http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.

pdf The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions which are intended to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on draft legislative acts as well as on other matters which may be of particular interest to them1. In relation to parliament being sent all documents. There is little that is new in this. Since 1997, the Treaty establishing the EuropeanCommunity (the EC treaty) has required the Commission not only to send all consultationdocuments to national parliaments but also to make legislative proposals available in good time so that the government of each Member State may ensure that its own national parliament receives them2 Moreover, since September 2006, under what has become known as the Barroso initiative the Commission has voluntarily sent parliaments its proposals for legislation and consultation papers. Some of the evidence we received suggested that the early-warning mechanism the yellow and orange card procedures will significantly enhance the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making machine. For example, Professor Dashwood told us that he was enthusiastic about it. It seemed to him that use of the early warning mechanism would have a real impact on the political dynamic within the Community. He added that, if there were a significant number of national parliaments which took the view that a proposal infringed the principle of subsidiarity: that is bound to have an impact on the prospect of the measure being adopted, whichever of the procedures applies. I think it would also make a difference to any proceedings that might eventuate in the [European] Court of Justice .15 Others disagree. For example, Richard Corbett MEP said in practice, I do not think that the yellow and orange card mechanisms will be extensively used. He cites the experience of the Finnish Parliament. It has had a subsidiarity control mechanism since its accession to the EU in 1995 and in that time has hardly ever found a case where they felt that a Commission proposal violated the principle of subsidiarity. Mr Corbett said that the principle is taken seriously by the Communitys institutions and that the Commissions legislative proposals can be adopted only if they have the support of the overwhelming majority of Member States Andrew Duff MEP goes further. He says that: there is a danger that, in assessing the Treaty of Lisbon, national parliaments become obsessed by the early warning mechanism on subsidiarity. It was understood by those of us involved in its drafting and, then, re-drafting that the mechanism, although a necessary addition to the system of governance of the Union, was not really intended to be used. It is, in Bagehots terms, more a dignified part of the European constitutional settlement than an efficient one.17 22. Professor Hix had doubts about the effect of the early warning mechanism but could also see some potential benefits. On the one hand, he was sceptical that the
1 2

Preamble to the Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. 9th Protocol to the EC Treaty, Article 2.

mechanism would make any real political difference in parliamentary systems, such as the UKs, where the governments have a substantial majority and so the extent to which national parliaments can actually constrain what their government are doing in Brussels is limited. On the other hand, there would be major benefits if use of the mechanism led to an increase in transparency about what happens in the Council of Ministers.18 23. Professor Hix also suggested that the thresholds attached to the yellow and orange cards are too high. The threshold for the orange card procedure, for example, is a majority of national parliaments. Professor Hix contrasted this with the actual practice of the Council of Ministers. He said that: It is very, very rare that legislation gets passed [by the Council] with more than three Member States opposed.19 24. We asked Commissioner Wallstrm for her views on the thresholds. She said that the Commission should listen to the views of national parliaments even if the number of votes did not reach the threshold.20 25. Professor Hix told us that he believed that many of the Lisbon Treatys provisions on the role of national parliaments could be introduced by some other means such as legislation or an intergovernmental protocol if the Treaty were not ratified.21 26. We asked Mr Murphy if he agreed. He told us that he did not think an informal arrangement would work. Moreover, he did not think there was a likelihood of the yellow and orange cards being introduced by another means. The Government is not attracted by the idea of adding parts of the Lisbon Treaty to the Treaty on the accession of Croatia to the EU. Moreover, in the Governments view: the Lisbon Treaty is a package and we are not interested in renegotiating the text of the package or unpicking parts and implementing by another route We also reiterate our earlier finding on the Lisbon Treatys provisions on national parliaments, contained in our first report on the Intergovernmental Conference that adopted the Treaty: ... we doubt the significance of the greater opportunities for national parliaments to be involved in any meaningful manner in the workings of the EU without ... a red card system that compels the Commission to withdraw any proposal which threatens to breach the subsidiarity principle.28 Commissioner Wallstrm told us that she believed that the Commission would listen to national parliaments opinions even if the thresholds were not attained. We expect the Commission to listen to the views of national parliaments even if the number of opinions does not reach the levels set for the yellow and orange cards. We warmly welcome Commissioner Wallstrms statement that the Commission should listen to the views of national parliaments even if the number of votes does not reach the threshold. The question arises as to how the House might give effect to the provisions described above30 and commonly referred to as the yellow and orange cards.

Before the provisions relating to national parliaments could come into effect, the House would need to decide: who is to identify draft legislation which appears not to comply with the principle; who is to draft the reasoned opinion; and who is to decide whether the non-compliance is sufficiently serious to justify presenting a reasoned opinion. 40. The first task would be to identify possibly non-compliant proposals, following which there would need to be a decision on whether the non-compliance was sufficiently serious to present a reasoned opinion. Since only the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) is systematically examining EU documents, it is only the ESC which could systematically undertake the first aspect, especially within the eight weeks allowed. Therefore the ESC would at least need to initiate the procedure for objecting to EU proposals on grounds of subsidiarity. It would also have to draw up the reasoned opinion, since it is not clear who else could do so. The Lisbon Treaty would allow national parliaments eight weeks in which to give opinions. While more generous than the period provided by the Constitutional Treaty, in terms of parliamentary scrutiny, eight weeks is still tight. The Committee would not wish to consider a proposal before it had received the Governments Explanatory Memorandum (EM) on it. There would then be very little time to obtain further information from Ministers, take account of the views of the devolved assemblies, draft the reasoned opinion and obtain the approval of the House to give a reasoned opinion. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmeuleg/197/197.pdf recomended reform We expect the Commission to listen to the views of national parliaments even if the number of opinions does not reach the levels set for the yellow and orange cards. We warmly welcome Commissioner Wallstrms statement that the Commission should listen to the views of national parliaments even if the number of votes does not reach the threshold. (http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/guide_to_treaty_of_lisbon.pdf)
The primacy of EU law It is often said that EU-sourced laws take precedence over domestic laws. This means that once an EU-sourced law is applicable in the UK, it would be contrary to the EU treaties for the UK to keep or pass any laws that contradicted the EU-sourced law. The primacy of European law is not new. This well-established principle has applied in the EU since the Court of Justice developed it in the 1960s, before the UK joined the EU. While the Constitutional Treaty re-stated this principle in the text, the Treaty of Lisbon does not explicitly refer to it, but rather includes this in a declaration. However, this was a political move, and it is clear that the case law of the Court of Justice and the primacy of European law remain cornerstone principles.

Look up http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf