BIBLIOGRAPY

Legal Text Books

o James Crawford's textbook "Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law", (p. 315,
para. 10.1
o Oeter, Stefan. "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Dispute Perspective."
European Journal of International Law, vol. 20, no. 1, 2009, pp. 207-232.
o Eide, A., Krause, C., & Rosas, A. (2001). Economic, social, and cultural rights: A textbook.
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
o Hannum, H. (1990). Autonomy, sovereignty, and self-determination: The accommodation of
conflicting rights. University of Pennsylvania Press
o Sahadžić, Maja. "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Dispute Perspective."
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 21, no. 1, 2014, pp. 97-119.

International Treaties and conventions

o United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations

o African Union. (1981). African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
o United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
o United Nations. (1975). Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
o United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

CASE LAW

o Tanganyika Law Society and The Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend
Christopher R. Mtikila v. The United Republic of Tanzania, African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, App. Nos. 009 & 011/2011 (2013).
o Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America)
o Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 26 November 1984, ICJ Reports 1984 p. 420,
para. 63.
o In The Matter Of Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza V Republic Of Rwanda Application 003/2014
o Frans Viljoen international Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) Oxford at page 256 and
Laurence R. Heller, Terminating Treaties in Duncan Hollis (ed.) The Ox ford Guide to
7reafies Oxford University Press, 2012 at pages 634-649.
o Social and Economic Rights Action Center & the Center for Economic and Social Rights v.
Nigeria (Communication No. 155/96 2002)
o Resolution on Coup d’Etats, Military Transitions and Attendant Violations of Human and
Peoples’ Rights in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and The Sudan - ACHPR/Res.548 (LXXIII)
2022
o Communication 313/05 - Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana (ACHPR) para 169.
o Communication 245/2002 - Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe.
o SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights American Association for the International
Commission of Jurists
o Southern Cameroons National Council v. Cameroon, Application No. 46/2016, judgment of
15 March 2019.
o African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v. Libya, Application No. 002/2013,
judgment of 3 June 2016.
o The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria, Application No. 155/96, judgment of 8 December 2000
o Crawford, James. Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law. 9th ed., Oxford
University Press, 2019.
o Southern Cameroons National Council v. Cameroon, Application No. 46/2016, judgment of
15 March 2019.
o Mouvement des Réfugiés Mauritaniens en Casamance (MRMC) v. Senegal (Application
No. 011/2011)
o Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria (Application No. 225/98)
o Fynn v Ghana (Application No. 287/2004)
o Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire (Application No. 13/89)
o Shelton, D. (2014). Remedies in international human rights law. Oxford University Press
o Kosovo Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2010)
o European Court of Human Rights. (2016). Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v.
Switzerland.
o United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
o African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. (2009). African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Sudan.
o International Criminal Court. (2014). The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui.
o International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. (2001). The Prosecutor v. Anto
Furundzija.
o Issa Abdou Yacouba v. Republic of Niger (Application No. 001/2013):
o Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and Open Society Justice Initiative
v. Republic of Tanzania (Application No. 009/2011)
o Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean
refugees in Guinea) v. Republic of Guinea (Application No. 249/2002)
o Association pour la Protection des Droits de l'Homme et des Personnes Détenues (APDH)
v. Côte d'Ivoire (Application No. 0006/2013):
o Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Another v. Nigeria, African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001).
o The Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, International Court
of Justice, 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Feb. 3)
o Michael Addo v. Ghana, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No.
242/2001 (2003).
o Human Rights Watch and Others v. Angola, African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, Comm. No. 292/2004 (2007).
 SUMMARY OF FACTS

The Republic of Rantania finds itself embroiled in a complex web of human rights violations,
electoral controversies, and political instability. Against the backdrop of contentious elections
and a recent coup d'état, the case raises critical questions about the rule of law, democratic
governance, and the protection of fundamental rights in Rantania

The case unfolds amidst highly contested elections in Rantania, marred by accusations of
electoral fraud and suppression of opposition voices. Mr. Ditan emerges as a prominent critic of
the electoral process, using platforms like "The Truth" to voice dissent and challenge
government policies. His activism highlights the importance of freedom of expression in
democratic societies, yet it also exposes him to risks of persecution and retaliation from
authorities.

