on how they feel
2) The Construction of State Interests: States act based of basic needs
3) Mutual Constitution of Structures and Agents: Interactions between states must be
understood in their social context
4) Multiple Logics of Anarchy: Anarchy is dependent upon what states and their
interests
Nina Tannenwald. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear
Nonuse.” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999). Person FIR, pages 131-163.
 Nucleaer Taboo: A seeming base understanding in which states refuse to actually use
nuclear weapons
 Three Normative Effects:
1) Regulative: Regulate existing behaviors and activity
2) Constitutive: Provides a seeming ethical framework that guides beliefs
3) Permisive: Unintended effects of an action
Amartya Sen. “The Violence of Illusion.” In Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny.
W.W. Norton, 2006. Handler CCR, pages 129-134.
 We must be careful with how we define others and ourselves and understand how these
classifications can affect our actions
Lesson 11: Domestic Theories of Foreign Policy
Lesson objectives: What is the difference between a ‘systems theory of international politics’
and a ‘theory of foreign policy’ according to Waltz? What are the various theoretical
explanations that identify domestic political factors as a cause of war? If the causes of war are
primarily domestic in nature, can state behavior be generalized beyond particular states at
particular times? How do domestic political institutions in the United States shape the
formulation and execution of American foreign policy?
Kenneth Waltz. “Systems Theories of International Politics.” In Theory of International Politics.
Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010. Person FIR, pages 189-190.
 It is important to study the processes through which systems operate
 It is possible to determine the actions of a state based off how its internal and
international processes work even if there is no real understanding of their driving theory
Jack S. Levy. “Domestic Politics and War.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4
(1988). Person FIR, pages 193-213.
 Factors at play in war
1) National attributes: The formation and structure of states can lead to increases
propensities for war and violence
2) Democratic v. Non-Democratic
3) Marxist v. Liberal
4) Economic structure: Economic stagnation can lead to war and expansionism
5) Nationalism: Can lead to need for war IOT maintain public support
6) Public opinion: Can determine a state’s stance
7) Scapegoat hypothesis: War leads to internal support
Michael Mastaduno. “The United States Political System and International Leadership.” In
American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, edited by G. John Ikenberry. New York:
Longman, 1999. Person FIR, pages 215-231.
 BLUF: The dispersal of power within the US provides a challenge to effective
international relations
 Internal Advantage: Easy to promote democracy within country
 External Disadvantage: Dispersion creates constraints through which international
relations must suffer through
 The US is a weak state as a commercial diplomacy and the only thing it has going for it is
its military might
 Reasons for Issues
1) Executive v. Congress
2) Bureaucracy
3) Interest groups can easily permeate into the government
Lesson 12: Writing in Political Science
NA
Lesson 13: Organizational and Bureaucratic Methods to Foreign Policy
Lesson objectives: Who or what are the key actors for each of the three decision making models
(described by Allison? What are the key deficiencies in the Rational Policy Model (RPM) that
necessitate the use of the Org. Process Model (OPM) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)
to explain a state’s foreign policy output? Why, according to the OPM and the BPM, do
governments sometimes take foreign policy actions that may be suboptimal solutions to the
problem at hand?
Graham Allison. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The American Political
Science Review 63, no. 3 (1969). (BlackBoard e-readings)
Lesson 14: Individual Theories of Foreign Policy
Lesson objectives: To what degree do individual political leaders shape foreign policy and the
consequences thereof in international politics? Under what conditions are individual leaders most
likely to influence international relations? How do insights into human rationality, psychology,
and neurology inform our understanding of leaders’ foreign policy decisions? Do we really need
to understand these individual-level factors in order to explain ‘why states do what they do?’
Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack. “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the
Statesman Back In.” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001). Person FIR, pages 237-257.
 BLUF: Argues for a first image approach in which one considers the beliefs of
individual leaders as a measure of state performance
Janice Gross Stein. “Foreign Policy Decision Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological
Models.” In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, edited by Steve Smith, Tim Dunne, and
Amelia Hadfield. Oxford University Press, 2016. Person FIR, pages 259-275.
 BLUF: A first image look at individuals within government and their reliance on
psychological models and the possible faultiness of perception
Lesson 15: Ethics in International Relations
Lesson objectives: Do the standards of individual morality also apply to the actions of states and
statesmen? Should moral standards constrain state behavior? If the answer to these questions is
affirmative, by what standards are we to judge the morality of a state’s actions? What are the
main ethical schools of thought that influence international relations? What are the traditional
ethical approaches used to evaluate whether an action is ethical?
James Fieser. Normative Ethics. 2009. Handler CCR, pages 163-167.
 Consequentialism
 Virtue Ethics
 Deontology
Joseph Nye. “Ethical Questions and International Politics.” In Understanding International
Conflicts, 6th ed. Pearson, 2007. Handler CCR, pages 168-173.
 There exist 4 chief limits to applying ethical frameworks in IR:
1) There are no international values to which one may appeal
2) States are not people and cannot be thought of in the same way
3) Complexity arises due to the many actors within and extrinsic to a state
4) Good order leads to justice
George F. Kennan. “Morality and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (1985). Person FIR,
pages 279-292.
 BLUF: We must take a dogmatic approach to both politics and morality
 There are two categories through which we view state morality
1) That of our own government as intrinsically good
2) The governments of other states committing what we perceive as bad actions
 Three Key Criteria:
1) Governments are responsible for diplomacy
2) Governments are to be held accountable like people
3) There are no set international rules or norms
Lesson 16: The First World War
Lesson objectives: What is the ‘security dilemma’ and what are the variables that influence its
intensity or severity? How does Jervis define the following variables: offensive advantage,
defensive advantage, and distinghishability of posture? In which of Jervis’ four worlds would we
place Europe on the eve of WWI? What are the origins of the ‘cult of the offensive,’ and how did
that ‘cult’ contribute to the outbreak of war in 1914? Explain how Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen
Points’ sought to establish the post-WWI peace through liberal principles of international
relations.
Robert Jervis. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978).
Handler CCR, pages 180-184.
 BLUF: Cooperation amongst states shouldn’t exist due to offense/defense imbalance and
the following four reasons:
1) Commitment Problem
2) Buffer States
3) Security Dilemma
4) Incentive to War
 Factors that promote and assist with cooperation:
 Increased chance of dual gains through partnership
 Cooperation good for collective security
 States produce a good or service that others rely on
 Geography that hurts military offensives
 Not exploitable
 War would be costly
Jack Snyder. “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984.”
International Security 9, no. 1 (1984). Person FIR, pages 319-351.
 BLUF: Despite it being an era of supposed defensive dominance, countries before WWI
took an offensive approach due to the civil/military divide and the ease of offensive
operations.
Woodrow Wilson. The Fourteen Points. Address to the U.S. Congress, January 8, 1918. Handler
CCR, pages 100-101.
 NA