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Vocations and Learning (2024) 17:253–276

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12186-023-09339-6

ORIGINAL PAPER

The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed


performance in full flight simulator training

Ari Tuhkala1 · Ville Heilala1 · Joni Lämsä1 · Arto Helovuo2 ·


Ilkka Tynkkynen2 · Emilia Lampi1 · Katriina Sipiläinen1 ·
Raija Hämäläinen1 · Tommi Kärkkäinen3

Received: 21 June 2022 / Accepted: 29 September 2023 / Published online: 24 November 2023
© The Author(s) 2023

Abstract
This study explores potential disparities between flight instructor evaluations and
pilot self-assessments in the context of full flight simulator training. Evaluated per-
formance was based on the Competency-based Training and Assessment frame-
work, a recent development of competency-based education within aviation. Self-
assessed performance is derived from survey responses and debriefing interviews.
The simulator session involves eight multi-crew pilot training graduates and eight
experienced flight captains, encompassing two tasks featuring sudden technical mal-
fucntions during flight. The flight instructor’s evaluations reveal no significant dif-
ferences in pilot performance. However, disparities become apparent when pilots
engaged in reflecting their performance. Novice pilots, despite perceiving both tasks
as easy, exhibited an overconfidence that led them to underestimate the inherent
risks. Conversely, experienced pilots demonstrated greater caution towards the risks
and engaged in discussing possible hazards. Furthermore, this study highlights the
challenge of designing flight simulator training that incorporates surprise elements.
Pilots tend to anticipate anomalies more readily in simulator training than during
actual flights. Thus, this study underscores the importance of examining how pilots
reflect on their performance, complementing the assessment of observable indica-
tors and predefined competencies.

Introduction

Authentic virtual reality simulators provide a secure environment to practice respond-


ing to risky or impossible situations in real life (Chernikova et al., 2020). In aviation,
there exist advanced technical training devices that can accurately mimic the operation
of real aeroplanes. These devices, known as full flight simulators, combine aeroplane
cockpits, computer software, displays, and other hardware to produce an authentic vis-
ual view from the aeroplane and force cueing that reacts to pilot’s manoeuvres. This

Extended author information available on the last page of the article

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Vol.:(0123456789)
254 A. Tuhkala et al.

enables pilots to immerse themselves in completing routine flight tasks and then face
unexpected events that require them to diverge from their original manoeuvres and pro-
cedures (Salas et al., 1998). For instance, when a technical malfunction occurs at a crit-
ical stage of a flight, the pilot needs to evaluate threats caused by the malfunction and
react accordingly (Casner et al., 2013). Thus, it is common to utilise full flight simula-
tors for both pre-service and in-career training, although the high costs and expenses of
these devices limit their availability (McLean et al., 2016).
Competency-based education has become the main educational approach in the train-
ing of professional pilots. The concept was introduced in the aviation industry in early
2000 as a result of the work made by an expert panel of the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (Kearns et al., 2017). The panel proposed that pilots’ profession should not
be defined by the mere number of flight hours but by the competencies that are devel-
oped and deployed throughout the training phases. This creates a systematic approach to
educating competent pilots that can operate an aeroplane safely and efficiently through
continuous monitoring and evaluation of performance. The most recent development
of competency-based education is the Competency-Based Training and Assessment
(CBTA) framework. CBTA is composed of nine competencies, each containing several
behavioural indicators that illustrate how it should manifest in action (EASA, 2020). The
European Union Aviation Safety Agency has mandated that all European flight pilot
training organisations incorporate CBTA into their training programs since 2022.
However, competency-based education has been criticised for its potential reduc-
tionism, if competencies and behavioural indicators are reduced to mere checklists,
potentially limiting pilots’ intuition and reflection (Franks et al., 2014; Hattingh et al.,
2022; Hodge et al., 2020). Our study considers this issue and explores how the formal
evaluation made by the flight instructor relates to the pilot’s self-assessment. The formal
evaluation is based on systematic grading with the CBTA framework, and the pilot’s
self-assessment is obtained from surveys and debriefing interviews. To implement this
study, we organised a training session utilising the Airbus A320 Full Flight simulator.
The session consisted of multiple flight tasks, with our focus being on two specific sce-
narios: one in which a malfunction occurs during standard take-off and another where
landing takes place in a crosswind. The interest of this study is not merely comparing the
performance between novice and experienced pilots, as in traditional expertise research.
Instead, the interconnective aspect is that the novices had just finished their multi-crew
pilot training, a program based on competency-based education and the use of full flight
simulators, whereas experienced pilots have gone through more traditional training.
Hence, the aim of this study is to investigate: How does performance evaluated by
the flight instructor using the CBTA framework and performance self-assessed by the
pilot interconnect?

Background

Pilot training and professional expertise

Persons seeking to pursue a professional career as a pilot without prior aviation


experience can apply for ab initio (i.e., from the beginning) training (Marques

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The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 255

et al., 2023). The applicants must have suitable physical characteristics and sec-
ondary education and take psychological tests that evaluate qualities such as their
spatial perception and pressure resistance. Also, the applicants are interviewed
by flight instructors and psychologists, and they undergo medical examinations
and security checks. Ab initio training programs generally last for two years and
include approximately 750 h of theory lessons and 200 flight training sessions.
After the ab initio training, pilots can apply for professional airline pilot licenses,
namely, Commercial Pilot License for smaller aircraft and Airline Transport Pilot
License to become a captain of a high-capacity aircraft. The license requirements
are defined by international standards and regulations by the International Civil
Aviation Organisation and based on flying hours.
Ab initio training, as a form of professional education (Eraut, 2009), instils
theoretical knowledge, including aerodynamics, principles of flight, air laws,
human performance, and meteorology. Flying using only the instruments (i.e.,
without visibility outside the cockpit) and airplane control represent practical
skills and techniques practiced in flight training sessions. Beyond this, neces-
sary generic skills are, for example, communication and leadership, as successful
plane operation involves collaboration between pilots, cabin crew, and air traffic
control. Furthermore, pilots’ general knowledge should cover topics such as the
history of aviation and the aviation business.
After completing ab initio training and acquiring the necessary licenses, the
pilot can apply for first officer positions. However, before becoming a first officer,
they must take a first officer course and secure a rating for the intended plane
type. During their career, pilots can complete additional training modules, such
as gaining type ratings for other aircraft, taking commander training modules to
become a flight captain, or pursuing a course to become a flight instructor. Fur-
thermore, pilots must participate in recurrent training and pass regular tests to
maintain their professional qualification to act as a pilot. In addition to the formal
pilot training discussed above, much of learning occurs incidentally and infor-
mally during the career, for example, through imitating how more experienced
pilots have handled different situations (Eraut, 2004).
After the ab initio training, the pilot begins the transition from a novice pilot
into the realm of professional expert. In that regard, pilot’s expertise is frequently
discussed in training context within the concept of deliberate practice, which is
defined as “activities that have been specially designed to improve the current
level of performance” (Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 368). Within this view, it is not
innate qualities, such as talent or gender, nor the mere amount of experience, that
underpin better performance, but the amount of high-quality practice (Ericsson,
1998). A similar notion can be found in the works of Bereiter and Scardama-
lia (1993), where the mere repetition of routine tasks does not contribute to the
development of expertise. Instead, professionals need to operate at the bounda-
ries of their existing competency, engaging with novel challenges and problem-
solving that push their capabilities to the limit. It is through such endeavors that
professionals continually learn and refine their expertise.
Consequently, a long tradition of expertise research has examined the differences
between expert and novice pilots’ performance (e.g., Bellenkes et al., 1997; Durso