Parallel to the political turmoil, Rantania grapples with human rights abuses in its mining sector,
particularly concerning the Omia people and child laborers. The Omia people face forced
eviction from their ancestral lands to make way for mining activities led by companies like MD
Ltd. Child labor is rampant in these operations, raising concerns about exploitation and
hazardous working conditions. These violations underscore the intersectionality of human rights
abuses, linking economic exploitation with broader social injustices.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the Human Rights First (HRF) play a pivotal role
in documenting and advocating against human rights violations in Rantania. Through legal
proceedings before the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR), the UHRC
seeks accountability for Rantania 's actions. The court serves as a forum for adjudicating on
allegations of human rights abuses, offering recourse for victims and holding state actors and
corporations accountable.

Amidst these challenges Rantania experiences a coup d'état, leading to the overthrow of
President Okello government. The coup exacerbates political tensions and raises questions about
the rule of law and respect for democratic principles in Rantania. The abrupt change in
government further complicates efforts to address human rights violations and uphold the
principles of justice and accountability.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
 a) Whether the withdrawal by Rantania of its article 34(6) declaration is invalid, as it
violates the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by undermining
the vested rights of Rantanians?
b) Whether Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights
instruments by failing to ensure that the Omia people and child workers are protected
from violations committed by the MD Ltd?
c) Whether Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights
instruments by overthrowing and subsequently detaining President Okello?
d) Whether Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights
instruments by accessing Mr Ditan’s data on the social media platform, The Truth, by
arresting him, and by convicting him of and sentencing him for disseminating
information likely to disturb public order?

STATEMENT ON JURISDICTION

The Applicant submits that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this Application
Pursuant to Article 63 of the African Charter, Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter
and Rule 29(1)(a) of the rules of the Court. The African Court in the case of konate. V Burkina
faso1 developed its jurisdictional scope as Ratione personae ,Ratione materiae, Ratione
temporis, Ratione territorial.

a) Material Jurisdiction

The African court is vested with materiae jurisdiction Pursuant to Art. 3 (1) of the Protocol2
which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted
to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other
relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned this is reiterated in rule
29 of the court rules.

2
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
In Makungu v Tanzania,3 the African Court held that its material jurisdiction relates only to the
application and interpretation of human rights instruments to which a State is a Party. According
to Professor Fatsah Ouguergouz, in his book "The African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights4, the material jurisdiction of the ACHPR encompasses "human and peoples' rights
violations committed by States Parties to the African Charter." This means that individuals or
groups who believe that their rights have been violated by a state party can bring their case
before the ACHPR.

In the current case, this application raises allegations of violations of the African Charter and
other Human Rights law to which Rantania is a party and has ratified in regards to violation of
the rights of Omia people5 and failure to protect child workers6 from violations committed by
MD Ltd, unconstitutional overthrowing and subsequently detaining President O’Kello 7 and
unlawful access of Mr Ditan’s data8. Therefore this court is vested with material jurisdiction.

a) Temporal Jurisdiction

As far as time is concerned, the Court’s jurisdiction extends to only those matters that occur after
the dates the African Charter, the Court’s Protocol and the Optional Declaration under Article
34(6) of the Court’s Protocol, came into force for the Respondent. 9 The alleged violations of the
rights of Omia people10 ,child labour11 by MD Ltd, unconstitutional overthrowing and
subsequently detaining President O’Kello12 and unlawful access of Mr Ditan’s data all occurred
after the state of Rantania ratified the Charter in 1986 and the Protocol in 2015 pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the facts.

