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Intelligence Estimates: NIEs vs. the Open

Press in the 1958 China Straits Crisis
Glenn P. Hastedt
Published online: 01 Dec 2009.

To cite this article: Glenn P. Hastedt (2009) Intelligence Estimates: NIEs vs. the Open Press in the
1958 China Straits Crisis, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23:1, 104-132,
DOI: 10.1080/08850600903143221

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 International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23: 104–132, 2010
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ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850600903143221

GLENN P. HASTEDT

Intelligence Estimates: NIEs vs. the Open

Press in the 1958 China Straits Crisis
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From their earliest days National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) have had a
special, albeit controversial, place in the study of the United States
Intelligence Community’s analytical products. In its broadest terms, the
debate over the significance of NIEs is marked alternately by the Council
on Foreign Relations identification of NIEs as the ‘‘most authoritative
written judgments concerning national security issues,’’ 1 and by the
judgment of a panel headed by former Central Intelligence Agency official
Richard Kerr—known as the Kerr Group—which concluded in 2004, after
looking at intelligence on Iraq, that ‘‘historically, with few exceptions,
NIEs have not carried great weight in policy deliberations.’’2
At least in the public realm, the debate over the significance of NIEs in the
policymaking process comes down to a question of accuracy: did the analysts
get it right in accounting for international behavior and anticipating key
world events? Accuracy is an intuitively appealing standard, lending itself
to an easy-to-convey scoreboard counting method to assess the
performance of the Intelligence Community (IC), and offering the promise
of identifying the possibly errant behavior of those to whom blame can be

Dr. Glenn P. Hastedt, Chairman of the Department of Justice Studies at the

James Madison University, Virginia, previously chaired the school’s Political
Science Department. The author of American Foreign Policy: Past, Present,
Future, his articles and book reviews on intelligence matters have previously
appeared in the International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, as well as in Intelligence and National Security, and the
Defence Intelligence Journal, and in numerous edited volumes on intelligence
issues. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at the Indiana University. An
earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, New York City, 16 February 2009.

104 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 105

attached. Yet, in many ways accuracy is a flawed standard for judging

intelligence estimates. At the base level, it confuses forecasting with
fortunetelling. The use of accuracy as a standard also raises the questions:
How accurate must one be? What is an acceptable ‘‘batting average’’?
More generally, any standard involving accuracy is suspect because of the
after-the-fact nature of the evaluative process. The difference between noise
and signals then becomes clearly distinct. The consequences of action or
inaction are now clear. By then, opposing leaders no longer have a
multiplicity of pressures upon them in making decisions nor multiple
options to choose from. The uncontrollable influence of chance is
removed. And, as Columbia University Professor Richard K. Betts has
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noted, typically surprise succeeds despite warning, and the primary

problem is revealed to be political disbelief.3
As compelling as is the question of accuracy, other questions which have
received far less systematic attention can be asked of NIEs. Simply put: What
is their value added? What do they contribute to the decisionmaking process
that goes above and beyond that which might be available to policymakers
from other sources? The tempting answer is that they provide additional
information. But, as countless commentators have noted, information is not
in short supply in Washington. If anything, there is an overabundance of it.
Missing, however, is insight. What policymakers need, according to a former
White House official, is help in interpreting available evidence, and guidance
in assessing patterns and alternative outcomes.4 Harvard Professor Joseph
Nye, who once served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) that coordinates the writing of NIEs, wrote in a similar vein that ‘‘the
purpose of estimating is . . . getting ideas into policy makers’ minds.’’
Estimating is not about fortunetelling, but rather consists of ‘‘summarizing
what is known and structuring the remaining uncertainties.’’5
Observations made by former intelligence officials suggest that NIEs may
well fall short of fulfilling this role. John McLoughlin told the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9=11
Commission) that preparing NIEs was a time-consuming process in which
judgments were watered down and in which the conclusions might
duplicate those already in circulation.6 The Kerr Group’s assessment of
the IC’s work on Iraq concluded in a similar vein that ‘‘of all the
methodological elements that contributed positively and negatively to the
Intelligence Community’s performance, the most important seems to be an
uncritical acceptance of established positions and assumptions. Gaps in
knowledge were left undiscovered or unattended . . .’’7 Commenting on the
Intelligence Community’s work in anticipating the Sino–Soviet split, retired
CIA analyst Harold Ford wrote of battles within the CIA and the IC in
constructing NIEs that left these documents lagging behind the judgments
of individual CIA officers. He noted that the coordinating process involved

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 106 GLENN P. HASTEDT

in producing them kept IC judgments cautious and understated the degree of

discord in this relationship.8

The Advent of OSINT

The significance of ‘‘value added’’ has become intensified in recent years
as analysis based on open source intelligence (OSINT) has been promoted
as providing an accurate, timely, and affordable alternative to the
traditional intelligence products and their reliance on secret sources.
Former intelligence officer Robert D. Steele, for example, foresees open
source intelligence as replacing eighty percent of the manpower and dollars
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currently devoted to obtaining secret intelligence.9 Dr. Amy Sands, provost

of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, sees open source
intelligence as never replacing secret intelligence, but as being central to
intelligence analysis in today’s new and evolving security environment.10
Not all are convinced of its potential. And, in these pages in 2001, former
CIA officer Thomas Carroll suggested that the benefits of open source
intelligence have been overstated and its costs and risks underestimated.11

BASELINES FOR EVALUATION

Making a judgment about the value added of NIEs requires, as a first step, the
construction of a baseline from which to make comparisons over time between
what was widely known (rightly or wrongly) at the time of an event and what
was contained in the NIEs issued regarding those matters. A database for
engaging in such an inquiry is now available as a result of efforts over the
past several years by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and the
National Intelligence Council to make public selected NIEs on such
subjects as Vietnam, the Soviet Union (1950–1959), the end of the Cold
War (1989–1991), the Cuban Missile Crisis, Yugoslavia, and China. Here
the focus is on the Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)
produced on the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis that were among the seventy-one
estimates on China produced during Mao Zedong’s rule that are included
in the National Intelligence Center’s Tracking the Dragon.12 (See Table 1.)
Several factors led to the selection of these SNIEs as part of a baseline for
future comparisons of open source information and analyses, and those
contained in NIEs:

1. The Taiwan Strait crisis followed by some eight years the 1950 establishment of
the Office of National Estimates (ONE) to write NIEs so that the system for their
production was firmly in place;
2. It was a Cold War crisis whose timing now permits potential comparisons with
both earlier and later crises;

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 107

Table 1. Taiwan Strait Estimates

Date SNIE # Title
28 August 1958 SNIE 100-9-58 Probable Developments in the
Taiwan Strait Area
16 September 1958 SNIE 100-11-58 Probable Chinese Communist
and Soviet Intentions in the
Taiwan Strait Area
28 October 1958 SNIE 100-12-58 Probable Developments in the
Taiwan Strait Crisis
13 March 1959 SNIE 100-4-59 Chinese Communist
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Intentions and Probable

Courses of Action in the
Taiwan Strait Area

3. It was a distinct intelligence problem, with clear beginning and end points;
4. Intelligence on the Taiwan Strait crisis does not neatly fit into the category of a
success or failure, thus minimizing selection problems caused by studies which
focus solely on intelligence failures;
5. It was sufficiently limited in time so that while more than one estimate was
written a manageable comparison with open source data can be made.

Reporting in the New York Times is here used as a surrogate indicator of

the publicly available information that policymakers would have had access
to during the crisis.