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256 A. Tuhkala et al.

& Dattel, 2012; Jin et al., 2021; Yu et al., 2016; Wiggins & O’hare, 2003; Wieg-
mann et al., 2002): Expert pilots’ attention is less constrained by resource limits than
novices’ attention because experts can automate domain-relevant tasks and develop
efficient resource-management strategies, such as moving between tasks or prioritiz-
ing subtasks. Novices concentrate their visual search behaviour (scanning the hori-
zon and the flight instruments) in a smaller area and visit flight instruments less
frequently than the experts. Expert pilots can better perceive and interpret informa-
tional cues and structural variants in their dynamic environment, leading to better
hazard detection and situational awareness. Experts are more aware of where poten-
tial hazardous situations may appear and, thus, better able to react to a situation
without significant inference from other tasks. Expert pilots develop more efficient
mental models that aid in their planning and decision-making. Furthermore, experts
seem to have more comprehensive knowledge strategies that allow them greater flex-
ibility in their decision-making and planning. These findings can be found from the
efforts of defining and descriping pilot’s professional competency, as next discussed.

Evaluation and self‑assessment in pilot’s profession

The evaluation practices in pilot’s profession derive from competency-based edu-


cation. However, competency-based education involves various theoretical tradi-
tions, with quite contrasting views (Brockmann et al., 2008; Mulder et al., 2007).
One demarcation is to consider whether competencies are understood as generic
skills, developed creatively and tacitly in everyday interactions (competence), or as
specific abilities to do something explicitly defined in advance and evaluated with
precise criteria (competency) (Antera, 2021). In this sense, aviation industry has
clearly adopted the latter, where an ability to participate in pilot’s professional prac-
tice depends on specific core competencies (Kearns et al., 2017). These competen-
cies include the specific information required to recall facts, identify concepts, apply
rules, solve problems and think creatively (knowledge); the ability to perform cer-
tain actions or activities (skill); and an internal mental state or disposition that influ-
ences on personal choice towards an object, person or event (attitude) (IATA, 2023).
The CBTA is the most recently introduced evaluation framework that consists
of nine core competencies (EASA, 2020). Evaluation is meant to be based on per-
formance, compare pilots against pre-defined competencies instead of each other
and recognise prior learning gained from earlier training or experience. The core
competencies combine the psychomotor and cognitive technical skills to con-
trol the aircraft both manually and automatically, as well as the threat and error
management skills for minimising risks. The non-technical skills are derived
from crew resource management and non-technical skills frameworks, such as
the European taxonomy of pilots’ non-technical skills (Flin & Martin, 2001;
Flin et al., 2003). The core competencies are assessed based on evidence from
pilot’s professional actions, referred to as behavioural indicators. For example,
one behavioural indicator of communication is that the pilot ensures the recipient
is ready and able to receive the information before starting the actual communi-
cation. As the evaluation is strongly based on the competency descriptions and

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The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 257

behavioural indicators, they play a major role in designing and implementing the
actual pilot training (Table 1).
Competency-based education has had positive effects on pilot training, reshap-
ing the emphasis from inputs (such as the number of flying hours) to outputs
(what pilot does), acknowledging the diversity in individual learning paces and
aptitudes among pilots by allowing training to continue until competency is
achieved, irrespective of the accumulated flying hours, and facilitates the provi-
sion of training and evaluation tools that are highly pertinent to the demands of
the professional pilots (Kearns et al., 2017). However, several scholars have high-
lighted inherent challenges in competency-based education. For instance, Franks
el al. (2014) conducted an examination of competency-based training within
Australian industry and advocated for the incorporation of problem-based learn-
ing that places greater emphasis on higher-order thinking skills within ab initio
training programs. They also suggested the adoption of an assessment framework
capable of discerning different levels of expertise. Hattingh et al. (2022) argue
that flight instructors may not necessarily possess the capability to interpret com-
petency descriptions accurately, potentially leading to difficulties in implement-
ing training that is strictly aligned with competency requirements. Hodge et al.
(2020) raise concerns regarding the assumptions underlying competency docu-
ments, particularly whether they can comprehensively capture all facets of a pro-
fessional’s practice and whether they would be consistently interpreted across
diverse contexts.
While the CBTA framework does address some of the presented criticism, such
as delineating varying levels of competency, it remains notably silent on a crucial
factor of learning: the ability of professionals to engage in reflective practice (Hager,
2008; Bontemps-Hommen et al., 2020). In this context, there is emerging body of
research considering reflection in pilot’s profession (Mavin, 2016; Mavin & Roth,
2014; Mavin & Roth, 2015; Mavin et al., 2018). These inquiries extend beyond the
question of how pilots can enhance their professional practice through reflection; it
encompasses the notion that reflection itself constitutes a skill that necessitates cul-
tivation (Mavin & Roth, 2014). Furthermore, the enhancement of a pilot’s capacity
to reflect on their professional practice retrospectively can serve as a pivotal catalyst
for fostering greater reflexivity while actively engaged in their practice (Cattaneo &
Motta, 2021). Consequently, our considerations regarding a pilot’s self-assessment
are not confined solely to numerical performance ratings in the form of self-evalu-
ation. Rather, they extend to encompass how pilots engage in reflective discussions
about their performance during debriefing sessions following simulator exercises.
This multifaceted approach recognizes the nuanced interplay between self-assess-
ment and the broader development of reflective practice within the field of aviation.

