Determinants of Rice Prices in the Philippines:

Recommendations for Policy Reforms to Reduce

Supply and Price Volatility

Gil S. Beltran
President

Abstract
This study explored the determinants of rice prices in the Philippines with the aim of identifying
policy reforms that can reduce supply and price volatility. Regression models and time series data were
used to determine the impact of production, stock inventory, and population growth on rice prices. The
results indicated that the farmgate price is influenced by the production growth, the growth of rice
inventory, and the population growth while both the wholesale and retail prices are influenced by the
farmgate price and the world price. These suggest that policy measures crafted to reduce supply and
price volatility should primarily focus on productivity enhancements, an improved stock management
program, an information system that enables stakeholders to make informed decisions, a gradual
reduction of tariffs in alignment with the improvement of productivity, and an insurance system that
enables a quick recovery in the event of a disaster. Recommended policy actions for these key elements
are discussed.

Keywords: Policy Reforms, Regression Models, Rice Inventory, Rice Prices, Rice Production, Rice Supply

*
This technical paper is part of an ongoing study, and its contents may be modified or revised in the future based
on the outcomes of its upcoming phases. Feedback, comments, and suggestions from the PTA stakeholders,
researchers, academic community, and/or research institutions are welcome within 60 days from the date of
posting. Contact us through email: reid@doftaxacademy.gov.ph
Determinants of Rice Prices in the Philippines: Recommendations
for Policy Reforms to Reduce Supply and Price Volatility

INTRODUCTION
The movements of rice prices attract the headlines in the Philippines due to the
importance of rice in the Filipino consumer’s diet and its large share in the consumer basket.
The rice price increases are monitored by news programs and are closely followed by
stakeholders. Due to the political sensitivity of the rice prices, discussions on the issue elicit
sharp exchanges between stakeholders that reverberate in the media, the halls of
government agencies, and public places. However, the causes and consequences of such price
movements are not properly discussed. This paper discusses the reasons why rice prices keep
rising despite efforts to keep them low and why they dropped when the Republic Act 11203,
otherwise known as the Rice Tariffication Law, was signed on February 14, 2019.

Objective

This study examined the factors affecting rice prices in the Philippines with the aim of
identifying policy measures that would lead to a more stable economic environment for rice
production and consumption. It analyzed the impact of the recent rice sector reforms,
particularly, the Rice Tariffication Law five years after its passage, and recommended policy
actions to preserve the gains therefrom.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Rice sector reform studies were first conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
in 1986 when it offered to create a reform program called the Grains Sector Development
Program (GSDP) for the Philippines. The GSDP prioritized policy and institutional reforms that
centered on the following: (a) adopting a more liberalized and cost-effective approach to
pricing and importing grains; (b) enhancing the management of grain buffer stocks; (c)
restructuring the National Food Authority to transition from a grains marketing monopoly
into a public regulatory agency and separate private sector marketing corporations; and (d)
implementing a more targeted and effective food subsidy program for the poor (Asian
Development Bank, 2000). In one of the ADB-commissioned studies, Cororaton (2004)
concluded that market reforms are necessary and should be supported by safety nets for the
adversely affected rice farmers. Unfortunately, the GSDP failed to produce the desired
reforms. A study conducted by Tolentino in 2002, with a revised version in 2006, explained
why the rice sector reform program failed to succeed despite its sound economic design.
From the political economy perspective, the study identified the main problem as the lack of
ownership of the reform due to the frequent changes in the leadership of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the absence of strong support from the Philippine Congress (Tolentino,
2002). Similarly, Balisacan and Ravago (2003) argued that the NFA, which is the government's
rice price and supply stabilization arm, “instituted interventions that exacerbated market
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failures, increased the volatility of domestic prices, discouraged the private sector from
investing in efficiency-enhancing distribution of storage facilities, and bred corruption and
institutional sclerosis.” In the 2008 ADB Validation Report on the GSDP, the project was rated
as “unsuccessful.”

