HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES Vol. 8 No.

2
© 1995 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi) pp. 1-23
1

Metaphor and monophony in

the 20th-century psychology of
emotions
KENNETH J. GERGEN

Attempts to define the emotions and elucidate their character have ornamented
the intellectual landscape for over 2,000 years. Two characteristics of this
continuing colloquy are particularly noteworthy: first, the presumption of
palpability; and second, the interminability of debate. In the former case, until
the present century there had been little doubting the obdurate existence of the
emotions. In the second book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguished among 15
emotional states; Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae enumerated six ’affective’ and
five ’spirited’ emotions; Descartes distinguished among six primary passions of
the soul; the 18th-century moralist David Hartley located ten ’general passions
of human nature’; and the major contributions by recent theorists, Tomkins
(1962) and Izard (1977), describe some ten distinctive emotional states. In effect,
the cultural history is one in which there is unflinching agreement regarding the
palpable presence of emotional states within persons.
At the same time, these deep ontological commitments are also matched by a
virtual cacophony of competing views on the character of the emotions - their
distinguishing characteristics, origins, manifestations and significance in human
affairs. For Aristotle the emotions constituted ’motions of the soul’; for Aquinas
the emotions were experienced by the soul, but were the products of sensory
appetites; Descartes isolated specific ’passions of the soul’, these owing to
movements of the ’animal spirits’ agitating the brain. For Thomas Hobbes

(1651), the passions were constitutive of human nature itself, and furnished the
activating ’spirit’ for the intellect, the will and the moral character. In his Treatise
on Human Nature (1739), David Hume divided the passions into those directly
derived from human instinct (e.g. the desire to punish our enemies), and those

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which derive from a ’double relation’ of sensory impressions and ideas. A

century later, both Spencer’s Principles of Psychology and Darwin’s The
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals attempted to place the emotions
on more seemingly certain biological grounds.
This interminability of debate is most effectively illustrated by considering the
’objects of study’ themselves: that which is identified as an emotion. For
example, Aristotle identified placability, confidence, benevolence, churlishness,
resentment, emulation, longing and enthusiasm, as emotional states no less
transparent than anger or joy. Yet, in their 20th-century exegeses, neither
Tomkins (1962) nor Izard (1977) recognizes these states as constituents of the
emotional domain. Aquinas believed love, desire, hope and courage were all
central emotions, and while Aristotle agreed in the case of love, all such states go
virtually unrecognized in the recent theories of Tomkins and Izard. Hobbes
identified covetousness, luxury, curiosity, ambition, good-naturedness, super-
stition and will as emotional states, none of which qualifies as such in
contemporary psychology. Tomkins and Izard agree that surprise is an emotion,
a belief that would indeed puzzle most of their predecessors. However, where
Izard believes sadness and guilt are major emotions, they fail to qualify in
Tomkins’s analysis; simultaneously, Tomkins sees distress as a central emotion,
where Izard does not.
There is a certain irony inhering in these two features of emotional debate -
palpability and interminability. If the emotions are simply there as transparent
features of human existence, why should univocality be so difficult to achieve?
Broad agreement exists within scientific communities concerning, for example,
chemical tables, genetic constitution and the movements of the planets; and
where disagreements have developed, procedures have also been located for
pressing the nomenclature towards greater uniformity. Why, then, is scientific
convergence so elusive in the case of emotions? At least one significant reason for
the continuous contention derives from a presumptive fallacy, namely White-
head’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness. One suspects that we labor in a
tradition in which we mistakenly treat the putative objects of our mental
vocabulary as palpable, where it is the names themselves that possess more
indubitable properties. Because there are words such as ’love’, ’anger’ and ’guilt’,
we presume that there must be specific states to which they refer. And if there are

not, we presume that continued study will set the matter straight. Two thousand
years have been insufficient to achieve this end, and one is ineluctably led to
suppose that there are no such isolable conditions inside individuals to which
such terms refer (or at a minimum, the terms are not determinant markers of such
states).
This latter possibility has become far more reasonable within recent years, and
particularly with the development of ordinary language philosophy. Witt-
genstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) was the major stimulus in this case,
both questioning the referential base for mental predicates and offering an