Methods

An ethical review was carried out before conducting this study by the Human Sci-
ences Ethics Committee of [anonymised] to ensure that it follows the guidelines
for responsible conduct of research. The review conducted an external assessment

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258

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Table 1  The competency-based training and assessment framework (EASA, 2020)
Competency Acronym Description

Application of knowledge APK Demonstrates knowledge and understanding of relevant information, operating instructions, air-
craft systems and the operating environment
Application of procedures and compliance with regulations PRO Identifies and applies procedures in accordance with published operating instructions and applica-
ble regulations, using the appropriate knowledge.
Communication COM Demonstrates effective oral, non-verbal and written communications, in normal and non-normal
situations.
Flight path management: manual / automatic control FPM Controls the aircraft flight path through manual flight, including appropriate use of flight manage-
ment system(s) and flight guidance systems.
Leadership and teamwork LTW Demonstrates effective leadership and team working.
Problem solving and decision making PSD Accurately identifies risks and resolves problems. Uses the appropriate decision-making pro-
cesses.
Situation awareness and management of information SAW Perceives and comprehends all the relevant information available and anticipates what could hap-
pen that may affect the operation.
Workload management WLM Manages available resources efficiently to prioritize and perform tasks in a timely manner under
all circumstances.
A. Tuhkala et al.
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 259

of the research plan, the data management plan, the data privacy notification and
the research consent for participants.

Participants

All together, we recruited 16 pilots using the intra-corporate communication


channels of the stakeholder flight company. All pilots were licensed to operate
Airbus A320 as a fully qualified crew member. All pilots had the same national-
ity, and all were male. Eight of the recruited pilots had just finished their multi-
crew pilot license (MPL) training and type-rating courses. When comparing to
ab initio training, the MPL aims for qualified multi-crew flight deck instead of
single-pilot operations, and the training program is strongly based on the CBTA
framework and the use of full flight simulators (Wikander & Dahlström, 2016).
Moreover, the training is performed in line-oriented flight training sessions,
where pilots practice real-life threats and challenging conditions as part of the
crew, instead of practicing in a single-pilot aircraft. In contrast, the other eight
pilots were all working as captains and had at least five years of flight experience.
To clarify, we will further on refer to the MPL graduates as novice pilots and to
the flight captains as experienced pilots.

Simulator sessions

The simulator sessions were performed in the Airbus A320 Full Flight Simulators
that is certified in the highest category (D) of regulated flight simulator systems
(EASA, 2012). The simulator sessions for the experienced pilots took place in Octo-
ber 2020 and for the novice pilots in November 2020. All participants acted as pilot
flying (main responsibility to control the aircraft) and had the same experienced co-
pilot as a pilot monitoring. A qualified simulator instructor operated the simulator
and acted as an air-traffic controller.
The simulator sessions lasted 47 min on average (SD = 9 min, range = 42 to
61 min) and followed the typical training structure of the training organization. The
session begun with an orientation by performing a normal take-off and a short flight
along the departure route. The actual training was designed to periodically increase
workload and difficulty across the following tasks: normal take-off, approach and
landing in light wind, take-off with a flight management system failure, approach
and landing in strong crosswind and approach and landing in strong crosswind
including an instrument failure. There was a 1–3-minute pause between the tasks,
during which the simulator calculated the parameters and the pilots oriented for the
next task. All approaches were flown manually based on instrument landing system
and raw data, without flight guidance augmentation.
This study focuses on two specific tasks that involved technical malfunctions.
In the first task, take-off with a flight management system failure, the environmen-
tal conditions were easy, but there was a computer navigation failure at a critical

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260 A. Tuhkala et al.

point after take-off. While the plane was climbing to the assigned altitude and turn-
ing toward the assigned heading, there was a sudden loss of both the autopilot and
flight director. The failure activated a system fault indicator on the display, which
automatically disappeared 30 s after activation. During this half-a-minute, the pilot
had to manually fly the plane to keep on the intended flight path while simultane-
ously assessing the situation and taking the proper actions. In a two-pilot crew, this
required active communication about the nature of the problem, prioritisation of
actions and coordination of task sharing.
In the second task, crosswind approach and landing with an instrument failure,
the pilot needed to fly using a raw data instrument approach and land in a high-
velocity crosswind. The task was challenging as the plane needed to be flown with
proper wind correction, so it was necessary to point the nose of the plane into the
wind to avoid it drifting from the intended path. The technical malfunction occurred
when the plane had descended to 2500 feet on its approach path. The monitoring
pilot’s primary flight display failure made the artificial horizon to drift, and as the
plane detected a discrepancy between the altitude indicator on the flying pilot’s and
that on the monitoring pilot’s sides, a failure alert chimed, and an electronic check-
list called for pilot action. In this case, the crew needed to compare primary and
standby instruments to verify which source was giving a false indication and then
change the data source of the faulty instrument to the operating one. The workload
of the flying pilot was significantly increased because the normal instrument scan-
ning pattern had to be altered until the abnormal situation was handled.

Data collection

First, the pilot was informed of the study and the rights concerning the experiment
and equipped with a microphone. Before entering to the simulator, the pilot filled a
pre-survey that included questions about expectations regarding the upcoming ses-
sion, such as how well does the pilot expect to perform in the simulator session.
After the pilot was seated, the simulator session started. The pilot’s performance
was recorded with one video camera focusing on the cockpit and two GoPro cam-
eras focusing on the flight instruments. When the simulator session was over, the
pilot filled out a post-survey that asked the pilot to rate each of the session tasks.
The pilot entered a debriefing room, where the interview took place. The interview
was recorded with a microphone and one GoPro camera. The interview questions
were presented by one of the researchers and moderated by a flight instructor. The
debriefing interview started with a general question about the first impressions and
thoughts regarding the simulator session. Then, the tasks were discussed in detail,
using interview prompts that encouraged the pilot to reflect on the tasks. The same
questions were used for both tasks: (a) How familiar the malfunction was? (b) On
what basis did you decide on your actions? (c) How do you think you performed in
the situations? (d) What do you think was particularly important in the situation?
(e) Was something particularly easy or difficult in the situations? (f) Would you do
something differently in a similar situation?