Thereafter, several studies were carried out by a research team of the Philippine
Institute of Development Studies (PIDS) composed by Briones, Galang, and Tolin from 2013
to 2017. In their first study, they debunked the 100% rice self-sufficiency program and
concluded that such a claim can only succeed with the risk of “an unreasonably high price of
rice” (Briones et al., 2013). This was supported by the findings of Clarete (2015) who
concluded that rice self-sufficiency “is costly insurance from food insecurity risks” and that
the “risk of not finding rice to buy in the world market is low considering that nearly half of
the world’s exportable rice comes from the ASEAN region.” In their final study, Briones et al.
(2017) reported that “the preferred option is to pursue tariffication, with revenues earmarked
as a safety net for rice farmers and that “a 35-percent tariff rate seems appropriate as a tariff
equivalent.” This study was liberally quoted by the Department of Finance (DOF) in its position
paper presented to the Philippine Congress and in its DOF Economic Bulletin on rice sector
reform during the discussions on the rice tariffication bill which started in 2017 (Department
of Finance, 2017). A recent study by Dait (2023) suggested that, to maintain the country's
access to rice security, a long-term agricultural strategy should be institutionalized that
focuses on increasing the land area used for rice production, promoting the use of irrigation,
and utilizing other inputs aside from inorganic fertilizers. Moreover, proactive climate
variability adaption measures are required to mitigate the long-term effects of changes in
temperature and rainfall on rice production in the Philippines (Dait, 2023).

Significance of the Rice Market

In the Philippines, rice is the staple food in the diet. It accounts for 25% of the consumer
basket, the highest among Asian countries (Ganbold, 2022). Rice production accounts for 17%
of total agricultural output and employs 2.4 million Filipino farmers (Philippine Statistics
Authority, 2020). In particular, rice farms account for 4.8 million hectares out of 13.42 million
hectares under agricultural crop cultivation, constituting 35.8% of the country’s total land
area devoted to agriculture (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2020). However, decades of poor
policy implementation and management have led to high levels of trade protection, high
production costs, and high retail prices for Filipino consumers. At the same time, the
intensified climate change and the present war in Ukraine have destabilized the rice supply,
made prices unstable, and pushed the marginal rice farmers and the poor consumers further
to extreme poverty.

The domestic rice market is supplied by products sourced from both the domestic
production and the imports. From 1990 to 2022, the domestic rice production was increased
by 2.4% annually while the consumption rose by 2.9%. The share of the domestic production
to total supply decreased from 91% to 77%. As a result, the weight of the imported rice in the
consumer basket has risen from 9% to 23% as shown in Table 1. When India, the biggest rice
exporter, implemented a rice export ban on non-Basmati rice in September 2023, to protect
its domestic consumers, world rice prices jumped to US$536/MT, pushing up the domestic

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rice prices. This was a repeat of the 2008 event when the world prices of rice rose to
US$700/MT due to a similar ban induced by a sharp fall in production caused by drought
(Table 1).

The domestic production is protected by tariffs. A 35% tariff on rice imports1 effectively
sets the domestic retail price of rice at levels higher than the world price. Before the passage
of the Rice Tariffication Law, quantitative restrictions (QRs) before 2019, pushed the retail
price by percentages to as high as 288% than the tariff rate in 2001. Nonetheless, the National
Government subsidy amounting to 2.5% of GDP (Jha and Mehta, 2008) reduced the retail
price to 91% in 2008 and 125% in 2009 of world price (Table 2).

From 1990 to 2002, the domestic rice production increased by 2.3%. However, the
production growth has been declining from 2.6% in 1990-2000 to 2.2% in 2000-2010 and
further went down to 1.9% in 2010-2020. On the other hand, rice consumption grew by 2.5%
in 1990-2000, 3.5% in 2000-2010, and declined to 1.4% in 2010-2020. Comparably, the
population grew by 1.7% annually and slipped to 1.4% in the decade 2010-2020. Thus, the
consumption growth outstripped both the production and the population growth during this
period.

Rice Prices

The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) monitors three categories of rice prices, to wit:

1. farmgate price;
2. wholesale price; and
3. retail price.

The farmgate price of dry palay (rough rice) is the price at which farmers sell unmilled
product to traders, excluding the selling and transport costs. On the other hand, the
wholesale price is the price at which traders sell to retailers who buy the product in large
volumes. The retail price is the price at which retailers sell the product to consumers. The
consumers are the end users of the product, buying the product without reselling it. For
simplicity, this study used the average price in the Philippines as reported by the PSA.

