MASTERARBEIT / MASTER’S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master‘s Thesis

“An-Other Language? Psychosomatic research and the

Lévinasian Conception of Otherness in Trauma Therapy”

verfasst von / submitted by

Magdalena Sedmak, BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2023 / Vienna 2023

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / UA 066 941

degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / Masterstudium Philosophie
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:
Betreut von / Supervisor: Mag. Dr. Michael Staudigl, Privatdoz.
2
When Lévinas claims that “the relationship between the Same and the Other is language”1 in

Totality and Infinity, what is meant by the “Same,” what is meant by the “Other,” what is

meant by “language,” what is meant by “relationship”? And, how can the findings

(psychosomatics of Lévinas’ ethics) be connected/applied to enhance (the therapeutic

relationship in) Trauma Therapy?

What does reading Lévinas’ account of the ethical relation in Totality and Infinity tell

about the needs of the traumatised? What is the therapeutic relevance and take-home for

trauma workers from Lévinas’ philosophy in Totality and Infinity?

1 Lévinas, 1969, p. 39.

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Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................14

II. THE PSYCHOSOMATICS OF TRAUMA...................................................23

II.I. Psychosomatics 23

II.II. Trauma in Mind and Body 24

II.III. Dissociation and Association 27

III. THE LÉVINASIAN CONCEPTION OF OTHERNESS ...............................33

III.I. The Other and The Same 33

III.II. Trauma as the Other(ness): On Suffering and Meaning 36

III.III. Touch and ‘Traumatism of Astonishment’: Vulnerability 43

IV. (LÉVINASIAN) LANGUAGE(S OF TRAUMA) .........................................50

IV.I. Relating via (an-other) Body Language 52

IV.II. The ‘Face-to-Face’: Expression. Truth and ‘Things’ 54

IV.III. The ‘Face-To-Face’: Speech. Transcendence and Thought 57

IV.IV. ‘The Ethical Condition or Essence of Language’ 62

V. THE ETHICAL (NON-)RELATION AND INFINITY ..................................65

V.I. On Shibboleth and Language: Distance 66

V.II. On Shibboleth and Language: (The Idea of) Infinity 67

V.III. Responsibility and ‘Openness of Being’ 74

VI. TRAUMA THERAPY ................................................................................79

VI.I. The Affective Witness in Trauma Therapy 79

VI.II. Somatic Experiencing in Trauma Therapy 83

VII. THE LÉVINASIAN CONTRIBUTION: RESPONSE(ABILITY) .................87

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 VII.I. Content: ‘to know’ or ‘to be conscious’ 87

VII.II. Parallels between Trauma-Therapeutical Methods and Lévinas’ Otherness 92

VII.III. Form: ‘Psychosomatic Experiencing’ of Lévinas 94

VIII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................101

REFERENCES .................................................................................................114

5
Acknowledgements

I write this thesis for my brother, for those who knew and love him, and in hope that it can

provide solace to anyone who has lost a loved one in their life. I also write for anyone who

knows of unbearable pain and the inability to handle it alone.

Thank you

To my family. With love.

Thank you, Michael. Beyond words.

Thank you, Armin.

Thank you, David.

Thank you, Alina.

Thank you, Gabriel.

Thank you, Jorge.

Thank you, Arzu.

Thank you, Chris.

Thank you, Martina.

Thank you, Patrizia.

Thank you, Lis.

Thank you, Lena.

Thank you, Celine.

6
Thank you to you who have provided and taught me about safe spaces (and wings) when

nothing was safe enough — L, C, H, E, M, A, P. Thank you so much.

Thank y o u, stranger.

7
Preface

“Hurt.”2

How can humans survive unbearable pain? And, not enough (note the difference between

survival mode and quality of life): How can they live with it? — The first is a question for

neurobiologists and psychologists. The second one is the interest of this philosophical

investigation. How can humans live with unbearable pain?

What characterises unbearable pain? — It must be felt, but it cannot, because it is too

much, too grave. How can it be felt, nevertheless? How to live with it? Rainer Maria Rilke

writes in Das Stundenbuch (The Book of Hours):

Let everything happen to you:

Beauty and Terror.

One must only keep going:

No feeling is final.

Don’t stray far away from me.

Nearby is the land they call life.

You will know it

by its graveness.

Give me your hand.3

What is he saying? — Life is full of pain. But not just that. Take my hand. Let’s walk

together through beauty and terror. You are not alone.

2 Leonie Holzner, Vienna, 2020.

3 As translated by James Owens from Rilke’s original version in German: “Lass Dir alles geschehen: Schönheit
und Schrecken. Man muss nur gehn: Kein Gefühl ist das fernste. Lass dich von mir nicht trennen. Nah ist das
Land, das sie das Leben nennen. Du wirst es erkennen an seinem Ernste.”

8
 Es ist Zeit, dass der Stein sich zu blühen

bequemt,

dass der Unrast ein Herz schlägt.

Es ist Zeit, dass es Zeit wird.

Es ist Zeit.4

“Corona” by Paul Celan

The literal and loose translation of the first line would be: “It is time that stone blooms.” Or

rather: that it is timely that the stone blossoms, that it should (finally allow itself to) blossom.

Now: How could a stone ever blossom?

Without analysing en detail what Paul Celan writes about, allow me to point towards

his experiences of the second world war that fed his poetry which ‘speaks its own language.’

It reflects the difficulty of sharing and also connecting and relating after traumatic

experience(s) such as the horror of the Shoah. Some experiences cannot be shared or even

grasped. Because, grasping and sharing would require a language that in traumatic

experiences often is lost (especially words5). It is paradoxical how Celan and other survivors

of the holocaust have nevertheless found words or used words to process and share. This

highlights that each person processes their experiences differently, and that we rely on

4 German is the original language in which this poem was written. Because the whole of this thesis is concerned
with language and relating through language, the issue of translation is also touched upon. For the reader(s) who
do not (yet) understand this German version, be assured that there will be a full English translation in the
epilogue.
5 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 231.

9
sharing these experiences in order to be in relation, to understand each other. But, through

trauma, the (common) ground is gone.6

Allow me to illustrate with the conceptual work of art, ‘Shibboleth’ (2007) by the

Colombian artist Doris Salcedo. It showed a crack in the floor of Tate Modern, London,

indicating a partition in the ground. Without its title, it would not as obviously have referred

to the concept of separation that Shibboleth irrevocably does. “Friends and enemies are parted

by fine, linguistic lines,” writes Doris Bravo regarding Salcedo’s piece.7 These lines are

characteristic for Shibboleth. They are characteristic of the phenomenon of a surface that

cracks, that has broken, that opens up a void. Language can also open up or call attention to

such void. Note that ‘language’ in German (‘Sprache’) refers both to ‘language’ and ‘speech.’

As the expression goes: ‘two people speak the same language,’ which means that they

understand each other. However — as writes Doris Bravo — it is often the case that humans

do in fact, not understand each other. They do not share the experience nor the language to

make others understand that experience. They are parted. There is Shibboleth.

The glossary says that ‘speaking the same language’ depends on shared opinions and

values — but this misses something. For, it depends on a multitude of factors. One way to

compress these factors is in shared experience. Shared experience is facilitated in shared

6 “In jeder Grenzsituation wird mir gleichsam der Boden unter den Füßen weggezogen.” (Jaspers, 1925, p. 249),
loosely translated as: ‘In every limit situation the ground is cut from under my feet.’ That which is the Gehäuse
(transl. ‘Housing’ or ‘Casing’ or ‘Case’) is broken. It is that which offers protection — from constantly being
occupied with the existential reality of the conditio humana that involves the awareness of death, of the
suffering other, of injustice, morality, and freedom of action. See also: Fuchs, 2021, p. 311f.
7 See: https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/salcedo-shibboleth-i-p20334. An image for this could be the passage
in the Bible that Derrida refers to in this text on shibboleth from 1999: In order for the Ephraimites to pass over
the river Jordan, the Gileadites ask them to pronounce the word “Shibboleth.” Their cultures are very similar,
but in one of them they are able to pronounce the “Shh” in “Shibboleth” and the other not. This is a symbol for
cross-cultural relations and their difficulties. (These will be addressed throughout the thesis as we go into
Otherness, too.)

10
environments. And, shared environments can lead to an ability in understanding, to speaking

‘the same language’ in spite of other differences (that shape one’s view of the world). There is

a common ground established. It is the ground that something can grow out of — no matter

the difference. This thesis is about searching for a ground in spite of it.

This thesis is about trauma; an experience that cannot be but somehow must be shared

in order to relate to others again. Salcedo’s piece serves as metaphor: Due to the traumatic

experience there is a crack in the ground. There is Shibboleth. There is no relation or

connection.

Special awareness and diligence is required if one realises that there would be a void

opening up in a human encounter, if such a common ground or common language would be

missing. Especially for human encounter after trauma. And with that awareness, if relating is

an aim — which it must be, because no one can exist solely by themselves — comes the

necessity of establishing a common ground, of finding a common language, a way of

communication. Which kind of language or which kind of communication that may be, is of

concern here. By concentrating on this path (out), something (new) may be understood about

trauma; something about stones, brokenness, blossoming — in another language. For, each

person speaks a different one.8

8 Theresa Kinzl, Trieste, 2022: “Each person speaks a different language.” A reference to Die politische Kraft
der Liebe by Clemens Sedmak.

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 *

Etwas

Entsteht

Im Zwischen In der Distanz Im Blick

ist schon da; das Zwischen Die Distanz Das Gesicht

gibts nicht

Im Zwischen.

Nähe?

Berührung?

(Die) Im Bewusstsein des Zwischen Des Dritten

Entsteht

*9

9 This is self-coined with Lévinas in mind. Translated: ‘Something Emerges In-Between In the Distance In the
Gaze Something Is already there; The In-Between The Distance The Face Something Is not In-Between
Closeness? Touch? (That) In the Awareness In-Between The Third.’

12
13
I. Introduction

If nothing human is alien to me then nothing alien can be

recognized as essentially human.10

What is essentially human?11

Well, for one, asking questions such as this one. Asking about the essence, the origin,

the beginning. A distance to the things themselves, then, would be ‘essentially human,’ a not-

letting-things-be, but putting them in question — and, with that, detaching oneself, distancing

oneself — perhaps in order “to know or to be conscious” which “is to take time to avoid the

instant of inhumanity,”12 according to Emmanuel Lévinas. The aim of this thesis is ‘to know

or to be conscious’ of our shared humanity. With Lévinas, this is “the human Other”13 and

also the distance, Shibboleth, between the Same and the Other14. In accordance with the quote

above, part of what it means to be human, essentially, includes the experience of being alien,

the experience of alienation. It means, very briefly, that there is a “problematic separation

10 Kirmayer, 2008, p. 470.

11 I invite you to pause for a moment.
12 Lévinas, 1969, p.15.
13 Galetti, 2015.
14 They are capitalised throughout the text because they are here understood as figures, first and foremost.

14
between same and other that belong together.”15 Why would that be or could that be

problematic? — it may be problematic when the separation hurts. That is how ‘trauma’ could

be understood: a painful separation between that which belongs together.

In Lévinas’ ethics, however, this separation is essential for ethical action. And

trauma is, too. This distance through the separation of (the Lévinasian) ‘trauma’ — through

the ‘language’ of the Other — calls for responsibility. It is a responsibility that can never be

fulfilled because the distance is too vast. But, in this awareness of the distance to the Other

and an awareness of the distance itself (which is also Other to oneself), the ethical encounter

can happen. With Lévinas, ethics is determined by the consciousness of the distance and,

henceforth, this “openness of being”16 for that which is ‘Other,’ for that which is ungraspable

— the human Other/the other human and their experience. The ethical then entails a space of

Otherness (the distance) that Lévinas calls ‘Infinity.’ This is “the absolutely other.”17 In the

“creative Infinite”18 a ‘language’ can be found to make that which is ‘other’ graspable: the

human Other/the other human and their (traumatic) experience. This is what trauma therapies

work with in order to discharge and integrate trauma somatically (chapters VI and VII). In

Ancient Greek, Soma means ‘body.’ It refers to unconscious processes, hence, to

15 Leopold, 2022. For a more detailed definition, see Rahel Jaeggi, 2014, especially the “foreword,” as well as
pp. 22–25. Here an excerpt of how it is to be understood here: “The concept of alienation — a product of
modernity through and through presupposes […] a conception of the human essence: whatever is diagnosed as
alienated must have become distant from, and hence alien to something that counts as the human beings true
nature and essence.” This “denotes relationlessness of a particular kind: a detachment or separation from
something that in fact belongs together, the loss of a connection between two things that nevertheless stand in
relation to one another. Being alienated from something means having become distanced from something in
which one is in fact involved or to which one is in fact related or in any case ought to be.” It describes not the
absence but the quality of relation. It means “disconnectedness or alienness, but an alienness that differs from
simple relationlessness.”
16 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.
17 Lévinas, 1969, p. 49.
18 Lévinas, 1969, p. 104.

15
‘Otherness’ (in one understanding of the word). There are multiple understandings explored

throughout this thesis: Otherness (as) in another person or an-other ‘language’ for as well as

their (traumatic) experience itself. Then, there is the unconscious processes (of the body and

the psyche), another is the lived experience of the body. That is how trauma is commonly

dealt with: through and with the body.19 In trauma therapy, such a space that welcomes

“Being”20 with “openness”21 is particularly relevant so that trauma can be expressed through

the body; somatically. But, such a space of letting-be requires being at a distance (so Lévinas)

— in order to ‘know or to be conscious’ of what can be spoken in order for the Other to be. It

requires the psyche (‘soul’), too. This thesis serves as such a distancing in order to put things

in perspective.

I hope to broaden our understanding of handling trauma with the philosopher(s22) at

hand. Because, contrary to what may be commonly thought, the discipline of philosophy —

in which this thesis is written — can be embedded in our common lifeworlds: as

philosophical practice and somatic encounter. And, according to Richard Kearney, “one might

describe the healing arc of trauma therapy — at both personal and communal levels — as

movement through different somatic stages.”23 This thesis is such a “movement of the soul”24

(or, in Ancient Greek: the psyche) — similar to Totality and infinity (the way Goodman/

Grover read it). It introduces (a) philosophical practice through (a kind of) somatic encounter

19 After all, “The Body keeps the Score.” See: van der Kolk, 2014.
20 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.
21 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.
22 There are, of course, some other figures important for this thesis apart from Lévinas. Most prominently are
Anna Westin and Jacques Rancière.
23 Kearney, 2010, p. 12.
24 Goodman/Grover, 2008, p. 249.

16
in text. This is explored with Emmanuel Lévinas and psychological research.25 It is not just

rational thinking, then, but emotional labour.

By developing a theory that implies trauma, Lévinas shares his traumatic experiences

from the Shoah. What this does to us, who are reading him giving voice to his trauma, is this:

“we are affected.”26 We are affected because the experience is (implicitly) shared this way.

The way that he is processing (or his processing is reflected) is interesting both because of the

way of his writing as well as the content of his writing. Both can be applied to therapy that —

from Ancient Greek therapeia — is about ‘curing, healing, service.’ Both are considered in

this thesis. As said, in trauma therapy, the question posed is “how we live out that affect.”27 It

requires ‘speech’ — a spoken response to the face-to-face.

Since trauma is an emotionally overwhelming experience, it must be shared in order to

“hold the pain.”28 This can only be done together. Due to the overwhelm, the subject may

dissociate, hence, lose the ability to express their emotions because they cannot be felt

anymore. In dissociation, the subject exits the body. This also describes an alienation: a

‘problematic separation between same and other that belong together.’ In this case, it is the

mind-body-organism29. It is problematic because dissociation also leads to an inability to

relate to others because the subject is not able to relate to themselves (or that which is ‘Other’

in oneself, i.e. the unconscious processes linked to emotions in/and the body and their lived

bodily experience). How this relationship can be reestablished is explored with Lévinas’

25 Admittedly, it is quite a project bringing these together because in this way neither one can be done justice in
this set-up. Please acknowledge the attempt
26 Westin, 2022, p. 4.
27 Westin, 2022, p. 4.
28 Bamber, 1998, p. 228.
29 This is a term from Somatic Experiencing (SE) that is used throughout this text, too.

17
statement that “the relationship between the same and the other is language.”30 D’accord, the

Research Question: When Lévinas claims that “the relationship between the Same and the

Other is language” in Totality and Infinity, what is meant by the Same, what is meant by the

Other, what is meant by language, what is meant by relationship?

Considering that one loses one’s ‘language,’ one’s way to express oneself and what is

going on within oneself after a traumatic experience, and has lost control over “[one’s] own

ship”31, it is relevant to ask how the traumatic experience can be shared and expressed or

spoken of accordingly. What kinds of language are there for respecting the trauma(tic

experience)? How is association (‘connection’) possible again? How does Lévinas conceive

relation (and with it, ‘language,’ ‘Same,’ ‘Other’?

After engaging with the question: How do we encounter ‘Otherness’ in ourselves and

others? (chapters II-V), another perspective on the lived experience of and with trauma

emerges (chapters VI-VII). From this perspective, a way of how to be with other

(traumatised) humans can be derived (chapter VII). In order to approach that which is Other

as opposed to the familiar, a medium and a method (a common ground; a common language)

are required. This is investigated by considering the content of Totality and Infinity with

reference to (Somatic Experiencing) trauma therapy. Further research inquiries are:

What does reading Lévinas’ account of the ethical relation in Totality and Infinity tell

us about (the needs of) the traumatised?, and

30 Lévinas, 1969, p. 39.

31 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 4. Meant by this here is the relation-ship to oneself. This is broken up due to
dissociation as one of the consequences of (a) trauma(tic experience).

18
 How can the Psychosomatics of Levinas’ Philosophy be applied to and enhance

Trauma Therapy? What is the therapeutic relevance and take-home for trauma

workers from Lévinas’ Ethics in Totality and Infinity?

The Hypothesis at hand: The Lévinasian ethics of alterity in Totality and Infinity and his

conception of Otherness that is central to his conception of the ethical can be useful32 for

trauma therapy. It opens up a new perspective.

His ethics of alterity and his conception of Otherness is about an effect that affects.

So, the central conclusion of this thesis is this: the Lévinasian ethics in Totality and Infinity is

about a traumatic effect that affects. This affectedness must be lived out.

For overview, the architecture of the thesis goes as follows:

First, psychosomatic research of Otherness hence the physiology and psychology of

trauma are elucidated in chapters (I) and (II).

Then, the Lévinasian conception of Otherness is introduced in chapter (III), followed

by the meaning of Otherness — or of the Other — that is explored in chapter (IV) on

language (bringing the ‘Same,’ the ‘Other’ and ‘relation’ together), and in chapter (V) the

ethical relation. Chapter (VI) lays out the aspiration of therapy, and a few trauma

therapeutical methods and highlights their common core: soma. Finally, in chapter (VII), a

meta-analysis of Lévinas’ body of work in Totality and Infinity follows. This means that his

writing will be analysed formally, not so much in content (as is the case in the other

chapters).

Furthermore, these topics and questions are closely linked to the hypothesis:

32 ‘useful’ has a very broad connotation in this thesis as much of it is about the difference between ‘useless’ and
‘meaningful.’ Hence, with the usefulness of Lévinas’ philosophy for trauma therapy is meant that it opens up a
new perspective that could be very potent for trauma therapy.