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The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 261

Data analysis

For the evaluated performance, the flight instructor who was present in the debrief-
ing, but not in the simulator session, analysed the video recordings. The evaluation
followed the guidelines of the CBTA manual (EASA, 2020). The automated flight
path management competence was removed because both tasks were flown manu-
ally. Additionally, only relevant behavioural indicators for the task were included
in the evaluation (Table 2). The applicable indicators were evaluated on a scale of
1 to 5, so that the higher value means more effective and regular demonstration of
behaviour with safer outcome (5 = significantly enhances safety, 4 = enhances safety,
3 = safe operation, 2 = did not result in an unsafe situation, 1 = resulted in an unsafe
situation).
Self-assessed performance consisted of survey answers and debriefing interviews.
When regarding the survey answers, we applied four items that represented pilot’s
own view of task performance on a scale of 1 (bad) to 10 (excellent): the expected
overall session performance (pre-survey), perceived performance in task 1 (post-sur-
vey), perceived performance in task 2 (post-survey) and how performance matches
current level of competence (post-survey). We decided to report all answers, instead
of mere descriptive statistics, as it was concise enough to be included in a single
table.
For the debriefing interviews, we utilised qualitative content analysis following
an inductive approach that is recommended when the researchers have insufficient
a priori knowledge (Mayring, 2000, 2014). Hence, the interviews were analysed by

Table 2  The evaluated competences and number of applied behavioural indicators


Competency Original Task Applied Percentage
indica- indicators of original
tors indicators

Application of knowledge 7 T1 3 43
T2 2 29
Application of procedures and compliance with regula- 7 T1 6 86
tions T2 6 86
Communication 10 T1 7 70
T2 7 70
Flight path management: manual 7 T1 6 86
T2 5 71
Leadership and teamwork 11 T1 4 36
T2 5 45
Problem solving and decision making 9 T1 5 56
T2 6 67
Situation awareness and management of information 7 T1 3 43
T2 4 57
Workload management 9 T1 7 78
T2 7 78

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262 A. Tuhkala et al.

the researchers who were not pilots, or pilot instructors, and thus not familiar with
CBTA or other pilot training frameworks. As such, our goal was to find different
ways in which the pilots reflected on the tasks, instead of mapping existing ones.
First, we transcribed the interviews and exported the files to Atlas TI version 22.
The first author started the analysis by identifying relevant instances and then devel-
oping codes that could group the instances together. For example, an excerpt where
a pilot explained the importance of staying calm was coded with ‘T1-d act calm’,
in which the signs marked which task (e.g. T1) and question (e.g. question d) the
code refers to. Two other authors analysed the data with the same coding scheme,
but only for two experienced (E7, E8) and two novice (N2, N3) pilots. The purpose
was to ensure that all relevant instances were identified by the first author and to
propose alternative codes if necessary. Eventually, relevant instances were marked
as quotations and assigned one or more codes, and each code was briefly described.
The authors responsible for the analysis discussed the final coding scheme, seek-
ing to interpret the meanings of and possible relationships between the codes. They
combined similar codes into groups that represented the target of reflection. For
example, the codes ‘act calm’, ‘control the airplane’, ‘prioritise actions’ and ‘analyse
before acting’ were grouped together and given a description ‘The most important
action was to [code] in the situation’. Finally, selected quotations were translated
into English for use in this paper to demonstrate the research findings.

Results

Evaluated performance

The competence grade is an average calculated from the relevant behavioural indi-
cators. For example, pilot’s application of knowledge in the first task is an average
of the following three behavioural indicators: (a) identifies the source of the failure,
knows how to recover systems and understands the effects on the continuation of the
flight, (b) applies standard procedures for take-off sequence correctly, applies cor-
rect task sharing, call outs, and ECAM procedure in trouble shooting failure and (c)
manages failure effectively by demonstrating knowledge (Table 3).
The average overall performance in the first task was 4.24 for experienced pilots
and 4.33 for novice pilots. Despite the rather similar performance as a group, the
performance of novice pilots was more stable. When using a cut-off value of four,
the performance was lower for three of the experienced pilots (E3, E6 and E8) and
for one novice pilot (N1) (Table 4).
The results for the second task were rather similar, although the difference
between the two groups was slightly larger. The average overall performance was
4.27 for experienced pilots and 4.41 for novice pilots. The overall performance
was below the cut-off value for two experienced and one novice pilot. It can
be noticed that the overall performance was at least three (safe operation) for all
pilots, but as a group, the novices performed a little bit better than the experienced
pilots. Especially when there was one outstanding performance (E1) that raised the

13
Table 3  Evaluated performance in the task 1 (5 = significantly enhances safety, 4 = enhances safety, 3 = safe operation, 2 = did not result in an unsafe situation, 1 = resulted
in an unsafe situation)
Experienced pilots E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 Average

Application of knowledge 5.00 4.33 3.33 4.00 5.00 3.67 3.33 5.00 4.21
Application of procedures and compliance with regulations 5.00 4.67 3.17 4.50 4.83 4.17 3.50 4.67 4.31
Communication 5.00 5.00 3.83 4.50 4.00 3.86 3.83 4.67 4.34
Flight path management – manual control 5.00 4.83 3.33 3.50 4.67 3.67 4.50 4.33 4.23
Leadership and teamwork 4.50 4.75 3.50 4.50 4.67 4.00 4.25 5.00 4.40
Problem-solving and decision-making 4.80 4.40 3.60 4.00 4.20 4.00 3.80 4.40 4.15
Situation awareness and management of information 5.00 4.67 3.33 3.67 3.67 4.00 3.67 4.00 4.00
Workload management 5.00 5.00 3.71 4.29 4.57 3.71 3.57 4.14 4.25
Overall competence 4.91 4.71 3.48 4.12 4.45 3.88 3.81 4.53 4.24
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed…

Novice pilots N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 Average


Application of knowledge 2.67 4.33 4.33 5.00 4.67 4.33 4.67 4.67 4.33
Application of procedures and compliance with regulations 3.00 4.33 4.33 4.67 4.83 4.83 4.67 4.67 4.42
Communication 3.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 4.33 4.86 4.86 4.63
Flight path management – manual control 3.67 4.67 3.00 4.50 4.50 5.00 4.33 4.33 4.25
Leadership and teamwork 3.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.33 4.33 4.67 4.67 4.46
Problem-solving and decision-making 2.67 4.33 4.33 5.00 4.20 4.50 4.40 4.40 4.23
Situation awareness and management of information 2.67 4.00 4.00 4.67 4.33 4.00 4.67 4.67 4.13
Workload management 3.14 4.00 4.00 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.31
Overall competence 3.12 4.42 4.21 4.77 4.50 4.50 4.62 4.62 4.34
263