Furthermore In the case of Tanganyika Law Society and The Legal and Human Rights
Centre v. United Republic of Tanzania the Court held that it had temporal jurisdiction because

3
(merits) (2018) 2 AfCLR 550, 555.
4
A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa" (page 382, paragraph 4
5

9
African Commission v Kenya (Ogiek Case) [2017] 2 AfCLR 9 [64]
10

11

12
the alleged violations of the right to freedom of expression occurred during a period when the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was in force and applicable to Tanzania.

a) Territorial Jurisdiction

Court in the case of Konaté v Burkina Faso13held that territorial jurisdiction is assumed where
the alleged violations of human rights occurred within the territory of respondent State party. In
the instant case the human rights violations alleged took place within the territory of the state of
Rantania.

b) Personal Jurisdiction

Article 5 of the protocol gives standing to victims of human rights violations from the state
party as well as non-government organization with observer status, 14 with a prerequisite of state
parties depositing a declaration on Article 34(6) of the protocol.

The state of Rantania ratified the Charter in 1986 and the Protocol in 2015 pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the facts , and is therefore party to both instruments, it has equally on 2nd August
2017 made the declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases from
Individuals and non-governmental organizations, within the meaning of Article 34 (6) of the
Protocol

In regards to withdrawal of the declaration on Article 34(6) the African court in the case of
ingabire viotoire umuhoza v republic of Rwanda 15 held that the legal effects of the
withdrawal are two-fold. On the one hand, and considering that a notice period of one year
applies, the act of withdrawal have effect only after the expiry of that period. As a consequence,
the Court held that the withdrawal of the Respondent's declaration under Article 34(6) of the
Protocol takes effect after a period of one year.

In a matter similar to the one at hand, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights made a
determination on the basis of the principle of legal certainty by holding in the case of Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru Judgment of February 6,
2001 that:

13
2014] 1 AfCLR 314 [41]
14

15
at paragraph 67
“A unilateral action by a State cannot divest an international court of jurisdiction it has already
asserted; where a State is allowed to withdraw its recognition of the contentious jurisdiction,
formal notification would have to be given one year before the withdrawal could take effect, for
the sake of juridical security and continuity."

This position is supported by the legal principle of non-retroactivity which stipulates that new
rules apply only to future situations. The Respondent's notification of intention of withdrawal has
no legal effect on cases pending before the Court.

Consequently the applicant submits that the court is vested with the jurisdiction to hear this
matter.

STATEMENT ON ADMISSIBILITY

It is Applicants submission that pursuant to, Article 6(2) of the African Court Protocol and
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, court shall rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account
the provisions in Article 56 of the African Charter. 16 An application is admissible if it meets
all the admissibility requirements.17 In this case, the requirements in dispute is exhaustion
of local remedies.18 And submission of Application within a reasonable period from the time
local remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized with the matter.

In African Commission v Libya,19 the Court held that the Applicant must exhaust local
remedies where they are available, effective and sufficient unless they are unduly prolonged.
Local remedies are available if they can be pursued without impediment; they are effective if
they offer a prospect of success; and they are sufficient if they are capable of redressing the
violations.20

In the case of Werema v Tanzania21 court held that when local remedies are unavailable,
ineffective, insufficient or unduly prolonged, the Applicant will not be required to exhaust them.

16

17

18

19
1 [2016] 1 AfCLR 153 [67].
20
Jawara v Gambia [2000] AHRLR 107 [32]
21
[2018] 2 AfCLR 520 [40].
Pursuant to the instant facts the courts in the Rantania have been reported to be marred by
corruption22 and under control of powerful officials and private companies to effectively remedy
the violations. Nonetheless complaints in regards to the violations of human rights towards the
Omia people23 and Mr Ditan24 where pursued upto the court of appeal however no fair hearing or
sufficient redress was accorded , furthermore unconstitutional ousting of president Okello was
unduely Prolonged25 considering its utmost urgency that it deserved.

In Odjouoriby Cossi Paul v. Benin, the African Commission declared the communication
admissible on the ground that the proceedings pending for 18 months before the Appeal Court of
Cotonou were unduly prolonged. The Commission has admitted cases where the domestic case
is pending at an appellate court.26 While there is no fixed defined period that can be understood
as ‘undue prolongation,’ the Commission has found on two separate occasions that a case
pending for 12 years and a case pending for 5 years was deemed to be unjustifiable.27

Therefore it’s the submission of the applicants that the domestic remedies where not available,
effective neither were they sufficient hence applicant was precluded from exhausting them.