TIMELINE OF THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

Because the last regularly produced China estimate, NIE 13-58, appeared in May
1958, an appropriate place to begin a timeline of events leading up to the 1958
Taiwan Strait crisis is June, when the New York Times began reporting a series
of small gunboat encounters between Chinese and Nationalist forces, with
Taiwan claiming many victories. Later, in July, the Middle East crisis spilled
over into Asia, with Taiwan putting its forces on ‘‘special alert.’’ This action
was deemed necessary because of Nationalist intelligence reports and
observations of stepped-up Communist military activities.13
As the Middle East crisis ran its course, Soviet Premier Nikita
S. Khrushchev unexpectedly went to Peiping (now Beijing) for a four-day
summit conference from 30 July–3 August. The public product of the
meeting was a lengthy communiqué that made no reference to Taiwan, but
included formulistic statements such as ‘‘the two parties . . . reached
unanimous agreement on the measures to be taken to oppose aggression
and safeguard peace,’’ along with references to ‘‘imperialist war maniacs’’

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 108 GLENN P. HASTEDT

and ‘‘fraternal relations of friendship and all-around cooperation and mutual

security assistance’’ between China and the Soviet Union.14 The Nationalists
characterized this closing communiqué as reading ‘‘like an up-to-date
implementation of the Communist blueprint for world conquest.’’15
On 1 August, Army Day in mainland China, Marshall Chu Teh delivered
an ideology-laden speech calling for strengthening Communist China’s
national defenses, and claiming that the U.S. was encircling China through
its occupation of Taiwan, along with military bases in South Korea,
Japan, and the Philippines. He said it was necessary for the Red Chinese
army and navy to wipe out the imperialist system for good.16 This was
quickly followed by a buildup in military tensions between China and
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Taiwan. Reports on 2 and 5 August indicated that China was building up

its coastal military strength. Also reported were aggressive Chinese
Communist air activity designed to block Nationalist planes from making
their reconnaissance and propaganda runs over the mainland. On 6
August, Taiwanese officials declared a state of emergency regarding Matsu
Island and the Pescadores.
The next two weeks saw Nationalist forces shoot down Red MIG fighters
near Matsu, while the mainland Chinese further expanded their number of
air bases in use near Taiwan and moved large numbers of troops forward
in Fukien Province. On 20 August, just days before the crisis is commonly
dated as beginning, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister declared that he could not
see how the United States ‘‘could do otherwise’’ than participate in the
defense of the Taiwanese-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Nationalist
officials were also quoted as stating that if the United States were to
publicly make such a supportive pledge, China would likely cancel any
plans it had for attacking the islands.17
The crisis began on 23 August with an intense Red bombing of Quemoy
against a backdrop of confusion. China accused the United States of
‘‘provocation’’ by U.S. planes and vessels off the Chinese coast. Press
reports of impromptu remarks made by Marshal Chen that evening quoted
him as saying either ‘‘we have begun the liberation of Matsu and
Quemoy’’ or ‘‘we are about to liberate the offshore islands.’’ Later that
same night, explosions were heard and music was piped through
loudspeakers throughout Taiwan’s capital. Speculation immediately
centered on an attack, but it was then learned that officials were launching
a new campaign to kill mosquitoes in public parks with fireworks and
music.18 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight
D. Eisenhower responded to the shellings of 23 August with warnings that
had little effect.
Military maneuvering soon began. China began a blockade of Quemoy
with a fleet of torpedo boats and heavy artillery fire from the mainland.
According to Nationalist sources, 53,340 shells fell on 8 September and

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 109

59,888 shells fell on 13 September. 19 Communist China also declared a

twelve-mile territorial boundary off the coast, easily placing Quemoy and
Matsu within their territorial waters. On 25 September, eight ships
attached to the U.S. Seventh Fleet were dispatched from Singapore to the
Taiwan Straits. Further reinforcements soon followed. On the 28th,
Taiwanese officials reported signs of a Communist Chinese build-up for an
amphibious attack on the offshore islands, possibly during the next week.
September began with reports of a joint U.S.–Taiwan amphibious
maneuver, along with the public acknowledgment that the Communist
Chinese had effectively blockaded Quemoy and Matsu, and that Taiwan
needed the help of the Seventh Fleet to break it.
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Dulles responded to the mounting of a blockade around Quemoy by citing

the 1955 Formosa Resolution by which Congress resolved that ‘‘the
President . . . [is] authorized to employ the armed forces of the United
States . . . [including] the securing and protection of such related possessions
and territories of that area . . . he judges to be required or appropriate in
assuring the defense of Formosa.’’ Dulles noted that Eisenhower had not
yet made any such determination and that the United States was interested
in a peaceful settlement of the dispute.20 The U.S. willingness to enter into
negotiations was repeated by Dulles in a speech on 25 September.21
A testy public exchange of letters between Eisenhower and Khrushchev
then occurred. In a letter of 7 September Khrushchev asserted that no
stable peace could be achieved in the Far East until U.S. naval and ground
forces were withdrawn from Taiwan. He also made clear that ‘‘an attack
on the People’s Republic of China . . . is an attack on the Soviet Union.’’22
In a second letter, Khrushchev threatened nuclear retaliation for
any attack on China.23 Eisenhower characterized Khrushchev’s second
message as being replete with false accusations, couched in abusive and
intemperate language, indulging in personalities, and containing
inadmissible threats.24
Militarily, the United States responded by escorting a Nationalist relief
convoy to Quemoy on 7 September, being careful not to enter into the
narrow three-mile territorial limit that the U.S. recognized as China’s
territorial waters. On 15 September, Washington dispatched Nike-Hercules
antiaircraft missiles to Taiwan to bolster its defenses. Those missiles would
arrive on 5 October as the crisis wound down. On 16 September, the New
York Times reported that ‘‘taking into account nuclear weapons, the
United States had gathered in the Western Pacific what is regarded as the
most powerful air–naval striking force in history.’’ Defense Department
officials described the armada as a precautionary effort, stating that the
Chinese ‘‘probably do not intend to attempt an island invasion.’’25 Before
the week was out, on 22 September, the Sidewinder missile was used for
the first time, with several MIG fighters being shot down.

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 110 GLENN P. HASTEDT

Allies and Others Keep Distance

The growing crisis found many key U.S. allies and neutral states nervous and
unsupportive. Australia called for Taiwanese independence and
neutralization, a solution that would please neither the United States nor
China. Japan rejected ‘‘with regret’’ a Taiwanese call for a public
statement of support. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for
turning over Quemoy and Matsu to Communist Chinese control. Press
reports from West Europe referred to those states as deeply disturbed and
frightened by the growing crisis, with European public opinion strongly
opposed to war. The Philippines, in contrast, affirmed its defense ties with
the United States and spoke favorably of Taiwan’s efforts at repelling
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foreign invaders.
The U.S.–China conflict next moved from the military realm to the
diplomatic-political one. President Eisenhower addressed the American
people via radio and television on 11 September, reminding his audience of
the European bailout in Munich and appeasement of the Nazi war
machine—while also holding out the possibility of bringing the Taiwan
issue before the United Nations Security Council. On 18 September, the
Communist Party newspaper rejected Eisenhower’s idea of a cease-fire.
Next came a statement from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi vowing
that China would reoccupy Quemoy and Matsu, and charging Dulles with
making ‘‘perverted’’ comments in a speech to the United Nations. Chen
asserted that no cease-fire was possible since no fighting was taking place
between the two countries.26 Matters escalated even further, when on 27
September, Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas spoke of the U.S.
readiness to use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crisis.27
In remarks made at a 30 September news conference, Dulles pulled the
United States back from Douglas’s position, observing that ‘‘it would not
be wise or prudent to keep large Nationalist forces on the islands if a
dependable cease-fire could be arranged.’’28 On 6 October, China offered
a one-week suspension of the bombing of Quemoy and Matsu, while still
ridiculing the idea of a ceasefire and insisting that both islands and
Taiwan itself are part of China. 29 The ongoing cease-fire would be
extended unilaterally to two weeks, and then to an every-other-day
program of bombing on odd-numbered days. From 23 August through 5
October, an estimated 475,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy,
according to Nationalist Chinese officials. The change in policy permitted
the resupplying by Taiwan of the offshore islands, and produced a
statement from U.S. military leaders on 8 October that the Red Chinese
blockade had been permanently broken. On 17 November, U.S. military
officials indicated that it was ‘‘obvious’’ the Taiwan Strait crisis had
abated.30

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 111

PRECRISIS INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Estimate 13-58: Communist China
(13 May 1958) 21 p.
NIE 13-58 began with the conclusion: ‘‘We believe that the Chinese
Communist ability to exercise firms an effective control of mainland China
will continue.’’ 31 As befitting an estimate with this opening, the great
majority of NIE 13-58 addressed domestic Chinese economic, societal, and
political conditions and challenged projecting the situation five years into
the future. Communist China’s military capabilities were seen as having
‘‘significantly’’ improved since the Korean War, and the military itself was
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defined as effectively under the control of the Party.

