TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. 1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………….....2

LIST OF CASES ……………………………………………………………………………...3

STATEMENTS OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................................4

SUMMARY OF FACTS ........................................................................................................…5

ISSUES RAISED ........................................................................................................................6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................7

ARGUMENT ADVANCED……………………………………………………………………9

ISSUE 1: WHETHER FATIMA IS ENTITLED FOR THE MINIMUM WAGES?

WHETHER NON-PAYMENT OF DUES CAN BE CHALLENGED UNDER THE
PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT, 1936?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE STRIKE BY THE WORKERS AND LOCKOUT BY THE

EMPLOYER IS JUSTIFIED?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER FATIMA IS ENTITLED FOR ANY BENEFITS UNDER THE

FACTORIES ACT, 1948? WHETHER FATIMA, WHO WAS WORKING IN INDUSTRY
FOR 3 YEARS, CAN BE DENIED THE RIGHTS AS DEFINED U/S 9 OF THE
MATERNITY BENEFIT ACT, 1961 (I.E. LEAVE FOR MISCARRIAGE) & THEN
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE?
ISSUE 4: WHETHER FATIMA HAS THE RIGHT TO CLAIM COMPENSATION FOR
THE INJURY CAUSED TO HER UNDER EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT?
WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF THE TRAINEE DOCTOR
OF THE DISPENSARY OF THE FACTORY BY GIVING PAIN KILLER PILLS WHICH
FURTHER ACCELERATED THE PROCESS OF MISCARRIAGE. CAN THE
EMPLOYER BE MADE LIABLE FOR THE SAME?

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................... 18
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ors. Others

Vs Versus

i.e. That is

SC Supreme Court

AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Art. Article

& And

Ors. Others

Sec. Section

UOI Union of India

Del Delhi
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES REFERRED

1. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

2. Trade Union Act, 1926.

3. The Constitution of India.

4. Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

5. Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED

1. Surya Narayan Misra, An Introduction to Labour and Industrial Law, Allahabad Law
Agency, 1978

2. S.C. Srivastava, Industrial Relations and Labour Law, Vikas Publishing House, New
Delhi

3. Indian Law Institute, Cases and Materials on Labour Law and Labour Relations

4. P.L. Malik, Industrial Law, Eastern Book Company, 2013

5. Dr. Goswami, Labour and Industrial Law, Central Law Agency, 2011

WEBSITES REFERRED

1. www.lexisnexisacademic.com

2. www.manupatrafast.com
3. www.scconline.com
4. www.legalindia.com
5. www.lawyersclubindia.com
6. www.indiankanoon.orgcx
7. www.casemine.com
8. www.lawctopus.com
 LIST OF CASES

People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union AIR 1982 SC 1473:

1. of India

2. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487 at 493

Ramanna D. Shetty v. International Airport AIR 1979 SC 1682

Authority
3.
Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. (1973) SC 1973 AIR 1227
4. Of India (P) Ltd. V. Management
Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. V. Their 1958 AIR 130,
5. Workmen
Air India Statutory Corporation v. United (1997) 9 SCC 377
6. Labour Union
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. V. NLC (2005) 10 SCC 785
7. Workers' Union
Punjab National Bank Ltd. V. All India Punjab (2001) 6 SCC 534
8. National Bank Employees Federation

9. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 588

Mackinnon mackenzie & co. Pvt ltd. V. (1969)15 SCC 607

10. Ibrahim mahmmed issak
Daya Kishan Joshi and Anr: Vs Dynemech (2018) 11 SCC 642
11. systems Pvt. Ltd
Asia Pacific Institute Of Management v. W.P.(C) 13923/2021
Office Of The Joint Labour Commissioner
12. And Another
Sunita Baliyan v. Director Social Welfare 2007 (99) DDRJ 551
13. Department GNCTD
(Mrs.) Chanda Rani Akhouri & ors. V. Dr. (SC) 391
14. M.A. Methusethupathi & ors
Vinod Jain v Santokba Durlabhji Memorial AIR 2019 SUPREME
15. Hospital and Ors. COURT 1143
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon'ble Labour Court has the jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Section 10(2) of the
Industrial Dispute Act
Section 10: Reference of dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunals
(2) Where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or
separately, for a reference of the dispute to Board, Court, [Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal] [Substituted by Act 36 of 1956, for" or Tribunal" Section 7 (w.e.Γ. 10.3.1957).], the
appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each
party, shall make the reference accordingly.