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264

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Table 4  Evaluated performance in the task 2 (5 = significantly enhances safety, 4 = enhances safety, 3 = safe operation, 2 = did not result in an unsafe situation, 1 = resulted
in an unsafe situation)

Experienced pilots E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 Average


Application of knowledge 5.00 4.00 3.50 4.50 4.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 4.38
Application of procedures and compliance with regulations 5.00 4.50 3.67 4.00 4.33 4.17 3.33 4.83 4.23
Communication 4.50 4.50 3.83 4.50 3.80 3.83 4.33 4.83 4.27
Flight path management – manual control 5.00 5.00 3.60 5.00 4.60 4.25 3.50 4.50 4.43
Leadership and teamwork 4.75 5.00 3.60 4.20 4.00 3.80 4.20 4.80 4.29
Problem-solving and decision-making 4.83 4.83 3.50 4.00 4.20 4.00 4.00 4.33 4.21
Situation awareness and management of information 5.00 5.00 3.75 4.00 4.00 3.60 3.75 4.00 4.14
Workload management 5.00 4.71 3.57 4.29 3.86 4.00 3.57 4.43 4.18
Overall competence 4.89 4.69 3.63 4.31 4.10 4.08 3.84 4.59 4.27
Novice pilots N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 Average
Application of knowledge 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 5.00 3.50 3.50 3.50 4.13
Application of procedures and compliance with regulations 4.00 4.83 4.83 4.83 4.67 4.33 4.33 4.33 4.52
Communication 3.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.50 4.33 4.67 4.67 4.62
Flight path management – manual control 4.40 4.60 4.80 4.75 4.75 5.00 4.75 4.75 4.73
Leadership and teamwork 3.50 4.50 4.50 5.00 4.25 4.25 5.00 5.00 4.50
Problem-solving and decision-making 3.33 4.17 4.17 4.80 4.40 3.83 4.17 4.17 4.13
Situation awareness and management of information 3.33 4.67 4.67 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.50 4.50 4.36
Workload management 3.67 4.40 4.40 5.00 4.57 3.83 4.14 4.14 4.27
Overall competence 3.63 4.65 4.67 4.83 4.61 4.10 4.38 4.38 4.41
A. Tuhkala et al.
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 265

average performance of the experienced pilots. In addition, there was no consider-


able differences between different competencies, as the average was over four for all
competences.

Self‑assessed performance

The pilots’ answers to the selected survey items are presented in Table 5. Almost all
pilots expected to perform well in the session, except N7, who anticipated a lower
performance than other pilots (N5 did not answer the question). N3 reported a worse
performance for the first task than the others, as he explained that he had missed the
correct altitude. N7 reported that he had failed the second scenario after being too
hasty in cancelling the approach. Otherwise, the pilots’ self-assessed performance
was good for both scenarios, varying between seven and ten. Based on the pilots’
own assessment, their performance in the session corresponded to their current level
of competence quite accurately, also varying between seven and ten. To conclude,
the self-assessed performance was good for all pilots except N3 and N7.
Table 6 presents the codes that resulted from the qualitative content analysis of
the debriefing interviews. The code descripition explains the context where the code
manifested. For example, two experienced pilots and four novice pilots demonstrated
capacity awareness in the task 1. To assist in interpreting the table, Fig. 1 depicts the
target of reflection. For example, capacity awareness, composure, performance and
ability to recall the situation codes emerged when the pilot was reflecting himself or
his own actions in the simulator.
Capacity awareness demonstrates either their good or limited capacity to han-
dle the occurred malfunction. Of the experienced pilots, one noted that he had not
remembered to execute a certain action immediately, a second said that focusing on
flying had taken up much of his time and a third brought up the difficulty of analys-
ing the situation from many different perspectives:
When you are in a hurry, and need to analyse the situation quickly, it is diffi-
cult to question your own arguments so that you do not trust only the ones that

Table 5  Survey answers (scale: 1 = bad, 10 = excellent)

Experienced pilots E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8
Expected simulator session performance 10 8 9 8 8 8 8 10
Self-assessed performance in task 1 10 9 8 8 8 8 9 9
Self-assessed performance in task 2 10 8 9 9 8 8 9 9
Performance represents current competence 9 9 8 8 9 8 7 10
Novice pilots N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8
Expected simulator session performance 7 8 8 8 7 5 8
Self-assessed performance in task 1 8 7 5 8 7 10 7 9
Self-assessed performance in task 2 8 8 7 8 8 10 4 8
Performance represents current competence 9 8 7 9 9 8 7 10

13
266

Table 6  Code descriptions and number of pilots who were assigned the code
Task 1 Task 1 Task 2 Task 2

13
Code description Code Experienced Novices Experienced Novices

Pilot demonstrated Capacity awareness 2 4 1 5


[code] in the Composure 1 4 1 6
debriefing
Awareness of good/ 7/0 6/1 5/0 6/1
bad performance
Ability to recall the 0 6 0 3
situation
Tasks stimulated Development needs 6 7 1 5
[code] to improve Risk awareness 4 0 7 2
expertise
Pilot referred to Experience 5 1 3 3
[code] when dis- Improvisation 2 1 0 3
cussing expertise
Procedures 5 8 2 7
Training 6 3 5 5
When discussing Communication 2 4 6 3
about the co-pilot, Responsibilities 2 2 3 5
[code] was empha-
Support 1 7 0 4
sised
It was most important Act calm 2 2 1 2
to [code] in the Analyse before acting 3 1 2 1
situation
Control the aeroplane 8 7 6 6
Prioritise actions 6 2 4 3
The task was per- Easy/difficult 5/2 3/1 6/2 4/4
ceived as [code] Familiar/unfamiliar 8/0 8/0 4/4 2/6
Immersive 3 5 3 5
A. Tuhkala et al.
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 267