In terms of China’s general foreign policy orientation, NIE 13-58 noted that
Chinese leaders ‘‘seem convinced’’ that the world balance was shifting in favor
of the Communist bloc, and that they viewed the present international
condition with ‘‘considerable confidence.’’32 Three specific foreign policy
issues were examined. The first was the Sino–Soviet relationship. The
estimate concluded that the Chinese Communists ‘‘appear to accept the
Soviet Union as the leader of the Bloc,’’ and that apart from ‘‘occasional
differences of nuance’’ there was ‘‘little evidence of any Sino-Soviet
disagreement on the character of Communist activities in Asia.’’ It did later
note that there would ‘‘almost certainly’’ be frictions in this relationship,
one of which was China’s possible desire for greater influence.33 A second
area of attention was China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The estimate
concluded that China had not yet developed a missile or nuclear weapon
capability of its own, but would by 1962, and that it would press the Soviet
Union for missiles and they would oblige. The estimate was less certain
about Soviet assistance in the area of nuclear weapons. With regard to
Asia, NIE 13-58 identified the weakening of U.S. influence and position as
an intermediate objective. It saw no lessening of China’s stated intention of
gaining control over Taiwan, but that it ‘‘almost certainly’’ would not
resort to military force as long as it risked war with the U.S.34

Open Source Material

New York Times reporting on Taiwan in 1958 began on 10 January with an
article from Quemoy reporting a United States proposal by ‘‘military
leaders’’ making clear that the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty between
Taiwan and the United States included the offshore islands. Under that
declaration, the U.S. committed itself to defend the offshore islands only if
‘‘an enemy attack was believed to be a threat against Taiwan.’’ Ten days
later, the State Department issued a statement indicating that no change in
policy was being contemplated.35 Also published in January was the first
of a litany of short news items, in fewer than fifty words, reporting that

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 112 GLENN P. HASTEDT

Chinese Communist artillery shells had been fired at Quemoy, and, to a much
lesser extent, Chinese Nationalist planes had dropped propaganda leaflets on
the mainland. These would continue through the next several months.
Two journals that would have been accessible to policymakers or those
who briefed them, the Journal of International Affairs and Current History,
ran special issues on China in 1957 providing additional open source
information. The Journal of International Affairs had three particularly
relevant articles. In ‘‘Taipei and Peking: The Confronting Republics,’’ Paul
Linebarger identified three reference points for Chinese foreign policy
toward Taiwan: its role as a major communist power, its behavior as a
great power, and the world of domestic Chinese politics. Critical to this
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last point was the repeated creation throughout Chinese history of

transient duplicate republics claiming to represent China.36
Michael Lindsay, who also wrote for the New York Times during the crisis,
contributed an essay, ‘‘The Policy of the Chinese People’s Government in
Asia.’’ He suggested that China ‘‘may not have a definite [foreign] policy,’’
and that those responsible for it ‘‘may be more and not less confused than
those behind the foreign policies of most democratic countries’’ because
‘‘they operate in an environment extremely unfavourable to clear
thinking.’’37 He characterized Chinese foreign policy as ‘‘almost certainly
confused by a tendency to act in terms of the world as presented by
Communist publicity rather than in terms of the world as it actually is.’’38
With this major qualification, Lindsay went on to characterize Chinese
foreign policy as motivated by a combination of nationalism, communism,
and rational self-interest.
In the third essay, ‘‘The Sino–Soviet Alliance,’’ Howard Boorman
examined the nature of China’s relations with the Soviet Union. 39 His
major contention was that caution was needed in making judgments about
the exact nature of this relationship due to its complexity and the paucity
of data available. He asserted that no one was in a position to prove
conclusively who was right and who was wrong. Boorman noted that this
relationship involved delicate issues of doctrine, methodology, radicalism,
revolutionary faith, national interest, racial pride, prestige, language, and
temperament, among others. After reviewing the development of the
alliance, Boorman ventured to say that the recent events portended an
increasingly significant role for China in Communist world affairs
although the Soviet Union was still the dominant force within the bloc.
Current History contained articles on the strength of the Chinese military
and Chinese foreign policy. In ‘‘Red Army in Retreat,’’ Lt. Col. Robert Rigg
wrote that the Chinese army posed a threat to many neighboring states and
to peace in Asia.40 He also noted that the Chinese military was still a force of
contrasts, one equipped with radar equipment but which also carried kitchen
equipment on shoulder poles. In the final analysis, he characterized the

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 113

Chinese army as then being in training to correct its deficiencies, but which
would be dangerous in the future. In ‘‘Foreign Policy of Communist
China,’’ Norman Palmer identified Chinese foreign policy as being shaped
by several long-standing factors—the most important of which were the
independent rise to power of the Chinese Communists, Communist
ideology, and the continuity of Party leadership. He also wrote that
China’s freedom of action in foreign policy was limited by both internal
pressures and weaknesses as well as an assessment of opportunities and
dangers in the international system.41
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STAGE 1: 1 JANUARY–26 AUGUST 1958

SNIE 100-9-58: Probable Developments in the Taiwan
Strait Area (26 August 1958), 7 p.
SNIE 100-9-58 began its analysis by providing policymakers with a rationale
for Chinese Communist actions: ‘‘We believe that Communist China’s
principal purpose in stepping up its military pressures in the Taiwan Strait
area is to test the intentions of the U.S. and of the Republic of China.’’42
It later stated that ‘‘the Chinese Communists probably have become more
impatient and frustrated as the passage of time has failed to visibly
advance them toward their goal of ending the existence of the GRC,
replacing it at the United Nations or even halting the drift to a de facto
two China situation.’’43
In discussing specific motives for the start of the crisis, the estimate stated,
‘‘We believe that the Chinese Communists now rate the risk of involvement
in local wars to be somewhat less than they did immediately prior to the
Sputnik era.’’ It also observed that a period of tension would ‘‘remind the
world of Peiping’s strength and determination to achieve its objectives.’’
Additionally, the estimate suggested that China probably judged there
to exist a weakening of Nationalist morale and a lessening in the
U.S. commitment to defend the offshore islands.44
NIE 100-9-58 stated that Chinese Communist efforts to secure Taiwan had
been ‘‘stymied by US commitments to the GRC—explicit and implicit—which
have faced the Chinese Communists with unacceptable risks in the military
field.’’45 It also asserted that ‘‘the Chinese Communists will not be deterred
from increasing their military pressures by U.S. moves which stop short
of either an explicit guarantee of the offshore islands or the commitment
of U.S. air or naval forces at least to the protection and of the supply of
these islands.’’46 And it added that if China were to launch an attack the
decision to do so ‘‘would probably be based on an estimate that the
US would not use nuclear weapons in defense of the offshore islands.’’ For
the moment, however, the estimate concluded that China would

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 114 GLENN P. HASTEDT

‘‘probably’’ continue to exert pressure on the islands but avoid a clear-cut

military showdown.
The estimate assessed Chinese military capabilities in the context of the
Nationalists having primary responsibility for supplying and reinforcing
the offshore islands, but with American help. Communist China’s air force
was judged to ‘‘could’’ have the ability to maintain air superiority, its navy
‘‘could’’ seize any of the lightly defended offshore islands, and its army
‘‘probably’’ could mount a successful assault. It was also judged to have
the ability to organize, launch, and support a large-scale attack on Taiwan.
But the outcome of such an action was not judged, in view of the U.S.
commitment to defend Taiwan.47
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On the matter of the Soviet Union’s role in the crisis, the first SNIE of
August 1958 stated that ‘‘it is almost certain’’ that both partners felt the
pace of world developments required closer coordination,’’ and that they
‘‘probably’’ reached agreement on future military cooperation activities,
including missiles and nuclear weapons. It also observed that the Taiwan
Strait crisis coincided with the Middle East crisis and a recent meeting in
Peiping between Khrushchev and Mao and their defense ministers. The
Soviet Union was seen as having ‘‘no objection’’ to a heightening of
tension, and might consider it to serve their interests. China was seen as
not expecting to ‘‘quickly achieve their basic objectives by this course of
action’’ but did expect its demonstration of power to have a psychological
impact on Taiwan and in the world at large.48

Open Source Reporting and Commentary

New York Times stories on Chinese foreign policy in the precrisis period were
few in number and ignored domestic influences, concentrating instead on the
nature of the Sino–Soviet relationship, with Khrushchev’s early August visit
to Peiping as the centerpiece of those discussions. On 10 August, Harry
Schwartz wrote that ‘‘there are few precedents in modern history of the
abrupt change in the international diplomatic picture that took place last
week following the Khrushchev–Mao talks,’’ adding that diplomats
throughout the West were still debating its meaning, with views ranging
from China now exerting a veto over Soviet foreign policy to its influence
still being of secondary importance. Schwartz reported that recent
developments pointed to three main Chinese goals with regard to the
content of Soviet foreign policy: 1) an all-out campaign to seat Communist
China instead of Nationalist China in all international organizations; 2) an
all-out campaign against Yugoslav revisionism; and 3) much bolder
military policies vis-à-vis the United States.49
Newspaper accounts also presented conflicting evaluations of the
developing situation in the Far East. A Times article on 11 August with a