For world rice prices, the Thailand export price is used as reported by the Thai Rice
Exporters Association (TREA) on its website. A similar price is reported by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in its publication, International Financial Statistics. The price of white
rice, 5% broken among different rice types, was chosen because it approximates the average
import price of the Philippines from Thailand. These prices are expressed in the current
Philippine pesos, except for the Thai export price which is reported in the current US$ and
needs to be converted to the Philippine pesos using the average exchange rate for the period.

1
Under Executive Order 135 signed in 2021, the 35% tariff rate applies on rice originating from
ASEAN and non-ASEAN. For non-ASEAN, the 35% rate is temporary and is in effect only up to
the end of 2024. The tariff rate for non-ASEAN reverts to 40% for minimum access volume
(MAV) in-quota and 50% MAV out-quota after this date.

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For the time series regression analysis, the prices are converted to constant pesos using the
GDP price deflator reported by the PSA.

Recent Rice Sector Reform

After decades of price regulation and tight control of domestic trading by the
government, the Philippines decided to pursue reform in its rice sector. Corollary to this, the
Rice Tariffication Law of 2019 aims to modernize the agricultural sector and make it globally
competitive by liberalizing the importation, exportation, and trading of rice. The law lifted the
quantitative import restriction on rice and replaced it with tariffs. Under this law, businesses
and individuals can buy rice from foreign sources after the payment of the 35%─50% tariff.
The law has led to a reduction in the price of rice with the retail prices dropping from Php
44.99/Kg in 2018 to Php 41.68/Kg in 2020. However, the price has since increased to Php
47.41/Kg as of December 2023 due to higher world prices triggered by adverse climate
developments in major rice-producing countries.

According to the DOF, the Rice Tariffication Law has generated Php 46.6 billion for the
farm sector from 2019 to 2021. From this, the amount of Php 10 billion a year was used to
fund the Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (RCEF), which is the government initiative
to help rice farmers improve their competitiveness and income. The RCEF program has
different components, including the mechanization program which aims to increase rice
farmers’ productivity and profitability through the use of appropriate production and
postproduction mechanization technologies. The program is implemented with the assistance
of local government units (LGUs). Another RCEF component is the credit facility which covers
farmers listed in the Registry System for Basic Sectors in Agriculture (Department of
Agriculture, n.d.).

The production cost of rice dropped from Php 11.76/Kg in 2018 to Php 11.45/Kg in 2019,
a 2.6% decline in current peso terms. Using the GDP deflator index, the production cost
declined from Php 11.48/Kg (2017=100) to P10.95/Kg in 2021, a 4.6% reduction. The yield per
hectare also rose from 3,972 Kg to 4,045 Kg, 1.8% higher just after a year. It has since
increased further to 4,154 Kg in 2021, a 4.5% improvement over 3 years (Table 3).

A more competitive rice market has also emerged with less price and import quantity
regulation by the Department of Agriculture, narrowing down the price margins of rice
traders. Since 2019, the domestic wholesale price of rice has declined from 179% of the world
price (in this case, the Thailand price) to 137% in 2023, the price margin closer to the tariff
imposed on imported rice. The ratio of retail price to world market price also declined from
197% to 148 %. The ratio of retail price to farmgate price has also narrowed from 252.1% to
208.5% (Table 2C).

METHODOLOGY
A regression analysis of rice prices was conducted to identify variables that need to be
addressed by policy action. The Data for the farmgate, wholesale and retail prices; rice

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production and stock inventory; and rice consumption and population growth were taken
from the reports of the DA and the PSA. Regression models and time series data were used
to determine the impact of production, stock inventory, and population growth on rice prices.

Results
Regression Analysis of Rice Prices

What are the factors that determine domestic rice prices? The regression analysis using
data from 2000 to 2023 suggested that:

1. The farmgate price is influenced by the production growth, the growth of rice inventory,
and the population growth.

Equation 1:

Farmgate = 40.03 ln population - 8.75 ln production – 2.87 ln stock inventory

price of
t = 4.41 t = -2.86 t = -1.4
rice

Adj R2 = 0.90 n =24 D.W. = 1.85

The independent variables population and production showed significant t-values at 1%

level of significance while the stock inventory growth showed a 17% level of significance. The
deviation is due to a high correlation (0.72) between the stock inventory and the production
using the 1990 to 2023 data. This is expected because the production contributes to a part of
the annual increment in-stock inventory.