Fig. 1  The targets of reflection

support your own view, and so that you do not just continue, ignoring possibly
conflicting indications.
The novice pilots brought up how they can forget some priorities when in hurry.
As there is so much to remember even in normal situations (without malfunctions),
any additional stimuli in a demanding task causes confusion. They feel compelled to
hurry, even if there is no need, and that may add stress to the situation, already ham-
pered by their limited self-esteem due to insufficient experience.
Composure implied that the pilots experienced the task as easy or unworrying.
In the first task, the novice pilots remarked that “the situation was quickly under
control” (N1), “the situation was stable all the time so there was no need for big
changes” (N4), “there was nothing special in the situation” (N6) and “the mal-
function was simple” (N8). In the second scenario, novice pilots were unworried
by the situation because the failure occurred on the monitoring pilot’s display, not
their own: “I decided that everything would be alright; even if we could not han-
dle the failure on the monitoring pilot’s Primary Flight Display, they could use
my display” (N1), and another noted that “the situation was very calm, and in that
sense, easy for me, as the failure was only on captain’s display, not in my own, so
I had no other concerns than concentrating on flying” (N6). In contrast, there was

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268 A. Tuhkala et al.

only one experienced pilot (E1) who described handling the situation with com-
posure. However, his discussion style was humorous and his comments regarding
the situation were at times sarcastic. For example, in describing the second task,
he remarked, “I trusted myself like I used to trust my neighbours, and knew that
I could handle the plane, so I dared to launch some malfunction troubleshooting
during the approach.”
Awareness of good/bad performance included quotations referring how the pilot per-
formed the task. The only negative quotation in the first scenario was by N3, who said,
“it could have been better as we exceeded the correct altitude by 200 feet”. In contrast,
the pilots described their good performance in how they kept the plane under control,
moved it in the correct direction, managed the speed and altitude, controlled the situ-
ation, recovered from the malfunction, analysed the situation correctly, prevented the
situation from escalating, followed the flight plan and kept the situation safe.
The second task involved only one clearly negative statement, presented by N7:
When the other guy’s display started showing false information, we were in
the clouds, meaning I could not see anything and did not know which display
was working. I was a bit hasty and decided to cancel the approach. So, I put
on full thrust and we started to ascend. However, we had not reached altitude
when we need to make the cancellation decision, so I could have taken a few
seconds to think about the situation.
The experienced pilots brought up the same aspects of good performance as in
the first task, but their positive statements were more cautious: “even though my
performance was diamond, a more safe option is always to cancel the approach”
(E1), “it was okay, but thinking about it afterwards, I could have done something
differently” (E2), “not perfect, but okay” (E3), “the situation was under control, but
thinking on it now, I could have made other choices” (E5) and “I am quite happy
with my performance” (E6). All experienced pilots mentioned that the break caused
by COVID-19 negatively affected their performance. In contrast, the novice pilots
proposed that their performance was good because they were able to complete the
most important task, i.e. keeping the plane under control. As N3 described: “I think
the performance was fine as my foremost job in the approach phase is to fly the
plane”.
Ability to recall the situation implies how easy or difficult it was to recall the mal-
functions that occurred in the tasks. Almost all novice pilots hesitated about which
situation we were referring to when we asked pilots to describe the malfunction for
the first time. A possible reason why some novice pilots had difficulties in recalling
the malfunctions was that their focus had been on flying, not on the overall situa-
tion. As described by N1: “If there are many approaches, I can remember what I did
in the approach phase, and if the malfunction does not affect to this phase, I cannot
remember the details of the malfunction.” In contrast, the experienced pilots could
recall and describe the malfunction itself, as well as their own actions in the situa-
tion, rather accurately.
We identified two ways the tasks stimulated possible ways to enhance pro-
fessional expertise, development needs and risk awareness. The tasks led both
novice and experienced pilots to contemplate their current expertise and possible

13
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 269

development needs. In both scenarios, the main development needs were practic-
ing more precise control of the aeroplane and clarifying the ideal communication
with the monitoring pilot. When regarding the other stimuli, only experienced
pilots considered the risks that the scenarios involved. In the first scenario, there
was a possibility to drift in the wrong direction or enter an erroneous altitude,
which creates a risk of collision with other aircraft. Although it can be assumed
that all pilots know of this risk, only experienced pilots explicitly pointed out the
possibility. When regarding the second task, the risks were discussed by E7:
If I had thought that I had the fault on my display, well, at that point, the
procedure is that your colleague starts to fly. His display showed that the
aeroplane was descending and curving left, and in reality, we would have
gone too far left and down into a very steep slide. Then, at that altitude, of
course, the GPS warnings start appearing fast. After that, well, the situation
could have escalated very quickly.
While all experienced pilots brought this danger up at some stage of the dis-
cussion, only N7 and N8 among the novice pilots explicitly considered this risk.
When the pilots discussed their professional expertise, they brought up experi-
ence, improvisation, procedures and training. Not surprisingly, the experienced
pilots often mentioned that their experience aids in handling a malfunction situa-
tion, as put by E5:
For me, through this background experience, plane control itself is not
really challenging. My experience also provides me with additional capac-
ity. For sure, plane control, for inexperienced pilots, and automatic shut-
off and other such tasks, or the disabling of all warnings, must be stressful
since it is not routine.
The novice pilots also referred to their experience, but not experience from
flight hours in an aeroplane; instead, they meant experience gained from training.
They described having recently practiced different malfunction situations for sev-
eral months, making them accustomed to them, whereas more experienced pilots
had been flying routine paths without any technical surprises. Procedures were
constantly brought up when the pilots were asked what they based their actions
on in a malfunction scenario, especially the golden rule of Airbus: fly, navigate
and communicate. Surprisingly, improvisation was mentioned more frequently by
novice pilots than experienced ones.
Communication with the co-pilot was referred to as crucial by both experi-
enced and novice pilots. The pilots pointed out that the whole crew needs to
know what the others are doing, with decisions made together. Despite this, two
pilots (N2, N4) mentioned that they had difficulties in agreeing with the moni-
toring pilot in the first scenario. The pilots emphasised that the monitoring pilot
has important responsibilities, such as to observe the correct path, analyse the
malfunction and communicate with the air-traffic controller. As such, the pilots
emphasised that the monitoring pilot’s responsibility is to take care of matters
besides flying so that the flying pilot can focus on that alone. The third code here,

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270 A. Tuhkala et al.