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Peking dateline suggested that the sudden reduction in ‘‘Liberate Taiwan’’

propaganda coming from the Communist Chinese press was an indication
that the Soviet Union was still the dominant partner in the Sino–Soviet
relationship, with Khrushchev having warned Mao not to launch an
offensive against Taiwan. Another article that same day from Taiwan,
appearing on the same page, ventured that the newly witnessed
aggressiveness of Communist Chinese air patrols along the coast might be
a prelude to an amphibious assault on the offshore islands. But the article
also noted that some observers doubted that this was likely, although they
agreed that an attack was inevitable ‘‘sooner or later.’’50
The New York Times also reported on evaluations of Chinese foreign
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policy goals from the region and elsewhere. A brief 24 August article
indicated that American, British, and other observers in Hong Kong did
not believe that a general Chinese attack was planned at that time, though
that view was not shared by many Chinese and even some American
officials on Taiwan. One theory was that China wanted to at least test
U.S. intentions, and that it might attack an offshore island.51
Differences of opinion were also expressed about China’s power projection
capabilities. Articles in late July, written from Hong Kong, emphasized
Peiping’s military weakness, with one story reporting that the Chinese
military was at its lowest level of effectiveness since the Korean War, due
in part to the fact that it had borne much of the brunt of the domestic
‘‘leap forward’’ campaign, with its officers and troops too involved in
building dikes, irrigating fields, and planting crops to undertake a military
campaign.52 New York Times correspondent Hanson Baldwin presented an
opposing view on 25 August, in which he asserted that China’s military
capabilities had steadily increased since the end of the Korean War, giving
it an ‘‘eventual capability for an amphibious assault.’’53 Harry Schwartz, in
his 10 August analysis of the Sino–Soviet alliance, made no mention of
China’s military capabilities in identifying the ‘‘levers’’ that Mao possessed
over the Soviet Union. Instead, he reported them as being the general need
for Communist bloc unity, the importance of China as an ally in the
struggle for Asia and Africa, and Khrushchev’s potential need for China
as an ally in his political battles in Moscow.

STAGE 2: 27 AUGUST–16 SEPTEMBER

SNIE 100-11-58: Probable Chinese Communist and Soviet
Intentions in the Taiwan Strait Area (16 September 1958), 3 p.
SNIE 100-11-58 began with the conclusion: ‘‘We believe that the most likely
Chinese Communist course of action in the immediate future is to continue
military harassment and interdiction of supply to Chinmen.’’54 It stated
that ‘‘it is likely that the Chinese Communists are willing to take actions

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involving considerable risk of major armed conflict with the U.S. and ‘‘would
probably attack’’ an all-American convoy. It then suggested that, in addition,
China ‘‘might’’ seize, with little or no warning, ‘‘one or more of the smaller
offshore islands’’ in order to increase international pressure on the U.S. for a
peaceful settlement.55 SNIE 100-11-58 concluded its overview by asserting
that a Chinese assault on the major offshore islands was unlikely because
‘‘in their view (a) it would be almost certain to involve them in major
hostilities with the US, (b) it would diminish the political and propaganda
advantage they now have, and (c) it would probably be unnecessary
because they could get the islands by other means.’’56
Other possible Chinese courses of action considered by SNIE 100-11-58
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were an intermittent enforcement of the blockade that would be tied to the

ambassadorial talks in Warsaw and a gradual end to the interdiction. The
first was defined as only a temporary measure if it occurred, and the latter
was termed ‘‘unlikely’’ and would be the product of Soviet pressures.
In judging Soviet intentions, the Estimate stated that Soviet leaders could
not be greatly concerned with the fate of the offshore islands. Their principal
objectives were seen as political—namely to discredit the U.S. and to support
its Communist ally. The Estimate held that ‘‘the Soviets probably do not
wish to see the scale of hostilities expanded,’’ and ‘‘almost certainly’’ made
their commitment to China based on the calculation that these military
activities would fall short of provoking U.S. intervention. SNIE 100-11-58
went on to note that ‘‘with respect to Soviet reactions to the U.S. use of
nuclear weapons, much would depend upon the scale of the U.S.
attacks. . . . The Soviets might conclude that more could be gained at less
cost and risk by exercising military restraint. . . . On the other hand, the
Soviets might conclude that such a challenge could not be passed by
without nuclear retaliation.’’57
No discussion of Chinese military capabilities was presented. Instead, a
concluding section dealt with the prospects for negotiations. Venues
suggested as being desired by the Chinese included a summit conference
and bringing the issue to the United Nations. Regardless of the selected
forum, SNIE 100-11-58 stated ‘‘it is clear’’ that China was in no mood to
return to the status quo ante. It asserted that, while China might accept a
temporary cease-fire during negotiations in order to enhance its
propaganda efforts, it would be unwilling to commit to an indefinite
cease-fire. Neutralization of the offshore islands ‘‘might’’ be accepted by
Peiping as an interim move but not as a permanent solution.58

Open Source Reporting and Commentary

Whereas, in the first period, Communist Chinese domestic affairs were
ignored when motivations were assessed, they figured prominently in press

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reports during the second period. On 31 August, Harry Schwartz identified

three motives for China’s escalating of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Two
of the three reasons involved domestic politics. On the international front,
he cited China’s ‘‘well known confidence’’ in the strengthening of world
Communism. Domestically, he cited (1) the fear among Chinese leaders
created by the brief 100 Flowers period which brought forward an
unexpected domestic criticism that might have led them to a renewed
determination to remove the Nationalists as a potential alternative to their
rule and a return of Chiang Kai-Shek, and (2) the possibility that creating
a crisis could increase morale among the Chinese people and make
pressures associated with Mao’s Great Leap Forward more endurable.59
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This last possibility was again cited by Schwartz in a 14 September article.60

In this article, he also advanced four possible foreign policy motivations as
guiding Chinese behavior: (1) recognition of Peiping as a major world
power; (2) the end of Nationalist China as soon as possible; (3) Red
domination of the Western Pacific; and (4) placing pressure on the Soviet
Union to take more risks. Other commentaries suggested that Peiping’s
primary and maximum objective was to obtain the China seat at the United
Nations still being held by Taiwan. Yet another view, identified as being
held by John Foster Dulles, was that China was not really interested in war
or retaking the offshore islands, but rather in keeping pressure on the
United States now that the Middle East crisis had passed.61 A New York
Times article, datelined London, indicated that in Britain’s view China did
not want an all-out war. Possible explanations it put forward for the
increased tensions were: (1) China was trying to squeeze Taiwan off the
offshore islands; (2) China might be testing U.S. resolve; and (3) China
might be trying to label the U.S. and Taiwan as aggressors, arguing that the
Chinese bombings were in retaliation for Nationalist bombings of the
mainland. 62 In general, most analyses during this time gave greatest
attention to the likelihood that China was motivated primarily by
the political goals of achieving recognition as a major power and seeking
to gain a psychological advantage over Taiwan and the region as a whole.
In looking at the military dynamics of the evolving crisis, two themes
appeared. The first, given expression to by Hanson Baldwin, was of U.S.
military superiority and the accompanying strength of its deterrence
posture. He asserted that China, and not the United States, was practicing
brinksmanship. Other articles reported that the Soviet Union fully
appreciated the dangers of nuclear war. The second theme was that of
accidental war. Agreeing that it was unlikely China would seek to take
Taiwan through military action now that the United States had clearly
drawn a line in the sand, one article cautioned that ‘‘the prestige of both
sides was heavily engaged . . . and a point of no return—accidentally or
deliberately—could easily be reached.’’ 63 One week later, these same

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themes reappeared. China was said not to be interested in a major war; it was
expected to keep up just enough pressure to achieve its political aims; but
‘‘there was always the danger that some mischance might bring on the big
war that the powers involved do not want.’’64
A common theme in these pieces was the uncertainty over Chinese
motivations. Even Baldwin noted that the current situation did not ‘‘give
conclusive indication’’ of Chinese intentions. Another reporter, William
Jordan, noted that ‘‘it would be presumptuous . . . to pretend to know just
what the Soviet and Chinese leaders believe or intend as far as Formosa is
concerned.’’65
Of repeated concern was the nature of the Sino–Soviet alliance. A
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consensus existed that the Khrushchev–Mao meeting had laid the

foundation for China’s military action against Taiwan. Debated were the
limits of Soviet support, if any, for Peiping. Harry Schwartz observed that,
while it would not be unexpected to see China receive pledges of solidarity
and strong rhetorical support from the Soviet Union, good reasons existed
to have substantial doubt about the depth of those promises, the most
important being that Taiwan was not as important to the Soviet Union as
it was to China; that Khrushchev had more to lose from a major war,
especially a nuclear war, than did Mao; and that long-term trends, such as
in population, pointed to future conflicts between the two countries.66 In
another article, Schwartz discussed the possibility that the Soviet Union
had transferred nuclear weapons to China, as suggested by reports from
Eastern Europe, but concluded that no evidence on this point existed.67