19
• What determines the Lévinasian ethics? (Chapters II, III, IV, V on Otherness, the Same,

the Other, language, relation, responsibility)

• What is this traumatic effect? (Chapters I, II, VII on trauma, two types of trauma, and

the psychosomatics of writing/reading)

• How does it affect? (Chapters II, VII on the traumatic effect and the psychosomatics of

writing/reading)

• Why must it (especially emotions after trauma) be lived out? (Chapters I, VI on trauma,

dissociation, and on trauma therapeutical methods as well as therapeutic responsibility

in Chapter V)

• How is it and how can it be lived out? (Chapters VI, VII on trauma therapeutical

methods and on the psychosomatics of writing/reading, and Outlook)

Materiality and text, physical sensations, the somatic, and scientific ‘truth’ will merge

together. That is why there is such a vast array of different sources from various disciplines:

they are needed to form the whole picture of the account of embodied healing with trauma.

The selection of text and research is, of course, based on the focus of this project: language

and relation with regard to trauma. So, if there is reference to research on psychosomatics,

then it is research with regards to somatic expression in relationships. If there is reference to

research on trauma, then it is about relational trauma. If there is reference to research on

therapy, it is about trauma therapy, and psychosomatic research used in trauma therapy. If

there is reference to research on a therapeutical method, it is a method that treats relational

trauma and the dissociation that occurs through such trauma. If there is reference to research

on dissociation, it is research conducted with the focus of dissociation through relational

experiences and the loss of the ability to express oneself due to the lack of connection to the

20
body. If there is reference to research about the body, it is from a phenomenological or SE33

perspective. Either, it is current research and debate, or pioneering research and debate. The

discourse on trauma both philosophically and psychotherapeutically is not very old after all

(The diagnose of PTSD34 is from 1980 when “a new era of trauma studies”35 emerged).

There is already quite an array of sources to choose from. And, since I have intended to

approach this topic as holistic as possible, the thesis will not discuss details in the specific

areas. So, let it be mentioned that there is much more to say about each of the concepts that

are introduced (such as trauma therapy, relational trauma and other trauma, dissociation,

psychosomatics etc.). They are merely touched upon; which is unfortunate but necessary in

order to fulfil the demands of the research question. However, these concepts allow for

embedding Lévinas’ theory in another context; and, for connecting Lévinas’ theory in Totality

and Infinity to other disciplines. In particular, this allows to demonstrate the implications of

his existential phenomenology and ethics for trauma therapy. It is challenging to translate

Lévinas into therapy by reading him somatically, so I would hereby like to ask the reader for

patience and openness for this attempt, acknowledging that it is exactly that: an attempt. In

chapter (VII), the ‘psychosomatics’ of Lévinas’ philosophy both in content and in form, and a

33 Short for “Somatic Experiencing”: a trauma therapeutical method that is focused on body experience and
works with the felt sense of the body to release trauma. It is abbreviated as “SE” and will be italicised when it is
used in this thesis.
34 This is short for “Post-Traumatic-Stress-Disorder” that was first diagnosed in Vietnam Veterans and then
formally defined by the American Psychiatric Association (Schiraldi 2016, p. 4)
35 Kearney, 2020, p. 2. Hereby let it be mentioned that the initial trauma studies however, began with Sigmund
Freud’s (1920) book called Beyond the Pleasure Principle in which he calls trauma the “shell shock” in
veterans. It was only further developed and the new, body-based rather than analytic approaches in treating
trauma were developed. For this reason, Kearney writes of the ‘new era’ in trauma studies.

21
suggestion of how this can — or must36 — be applied to trauma work are summarised. Now,

to begin with, the psychosomatics of trauma are defined in chapter (II).

36 — in that very grave sense of there being no other way.

22
II. The Psychosomatics of Trauma

In this chapter the psychosomatic research of Otherness — which amounts to the

psychology37 and the physiology38 of (the) trauma(tic experience) — is elucidated. To

establish the connection between Otherness and trauma, it is important to note that Otherness

in Lévinas’ existential phenomenology “keeps the character of a phenomenon.”39 The

traumatic experience (the moment) and trauma (the consequences that this experience entails

that become lived experience, too) are such a phenomenon of Otherness.

II.I. Psychosomatics

Since the concern here is psychological trauma, it is the psyche of the person that is affected.

Nevertheless, this is about both, the mind and the body. For the purpose of this inquiry, let

psychosomatics be defined as “relating to a physical problem caused by emotional anxiety

and not by illness, infection or injury.”40 To be more precise:

1. “relating to, concerned with, or involving both mind and body”41

2. “relating to, involving, or concerned with bodily symptoms caused by mental or

emotional disturbances”42

37 Regarding the human mind and its functions.

38 Regarding the body and whole body-organism and its functions.
39 Waldenfels, 2006, p. 73.
40 Cambridge Dictionary, 2022.
41 Cambridge Dictionary, 2022.
42 Cambridge Dictionary, 2022.

23
And since psychosomatic medicine is concerned with body and mind as they are always both

affected,43 body and mind are examined with respect to trauma and Otherness in the

following sections.

II.II. Trauma in Mind and Body

Any disturbing experience that results in significant fear, helplessness, dissociation,

confusion, or other disruptive feelings intense enough to have a long-lasting negative

effect on a person’s attitudes, behaviour, and other aspects of functioning. Traumatic

events include those caused by human behaviour (e.g. war, industrial accidents) as

well as by nature (e.g. earthquakes) and often challenge an individual’s view of the

world as a just, safe, and predictable place.44

At the core of this investigation lies trauma — derived from the Greek noun τραῦµα

(trauma), translated from Ancient Greek to ‘wound,’ ‘hurt,’ ‘defeat.’ Since 1894 there is also

this sense of “psychic wound or unpleasant experience which causes abnormal mental stress

and resulting illness or damage to the physical body.”45 It can be connected to the

philosophical concerns of alienation46 and ‘Otherness.’47

The psycho-traumatologists Fischer and Riedesser have defined trauma “as the

experience of vital discrepancy between threatening factors in a situation and individual

43 Kugelstadt, 2020, p. 26.

44 American Psychological Association (APA), 2022.
45 Etymology Dictionary, 2022.
46 A reminder: this is a “problematic separation between same and other that belong together.” (Leopold, 2022)
47 Otherness and Other will be capitalised throughout the text. After all, the Same and the Other are understood
as figures.

24
coping abilities.”48 It is difficult to grasp what trauma in fact means because it is beyond the

human ability to do so. That is why there is a better chance to grasp trauma — this experience

which is ‘outside of usual’49 — if it is elucidated from several angles. It affects the whole life

world of a person, all aspects of the ‘usual.’ It disrupts. This disruption is — amongst other

things — reflected in the body and the mind of the person; discussed down below. First the

body, then the mind. D’accord with the common approach of trauma therapies, the structure

of elucidation is a bottom-up (body to mind) one.

II.II.i. In the Body

How does trauma impact the body?

According to Somatic Experiencing (SE), trauma is stored in the nervous system.

The approach is based entirely on the human biology that is an animal architecture and thus

has the same bodily responses as other animals do in situations of heightened and

overwhelming distress. If the traumatic stress is not discharged, there remains a charge, a

stress. It is an underlying but omnipresent stress in the autonomic nervous system (ANS). The

functions of the ANS run automatically. One does not have to organise or think about them,

but also, one cannot control them. It is understood as the instinctual part of our bodily

organism. Other areas that are affected are the limbic system and the neocortex. The

neocortex can be engaged by practicing ‘conscious awareness’ and focus on one’s bodily

48 Fischer/Riedesser, 2009, p. 84.

49 This phrase will become interesting with Lévinas later when talking about immanence and transcendence —
exterior and interior.

25
sensations — which are overwhelming, too, since due to the traumatic experience the limbic

and the primitive brain are in a constant state of over-activation.50

The limbic system (hippocampus and amygdala) is responsible for emotion

regulation and behavioural responses and connects sensory and memory function. It is closely

linked to the ANS and thus strongly affected by a charge in that area.51 Pierre Janet, a leading

researcher on psychological trauma, says that an émotion choc (‘emotional shock’) occurs

after trauma — which is located in the limbic system.52 This shows in “impulsive, automatic

reactions, which alternate between frenzy, withdrawal, and immobility/paralysis.”53 Thus, the

body reacts automatically. The mind is usually the part of us that is responsive, not reactive

(at least, there would be a chance to). However, trauma affects ‘all aspects of the usual.’ So,

how does trauma affect the mind?

II.II.ii. In the Mind

Trauma cannot be processed. Hence, the mind, too, is affected. The neocortex is responsible

for “our use of language, communication skills, and our higher cognitive functions including

reasoning, planning, and flexibility.”54 To illustrate: Jean Piaget, a primary psychologist of

emotional trauma, found “the harmony or synthesis of an organism and environment may be

represented by internal regulation systems called schemas.”55 There are relationship schemas

that contain cognitions and emotions (affects, etc.) that are responsible for assimilation and

50 “Somatic Experiencing Beginner Year” Manual, B1. 14.

51 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 65f.
52 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 65f.
53 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 65f.
54 “Somatic Experiencing Beginner Year” Manual, B1.14.
55 Piaget, 1947.

26
accommodation in the world. This helps in understanding each other, or have an

understanding of each other.56 When a person is healthy, their schemata as inner models and

maps are interconnected. However, traumatic experiences cannot be integrated into those

schemas. They are not connected to the other cognitive or emotional maps. Thus, they stand

alone. This means that they remain as ‘dissociated schemas.’ Now: What does it mean to have

something dissociated? What does it mean to be dissociated?

II.III. Dissociation and Association

“Dissociation” is “the essence of trauma.”57

Dis-Sociation. Alienation58 on multiple levels. In a single moment “the collapse of connection

between our mental and somatic components”59 occurs. The following explanations serve to

briefly illustrate the phenomenon.

Dissociative Disorders are due to “the ability to exit one’s body when something

harmful occurs to it.”60 It is one of the defence mechanisms of the brain, a rather complex

one;61 and, if it happens, then there is no longer an awareness of the bodily sensations,

feelings, needs. In the most extreme form of dissociation, the traumatised subject cannot

experience past, present, and future because their time perception is distorted or lost. The

subject then detaches themselves from the present moment, hence there is no sense of time

56 Kirmayer, 2008.
57 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 66.
58 Remember the definition of alienation in the introduction: the problematic separation between Same and
Other.
59 Kearney, 2020, p. 8.
60 Koch, 2012, p. 369.
61 Weber 2021, p. 38.

27
(detemporalisation).62 This means that they cannot locate themselves in time and space

anymore, which subsequently means that they have lost their narrative sense of personality

(their understanding of themselves and being in the world) — depersonalisation.63 With such

loss of “psychological energy,”64 one’s own behaviour cannot be regulated anymore.

As we learned in section (II.II.i) on trauma’s effects on the body: the limbic brain

connects sensory and memory function, and is responsible for emotion regulation and

behavioural responses. Hence, if trauma affects these functions of the limbic system, then it

also affects the narrative sense of self and the ability to be in the present moment. What is

needed, then, is the activation of the limbic brain. In order to activate the limbic brain, other

people are necessary. Because of this dissociative and alienated65 aspect of traumatisation, it

is crucial that the process of healing cannot remain an individual endeavour, but is a social

one.

The counterpart to dissociation is association, which means ‘connection’ and

‘cooperation.’66 It is that which must be regained after trauma.67 The problem brought up by

the traumatic event cannot be solved by the individual alone, because the traumatised

individual cannot stand alone; it cannot sense themselves (as a mind-body-organism as well

as their social identity). Recovery, then, requires relationships through which one can sense

themselves again.68 It is not possible alone.

62 Beere, 1995, p. 16.

63 Beere, 1995, p. 117.
64 Heim, 2006, p. 112.
65 Remember: the separation between same and other.
66 Cambridge Dictionary, 2022.
67 Mancini/Buchner, 2022, p. 33.
68 Herman, 1992, p. 17.

28
 Because of this, it is important to consider relationships when facing the issue of

dissociation, i.e. finding ways to grasp the trauma(tic experience) and to share it. This can be

safely done in therapy. Hence, the therapeutical relationship is particularly necessary, as it is a

safe way for the traumatised to re-connect to others and to themselves.69 If one cannot sense

oneself, it is this which must be reestablished: a sense of self. Through and with others. How?

Does simply being there with one another suffice for association?

II.III.i. Dissociation and Release

When the body is dissociated, one lives in a meta-somatic state, the nervous system is stuck

in fight, flight, or freeze. One becomes a victim of one’s bodily stress symptoms, and lives in

constant overwhelm that cannot be felt. In her book Embodied Trauma and Healing, Anna

Westin summarises the body’s reaction to trauma with Peter Levine, the founder of Somatic

Experiencing (SE). It is important to note that it is only a method, not a therapeutic school

such as, for example, Gestalttherapie or Existential Psychotherapy. Still, in addition to

therapeutical, clinical, or other professions70, it can be used as trauma therapy.71 There are:

four components of traumatic reaction, which include hyperarousal, constriction,

dissociation and freezing, or immobility, that is attached to experiences of

helplessness. Understanding the trauma, then, requires exploring where these

defensive energies have emerged from, and why they were not appropriately

discharged and released back into the flow of bodily energy. Even though it is at a

69 There is research on mirror neurons regarding this as well, but this cannot be discussed further.
70 Such as body-based movement.
71 Other trauma-therapeutical methods are discussed in chapter (VI).

29
 non-verbal level, the body is communicating. It signals that something has happened

to the person, which has not yet been fully ‘discharged or integrated.’72

So, the conclusion from this section is that trauma must be discharged and integrated

somatically through and with others if one is to re-arrive in the body. A reminder of part of

the hypothesis is that the Lévinasian trauma is about an effect that affects. This must be lived

out. It seems here, now, that this must happen somatically. Since we are concerned with the

psychosomatics of trauma here, could there be a discharge through the psyche as well? What

happens to the psyche and the mind after (a) trauma(tic experience)?

II.III.ii. Dissociation and a Broken (Self-)Understanding

The overwhelm also shows in the mind: In The traumatized subject, Rudolf Bernet points out

that the narrative self is broken, that the identity of the person is broken in this moment of the

traumatic. The usual way of processing and integrating an experience is interrupted

(remember the dissociated schemata), and another method seems to be needed. Bernet points

to the destruction of subjective identity through the traumatic event73 as the event that breaks

the subjective because “something completely Other falls into the subjective reality.”74 Going

back to Piaget, what seems to be necessary is to associate the cognitive maps and inner

models that constitute one’s subjective reality, to as-, or re-sociate the schemas75 that are split

off.

72 Levine, 1997, p. 132.

73 Bernet, 2000, p. 234.
74 Bernet, 2000, pp. 227f, 231.
75 Or also: “Schichten” if we use Karl Jaspers’ term from his psychopathology.

30
 After all, the traumatic event causes, metaphorically speaking, a crack in the

grounding of the subject. Such a crack can be understood, more concretely speaking, as

partition between two subjective realities: the one that the subject lived in before the event of

traumatisation, and the one after the moment or the time period. The crack itself represents

the traumatic moment that splits something up, breaks something seemingly unbreakable,

splits oneself (mind and body) off from oneself and (from the Otherness) in others. The body

is affected in trauma. Since it is one way of relating to oneself and to others,76 it becomes

impossible to truly encounter others, because one cannot be (bodily) present with oneself and

others anymore.

So, dissociation is important in this investigation because trauma(tic experience) is

an experience of alienation and otherness.77 As we learned in the previous section — trauma

must be discharged and integrated somatically through and with others. And this affectedness

must be lived out because the overwhelming emotions of the traumatic experience must be

discharged in order to be integrated. Hence, the medium between the mind and experience —

the body — takes a central role in our understanding of trauma.

Considering trauma philosophically, then, means, to be concerned with Otherness —

as, in fact, Lévinas was in his ethics. His conception of Otherness is spelled out in Totality

and Infinity, saying that “alterity is only possible starting from me,”78 but then also that “the

Other introduces into me that which is not me.”79 What must be encountered is that which has

become ‘Other’ in order to heal: in oneself and in others. What is this ‘Otherness’ that is

introduced? What does Otherness in oneself and in others’ mean?

76 Sigurdson, 2019, p. 91.

77 Here it is not capitalised because it does not refer to Lévinas conception of Otherness (yet).
78 Lévinas, 1969, p. 40.
79 Lévinas, 1969, p. 203.

31
 Taking up the Lévinasian perspective in chapters (III–V): how can a relation be re-

established to oneself and to others?, to that which is ‘Other’ in oneself and the other(s)?

• Trauma of/and Otherness

• Language of/and Otherness

• The Ethical Relation of/and Otherness

Once the Other and the Same have been better understood (chapter III) with regards to

trauma and language (chapter IV), relation is considered, and in particular the ethical relation

(chapter V). First, however, we start with an elucidation of Otherness and trauma from

Lévinas’ perspective in Totality and Infinity. The traumatic effect — the effect that in our

understanding of trauma so far leads to the loss of connection between mind and body — the

Shibboleth within oneself, the inability to sense oneself due to dissociative reactions — and

Otherness are considered.

32
III. The Lévinasian Conception of Otherness

III.I. The Other and The Same

Sur le marches de la mort

J’ecris ton nom

Sur la santé revenue

Sur le risque disparu

Sur l’espoir sans souvenir

J’ecris ton nom

Et par le pouvoir d’un mot

Je recommence ma vie

Je suis né pour te connaître

Pour te nommer

Liberté.

“Liberté”80 by Paul Elouard81

Ontology, which reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom — the freedom

that is the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the

other.82

These quotes above serve as an indication that Lévinas’ conception of Otherness is about

freedom and allowing ourselves to be alienated by another. Lévinas writes that “sensation

80 See: poetica.fr; transl. mikeandenglish.files.wordpress.com: “On the marches of death I write your name On
the health that’s regained On danger that’s past On hope without memories I write your name By the power of
the word I regain my life I was born to know you And to name you Liberty.”
81 From an exhibition in January 2023 at Albertina Modern, Vienna. The name of the Exhibition was: “Ways of
Freedom.” See also: https://www.albertina.at/en/albertina-modern/exhibitions/ways-of-freedom/
82 Lévinas, 1969, p. 42.

33
breaks up every system.”83 It is the system (totalitarian structures, totalitarian thinking) that is

broken when one is traumatised,84 a “new dimension”85 is opened, in which one “understands

(entend) the remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority of the other.”86 What is this

dimension? — It is “the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality.”87 This is

the ‘trauma’-tic effect (section III.II) that another person can have on one person. It is the

Other and a relationship to that, to them, that is necessary in order to really acknowledge the

Other(ness), to encounter it. One must be ‘alienated by another.’ Otherwise, it would be

‘einverleibt’:88 there would be ‘an identification of the same.’

Rather than ontology then, Lévinas focuses on metaphysics — which for him is an

existential ethics. As stated previously, in the existential moment in which “the rupture of

death is embodied”89 and i.e. Kierkegaard turns to the edge of a cliff, Lévinas turns to the

Other which can be thought of as the body, the vis-á-vis, the separation/distance between the

Other and the Same as well as the healing process (‘language’) that occurs through that

distance. As he focuses on the encounter in the moment of most radical freedom — in which

one becomes ‘conscious’ — the terms trauma, relation, and Otherness merge.90

83 Lévinas, 1969, p. 59.

84 For further reading, this can be understood with Carl Jaspers. He writes about limit phenomena in
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1925).
85 Lévinas, 1969, p. 197.
86 Lévinas, 1969, p. 34.
87 Lévinas, 1969, p. 171.
88 = ‘incorporated.’
89 Lévinas, 1969, p. 56f.
90 According to Dino Galetti (in: The Grammar of Lévinas’ Other, 2015), there are four different types of
otherness that are addressed in Totality and Infinity: “other,” “Other,” “autrui,” and “Autrui,” which one finds
here: Lévinas, 1969, p. 205f.