support, reflects how all novice pilots brought up at some stage of the interview
how the captain (i.e. monitoring pilot) supported their own actions by staying
calm, explaining what was going on, giving instructions, leading the situation and
acting as a backup in case the pilot lost control of the plane. The captain’s impor-
tant supporting role was well-described by N1:
In my opinion, what has a great effect is teamwork. Even in a more chal-
lenging situation, what the captain does in the neighbouring chair affects the
outcome a lot. The captain does not let you fail. Instead, they give you time
early in the process to seek some advice, and if the advice is not sufficient,
then the captain fixes the situation a little. It helps that you do not get the
feeling that everything depends purely on you.
The most important actions in the malfunction scenarios were to control the
aeroplane, prioritise actions, analyse before acting and act calmly. These four
codes overlapped, and the importance of taking and keeping control of the
plane was brought up by all pilots. They explained that in any situation, the cor-
rect speed, altitude and direction need to be reached before any other actions
are taken, to prevent any additional dangers from arising, such as drifting into
another plane’s path. This was evidently important in the first scenario where the
malfunction caused the autopilot to turn off, meaning the pilot needed to start fly-
ing manually. In the second scenario, this step was then intentionally challenged:
before the pilot could control the plane correctly, situation analysis was necessary
to identify which one of the two Primary Flight Displays was showing the correct
information. Still, the pilots emphasised the importance of keeping the focus on
flying, as it was possible to cancel the approach to gain more time to analyse the
situation. As such, acting calmly did not only mean the pilot’s calm behaviour but
also moving the plane into a safe position to buy more time.
The tasks themselves were described either difficult/easy, familiar/unfamil-
iar and immersive. As brought up in numerical self-assessment, almost all pilots
rated their performance as good in both tasks. This could be observed in the
interviews. There were only three quotations that described the first scenario as
difficult: the situation was surprising, the malfunction occurred when the aero-
plane was in the middle of turning and the correct actions needed to be priori-
tised. In turn, taking control of the aeroplane when the malfunction occurred was
unanimously perceived as easy, something that they are trained to do. The second
task was perceived as difficult because the situation was something that the pilots
had not encountered before, requiring that the pilot intensively focus on keeping
the plane in the correct position, analyse the situation and communicate with the
co-pilot at the same time. Then, the pilot needed to decide whether to continue
or cancel the approach, and the malfunction occurred in bad weather conditions.
The novice pilots seemed to perceive the task as easier than those who were expe-
rienced; they saw that their responsibility was to control the aeroplane and let the
monitoring pilot focus on troubleshooting the malfunction.
As pointed out by the pilots, the difficulty of the task was strongly connected to
how familiar it was. The first task was familiar for all pilots, either from simulator
training or real flights. In contrast, the second task was familiar to four experienced

13
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 271

and two novice pilots. Finally, the pilots’ quotations considered how immersive the
task was. Although the pilots are advised to act in a simulator as they would on a
real flight, we identified occasions where the pilots thought that they might have
acted differently in real life. Two experienced pilots (E4, E6) commented that they
may have been more eager to cancel the approach in the second task in a real situa-
tion, for additional safety. As put by E4: “I thought that this might call for cancelling
the approach, but I did not know if it was the purpose of this practice, so I decided to
continue the approach.” The novice pilots pointed out that simulator practice is men-
tally different because the pilot is prepared for surprising anomalies in the scenario,
and the pilot’s career, or life, is not in danger in the situation. It was also brought up
that while the cockpit itself is an accurate replica of a real aeroplane, the window
screen graphics do not equal the real visual environment.

Discussion

Flight training organisations can derive valuable insights from an examination of


their assessment and feedback procedures, with potential to reduce the number of
student dropouts, for example (Wulle et al., 2020). Drawing upon our findings, cer-
tain disparities between evaluated and self-assessed performance came to light. Ini-
tially, despite the deliberative design of tasks to challence even experienced pilots,
all participated pilots garnered commendable evaluations from the flight instructor,
with novice pilots even outperforming their experienced counterparts. Secondly, the
most striking contrast between evaluated and self-assessed performance manifested
in the case of one novice pilot, who received the highest evaluation among novice
pilots, and still, he self-assessed his performance as poor, describing his experience
as a mere attempt of surviving the tasks.
These findings raise a pertinent question regarding the CBTA framework: To what
extent can the framework accurately discern developmental needs in pilots’ perfor-
mance? In essence, does the framework provide precise feedback that can effectively
support pilot’s professional development, as a sound evaluation should? These con-
siderations merit attention when the framework is put into use, extending its valida-
tion beyond sole evaluative purposes (Franks et al., 2014; Hattingh et al., 2022; Hodge
et al., 2020). In our study, discernable differences between novice and experienced
pilots were not apparent in the flight instructor’s evaluation. However, disparities
between groups became more evident when pilots engaged in reflective debriefing
interviews that followed the simulation session. Consequently, there is a compelling
need for additional research into flight instructor evaluation methods, and evaluation
frameworks, that takes into account the pilot’s own view of their performance.
This study contributes also to the limited body of contextual research concern-
ing flight pilots’ ability to reflect professional practice (Mavin & Roth, 2014;
Mavin et al., 2018). Despite the fact that most of the novice pilots perceived
both of the tasks as rather straightforward, it seems that they were overly con-
fident, whereas the experienced pilots were more adept at discerning potential
risks inherent in the situation. This disparity can be elucidated by the fact that the
experienced pilots, all captains, focused on the comprehensive situational context

13
272 A. Tuhkala et al.

over their individual performance, even though responsibility for troubleshooting