MERITS

ISSUE 1

1. The withdrawal by Rantania of its article 34(6) declaration is invalid, as it violates

the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by undermining
the vested rights of Rantanians.

22
Para 8
23
Para 8
24
Para 18
25
Para 17
26
African Commission, El Hadj Boubacar Diawara v. Benin, Communication No. 18/88 (1994);
African Commission, Kenya Human Rights Commission v. Kenya, Communication No. 135/94
(1995).
27
African Commission, Enga Mekongo v Cameroon, Communication No. 59/91 (1995) (12 years pending);
African Commission, Oudjouriby Cossi Paul v Benin, Communication No. 199/97 (2004) (5 years ongoing)
Applicant submits that the withdrawal by Rantania of its Article 34(6) declaration is invalid, as
it violates the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by undermining the
vested rights of Rantanian. Applicant will submit that the 1.the declaration creates a right
2.withdrawal is invalid and it violates the right to access to justice, 3. Accepting to submit to the
law ipso facto entails abandoning a part of one's sovereignty.

The declaration creates a right

In Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda, 28Court clearly stated that the requirement
of prior notice is necessary in the event of a withdrawal, considering in particular that the
Declaration deposited under Article 34(6) of the Protocol is not only an international
commitment made by the state but also, more importantly, a means by which it creates subjective
rights for individuals and groups.29

In the Ingabire judgement, the Court, while recognizing the right of states to withdraw the
Declaration, considered it as a unilateral act. It however confirmed that the withdrawal was not
absolute because the Declaration created rights for third parties, the enjoyment of which requires
juridical security30.

Right to access to justice;

Article 1 of the Charter states the commitment of the States to recognize the rights, duties and
freedoms it guarantees and to adopt legislative and other measures to implement them, Article 7
clearly recognizes "the right to an appeal To competent national organs against acts of violating
his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and
customs in force”.

The Protocol therefore reinforces the right to remedy established by the Charter 31, even though
the Protocol requires the States to first make the declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court.

28
Application No. 003/2014),
29
Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda, (Application No. 003/2014),Paragraph 61).

30
Para 60 of the Ingabire judgement
31
Article 2 of protocol
In Sébastien Germain Marie Aikoué Ajavon v. Republic of Benin, the Court explained that it
"considers that when a state party recognises a fundamental right, any regressive measure, i.e.,
"any measure which directly or indirectly marks a step backwards with regard to the rights
recognized in the Covenant is a violation of the ICESCR itself”.

Consequently an abrupt withdrawal without notice is likely to weaken the human rights
protection regime provided for by the Charter, and that therefore the notice period is obligatory
in the event of a withdrawal of the Declaration 32.Therefore by making the Declaration, States
recognize the right of individuals and NGOs to bring cases before the Court, hence their
withdraw of the Declaration infringes this right.

Accepting to submit to the law ipso facto entails abandoning a part of one's sovereignty.

The sovereignty-based arguments against the applicability of internationally protected human

rights are no longer effective. This is the result of an enormous compendium of treaties,
customary state practices, and legally binding international law that have characterized the
aggregation of treaties, customs, national legislation, and jus cogens.33

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also decided that states are required to uphold their
obligations under the United Nations Charter along with other rules of international law,
including international humanitarian and human rights laws.

International justice is entirely based on the necessary and difficult balance that must be struck
between the inviolable sovereignty of states and the necessary independence of those responsible
for rendering justice34, accepting to submit to the law ipso facto entails abandoning a part of one's
sovereignty. Be that as it may the Applicant urges the Court to further be guided by the principle
of pacta sund servanda, which requires parties to a treaty to perform their duties in good faith.
The Rantania withdrawing its declaration as such a time when the applicants had announced their
intention to lodge it before the african court wasn’t in good faith but to obstruct justice and right
to a remedy.