[(2-A) An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal
under this section shall specify the period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate Government:
Provided that where such industrial dispute is connected with an individual workman, no such
period shall exceed three months:

Provided further that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner,
whether jointly or separately, to the Labour Court. Tribunal or National Tribunal for extension
of such period or for any other reason, and the presiding officer of such Labour Court. Tribunal
or National Tribunal considers it necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may for
reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit:

Provided also that in computing any period specified in this sub-section, the period, if any, for
which the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal had been stayed
by any injunction or order of a Civil Court shall be excluded:

Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall
lapse merely on the ground that any period specified under this sub- section had expired without
such proceedings being completed.] [Inserted by Act 46 of 1982, Section 8 (w.e.f. 21.8.1984).]
 SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Fatima, married to Ibrahim Ali Khan and a resident of District Ramnagar in Uttar Bharat,
dedicated three years of her life to the Bawana Industry, a cornerstone of the region's economy.
Despite her integral role in the factory's success, her rights as a laborer were consistently
disregarded.
2. Over her tenure, Fatima was denied the basic entitlement of minimum wages and job confirmation,
a blatant violation of labor laws. Despite her continuous service for three years, she was never
officially confirmed, leaving her in a vulnerable position.
3. The events leading to her miscarriage paint a distressing picture of neglect and exploitation. When
instructed by her supervisor, Mr. Shyam, to undertake strenuous tasks despite being two months
pregnant, Fatima appealed for a reassignment due to her doctor's advice against heavy lifting.
However, her plea was met with threats of job termination, leaving her with no choice but to
comply.
4. The dispensary's negligence exacerbated the situation. Instead of providing proper medical care,
the trainee doctor irresponsibly offered painkiller tablets, knowing the potential risks to a pregnant
woman's health. Fatima, fearing repercussions for her job, chose to endure the pain and continue
working.
5. The tragic outcome—a miscarriage—was a result of the combined effects of physical strain from
lifting heavy loads and the ingestion of painkillers. This loss compounded Fatima's previous
miscarriage, which led to her husband divorcing her on grounds of infertility, leaving her
emotionally and financially vulnerable.
6. Upon her recovery and attempt to return to work, Fatima was callously replaced without receiving
her rightful dues, further exacerbating her plight. The Trade Union's subsequent peaceful protest,
met with violent retaliation from the factory owner, Mr. Adhinath, underscores the pervasive
exploitation and disregard for labor rights in the industry.
7. In light of these egregious violations, the Trade Union rightfully seeks recourse through the legal
system, filing a claim before the Labour Court to hold the Bawana Industry accountable for its
actions and to seek justice for Fatima and her fellow workers.
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER FATIMA IS ENTITLED FOR THE MINIMUM WAGES? WHETHER NON-

PAYMENT OF DUES CAN BE CHALLENGED UNDER THE PAYMENT OF WAGES
ACT, 1936?

ISSUE 2

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE STRIKE BY THE WORKERS AND LOCKOUT BY THE

EMPLOYER IS JUSTIFIED?

ISSUE 3

ISSUE 3: WHETHER FATIMA IS ENTITLED FOR ANY BENEFITS UNDER THE

FACTORIES ACT, 1948? WHETHER FATIMA, WHO WAS WORKING IN INDUSTRY
FOR 3 YEARS, CAN BE DENIED THE RIGHTS AS DEFINED U/S 9 OF THE
MATERNITY BENEFIT ACT, 1961 (I.E. LEAVE FOR MISCARRIAGE) & THEN
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE?