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alternative way of accounting for such discourse. As Wittgenstein asks, ’I give

notice that I am afraid. - Do I recall my thoughts of the past half hour in order
to do that, or do I let a thought of the dentists quickly cross my mind in order
to see how it affects me; or can I be uncertain of whether it is really fear of the

dentists, and not some other physical feeling of discomfort?’ (1980: 32e). The
impossibility of answering such a question in terms of mental referents for
emotion terms, demands an alternative means of understanding mental terms.
This understanding is largely to be found in Wittgenstein’s arguments for use-
derived meaning. On this view, mental predicates acquire their meaning
through various language games embedded within cultural forms of life. Mental
language is rendered significant not by virtue of its capacity to reveal, mark, or
describe mental states, but from its function in social interchange. The challenge
posed by these ideas to traditional dualistic theories of knowledge was effec-
tively extended in the works of Ryle (1949) and Austin (1962). Other scholars,
such as Kenny (1963) and Anscombe (1976), went on to explore the various
functions, problems and philosophical challenges of mental state terms in their
everyday usage.
As the Wittgensteinian view is extended, the possibility of falsifying scientific
propositions about emotional states becomes increasingly problematic (see
Gergen, 1994). This problematization is fortified by a substantial body of
writing in both the history of science and the sociology of knowledge, demon-
strating the sociocultural processes at work in rendering various scientific
claims intelligible and acceptable. The important point for the present offering
is that, together, these various arguments invite consideration of the reality
posits of scientific psychology, independent of the methods and findings typi-
cally employed as justificatory bases within the field. It is within this context
that I wish, then, to sketch with broad strokes the vicissitudes of emotional
discourse in scientific psychology of the present century. As I shall propose,
emotion terms have largely served political purposes within professional psy-
chology, strategically situating the discipline (or its various subcultures) in re-
lationship to the academy, to the general public and to its own membership.
What psychology has had to say about the emotions, or in many instances has
failed to say, is not - and in principle cannot be - the result of careful and con-
trolled observation. Rather its varying scientific postures can be traced, in large
measure, to the intellectual and cultural circumstances in which professional life
is played out.
Caveats are required: I am not proposing that the present account is conclu-
sive. This is but a preliminary sketch, and there are many other influences to
which inquiry should also be directed. Nor am I proposing that all inquiry into
the emotions is the result of consciously considered strategies. Rather, I am
generating a lens through which coherent sense may be derived from an other-
wise chaotic morass of particulars. Finally, the present analysis is largely con-
fined to developments in mainstream psychology in the United States. There

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are other stories to be told about the development of psychology in the context of
an embattled Europe, as well as in the many tributaries of American psychology.

PROLEGOMENON ON POWER/KNOWLEDGE

Foucault’s (1978; 1979) writings on knowledge and power are an effective entry
to the present analysis. Language, for Foucault, serves as a major medium for

carrying out relations. Because language constitutes what we take to be the

world, and rationalizes the form of reality thus created, it also serves as a socially
binding force. By acting within language, relations of power and privilege are
sustained. And, by engaging in the further circulation of a form of language, the
array of power relations is further extended. Thus, as disciplines such as
psychology, psychiatry and sociology are developed, so do they operate as
discursive regimes. They specify a world and a normative domain of relevant
action. As these languages are further elaborated and disseminated, so then is the
configuration of power extended. In this sense, power relations possess a
productive capacity. The relevance of this perspective for psychology has been
effectively demonstrated in Rose’s (1985; 1990) analyses of psychological theory
and measurement as forms of cultural control.
Yet, there is a strong tendency in Foucault’s work to treat discursive regimes as
unitary forms. That is, regimes tend to be treated as internally coherent and
hegemonically accelerated. As Foucault proposes, beginning in the 18th century
and extending into the present,
... the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly
reinforce(d) one another in a circular process.... First the hospital, then
the school, then, later, the workshop were not simply ’reordered’ by the
disciplines: they became, thanks to them, apparatuses such that any
mechanism of objectification could be used in them as an instrument of
subjection, and any growth of power could give rise in them to possible
branches of knowledge; it was this link, proper to the technological
system, that made possible within the disciplinary element the formation
of clinical medicine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychol-
ogy, and the rationalization of labor. It is ... a multiplication of the effects
of power through the formation and accumulation of new forms of
knowledge. (1979: 224)
This line of argument has also been fortified by much Marxist theory,
particularly as inspired by Althusser, of a unified, hegemonic order.
The view I wish to propose, and indeed which might be supported with
alternative quotes from Foucault’s capillary view of power, is that life within
what we take to be the existing regimes is seldom unitary. Rather, regimes
themselves are composed of variegated discursive practices, drawn from sundry