malfunctions typically falls upon the monitoring pilot.
Moreover, it becomes evident that the novice pilots, to varying degrees, tended to
downplay the significance of malfunctions, whether consciously or subconsciously,
as they had difficulties in accurately recalling the sequence of events and their spe-
cific details during the tasks. This presents a formidable challenge when designing
simulator tasks: if the objective is to introduce malfunctions suddenly and unex-
pectedly, how can the attention of aviation professionals be effectively captured,
allowing for subsequent active reflection? This is a crucial question because while
technical competencies may be enhanced through iterative practice and correction,
the improvement of non-technical competencies necessitates an examination of the
situational dynamics, such as explorating what, how and why certain actions were
executed, along with critical thinking of whether any future changes should be con-
sidered (Cattaneo & Motta, 2021; Mavin & Roth, 2014; Mavin et al., 2018).
Our study also raises a question concerning the design of pilot training: how can
simulator sessions be effectively instructed to ensure that pilots comprehend the learn-
ing purpose and objectives of the task while still incorporating the element of unpre-
dictability? Pilots are consistently advised to act in a simulator exactly as they would
in an actual flight. However, it is noteworthy that some pilots articulated the possibility
of responding differently, if they encountered a similar malfunction during a real flight
rather than in a simulator. Such disparities may arise if pilots are not entirely compre-
hending the purpose of the practice. For instance, a pilot might make decisions based
on the assumption that task aims to facilitate a challenging landing, even though in
an actual flight he would cancel the approach to ensure maximum security. Further-
more, the surprise factor in simulator sessions may be diminished if pilots anticipate
that flight instructors deliberately introduce malfunctions and other unforeseen events,
given that these occurances often constitute the main purpose of simulator training.
When considering the limitations of this study, it is apparent that this was just a
single simulator training occasion, involving only limited cohorts of pilots. However,
it is important to acknowledge that flight simulator time incurs substantial costs,
and opportunities to conduct research in this environment are rare. The evaluation
employing the CBTA was also conducted by just one flight instructor. However, the
CBTA framework itself involves the premise that the evaluation should be independ-
ent of the evaluator, as it relies on detailed competency descriptions and behavioural
indicators. To conclude, our findings should not be extrapolated to imply univer-
sal applicability across all pilot training. Rather, they underscore a pertinent con-
cern, indicating that reliance solely on the CBTA framework may not constitute the
most judicious approach for addressing potential development needs and knowledge
gaps in pilots’ professional development, underscoring the continued importance of
human debriefing, feedback and reflection within training and evaluation.
Acknowledgements The work was supported by the Academy of Finland under Grant numbers 292466,
311877, 318905, and 331817. We greatly acknowledge Professor Dr. Matti Vihola and Senior Researcher
Dr. Jouni Helske for their intellectual contribution. We also acknowledge Dr. Teuvo Antikainen for his
initiative when creating this unique collaboration. We would also like to thank Tiina Kullberg and Max
Lainema for their help in the data collection, Eeva Harjula and Juho Vehkakoski for transcribing the
interviews and Aaron Peltoniemi for helping to translate the selected excerpts.

13
The interconnection between evaluated and self‑assessed… 273

Authors’ contributions AT Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Data cura-


tion, Writing – Original Draft and Review & Editing, Visualization. VH Conceptualization, Formal
analysis, Methodology, Investigation, Writing - Review & Editing. JL Conceptualization, Methodology,
Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing - Review & Editing, Visualization. AH Conceptualization, Meth-
odology, Investigation, Resources. IT Investigation, Writing - Review & Editing. KS Formal analysis,
Investigation. RH Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Writing - Review & Editing, Pro-
ject administration, Funding acquisition. TK Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Writing -
Review & Editing, Project administration, Funding acquisition.

Funding Open Access funding provided by University of Jyväskylä (JYU). Open Access funding pro-
vided by University of Jyväskylä (JYU).

Declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate The data that support the findings of this study are available on
request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restric-
tions. The dataset is anonymous and stored in secure cloud services whose server rooms are located at the
University of Jyväskylä. The metadata has been stored at the research portal of the University of Jyväskylä
(Converis). When we conducted our study, we followed the guidelines of the Finnish National Board on
Research Integrity. The Human Sciences Ethics Committee of the University of Jyväskylä made a positive
statement about our study (755/13.00.04.00/2020) before we recruited the participants and collected the data.

Competing interests No potential conflict of interest is reported by the authors.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://​creat​iveco​mmons.​org/​licen​
ses/​by/4.​0/.

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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Ari Tuhkala works as a senior lecturer in the Department of Education at the University of Jyväskylä. His
research considers learning in technology-enhanced environments and semi-automatic natural language
learning tools.

Ville Heilala works as a doctoral researcher in the Faculty of Information Technology at the University of
Jyväskylä. He holds two Master’s degrees, one in education and one in computer science. His research is
about learning analytics and student agency.

Joni Lämsä works as a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Education at University of Jyväskylä,
Finland. In his research, he has adopted the temporal perspective on learning, teaching, and interaction in
technology-enhanced contexts by applying multimodal data sources.

Arto Helovuo works as Head of Compliance and Business Development, flight instructor and examiner
(TRI/TRE) and A330/350 captain at Finnair. He holds a Master’s degree in Human Factors and System
Safety.

Ilkka Tynkkynen works as a Chief Theoretical Knowledge Instructor (CTKI), a synthetic flight instructor
(SFI) and a co-pilot A330/A350 at Finnair. He holds a Master’s degree in business law.

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276 A. Tuhkala et al.

Emilia Lampi works as a project researcher at the Finnish Institute for Educational Research. Her research
interests are related to the use of extended reality in competence building and professional development.

Katriina Sipiläinen works as a research assistant in the Faculty of Education and Psychology at the Uni-
versity of Jyväskylä. She holds a Bachelor of Science in Statistics.

Raija Hämäläinen works in the field of technology-enhanced learning at the Center for Research for
Learning and Teaching at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Hämäläinen seeks to understand learning
and professional development by investigating how learning and interaction processes occur and unfold
over time with novel methods, such as eye-tracking, heartrate variability and prosodic analysis of voice.

Tommi Kärkkäinen serves as a professor at the Faculty of Information Technology, University of


Jyväskylä, leading currently the Learning and Cognitive Sciences division and research group on human
and machine-based intelligence. His main research fields include computational sciences and computing
education research with special emphasis on data mining, machine learning, and learning analytics. He
has published over 180 research papers, led dozens of R&D projects, and supervised over 30 PhD theses.

Authors and Affiliations

Ari Tuhkala1 · Ville Heilala1 · Joni Lämsä1 · Arto Helovuo2 ·


Ilkka Tynkkynen2 · Emilia Lampi1 · Katriina Sipiläinen1 ·
Raija Hämäläinen1 · Tommi Kärkkäinen3

* Ari Tuhkala
ari.s.tuhkala@jyu.fi
Ville Heilala
ville.s.heilala@jyu.fi
Joni Lämsä
joni.lamsa@jyu.fi
Arto Helovuo
arto.helovuo@finnair.com
Ilkka Tynkkynen
ilkka.tynkkynen@finnair.com
Emilia Lampi
emilia.k.lampi@jyu.fi
Katriina Sipiläinen
katriina.m.sipilainen@jyu.fi
Raija Hämäläinen
raija.h.hamalainen@jyu.fi
Tommi Kärkkäinen
tommi.p.karkkainen@jyu.fi
1
Department of Education, University of Jyväskylä, P.O. Box 35, FI‑40014 Jyväskylä, Finland
2
Finnair, Helsinki, Finland
3
Faculty of Information Technology, University of Jyväskylä, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä,
Finland

13

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