ISSUE 4

ISSUE 4: WHETHER FATIMA HAS THE RIGHT TO CLAIM COMPENSATION FOR

THE INJURY CAUSED TO HER UNDER EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT?
WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF THE TRAINEE DOCTOR
OF THE DISPENSARY OF THE FACTORY BY GIVING PAIN KILLER PILLS WHICH
FURTHER ACCELERATED THE PROCESS OF MISCARRIAGE. CAN THE
EMPLOYER BE MADE LIABLE FOR THE SAME?
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: Whether Fatima is entitled for the minimum wages? Whether non-payment of dues
can be challenged under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
The defendant contends that Fatima's working conditions do not meet the criteria for forced labor as
defined in Article 23(1) of the Indian Constitution. The interpretation by the Supreme Court in People’s
Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) clarified that forced labor includes situations
where labor or services are provided for less than minimum wages. However, if Bawana Industry does
not meet the criteria to be considered a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, then Article 23(2)
allows states to impose compulsory services for public purposes without violating fundamental rights.
In this context, the defendant argues that Fatima's work would not qualify as forced labor. The
defendant emphasizes that Fatima's employment status and the nature of her work are pivotal in
determining her entitlement to minimum wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Without formal
employment confirmation, Fatima's eligibility for minimum wages may be uncertain. Furthermore, the
absence of a clear contract outlining terms and conditions complicates this matter. The defendant asserts
that Fatima may not be eligible for overtime pay since she did not consistently work up to the maximum
daily limit of nine hours prescribed by the Factories Act, 1948. Fatima's visit to the dispensary during
working hours without prior employer approval interrupts the continuity of her work, potentially
disqualifying her from overtime compensation.
ISSUE 2: Whether the strike by the workers and lockout by the employer is justified?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court by the counsel of the defendant that the lockout is
justified as a response to the workers' strike and to address the industrial dispute, in accordance with
Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Concerns over workplace safety, as highlighted by
Sections 11 and 21 of the Factories Act, 1948, justify the temporary suspension of operations to mitigate
risks. Compliance with legal requirements, including serving notice of lockout, supports the legitimacy
of the employer's actions.

ISSUE 3: Whether Fatima is entitled for any benefits under the Factories Act, 1948? Whether
Fatima, who was working in industry for 3 years, can be denied the rights as defined u/s 9 of
The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (i.e., leave for miscarriage) & then financial assistance?

Respondents respectfully denies Claimants claim for full benefits under the Factories Act (1948). No
clear causal link exists between the alleged heavy lifting and the miscarriage, as evidenced by the lack
of medical evidence or expert opinions. Additionally, Claimants decision to continue working after
receiving pain medication from the on-site doctor weakens the argument of forced overtime.

7|Page
Furthermore, the Factories Act focuses on demonstrably harmful work environments, and exceeding
working hours alone doesn't qualify for benefits. While the Maternity Benefit Act offers leave for
miscarriage, eligibility hinges on proper medical documentation and a formal notification of pregnancy
– neither of which Claimants has provided. Case law from Asia Pacific Institute of Management v.
Office of The Joint Labour Commissioner and Another supports the importance of notification, even
if not immediate. While Respondents acknowledges Claimantshardship, awarding benefits without a
direct work-related cause and proper notification sets an undesirable precedent. However, the company
remains open to exploring alternative forms of support within company policies.

ISSUE 4: Whether Fatima has the right to claim compensation for the injury caused to her
under employees’ compensation act? Whether there has been negligence on part of the trainee
doctor of the dispensary of the factory by giving pain killer pills which further accelerated the
process of miscarriage. Can the employer be made liable for the same?
In response to Claimants's claim for compensation under the Employee's Compensation Act due to her
miscarriage, it is argued that her injury does not meet the criteria for compensability under the Act. The
Act stipulates compensation for injuries caused by accidents arising out of and in the course of
employment. However, Claimants's miscarriage cannot be directly linked to her employment at
Bawana Industry, as the company provided a safe work environment and was compliant with labor
regulations, suggesting the injury did not occur in the course of her duties. Furthermore, under the Act's
provisions, compensable injuries must result in total or partial disablement exceeding three days, which
did not occur in Claimants' case. She did not experience any physical injury leading to decreased
earning capacity, as defined by the Act. The actions of the trainee doctor at the factory dispensary, while
potentially misguided, do not establish a direct causal link between the prescribed medication and
Claimants' miscarriage, as she was given a choice between treatment options. Legal precedents
emphasize that medical professionals are not negligent if they adhere to accepted medical practices, as
highlighted in cases like Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee and (Mrs.) Chanda Rani
Akhouri v. Dr. M.A. Methusethupathi. Similarly, the Vinod Jain v. Santokba Durlabhji Memorial
Hospital case supports that adherence to accepted medical practices does not constitute negligence.
Claimants' prior miscarriage suggests the possibility of a pre-existing medical condition contributing
to her current miscarriage. Therefore, comprehensive medical assessments ordered by the court are
necessary to evaluate the role of any pre-existing condition in Claimants' injury and subsequent
miscarriage.
In conclusion, the employer, Bawana Industry, cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of the
trainee doctor at the factory dispensary, as there is an absence of a proximate relationship between the
factory and dispensary, and no principal-agent relationship exists to impose liability on the employer.