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contexts, rippedfrom previous ecologies of usage and stitched awkwardly

together form
to what - with continued usage and considerable suppression - is
seen as a coherent view (’a discipline’). Ontologies and rationalities are thus
only
apparently and momentarily univocal; they harbor multiple tensions and
contradictions even for those who dwell within. In a sense, I wish to augment (or
shift the emphasis of) a Foucauldian perspective with important theses from
Bakhtin (1981) and Derrida (1976). While Bakhtin points to the hybrid or
heteroglossial character of any given domain of language, Derrida’s writings
emphasize the failure of any language to carry autonomous meanings - to stand
independent of its multiple signifying traces. The present analysis agrees, then,
with Raymond Williams’s (1980) view that ’Hegemony is not singular. Its own
internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be renewed,
recreated and defended; and by the same token ... they can be continually
challenged and in certain respects modified’ (1980: 38). The present concern is
the history of these internal movements in psychological science - their
challenges, conflicts and evolutions - from the pre-behaviorist period through
contemporary constructionism.

METAPHOR AND THE POLITICS OF EMOTION

The statusof psychological study at the turn of the century was a tenuous
one. Scholars both in Europe and the United States were struggling to achieve
recognition for a uniquely psychological science, independent of its philo-
sophic forebears, and independent of adjoining and already established sci-
ences (particularly medicine and biology). At the same time, if such a

discipline were to gain sanction within the academy, its rationale would have
to achieve intelligibility in these very disciplines, as in others. Moreover, such
a discipline should ideally enjoy the affirmation of a broader, educated
public.
This was particularly so in the United States, with its strong emphasis on the
pragmatic outcomes of scholarly work (Manicas, 1987). In terms of the
present analysis, the central challenge for psychology, then, was to generate
forms of self-representation that could simultaneously appeal to audiences
both within the academy and among the educated public - in addition to its
own membership.
It is within this context that we may consider the status of emotions discourse.
At the outset, such discourse serves as symbolic capital of high order. Given the
long history of scholarship on the emotions, particularly within philosophy and
later in medicine and biology, there was little doubting the existence of emotions
in human makeup. And, for the fledgling discipline to claim independent, but
allied, investigation into the emotions would be a potentially powerful
self-justificatory device. Similarly, because of long-standing beliefs in the

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emotions more generally within the culture, a discipline that could finally

illuminate their character and function would purchase promise in providing

useful information and services to the society.
At the same time, to annex the discourse of emotions was not without its
dangers. Strong claims to probity on matters of the emotions could threaten the
investments of the more established disciplines, thus fostering political enmity.
Further, for psychology to employ the established forms of description and
explanation could simultaneously threaten its claims to being a separate or
independent discipline. In addition to these problems, emotions discourse also
served as the mainstay for cultural romanticism. The romanticist rhetoric was
becoming increasingly suspect - not only in certain sectors of philosophy, but
within the sciences more generally. For a discipline aspiring to scientific status, to
grant the emotions a central place in its vocabulary of explanation might prove
hazardous. In effect, there were treasures to be gained in appropriating the
discourse of the emotions, but the course could be perilous.
There was extant a rich and compelling vocabulary on which psychological
investigation could proceed. Of particular importance, Averill (1990) dis-
tinguishes among five major metaphors available to psychological science from
preceding centuries of dialogue: emotions as 1) inner feelings (experiences); 2)
physiological responses; 3) animal impulses in human nature; 4) diseases of the
mind; and 5) driving forces (vital energy). The metaphors were also wedded to
estimable traditions. First, the 19th-century writings of Bain, Darwin and
Spencer, among others, defined the emotions as biological processes (drawing
from the related metaphors of emotions as physiological responses, and as animal
impulses in human nature). The biological view was advantageous for a fledgling
discipline, inasmuch as it would ally psychological study with the Naturwissen-
schaften as opposed to the new and more tentative breed of the Geisteswissen-
schaften. In contrast, there was also a long heritage - drawing from the works of
Descartes, Hartley and Cabanis - which defined the emotions largely in terms of
internal sensations (the metaphor of inner feelings). It is this tradition that lent
strong support to the efforts of 19th-century German psychologists to establish
psychology as a science sui generis. For figures such as Fechner, Lehmann,
Wundt and Hamilton the primary emphasis was thus placed on the emotions as
elements of conscious experience.
Finally, a third tradition - more allied to the artistic community than to the
biological and philosophical - granted the emotions a pre-eminent position in
human makeup. This, the romanticist tradition, treated the emotions as the
fundamental wellsprings for human action. For them these sources of energy
were beyond the penetration by (mere) conscious sensation or reasoning. This
was essentially the tradition of Goethe, Herder and Nietzsche, and of Shelley,
Keats and Byron. It was also a tradition of special promise to practitioners of
psychology, to those who functioned not in the impersonal conditions of the
laboratory, but in the hospital or consultation room. For this was pre-eminently