34
 For, trauma is the experience that may bring forth absolute alienation. It is the

“exemplary Other91” that ‘comes from somewhere else.’92 It is an ‘Other’ that did not belong

to the Same (simplified: to the understanding of one’s reality and self before the moment of

splitting Same and Other hence that which is familiar and that which is not93). It is an-other

that brings about the alienation of the Same and an-other Other; it separates that Same from

the same and thus makes same and other from then on two separated entities: Same and Other

in oneself. Here is is important to note that Same and Other are understood as figures — and,

if the Other is thought of as that which is traumatising, then it could also be understood as the

vis-à-vis (another person). And, if one’s understanding of self is only that which is familiar

(‘Same’), then the Same could also refer to a person. However, generally, Lévinas

distinguishes between ‘oneself’ and ‘Same’ and ‘Other’ — and the Same and the Other are

qualities that are in oneself and others, too.

This fundamental experience of being human, of being alienated from oneself, from

this world and others, as well as being in this world and with others is considered as it is that

which is the reality of the loneliness of trauma — a reality (as Peter Levine says) everyone

has (to) face(d) one way or another.94 The same is true for Lévinas, but he takes it one step

further. With the understanding of trauma and Otherness so far, they can be thought together,

and are both an inevitable part of life. It is summarised in the following quote:

91 Again: “Other” is capitalised all throughout the text when it refers to Lévinas conception of Otherness.
Otherwise, it is not capitalised.
92 Staudigl, 2003, p. 80.
93 Leaning on: Lévinas, 1969, p. 67.
94 Levine, 2010, Introduction.

35
 The absolutely other is the Other / L‘absolument Autre, c‘est Autrui […]

Over him, I have no power. / je ne peux pouvoir […]

We are the same and the other […]95

After the traumatic event (as it is commonly understood), relating is only possible —

according to Lévinas — if one turns to the Other. With this, Lévinas focuses on the

relationship — the in-between individuals, the bond, that which holds together. Or is it

actually that which separates, the separation? This in itself is paradoxical because trauma is

thought of differently: it is characterised as the experience of Otherness which is alienating

(and potentially traumatising). So, why would one go back there? After all, it is trauma that

leads to dissociation and trauma that requires association. How can the wounding quality of

trauma (Otherness and alienation) also be the healing one?96 A reminder: trauma must be

discharged and integrated somatically. Could that be through the Other?

III.II. Trauma as the Other(ness): On Suffering and Meaning

For Lévinas, the reality of trauma, of the Other, is not (just) something that happens to

everyone as Levine claims, but is something that must constantly happen. In a nutshell:

Otherness is traumatic. Trauma is the Otherness. This traumatic Otherness is necessary to be

fully alive.

95 Lévinas, 1969, p. 39.

96 Michael Staudigl in Grenzen der Kulturkonzepte asks something similar when finding that the Lévinasian
ethics are traumatising. Although the Other has ethical priority, it is questionable whether an ethics born out of a
traumatism can do justice to trauma. See: Staudigl, 2003, p. 86f.

36
 But, there are two different types of Otherness hence two different ways of thinking

trauma for Lévinas. In fact, there are (many) different forms that this Otherness takes on.97

Through Lévinas’ conception of Otherness, trauma (and with it, the therapeutic responsibility

in trauma therapy) can be rethought. In the following chapter, concepts in order to provoke a

different conceptualisation of trauma are introduced. What trauma, language, and relation

have to do with Otherness98, is explored in this chapter, too.

As said, part of the task is to (first) disassemble: Otherness in the form of the

traumatic, Otherness as language, Otherness as the vis-a-vis — and all of this being the

constitutive element for relating to one another — infinitely; as “the infinite is the absolutely

other.”99 Before we get to infinity, there is “the primordial sphere” “which corresponds to

what we call the same” and it “turns to the absolutely other.”100 That is exactly the baseline

situation for our further investigation: the Same turning to the Other: An encounter. But,

the Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his

epiphany is produced and which appears to me breaks with the world that can be

97 Let it be mentioned that the English translator Lingis questions if we are ever actually concerned with
interactions in Lévinas’ work — which might prove to be challenging to use it for orientation in trauma therapy
if we remember the argument based on Hermann‘s thought about recovery lying in relationality. Lingis’ concern
is addressed later with the meta-analysis. For now, we remain focused on the claim that ‘the relationship
between the same and the other is language.’ Out of which the research question is derived: When Levinas
claims that “the relationship between the Same and the Other is language” (Lévinas, 1969, p. 39); What is meant
by the Same, what is meant by the Other, what is meant by language, what is meant by relationship? If all of this
actually entails the “traumatism of astonishment” (Lévinas, 1969, p. 73)?
98 “other” and “Other” are “autre” in French, which is ‘God’ and the ‘human other.’
Lévinas, 1969, p. 205f.; as well as Lingis, 1969.
99 Lévinas, 1969, p. 49. More on that in chapter (V).
100 Lévinas, 1969, p. 67.

37
 common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our

existence,101 it makes a space arise specifically as a void.102

Remember Shibboleth. Let’s keep Shibboleth in mind when moving into the investigation of

Otherness and trauma103 with Lévinas:

In Totality and Infinity, trauma is mentioned as “traumatism of astonishment.”104

This moment takes one by surprise; the moment where one stands wrapped in awe, when “the

present is broken open (opened to the event, to the future) by that which it cannot grasp or

anticipate.”105 This is where the wound and the healing lie. This ‘traumatism of astonishment’

is explored in section (III.II.ii.) with Shibboleth in mind. First:

III.II.i. Two Types of Trauma: Useless Suffering

One can differentiate between two different types of trauma with Lévinas. There is a trauma

which causes ‘useless suffering’ and another kind of trauma that occurs in the meaningful106

encounter between the Same and the Other. One has a political connotation, the other an

ethical one.

The first type of trauma is in accordance with the common understanding of the

concept. It is or causes ‘useless suffering.’ Lévinas says that “the least one can say about

101 Lévinas, 1969, p. 194. It is of course not just ‘his’ face that matters in considering the Other as the vis-à-vis.
Quite the contrary: It is also ‘her’ face, ‘their’ face, ‘an-other’ face. The gender issues with Lévinas’ writing are
not gone into any further than this mention of inclusion.
102 Lévinas, 1969, p. 189.
103 Let it be mentioned here that some of the concepts that are relevant in later chapters are also introduced here.
104 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.
105 Newman, 2009, p. 107.
106 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206: “Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within
the primordial face to face of language.” I will pick up this quote up later on in the text.

38
suffering is that in its own phenomenality, intrinsically, it is useless, for nothing.”107 ‘Useless

suffering’ is characterised by “extreme passivity, impotence, abandonment, solitude.”108

‘Useless Suffering’109 describes pain that one is left to live through after experiencing trauma

that is unnecessary, avoidable; ‘pointless.’110 Also, “in suffering sensibility is a vulnerability,

more passive than receptivity; it is an ordeal more passive than experience.”111 This sounds

similar to the common understanding of trauma, the understanding that trauma therapies

build on; the helplessness of the subject. The subject is stuck. There is no movement, no e-

motion. In this helplessness from the overwhelm of the event, one becomes a victim of the

bodily stress responses. This is survival mode.

There are parallels to how the trauma(tic experience) is psychosomatically

understood: There is dissociation from both the body and the mind as a consequence of

trauma, meaning that the relationship schemas amongst others are split off, as is the

connection or relation of (sensations in) the body. Sigurdson says that the body is the

“prequisite for experienced suffering.”112 And, it is through the body that we relate to

ourselves as well as to others. There is a focus on the (relational) body in thinking about

trauma and pointless suffering: for example in Behnke’s phenomenology (2002) and

Bourdieu’s thought (2005), claiming that psychosomatic illnesses are due to socio-somatics

of societal power structures that allow for “the very phenomenon of suffering, which, in its

uselessness, is in principle, the pain of the other.”113 The ‘Other’ here is understood as our

107 Lévinas, 1969, p. 158.

108 Lévinas, 1981, p. 158.
109 Lévinas, 1981.
110 Samuelson, 2018.
111 Lévinas, 1981, p. 158.
112 Sigurdson, 2019, p. 90.
113 Lévinas, 1981, p. 162.

39
fellow human beings.114 This is what politics and totalitarian structures allow for, which

Lévinas mentions, too:

This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the

totalitarianisms of right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and

the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is the century which is drawing to a

close in the haunting memory of the return of everything signified by these barbaric

names: suffering and evil and deliberately imposed, yet no reason sets limits to the

exasperation of a reason become political and detached from all ethics.115

In events that cause ‘useless suffering,’ violence is deliberately and implicitly imposed on

others, and the ethical is not considered. This also — but of course not solely — causes

psychological trauma as it is commonly understood. It affects — remembering chapter (II) —

the limbic system, the mind-body-connection, as well as our ability, and way of remembering

hence our time-perception. If that traumatisation is not resolved, one suffers on and on, trying

to go back to that moment, feeling threatened in the present, too.

Lévinas seems to be concerned with relational trauma because he writes about

‘useless suffering’ being caused not only by totalitarian structures (politics) but also by

“totalitarian thinking” — which, of course, could be caused by totalitarian structures/politics.

This kind of thinking “accepts vision rather than language as its model.”116 If ‘totalitarian

114 Lévinas, 2016, p. 95.

Let’s keep this in mind. The moment that trauma is thought of from the body, all others become the vis-à-vis to
encounter ethically in order for the healing of the political to occur. And this makes trauma work both social and
political and not exclusive in any way. More on this in Outlook later.
115 Lévinas, 1981, p. 162.
116 Lévinas, 1969, p. 15.

40
thinking’ through ‘vision’ is what causes ‘useless suffering’ hence ‘trauma’ in the sense

explored in chapter (I), what about the kind of thinking that ‘accepts language as its model’?

III.II.ii. Two Types of Trauma: the Meaningful Encounter

There is also the “traumatism of astonishment.”117 From now on, this is called the Lévinasian

trauma, a kind of trauma that it is much more subtle — the other type of ‘trauma’ that this

thesis is about. It is a ‘surprise,’ an “overflowing”118 of sensation,119 or also an

“overwhelm.”120 But since “infinity overflows the thought that thinks it,”121 the

understanding can only be thus far. Lévinas writes that “sensation breaks up every system”122

It is the system (totalitarian structures, totalitarian thinking) that is broken when one is

traumatised,123 a “new dimension”124 is opened,125 in which one “understands (entend) the

remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority of the other.”126 What is this dimension? — It is

117 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.

118 Lévinas, 1969, p. 25.
119 Elaborated quote: “infinity overflows the thought that thinks it.” See: Lévinas, 1969, p. 25.
120 Full quote: “where events other than that of the presentation of the original being come to overwhelm or
sublimate the pure sincerity of this presentation,” see p. 202 in TI. Which presentation is meant here, however?
— the presentation of the face as described in TI on p. 203f: “the face of the other — the absolutely Other — the
presentation is preeminently nonviolence, far instead of offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and
founds it.” This is later also discussed later in this thesis.
121 Lévinas, 1969, p. 25.
122 Lévinas, 1969, p. 59.
123 For further reading, this can be understood with Carl Jaspers. He writes about limit phenomena in
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. (1925)
124 Lévinas, 1969, p. 197.
125 This is not just the case when there occurs traumatisation in this subtle and gentle sense. This is also the case
when the initial ‘trauma of astonishment’ which occurs through the sensible is replaced by the ethical relation.
This will be further elucidated and differentiated in the following sections.
126 Lévinas, 1969, p. 34.

41
“the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality.”127 This is the ‘trauma’-tic

effect that another person can have on one person, or must have in order for that person to —

taken literally (see example in section III.II.iii.) — live. A presence of infinity.

However, “the idea of Infinity implies the separation of the same with regard to the

other.”128 The starting point for the ethical relation.129 The Same and the Other remain two

separate entities, the Other is not ‘einverleibt.’130 After all, the finite mind cannot think the

Infinite. And, the infinite essence of another could not even be touched (or could it? — this is

explored in section III.III. and onwards). There remains a separation. But, Lévinas writes that

“as nonviolence it nevertheless maintains the plurality of the same and the other. It is

peace.”131 That implies then that the Lévinasian ‘trauma’ serves as the antidote to ‘useless

suffering’ as equivalent to the common understanding of ‘trauma.’ For, how could trauma be

peaceful?

It is about “a relationship that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not

a totalisation of history, but the idea of infinity.”132 Lévinas writes that “meaning is the face

of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the primordial face to face

of language.”133 And, for Lévinas, language and the (ethical) relationship are closely

connected. In this ‘face-to-face’ a “meaningful”134 one, “a relationship that does not result in

127 Lévinas, 1969, p. 171.

128 Lévinas, 1969, p. 53.
129 The ethical relation and infinity will be considered in chapter (V).
130 Arguably, it is that which happens during the common traumatisation: something is ‘einverleibt’ — the other,
the cause of the trauma or the trauma itself — and it becomes part of oneself yet remains strange and other in
oneself. The trick here is to keep it at a distance, to acknowledge the otherness.
131 Lévinas, 1969, p. 203f.
132 Lévinas, 1969, p. 52.
133 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.
134 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.

42
a divine or human totality, that is not a totalisation of history, but the idea of infinity”135 is

possible. For, Lévinas writes, “meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words

takes place already within the primordial face to face of language.”136

What kind of ‘language’ or communication does this entail? He says that “discourse

is thus the experience of something absolutely foreign, a pure ‘knowledge’ or ‘experience,’ a

traumatism of astonishment.”137 Before delving into the different kinds of language, the

‘traumatism of astonishment’ is explored a bit further. Is this ‘discourse,’ ‘language’?

III.III. Touch and ‘Traumatism of Astonishment’: Vulnerability

Touch138 is the first “traumatism of astonishment”139 that is experienced through the Other in

Lévinasian terms. To illustrate this: Everything in the world, everything after the event of

birth, is firstly astonishing and ‘traumatising.’ The baby is completely at the mercy of its

surroundings, of which everything is new. This part in each of us remains. The sensible,

reliant, astonished part that needs care, the part that is utterly helpless and prone for hurt

(hence: vulnerable).

This can be underlined with a psychological experiment (1994) carried out in

Romania by child-development specialist Joseph Sparling, neurobiologist Mary Carlson, and

psychiatrist Felton Earls. During the experiment, they found out that, if children are not able

135 Lévinas, 1969, p. 52.

136 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.
137 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.
138 Start of excerpt from B.A. thesis. Also: Consider Dino Galetti, Dan Zahavi, James Mensch and Richard
Kearney’s recent works on trauma and touch. But of course also note that Karl Jaspers, Michael Staudigl and
other philosophers have worked with the concept already twenty years ago.
139 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.

43
to develop their sense of touch by being caressed, held, or touched by another living being,

they are sensorily deprived. This has effects that may even lead to the death of the baby.

Neuroscientist David Linden calls this the “essential touch” that newborns need in order to

thrive.140 A touch, in fact, that all human beings are in need of, children as adults. Later on,

however, adults are also emotionally touched otherwise. Words can be touching, for example.

Lévinas writes that anything that meaning is awarded to can be touching.

And, meaning is found in responding, in sensing a demand.141 Since in any discourse

there must be a call and answer, a dialogue, meaning could be attributed to any

relationship.142 And, since we put ourselves in relation to subjects and objects in order to

distinguish ourselves from them, meaning is relational (which is a statement that Lévinas

makes, too143). This describes the cognitive maps and models that Piaget has called

‘schemas.’ Touch is the first meaning that is attributed to us, when we can only be touched

but not initiate it (yet).144 By being touched, meaning is awarded. This allows the one touched

to award meaning, to others, too. After a traumatic event as commonly understood, one is in

that exact place again, one needs exactly a kind of sensible145 touch again to not only survive,

but live (because adults are also emotionally touched otherwise).

140 Konnikova, 2015.

141 Lévinas, 1969, p. 171.
142 “Every human experience carries meaning as an outset.” (Bergo, 2023, 2.1.).
143 Lévinas, 1969, p. 171.
144 End of excerpt.
145 Unfortunately, it is not possible to go into the different nuances of the concept of sensibility. Let it be
mentioned however that there is a distinction between sensibility and consciousness for Lévinas. Sensibility is
an openness while consciousness is ‘consciousness of,’ which implies an understanding that in a sensible
encounter is not necessary or even possible. And it is in sensibility that the ethical (transcendence) occurs.
(Newman, 2009, 99f.) More on that in chapter (IV).

44
 But, because the human sensibility becomes a vulnerability, for ‘in suffering

sensibility is a vulnerability,’ ‘more passive than experience’ (section III.II.ii), one has to

relearn a sensibility with others, to sense interconnectedness; feel intersubjectivity. But,

because of the wound, this is painful. One suffers.

Bernet does point to the sense of vulnerability146 that comes with a lived trauma

which ties in with Lévinasian philosophy. It indicates an awareness of the connection

between trauma, the mind-body-organism, and others; the “anthropological vulnerability”147

of human beings. It is about the potential to be (further) hurt. Sigurdson writes that “only

Vulnerable Creatures Suffer.”148

In Lévinasian philosophy, it is the awareness of this vulnerability that allows for

meeting another person in a shared sensibility, ethically.149 It is interesting that he says that

there is first the trauma in sensibility that shows in being-taken-by-surprise through the Other,

an “overflow of sensation”150 — and then, through and because of that traumatisation, an

awareness of the vulnerability. Then, one can gain an understanding of oneself again through

connection (association), through sensing (one) another. After all, this is lost when one is

dissociated. Again: Lévinas characterised ‘useless suffering’ as “in suffering sensibility is a

vulnerability, more passive than receptivity; it is an ordeal more passive than experience,”151

and Bernet pointed towards the ‘vulnerability’ in, after, and through a trauma(tic experience).

Martin Endress writes about the sociology of trauma, saying that even after such a

146 Bernet 2000, p. 252.

147 Dornberg, 2006; Merleau-Ponty.
148 Sigurdson, 2019, p. 90.
149 Newman, 2009, p. 99.
150 Newman, 2009, p. 99.
151 Lévinas, 1981, p. 158.

45
traumatisation as the holocaust, the survivors and their witnesses can use their vulnerability

as a resource of sensibility (“Sensibilitätsresource”).152 How can sensibility that ‘is more

passive than experience’ and ‘useless for nothing’ become a resource then?

Arguably, this is exactly what the Lévinasian trauma does: it is a different kind of

experience than the one that is ‘useless’ and passive. After all, it is a meaningful encounter

that requires a ‘discourse.’ That which has been explored as the Lévinasian and a necessary

‘traumatisation’ in the last section is physical touch and touching in a sensible manner

through the awareness of the — remember Bernet on The traumatised subject —

vulnerability; a wounded sensibility.

From the perspective just elucidated, the Lévinasian ‘trauma’ is inevitable as being

touched by and connected to others is vital for survival. Remember: The Lévinasian ethics of

alterity in Totality and Infinity and his conception of Otherness that is central to his

conception of the ethical can be useful for trauma therapy. His ethics of alterity and his

conception of Otherness is about an effect that affects. And, as with all emotions, this

affectedness must be lived out. Such an affectedness happens via touch (see the example just

now), and, if it is a specific way of touching, it is life-giving. It is this kind of language and

communication that newborns and the vulnerable can understand and that is original (and

essential) since through trauma, one goes back to this part that must be attended to: the

sensible, reliant, astonished one — and perhaps even all the more because it has become

vulnerable, too. This part must be attended to, relies on others, and needs care (of oneself and

others). This requires a somatic dialogue.