8|Page
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: Whether Fatima is entitled for the minimum wages? Whether non-payment of dues
can be challenged under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
The Indian Constitution, as the supreme law, prohibits human trafficking, forced labor, and beggar
under Article 23(1). The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of forced labor and beggar in the case
of People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India. The Court ruled that providing labor or
service for less than minimum wages constitute forced labor.
Fatima's employment status and the nature of her work are pivotal in determining her entitlement to
minimum wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. Various factors must be taken into account to
assess her eligibility for minimum wages. Firstly, if Fatima had a formal written employment contract
clearly specifying her wages, working hours, and other terms, it would strengthen her case for minimum
wages. However, in the absence of an explicit contract or if the terms were unclear, this may introduce
uncertainty regarding her entitlements.
Secondly, despite working in the industry for three years, Fatima was not formally confirmed in her
employment. Confirmation typically carries certain benefits, including entitlement to minimum wages.
Since Fatima was not confirmed, she may not be entitled to the same benefits as confirmed employees.
In the case of Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management,1 the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of employment confirmation in determining the rights and
obligations of employees and employers. Without formal confirmation, the employment relationship
may be deemed provisional or temporary, impacting the application of statutory wage provisions.
It would also be inaccurate to assume that Fatima worked beyond the prescribed daily maximum hours.
Section 51 of the Factories Act, 1948, governs weekly hours of work for adults. According to this section, the
daily maximum limit is 9 hours of work, inclusive of overtime. However, Fatima visited the dispensary during
working hours without prior employer approval and did not work continuously for 10 hours straight.
Therefore, she should not be held liable for any overtime dues. The Supreme Court underscored in the case
of Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1958) the importance of establishing a direct causal link
between employment conditions and injuries or health issues experienced by employees. Without definitive
medical evidence connecting the miscarriage to her work environment, assigning liability to the employer
under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, becomes challenging.2Additionally, if Fatima seeks

1
Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. V. Management (1973) SC 1973 AIR 1227, 1973 SCR (3)
587
2
Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. V. Their Workmen (1958) 1958 AIR 130, 1958 SCR 667.

9|Page
reimbursement for medical expenses or compensation related to the miscarriage, these may not
qualify as wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and therefore may not be subject to
challenge under its provisions. This is particularly noteworthy considering that one of the primary
factors contributing to her miscarriage was the painkillers she took instead of resting as advised by
the trainee doctor.
ISSUE 2: Whether the strike by the workers and lockout by the employer is justified?

It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that the lockout by the employer is justified. In the realm
of industrial relations, conflicts between employers and workers are not uncommon. These conflicts
often escalate into industrial disputes, which can disrupt normal business operations and lead to
significant economic and social consequences. In such scenarios, both employers and workers resort
to various measures to assert their interests and resolve the underlying issues. One such measure
employed by employers is the imposition of a lockout, a temporary suspension of work operations
aimed at addressing industrial disputes. However, the justification of lockouts is often contested, with
workers arguing that they represent an unjustified response that undermines their rights and livelihoods.
In the present case, it is submitted that the employer enacted the lockout in direct response to the strike
initiated by the workers, viewing it as a necessary measure to confront the industrial dispute at hand.
This action aligns with the provisions outlined in Section 22(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
which acknowledges the employer's prerogative to declare a lockout as a legitimate strategy for
safeguarding their interests and seeking resolution during conflicts with employees. This section of the
Act affirms the employer's right to take decisive action in managing industrial disputes within the
parameters of the law.
An illustrative case that underscores the legitimacy of employers invoking lockouts as a means of
dispute resolution is the landmark judgment of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour
Union (1997)3. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the employer's authority to declare a lockout,
recognizing it as a valid mechanism to protect business interests and maintain operational continuity
amid labour unrest. The judgment emphasized on the employer's right to take proactive measures
during industrial disputes, affirming the legal basis provided by Section 22(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
Furthermore, it is submitted by the counsel that the imposition of the lockout served as a strategic
manoeuvre to mitigate the adverse effects of the workers' strike on business operations and financial
stability. By temporarily suspending activities through the lockout, the employer aimed to minimize
disruptions, safeguard assets, and preserve the overall viability of the enterprise. This action of the