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a tradition broadly shared within the culture. To speak this language would be
most effective in the public sphere.
Faced with these options, how should the discipline proceed? In a broad sense,
the choice was between a monophonic and a polyphonic intelligibility. In the
former instance, one could select a single metaphor from the available array, and
within the theoretical and research contexts, extend its intelligibility to full
fruition. There were both advantages and liabilities in doing so. Each of the exist-
ing metaphors offered a major means of rendering an emotional world intelli-
gible, and the full expansion of its linguistic implicature offered the possibility of
a complete, coherent and rhetorically powerful theory. Further, an effective

monophonic account would either denigrate the significance of the alternatives,

appropriate them, or fully erase their ontologies. For example, a theory that
claims the emotions fundamentally to be inner feelings, can place physiology in a
secondary position (as mere accompaniment or a reductionist parallel), and can
function unproblematically without reference to impulses, diseases, or driving
forces. Similarly, with the full expansion of the physiological metaphor, ’feelings’
become either a secondary manifestation or fully suspect; animal impulses can be
appropriated as physiology at an imprecise level of description, and the metaphor
of driving force becomes so much poetry. The driving force theorist can reduce
feelings and physiology to the status of manifestations of the driving force, can
claim such discourses to be reductionistic (and largely irrelevant) descriptions,
and can claim fully explanatory potential without reference to animal impulses.
Yet, the monophonic account is also purchased at a price. For psychology to
lay claim to either the physiological or biological metaphors would encroach on
neighboring disciplines and disclaim rights to independent status. The disease
metaphor is highly circumscribed, and the driving force metaphor would ally the
field too closely with romanticism. The metaphor of inner feelings had been par-
ticularly appealing in establishing psychology as an independent discipline in the
German context. However, such a metaphor reduces psychology to the study of
conscious states, and thus in the American context failed to meet the standards of
pragmatic utility. If the field is to appeal to other disciplines without encroaching
on their self-definitions, and if it is to acquire credibility both within and outside
the academy, the more favorable choice would seem to be polyphony. That is,
the most rhetorically powerful discourse should be one that harbors multiple
metaphors. Whether this is indeed a winning option is revealed in the following.

THE EARLY IMPULSE TOWARDS POLYPHONY

At the turn of the century, psychology as an academic discipline in the United

States was struggling towards recognition. The American Psychological Associ-
ation was organized in 1892 with 31 members, only a minority of whom identi-
fied themselves professionally as psychologists. If such a field were to justify

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itselfthrough its accounts of mental life, how was it to proceed? From the
preceding, there is much to be gained by appropriating the discourse of emotion;
and there is more to be gained in this early stage by amalgamating metaphors than
in monophony. Polyphonic models were also available for the undertaking.
Within the immediately preceding decades, Lotze and Fechner in Germany, and
Lange in Denmark, had attempted to integrate mind and body into a single
theory of emotion. For each, there was an interactive relationship between the
mind as sensorium and determinantly linked physiological processes; for each,
psychological and biological inquiry were interdependent. For American
psychology, William James’s work was thus of pivotal significance. Not only did
his 1890 treatise, The Principles of Psychology, suggest the contours of a unified
discipline - a mutually fortifying synthesis - but his theory of emotion
demonstrated the possibility by integrating two of the root metaphors into a
single formulation. Consider the famous passage:
Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and ...
our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common

sense says we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are

frightened and run.... The hypothesis here to be defended says that this
order of sequence is incorrect .... (Rather) we feel sorry because we cry,
afraid because we tremble. (James, 1890: 449-50)
As is clear, the emotionsare the byproduct of two interacting conditions, a

biological event on the one side, and a pattern of sensations on the other. In
effect, James linked the discourses of physical and sensory reality in such a way
that emotional life could not be understood by a more reductionistic discipline.
Both were required. One could surmise, then, the possibility of a unified
psychology, a discipline requiring its own identity outside biology, but safely
allied with this more established tradition.
But would it be possible to forge a second alliance, this time with the more
pragmatically promising enterprise of clinical treatment? There were hopes
extant even in 1896, with the development of the first psychological clinic at the

University of Pennsylvania, that clinical practitioners could be integrated into a

unified psychology. However, there were at least two major hurdles to be
traversed. First, strongly committed to psychoanalytical theory, psychiatric
practitioners were struggling to gain their own identity and public sanction. The
practitioners in this case were also medical doctors as opposed to laboratory
researchers. In effect, psychologists confronted an alterior subculture with its
own centripetal force. Both related to and rationalizing these sociopolitical

barriers, were discursive differences - primary among them the root metaphors
for describing the emotions. The psychiatric view of emotions as life-forces, and
the practices associated with this metaphor, were not easily integrated into the
bio-sensory formulations of the experimentalist. However, with some hope of
integration, Sigmund Freud was invited in 1908 to speak to an estimable group of