152 Endress, 2006, p. 8.

46
 An example from Richard Kearney’s book on Touch: Recovering our most vital

sense (No Limits) that actually is about ‘healing touch’ as in the Lévinasian ‘traumatism of

astonishment’:

[…] the testimony of Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, a founder of the antiapartheid

movement in Capetown, who tells the story of touching a hand of one of the most

criminal executioners of the apartheid regime, Eugene de Kock.153 Her testimony is

all the more remarkable for the fact that she happened to touch his ‘trigger hand’154

used for shooting his victims. It was her totally unpredictable gesture of touch, she

realized, that sparked a moment of ‘impossible forgiveness.’155

An ‘unpredictable gesture of touch,’ ‘sparked a moment.’ This sounds similar to the

‘traumatism of astonishment’ that is a ‘surprise,’ an “overflowing”156 of sensation,157 or also

an ‘overwhelm.’ Touch in its many forms is in a specific sense traumatising, and it is that

which opens us up for being in relation.

But, as said, adults are also touched otherwise (which also means that traumata can

happen on multiple levels, too — remember that in the Psychosomatics of Trauma, emotional

anxiety as opposed to physical illness was mentioned; adults are also emotionally touched

otherwise). In this case above it was physical touch is what works “in truth and reconciliation

projects in postconflict societies”158 but does it suffice for the Lévinasian ‘traumatism of

astonishment’ between the Same and the Other that allows for the meaningful encounter

153 Gobodo-Madikizela, 2019.

154 Kearney, 2020.
155 Kearney, 2020, p. 11.
156 Lévinas, 1969, p. 25.
157 Elaborated quote: “infinity overflows the thought that thinks it,” see Lévinas, 1969, p. 25.
158 Examples are: South Africa, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland (Kearney, 2020, p. 11).

47
hence for a relationship? Is physical touch hence body language that which is what he means

by ‘language’ that is constitutive of relationship? He writes that “meaning is the face of the

Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the primordial face to face of

language.”159 Here — as the body is in Lévinas existential phenomenology — the face is

understood as “phenomenon.”160 It is an experience that — since ‘meaning is the face of the

Other’ — carries meaning. So, it seems, that the meaningful encounter does not require words

or ‘logic.’161 It happens in the ‘face-to-face’ encounter. This is a language that Newman calls

“a language of trauma in order to evoke the way in which sensibility is always already

affected by the Other.”162 In suffering sensibility an encounter occurs that speaks to one’s

vulnerability hence it affects. If the face is a phenomenon, this encounter would mean that a

“discourse is thus the experience of something absolutely foreign, a pure ‘knowledge’ or

‘experience,’ a traumatism of astonishment.”163 Discourse would be the face-to-face hence

both acknowledging each other’s faces. And then?

A reminder of the quote from the research inquiry: ‘the relationship between the

same and the other is language.’ What does the face-to-face actually entail? Is language

merely an experience of Otherness as (the) trauma(tic experience) is?

Now: There are four nuances of ‘language’ that are explored in the next chapter in

order to understand this constitutive aspect of relation in Totality and Infinity:

First, Lévinas’ conceptualisation of the body is considered to answer the question if

the face-to-face encounter is something that occurs as bodily language. Then, ‘expression,’

159 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.

160 Waldenfels, 2006, p. 67.
161 Lévinas, 1969, p. 172f.
162 Newman, 2009, p. 92.
163 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.

48
and ‘speech’ as part of the face-to-face are explored. The fourth has to do with the response to

the Other in the ethical relation, the others are assertions of Otherness. These are explored in

chapter (IV).

49
IV. (Lévinasian) Language(s of Trauma)

language (n.)

late 13c., langage “words, what is said, conversation, talk,”

from Old French langage “speech, words, oratory; a tribe,

people, nation” (12c.), from Vulgar Latin *linguaticum,

from Latin lingua “tongue,” also “speech, language”164

Lévinas writes: “Language does not belong among the relations that could appear through the

structures of formal logic.”165 In the same paragraph he writes that it is relation across a

divide: “it is contact across a distance, relation with the non-touchable, across a void.”166 One

is always already affected if there is contact. This is not something logical, it is something

that just so happens. Is this passive? — Perhaps before it becomes contact ‘across a distance’

hence it is not mere physical contact/touch — as was explored in the previous section — that

which is vital for survival and living (‘foregiveness’). ‘Contact across a distance’ could entail

both something active and something passive. But, if Newman writes that language for

Lévinas is about being “always already affected by another”167 in the — so Lévinas —

“primordial face to face of language,”168 then it is something that happens. After all,

“meaning is the face of the Other.”169 With that there is the “presence of infinity”170 which

164 Etymology Dictionary, 2022.

165 Lévinas, 1969, p. 172f.
166 Lévinas, 1969, p. 172f.
167 Newman, 2009, p. 92.
168 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.
169 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.
170 Lévinas, 1969, p. 171.

50
“implies the separation of the same with regard to the other.”171 Infinity is explored in chapter

(V) on the ethical relation. For now, we remain with what can happen in the face-to-face

encounter, the touch that is a ‘traumatism of astonishment’ (section IV.I), the answer to

which, must be active (sections IV.II and IV.III).

The following section is the beginning of exploration of a psychosomatics of

philosophy; it opens with the idea that The body speaks a language beyond words.172 It could

be connected to Peter Levine’s method of Somatic Experiencing (SE); which is focused on

increasing awareness of bodily sentiments by listening to and sharing what the body tries to

tell us, first and foremost. It is a therapeutical method that aims at learning to have a dialogue

with the Other. This includes the body, too (or even is about a dialogue with it).

There is explicit mention of ‘expression’ and ‘speech’ with respect to the face-to-

face encounter in Totality and Infinity. With the face-to-face, both have at their core a kind of

‘language’ that occurs between two people — and affecting each other in a way that must be

lived out — also without touching each other physically.173

171 Lévinas, 1969, p. 53.

172 Amongst others, this can be found in Nancy, 2000, p. 111.
173 Lévinas, 1969, p. 197: “The relation with the Other alone introduces a dimension of transcendence, and leads
us to a relation totally different from experience in the sensible sense of the term, relative-egoist.”

51
IV.I. Relating via (an-other) Body Language

“Corpus.”174

Lévinas conceptualises the body this way:

To be a body is on the one hand to stand (se tenir), to be master of oneself, — and on

the other hand, to stand on the earth, to be in the other, and thus to be encumbered by

one’s body […] to be at home with oneself in something other than oneself, to be

oneself while living from something other than oneself, to live from[…] is

concretized in corporeal existence.175

So, being a body is ‘to be in the other,’ ‘to be at home in something other,’ ‘to be oneself’

while ‘living form something other.’ With this Other as the body, there must be a dialogue,

too. For, ‘the relationship between the Same and the Other is language.’

The alienation (dissociation) from the body is what happens in trauma, and trauma

remains stored in the body. This makes the bodily experience for the traumatised a twofold

experience of Otherness; one is the simple condition of being a body and consciousness, the

other is the experience of the trauma being inscribed in the body but not being conscious of it.

Somatic Experiencing (SE) builds on this fact, and also the therapeutical relation in SE. It is

174 Nancy, 2000, pp. 111, 121f. Nancy’s understanding of the body will accompany us into the last section on
therapeutical writing/reading. For now: it is interesting that he thinks the body as ‘expression beyond
language’ (or that which one commonly understands as ‘language’). For, the body is constantly changing, an
open entity. With that, it is open and infinite. This is how Lévinas characterises the ethical relation, too. This
being said, both the body and relating with the body may later play a role in defining ‘a common language.’ The
body and its language is considered a ‘resource’ in SE therapy for example.
175 Lévinas, 1969, p. 164.

52
based on the assumption that bodies communicate with each other, regardless of the persons

inhabiting these bodies.176

Here, the ‘felt sense’177 that some trauma therapies work with comes into play which

is the method that was mentioned before the Lévinasian quote in which one feels into the

body, is re-learning to communicate with one’s body (which will be explored in chapter VI).

This happens with another person being physically present to facilitate this ‘felt sense’ that

the trauma patient may be disconnected (and with that, dissociated) from their body due to

their trauma(tic experience). Since the body is an-Other, just as the vis-à-vis is, finding a

dialogue with one of them can help facilitate a connection to the respective other, too: For —

considering psychological trauma — it is clear that one is exposed to something that is

emotionally overwhelming and cannot be processed, which leaves the psyche damaged (in

ways that has been considered already, as well as ways beyond). It happens without one’s

doing, it happens by itself — as do the bodily reactions. So: The psyche and the body are

closely connected and then become disconnected. This opens one up, it leaves — to return to

this image once again — a crack between the Same and the Other — both the Other in myself

(the body and the experience of trauma in the body) as well as the other (person) outside of

oneself.178

When two persons are with each other, they communicate at first via body language

— not through physical touch, but through sensing each other. This on its own is touching

(which may also be disturbing or frightening at times). It is not about words. It is about that

which is felt with the other person: the (Levinasian) ‘traumatism’ through the body language.

176 Manual “Somatic Experiencing, Beginner I-II.”

177 Somatic Experiencing Introductory Manual by SE Greece.
178 Die Weltenseele (“soul of the world”) as Paulo Coelho would say.

53
This is the vulnerability (‘sensibility is a vulnerability’ after trauma, as we learned earlier

from Bernet): the wound is sensible, is felt. This “constitutes the very significance of

language” in signifying how one is opened and “exposed like a bleeding wound,”179 before

“language scatters into words.”180 This kind of ‘touch’ would be a ‘sensible

experience.’ ‘Language,’ then, is understood here as being in a (somatic) dialogue with one’s

own and another’s body and is taken to be constitutive of relationship between the Same and

the Other, or between oneself and another person.

However, there may be more to language than this. Perhaps, it is not language as

understood here (as a bodily dialogue with one another) that constitutes relationship, but

rather that it is the two people that enter into the possibility of a relationship (when they

encounter each other by just being physically present with each other). After all, a sensible

experience may be more. And, the face-to-face as something ‘primordial’ may imply more as

well. So, what exactly is experienced, or, how can the experience of the encounter and the

(possibility of) relationship be described? — Lévinas writes that “the relation between the

Other and me which dawns forth in its expression.”181 What is meant by ‘expression’ if it is

that which the relation ‘dawns forth’ in?

IV.II. The ‘Face-to-Face’: Expression. Truth and ‘Things’

The second nuance to the Levinasian ‘language’ is concerned with ‘expression.’

179 Levinas, 1998b, p. 151.

180 Michelsen, 2015, pp. 51, 94.
181 Lévinas, 1969, p. 194.

54
 Expression manifests the presence of being […] It is of itself presence of a fate, and

hence appeal and teaching, entry into relation with me — the ethical relation.182

If ‘relationship’ lights up in expression, it is accentuated through expression, and, as it says

here, it begins with expression — it is not constituted. It is merely accentuated, or initiated.

Then, it would be within the face-to-face encounter, ‘the primordial face to face of

language,’ ‘before language scatters into words.’

According to the findings of the previous section, the face-to-face is the moment in

which the (vulnerability of the) face shows. This is the simple ‘presence of a fate,’ ‘a

‘presence of being.’ It is that which is firstly shown and felt in any encounter: the presence of

an-other Being, for “Being, the thing in itself, is not, with respect to the phenomenon, the

hidden.” As opposed to the face which is understood as a phenomenon, expression hides this

phenomenon. Through the face, then, the ‘truth’ is revealed, authenticity and the person per

se is expressed — through expression it is the “possibility of appearance.”183 For, “to be in

oneself is to express oneself, that is, already to serve the Other.”184 The focus in expression

then is not oneself, but is the Other. Lévinas writes:

And expression does not manifest the presence of being by referring from the sign to

the signified; it presents the signifier. The signifier, he who gives a sign, is not

signified. It is necessary to have already been in the society of signifiers for the sign

182 Lévinas, 1969, p. 181.

183 Lévinas, 1969, p. 200: “Expression does not impose itself as a true representation or as an action. The being
offered in true representation remains a possibility of appearance.”
184 Lévinas, 1969, p. 183.

55
 to be able to appear as a sign. Hence the signifier must present himself before every

sign, by himself — present a face.185

So, the signifier presents themselves; presents their face. It accesses one’s vulnerability; the

“traumatism of astonishment.”186 Then, “expression manifests itself in the presence of being,

but not by simply drawing aside the veil of the phenomenon,” but by presenting a face,

staying with the phenomenon: the shared sensibility. Otherwise, expression becomes a sign

that may describe the signified, and “the truth of the thing in itself is not disclosed,” and “the

thing in itself expresses itself.”187 But, “not only verbal signs but all signs can serve as

language.”188 This — as opposed to the face — is a “language, which does not touch the

other”189 (‘touch’ also in a non-physical but an ‘original’ sense). When signs are involved in

the face-to-face, hence, when “expression manifests the presence of Being,”190 then the

distance between the Same and the Other remains. This is important before we get into

‘speech.’

Let us return to the image: The Same and the Other stand across from each other.

And, ‘a being separated from the other,’ ‘speaks.’ Now, here is “the event proper to

expression,” it “consists in bearing witness to oneself, and guaranteeing the witness. This

attestation of oneself is possible only as a face, that is, as speech.”191 For, “speech proceeds

from absolute difference.”192 So: as an answer to expression in which the thing (signified) is

185 Lévinas, 1969, p. 181.

186 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.
187 Lévinas, 1969, p. 181.
188 Lévinas, 1969, p. 181f.
189 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.
190 Lévinas, 1969, p. 181.
191 Lévinas, 1969, p. 201.
192 Lévinas, 1969, p. 194.

56
expressed (sign), the signifier (the being in the face, the truth) must answer once more. In

order to remain with the (vulnerability of) the face, the truth ‘of being’ must be

experienced.193

IV.III. The ‘Face-To-Face’: Speech. Transcendence and Thought

Speech is an incomparable manifestation: it does not accomplish the movement from

the sign to the signifier to the signified; it unlocks what every sign closes up at the

very moment it opens the passage that leads to the signified, by making the signifier

attend this manifestation of the signified.194

So, as opposed to expression which does not show the truth (signifier), speech brings the

signifier and the signified together. In that case, if one opens up to the Other, they may

become a ‘Sensibilitätsresource’ (resource of sensibility) that affects oneself, that speaks to

the vulnerable part (with)in.

This would be ‘truly’ seeing the Other. It is about “the face to face.”195 Lévinas says

that “the idea of the other in me we name here face,” and “the face brings a notion of

truth.”196 This already is ‘language.’ But,

the ‘vision’ of the face is inseparable from this offering language is. To see the face

is to speak to the world. Transcendence is not an optics, then, but the first ethical

gesture.197

193 Peperzak, 1993, 39f.

194 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.
195 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.
196 Lévinas, 1969, p. 50.
197 Levinas, 1969, p. 174.

57
‘Seeing’ here is a kind of vision. And, we remember that this is d’accord with totalitarian

structures and thinking. Or, does thinking need to be totalitarian?

— If it is ‘the first ethical gesture,’ how could it? It is what Lévinas calls ‘speech,’

the first ethical gesture. Seeing (recognising) is also part of his understanding of language, of

establishing a relationship. Lévinas seems to be claiming here that ‘seeing’ implies

‘speaking.’ Or, that ‘seeing’ is in fact ‘speaking’?, meaning that speaking would be sensing198

(or something even more ‘original’)? It would be about recognising the Other in their

Otherness (and truth), in their alterity. And, with it, my inability to fully grasp or understand

hence adequately respond to their ‘presence of being.’ It is then an experience of ‘language,’

that which happens between two people in the meaningful encounter.

As a reminder: It has been shown in chapter (II) that there is a type of ‘trauma’ that

may cause the potential of ‘useless suffering’ but is in fact a meaningful encounter. The

metaphor that has been used is the newborn that is being held, that needs the ‘traumatising’

touch in order to survive. This is a metaphor for a ‘traumatised’ subject, and for their needs

about meaning, for ‘in suffering sensibility is a vulnerability.’ Working with trauma requires a

sensibility that I have been trying to convey through the text so as to not cause ‘useless

suffering’ which is caused by totalitarian structures and totalitarian thinking. It is these

structures that rely on what Lévinas calls ‘vision’ rather than ‘language.’ That is why

language in the face-to-face — and with it, the relation that helps the dissociated traumatised

subject — must be established. And, indeed,

198 As seeing something, in the literal meaning, is about bodily sensing.

58
 Speech refuses vision, because the speaker does not deliver images of himself only,

but is personally present in his speech, absolutely exterior to every image he would

leave.199

So, speech would be different from the ‘presence of being’ yet one is ‘personally present.’

This implies a more active kind of ‘expression’ than ‘expression’ itself because in speech,

‘the speaker does not deliver images […] only.’ It is not just signs:

In language, exteriority is exercised, deployed, brought about […] Language is the

incessant surpassing the Sinngebung by the signification. This presence whose

format exceeds the measure of the I is not reabsorbed into my vision.

In speech, if one is ‘personally present,’ one can also transport the ‘primordial face-to-face of

language’: the truth of being; the individual person. This (experience of the Otherness of the)

person exceeds my capacity to fully grasp or understand. The finite mind cannot think the

infinite. So, there is an “overflowing of exteriority” which “precisely constitutes the

dimension of height or the divinity of exteriority. Divinity keeps its distances.”200 This is

transcendence.

Two things are relevant: there is a distance in relation. Shibboleth remains. And: an

overflowing of exteriority comes before this; as the type of trauma that touches us lightly,

based on the body language, in spite of expression, through speech:

199 Lévinas, 1969, p. 296f.

200 Lévinas, 1969, p. 296f.

59
 The presence of the Other, or expression, source of all signification, is not

contemplated as an intelligible essence, but is heard as language, and thereby is

effectuated exteriority.201

This exteriority is ‘overflowing’ (as is the trauma of astonishment). This is language. It

breaks through totalitarian structures and thinking. Yet,

Language thus conditions the functioning of rational thought: it gives it a

commencement in being, a primary identity of signification in the face of him who

speaks, that is, who presents himself.202

So, ‘Being’ is (but also is not) expressed, and ‘the face’ speaks. And this is the beginning of

rational thought which makes ‘speech’ the ‘first ethical gesture.’

Now, this is the critical turning point: There are two parties involved in ‘speaking the

same language,’ in communicating on common ground: speaking and listening, coming on

and receiving, feeling and thinking. For, if it is only about ‘seeing the face,’ if it is about

‘vision,’ then the Other is not truly ‘seen’ and violence happens which can cause useless

suffering. What is needed now is ‘truly’ seeing the Other. It is about “the face to face.”203 This

acknowledgement of the face calls the Same to respond and be(come) responsible.