3
Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377
10 | P a g e
employer perfectly aligned with the overarching objective of Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, which prioritizes the interests of both employers and employees while promoting the peaceful
resolution of conflicts.
Bringing to the notice of the Hon’ble Court is another precedent that explained the strategic rationale
behind employers' resorting to lockouts in the case of Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. NLC
Workers' Union (2005)4. In this legal precedent, the Madras High Court recognized the employer's
prerogative to enact a lockout as a proactive measure to address labour disputes and protect business
interests. The employer's imposition of the lockout as a response to the workers' strike is firmly sought
as a lawful recourse, where the employer endeavors to protect its interests, restore order, and facilitate
constructive dialogue aimed at resolving the underlying dispute. By drawing upon established legal
frameworks and precedent-setting case laws, the employer's actions reflect a conscientious effort to
navigate the complexities of labour relations while upholding the principles of fairness and equity.
In the present case the employer's decision to enact a lockout was in accordance with the legal
stipulations set forth in Section 22(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This provision explicitly
mandates that prior to initiating a lockout, the employer must serve a formal notice to the relevant
authority and the representatives of the workers. By adhering to these statutory requirements, the
employer ensured transparency and procedural fairness in the implementation of the lockout, thus
affirming its justification under the ambit of the law. An important precedent that further exemplifies
the importance of adhering to legal protocols in enacting a lockout is the precedent set in Punjab
National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation (2001)5. In this case,
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a lockout imposed by an employer, emphasizing the
significance of compliance with statutory regulations, including the provision of prior notice to relevant
stakeholders. The judgment underscored the employer's obligation to follow due process in initiating
industrial actions, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of lockouts conducted in accordance with Section
22(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Furthermore, it is contented before the Hon’ble Court that the employer's decision to institute a lockout
was motivated by concerns over workplace safety, as under Sections 11 and 21 of the Factories Act,
1948. These sections mandate employers to uphold rigorous safety standards and implement adequate
measures to safeguard the health and well-being of workers within the workplace environment. Thus
by temporarily suspending operations through the imposition of a lockout, the employer proactively
addressed potential safety hazards and ensured compliance with legal obligations, thereby prioritizing
the protection of employees' physical integrity and fostering a conducive working environment.

4
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. NLC Workers' Union, (2005) 10 SCC 785
5
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation, (2001) 6 SCC 534
11 | P a g e
 A pertinent legal precedent that underscores the paramount importance of prioritizing workplace safety
is evident in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004)6. In this landmark judgment, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the imperative for employers to uphold stringent safety standards in workplaces,
particularly in hazardous industries, highlighting the legal and moral imperative of prioritizing
workplace safety above all else. By aligning with the mandates outlined in Sections 11 and 21 of the
Factories Act, 1948, through the imposition of a lockout, the employer demonstrated a proactive
commitment to ensuring the well-being of its workforce and compliance with statutory obligations.
As regards to the question of whether the strike by the trade union was justified, certain parameters can
to be taken in due respect by the Hon’ble Court. Firstly, that strike bypassed established legal
procedures, particularly as mandated by Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore
its validity is questioned. Legal protocols, such as providing prior notice to the employer, are essential
for ensuring fair and orderly dispute resolution.
Secondly, the legitimacy of a strike rests on its proportional response to grievances, adherence to
negotiation processes, and consideration of broader societal impacts. The workers neglected the
negotiation procedures and caused disproportionate harm to employers' interests thus its justification
is called into question. Moreover, adverse effects on stakeholders, like consumers and public safety,
further influence perceptions. Strikes, as a vital tool for worker rights, must balance these factors to
maintain legitimacy. In the present case, the workers failed to do so, and strike rightfully face scrutiny
regarding their necessity and adherence to legal standards, highlighting the delicate balance between
workers' rights and broader societal welfare.