Alternative equations regressing the production and the stock inventory separately
showed both independent variables registering higher t-values.

Equation 1.1:

Farmgate = 41.44 ln population – 13.62 ln production

price of
t = 5.56 t = -5.09
rice

Adj R2 = 0.90 n= 24 D.W. = 1.77

In Equation 1.1, all independent variables are significant at 1% level of significance.

Replacing the production with the rice stock inventory in this equation, using the same
database, resulted in higher t-ratios, as follows:

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 Equation 1.2:

Farmgate = 10.56 ln population – 4.36 ln production

price of
t = 3.28 t = 2.29
rice

Adj R2 = 0.87 n =24 D.W. = 1.85

The adjusted R2 was slightly lower than in Equation 1.1 but the t-values of both the
population and the stock inventory remained significant at 1% and 3% level of significance,
respectively.

The wholesale price is influenced by the farmgate price and the world price as evident
in the Equation 2 results. The coefficients of the farmgate price and the world export price
reflect their relative shares in the consumption basket.

Equation 2:

Wholesale = 1.5 farmgate price + 0.24 world export price

price
t = 12.25 t = 1.70

Adj R2 = 0.94 n = 24 D.W. = 1.74

2. The retail price is influenced by both the farmgate price and the world price.

Equation 3:
Retail = 1.85 farmgate price + 0.24 world export price
price
t = 17.52 t = 2.77

Adj R2 = 0.94 n = 24 D.W. = 1.63

All independent variables are significant at 1% level of significance.

The Philippines is a part of the world rice market with the domestic prices heavily
influenced by developments in the world market. The coefficient for world export price is 0.24
for both the wholesale price and the retail price, which is almost the same as the share of
imported rice (0.23) in the domestic market in 2022. No amount of domestic price and import
quantity regulation could lower the price down the farmgate price and world export price
without a substantial subsidy, which the country cannot afford.

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DISCUSSION
The regression results indicate that the ideal programs for the rice sector should include
these key elements: productivity enhancements, an improved stock management program,
an information system that enables stakeholders to make informed decisions, a gradual
reduction of tariffs in alignment with the improvement of productivity, and an insurance
system that enables a quick recovery in the event of a disaster.

a. Productivity enhancements

A rice productivity program that fosters efficient farm yields through better
seeds, modern farm implements and practices, and more irrigation facilities would
contribute to price stability. For example, a Filipino company SL Agritech Corp., which
is reportedly the largest seed producer in Asia, is marketing a hybrid rice seed variety
called SL8H. Based on farm testing conducted in Iloilo, SL8H could raise yield from
4.154 MT/ha in 2021 to 10─12 MT/ha. This variety has a potential to boost productivity
by 241 % to 289%.

The use of new milling technology, modern drier, or mechanical harvester

would reduce wastage and increase recovery from 60% to 65%. This could enhance
the production efficiency by 8.3%. (Department of Finance, 2017). Since manual
harvesting takes more time and is usually more expensive, especially during the
harvest season when the demand for workers surges, the use of farm machinery by
farmers’ cooperatives allows farmers to harvest quickly whenever a strong typhoon
approaches an area. This also holds true for areas that are prone to drought or other
natural disaster.

Rice production is water-intensive. Existing rice varieties consume, on

average, about 2,500 liters of water supplied either by rainfall and/or irrigation to a
rice field to produce 1 Kg of palay (rough rice). According to the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI), “these 2,500 liters account for all the outflows of
evapotranspiration, seepage, and percolation” (Bouman, 2008). This requires more
efficient rainfall storage and water management in the country’s dams. The release of
excess water from dams that flood river basins during the rainy season is better
avoided by reengineering the country’s dam systems to expand storage capacity.