To recognise the Other is therefore to come to him across the world of possessed

things, but at the same time to establish, by gift, community and universality […] To

speak is to make the world common, to create commonplaces. Language does not

refer to the generality of concepts, but lays the foundations for a possession in

201 Lévinas, 1969, p. 297.

202 Lévinas, 1969, p. 204.
203 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.

60
 common […] The world in discourse is no longer what it is in separation, in the

being at home with oneself where everything is given to me; it is what I give: the

communicable, the thought, the universal.204

The focus then is on the in-between, on ‘commonplaces.’ One has jumped into the abyss, one

is not separate anymore from the one who presents themselves, but is with them. In dialogue;

a ‘discourse.’ Lévinas says that there is no other way than responding because to speak is to

‘make the world common, to create commonplaces,’205 since ‘the world in discourse is no

longer what it is in separation, in the being at home with oneself where everything is given to

me; it is what I give: the communicable, the thought, the universal.’ And, in thinking lies the

ethical responsibility for the Other: “this ethical condition or essence of language.”206

Lévinas says that “the exteriority of being” does not “fill the abyss of separation.”207

Rather, it allows for a consciousness of it, from the Other, from the exterior. It is a language

that is ‘produced’ only in the face to face as a ‘presence’ and a ‘personal response.’ It is a

‘discourse’ hence ‘the experience of something absolutely foreign, a pure ‘knowledge’ or

‘experience,’ a ‘traumatism of astonishment.’ That which gives meaning to the (language of

the) Other, to that which is being said or communicated nonverbally (as ‘language’ of the

face) is call. Then, the response of the Same to the Other is sharing one’s thoughts, is

speaking. One is touched and thus touches, too.208 It is a discourse that opens up over and

over.

204 Lévinas, 1969, p. 76.

205 Lévinas, 1969, p. 76.
206 Lévinas, 1969, p. 200.
207 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.
208 Lévinas, 1969, p. 204.

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IV.IV. ‘The Ethical Condition or Essence of Language’

But, there is a distance that is “untraversable, and at the same time traversed.”209 Shibboleth.

The point is exactly that the Other cannot be possessed, is free. And that, in turn, keeps one

‘free’ as well, keeps one with oneself. It is this Otherness that allows for the encounter that is

at the basis for Lévinas’ existential ethics: one in which two separated entities meet as such

and relate to each other through a reciprocal being with each other in spite of but also through

their ‘expression’ and in spite but also through ‘speech.’ These are the conditions, the first

gestures of the ethical relation that constitute it through this reciprocity. It is not within, but

without. It is not interior, but exterior. There is an exchange. This is a common place of

humanity. Is this ‘to know’ or ‘to be conscious’? Yes and no. For, that which is expressed is

never ‘being’ itself but being in spite of expression and through speech — language is

not enacted within a consciousness; it comes from me from the Other and

reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question. This event is irreducible to

consciousness, where everything comes about from within — even the strangeness

of suffering. To regard language as an attitude of mind does not amount to

disincarnating it, but is precisely to account for its incarnate essence.210

There is a connection then between thought and the ethical — Lévinas is pointing on the very

essence of psychosomatics: that language, if it is considered something in the mind, is still —

or all the more — something in the body and the mind as well as in between.

209 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.

210 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.

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 If we take ‘attitude’ in i.e. German which is ‘Haltung,’211 then language (and

thinking) determine the how of the encounter. And, since language is ascribed to thought,

there is a language that Lévinas is ascribing to something else: a — perhaps — state of mind:

an awareness of the Other(ness). This occurs because in exteriority everything is otherness

and expression and speech and constantly put in question — the Same (and perhaps also the

self) is constantly questioned because the Other (the face of the vis-à-vis) ‘overflows’ my

consciousness. It is a ‘traumatism of astonishment,’ a being touched without being touched.

There is Shibboleth. And in this lies the possibility of relating, over and over. A quote for

orientation:

The Exteriority of being does not, in fact, mean that multiplicity is without relation.

However, the relation that binds this multiplicity does not fill the abyss of

separation; it confirms it. In this relation we have recognised language, produced

only in the face to face.212

So, ‘language’ is both ‘expression’ and ‘speech’ that are presented and already demand or ask

for a response, but are also a response themselves. The first ethical act happens with the

Other expressing itself to the Same. The Other speaking and the Same is called upon to

respond to that which they see: the face. This “offering of contents which answers to the face

of the Other or which questions him, and first opens the perspective of the meaningful.”213

This dialogue opens the perspective that allows for the ethical relation to be established: a

truly meaningful one.

211 In other languages as well: the etymology from French ‘attitude,’ from Italian ‘attitudine’ (“attitude,
aptness”), from Medieval Latin ‘aptitūdō’ (“aptitude”) and ‘actitūdō’ (“acting, posture”).
212 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.
213 Lévinas, 1969, p. 174.

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 This perspective is a rational one, a perspective of the mind rather than the body,

rather than the sensible encounter. It is the first ethical act that ‘calls for thinking’ that

acknowledges the void in-between and the impossibility of meeting the responsibility that

comes with it. This acknowledgement allows for meaning. It is where we move from the

sensible and vulnerable to expression, to speech, to ethics: It is “this bond between expression

and responsibility, this ethical condition or essence of language, this function of language

prior to all discourse of being,”214 noticed through thinking. ‘This bond,’ which is at the same

time the void (Shibboleth), is explored in chapter (V) with the ethical relation. For, now that

‘language’ has established a relation, it must be(come) ethical.

214 Lévinas, 1969, p. 200.

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V. The Ethical (Non-)Relation and Infinity

Relation (n.) c. 1300 relacioun, “relationship, connection,

correspondence;” “act of telling or relating in words,” from

Anglo-French relacioun, Old French relacion “report,

connection” (14c.) and directly from Latin relationem

(nominative relatio) “a bringing back, restoring; a report,

proposition,” from relatus.215

relationship: “quality, condition; act, power, skill; office,

position; relation between”216

How can people gain control over the residues of past

trauma and return to being masters of their own ship?217

The content of this chapter builds on the findings of Otherness and language from chapter

(IV). For Lévinas, it is about the relation between the Same and the Other, it is the in-between

that must be focused on in order for the ethical to be. In this chapter, the pillars of the ethical

relation are considered with a quote from Totality and Infinity, namely that

language, that is, a response to the being who in a face speaks to the subject and

tolerates only a personal response, that is, an ethical act.218

215 Etymology Dictionary, 2022.

216 Etymology Dictionary, 2022.
217 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 4.
218 Lévinas, 1969, p. 219.

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This ethical act happens through language which calls for thinking and puts the interior

consciousness in question by turning to the exteriority of being — one’s own and that of the

Other. Then, an ethical relationship through language can be established.

V.I. On Shibboleth and Language: Distance

It is the existential moment when one becomes truly conscious of the human condition (as

mentioned earlier) and the abyss in-between the Same and the Other. This is the moment of

the most radical freedom, and it opens up what Lévinas calls ‘Infinity.’ Before the response

(and with it the ethical responsibility) can be considered en detail, the Infinite must be

mentioned, because here the core of this investigation is revealed, and a connection to chapter

(III) on Lévinas conception of Otherness is drawn: “Infinity is the absolutely other.”219 After

all, we are concerned with relation and the ethical relation because of the separation between

the Same and the Other in the first place — learning, with Lévinas, to focus on the Other and

the void in order to establish a relationship. It is the fact of the void, that which cannot be

bridged, filled, understood, or become common ground that requires relation. Could then the

void be the common ground, the — so to speak other ‘Other’ — that which is Other for both

the Same and the Other?

This opens up another idea of the Other, namely the void between two that is Other

for both, but because of that also a connecting element, a ‘bond.’ So far, ‘trauma’ as

Otherness as well as ‘language’ as Otherness or through the Other (as a vis-à-vis) has been

considered (namely that which is infinite, which reveals Infinity). Now, Shibboleth. That,

which cannot be bridged, cannot be understood. Why can’t it be understood?

219 Lévinas, 1969, p. 49.

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V.I.i. The Other and Divinity

Lévinas says that “the dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face,”220 which

makes clear that Lévinas is actually not saying that the other person is in fact God, but he is

saying that the divine can manifest between two people. It is that which is in between: when

both look directly at each other, when they ‘see’ each other in the Lévinasian sense when

there is ‘expression’ and ‘speech,’ then the Other introduces me to that which I can only see

through the Other.221 He writes:

There can be no ‘knowledge’ of God separated from relationship with men. The

Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation

with God. He does not play the role of a mediator. The Other is not the incarnation

of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of

the height in which God is revealed.222

If the Other as the vis-à-vis can reveal something divine, and is ‘infinity’ as it is that which is

‘the absolutely other,’ what is this understanding of Otherness? What is at the core of

Lévinas’ ethics of alterity?

V.II. On Shibboleth and Language: (The Idea of) Infinity

Seeing the face and offering language, expressing oneself, is constitutive of relating to an-

other. The possibilities of expression are infinite. There is a response — or an invitation —

220 Lévinas, 1969, p. 78.

221 Lévinas, 1969, p. 78.
222 Lévinas, 1969, p. 78f.

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that is required first, however. The ethical relation makes possible expression, makes possible

not ‘just’ a relationship with one another, but recognising the other in its subjectivity and

valuing the individual expression, the individual in spite of the expression. And it is:

The idea of infinity, the overflowing of finite thought by its content, effectuates the

relation of thought with what exceeds its capacity, with what at each moment it

learns without suffering shock. This is the situation we call welcome of the face. The

idea of infinity is produced in the opposition of conversation, in sociality. The

relation with the face, with the other absolutely other which I can not contain, the

other in this sense infinite […] the relation is maintained without violence, in peace

with its absolute alterity. The “resistance” of the other does not do violence to me,

does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical.223

The relation here ‘exceeds its capacity’ because it cannot be grasped in its Otherness, the

Other cannot be contained. Then, it is ethical. It is not just about an ethical act, but about an

ethical relation. The ‘primordial face to face of language,’ before the conversation takes place

as language (speech and thought), there is the sociality224 that takes place as language

(through the ‘incarnate essence’ that reveals itself in spite of expression but through thought

in speech in an exterior encounter) and demands the ‘welcoming of the face.’

In the ethical structure of relating, there is no violence. And, “as nonviolence it

nonetheless maintains the plurality between the same and the other.”225 This means

welcoming the space in between the Other and Infinity if one is to act ethically. That,

223 Lévinas, 1969, p. 197.

224 Lévinas says that “A relation with the transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent is a social
relation.” (1969, p. 78).
225 Lévinas, 1969, p. 197.

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however, already describes the absolute impotency and failure of nonviolence because in the

unknown, anything is possible. If we are in the space of the unknown, how could we know it

if remains peaceful? If we touch one another, then there is (the potential) for hurt. Then, what

is left is only ‘to know and to be conscious’ of that very fact, of:

The face in which the other — the absolutely other — presents himself does not

negate the same, does not do violence to it as do opinion or authority or the

thaumaturgic supernatural. It remains commensurate with him who welcomes; it

remains terrestrial. This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for, instead of

offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it. As nonviolence it

nonetheless maintains the plurality of the same and the other. It is peace.226

But this peace only exists in that moment that one sees the face, only when the vulnerability

is recognised, and:

The idea of infinity is the mode of being, the infinition, of infinity. Infinity does not

first exist, and then reveal itself. Its infinition is produced as revelation, as a positing

of its idea in me. It is produced in the improbable feat whereby a separated being

fixed in its identity, the same, the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither

contain nor receive solely by virtue of its own identity. […] This book will present

subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is

consummated. Hence intentionality, where thought remains an adequation with the

object, does not define consciousness at its fundamental level. All knowing qua

226 Lévinas, 1969, p. 203.

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 intentionality already presupposes the idea of infinity, which is preeminently non-

adequation.227

This idea of non-adequation, of a consciousness that is not thought proper, then, is reflected

in the way that Lévinas describes the ‘welcoming of the face.’ This must occur in an infinite

and not in a totalitarian sense — meaning the understanding that the face cannot be grasped,

cannot be understood. Shibboleth must remain, that which is ‘other’ in between. This ‘breaks

up every system.’ It is after all ‘sensation.’ For,

Infinity is produced by withstanding the invasion of totality, in a contradiction that

leaves a place for a separated being. Thus relationships that open up a way outside of

being take form. An infinity that does not close itself in upon itself in a circle but

withdraws from the ontological extension so as to leave a place for a separated being

exists divinely […] The relations that are established between the separated being

and Infinity redeem what diminution there was in the contraction creative of Infinity

[…] Multiplicity and the limitation of the creative Infinite are compatible with the

perfection of the Infinite; they articulate the meaning of this perfection.228

What determines, then, the ‘creative Infinite’ and ‘the meaning’ of the infinite void?

Arguably, it is the ethical. Meaning, the responsibility for the Other which is distant.

The responsibility lies not in trying to mend, undo, or bridge the crack, but to recognise the

Other — language, the vis-à-vis, the abyss of the ‘trauma,’ the relationship — as ‘stranger.’ In

that Otherness lie infinite possibilities of who the vis-à-vis and the relation could be. Infinity

overflows one’s consciousness — one is touched, moved, and called upon. That which affects

227 Lévinas, 1969, p. 197.

228 Lévinas, 1969, p. 104.

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us is the “movement of the soul”229 — which can become a dance of two if it becomes a

response. This requires a space of freedom, a ‘sphere’ in which the Same and the Other can

meet. And, “instead of offending my freedom, it calls it to responsibility and founds it,”230 it

is the possibility of the “Infinite”231 which allows for ‘expression,’ ‘speech,’ ‘language’ —

with the awareness of the ‘untraversable’ distance, and the responsibility for the Other. The

ethical relation is what makes possible this expression, makes justice possible, and not ‘just’

relating with one another, but a recognition and honouring of the subjective. This is what

Lévinas calls ‘Transcendence.’

V.II.i. Transcendence and Distance

Transcendence designates a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own

reality, yet without this distance destroying this distance, as would happen with

relations within the same; this relation does not come an implantation in the other

and a confusion with him, does not affect the very identity of the same.232

Lévinas says that “A relation with the transcendent free from all captivation by the

Transcendent is a social relation.”233 The transcendent remains a “stranger.”234 ‘Free from all

captivation’ means that it is truly recognised for what or who one is: Other. To the Other,

there is a distance.

229 Goodman/Grover, 2008, p. 249.

230 Lévinas, 1969, p. 203.
231 Lévinas, 1969, p. 104.
232 Lévinas, 1969, p. 41f.
233 Lévinas, 1969, p. 78.
234 Lévinas, 1969, p. 78.

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 The distance is the in-between, the relation, the way of relating non-violently. This

distance is what allows for recognising one another as Other, for “alterity be produced in

being,” “a thought is needed and an I is needed”235 — and “speaking rather than ‘letting be’

solicits the other.”236 Expression calls for speaking which then allows for the relation to

unfold, and for responsibility to arise. This responsibility shows in thinking hence “to know

or to be conscious” which “is to have time to avoid and forestall the instant of inhumanity.”237

It means understanding that the Other is a Stranger, which “also means the free one. Over

him I have no power.”238 This respects the dignity of the other person. If that which is

transcendent is the stranger, then one must all-the-more be conscious of Otherness and that

there is neither power nor possession over the other — but to encounter them with infinite

wonderment. It is about being fully human, and allowing especially the alienating aspects in.

And that means — we go back to the introductory quote — to allow for otherness, to stay

with the alienation, to open up to the Other. That which Lévinas calls ‘the divine,’ then, is the

dignity of the Other that must be recognised at all costs.

The ethical relation, the face-to-face, also cuts across every relation one could call

mystical […] Here resides the rational character of the ethical relation and of

language. No fear, no trembling could alter the straight-forwardness of this

relationship, which preserves the discontinuity of relationship […]239

235 Lévinas, 1969, p. 32.

236 Lévinas, 1969, p. 195.
237 Lévinas, 1969, p. 35.
238 Lévinas, 1969, p. 39.
239 Lévinas, 1969, p. 202.

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So, the ethical relation is a non-relation: it is a relationship while also ‘preserving’ the

discontinuity of a relationship. Since there is a ‘straightforwardness’ in expressing a relation,

or the need for a relation, the ethical relation is truthful — and for this reason not ‘mystical.’

In the mystical, when there is no consciousness of the potential of the ‘instant of inhumanity,’

we do not recognise the other as stranger.240 Once there is the recognition, the Other can be

met with clarity; truthfully, with the ‘rational character.’ It means, then, that the responsibility

lies in exactly not trying to mend, undo, or bridge the crack, but to acknowledge it.

This is the understanding of ‘language’ that invites the rational component in — the

mind, and the understanding and taking on of the responsibility for the Other and the relation

with the Other. It is a particularly (because of the rational component) straightforward way of

relating: it resides in the face-to-face, in the seeing hence recognising and then answering to

the face. The first part is characteristic of the ethical relation, the second is the rational aspect

of it. Lévinas writes that

the work of language is entirely different and it consists in entering into relationship

with a nudity disengaged from every form, but having meaning by itself […] Such a

nudity is the face. The nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me because I

disclose it […] The face has turned to me — and this is its very nudity.241

240 Lévinas writes that “faceless gods” are “impersonal gods to when one does speak.” (Lévinas, 1969, p. 142.)
241 Lévinas, 1969, p. 74f.

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This responsibility comes from sensing a demand, a vulnerability, a need in the face that —

once seen — must be voiced, and responded to.242 How, exactly? How can this responsibility

be lived out? This is of particular interest with respect to the hypothesis of this thesis, namely,

that the affectedness — here, the call for a response — must be lived out. If there is a of one

person on another, then the responsibility for the Other in the ethical relation arises.

V.III. Responsibility and ‘Openness of Being’

If the Other is that which is infinite243 — or at least opens up the void — with the

responsibility comes the awareness that one cannot mend, undo, or bridge the crack hence the

wound that one has suffered (from the ‘traumatic’ event). But rather to acknowledge it, and

the possibility of deepening it (remember: in sensibility lies vulnerabilty). With that

awareness of the distance, and the responsibility for the Other, the relationship is interrupted,

and requires an effort, an (at)tending to: a “perpetual here I am (me voici).”244 This is called

hineni. It is how the effect must be lived out. This quote describes a concept — hineni — that

summarises the Lévinasian conception of responsibility and also illustrates how his ideas of

the religious and the political are brought together in the ethical as understood here. This is

242 We remember: “Die Idee des Unendlichen offenbart sich im starken Sinne des Wortes,” “die Idee des
Unendlichen im Bewusstsein ist ein Überfließen im Bewusstsein.” (In English: “The Idea of the Infinite
manifests itself in the Infintiy of consciousness, it is an overflowing of consciousness”). This ‘consciousness
overflowing’ once more indicates a physiological reaction to a traumatic event. It is an overflow, indicating a re-
traumatisation meaning that the system is reminded of the trauma because the stress reaction in the body is
similar to that of the trauma itself. Here, we can find an indication to Lévinas’ traumatised body: him writing
about ‘fear’ and ‘trembling’ as bodily (stress) reactions to the encounter, to the face-to-face.
243 We are facing the impossibility of a total grasp or final comprehension of the Other/the trauma(tised).
244 Goodman/Grover, 2008, p. 562.

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vital to keep in mind for the therapeutical practice and the question about Lévinas’ value for

the profession. It demonstrates that the ethical relation is fundamental.245 What is Hineni?

Hineni is a term from the Jewish tradition, translated from Hebrew as “Here I am”;

fully present, letting go of my own needs, fully and completely open to the Other and to the

present moment; meeting the Other in the present moment. Lévinas writes that the concept of

hineni is grounded in a sense of responsibility that has a pre-cognitive character; he argues

that “responsibility […] has no cognitive character.”246 For him, “Responsibility is not an

esoteric knowledge or capacity but an embodied memory of the other.”247 A memory of my

own vulnerability and need that is reflected through the Other; a recognition of the human

condition and that sensible part in each of us remains. Hineni requires us to have “a psyche

oriented toward the Other, the very configuration or shape of their selves being lived out as

hineni, a perpetual Here I am (me voici).”248 Hineni grants this right out of a felt

responsibility before it is conscious, before it is cognitive and rational and thus ethical.