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American psychologists. And in 1918 Robert Woodworth’s Dynamic Psycbol-

ogy was published, a volume that attempted to integrate the psychodynamic
views into the experimental account.
Yet, these were indeed uneasy alliances, for each attempt to integrate, collate,
or combine necessarily left significant traces of the root metaphors. The extended
discourse surrounding, substantiating and constituting the metaphorical center
remained undigested. The result was a continuous tension: by reverting to
monophony, any subculture could brandish Occam’s razor, and claim a pure
and powerful access to the emotions. Such was the case as the experimental work
of Sherrington (1906), Head and Holmes (1911) and Cannon (1914) were all used
to discredit James, and replace his theory with a single foundation in

neurophysiology. The senses were, then, epiphenomenal - simply biological

processes at a gross level of description. Further, the clinically oriented
psychologists found that too much was sacrificed in Dynamic Psychology’s
translation of life-urges into experimental abstractions. Thus, the journal The
Psychological Clinic contemptuously dismissed the volume as ’brass instrument
psychology’, with the instruments ’cunningly concealed’ from the public.
Finally, the Jamesian emphasis on sensations was difficult to cash out in terms of
broader pragmatic demands. The invitation to polyphony was insufficient, then,
to impede the rapacious discourse of behaviorism.

BEHAVIORISM AND THE SACRIFICE OF

EMOTION

As broadly recognized, there was a close association between the ascendance of

behaviorist psychology in the 1930s and the bold moves of philosophers of
science towards foundations for a unified science (Koch, 1963). For academic
psychologists in particular, the availability of principles of scientific rationality
was particularly consequential. Still struggling for recognition and reputation,
and unable to forge viable linkages among biological, human experimental and
practitioner enclaves, the possibility of modeling itself on a philosophically
grounded model of science was an attractive one. Such a move would allow
psychological inquiry to lay claim to independent scientific status. Because the
conception of a unified science would ensure its connection to the natural
sciences, no specific alliance with biology was essential. And because empiricist
foundationalism gave hope that fundamental principles of human activity could
be discovered, then any responsible clinical practice would necessarily be derived
from the more basic science. In effect, there was a strong rationale for establishing
psychology as an independent, and basic, science, from which could be
developed a profusion of practical applications - in the clinic, schools, industry,
the military, and so on. In retrospect, one must suppose that this family of

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arguments was a powerful one: between 1930 and 1960 the ranks of the
American Psychological Association expanded some twentyfold.
Yet, how were the emotions to be regarded by this foundational form of
psychological science? To appreciate the fate of the emotions in this era, we must
further consider the scientific model which psychologists appropriated from the
philosophy of science. Central components of this received view were particular
conceptions of observation, causality and methodology. That which most clearly
aligned the new psychology with the natural sciences was to be its emphasis on
observables. Each of its theoretical conceptions, insofar as possible, was to be
linked through a series of ’operational definitions’ to observable behaviors of the
organism. In this way the discipline could replace the interminable and
embarrassing imbroglios over the nature of the ’inner world’, with facts open to
public observation and reliable replication. And, because overt behavior was
clearly material, where ’mindstuff’ was dubitable at best, the discipline could
claim ultimate unity with the natural sciences.
The centrality of observation was closely linked to a mechanical view of
causality (Hollis, 1977). If the goal of the science is to predict the behavior of
organisms, and the commitment to observation is pre-eminent, then the favored
explanatory model is that of Humean causality: behavior as a consequence of
observable antecedents. Teleology and intentionality, as alternative explanatory
forms, are rendered suspect because of their necessary reference to inner
(non-observable) impulses. And, with mechanical causality as the strong
preference for the new science, the optimal research method is experimentation.
It is only in the context of the laboratory experiment, in particular, that the
scientist can systematically control the antecedent conditions (’independent
variables’), and trace their ’causal effects’ on behavioral outcomes (’dependent
variables’).
With these commitments in place, the fate of the emotions is virtually sealed.
First, if the chief focus of the science is publicly observable behavior, then mental
states and conditions are shunted to the margins of the discipline, at best
’hypothetical’ and at worst obfuscating folklore. Because the emotions are
commonly viewed as constituents of the subjective world (the metaphor of inner
sense), their status as ’objects of study’ is threatened. And, if they are primarily
biological processes, as many argued, their status in psychological science is
equally problematic. The prescribed forms of study in this case are primarily
neurological and biochemical. Nor were the emotions easily absorbed into a
science committed to a conception of mechanical causation. Theorists did argue
that emotions are ’triggered’ by environmental stimuli, but on most traditional
accounts the emotions themselves are inherent or instinctual. For example, if
emotions are vital life-forces with the capacity to drive or motivate thought and
action, they function as unmoved movers. They are outside the system of
antecedent-consequent contingency. One might observe their effects in natural
settings, or compare the emotional tendencies of various species, but these are