Issue 3: Whether Fatima is entitled for any benefits under the factories act, 1948? Whether
Fatima, who was working in industry for 3 years, can be denied the rights as defined u/s 9 of the
maternity benefit act, 1961 (i.e., leave for miscarriage) & then financial assistance?

1. We respectfully deny the claim for full benefits under the Factories Act. The Act protects employees
from injuries or diseases directly arising from work. The Trade Union needs to establish a clear causal
link between Claimants work and the miscarriage. Currently, there's no medical evidence or expert
opinion definitively connecting the alleged heavy lifting to this tragic event.
2. Further, the on-site doctor, appointed under the Act, reportedly offered Claimants a choice – rest or pain
medication. Choosing medication and continuing to work weakens the argument of forced overtime
causing the miscarriage. This suggests Fatima had control and opted to continue despite the doctor's
advice. Additionally, complete medical disclosure is crucial for proper diagnosis. Not mentioning the

6
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 588
12 | P a g e
 pregnancy potentially impacted the doctor's assessment. Exceeding working hours is a concern, but the
Act focuses on demonstrable harm caused by the workplace. Without a clear link between any violation
and the miscarriage, full entitlement under the Factories Act appears unwarranted. Respondents
prioritizes employee well-being. However, awarding benefits without a direct work-related cause sets
an undesirable precedent.
3. In the judgement of Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt Ltd. V. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak 7 it was held that
“The words "in the course of the employment" mean "in the course of the work which the workman is
employed to do and which is incidental to it." The words "arising out of employment" are understood
to mean that "during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the
duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe
the workman would not otherwise have suffered." In other words, there must be a causal relationship
between the accident and the employment. The expression "arising out of employment”. To put it
differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the
claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added
peril by his own imprudent act."
4. This landmark judgment has set precedent to several other judgements such as Daya Kishan Joshi and
Anr: Vs Dynemech systems Pvt. Ltd.8 In this case as well the court held that the expression "arising out
of and in the course of employment" is a wide term and if the accident is directly connected with the
employment of the worker only then it would be covered under the Act onus of proving the same shall
lie on the applicant/ claimant.
5. Mere speculation about a potential link between work and the miscarriage is not enough. The Trade
Union needs to provide substantial medical evidence and expert opinions establishing a direct causal
connection. This could involve medical records documenting the pregnancy, the timing of the alleged
heavy lifting incident in relation to the miscarriage, and expert opinions from qualified medical
professionals who can definitively link the work activity to the pregnancy complication.
6. The facts surrounding the on-site doctor's consultation with Claimants are also relevant. If, as reported,
the doctor appointed under Section 10 of the factories Act the relevant portion is read as follows The
State Government may appoint qualified medical practitioners to be certifying surgeons for the purposes
of this Act within such local limits or for such factory or class or description of factories as it may assign
9
to them respectively. offered Fatima a choice between rest and pain medication, her decision to
continue working after taking medication weakens the argument that forced overtime caused the