STAGE 3: 17 SEPTEMBER–28 OCTOBER

SNIE 100-12-58: Probable Developments in the Taiwan Strait
Crisis (28 October 1958), 3 p.
SNIE 100-12-58 began by stating that, while Communist China had shown
greater boldness than ever before, ‘‘we believe that the shift in tactics in
the Taiwan area does not portend any basic change in the overall conduct
of Chinese Communist foreign policy.’’ The estimate continued holding
that China did not initiate the crisis with the firm intention of obtaining
the offshore islands at all costs: ‘‘Almost certainly’’ China was using
military power primarily as a political weapon. 6 8 SNIE 100-12-58
supported its conclusions by stating that ‘‘the less than maximum possible
artillery effort, the emphasis on the undermining of Chinese Nationalist
morale, and the cessation of bombardment between 6 and 20 October
almost certainly indicates that Peiping’s leaders are using military power
primarily as a political weapon.’’69
Six ‘‘probable’’ short-term objectives toward the ultimate goal of
eliminating the Republic of China were suggested as being served by the

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crisis: (1) probing U.S. determination to aid Taiwan; (2) driving a wedge
between the U.S. and Taiwan; (3) discrediting the U.S. and Taiwan in the
eyes of world opinion; (4) reminding the world that China was a power to
be reckoned with; (5) preventing a drift to a two China policy; and (6)
straining Nationalist morale.70
For the first time in the estimates regarding Taiwan, reference was made to
the influence of China’s domestic politics on its foreign policy, although that
influence was minimized. The estimate observed that ‘‘although domestic
considerations probably played some part in the timing of the Chinese
Communist initial attack, we believe these considerations were of
secondary importance.’’ 71 No further discussion of Chinese domestic
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politics occurred.
With SNIE 100-12-58, doubts surfaced regarding Soviet foreign policy. It
noted that ‘‘available evidence, albeit inconclusive, indicates that the USSR
did not initiate the crisis by encouraging the Chinese Communists . . .
however, the Soviets clearly acquiesced.’’ It went on to observe that there
was ‘‘no evidence as to what role the USSR played, if any, in the
temporary suspension of shelling.’’72 Later, SNIE 100-12-58 made it clear
that the Soviet Union was an important actor in the conflict, stating that
Chinese tactics would depend ‘‘in large measure on Soviet attitudes’’ along
with Nationalist and U.S. actions.73
In looking to future possibilities in the crisis, SNIE 100-12-58 concluded
that China had ‘‘probably become convinced that the U.S. itself would
fight rather then permit the offshore islands to fall in the face of direct
military pressure.’’ It also asserted that China ‘‘almost certainly
consider[s] that their position is a strong one and that there is little
compulsion on them to make concession.’’ 74 The estimate went on to
indicate that China’s intention was ‘‘probably’’ to maintain negotiations
with the U.S., and that its preference would be for them to be held in
Warsaw rather than at the UN or any other international forum. SNIE
100-12-58 concluded that it did not anticipate China taking overt
military action elsewhere in the Far East, but that a high degree of
military tension always created the opportunity for miscalculation from
which hostilities between U.S. and Chinese Communist forces could
develop.75

Open Source Reporting and Commentary

Most views expressed at this time pointed to a lessening of the conflict,
although often for different reasons. A range of international political
considerations were put forward. Some accounts attributed the possible
reduction to a decided shift in the balance of military power in favor of
the Nationalists as a result of seemingly having solved the resupply

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problems to Quemoy and the introduction of Sidewinder missiles. Hanson

Baldwin, for example, stated that there was now far less likelihood of a
Communist assault against the islands.76 Other accounts did not reference
the military situation. A report from Yugoslavia saw little likelihood that
China would let the situation develop into a full-scale war, and predicted
the tension would soon die down, in part due to difficulties with Peiping’s
industrialization efforts.77 Conflicting interpretations came from London.
In one account, British authorities were said to be fearful of escalation to
a nuclear war. A few days later they were said to sense an easing of the
crisis due to a changed attitude on the part of Chinese leaders that grew
out of the increasingly negative public reaction to the crisis in Asian
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countries.78 Yet another point of speculation was that the Soviet Union
might have become alarmed over the direction the crisis was taking. In this
view, Soviet support had been originally given as a result of Mao’s
assertion that a victory would be quickly and easily achieved.79
Domestic factors also figured prominently in some explanations of Chinese
foreign policy behavior that were put forward in New York Times articles
during this third period. A 27 September article by Tillman Durdin began
with the observation that ‘‘judging conditions in Communist China from
the conventional standpoint, the present would not seem to be an
appropriate time for Peiping to engage in a showdown conflict with the
United States in the Taiwan Strait.’’80 Durbin noted that 1958 had been a
year of major economic and social transition in China, including drastic
changes in agriculture. He argued that even a limited war with the U.S.
could be disastrous for Mao and his colleagues, but that the raising of
tensions ‘‘serve[d] Communist leaders well’’ in their efforts to push China
toward change. In a lengthy 12 October feature story on Mao’s foreign
policy, Michael Lindsay wrote that the impact on Chinese foreign policy of
internal developments in China over the past two years had been neglected
in speculation over its current motives. Lindsay cited the domestic
‘‘anti-rightist’’ campaign as particularly important because it made Chinese
leaders even more intransigent in their foreign policy thinking, and
lessened any possibility of luring dissatisfied Nationalists to their cause.
Along with discussions of the Chinese domestic scene and its influence on
Peiping’s foreign policy toward Taiwan, a profile of Mao was presented. It
portrayed him as having been personally humiliated by his poverty and by
slights at school, and as complaining about having been treated like a
peasant by Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. This allegedly led him to
demand being treated with respect by the Soviet Union and general
recognition of China as a world power.81
The explanations of the impact of international and domestic politics on
Chinese foreign policy also contained assessments of where the crisis was
going. A frequent theme in the international politics-focused accounts was

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that the Taiwan Strait crisis had become too costly, and that China was now
in search of a way to extricate itself from the crisis ‘‘with honor.’’ One
account, reported from Britain by Drew Middleton, suggested that the
Chinese did not intend to take Quemoy and Matsu by force and probably
never did.82 When the cease-fire was extended the reasons given by U.S.
officials were consistent with this type of assessment: militarily the siege
had failed and politically it had produced a backlash in regional states that
opposed the use of force and forestalled talk of a compromise that would
have recognized the existence of two Chinas.83 Additionally, the suggestion
was that the cease-fire and any resumption of bombing combined as a
rational method for driving a wedge between the United States and its
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allies, as well as keeping Taiwan confused over Peiping’s motives.

In general, these analyses did not rule out the possibility of an incident such
as an accidental air clash leading to war, but they expected the Chinese
cease-fire to continue. Domestic accounts did not necessarily disagree, but
suggested that other possibilities existed. Michael Lindsay, observing ‘‘a
considerable element of irrationality’’ in Chinese foreign policy, reported
that Chinese leaders had very little understanding of the outside world and
that their handling of foreign policy showed elements of ‘‘considerable skill
and what seem to be extremely stupid blunders and miscalculations.’’84 One
of those errors may have been the expectation that the Nationalist military
garrisons on Quemoy would defect at the outset of Red China’s bombing
campaign. 85 Tillman Durdin seconded this assessment, cautioning that
China’s new found sense of strength, plus its doctrinaire and distorted view
of the world, might allow its leaders to overestimate their power and lead to
war, despite its potential for destroying the Chinese system.
The tentative and incomplete nature of the U.S. understanding of Chinese
foreign policy was again underscored by Lindsay, who observed that ‘‘almost
no one seems to have predicted the flare-up of hostilities over Quemoy . . . a
good many people expected that there would be trouble in the area
sometime but it is not at all clear why the Peiping regime should have
considered that August 1958 was the appropriate time to start it.’’86
News stories varied considerably in the degree to which sources were
identified and degrees of certainty were expressed. With the exception of
Dulles and Eisenhower, sources were not identified by name. Rather, when
cited, they were ‘‘Nationalist estimates,’’ ‘‘a high Yugoslav official,’’ ‘‘some
Western diplomats,’’ ‘‘British officials,’’ ‘‘diplomats representing
Communist nations,’’ or, more generically, ‘‘observers.’’ The strength of an
assessment of future behavior or the reasons for Chinese actions were
conveyed using phrases such as ‘‘Communists undoubtedly thought,’’
‘‘there have been indications,’’ ‘‘no indication,’’ ‘‘a good deal of current
speculation,’’ ‘‘it is possible, though much more speculative,’’ ‘‘the
prevailing view here, ’’ it is unlikely,’’ and ‘‘certainly Peiping realizes.’’