Irrigation facilities may also need to expand. It takes 115 days from planting to
harvesting a rice crop (Tan, 2021). An irrigated rice farm can therefore have as many
as three harvest cycles a year as opposed to rainfed farms which can only support a
single cropping cycle in a year. Irrigation could potentially increase harvest by thrice
in 1.46 million hectares of unirrigated rice farms in the country (PSA, 2023 as cited by
the Philippine Rice Research Institute), raising the overall production in the country by
91.3%. In line with this, the areas of irrigable farms should be evaluated to ensure
productivity improvement. Likewise, assuming 2017 prices, a Php 4 billion budget
annually for the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) could raise irrigation coverage by
1.3M hectares (Department of Finance, 2017).
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 Furthermore, minimizing wastage across rice production, distribution, and
consumption among different institutions involved in the rice business could help
lower costs and raise viability. Cost reduction measures such as better drying, milling,
and handling facilities, and better farm-to-market roads and ports will enhance the
competitiveness of rice farming and trading. Additionally, consumers should be
educated on proper rice handling and storage to avoid wastage, lengthen the shelf
life, and preserve the nutrients, flavor, and overall product quality. This could reduce
an estimated Php 7.27 billion worth of rice in a year from being wasted in the country
based on the 2008 data. This is equivalent to 12.2% of the country’s total rice imports
which could feed around 2.5 million Filipinos in a year. In 2016, the PSA cited “an
average individual wastage of around 335 grams from annual rice leftover.” Expanding
the RICEponsible campaign to beyond the 42 LGUs presently involved can promote
practices for more efficient rice consumption to a wider audience (Philippine Rice
Research Institute, 2017).

Professionalizing rice farming by tapping research findings and keeping

farmers updated on the latest good farming practices would also contribute to better
results. For instance, with DA as a proponent, research on rice varieties that consume
less volume of water and endure higher temperatures is a step in the right direction
(Department of Agriculture, n.d.). A better agricultural extension program is also
necessary to implement scientific farming at the grassroots level. A rice production
growth that exceeds the annual population growth which is down to 1.4% per year
could also ease the demand and reduce pressures on the farmgate price. It is worth
noting that rice consumption has grown by 2.2% annually from 2000 to 2002,
resounding the need for better rice production.

b. Rice stock management

A better rice stock management that capitalizes on better domestic production

levels would contribute to stable prices. Enabling the NFA to keep a stable buffer will
dampen attempts at speculation and price rigging. Based on Equation 1.2, a
percentage rise or drop in the average stock inventory, respectively, decreases or
raises the farmgate price by 4.36%. The NFA may need to set a benchmark for the ideal
stock inventory that quells supply and price manipulation.

c. Information system

An up-to-date information system that allows stakeholders in the industry to

monitor prices throughout the country similar to the TREA website and enables
stakeholders to tap favorable prices in rice-deficit areas would help in making the rice
market more vibrant and competitive. This could also help stabilize prices in these
areas.

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 d. Tariff policy

Due to the negative impact of high rice prices on poor consumers and the
nutritional status of children, the 35% tariff may be gradually reduced during the
medium term in alignment with productivity improvement. The latest data show that
the production cost of rice in the Philippines is 7.0% higher than the arithmetic average
for six (6) Asian countries (Table 4). The yield per hectare is also 10.6% lower than the
average in these countries (Table 5). Using December 2023 prices and assuming 7%
freight and insurance charges which are the average for all traded commodities, the
milled rice production cost of Php 18.64/Kg as of 2021 should decrease by Php 3.83/Kg
to bring the tariff rate down to 10%. At this level, the average production cost should
fall somewhere between the production costs of Thailand and India.