7
(1969) 15 SCC 607
8
(2018) 11 SCC 642
9
The Factories Act, 1948 Act No. 63 Of 1948
13 | P a g e
 miscarriage. This suggests that Fatima had some control over her immediate work situation and chose
to continue despite the doctor's recommendation.
7. Even if the Trade Union argues that exceeding working hours (Section 54 of the Act) played a role, they
still need to establish a causal link to the miscarriage. The Act mandates a maximum of nine working
hours per day, but exceeding this limit doesn't automatically translate to entitlement under the Act. The
focus remains on a demonstrably harmful work environment directly causing the occupational disease
or injury.
8. Section 9 of the Maternity Benefit Act offers a lifeline to women experiencing pregnancy complications.
It mandates employers to grant leave with pay for a period of six weeks following a miscarriage. This
provision recognizes the physical and emotional toll a miscarriage can take and provides women with
time to recover. However, eligibility for leave hinges on Claimants fulfilling a crucial requirement:
9. The Act, through Section 9, states that leave is granted for "miscarriage." While the emotional trauma
is undeniable, the legal justification for leave rests on the medical reality of the pregnancy complication.
The onus lies on Claimants to present substantial medical evidence documenting the miscarriage. This
could involve medical records confirming the pregnancy, the date of the miscarriage, and a doctor's
diagnosis.
10. Section 6 of the Act establishes a crucial requirement - a written notice of pregnancy from women
claiming benefits under the Act. Respondents asserts that despite potential conversations with
supervisors regarding Claimants pregnancy, they did not receive a formal notification in writing as
prescribed by the Act. The importance of a formal notification lies in ensuring transparency and
accountability within the workplace. It allows employers to plan for potential absences and make
necessary adjustments.
11. In the case of Asia Pacific Institute Of Management v. Office Of The Joint Labour Commissioner
And Another10It was stated that the question as to whether the notice to be given under Section 6 (6) of
the Act is mandatory, was considered in Sunita Baliyan v. Director Social Welfare Department
GNCTD11, 2007 (99) DDRJ 551. In the said case, the Ld. Single Judge held that immediate notice to
the employer, of pregnancy of an employee is not required, however, notice would be required to be
served within a reasonable period and in any event as soon as possible after delivery.
12. It is clear that noncompliance with Section 6, has resulted in non-eligibility to get a compensation under
Section 9 of the Act. It must be noted that going through pregnancy for the second time, she should have
been aware about the ill effects of taking pain killers and doing the nature of work she had undertaken.

10
W.P.(C) 13923/2021
11
2007 (99) DDRJ 551
14 | P a g e
 Further, she was given an option by the doctor to take rest for an hour in place of taking pain killers
which she refused.
13. It's important to acknowledge international health guidelines regarding pregnancy after a miscarriage.
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a gap of at least six months, or ideally longer,
between a miscarriage and attempting to conceive again. This recovery period allows a woman's body
to heal physically and emotionally, potentially increasing the chances of a healthy subsequent
pregnancy.
14. A thorough investigation into the miscarriage through medical evidence is necessary. Furthermore, a
review of communication regarding Claimants pregnancy and adherence to notification procedures is
crucial.

ISSUE 4: Whether Fatima has the right to claim compensation for the injury caused to her
under employees’ compensation act? Whether there has been negligence on part of the trainee
doctor of the dispensary of the factory by giving pain killer pills which further accelerated the
process of miscarriage. Can the employer be made liable for the same?
1. It is presented that the miscarriage of Claimants is not a compensable injury under the Employee's
Compensation Act. The Employee Compensation Act offers crucial protection for work-related injuries
and illnesses. In this case, it is submitted that Claimants's unfortunate situation did not arise directly
out of and in the course of her employment at Bawana Industry. It is also presented that the company
provided a safe work environment and complied with all labor regulations. Additionally, the doctor's
actions at the factory dispensary, while potentially misguided, cannot be directly linked to Claimants's
miscarriage

2. As per section 3 (1) If personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable –
(a) in respect of any injury that does not result in the total or partial disablement of the employee for a
period exceeding three days;
(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or permanent total disablement 1
caused by an accident which is directly attributable to (i) the employee have been at the time thereof
under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the employee to an order
expressly given, or to a rule express framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of employees, or

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 (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the employee of any safety guard or other device which he knew
to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of the employee12.

3. In order for an employee to claim personal injury under the Employee Compensation Act there must
be either partial or permanent disablement which is devoid in the case of Claimants, so personal injury
cannot be claimed by Claimants as there is no disablement in her case and no physical injury resulting
in decreased earning capacity. As per section 2 (g) "partial disablement" means, where the disablement
is of a temporary nature, such disablement as reduces the earning capacity of a *[employee] in any
employment in which he was engaged at the time of the accident resulting in the disablement, and,
where the disablement is of a permanent nature, such disablement as reduces his earning capacity in
every employment which he was capable of undertaking at that time: provided that every injury
specified [in Part II of Schedule I] shall be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement. And as
per section 2(l) "total disablement" means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent
nature, as incapacitates an employee for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of
the accident resulting in such disablement.

4. It is presented that Claimants was given a well-informed choice between two alternative course of
action by the trainee doctor of factory dispensary and she of her own free will chose the painkillers so
the trainee doctor and the employer cannot be held liable for the unfortunate miscarriage of Claimants.