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STAGE 4: 29 OCTOBER 1958–19 MARCH 1959

SNIE 100-4-59: Chinese Communist Intentions and Probable
Courses of Action in the Taiwan Strait Area (13 March 1959), 8 p.
SNIE 100-4-59 began with the assertion: ‘‘We believe that Communist China
broke off the Taiwan Strait crisis last October primarily because it believed
that to increase military pressures . . . carried unacceptable risk of hostilities
with the U.S.’’ It added that China was also concerned over how some
Asian states were responding to the crisis. 87 That said, the Estimate
projected that it expected China to continue to employ military pressure in
support of its political and psychological campaign against Taiwan.
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In reviewing the lead-up to the crisis, SNIE 100-4-59 stated that ‘‘a number
of considerations’’ were behind the Chinese decision. The Estimate placed
greatest emphasis on the renewed sense of confidence with which it looked
at the international scene in 1958, citing, in particular, progress in Soviet
rocketry, and noting that ‘‘we continue to believe that foreign and Bloc
policy considerations were primary in Communist China’s decision to
initiate hostilities in the Taiwan Strait,’’ that ‘‘Peiping probably anticipated
that it could not lose in such a probing action,’’ and that, ‘‘in any event,
Communist China’s leaders probably did not intend to take measures
which would seriously risk U.S. counterattack against the mainland.’’88
SNIE 100-4-59 did speak to the domestic side of Chinese foreign
policymaking, noting that ‘‘the regime must have considered the interplay
between such a military crisis and its domestic leap forward and
commune programs . . . [and that] the regime probably had planned to
take advantage of the Strait action to push these domestic programs.’’
The Estimate ranked these domestic concerns behind foreign policy
considerations concluding, ‘‘We do not believe that this action was
undertaken because of any compelling internal need.’’89 SNIE 100-4-59
later added: ‘‘We do not believe that domestic considerations would by
themselves cause Communist China to go so far as to undertake a major
military effort in the Strait area during the next year,’’ although it
speculated that Peiping might again create tension in the region in order
to produce a call for greater sacrifice among the people for its domestic
programs.90
SNIE 100-4-59 continued to acknowledge that the USSR’s role in the 1958
crisis remained unclear, although the Intelligence Community felt that
Moscow had acquiesced and supported the Communist Chinese, who had
come up with the idea, rather than the Soviet Union having prompted the
crisis itself. Moreover, the estimators felt ‘‘confident’’ that the Communist
Chinese had been planning the crisis for some time. 91 SNIE 100-4-59
returned to the theme of viewing the Taiwan Strait crisis squarely in the
broader context of bloc relations and the Berlin crisis. It speculated that

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the Mao–Khrushchev meeting ‘‘may have included an agreement that

diversionary pressures in the Middle East could advance bloc interests and
that a high state of tension might be maintained simultaneously on two
fronts.’’ 92 In terms of specific actions that China might undertake, the
Estimate concluded that ‘‘we do not believe that the Chinese Communists
would heighten tensions without prior consultation with the Soviets.’’93
In addressing Peiping’s military capabilities, the Estimate noted that
Chinese leaders were ‘‘undoubtedly impressed’’ by the rapidity and nature
of the U.S. military response during the crisis. It concluded, however, that,
assuming no U.S. military intervention, ‘‘we believe that the Communist
Chinese could seize the Matsus or the Chinmens, although at considerable
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cost.’’94 But the Estimate also held that China did not have the capability
to prevent U.S. resupply of the offshore islands. Moreover, the estimators
concluded that ‘‘there are presently no indications of any Chinese
Communist preparations for increased military pressure in the Taiwan
Strait. There is no firm evidence that additional troops, heavier artillery,
missiles, additional aircraft, additional motor torpedo boats or minecraft
have been moved into the Strait area.’’95

Open Source Reporting and Commentary

Commentaries in the New York Times on Communist Chinese motives for
the shelling of Quemoy and the likely course of future events continued
into November, and then virtually ceased with subsequent articles
documenting the on-again off-again nature of Chinese shelling and a brief
public spat between the United States and Taiwan over the possibility of
Nationalist troop reductions on Quemoy—a possibility raised by Secretary
Dulles and rejected out of hand by the Nationalists. The Times also
carried one report of a peace proposal made by Communist China to
Taiwan that called for a negotiated settlement and annexation that was
dismissed by Nationalist officials as propaganda.
Hanson Baldwin wrote of the decisive U.S. victory at Quemoy, attributing
it to the firm stand taken by the United States and Taiwan that revealed the
weakness of the Chinese military. Baldwin also cast the Quemoy crisis in
global terms, stating that ‘‘the basic issue of these crises cannot be
localized or reduced. . . . [T]he basic issue is, and must be, whether the
United States is to yield to the threat of aggression.’’ He concluded by
noting that the offshore islands problem had probably not been resolved
and the victory therefore incomplete.96 A contrasting view appeared one
week later, when a Times dispatch from Hong Kong concluded that the
Chinese leadership was ‘‘satisfied that, over all, it has come out of the
Quemoy crisis in a more favorable position than when it started.’’ This
article attributed the start of the crisis to three factors: (1) China’s fear of

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 124 GLENN P. HASTEDT

encirclement by the United States and Great Britain that grew from their
intervention in Lebanon and Jordan; (2) Peiping’s need to keep the
Chinese people in a constant state of revolutionary ferment and raise
economic productivity; and (3) the Chinese desire to gain political
influence by discrediting the United States and arousing the sympathy of
states in the region.97

PUBLIC SOURCE POSTSCRIPT

At the outset, this survey of academic commentary on Chinese foreign policy
sought to provide a backdrop against which to place the public and secret
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analyses of the Taiwan Strait crisis. In looking at postcrisis commentary

for additional insight into the quality of analyses presented by newspaper
accounts and intelligence estimates, along with the overarching question of
the value-added provided by various NIEs, two different lines of analysis
emerge.
The first line of analysis takes as its point of departure the unitary and
rational actor approach found in the NIEs, as well as in many of the New
York Times accounts. As Charles McClelland observed, the purpose of
these pieces was not to describe or explain Chinese motives or goals but to
search for patterns of regularity in state behavior and the dynamics of
international interactions. 98 Accordingly, the conceptual frameworks
employed emphasize how states signal and communicate (meaning
diplomatic statements, shows of military force, etc.) during crises in a
controlled and calculating fashion in pursuit of foreign policy goals
through a series of probing, warning, demonstration, attack, and
de–escalatory actions. McClelland compared the Taiwan Strait crisis with
the Berlin crisis of 1948. His concern was with signaling and
communication in crises and the strategic considerations behind various
actions. More than a decade later, Steve Chan focused more directly on
China and sought to establish a Chinese strategy of conflict management.99
In 1967, Morton Halperin and Tang Tsou examined the Taiwan Strait
crisis from an international politics perspective, although their analysis was
rooted more in the traditional Kreminological style of analysis in which
public statements were analyzed and evaluated according to their fit to
actual behavior. Halperin and Tsou were particularly concerned with
Sino–Soviet relations during the Taiwan Strait crisis. They concluded that
the two countries worked together in relative harmony during the crisis.
Neither side felt let down because of how it played out. Each understood
the other’s position, although disagreements did exist. The authors argued
that Chinese behavior suggested that ‘‘Mao and Khrushchev both believed
that it was time to probe again but in a way that would not risk a major
attack by the United States.’’100

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Professor Allen Whiting, often a consultant to the U.S. State Department,

provided a bridge between this literature and that which stresses the link
between domestic politics and foreign policy.101 Through an examination
of statements made by Mao Zedong, released after the Cultural
Revolution, he argued that Mao made several important miscalculations
about the veracity of the U.S. response to China’s actions during the
Taiwan Strait crisis. Whiting pictured Mao as having initiated the crisis for
the explicit purpose of liberating the offshore islands without provoking an
American response. In his view, the crisis ended in defeat for China, and
he dismissed arguments holding that the episode was advantageous to
China as a means of mobilizing its population for domestic programs as
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post hoc rationalizations.

Writing shortly after Whiting, another China expert, Melvin Gurtov,
challenged that interpretation.102 He argued that Mao was not primarily
interested in forcing Taiwan to abandon the offshore islands, and for that
reason the Taiwan Strait crisis could not be seen as a defeat for him.
Rather, he argued that Mao’s primary reason for starting the crisis lay in
his need for international calm in order to carry out his domestic reform
agenda. In his view, this reform agenda created serious resource
distribution issues in the Chinese system and negatively affected Chinese
military capabilities. To succeed, Mao needed international quiet.
According to Professor Gurtov, U.S. and Nationalist military actions in
the preceding months had caused Mao to fear an international conflict and
he instigated the crisis as a signaling effort to block a larger crisis. Pictured
as important in shaping Mao’s views of a possible impending conflict were
U.S. policy in Lebanon, the U.S. attempt to downgrade the status of
U.S.–China talks, the test-firing of a Matador missile on Taiwan in May,
and the Nationalist military buildup on the offshore islands. Thus, Gurtov
suggests Mao recognized U.S. power and acted in such a way as to avoid
direct confrontation with the U.S., and his primary objective was met. In
looking at Sino–Soviet relations, Gurtov sees Mao as having fully
recognized the differences in priorities and policies, and pictures him as
working hard to carve out an autonomous power position for China.
Coming out of the meeting with Khrushchev, Mao expected and received
only minimal Soviet support. Only after U.S. offers t o resume
ambassadorial talks were accepted by China did the Soviet Union engage
in a bold rhetorical defense of China.