e. Crop insurance

Due to the increasing frequency of extreme weather phenomena stemming

from climate change, the role of a viable and sustainable index-based crop insurance
system for farmers becomes crucial. With a crop insurance system in place, farmers
hit by natural disasters can claim benefits to enable them to replant and recover after
an adverse event. Equally, a subsidy fund may need to be set up by Philippine Crop
Insurance Corp. (PCIC) to help the poorest of the poor farmers. While the rest of the
farmers who can afford the insurance premium can be covered by the private sector
insurance industry. The PCIC may need to retool itself to be able to manage this fund
well and create and maintain a list of qualified beneficiaries. These considerations
could help stabilize the rice supply.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The results of regression analyses indicated that the farmgate price is influenced by the
production growth, the growth of rice inventory, and the population growth while both the
wholesale and retail prices are influenced by the farmgate price and the world price. These
suggest that policy measures addressing supply and price volatility should primarily focus on
improving rice production and inventory stock management. In addition, policymakers and
administrators in the rice sector, as well as lawmakers, should consider introducing gradual
adjustments on tariffs aligned with the rice production improvement. The Philippine
government, aside from providing monetary and non-monetary assistance to farmers, should
also ensure that an equitable insurance system is in place to help rice farmers recover during
an unexpected loss due to world rice market volatility, climate changes, or natural disasters.
Aspiring for a long-term solution, the government should invest in expanding the capacity of
the country’s dam and irrigation systems to provide adequate water supply to farmland
during the dry season. Furthermore, a vibrant information system that would allow rice
stakeholders to monitor prices across the country should be established. This could give them
an advantage in favorable prices in regions where rice shortage exists, making the market
more competitive.

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STATISTICAL APPENDICES
Table 1. Rice Production and Imports, 1990-2022.
Year Production Imports Local Imports
(MT) (MT) Production as % of
as % of Supply
Supply
1990 6,095 606 91.0% 9.0%
1991 6,326 - 100.0% 0.0%
1992 5,970 1 100.0% 0.0%
1993 6,170 202 96.8% 3.2%
1994 6,892 - 100.0% 0.0%
1995 6,894 264 96.3% 3.7%
1996 7,379 867 89.5% 10.5%
1997 7,370 722 91.1% 8.9%
1998 5,595 2,171 72.0% 28.0%
1999 7,708 834 90.2% 9.8%
2000 8,103 639 92.7% 7.3%
2001 8,472 8,081 51.2% 48.8%
2002 8,679 11,967 42.0% 58.0%
2003 8,829 886 90.9% 9.1%
2004 9,481 1,001 90.5% 9.5%
2005 9,550 1,822 84.0% 16.0%
2006 10,024 1,716 85.4% 14.6%
2007 10,621 1,806 85.5% 14.5%
2008 10,997 2,432 81.9% 18.1%
2009 10,633 1,755 85.8% 14.2%
2010 10,315 2,378 81.3% 18.7%
2011 10,911 707 93.9% 6.1%
2012 11,793 1,041 91.9% 8.1%
2013 12,059 398 96.8% 3.2%
2014 12,405 1,087 91.9% 8.1%
2015 11,870 1,478 88.9% 11.1%
2016 11,528 605 95.0% 5.0%
2017 12,607 885 93.4% 6.6%
2018 12,469 2,002 86.2% 13.8%
2019 12,305 3,118 79.8% 20.2%
2020 12,619 2,219 85.0% 15.0%
2021 13,054 2,967 81.5% 18.5%
2022 12,921 3,863 77.0% 23.0%
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

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Table 2A. Thailand Export Price of Rice
Export Export FOB Export FOB Export
Year Price/MT Price/Kg Price/Kg Price/Kg
Php
USD USD Php 2018=100
White 5%
brokens
2000 203.69 0.20 8.33 16.16
2001 172.71 0.17 6.75 12.34
2002 191.83 0.19 8.48 14.83
2003 199.46 0.20 10.17 17.24
2004 245.78 0.25 12.68 20.22
2005 287.81 0.29 15.60 23.37
2006 303.52 0.30 17.01 24.17
2007 332.39 0.33 18.31 24.36
2008 700.2 0.70 35.93 45.89
2009 589.38 0.59 27.20 33.85
2010 520.49 491.72 0.49 21.87 26.04
2011 551.71 549.40 0.55 23.79 27.19
2012 580.24 573.48 0.57 24.22 27.11
2013 519.31 516.81 0.52 21.94 24.04
2014 426.48 422.83 0.42 18.77 19.95
2015 380.05 385.91 0.39 17.56 18.78
2016 388.26 394.81 0.39 18.75 19.79
2017 399.07 398.93 0.40 20.11 20.62
2018 403.08 420.56 0.42 22.15 22.15
2019 396.51 417.72 0.42 21.64 20.87
2020 477.84 496.71 0.50 24.64 23.53
2021 441.96 458.17 0.46 22.57 21.07
2022 419.06 436.58 0.44 23.79 21.07
2023 512.20 553.79 0.55 30.08 25.30
*Free-on-Board (FOB)
Sources: Thailand Rice Exporters Association & Philippine Statistics
Authority