5. It was held in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) A doctor is not guilty of
negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art. Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent if he is
acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a
contrary view.” It was further held that “where you get a situation which involves the use of some
special skill or competence, then the test whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the
man on the top of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard
of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man may not possess
the highest expert skill at the risk of being found negligent. It is well-established law that it is sufficient
if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art. A doctor
is not negligent if he is acting in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body
of medical men skilled in that particular art13.”

12
Employee Compensation Act, 1923
13
Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957)
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6. This point was also reiterated by Apex Court in (Mrs.) Chanda Rani Akhouri & ors. v. Dr. M.A.
Methusethupathi & ors. “ A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional
negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on
the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical
profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course
or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have
chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed14”

7. It is further presented that there was no negligence on behalf of the trainee doctor as he advised her to
rest for an hour and negligence cannot be claimed in case where a minimum standard of care is applied.
As held in the case Vinod Jain v. Santokba Durlabhji Memorial Hospital and Ors. “ A doctor
cannot be said to be negligent if he is acting in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a
reasonable body of medical men skilled in that particular art, merely because there is a body of such
opinion that takes a contrary view. In cases of medical negligence, where a special skill or competence
is attributed to a doctor, a doctor need not possess the highest expert skill, at the risk of being found
negligent.15”

8. It is also presented that Claimants may have had a pre-existing medical condition that caused a
miscarriage as evident from the fact that she had a miscarriage a year earlier. It is prayed that the
medical reports are to be compiled in an unbiased manner on the order of the court and neither Bawana
Industry nor the trainee doctor can be held liable for physical injury in case of a pre-existing condition.
As stated in Jacob Mathews v State of Punjab no prosecution can be launched against a doctor accused
of medical negligence without the report of an expert committee

9. It is contended that even if there was a slight chance of medical negligence on the part of trainee doctor,
the employer i.e. Bawana Industry could not be held liable as there exist an absence of a proximate
relationship between the factory and dispensary, moreover, there is no principal-agent relationship to
claim the liability. For the employer to be liable there must exist some sort of relationship and need to
pass the test as stated in Yewen v Noakes (1880), as ability to select the servant/employees, the power
of deciding the pay, controlling the method of doing the work, and the authority to suspend the
services16.

14
Chanda Rani Akhouri v. Dr. M.A. Methusethupathi (SC) 391
15
Vinod Jain vs Santokba Durlabhji Memorial Hospital AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 1143
16
Yewen v Noakes (1880)
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 PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsel on behalf of the Respondent humbly prays before this Hon’ble Court to adjudge and declare
that:
1. Fatima is not entitled for the minimum wages, and thus the non-payment of dues by the
employer cannot be challenged under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
2. The strike organized by the workers was not carried out as per the provisions of Industrial
Dispute Act, hence was not justifiable, whereas the lockout by the employer was a justified act.
3. Fatima is not entitled for the benefits under the Factories Act, 1948, also she should be denied
the rights as defined u/s 9 of The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (i.e., leave for miscarriage) &
then financial assistance.
4. Fatima does not have the right to get compensation for the injury caused to her as per Employees
Compensation Act, and hence cannot make the employer liable for the negligence of the trainee
doctor,
and/or

Pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity,
fairness, and good conscience. For which act of kindness, the respondent shall as in duty
bound, ever pray.

~COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT~

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 PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsel on behalf of the Claimants humbly prays before this Hon’ble Court to adjudge and declare
that:
1. Fatima is entitled for the minimum wages, and the non-payment of dues by the employer can be
challenged under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
2. The strike organized by the workers was justifiable as per the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act,
whereas the lockout by the employer was in retaliation to the strike and thus is not a justified act.
3. Fatima is entitled for the benefits under the Factories Act, 1948, as well as she cannot denied the
rights as defined u/s 9 of The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (i.e., leave for miscarriage) & then
financial assistance.
4. Fatima has the right to get compensation for the injury caused to her as per Employees
Compensation Act, and make the employer liable for the negligence of the trainee doctor,

and/or
Pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity,
fairness, and good conscience. For which act of kindness, the Claimants shall as in duty bound,
ever pray.

~COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANTS~

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