32
64 of the judgemen
33
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 238
(1993).
34
Advocate Yare Fall, President, Lawyers without Borders – Senega, African court coalition discussions:
states withdrawals from article 34(6) of the african court protocol in this issue.
ISSUE 2

2. Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments
by failing to ensure that the Omia people and child workers are protected from
violations committed by the MD Ltd.

The Republic of Rantania's actions constitute a clear violation of its obligations under the
African Charter, the CRC, and other relevant international human rights instruments. Applicant
will submit that the Omia people were evicted without consent and fair compensation violating
their right to property, in regards to child labour applicant submits that children were below age
and the action of MD LTD are attributable to the Respondent .

Violation of right to property.

Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights states that; every individual shall
be entitled to the enjoyment of the right and freedom recognized and guaranteed without
distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any
other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth and other status

Article 14 of the African Charter recognizes the right to property of all persons, which extends to
both individuals and groups, such as indigenous persons. 35 This Court has held that Indigenous
peoples/communities have the right to occupy, use/ utilize their ancestral lands. 36

Article 16 of the ILO indigenous and tribal peoples convention 1989 , the peoples concerned
shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy. Where the relocation of these peoples is
considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their
free and informed consent. Where the peoples concerned express a preference for
compensation in money or in kind, they shall be so compensated under appropriate guarantees.

Pursuant to the facts para.6 its reported that the Omia people were evicted from their ancestral
lands without their free prior and informed consent or any fair compensation. Omia people were
intimated to leave their ancestral lands leaving them without farmland foe survival,neither were
they consulted in the decision making process.
35
African Commission v Kenya, application 006/2012, para 123.
36
Ibid, para 128
Although the respondent may argue that the right to property is not absolute, this Court has noted
that the right to property may only be limited if the limitation is in public interest, and in
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws, necessary and proportional.37

The African Commission has noted that ‘in accordance with the law’ requires consultation and
compensation of the affected parties,38 and the failure to consult and seek consent of the
indigenous peoples, the failure to compensate them is a violation of their rights to property
and right to development which are interlinked.39
The respondent due to revelation of the violation they provided the omia people with state
funded housing units, however this doesn’t amount to fair compensation given the fact that omia
people are pastoralists.
Article 28 of the UN declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples states that indigenous
people shall be given just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned and Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the
peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources
equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate
redress.
Hence the compensation wasn’t just,fair and equitable .

Furthermore In Mary and Carrie Dann v. USA, the Court held that to have a process of consent
that is fully informed “requires at a minimum that all of the members of the community are
fully and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of the process and provided with
an effective opportunity to participate individually or as collectives.”

In Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International
on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/2003,; the subsequent restrictions on
access to the land; and the inadequate involvement in the process of developing the region for
use as a tourist game reserve, had violated the community's right to development under the U.N.

37
African Commission (n 27), para 120
38
African Commission(n 27), para 225
39
Paras, 226-228
Declaration on the Right to Development.. Even though the system allowed for compensation, it
nevertheless violated property rights by effectively causing forced evictions.

Child labour.

Article 4 of the ACRWC provides that the best interests of the child shall be paramount in all
decisions taken by any person or authority. In Center for Human Rights and RADDHO v
Senegal,40 the ACERWC held that the best interests’ principle requires that State Parties take
measures that safeguard children’s rights and contribute effectively to the well–being and holistic
development of children.

Moreover under Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Article 32 Recognizes the
right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that
is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's
health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development.

Facts41 show that the least 2,000 children aged between 15 and 18 years old are employed in
mining activities, as diggers and washers, with inadequate equipment and in appalling safety
conditions and this lead to about 10 children losing their lives, this is in total disregard to the
treaties and the best interest principle.

Furthermore, ILO (International labour convention) Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No.
138) (1998), under ARTICLE 3 – Children under 18 are forbidden from doing work that is
dangerous, unhealthy or bad for their morals (some people call this “hazardous work”). The
government has to discuss with trade unions and business organizations and make a list of
hazardous work a child should not be doing under 18 years.