Hineni is the space that is not political — see the example — but rather an ethical position in

the face of a totalitarian politics. It is the politics of the infinite. In this memory of the

experience of Otherness (the ‘traumatism of astonishment’), I become responsible for the

Other (the trauma, the wound) hence the experience of vulnerability in the Other and the

Same. Interestingly, this shows that the responsibility actually has a bodily component; the

bodily memory of vulnerability.

245 Lévinas, 1969, p. 98.

246 Levinas, 2000, p. 186.
247 Lévinas, 2000, p. 186.
248 Goodman/Grover, 2008, p. 562.

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 This openness is the consequence of the realisation that “the relationship to the

Other suggests traumatic repetition,”249 says Lévinas, as well as “without some kind of

relation there would be no ethics, only the traumatic repetition of non-relation.”250 Non-

relation — as we explored it above — is where two people are not conscious of each other,

but one way or another, in contact; able to touch — either hold or hurt another (of course it is

always also both). They are either in a totalitarian cogito, or a blind sentio — either in

totalitarian structures of thinking that attempt to grasp the Other and their woundedness

instead of ‘letting be,’251 or a blind ‘feeling’ of the Other, melting or merging with the Other

that does not recognise them in their individuality. It requires “compassionate action” that

must be “coupled to moral commitments, and translated into action.”252 Goodman and Grover

use the example of the inhabitants of a French village called le Chambon-sur-Lignon that

took in Jews during the Shoah without hesitation.253 They were open to them, met them in a

place that was not bound by law or totalitarian conceptions or else: the totality of war was

‘broken,’ and relation established; Infinity found. Justice is the space that allows for speech,

for expression of truth (as could the Jewish in Chambon-sur-Lignon). Only in the second

instant a ‘thing’ is expressed and answered to. At first, it is the ‘primordial face to face of

language.’ It is the right that is granted by another, by the Same. It serves as the fundament in

the face of the infinite void in which ‘the totality of war can be broken,’254 for: “justice is the

right to speak.”255 Further,

249 Lévinas, 1969, p. 108.

250 Lévinas, 1969, p. 122.
251 Reference to the Introduction.
252 Kirmayer, 2008, p. 461.
253 Goodman/Grover, 2008, p. 562.
254 Runge, 2015, p. 2.
255 Lévinas, 1969, p. 298.

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 In political life, taken unrebuked, humanity is understood from its works — a

humanity of interchangeable men, of reciprocal relations. The substitution of men

for one another, the primal disrespect, makes possible exploitation itself. In history

— the history of States — the human being appears as the sum of his works; even

while he lives he is his own heritage. Justice consists in again making possible

expression, in which in non-reciprocity the person presents himself as unique.

Justice is the right to speak.256

This right is the foundation of Lévinas’ ethical relation. The right granted and the right

recognised are what constitute it. There is an example that Goodman and Grover use to

elucidate it when thinking about Totality and Infinity; a book about “modes of presence”257 of

which hineni is one.

At this point, we are in the position to draw some conclusions which answer (part of)

the research questions. What does reading Lévinas’ account of the ethical relation in Totality

and Infinity tell us about the needs of the traumatised? It requires ‘language’ that ‘calls for

thinking’ if one has been ‘touched by the truth.’ That is: With another person comes a

responsibility that must be taken seriously if we (have) see(n) their vulnerability in the

traumatising moment; if we have seen the truth (and by ‘seeing’ is meant sensing, feeling —

or remembering258). This being touched is a memory of the first ‘traumatism of

astonishment.’ An awareness of this traumatism — or the potential of this traumatism to

cause ‘useless suffering,’ leads to the ethical relation. It is an awareness of the pain that could

256 Lévinas, 1969, p. 298.

257 Newman, 2009, p. 92. There he also writes that “Totality and Infinity is a book about the modes of Alterity
and the relation to the Other and the Same.”
258 See Lévinas, 2000, p. 186.

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be caused. The void, Shibboleth must be acknowledged, as well as the possibility of

deepening it. This Otherness or Shibboleth is where the ethical lies; for, in the memory of the

experience of Otherness (the ‘traumatism of astonishment’), I become responsible for the

Other (the trauma) in the Other and the Same. And then? — it is my task to not re-

traumatise, but simply being here and being open to the present moment. As embodied

rationality with vulnerability and responsibility. As truthful as possible; transcendent(ly). This

is absolutely impossible. It is too much, too grave. But, that is ‘responsibility.’

The next chapter (VI) explores trauma therapy as such. Following that, in chapter

(VII), Lévinas’ connection and contribution to trauma therapy is investigated.

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VI. Trauma Therapy

VI.I. The Affective Witness in Trauma Therapy

Wounded by a foreign body (a common trope of trauma), we become a nobody, that

requires connection with another body (healing) in order to become somebody again

(recovery). Moving thus from traumatised nobody to reintegrated somebody is an

empathetic opening to everybody who has suffered pain. This sense is ultimately

embodied sense. A commons of the body.259

The task of trauma therapy lies in an attempt to resolve trauma, somehow.260 In The Body

keeps the Score, van der Kolk writes, “Therapists have an undying faith in the capacity of talk

to resolve trauma […] unfortunately, it is not so simple. Traumatic events are almost

impossible to put into words.”261 This goes for a philosophy of trauma as well, as Anna

Westin points out in her research as she says that “the abstractions and generalisations of

phenomenology cannot yield the fine-grained texture of lived experience” in Embodied

Trauma and Healing.262

259 Kearney, 2010, p. 12. Before this, he writes that “In sum, one might describe the healing arc of trauma
therapy — at both personal and communal levels — as movement through different somatic stages. One could
put it like this:”
260 Kearney, 2010, p. 12.
261 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 231.
262 Westin, 2022, p. 464.

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 The structure of this chapter: First, therapy is defined in section (VI.I.i). In section

(VI.I.iii) some methods are elucidated. This is done after the philosophical ground for them is

offered in section (VI.I.ii).

VI.I.i. Definition of Therapy

Etymologically, therapy (from Ancient Greek therapeia) means “curing, healing, service

done to the sick; a waiting on, service,” from therapeuein “to cure, treat medically,” literally

“attend, do service, take care of.”263 Trauma therapy would therefore have to attend to the

trauma(tised), and offer ways of healing. The consequences of trauma on the body and the

mind are dissociative states (“the essence of trauma,”264 according to van der Kolk) in which

mind and body are disconnected, and the subject is alienated from their inner world, or at

least parts of their inner world that are too painful to process. Trauma must be discharged and

integrated somatically, as we learned from Peter Levine. For that, it needs an “affective

witness”265 to “establish a sense of trust and containment” in order to share the experience.266

How is this done?

VI.I.ii. Witnessing Affectively: Philosophical Considerations

To illustrate trauma work, let us have a look at an account of a trauma therapist. Helen

Bamber wrote about working in several refugee camps and other contexts where trauma is

263 Cambridge Dictionary, 2022.

264 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 44.
265 Kearney, 2020, p. 3.
266 Kearney, 2020, p. 4.

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ever-present. She emphasises “being physically present”267 with the pain of the traumatised.

Being physically present is about bearing bodily witness, about the ability to receive and

“hold”268 the suffering. She calls this the “affective witness”269 that a traumatised human

needs. To give us a broader understanding of the conceptualisation of witnessing — another

holocaust-survivor — let us turn to Jaques Rancière. He writes about the “sense-perceptual

dimension”270 of being with one another. This is in accordance with Levinas’ hineni as well

as Helen Bamber’s findings on physical presence in trauma work.

What do I mean when I say ‘I bear witness’ (for one only bears witness in the first

person)? I do not mean ‘I prove,’ but ‘I swear that I saw, I heard, I touched, I felt, I

was present.’ That is the irreducible sense-perceptual dimension of presence and past

presence, of what can be meant by ‘being present’ and especially by ‘having been

present,’ and of what that means in bearing witness. ‘I bear witness’ — that means:

‘I affirm (rightly or wrongly, but in all good faith, sincerely) that that was or is

present to me, in space and time (thus, sense-perceptible)’271

Interestingly enough, Rancière conceptualises himself here as the witness to the traumatic

experience itself. So, he himself is the witness that again is witnessed by another (the reader

of his writings, for example). This is where Lévinas’ understanding of the ethical face to face

encounter comes into play, too.272

Rancière’s conceptualisation will pave us the way deeper to Lévinas’ theory:

267 Westin, 2022, p. 88; Bamber, 1998, p. 228.

268 Westin,, 2022, p. 88; Bamber, 1998, p. 228.
269 Westin, 2022, p. 88.
270 Rancière, 2006, p. 75.
271 Rancière, 2006, p. 75.
272 Rancière, 2006, p. 75f.

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 ‘I bear witness’ — that means: ‘I affirm (rightly or wrongly, but in all good faith,

sincerely) that that was or is present to me, in space and time (thus, sense-

perceptible).’273

With this he implies that there is a physical dimension of being with a traumatised subject

since the traumatisation itself is physical (“sense-perceptible”). In order to draw nearer to

them and their traumatisation (and thus accompany the healing process). However, — and the

therapist must be aware of this —:

The addressee of the testimony, the witness of the witness, does not see what the

first witness says she or he saw; the addressee did not see it and never will see it.

This direct or immediate non-access of the addressee to the object of the testimony is

what marks the absence of this ‘witness of the witness’ to the thing itself.274

So, after Rancière’s and Bamber’s accounts, we know that one can witness both in person as

well as through a ‘thing itself.’ This becomes relevant in chapter (VII). What is true for both

and is that ‘the witness of the witness’ (hence, the person that is ‘holding the pain’ with the

other person) ‘does not see’ what ‘he or she saw.’ Here, we encounter the figure of Shibboleth

once more, the brokenness that cannot be mended, or even grasped. One can only be present

with it and acknowledge the pain. Does that suffice?

273 Rancière, 2006, p. 75f.

274 Rancière, 2006, p. 75f.

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VI.II. Somatic Experiencing275 in Trauma Therapy

VI.II.i. Foundations

An image from Somatic Experiencing (SE) may help to illustrate: the concept of the triune

brain and of traumatisation. It is a metaphor that conceptualises the brain as being threefold:

with an instinctual, an emotional, and a rational part.276 The instinctual part is linked to the

nervous system while the emotional part is attributed to the limbic system and the rational to

the neocortex. All three parts process a traumatic experience as they are all part of our sense

of self in the world and regulate our relatingship to and with others. However, the instinctual

and the emotional part are tendentially inhibited and regulated by the rational one — the neo-

cortex.277 According to research on trauma, if one is to process the traumatic experience, the

body must get involved.278

VI.II.ii. Methods

The Methods that are currently used in trauma therapy are bottom up approaches that move

from the body to the mind. That is because when it comes to trauma, “the body keeps the

score.”279 For van der Kolk, the body has the capacity to store memory in a way that is not

275 This does not only refer to Somatic Experiencing (SE), but to somatic-based trauma-therapeutical practices
more generally.
276 The philosopher may be reminded Plato here.
277 It is the part of the brain that is only fully developed at the age of 21.
278 In fact, it often is the body that is the cause for violence: a body of colour, the body of a woman,… For
reference see Fanon Black Skin, White Masks (1952).
279 To speak with the aptly titled book The Body keeps the Score of Bessel van der Kolk book on the somatic
dimension(s) of trauma.

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available to the communicative faculties of the body. It is stored way beyond the brain’s usual

language pathways, at the limbic level. The limbic system is pre-cognitive and connected to

instincts, intuition, memory, feeling (as elucidated in chapter II).280 Antonio Damasio in the

Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (2000) also

calls these the “primordial feelings” that are our basic ones, responsible for our survival and

communication.281 Hence, it is this which must be accessed when working with trauma.

Van der Kolk, for example, writes about the effectiveness of yoga, EDMR (“Eye

Movement and Desensitation Reprocessing”), and other body-based-practices that are bottom

up approaches, too. They start with (the focus on) the body and move to the mind from there.

The body becomes the medium and bridge between the subjective and the social, and many

of these practices are also done in groups. He and David Emmerson have developed and

conducted research on the practice of ‘trauma-sensitive-yoga.’282 Apart from yoga, there are

movement, dance, and art therapies offered at EZRA, the Trauma Center in Vienna for

holocaust victims and their families.283 This focus on the body is amongst others found in

Behnke’s (2002) phenomenology and Bourdieu’s thought (2005), claiming that

psychosomatic illnesses are due to sociosomatics of societal power structures where much

trauma lies or is caused.

Remember Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s account used to illustrate the connection

between trauma and touch. With the Lévinasian ‘trauma’ in mind, it is community and body

contact that seems effective in healing, too. Going off the wounds that have hurt — in this

case it is social injustice, discrimination etc. to heal through other ‘peaceful,’ ‘positive’ (in the

280 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 65f.

281 Kearney, 2020, p. 9.
282 Emmerson, 2015.
283 See: https://esra.at/

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Lévinasian sense) experiences. This happens through others (as seen in the examples). In

Somatic Experiencing (SE), people are considered ‘resources.’

In another trauma-therapeutical method — that has been mentioned several times

since chapter (I) —the practitioner moves gently between resources (ideas, sensations, people

— that which is stabilising for the patient) such that the patient can focus on being in the

present as well as a reliving (through the “Felt Sense” of the body) the traumatic experience

in order to integrate it. This is called the ‘Flow Modell and Pendulation between Vortexes’ in

Somatic Experiencing (SE).284 This is similar to EDMR therapy where the patient is asked to

describe the traumatic experience, hence, relive it. When the system becomes active again,

the attention is diverted to a movement that the therapist is doing which calms the arousal.

This happens while the therapist moves their finger from right to left, a movement that the

patient can focus on while narrating and being in distress — which also reminds them that

they are not alone because they are with someone else and are “feeling listened to.”285 It

brings the patient into a state of extreme vulnerability but then allows them to focus on the

shared sensibility286 in that process — on an-other body.

These methods work with the access to one’s body by diverting the focus of the

trauma from past to present. This happens in the therapeutical setting, which the patient

leaves again after some time. What if one is actually surrounded by resources287 (i.e. people

that feel safe) or in an environment that is resourceful for this person, hence, continuously in

284 It was provided by SE Greece in “The Introductory Workshop to Somatic Experiencing.”

285 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 278.
286 Francine Shapiro who coined EMDR is also one of the leading thinkers on ‘sensibility’ (2011), alongside
Drabinski (2001) and Doyon/Breyer (2015). See: Bergo, 2019, Footnote 2.
287 This is what Steven Porges (2017) would call ‘neocortical social engagement.’

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a setting that has therapeutical value? What if that is part of what the therapist helps the

patient to establish?

VI.II.iii. The Condition for Trauma Therapy

It is the ‘ground’ that must be established anew for a traumatised person — and with this also

the common ground between the traumatised and others.

So, without considering Lévinas at this point, it has been established that active

witnessing, and being ‘physically present’ are trauma therapeutical methods that work as well

as body and community work. The first and most important part of therapy, however, is the

beginning288 as a therapeutic effect; namely, embedding the traumatised in a safe context as

well as building a safe relationship to begin the process of associating, building a container

for association. Only then can the work even continue.

This happens by being fully present, and by being open to the other person and what

they bring into the setting. Therapy is about holding the pain together to gain the strength

again to do so on one’s own: with a focus on the body, on the present, on others in the

community in a safe space.

In line with the research question, what remains to be investigated is this: how does

the Lévinasian trauma and an awareness of it provide a useful perspective regarding trauma

therapy? How can the trauma be lived or spoken (of)?

288 What is meant by that? — It is the original encounter, this vulnerable part in each one of us.

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VII. The Lévinasian Contribution: Response(ability)289

“Surprise Yourself.”

— Vincent Cassel290

The following chapter summarises what has so far been learned from Levinas. Then, this is

connected and applied to trauma work.

VII.I. Content: ‘to know’ or ‘to be conscious’

In Totality and Infinity, the traumatic encounter with the Other is converted to an ethical

relation where the Same meets its responsibility towards the Other.291 This happens by

addressing and acknowledging the Other as such — and with it, accepting that Otherness

remains the Other. And with that, trauma remains ever-present, too. These three steps involve

‘language’ which is ‘the relationship between the Same and the Other’ according to Lévinas.

289 Alternative and longer title: “A Psychotraumatherapeutical Process/Method with or following from
Lévinas’ (Body of) Thought”
290 This was Vincent Cassel as Thomas Leroy in the film “Black Swan” by Darren Aronofsky, 2010.
291 Newman, 2009, p. 91.

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VII.I.i. Language and Addressing and Acknowledging the Other

So, in Lévinas’ text, therapy and ethics are reduced to the essential: the ‘original’ or

‘essential’ encounter. And it is the possibility292 of such an encounter that is highlighted, and

the possibilities that lie within such an encounter. For, “in the trace of this absence” “is

infinity.” The only true transcendence for Lévinas is ethical transcendence: the transcendence

toward the Other.293

As we have considered Lévinas’ understanding of Otherness and trauma, we have

encountered a twofold meaning of traumatisation. The first is ‘useless suffering,’ the other,

perhaps, ‘necessary’ or ‘meaningful’ suffering. We also learned about the consequence of

Lévinas’ traumatising moment: the encounter that so happens (‘saying’) and the conscious

encounter (‘said’) through signs/language by the signifier. Similar to the ‘suffering,’

Language also has various different meanings: With Lévinas, communication happens (a) via

body language (or so we understand the Levinasian ‘expression’ here), which refers to

something more primordial, namely, one’s sensibility — and (b) explicit language

(Levinasian ‘speech’), which invites the rational aspect into the relation — but also points to

the non-relation that is implied in relating, for “speaking rather than letting-be solicits the

292 The idea for this thesis came up in 2020, while writing the Bachelor theses (one of which, this one builds
upon: “A Plea for a Politics of Hope: Potentiality, Actuality, Natality”) written in the course of a seminar on the
potential of violence of unconditional claims. See the course syllabus: https://ufind.univie.ac.at/en/course.html?
lv=180121&semester=2019W. Because, in a time during the Covid-19 Pandemic, where personal encounter is
rare because of lockdowns, even the possibility of encounter is taken away. The possibility of the encounter
entails violence, too — so Lévinas. But it also entails the opposite and everything in between — and it is
necessary for all of us. These issues are explored in this section.
293 Lévinas, 1969, p. 102.

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other.”294 Both, (a) and (b), come together and a third aspect opens up: It is an awareness of

the Other and the Same in all honesty, in the shared sensibility and their vulnerability.

VII.I.ii. Language and Answering to the Other

Although sensibility or even vulnerability is shared, still the relation “does not fill the abyss

of separation; it confirms it. In this relation we have recognised language, produced only in

the face to face.”295 In relation we recognise ‘language,’ and it is the face that is “original

language” “before words.”296 It is the relation that is established through exactly that

recognition by answering to the face, by showing one’s own vulnerability, one’s own

helplessness or insufficiency. Then, the ‘face-to-face’ is honest.297

Thus, language

consists in entering into relationship with a nudity disengaged from every form, but

having meaning by itself […] The face has turned to me — and this is its very

nudity. It is by itself and not by reference to a system.298

So, the face is not ‘serving the Other’ already, not an entering into the relationship, but it has

meaning by itself so of course it touches one. It does not belong to a system of signs that

could also be a totalitarian system that is about ‘vision’ rather than ‘language.’ If it would be

about ‘vision’ rather than language, then the Other is not truly ‘seen’ and forms of violence

occur. For this reason, there must be a distance, Shibboleth. This remains when there is an

294 Lévinas, 1969, p. 195.

295 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.
296 Lévinas, 1981, p. 178.
297 Lévinas, 1969, p. 291.
298 Lévinas, 1969, p. 74f.