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scarcely inviting topics for laboratory experimentation. In effect, with the assent
of behaviorism the emotions largely vanished from the agenda of scientific
psychology.
For radical behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner (1938), all mental state terms
could properly be eradicated from the discipline. For more liberal behaviorists,
the emotions made but fleeting entry into professional consciousness. For
example, in F. H. Allport’s volume, Social Psychology (1924), considered by
many to have shaped the next 30 years of social psychological research, only 15 of
the 453 pages are devoted to ’feelings and emotions’. Further, the treatment is
primarily couched in terms of the biological metaphor. As to the origin of
’feelings’, Allport proposes: ’The cranio-sacral division of the autonomic
nervous system, supplemented under certain conditions by the cerebro-spinal

system, innervates those responses whose return afferent impulses are associated
with the conscious quality of pleasantness. The sympathetic division produces
visceral responses which are represented in the consciousness as unpleasantness’
(1924: 90). Much the same view is taken in Myerson’s volume, Social Psychology,
published ten years later. No chapter is given over to the emotions in social life,
and the few relevant pages of the volume are built around the view that ’The
expression of emotion in the sense of the enormous changes which take place and
become visible as rage, fear, etc. and which come to consciousness as the affect,
arise largely through the hypothalamus’ (1934: 158). In a highly popular, and
more cognitively oriented, text studied in the 1950s, Krech and Crutchfield’s

Theory and Problems of Social Psychology (1948), there is no organized treatment

of emotion; it is simply a term associated in unsystematic fashion to the concept
of motivation.

NEO-BEHAVIORISM AND THE RETURN OF THE

INTERIOR

The reasons for the softening grasp of radical behaviorism on psychological

science are many and complex. However, as Koch (1963) outlines the case,
psychologists themselves found the demands of a rigorous positivism too
restrictive. Broad debate over the problems inherent in a strict operationalism,
for example, led to a liberalization of views. Strong cases were made in favor of a
family of ’hypothetical constructs’, terms which stood in for possible psycho-
logical processes but which were not to be confused with the processes
themselves. The chief function of such terms was to link independent and
dependent variables in a systematic way. This liberalization of behaviorism - or
the emergence of neo-behaviorism - opened a respectable way for psychology to
readmit the psychological interior to the science.
Perhaps the pivotal work for mainstream psychology was that of Clark Hull
and his colleagues at Yale’s Institute for Human Relations. Hull’s careful and

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intellectually commanding work served as a model for psychology as science. His

quasi-mathematical formulations for a theory of learning incorporated an
increasing number of formal terms for a hypothetical interior. And, while there
was no scientific purpose served by freighting such terms with cultural content,
the possibility of a distinctly psychological treatment of the emotions was slowly
reawakened when Hull articulated a concept of primary drive in his widely
heralded Principles of Behavior (1943). Although primarily interested in the
organism’s acquisition of behavior patterns, Hull required an explanation for the
organism’s state of basic activation. This was accomplished first by borrowing
from the biological metaphor the concept of tissue needs necessary for survival.
The choice of a needs discourse was particularly auspicious, in this case, because
needs, as opposed, for example, to instincts, can be related to environmental
conditions (’hunger needs can be sated’), and the model thus retained an
allegiance to the mechanistic metatheory. At the same time, however, Hull set
out to establish a fully psychological theory. Thus, needs at the biological level
were reinscribed as drives at the psychological level. Primary drives were thus
based on a few simple organismic needs (hunger, thirst, pain avoidance, etc.), but
once placed into theoretical orbit, operated with explanatory efficacy without
further reference to biological conditions.
While drawing sustenance from the biological metaphor, the conception of
primary drive also carries strong traces of the romanticist metaphor of vital
energy. By exploiting this tradition, psychoanalysts had successfully ensconced
themselves within the medical profession. However, with the concept of drive
now granted scientific respectability, the door was open not only for scientific