40

41
Para 7
ARTICLE 8 – National rules may allow a child to work below the general age of 15, in case of
artistic performances (theatre, concerts) or advertisements. Permission may be granted only after
examining the conditions of work, the number of hours, the type of performance, etc.

Special protection is further elucidated in Article 10 of the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which affirms that:

Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their
employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper
their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below
which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.

Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, requires States to take action to
prevent the worst forms of that labour: that is hazardous or interfere with the child’s education,
or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.

ISSUE C

3. Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments
by overthrowing and subsequently detaining President Okello

It is the submission of applicant that this court should be Cognizant of the right of citizens to
‘participate freely in the conduct of the public affairs of their country, either directly or through
freely chosen representatives’ as enshrined under Article 13 of the African Charter .The
Republic of Rantania's unconstitutional overthrow and subsequent detention of President Okello
represent a severe violation of fundamental human rights and democratic principles. This action
directly contradicts the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) and the
AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, to which Rantania is a signatory.

Under the African Charter, Article 6 guarantees every individual the right to liberty and security
of person. President Okello detention, carried out without due process or access to legal
representation, directly contravenes this provision. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Charter affirms
the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. By detaining
President Fameika without affording him the opportunity for a fair trial, Rantania violates this
fundamental right.
 In this regard, the African Commission provided an insight to Article 7(1) (a) in Kenneth Good
v Republic of Botswana where it held that "The right to be heard requires that the Complainant
has unfettered access to a tribunal of competent jurisdiction to hear his case. It also requires that
the matter be brought before a tribunal with the

The African Commission noted in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe ,42 that
"The protection afforded by Article 7 is not limited to the protection of the rights of arrested and
detained persons but encompasses the right of every individual to access the relevant judicial
bodies competent to have their causes heard and be granted adequate relief."

To strengthen the spirit of Articles 7 and 26 of the African Charter, the African Commission
adopted the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa
(the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial), 43 to assist States Parties to the African
Charter in their guarantee of the right to fair trial as enshrined in the African Charter. One of the
essential elements of a fair hearing under the Principles include; "An entitlement to an appeal to
a higher judicial body."44 It also provides that, "The right to appeal should provide a genuine
and timely review of the case, including the facts and the law...."

Additionally, Article 9 of the African Charter prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. The
detention of President Okello following the unconstitutional overthrow of his government
represents a clear violation of this provision. Moreover, Article 13 safeguards the right of
individuals to participate freely in the government of their country. By forcibly removing
President Okello from power, Rantania undermines the democratic principles enshrined in the
Charter.

Furthermore, the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance explicitly condemns

unconstitutional changes of government. Article 23 of the Charter mandates member states to
reject and condemn such changes. Rantania’s actions in overthrowing President okello
democratically elected government directly contravene this provision.

42
Communication 245/2002 - Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe.
43
See also the Recommendation on the Respect and Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary adopted by the African Commission
during its 19th Session, which took place in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in 1996. This Recommendation calls upon States Parties to the African
Charter, to meet certain minimum standards to guarantee the independence of judiciaries in the region, including inter alia; the recognition of
universal principles of judicial independence; and urging governments to eliminate any legislation affecting judicial independence.
44
ibid
As the case was in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya. Appl. No.
002/2013, in June 3, 2016, The Commission had alleged that the Libyan government had
violated its obligations under the Charter to protect one of its citizens, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi,
from incommunicado detention and to provide him access to counsel. When Libya failed to
respond to the Commission's complaint and to the Court's order of provisional measures, the
Court proceeded to the merits and found Libya in violation of several articles of the Charter. Its
decision reflected both a measured approach to the issuance of default judgments and an
emphasis on the need for states to comply with their human rights obligations even in situations
of exceptional political and security instability.

ISSUE D

Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by
accessing Mr Ditan’s data on the social media platform, The Truth, by arresting him, and
by convicting him of and sentencing him for disseminating information likely to disturb
public order.