THE EXTENT OF ADDED VALUE

No single case study is capable of firmly establishing the extent to which
NIEs provide policymakers with an intelligence value added that goes
beyond that which they might obtain from public sources. But the Taiwan

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 23, NUMBER 1

 126 GLENN P. HASTEDT

Strait case can suggest the outlines of a balance sheet from which to work in
making such judgments. At the top of such a balance sheet is the matter of
goals. Little disagreement is found here, as both NIEs and public press
reports emphasized the political nature of China’s goals. In each, repeated
reference is made to concerns of prestige, influence, enhanced regional
standing, and testing U.S. intentions, rather than Peiping’s desire for war.
Differences are most stark in discussing the conflicts underlying
dynamics. Public source reporting, as captured by the New York Times
accounts of the crisis, gave attention to a broader array of factors than
did the NIE analysis. Readers of the New York Times found discussions
of domestic factors that might have contributed to the crisis, as well as
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an attention to the military balance of power. The NIE analysis

employed almost exclusively a rational actor international interaction
perspective rooted in the logic of deterrence and crisis management. This
difference in perspective led to a difference in how the possibility of an
accidental escalation of the conflict was assessed.
With its emphasis on domestic factors, open source reporting was not as
sanguine as the NIEs on the underlying international dynamics of the
crisis. While the NIEs acknowledged the potential for an accident that
might set off a direct military confrontation between China and the U.S.,
their emphasis on the overriding logic of deterrence led them to have
greater confidence in the ability of policymakers to control events. No
conclusion can be reached that this line of analysis, with its rational actor
base, was in any sense wrong. As later writing reveals, this approach is a
staple of national security policy analysis that is often used when key
pieces of information are absent. But it did present a constricted view of
Chinese decisionmaking. At the same time, the positive benefit of the
broadened perspective found in open sources was potentially lessened by
the inability to present policymakers with an overall sense of the relative
importance of domestic and international factors, and the possibility
suggested by later scholarship that an important strain in the domestic
analysis (with Peiping using the crisis to build domestic support for its
economic programs) may have been in error.
Another area of difference in analyzing of the Taiwan Strait crisis involved
the nature of the Sino–Soviet relationship, with the NIEs holding to a view
that emphasized unity of effort to a much greater degree than did the open
source reporting. However, open sources did provide a range of opinion
on the subject, and placed greater emphasis on existing rather than
potential sources of disagreement between the two states. Subsequent
analysis, including that carried out by the Intelligence Community, points
to far greater points of disagreement than acknowledged in the NIEs.
A third point of comparison in any balance sheet involves process, or the
presentation of information. Involved here is a combination of issues

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 127

involving the transparency of the analysis. The NIEs, by nature of the style in
which they were written, were far more opaque than were open source
writings. They did not identify either the source of the analysis presented
to policymakers or the source of the information used for analysis. Neither
dissenting footnotes nor in-text dissents were included. True to the notion
of NIEs as the considered conclusion of the entire Intelligence Community,
information was presented in summary, although detailed, fashion. Only
the most generic statements were presented, as in SNIE 100-12-58 of
October 1958, which noted that ‘‘available evidence, albeit inconclusive,
indicates that the USSR did not initiate the crisis by encouraging Chinese
Communists to their actions.’’ 103 From a value-added perspective, this
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reporting style’s primary benefit is its time-saving nature. It frees

policymakers from the need to reconcile competing pieces of information
and lines of analysis. Its downside leaves analysts vulnerable to the charges
of tilting evidence or acting on the basis of bureaucratic imperatives rather
than the best interest of policymakers.

The Benefits of Open Source Reporting

In contrast, open source reporting not only identified the analyst but
presented a much wider range of views. Prominent reporters in the Taiwan
Strait crisis included Harry Schwartz, a Soviet expert and Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) veteran with a specialization in economic
intelligence; Tillman Durdin, a long-time China specialist who covered the
Japanese invasion of China, the Chinese civil war, and the beginnings of
the war against the French in Indochina; Michael Lindsay (Lord Biker),
who served as a radio instructor in the Chinese Communist army in
fighting against Japan and later became a critic of the Communist regime;
and Hanson W. Baldwin, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, who advocated
a strong defense and had close ties with military officials. Articles
appearing in the New York Times were far more forthcoming in identifying
sources of information and opinion as British and Yugoslav officials.
From a value-added perspective, both strengths and weaknesses of open
source information follow. On the plus side, knowledgeable readers are
better able to assess biases in reporting. On the negative side, a
professional standard for judging the merits of arguments being presented
by the various reporters is absent.
A final point of comparison of the two methods involving the presentation
of information is the ability to convey a sense of the degree of certainty=
uncertainty that underlay the analysis. The approach favored by
newspaper accounts was to include in various articles a significant
disclaimer warning readers of how little was known about Chinese
intentions and motivations. The reporter would then proceed to present his

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 128 GLENN P. HASTEDT

view of the situation. The NIEs, meanwhile, often emphasized the

uncertainty of their analysis in the body of the text, with a frequency that
suggested bureaucratic survival instincts were at work instead of a problem
analysis. For example, in discussing Chinese Communist motivation, SNIE
100-9-58 used the following phrases in a five-paragraph discussion that was
cited as supporting its conclusion.104

. The Chinese Communists probably have become more impatient and frustrated.
. The Chinese Communists probably feel that a period of tension in the Taiwan
Strait would be useful.
. They probably believe that world trends and the passage of time have brought
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some weakening to Nationalist morale.

. Broader considerations may also be influential.
. The USSR probably has no objection to the heightening of tension.
. The USSR would almost certainly seek to restrain Peiping.

From a value-added perspective, the major potential advantage of the NIE

approach is to increase the likelihood that, if a judgment is taken out of
context, an expression of uncertainty will travel with it rather than be
detached. The major disadvantage is the inability of NIE readers to
intellectually process all these qualifiers, with the result that policy may do
little more than reflect existing policymaker biases rather than processed
intelligence.

REFERENCES
1
Council on Foreign Relations, ‘‘National Intelligence Estimates,’’ http://
vvww.cfr.org/publication/7758/national_intelligence_estimates.html (accessed
10 August 2008).
2
Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donnagan, and Arris Pappas,
Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community [The
Kerr Group Report], 29 July 2004, p. 11. Available at http://wwvv.gwu.edu/
~nsaarchiv/news/20051013/kerr_report.pdf (Accessed 11 August 2004).
3
Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982), p. 18.
4
Quoted in Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘‘Peering into the Future,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73,
1994 July=August, p. 83.
5
Ibid, p. 93.
6
Richard Best, Intelligence Estimates; How Useful to Congress? CRS Report to
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 21 November
2006), p. 4.
7
Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donnagan, and Arris Pappas,
Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community [The
Kerr Group Report], p. 11.

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 129

8
Harold Ford, ‘‘Calling the Sino–Soviet Split,’’ Studies in Intelligence, Winter
1998–1999, p. 61.
9
Robert Steele, ‘‘Open Source Intelligence,’’ in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic
Intelligence, Vol. 2: The Intelligence Cycle (New York: Praeger, 2007),
pp. 95–122.
10
Amy Sands, ‘‘Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat
Assessments,’’ in Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S.
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), pp. 63–78.
11
Thomas Patrick Carroll, ‘‘The Case Against Intelligence Openness,’’
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 14, No. 4,
Winter 2001–2002, pp. 559–574.
12
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National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence

Estimates on China During the Eea of Mao, 1948–1976 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 2004). Thirty-seven of the estimates are available
on the paper version of Tracking the Dragon. The other thirty-seven are
available on a CD. All are available through its Website. All citations here
refer to the page number in the estimate itself rather than its location in a
particular source, thereby allowing for consistency in finding the material
regardless of how it is pursued.
13
‘‘Taiwan Alerts Forces,’’ The New York Times, 18 July 1958, p. 3, and ‘‘Taiwan
Wary in Crisis,’’ The New York Times, 19 July 1958, p. 5.
14
‘‘Chinese–Soviet Meeting,’’ The New York Times, 21 September 1958, p. E5.
15
‘‘Taiwan Sees Red Plot,’’ The New York Times, 5 August 1958, p. 6.
16
‘‘Chu Bids Peiping Bolster Defense,’’ The New York Times, 2 August 1958, p. 4.
17
Tillman Durdin, ‘‘Taipei Hopes U.S. Will Guard Isles,’’ The New York Times, 20
August 1958, p. 5.
18
‘‘U.S. ‘Provocation’ Charged,’’ The New York Times, 26 August 1958, p. 3.
19
‘‘Red Chinese Spur Quemoy Shelling,’’ The New York Times, 24 November
1958, p. 11.
20
‘‘Text of Dulles Statement on the Far East,’’ The New York Times, 5 September
1958, p. 2. The key portions of the text of the Formosa Resolution can be found
at ‘‘The Formosa Resolution,’’ The New York Times, 14 September 1958, p. E5.
21
Secretary Dulles’s Speech to the Far East–American Council of Commerce, The
New York Times, 26 September 1958, p. 3.
22
‘‘Message From Khrushchev to Eisenhower on Crisis in the Taiwan Strait
Area,’’ The New York Times, 9 September 1958, p. 12.
23
‘‘Text of Khrushchev’s Message to President Eisenhower,’’ The New York Times,
20 September 1958, p. 2.
24
‘‘Text of Statements by the White House,’’ The New York Times, 21 September
1958, p. 2.
25
Jack Raymond, ‘‘U.S. Air–Sea Force Massed in Pacific,’’ The New York Times,
17 September 1958, p. 17.
26
‘‘Red China Vows to Take Islands,’’ The New York Times, 21 September 1958, p. 4.

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 130 GLENN P. HASTEDT

27
Max Frankel, ‘‘U.S. Called Ready to Use Atom Arms,’’ The New York Times, 28
September 1958, p. 10.
28
Thomas Ronan, ‘‘British See Shift by U.S. on Taiwan,’’ The New York Times, 2
October 1958, p. 2.
29
‘‘Peiping Offer of Week’s Truce,’’ The New York Times, 6 October 1958, p. 3.
30
‘‘Lull at Taiwan Cited,’’ The New York Times, 17 November 1958, p. 3.
31
NIE 13–58, p. 1.
32
Ibid., p. 18.
33
Ibid., p. 17.
34
Ibid., p. 19.
35
Greg MacGregor, ‘‘Wider U.S. Guard Urged for Taiwan,’’ The New York
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Times, 10 January 1958, p. 27, and ‘‘Taiwan Defense Stands’’ The New York
Times, 20 January 1958, p. 6.
36
Paul Linebarger, ‘‘Taipei and Peking: The Confronting Republics,’’ Journal of
International Affairs, No. 11, 1957, pp. 135–142.
37
Michael Lindsay, ‘‘The Policy of the Chinese People’s Government in Asia,’’
Journal of International Affairs, No. 11, 1957, 143–149 quotes here are on
pp. 144–145.
38
Ibid., p. 145.
39
Howard Boorman, ‘‘The Sino-Soviet Alliance: A New Dimension in World
Politics,’’ Journal of International Affairs, No. 11, 1957, pp. 122–124.
40
Robert Rigg, ‘‘Red Army in Retreat,’’ Current History, No. 32, 1957, pp. 1–6.
41
Norman Palmer, ‘‘Foreign Policy of Communist China,’’ Current History
No. 32, 1957, pp. 7–12.
42
SNIE 100-9-58, p. l.
43
Ibid., p. 4.
44
Ibid., p. 4.
45
Ibid., p. 3.
46
Ibid., p. 2.
47
Ibid., p. 3.
48
Ibid., p. 4.
49
Harry Schwartz, ‘‘Is Peiping Calling the Signals for Moscow?’’ The New York
Times, 10 August 1958, p. E3.
50
‘‘Peiping Propaganda Eases,’’ The New York Times, 11 August 1958, p. 9; and
Tillman Durbin, ‘‘Pelping’s Planes Active on Coast,’’ New York Times, 11
August 1958, p. 9.
51
‘‘Assurance Held Adequate,’’ The New York Times, 24 August 1958, p. 3.
52
‘‘Red Chinese Move Called Unlikely,’’ The New York Times, 21 July 1958, p. 13,
and an untitled article on 30 July 1958, p. 3.
53
Hanson W. Baldwin, ‘‘Alarm Over Taiwan,’’ The New York Times, 24 August
1958, p. 4.
54
SNIE 100-11-58, p. 1.

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 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES: NIES VS. THE OPEN PRESS 131

55
Ibid., p. 2.
56
Ibid., p. 2.
57
Ibid., p. 2–3.
58
Ibid., p. 3.
59
Harry Schwartz, ‘‘What Is Soviet Role in New Taiwan Threat?’’ The New York
Times, 31 August 1958, p. E3.
60
Harry Schwartz, ‘‘Peiping Shooting for Big-Power Status,’’ The New York
Times, 14 September 1958, p. E3.
61
Lindesay Parrott, ‘‘Taiwan: The Political Objectives.’’ The New York Times, 7
September 1958, p. E3.
62
‘‘Britain and U.S. Discuss Taiwan,’’ The New York Times, 28 August 1958, p. 3.
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63
‘‘Far East Crisis,’’ The New York Times, 7 September 1958, p. E1.
64
‘‘Showdown No. 1,’’ The New York Times, 14 September 1958, p. E1.
65
William Jorden, ‘‘How the Soviet Sees It,’’ The New York Times, 14 September
1958, p. E5.
66
Harry Schwartz, ‘‘What Is Soviet Role in New Taiwan Threat?’’
67
Harry Schwartz, ‘‘Peiping Shooting for Big-Power Status.’’
68
SNIE 100-12-58, p. 1.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid., p. 2.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid., p. 3.
74
Ibid., p. 2.
75
Ibid., p. 3.
76
Hanson W. Baldwin, ‘‘What for Quemoy—Small War or Big War?’’ The New
York Times, 28 September 1958, p. E3.
77
Paul Underwood, ‘‘Yugoslavs Think China Crisis Ebbs,’’ The New York Times,
21 September 1958, p. 6.
78
See Drew Middleton, ‘‘British Are Wary of Nuclear War,’’ The New York Times,
24 September 1958, p. 3, and ‘‘British See Hope in Quemoy Crisis,’’ The New
York Times, 28 September 1958, p. 6.
79
Harry Schwartz, ‘‘Cease-Fire: Communist Reasons,’’ The New York Times, 12
October 1958, p. E5.
80
Tillman Durdin, ‘‘On China Home Front: Major Reforms Begun,’’ The New
York Times, 27 September 1958, p. E5.
81
Richard Hughes, ‘‘The Long March of Mao Tse-tung,’’ The New York Times, 21
September 1958, p. SM9.
82
Drew Middleton, ‘‘British Discount Peiping’s Threats,’’ The New York Times, 5
October 1958, p. 20.

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 23, NUMBER 1

 132 GLENN P. HASTEDT

83
Dana Schmidt, ‘‘U.S. Won’t Press Cuts at Quemoy,’’ The New York Times, 14
October 1958, p. 6.
84
Michael Lindsay, ‘‘Chinese Puzzle: Mao’s Foreign Policy,’’ The New York
Times, 12 October 1958, p. SM7.
85
Tillman Durdin, ‘‘Peiping Aims to Split Taiwan From the U.S.,’’ The New York
Times, 19 October 1958, p. E5.
86
Michael Lindsay ‘‘Chinese Puzzle: Mao’s Foreign Policy.’’
87
SNIE 100-4-59, p. 1.
88
Ibid., p. 2.
89
SNIE 100-4-59, p. 3–4.
90
Ibid., p. 7.
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91
SNIE 100-4-59, p. 4.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid., p. 2.
94
Ibid., p. 5.
95
SNIE 100-4-59, p. 1.
96
Hanson W. Baldwin, ‘‘The Victory at Quemoy,’’ The New York Times, 9
November 1958, p. 12.
97
‘‘Reds Use Quemoy to Raise Output,’’ The New York Times, 16 November 1958,
p. 9.
98
Charles McClelland, ‘‘Action Structures and Communication in Two
International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin,’’ Background, No. 7, 1964, pp. 201–215.
99
Steve Chan, ‘‘Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior,’’ World Politics, No. 30,
1978, pp. 391–410.
100
Morton Halperin and Tang Tsou, ‘‘The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,’’ in Morton
Halperin, ed., Sino–Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1967), p. 273.
101
Allen Whiting, ‘‘New Light on Mao,’’ China Quarterly, No. 62, 1975, pp. 265–270.
102
Melvin Gurtov, ‘‘The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy
in Chinese Motivations,’’ Modern China, No. 2, 1976, pp. 49–103.
103
SNIE 100-12-58, p. 2.
104
SNIE 100-9-58, p. 4.

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