psychology to reclaim the discourse of emotion, but for appropriating

psychoanalytical formulations - of demonstrating that the basic tenets of
psychoanalytical theory were consistent with the more scientifically well-
grounded theories of neo-behaviorism. The most significant attempt of this kind
was Dollard and Miller’s 1950 volume Personality and Psychotherapy. As these
authors proposed, by drawing on the energic wellsprings of the primary drives,
new dispositions (secondary drives) could - under a particular combination of

antecedent conditions - be established. Thus, for example, fear is ’an innate

response to a (pain) stimulus’ (1950: 69). However, if the painful stimulus is
associated with a previously neutral cue, the neutral cue will come to produce
fear (now a secondary drive). By extending assumptions such as these,
psychotherapy can be properly envisioned as a form of learning laboratory.
With this opening for the development of emotion-like constructs in scientific
psychology, the metaphor of emotion as driving force was reinscribed in dozens
of volumes, including Young’s Motivation and Emotion (1961), Symonds’s
Dynamic Psychology (1949), Leeper and Madison’s Toward Understanding
Personality (1959) and Cofer’s Motivation and Emotion (1972). Such volumes
succeeded in tracing the major Freudian concepts - along with a broad array of
common emotion terms (including love) - to a drive formulation. Yet, the

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monophonic claim to superiority also stood as a challenge to those invested in

alternative discourses. If the emotions were now legitimate objects of study,
there were other long-standing metaphors to which allegiance could be claimed.
The old battle-lines were soon reactivated. In 1964, D. E. Berlyne was given the
opportunity to inscribe the first chapter on emotions ever to appear in the
prestigious Annual Review of Psychology. The title of this entry into the 15th
volume of the series, ’Emotional Aspects of Learning’, seems to leave the
behaviorist imprimatur unquestioned. As Berlyne begins, ’Psychologists are, on
the whole, following a suggestion reiterated since 1934 by Duffy. She contended
that terms like &dquo;emotion&dquo; have outlived their usefulness. We should, she feels,
give them up and recognize that all behavior, including &dquo;emotional&dquo; behavior,
has both a &dquo;directive&dquo; aspect and an &dquo;energy-mobilization&dquo; (or to use newer
terms, &dquo;activation&dquo; or &dquo;arousal&dquo;) aspect, with distinguishable determinants’
(1964: 115). Berlyne concurs with this view, but through a series of subtle
interpolations points the way to replacing the metaphor of driving force with a
physiological discourse.
As Berlyne reasons, if emotions are essentially internal drives, and drives are
fundamentally biological, then neurological investigation of brain stimulation
constitutes a contribution to our understanding of emotion. By then reviewing
research on the reticular formation, the limbic system and the lateral hypothala-
mus as they ’arouse’ the organism, the way was again opened to replace ’drive’

with physiology. And when physiology becomes the basis of learning, then
psychological theorizing about learning becomes superfluous. Behaviorist
theory is placed in jeopardy; the physiological metaphor is resuscitated. Further
conflict, however, would be postponed until the cognitive movement reached
maturity.

THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION: SUPPRESSION

AND SUSPIRATION

With interior process once again reinstated, the neo-behaviorist program was
slowly eclipsed by a broad and enthusiastic resuscitation of mental discourse -
particularly the discourse of reason. Although there are many reasons for what
became known as the ’cognitive revolution’ in psychology, just as in the case of
behaviorism, this investment can be traced in part to psychology’s dependency
on a philosophy of science with its major roots in the Enlightenment. The twin

philosophical movements on which enlightenment epistemology largely rests are

the empiricist and rationalist. Empiricist philosophy of science (drawing from
Locke, Hume and the Mills) gives primary voice to the former (e.g. the
pre-eminent role of observation), while the rationalist tradition (drawing from
Descartes, Leibniz and Kant) is placed in a secondary but nevertheless essential
position (e.g. the role of induction and deduction). In many respects, the