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ethical response to the face that speaks before anything else can; in the ethical, ‘seeing’ the

face implies ‘speaking.’

VII.I.iii. Responding and (the Impossibility of Meeting) Responsibility

‘Speaking’ rather than ‘letting be’ solicits — and we have to speak but could never do justice

to the Other; their demand and expression, could never do justice to their Being. For this

reason the right to speak must be granted. Lévinas writes that “justice is the right to speak.”299

It is the face that speaks before anything else can; and it is seeing the face that implies

speaking. This acknowledgement of the face calls the Same to respond and be(come)

responsible. Because of this, “there must be a rupture of continuity, and continuation across

this rupture”300 hence a continuous work on the relationship,301 a looking-out-for the other.

And so “the calling in question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other in the

face, we call language.”302 And it is language that is or constitutes the relation.

It is the “becoming-conscious”303 of this that already implies language and relation

because in the moment one becomes conscious one is also responsible. But, if responsibility

lies in Infinity, we could never even come close to our responsibility, to the vulnerability of

the Other. There is only a shared sensibility, and the meaningful encounter in vulnerability.

299 Lévinas, 1969, p. 298.

300 Lévinas, 1969, p. 284.
301 Lévinas 1969, p. 80: “the same and the other cannot enter into a cognition that would encompass them; the
relations that the separated being maintains with what transcends it are not produced on the ground of totality,
do not crystallise into a system.”
302 Lévinas, 1969, p. 171.
303 Lévinas, 1969, p. 305.

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An awareness so as to not deepen the wound, but letting it open further and further — being

there with it, holding the pain, the trauma.

The responsibility is exactly not in trying to mend, undo, or bridge the crack (the

wound that has been suffered from the traumatic event), but to acknowledge the wound, and

the responsibility in not being able to mend the crack, but holding space for it. That is

possible with this consciousness. This is “distance and truth” and “results from an elementary

gesture of the being that refuses totalisation. This refusal is produced as a relation with the

non-encompassable, as the welcoming of alterity — concretely, as presentation of the face.

The face arrests totalisation. The welcoming of alterity hence conditions consciousness and

time.”304 What does this mean? — It seems to imply presence (hineni). But at the same time

also already a rupture of this presence. Because, through the Other, “the present is broken

open (opened to the event, to the future) by that which it cannot grasp or anticipate”305 — by

the responsibility for the Other.

So, “the distance is untraversable, but at the same time traversed.” And, “separation

and interiority, truth and language constitute the categories of the idea of infinity.”306 For one,

this idea of infinity arguably is useful for therapy. Arguably, also Lévinas’ understanding of

the impossibility of responsibility: It gives a newfound meaning to therapy and that which is

therapeutical.

304 Lévinas, 1969, p. 281.

305 Newman, 2009, p. 107.
306 Lévinas, 1969, p. 62.

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VII.II. Parallels between Trauma-Therapeutical Methods and Lévinas’
Otherness

VII.II.i. Trauma and Touch

Seeing the face hence speaking must both encompass the traumatic moment and the healing

quality — which, physically, is also what happened in Pumla Gobodo Madikizela’s

experience. Because there is a traumatisation, there must be a relation because the trauma(tic

experience) speaks through the person — and that requires a response. This then establishes a

relation — and, in turn, calls to responsibility for the Other (in-between), for that relation(al

‘bond’). It must be the trauma that is touched upon diligently; the shooting hand that is held.

It is the immediate encounter that traumatises and leaves the trace of responsibility. This is a

bodily encounter, potentially that which can be read to be the encounter with our reptilian

brain. Information goes from there to the limbic system and only then gets digested in the

prefrontal cortex which rationalises experiences hence is concerned with rationalising an

experience hence also verbalising it.307

In chapter (I), it has been clarified — and this has been proven effective in trauma

therapies as we have seen in chapter (VI) — that trauma must be discharged or integrated

somatically if one is to re-arrive in the body (the body that has been identified — alongside

the trauma itself and the vis-à-vis as ‘Other’). And, with Lévinas, the second type of trauma

— the meaningful encounter — has been illustrated with holding a newborn in one’s hands;

touching and holding the sensible and already (as holding already implies touch and trauma).

307 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 66f.

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 Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already

within the primordial face to face of language.308

VII.II.ii. Presence

This would be in accordance with the bottom-up-approaches of trauma therapies: first, the

body must be attended to, then everything else (because trauma is such a somatic experience

and thus must be dealt with somatically, too). The face-to-face has been explored as that

which is language that is constitutive of relation: expression, speech, thinking — the whole of

the person. If that is the case, then what matters is ‘the embodied memory of the Other’;

hineni. Lévinas claims that the Other addresses me from beyond history.309 Behind the face is

a “pre-original, anarchic” identity, “older than every beginning.”310 This, refers to something

‘beyond the body’ that must be taken seriously. It however, is also a way to describe the co-

regulation that is used in Somatic Experiencing (SE) where two systems are present with each

other, ‘holding’ as Helen Bamber would say, ‘the pain together.’ This and other methods (as

discussed earlier) in Somatic Experiencing (SE) allow the patient to arrive in their body in the

present.

Then, there is this vulnerable quality that is found in oneself again, too — the

vulnerable quality requires presence and care, and that allows for relation. In the therapeutical

setting itself, then, it is hineni that can be valuable in trauma work so that the patient can gain

access to their vulnerability (their ‘suffering sensibility’) and transform it into a source of

sensibility (“Sensibilitätsresource”).

308 Lévinas, 1969, p. 206.

309 Levinas, 1969, p. 23.
310 Levinas, 1981/1998, p. 145.

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 This, however, requires the therapeutic ‘openness of being’ and an understanding of

the infinity in between the Same and the Other. And that is a responsibility that the therapist

must carry but in fact has already failed to. Because, when the ethical is attempted — which

it must because ‘language calls for thinking’ — one is ‘speaking’ rather than ‘letting be.’ And

this ‘solicits the other.’ Then, one cannot encompass them, cannot keep them in a safe space

(as this is done with SE in pendulation or with EDMR with moving the fingers), where the

therapist is comfortable and is of course also trying to make the patient comfortable.

However, arguably this only serves as a survival strategy. In order to gain a quality

of life again, the focus on the work of ‘language’ is necessary. Now that the content of

Totality and Infinity has been considered, the form follows to develop this thought further.

VII.III. Form: ‘Psychosomatic Experiencing’ of Lévinas

In the last section(s), it has been considered what ‘language’ means for Lévinas in Totality

and Infinity and how that can be connected to the few trauma therapeutical examples that

were given in chapter (VI). Now, although Lévinas writes of “spoken language over written

language”311 speech happens both in the face-to-face as well as the answer to/of the face.

Now, a question arises: Could the ‘nakedness of the face’ also be transported through writing?

After all, what has not been considered is “the language of the inaudible, the language of the

unheard of […] Scipture!”312 Could it also be an encounter, can Lévinas’ ethics be

experienced by reading about it?

311 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.

312 Lévinas, 1981, p. 178.

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VII.III.i. A Case Study

For one, Lévinas can serve as a case study for a trauma patient. The reader witnesses a

traumatised subject, and the inner processes of traumatisation.313 After trauma as commonly

understood, there follows dissociation and an inability to express oneself in the usual ways.

When considering the way that Lévinas writes about relation, then a dissociated trauma

patient that longs for but is unable (yet aware of his and the human default) to connect with

others — or rather, sees the effort to do so — could be identified. The ethical relation and its

connection to the political especially makes clear that he writes from his experiences from

WWII, that he, too, is verbalising something that cannot be put in words; the trauma of the

Shoah. This would also explain why Otherness is written into his writing for, it may be the

expression of an “inner representation of the invisible and inaudible physical reality”314 that

he was living with which found its way into writing. The perspective that his philosophy is

formulated from is ambivalent: Although he writes about touch, he also writes about the

impossibility to touch another human being. There seems to be a longing for a somatic-social

aspect that he may not have been able to live if he was dissociated. As well as a resistance

against totalitarian structures in politics (and an awareness how that can come between

humans).

Arguably, since, as Bessel van der Kolk says: “writing helps as we are listening to

ourselves while we do,”315 Lévinas may have overcome or at least dealt with his trauma

through (implicitly) writing about it. Although Lévinas writes of “spoken language over

313 Please note that this is merely the perspective of a philosopher, and not of a qualified (trauma) therapist.
314 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 280.
315 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 284.

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written language,”316 speech happens both in the face and the recognition or answer thereof.

And, could the ‘nakedness of the face’ not also be transported through writing which is a

reflection of something ‘rational’ that Lévinas also attributes to language? — the Otherness

that he writes about would then also be his own to discover.

How does the reader come to ‘bear witness’ in the sense that was elucidated in the

previous chapters? Is it possible that one could bear witness to Lévinas in the Lévinasian and

a trauma-therapeutical sense that has been discussed; ethico-somatically (as well as Lévinas

witnessing himself)?

If Lévinas says that in the face-to-face what is seen or recognised is ‘undone over

and over’317 — and verbal signs are undone by “the face of him who speaks,”318 how could

writing or reading be a witnessing of an-other and their traumat(tic experience) in the

Lévinasian sense?

VII.III.ii. Embodied Cognition

As can be witnessed in Lévinas’ writing, “our physiology provides the concepts for our

philosophy.”319 Marianna Bolognesi, a linguist at the International Center for Intercultural

Exchange in Siena, Italy, puts it this way:

The classical view of cognition is that language is an independent system made with

abstract symbols that work independently from our bodies. This view has been

316 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.

317 Lévinas, 1969, p. 204.
318 Lévinas, 1969, p. 204.
319 As Lakoff wrote in his introduction to Benjamin Bergen’s book Louder than words: The New Science of How
the Mind Makes Meaning (2012).

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 challenged by the embodied account of cognition which states that language is

tightly connected to our experience. Our bodily experience.320

So, we must look closely at the body (of thought) in this investigation; it allows the reader to

access their Otherness, one ‘is affected’ because the experience is (implicitly) shared, and one

does get to know Lévinas somatically. This can be located in the limbic brain that is

responsible for emotion as well as memory and imagination.321 It even explains how poetry

and abstract writing have a trauma-therapeutical effect. It also explains why trauma therapies

are mostly art and movement based; they are all concerned with a kind of expression; what

Lévinas might call the “creative Infinite”322 (which the therapist must take responsibility for).

But, embodied cognition suffice to be compared to the face-to-face? — for the

ethical encounter and the responsibility that comes with it? After all, “the abstractions and

generalisations of phenomenology cannot yield the fine-grained texture of lived

experience”323 and “nothing psychological would correspond to the simplicity of the

physiological sensation.”324 What if we are not (merely) somatically, but psychosomatically

witnessing Lévinas’ process?

VII.III.iii.Psychotraumatherapeutical Writing/Reading

Now, of course there is a difference in reading Lévinas and considering the relation between

therapist and patient, between subject and traumatised subject. One of these differences is

320 Chorost, 2014, p. 2.

321 Bosnak, 2007.
322 Lévinas, 1969, p. 104.
323 Westin, 2022, p. 464.
324 Lévinas, 1969, p. 187.

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that, although Lévinas somatic state may fall under a sensible encounter by reading him, it is

impossible to be present with his whole person, only with a medium. Or is that the only way

with which the traumatised can be present anyway? Never fully, but through a medium? —

Also when we are physically with another person, there is a medium that the trauma is

processed through; the body. And whether we read from a traumatised subject about a bodily

encounter or do encounter a traumatised subject bodily, the trauma is implicit(ly present), and

we are affected. This would then mean that reading Lévinas differs in content and form in the

sense that the content is about the encounter that can happen through the face-to-face which

is about Otherness as the vis-à-vis and trauma as Otherness, while witnessing his process by

reading and engaging with it as a case study is about Otherness as the body, and in the mind.

What they share however, is the individual expression. So, the trauma is not expressed by the

works of art or writing, it is not the piece that reflects the therapeutical value, not whatever is

produced in the process. The question is if the person was able to really express themselves,

if it was a work of language. If it was, what is the consequence?

Arguably, it is the soul (or psyche) that can be felt because one is not encompassed

by the physiological response to the person or the being together. Then, the psyche (or ‘soul’)

of the person becomes tangible through ‘the things.’ If that is the case, then what matters is

‘the embodied memory of the Other;’ hineni. Lévinas claims that the Other addresses me

from beyond history.325 Behind the face is a “pre-original, anarchic” identity, “older than

every beginning.”326 If it is the language of the soul that is transported, then ‘language

conditions thought’ — and this calls the reader to responsibility.

325 Levinas, 1969, p. 23.

326 Levinas, 1981/1998, p. 145.

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 If I go off embodied cognition, reading Lévinas changes the physiology of our body

as the mind is so intertwined with it. So, simply engaging with his thought may raise an

awareness of a traumatised body and its needs. Namely: the longing for relation in a peace-,

and respectful way by changing our perspective and understanding of what trauma actually

breaks: the connection between bodily symptoms and our body of thought.

It turns out that language is both bodily language and somatic expression as well as

verbal language as expressed through words. It seems that the bodily and somatic aspect are

closely connected to the cognitive and verbal aspect in Lévinas’ philosophy as language is

vision, expression, speech, thought, written word, and ‘resonance,’ or ‘co-regulation.’ This

even works when I attribute his writing with embodied cognition as one is touched without

being touched physically yet somatically and cognitively affected by his theory. It is perhaps

this dimension that he tries to break and keep open when he considers language and relation

in Totality and Infinity. It is the physical boundaries that are broken apart through that which

is not physical but physically sensed. It is that which must simply be lived out and

experienced — with others, and because of others. This is the Lévinasian effect that affects

due to Embodied Cognition. This must be lived out if therapy is to be ethical.

So, what is the take-home from Lévinas’ writing (body) for trauma therapy? —

Although it has been stated that therapy is about building a safe container, it is also true that,

for Lévinas, therapy (if ethical) is actually about freedom — and the impossibility of

responsibility. But, if “the things are naked, by metaphor”327 — if the vulnerability of the

face, if the language of the Other “adresses me from beyond history,”328 (as is the case with

327 Lévinas, 1969, p. 74f.

328 Lévinas, 1969, p. 23.

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therapeutical work in the face-to-face or in the sense of art/writing/movement) in our shared

humanity hence vulnerability — then one must take on that impossibility, infinitely.

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VIII. Conclusion

Vis-à-vis

Towards

Toward

with respect to

across from329

I have attempted to answer three questions. The first — and main one — ‘When Lévinas

claims that the relationship between the Same and the Other is language in Totality and

Infinity, what is meant by the Same, what is meant by the Other, what is meant by language,

what is meant by relationship?’ — was answered in order to explore the connection,

contribution, and enhancement of Totality and Infinity to trauma therapy.

None of the concepts (Same, Other, language, relationship) could be understood if

one does not concern themselves with the “traumatism of astonishment”330 discussed in

section (II.I.) “The Same and the Other” in the part on “Discourse and Ethics.” It is the

“experience of something absolutely foreign,”331 a “pure knowledge”332 or “experience.”333

That, for Lévinas, however, does not (or must not) have the negative connotation that

‘trauma’ always has. The ‘experience of something absolutely foreign’ is, in fact, the

329 These are translations of the German word “Gegenüber” (noun) or “gegenüber” (adverb) in response to a
thought that Armin Pixner shared: “Wir sind nicht alle Therapeut:innen, aber alle stehen einander gegenüber.”
(Translated as: “Not all of us are therapists, but we all stand across from each other.”)
330 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.
331 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.
332 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.
333 Lévinas, 1969, p. 73.

101
experience of life in all its rawness. This describes the traumatic experience, too — but also

has a different connotation.

The traumatic experience was elucidated: Due to their anthropological vulnerability,

however, grown humans as opposed to other animals have less of a natural way of dealing

with the ‘absolutely foreign’ (also due to their idea of the familiar), and are prone to physical

and psychological pain, because it is not discharged and integrated somatically. There is a

‘problematic separation between same and other that belong together,’ an alienation from

oneself and others: a dissociation. If this vulnerability is not attended to in the face of alterity,

of Otherness, of something ‘foreign,’ then the traumatic experience leaves a “psychic wound”

due to an “experience which causes abnormal stress,” in turn due to a “vital discrepancy

between threatening factors and individual coping abilities.”334

To illustrate ‘trauma’ throughout the text, I have used the metaphor of a broken

surface, of a crack, a partition in the ground: “Shibboleth.” This illustrates ‘dissociation’

which I have identified as the ‘essence of trauma’ (in this thesis) with Bessel van der Kolk.

Dissociation is the separation between the body and the mind hence between two entities that,

amongst others, make up one’s sense of self. It is an internal separation, an alienation from or

within oneself. Due to this separation, this Shibboleth, the inability to cope with the traumatic

experience remains; a helplessness. In order for the traumatised to “gain control over their

own ship”335 again it needs a vulnerable Other that exposes their whole Being to the

possibility of pain, and with that the possibility of re-traumatisation. Herein lies the different

connotation of trauma, the ‘traumatism of astonishment.’ It is an encounter with the Other in

which one’s vulnerable ‘Otherness’ (due to these other traumata) is met in reciprocity. For,

334 Fischer/Riedesser, 2009, p. 84.

335 van der Kolk, 2014, p. 4,

102
the exposure of one to the possibility of pain, invites the other to do so, too. This is

association. In the awareness of this potential re-traumatisation due to the exposure of the

vulnerability of the face, the Same is “physically present with one’s pain.”336 A

(re-)traumatisation would be violence by the Same. Such violence causes “useless

suffering,”337 which Lévinas defines as “the pain of the other”338 through “extreme passivity,

impotence, abandonment, solitude.”339

Instead of ‘passivity’ and ‘solitude,’ trauma therapy — and this ‘traumatism of

astonishment that I have called the Lévinasian trauma — must be about an active relation.

Herein lies a connection to (SE) trauma therapy or other types of trauma work (i.e.

movement, dance, art therapies) that rely on physical presence in order to “hold”340 the pain

together — and anything that can or must be felt. Then, in spite the difference through

traumat(tic experience), the lived experience of the body is shared and rediscovered.

This situation of exposure requires what Lévinas calls ‘language,’ facilitated through

the reciprocal “openness of being.”341 This ‘openness of being’ reveals the ‘common’ space of

freedom in which the potential of violence, or re-traumatisation as well as infinitely many

other actions and occurrences lie. For this situation, the image of the partition in the ground,

Shibboleth, is useful, because, in this exposure, both Same and Other stand across that

partition in the ground. There is a distance in between. In this moment or this situation, one

becomes aware that anything is possible. And one must ‘know’ or ‘be conscious’ in order to

336 Bamber, 1998, p. 298.

337 Lévinas, 1981.
338 Lévinas, 1981, p. 158.
339 Lévinas, 1981, p. 158.
340 Bamber, 1998, p. 298.
341 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.

