This extract is taken from Amol Singh v. State of M.P.

, (2008) 5 SCC 468 :

(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 637 at page 471
13. Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than
one dying declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of
the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the
prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable
and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any
corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If the
deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations,
that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration they should be
consistent. (See Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P. [(1993) 2
SCC 684 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 655] ) However, if some inconsistencies are
noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to
examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are
material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying
declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the
light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.

This extract is taken from Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P., (1993)
2 SCC 684 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 655 at page 697
18. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general
rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible evidence and unless
evidence is tested by cross-examination, it is not creditworthy. Under
Section 32, when a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of
death or as to any of the circumstances which result in his death, in cases
in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such a
statement, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a
relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statement made by the
deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that category provided it
has been made by the deceased while in a fit mental condition. A dying
declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special
sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any
untrue statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the
guarantee of the truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding
the causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration,
therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence,
coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased victim. Once the
statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witnesses
testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it
becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court
is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any
embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for
recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration. If there
are more than one dying declarations then the court has also to scrutinise
all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test
of being trustworthy. The Court must further find out whether the different
dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars
before accepting and relying upon the same. Having read the evidence of
PWs 1-3 with great care and attention, we are of the view that their
testimony is based on intrinsic truth. Both the dying declarations are
consistent with each other in all material facts and particulars. That the
deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the dying
declarations, or that they were voluntary has neither been doubted by the
defence in the course of cross-examination of the witnesses nor even in
the course of arguments, both in the High Court and before us. Both the
dying declarations have passed the test of creditworthiness and they
suffer from no infirmity whatsoever. We have therefore no hesitation to
hold that the prosecution has successfully established a very crucial piece
of circumstantial evidence in the case that the deceased had voluntarily
made the dying declarations implicating both the appellants and
disclosing the manner in which she had been put on fire shortly before her
death. This circumstance, therefore, has been established by the
prosecution beyond every reasonable doubt by clear and cogent
evidence.

This extract is taken from Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976
SCC (Cri) 376 at page 106
6. The High Court has held that these statements are essentially true
and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is well settled that though a dying
declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the
maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross-examination, there is
neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule
of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is
corroborated (see Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay [1958 SCR 552 : AIR
1958 SC 22 : 1958 Cri LJ 106] ). The High Court, it is true, has held that
the evidence of the two eyewitnesses corroborated the dying declarations
but it did not come to the conclusion that the dying declarations suffered
from any infirmity by reason of which it was necessary to look out for
corroboration.

This extract is taken from Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552 : AIR
1958 SC 22 : 1958 Cri LJ 106
16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of
the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court,
we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full
Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down
as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be
determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which
the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a
general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence
than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the
same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the
light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles
governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which
has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that
is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable,
in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher
footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which
may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human
character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying
declaration, the court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the
opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there
was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the
capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired
at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his
control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had
several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official
record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest
opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.
This extract is taken from Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552 : AIR
1958 SC 22 : 1958 Cri LJ 106
17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration
has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that
the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no
opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination.
But once, the court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration
was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the
assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on
the other hand, the court, after examining the dying declaration in all its
aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not
reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without
corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity
for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying
declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases,
but from the fact that the court, in a given case, has come to the
conclusion that that particular dying declaration was not free from the
infirmities referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be
disclosed in evidence in that case.