The actions taken by the Republic of Rantania against Mr. Ditan, including accessing his data on
the social media platform, The Truth, arresting him, and subsequently convicting and sentencing
him, constitute a clear violation of human rights as enshrined in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.

Article 9 of the African Charter protects individuals from arbitrary arrest and detention. Mr.
Ditani arrest without clear legal basis or proper judicial process constitutes an infringement of
this right.

Violation of Right to freedom of expression

Article 19 of the Charter guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. Mr. Ditan's actions on social media, assuming
they were peaceful and did not incite violence or hatred, fall within the realm of protected
expression. Therefore, his arrest and subsequent conviction for disseminating information likely
to disturb public order may amount to unjustifiable restrictions on freedom of expression.

Furthermore, the arrest and detention of Mr. Ditan without access to legal representation or due
process rights, as required by Article 7 of the African Charter, further exacerbate the violation of
his fundamental human rights. The denial of fair trial guarantees undermines the principles of
justice and the rule of law, which are foundational to a democratic society.

In addition to the African Charter, other relevant human rights instruments emphasize the
importance of protecting freedom of expression and ensuring due process rights. For example,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Rantania is a
signatory, similarly protects the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 and the right to
a fair trial pursuant to Article 14.

In its General comment No. 34, Human Rights Committee noted that Freedom of expression is a
necessary condition for the realization of the principles of transparency and accountability that
are, in turn, essential for the promotion and protection of human rights

According to the holding in Application 001/2014 - Tanganyika Law Society and the Legal and
Human Rights Centre v. United Republic of Tanzania, the applicants alleged that certain
provisions of the Tanzanian Media Services Act violated the right to freedom of expression. The
Court found that Tanzania had violated Article 9(2) of the African Charter by failing to ensure
that the law was compatible with the Charter's provisions on freedom of expression. The Court
also found that Tanzania had violated Article 13(1) of the African Charter by failing to
guarantee the right to access information.

The actions taken by the Republic of Rantania against Mr. Ditan must be assessed in light of the
principles outlined in principle 1 paragraph 10 of the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These
principles provide guidance on the circumstances under which governments may legitimately
limit human rights, including the principles of legitimate aim, necessity, proportionality, public
order, and national security.

1. Legitimate Aim
Any limitation on human rights must pursue a legitimate aim recognized by international law.
Rantania may argue that its aim was to maintain public order and prevent the dissemination of
information that could incite violence or disturb public order. (Principle 245) However, the
legitimacy of this aim must be scrutinized to ensure it aligns with international human rights
standards.

Necessity

The limitation on human rights must be necessary to achieve the legitimate aim identified.
Rantania may argue that Mr. N Ditan's arrest and detention were necessary to prevent potential
unrest or violence in society. (Principle 346) However, the necessity of these measures must be
evaluated based on evidence demonstrating an imminent threat to public order that could not be
addressed through less restrictive means.

Proportionality

The limitation on human rights must be proportionate to the aim pursued, meaning it should not
impose greater restrictions than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective. (Principle 447)
Rantania must demonstrate that the measures taken against Mr. Ditan were proportionate to the
alleged threat to public order and that less intrusive measures were considered and found
insufficient.

Public Order and National Security

While maintaining public order and national security is crucial, any measures taken must comply
with human rights standards. Rantania may argue that Mr. Ditan 's actions posed a threat to
public order, justifying his arrest and detention. (Principle 648) However, the government must
ensure that such measures do not unduly restrict freedom of expression and other fundamental
rights.

PRAYERS

45
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
46
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
47
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
48
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Applicant Prays That This Court Findings That

e) The withdrawal by Rantania of its article 34(6) declaration is invalid, as it violates the
African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by undermining the vested
rights of Rantanians.
f) Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by
failing to ensure that the Omia people and child workers are protected from violations
committed by the MD Ltd.
g) Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by
overthrowing and subsequently detaining President Okello
h) Rantania violated the African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments by
accessing Mr Ditan data on the social media platform, The Truth, by arresting him, and
by convicting him of and sentencing him for disseminating information likely to disturb
public order.