103
‘avoid the instant of inhumanity’ (i.e. re-traumatisation). ‘Language’ then, describes the

moments in which the distance is bridged. These are the moments in which the vulnerability

and truthfulness of the face hence of the essence of the other Being is visible and recognised

or shows itself. The ethical relation is characterised through “the formal structure of

language” — a “straightforwardness”342 that is due to “speaking, rather than ‘letting be’”343

(the latter being the first type of encounter with the face: a mere bodily or even more

primordial one). Here, the truth of the other Being is recognised. In the ethical relation, then,

one speaks in response to the face. Here, the face shows itself. This response or ‘language’ is

always a meeting of responsibility which implies that the Same and the Other are then in the

ethical relation. The face calls the Other to responsibility which means to be present (hineni)

but also to speak to the Other, to address it. In the moment of the encounter — when the

ethical responsibility is called upon by the face and met through showing the face — lies the

awareness of one’s common humanity, or “a commons of the body.”344 If the response is

personal, then also that which is spoken (‘all signs can serve as language’) allows for this

common understanding of one another’s humanity. In expressions of ‘things’ however, the

truth of the face remains hidden. This truth (and with it the vulnerability) can only be kept if

the awareness of the Otherness remains. Then, a ‘traumatism of astonishment’ is possible

continuously.

In this situation — which can be the therapeutical setting — “the presence of a being

not entering into, but overflowing, the sphere of the same determines its ‘status’ as

infinite.”345 And it is the ‘idea of infinity’ that maintains the ethical relation, and that must

342 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.

343 Lévinas, 1969, p. 195.
344 Kearney, 2020, p. 8.
345 Lévinas, 1969, p. 196.

104
define trauma work. This “openness of being”346 could provide a basis for trauma therapies.

That is how ‘language’ can be understood, and also the condition under which it can be

expressed. It is a sensing of the space of freedom, of absolute uncertainty, thus of alterity and

Otherness. In trauma therapies this space is particularly relevant because it serves as the

container for individual self expression (in Lévinasian terms this is ‘speech’). Lévinas’ text is

asking for meeting that which is Other in oneself and others hence a being present with the

pain of the other, for facing the distance between one another; facing Otherness together. This

‘together’ is the language that must be spoken, established, found through the “face to

face.”347

The ‘vulnerability of the face’ can also be transported through text which makes

Lévinas (and also this thesis) a case study for trauma work. If one is open as a reader, one

encounters Lévinas’ trauma, and witnesses its potential transformation. The transformation

happens through the witness themselves (in this case it is you): through this shared

experience of an-other language (which is possible according to embodied cognition), there is

a (kind of) relation. And it is “this relation that does not fill the abyss of separation, but

confirms it.”348 The point is: It is about figuring out one’s language with the ‘idea of infinity’

in mind and body. This is what trauma therapy can facilitate with an ‘openness of being.’ In

that sense,

How can the findings (psychosomatics of Lévinas’ ethics be connected/applied to

enhance the therapeutical relationship) in trauma therapy? What does reading

346 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.

347 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.
348 Lévinas, 1969, p. 295.

105
 Lévinas account of the ethical relation in Totality and Infinity tell us about the needs

of the traumatised? What is the therapeutic relevance and take-home from Lévinas?

I will summarise our conclusion with Jacques Derrida’s Adieu:

We must not despair of philosophy. In Emmanuel Lévinas’ book (Totality and

Infinity) — where, it seems to me, philosophy in our time has never spoken in more

sober manner, putting back into question, as we must, our ways of thinking […] —

we are called upon to become responsible for what philosophy essentially is, by

welcoming […] the idea of the Other […] the relation with autrui.349

I hope that this piece serves as an example of what philosophy can do — beyond rational

thinking and verbal language; on a sensory-, and psychosomatic level. Hopefully, it offers a

perspective on the top-down (mind to body) approaches, challenging the one-sided (bottom-

up) approach, currently used in trauma-therapies.

Further, I hope that it could emphasise the necessity of openness and presence as the

qualities that the therapist must cultivate for an ethical relationship with the patient. In turn,

the patient may be able to use this openness to deal with the part of themselves that still holds

their trauma in the present. It can only be held together — which requires the ‘openness of

being’ (hineni).

The hypothesis I investigated in this thesis was this: The Levinasian ideas of

Otherness and the ethical relation turn out fruitful for trauma therapy. The Lévinasian ethics

of alterity and the conception of Otherness is about an effect that affects. So, the Lévinasian

ethics in is about a traumatic effect that affects. This affectedness must be lived out.

349 Derrida, 1999, p. 8f.

106
 The findings of this thesis can give more details to this hypothesis: How can this

affectedness be lived out? In order to heal, trauma must be discharged and integrated

somatically through and with others. How, is for each one of us to figure out. For, therapy is

about holding the pain together — being present with it — in order for the patient to learn to

hold it on their own; owning that vulnerable part; speaking to, with, and from this ‘Other.’

This vulnerability is ‘more passive than experience’ when there is ‘useless’ suffering.

It can become a meaningful resource if this ‘Other’(ness) becomes ‘conscious’ and is must be

expressed somatically and socially, in order to experience (the Other’s350) Infinity actively.

Then, suffering and trauma become a ‘discourse’: through the response to the ‘traumatism of

astonishment.’ This is what therapy must facilitate. This vulnerable part might be the lightest

one in all of us — yet the key to being fully alive. ‘You will know it by its graveness.’

Take my hand.

350 One’s own and that of others.

107
*

“Corona” by Paul Celan, translated. Pierre Joris

Autumn eats its leaf out of my hand: we are friends.

We shell time from the nuts and teach it to walk:

time returns to the shell.

In the mirror is Sunday,

in the dream we sleep,

the mouth speaks true.

it is time, for this to be known!

It is time that the stone took the trouble to bloom,

that unrest’s heart started to beat.

It’s time for it to be time.

It is time.

108
Epilogue

To speak with Celan: ‘Es ist Zeit’:

Es ist Zeit, dass der Stein sich zu blühen

bequemt,

He writes: It is time that stone took the trouble to bloom. A reminder of the Preface:

Shibboleth, a partition in the ground, a crack: In trauma — metaphorically — the ground

parts, and one falls into the gaping void. Now, if we take the Lévinasian conception of trauma

(therapy) — his ethics of alterity — seriously, then the aim of dealing with trauma is not to

close or bridge this void but to learn to live with it. In it. Down below, in the depth. It is ‘too

deep’ to adequately express, and it is too grave to fully hold it. But, maybe, if one tries

responsibly — if one responds to the trauma adequately, ethically — then the crack becomes

ever more wide. If that part is encountered in an ethical way — in oneself and others — with

“openness,”351 then there are no structures that are seemingly grounding but in fact at risk of

breaking over and over. There is in fact a newfound ‘ground’ in this openness. A grounding

within one’s vulnerable part. This is a grounding in the psyche or soul oriented toward the

Other. This allows for the “movement of the soul”352 “without fear or trembling,”353 in full

awareness that there is so much yet to be discovered with fluidity, movement (e-motion),

351 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.

352 Goodman/Grover, 2008, p. 249.
353 Lévinas, 1969, p. 85.

109
lightness. If you “let everything happen to you,”354 then you might recognise that the stone is

no longer. What remains?

— the blossom.

354 Rilke, The Book of Hours.

110
Outlook355

I would like to end with a plea for therapy to be fostered by the state, to become more

accessible — and to rethink that which is therapeutic, namely “an interactional process

between two people able to allow mutual influence. This depends on a larger political context

that allows for dialogue in situations of unequal power.”356 As Lévinas says: “justice is the

right to speak.”357 And this shall be facilitated with the mind’s “openness”358 upon the true

(that has been identified as the main or most valuable therapeutic quality) hence “the

welcoming of the face and the work of justice — which condition the birth of truth itself.”359

And, once conditioned, “the aspiration to radical exteriority […] which, above all, we must

‘let be,’ constitutes truth.”360 Often, radical exteriority is difficult for those who feel

especially much361, who hurt especially deeply and/or those that are particularly vulnerable

(i.e. due to experiences of violence). And that could be each and every one of us. But due to

societal structures — economic inequality, patriarchy, white supremacy, colonialism etc. —

some believe themselves to be more safe than others (and are in fact within those structures).

But, healing occurs where those structures are rethought, refought, redone: through and with

others. So, since it is societal structures that allow or even facilitate such pain, it is there that

355 An attempt to go beyond the self-referentiality of philosophy.

356 Kirmayer, 2008, p. 457.
357 Lévinas, 1969, p. 298.
358 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.
359 Lévinas, 1969, p. 28.
360 Lévinas, 1969, p. 29.
361 See, for example: Wager, 2020.

111
therapeia (“to cure,” “to heal,” “service done to the sick”362) must be implemented. The

“openess of being”363 — love? — could turn political, into “a politics that is not politics.”364

This connection between the therapeutic — and especially trauma-therapeutic — work, and

political activism ought to be explored further in research and practice. And here — perhaps

— is the most valuable aspect of Lévinas’ contribution to trauma work (that is in essence any

type of social work, any type of work ‘Doing’ that is with and about Being): his philosophy is

not about the love for wisdom, but the wisdom of love — and its political power. And this

power lies precisely in an awareness of one’s own powerlessness, of one’s vulnerability to life

— and one’s responsibility for, within, and because of the Infinite.365

362 Etymology Dictionary, 2022.

363 Lévinas, 1969, p. 44.
364 Lévinas, 1969, p. 21f.
365 Touch as well as vulnerability and sensibility, trauma from dissociation through ongoing ‘useless suffering’
as well as the meaningful encounter could be explored further, too. This is not the end. It is the beginning.

112
 etwas

entsteht

113
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Abstract (en.)

‘The abstractions and generalisations of phenomenology cannot yield the fine-grained

nuances of lived experience,’ says Anna Westin. This thesis defies this statement and attempts

to do exactly that; testing the limits and limitlessness of Philosophy and in Lévinasian

phenomenology. It is a reflection on trauma. It is an exploration of the psychosomatic and

therapeutical value and with that, healing potential of Lévinas’ conception of Otherness (that

is central to his Ethics of Alterity). Since trauma is about relationlessness, the question of

how to relate is specifically relevant in this thesis (and in trauma work.)

The thesis asks what it is that defines an ethical relation (which is ‘language’

according to Emmanuel Lévinas) with trauma therapy in mind. It is this focus on that which

is ‘Other’ as opposed to the familiar (the Same) as it is this estrangement that defines the

trauma(tic experience). This entails the body as an Other, the mind as an Other (breaking out

of totalitarian thinking and structures), the vis-à-vis as an Other, the trauma(tic experience)

and the healing process as Other, too. The key is the face-to-face encounter and ‘language’ for

Lévinas. The face-to-face-encounter occurs through recognising the vulnerability of the face

and responding to the vulnerability through signs such as words.

The trauma(tic experience) is thought as that which alienates oneself from

everything , where Otherness becomes encompassing. The Levinasian ‘traumatic effect’ is an

encounter between two persons that allows for meaningful experience. Trauma, however,

does not allow for a meaningful experience. It cannot be grasped or classified — Instead it is

followed by ‘useless’ suffering. This, again from a psychosomatic perspective of (the)

trauma(tic experience) and its consequences, shows amongst other disorders (i.e.

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depersonalization, detemporalisation) dissociation. In dissociation as well as in ‘useless

suffering,’ the subject does not sense themselves and others anymore, has lost their

connection to the body and the mind, cannot regulate their behaviour any longer. Lévinas

describes ‘useless suffering’ as extreme ‘passivity, abandonment, solitude.’ And, in ‘suffering,

sensibility becomes a vulnerability.’ This is where trauma therapy can be enhanced by

Lévinas: this awareness of vulnerability and the responsibility that comes with it calls for

radical openness and presence with the patient and their process so as to support them in their

fragile steps into the world again.

As can be said with Lévinas, anything — after all, ‘infinity’ is the ‘absolutely other’

— can happen when this Otherness is explored in ‘trauma.’ Without totalitarian structures or

thinking of how this process ought to be done, without a restriction on a certain method or

school. The awareness of this responsibility toward vulnerability also means that the therapist

could never do justice to the patient in their ‘naked face,’ their needs in this vulnerability. But,

since one has recognised this vulnerability — which in trauma therapy (and care professions

generally) is a given — since the patient needs something; their ‘face’ has ‘turned to me,’ the

one that is addressed must respond and there is responsible, so as to not violate the Other in

any way, but support (‘witness’) them with clarity (a ‘straightforwardness’). This requires a

radical openness with (oneself and for) the patient, which then becomes a reciprocal

openness. In order to be in relation, explicit language is necessary for Lévinas. However,

since language is connected to thinking (too), it has its limits. Thinking cannot contain

infinity. Because of this, a distance (or an awareness of the distance) must remain. This

makes a space of freedom and individual unfolding possible while still experiencing (and

facilitating) relational moments of touch.

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 This thesis serves as a reminder that therapeutic work requires a lot of self

experience and that that which has therapeutic value cannot be acquired by a specific school

or method. Honesty as sensibility — ‘Truth’ as Lévinas says (which is sought in the Other) —

can again become a ‘resource of sensibility’ (“stabilising factors,” as they are called in

Levine’s Somatic Experiencing Therapy). This reciprocal openness and communication is

what therapy must facilitate.

Healing trauma works often through the body. Another way of thinking healing is

psychosomatic writing: a text that contains both the body and soul (psyche) of the writer. If

one is open as a reader, this may have an effect that affects (in vulnerability) which calls for a

response, hence, for responsibility.

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Abstract (dt.)

Diese Arbeit ist ein Versuch Emmanuel Lévinas’ Ethik der Alterität (im spezifischen seine

Konzeptionalisierung von Andersheit in der zwischenmenschlichen Begegnung und die

daraus resultierende ethische Verantwortung für den Anderen) für den trauma-therapeutischen

Diskurs fruchtbar zu machen. Diese Ethik der Alterität baut auf der Idee von trauma(tischen

Erfahrung) als einer Erfahrung von Andersheit (Anders-Sein und Fremd-Sein) auf, die mit

dem Moment der Begegnung (‘Trauma des Staunens’) bei Lévinas verglichen wird.

Allerdings unterscheidet sich das Trauma mit dem therapeutisch gearbeitet wird, und das

Lévinassche ‘Trauma’. Trauma wird durch Gewalterfahrungen davongetragen, die

schwerwiegende beeinträchtigende Folgen wie Dissoziation, Depersonalisation und

Detemporalisation haben können. Wohingegen das Lévinassche Trauma das Potential für

Gewalt birgt, nicht aber Gewalt ausübt.

In diesem Potential für Gewalt liegt allerdings schon die Unmöglichkeit einer

ethischen Beziehung, da das, wofür man im Moment, in dem man die Verletzlichkeit des

Anderen erkennt (da sie einem als ‘Antlitz’ gezeigt wird), verantwortlich wird — für deren

Verwundbarkeit und den eigenen Umgang damit — überwältigend ist. Dieser Moment ruft zu

einem verantwortlichen Dialog auf, der immer auch in einer Form verstörend sein kann, da es

in Lévinas’ Sprache um Klarheit als auch um Offenheit geht, um Denken als auch Fühlen.

Dissoziation ist als Beispiel einer der Folgen aus der traumatische Erfahrung

angegeben, um die Wichtigkeit und Notwendigkeit der therapeutischen Beziehung

darzustellen. In der Dissoziation spaltet sich die Patient:in von den zu schmerzhaften

Erfahrungsanteilen ab. Das resultiert in einer Unfähigkeit sich körperlich und geistig zu

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spüren (sprich, in Beziehung und im Dialog mit dem eigenen Körper und zu sein), als auch

— bzw. dadurch auch — in der Unfähigkeit in Beziehung mit Anderen zu treten. Dafür

braucht es den therapeutischen Berührungspunkt, das Lévinassche ‘Trauma des Staunens.’

Dies ist eine Erfahrung von Andersheit, die verschiedene Formen der ‘Andersheit’ birgt, von

denen einige in der Arbeit besprochen werden: der Körper (und dessen phänomenologische

Situiertheit) als Anderer, die damit einhergehenden unbewussten Prozesse, die Begegnung

mit einer anderen Person als Andere, der Ausdruck (‘Sprache’) als Anderer insbesondere im

Gesichte einer traumatischen Erfahrung, als auch die gemeinsame Beziehung als Andere.

Genau in der Verletzlichkeit, in der ‘Wunde,’ in dem ‘Trauma’, liegt die ethische

Beziehung, oder der notwendige Versuch eine solche aufzubauen trotz der eigenen

Hilflosigkeit. Der Fokus auf die Wunde (die als Shibboleth — als unüberbrückbarer Riss im

Boden veranschaulicht ist) ist unausweichlich. Denn, dadurch wird die radikale Offenheit für

die ‘Unendlichkeit’ als das ‘absolut Andere’ und somit die Begegnung mit dem Anderen als

absolut Anderem bedingt. Das eröffnet den Patient:innen den Freiraum der Wunde Ausdruck

zu verleihen (und die Unmöglichkeit dafür Verantwortung zu übernehmen, diese als

Therapeut:in als auch Mensch aber trotzdem zu haben). Statt sich also an totalitären

Denkstrukturen, wie eine Behandlung zu sein hat, festzuhalten (das würde dem Anderen

Gewalt antun), muss man als Gegenüber selbst in der Verwundbarkeit, in der Selbsterfahrung

bleiben, um den Patienten in einer Weise (dieser Weise) zu begegnen, die es ihnen — laut

Lévinas — möglich macht, ihre eigene Wunde und Verwundbarkeit zu erkennen und daraus

zu schöpfen. Dies kann auch durch ‘Dinge’ ermöglicht sein, die aus einer Verwundbarkeit

heraus entstanden sind — durch Text, Bewegung, allerlei Kunstwerke und Selbstausdruck,

etc. die im therapeutischen Kontext gestaltet werden, um die Erfahrung auszuleben, der

Erfahrung psychosomatisch Ausdruck zu verleihen. Traumatherapien wie Somatic

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Experiencing arbeiten meist über den Körper, d.h., sie sind Bottom-Up-Approches. Diese

These dient also außerdem dazu, zu zeigen, dass auch Top-Down-Approaches wertvoll sind

— wie der Versuch, trotz der Sprachlosigkeit einer traumatischen Erfahrung und deren

Folgen eine Sprache zu finden. Eine Sprache, die der ‘Wahrheit’, wie Lévinas sagen würde,

d.h. der eigenen Verwundbarkeit oder auch ‘Wunde’, dem Trauma, entspricht. Um in

Beziehung zu sein ist explizite Sprache für Lévinas unausweichlich. Dies kann allerdings zu

einer (Re-)Traumatisierung führen, da die Sprache mit dem Denken verbunden ist. Das

Denken ist immer auch begrenzt, es kann die Unendlichkeit (des Anderen) nicht fassen.

Dadurch muss immer eine Distanz zu dem Anderen bestehen bleiben (oder ein Bewusstsein

der Distanz). Dieses Bewusstsein kann sowohl den Freiraum ermöglichen, als auch Momente

der Berührung (und somit: Beziehung).

Text (sowohl schreibend als auch lesend) wird somit als eine Begegnung mit dieser

Andersheit gedacht und dessen psychosomatisch-therapeutisches Potential erläutert. Das

wiederum stellt die philosophische Arbeit für andere — zum Beispiel therapeutische Diskurse

— in ein neues Licht, da auch das Denken fühlt und Bewegungen des Soma (des Körpers) als

auch der Psyche (der Seele) darin reflektiert sind. Das affiziert und ruft zur Antwort und

Verantwortung (in der Verwundbarkeit).

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