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Table 2B. Philippines’ Wholesale and Retail Rice Prices.
Wholesale Wholesale Retail Retail
Year Price/Kg Price/Kg Price/Kg Price/Kg
Php, Php,
Php 2018=100 Php 2018=100
Well Milled
2000 17.77 34.48 19.45 37.74
2001 17.61 32.20 19.43 35.53
2002 18.21 31.86 19.98 34.96
2003 18.3 31.01 20.2 34.23
2004 19.12 30.48 21.04 33.54
2005 20.93 31.36 22.88 34.28
2006 21.39 30.39 23.56 33.48
2007 22.89 30.46 24.72 32.89
2008 29.81 38.07 32.71 41.78
2009 31.17 38.79 34.12 42.46
2010 31.72 37.77 34.34 40.89
2011 32.01 36.57 34.73 39.68
2012 32.70 36.59 35.30 39.50
2013 34.50 37.80 36.87 40.40
2014 39.36 41.84 42.32 44.98
2015 38.31 40.96 42.04 44.95
2016 38.10 40.21 41.72 44.03
2017 38.91 39.89 42.14 43.21
2018 42.42 42.42 44.99 44.99
2019 38.80 37.43 42.73 41.22
2020 37.87 36.16 41.68 39.80
2021 37.70 35.20 43.18 40.31
2022 38.36 33.97 43.58 38.60
2023 42.72 35.94 47.41 39.88
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

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Table 2C. Farmgate Prices of Rice and Price Ratios
Year Farmgate Farmgate Wholesale Retail Retail Price as
Price Price as % of Price as % of
(Dry Palay) (Dry Palay) Thailand % of Farmgate
Export Thailand Price
Price Export
Price
Php,
Per Kg 2018=100
2000 8.42 16.34 2.13 2.34 231.0%
2001 8.17 14.94 2.61 2.88 237.8%
2002 8.82 15.43 2.15 2.36 226.5%
2003 8.84 14.98 1.80 1.99 228.5%
2004 9.45 15.06 1.51 1.66 222.6%
2005 10.43 15.63 1.34 1.47 219.4%
2006 10.46 14.86 1.26 1.39 225.2%
2007 11.22 14.93 1.25 1.35 220.3%
2008 14.13 18.05 0.83 0.91 231.5%
2009 14.63 18.21 1.15 1.25 233.2%
2010 14.81 17.63 1.45 1.57 231.9%
2011 15.05 17.20 1.35 1.46 230.8%
2012 15.92 17.81 1.35 1.46 221.7%
2013 16.53 18.11 1.57 1.68 223.0%
2014 19.46 20.68 2.10 2.25 217.5%
2015 17.55 18.76 2.18 2.39 239.5%
2016 17.76 18.74 2.03 2.22 234.9%
2017 18.08 18.54 1.94 2.10 233.1%
2018 20.09 20.09 1.91 2.03 223.9%
2019 16.95 16.35 1.79 1.97 252.1%
2020 16.76 16.00 1.54 1.69 248.7%
2021 16.76 15.65 1.67 1.91 257.6%
2022 17.44 15.45 1.61 1.83 249.9%
2023 20.90 17.58 1.42 1.58 226.8%
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

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Table 3. Production Cost and Yields

