Craig Stimpson
3092755
Short Paper
Introduction to Military History
24 October 2024
Patton’s Right Hook
2
In December 1944, the Allied advance in the west had reached the
German frontier and Soviet forces had achieved great success against the
Wermacht on the eastern front. Pressured on two fronts, the Nazi regime
under Adolf Hitler launched a massive counter offensive through the Eifel-
Ardennes region in order to split the western Allied armies and capture the
Belgian port of Antwerp.1 The battle that followed would be the most
costly the US Army would face in Europe and would become known as the
Battle of the Bulge. To accomplish this daring task, the Germans had
assembled a force consisting of 18 divisions with over 200,000 men, over
500 tanks and approximately 1900 howitzers and rockets.2 This build up
of men and equipment was completed without alerting the Allies as to their
plan of attack.3 Hitler’s intent was to force the British and Americans to sue
for peace thus allowing his military forces to concentrate on the Soviet
advances in the east.4
The Allies met the German onslaught with fierce resistance but
were ill prepared to stop the advance. Hitler had wisely chosen the
Ardennes, a heavily forested region that straddles the borders of Germany
and Belgium, as the area he would use for his massive counter-attack. .
Analysis of the German Army’s capabilities had suggested that it was
incapable of “major offensive operations”.5 As a result, the Ardennes were
weakly defended to provide additional combat forces in other areas along
1
HistoryNet Staff, General George S. Patton and the Battle of the Bulge, 2
2
Cole, Hugh M., The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, 650
3
Cole, 58
4
HistoryNet Staff, 2
5
The Army Times, Warrior: The Story of General George S. Patton Jr., 162
3
the western front. The Allied units assigned to the area were comprised
of the 2nd, 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions. The 2nd Division was in the
process of refitting after several months of intense fighting while the 99th
and 106th Divisions were newly deployed and untested in battle.6
Additionally, two armored combat commands, one each from the 9th and
10th Armored Divisions, would be the only tanks available to blunt the
powerful German advance.
On 16 December, the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies along with the
German 7th Army began their attacks toward the port city of Antwerp.
Allied reaction to the German’s counter-offensive was swift but initially
ineffective. Elements of the US XVIII Airborne Corp were quickly
dispatched to slow the Nazi advance. The 101st Airborne Division was sent
to defend the Belgian town of Bastogne, while the 82nd Airborne Division
was tasked with defending the critical crossing points on the Meuse River.
Allied units all along the western front were facing determined resistance
and would be hard pressed to relieve the beleaguered defenders.7
As the German advance continued, General Dwight Eisenhower
met with his commanders in Verdun to develop a plan that would stop the
counter-offensive. Attending the meeting were Eisenhower, British Air
Marshall Arthur Tedder, American Generals Omar Bradley, George Patton
and Jacob Devers, and the aide of British Field Marshall Montgomery,
General Freddie de Guingand. Montgomery refused to travel to meet with
6
Cole, 55
7
HistoryNet Staff, 3
4
lower ranking officers.8 Montgomery recommended that the Allies fight a
series of delaying actions which he called “tidying the lines” in an effort to
exhaust the Germans through attrition.9 This plan was quickly rejected
and General Patton was tasked with countering the German advance. To
facilitate this, General Devers’ 7th Army would relieve elements of Patton’s
3rd Army in the Saar region.
Most of the Allied intelligence analysts had misinterpreted the
German attempts to hide the build up of troops for their push into Belgium
as a lack of combat power. Patton’s own staff had anticipated the Nazi’s
ability to undertake the desperate gamble and had made tentative plans to
act. As the first reports of the Ardennes counter-offensive began to
circulate, Patton developed three maneuver plans to thwart the advancing
Germans. Arriving at the 19 December meeting with Eisenhower, Patton
stated that he could have three divisions ready for the attack in less than
three days.10 Eisenhower was reluctant to believe that Patton could
maneuver these units so quickly and admonished Patton for his bravado.
Patton reassured the Supreme Allied Commander that it was no boast and
that he had already put plans in place for this occurrence. Patton was
instructed by Eisenhower to launch his attack no earlier than 22
December. On that date, Patton engaged the southern edge of the
German salient with the 4th Armored Division as well as the 26th and 80th
Infantry Divisions.11
8
HistoryNet Staff, 2
9
The Army Times, 174
10
The Army Times, 164
11
HistoryNet Staff, 5
5
Patton accomplished a tactical and logistical miracle with the
redeployment of three divisions in less than three days. Prior to the
German counter-offensive, the 4th Armored Division had been fighting on
the eastern bank of the Saar River in Germany.12 The 26th and 80th
Divisions had been preparing to exploit US gains in the Saarland as well
when they were re-tasked to interdict the Germans. Patton’s troops would
cover over 125 miles during the harsh European winter.13 Attacking along
a broad front, the American forces began a systematic advance into the
German’s southern flank. One of Patton’s most important objectives was
the relief of the American 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne. Using
elements of the 4th Armored Division as his spearhead, Patton’s forces
reached the beleaguered paratroopers on 26 December.14
This would not be the culminating point of the battle. German
resistance was brutal and several attempts were made to cut off the
American defenders in and around Bastogne. Patton’s men kept pressure
on the German 5th Panzer Army with their goal the liberation of the Belgian
town of St. Vith. The success of the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions in
severing German supply lines was crucial to halting the German advance.
Cut off from reliable re-supply and unable to secure enough fuel to
maintain their armored forces the German advance stalled. On 8 January,
Hitler ordered his forces to withdraw from the Ardennes to the fortifications
of the Siegfried Line.15
12
The Army Times, 166
13
The Army Times, 166
14
HistoryNet Staff, 8
15
Cole, 675
6
While the withdrawal of German troops marked the end of the
Battle of the Bulge, it did not mark the end of German resistance. Patton
and the Third Army continued to pressure the Germans until the end of
hostilities on 7 May 1945. It can be said that no other army has ever
matched the achievements of the Third Army during the battle in the
Ardennes. Patton’s expert handling of the Third Army’s role in the Battle of
the Bulge was a masterful example of maneuver and logistics.
7
Bibliography
Cole, Hugh M., The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Washington D. C.:
Department of the Army, 1965
HistoryNet Staff, ed. "General George S. Patton and the Battle of the
Bulge" HistoryNet, May 17, 2007, http://www.historynet.com/general-george-s-
patton-and-the-battle-of-the-bulge.htm (accessed October 29, 2009).
The Army Times, ed. Warrior: The Story of General George S. Patton. New York,
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1967