Year Cost/Kg Cost/Kg Yield/ha GROSS RETURNS NET RETURNS Net

Php Deflated Kg Php Deflated Php Deflated Profit -
using using using GDP Cost
GDP GDP Deflator Ratio
Deflator Deflator
2017=100 2017=100 2017=100
2002 6.7 11.20 3,188 27,483 45,937 6,126 10,240 0.29
2003 6.65 10.78 3,370 29,791 48,294 7,387 11,975 0.33
2004 7.05 11.08 3,513 33,198 52,172 8,428 13,245 0.34
2005 7.63 11.32 3,588 37,423 55,516 10,037 14,890 0.37
2006 7.61 10.65 3,684 38,535 53,924 10,498 14,690 0.37
2007 7.86 10.46 3,801 42,647 56,754 12,785 17,014 0.43
2008 9.62 12.04 3,770 53,270 66,652 17,002 21,273 0.47
2009 10.81 13.00 3,409 50,324 60,539 13,483 16,220 0.37
2010 10.5 12.32 3,622 53,859 63,173 15,830 18,568 0.42
2011 10.88 12.23 3,678 55,795 62,727 15,792 17,754 0.39
2012 11.05 11.94 3,845 62,366 67,393 19,891 21,494 0.47
2013 11.97 12.67 3,513 58,878 62,339 16,818 17,807 0.4
2014 12.33 12.79 4,002 80,320 83,311 30,956 32,109 0.63
2015 11.95 12.03 3,898 67,542 68,016 20,951 21,098 0.45
2016 11.04 11.18 3,869 67,427 68,304 24,719 25,040 0.58
2017 11.05 11.05 4,006 72,950 72,950 28,699 28,699 0.65
2018 11.76 11.48 3,972 79,670 77,750 32,976 32,181 0.71
2019 11.45 10.78 4,045 68,561 64,544 22,243 20,940 0.48
2020 11.5 10.72 4,089 68,519 63,844 21,492 20,025 0.46
2021 12.02 10.95 4,154 69,600 63,410 19,680 17,930 0.39
Source: PSA

Table 4. Comparative Cost of Producing 1 Kg of Palay

(*Php/Kg, 2013-2014)
Country Unhusked Milled Rice
Rice (Palay) Equivalent
Vietnam 6.53 9.92
Thailand 8.81 13.68
India 9.87 14.99
PHILIPPINES (2021) 12.02 18.64
China 14.08 21.39
Indonesia 15.69 23.67
AVERAGE 11.23 16.63
Source: PIDS Policy Notes, March 2017
*Except the Philippines which uses 2021 data

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 Table 5. Rice Yields, 2021
Country Yield (MT/ha)
China 7.11
Vietnam 6.07
India 4.21
Indonesia 4.21
PHILIPPINES 4.15
Malaysia 3.75
Thailand 2.99
AVERAGE 4.64
Source: FAO

Table 6. Philippines’ Rice Production and Consumption

Production Milled Rice
Growth Growth Population
Year Dry Palay Consumption
(%) (%) Growth
(MT) (MT)
1990 6,095 6,701 63.64
2000 8,103 2.62% 8,742 2.45% 76.81 1.72%
2010 10,315 2.22% 12,693 3.45% 92.72 1.73%
2020 12,619 1.85% 14,838 1.43% 108.3 1.42%
2022 12,921 1.75% 16,784 2.17% 110.8 1.38%
Average
2.30% 2.82% 1.69%
Growth
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

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Table 7. Philippines’ Rice Stock, Production, and Imports
Stock Inventory Production
Imports
Year (Monthly Milled Rice
(MTM)
Average in MT) (MT)
2,321.80
2000 1,826.77 12,389,412 639
2001 2,097.98 12,954,870 8,081
2002 1,896.15 13,270,653 11,967
2003 2,095.95 13,499,884 886
2004 1,917.93 14,496,784 1,001
2005 1,797.05 14,603,005 1,822
2006 2,061.46 15,326,706 1,716
2007 1,715.38 16,240,194 1,806
2008 2,178.47 16,815,548 2,432
2009 2,555.73 16,266,417 1,755
2010 3,101.90 15,772,319 2,378
2011 3,009.04 16,684,062 707
2012 2,245.02 18,032,525 1,041
2013 2,169.06 18,439,420 398
2014 2,162.33 18,967,826 1,087
2015 2,626.71 18,149,838 1,478
2016 2,886.66 17,627,245 605
2017 2,436.92 19,174,601 885
2018 2,102.03 14,362,711 2,002
2019 2,502.48 18,811,827 3,118
2020 2,417.82 19,294,856 2,219
2021 2,167.05 19,960,170 2,967
2022 2,030.25 19,756,392 3,863
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority

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