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14

behaviorist and neo-behaviorist movements in psychology recapitulate, at the

theoretical level, the empiricist emphasis in the philosophy of science. That is, the
theories of human psychology represent reformulations of the empiricist
metatheory that informs the behaviorist and neo-behaviorist projects of science
(Gergen, 1994b). However, these movements simultaneously left unexplored the
rationalist contribution to the reigning metatheory. Unexplored was the implicit
implicature, in which rational processes could be credited with a contribution to
human action - not simply pawns to antecedent conditions, but possessing
intrinsic properties with their own demands on action. Thus, the drama of
Piaget’s (1952) genetic epistemology; Chomsky’s (1959) critique of the Skinner-
ian theory of language, along with his subsequent advocacy of inherent
syntactical knowledge (Chomsky, 1968), was a significant demotion in the causal
powers attributed to ’the stimulus world’. These theories granted active mental
operations the central role in directing human action. The floodgates were now
open, and the literature soon abounded in research and theory on intrinsic
cognitive process.
In terms of inquiry into the emotions, however, the initial effect of the
cognitive movement was full-scale suppression. To render the ontology of
’cognition’ both intelligible and compelling meant favoring a family of
metaphors that either obscured or failed to recognize a domain of emotions.
Although centrally concerned with the problem of ’mental representation’, the
traditional epistemological metaphor of ’mind as mirror’ (Rorty, 1979) was
unserviceable. The metaphor again granted too much credit to the demands of
the stimulus world. Rather, cognitive theorists required fresh metaphors - and
particularly those which could grasp the imagination of the scientific community.
It is thus that much cognitive theory incorporated, for example, the metaphor of
the mind as statistical process; when operating optimally, rational thought
approximated the principles of statistical analysis (see Gigerenzer and Murray,
1987). Also compelling was a family of metaphors drawn from engineering
(servo-mechanisms, feedback loops, networks) and physics (the hologram).
However, perhaps the dominant metaphor for the cognitive theorist, and one
which adds the strength of allegiance to the field of artificial intelligence, is the
computer (see Hoffman, Cochran and Nead’s 1990 review). When the internal
world is constituted by computational devices, addresses, locations, data
structures, formats and other forms of information-processing, the emotions are
erased from the ontology of the interior. Thus, between Berlyne’s 1964 entry and
1986, not a single chapter on the emotions appeared in the Annual Review of
Psychology.
Yet, a psychology without emotion would not only fail to draw public
advantage from this symbolic repository, but more locally would reduce the
dependency of clinical practitioners on ’mainstream’ science. The major
challenge, then, was to develop a theory that would allow the emotions to be
appropriated by cognitive theory. This was furnished by Stanley Schachter’s

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 15

two factor theory of emotion (Schachter, 1964; Schachter and Singer, 1962).
Schachter’s formulation carried the traces of both the James and Hull
formulations. Like James, he cleanly separated biology from psychology. At the
same time he was able successfully to reframe the sensory metaphor. Rather than

viewing conscious experience as a passive recording (in this case of the biological
interior), the psyche was granted status as an active interpreter of the world and
self. Cognitive process did not so much reflect as determine the nature of
emotional experience. Similarly to Hull, Schachter resorted to an amorphous
concept of undifferentiated arousal. In effect, the biological system furnished
energy in the form of generalized activation, and the cognitive system (rather
than sensing messages from biology as in the case of James) operated in a
’top-down’ manner to define its character. For Schachter, cognition ’exerts a
steering function.... It is the cognition which determines whether the state of
physiological arousal will be labeled &dquo;anger,&dquo; &dquo;joy,&dquo; or whatever’ (1962: 51).
Not only did Schachter’s polyphonic account open up a means for cognitive
theorists to annex an important discourse - without threatening the preferred
explanatory fulcrum - but it also promised riches in practical/therapeutic
application. Of particular importance was the conception of cognitive attri-
bution. Thus, rather than actual states of emotion, motivation, pain, etc. being
treated, these states were de-ontologized, and the practitioner was invited to
focus on attributional tendencies or styles. Under what conditions did the
individual attribute pain, anger, romantic love and so on to the self, and how
could therapists help the client to reconceptualize these conditions in a more
promising way? (See, for example, Harvey and Ickes, 1976; Harvey and Weary,
1985.) Perhaps the most articulate application of the cognitive perspective to
psychotherapy is contained in Aaron Beck’s (1976) Cognitive T’herapy and the
Emotional Disorders, published almost 15 years after the initial appearance of
Schachter’s work. Beck alters the explanatory structure, so that the individual
does not cognize undifferentiated arousal (a view which had come under
considerable attack), but cognizes the situation. It is this cognition that has an
automatic eliciting effect on the emotional response. ’The thesis that the special
meaning of an event determines the emotional response forms the core of the
cognitive model of emotions and emotional disorder. The meaning is encased in
cognition’ (1976: 52). In effect, while a biological propensity is recognized,
cognitive process remains regnant.
In many respects, Schachter’s theory did much the same as William James at
the turn of the century to generate a vision of unification among psychologists,
biologists and the mental health practitioners - yet with psychology firmly at the
helm. Also similar to James, this vision was not to be realized. Schachter’s
polyphonic account not only brought emotions into the analytical eye once
again, but also brought the residual traces of competing metaphors. The
tum-of-the-century metaphors had scarcely been lost; they were not only
present in the common vernacular, but various professional enclaves (e.g.

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16

comparative psychologists, psychobiologists, ethological psychologists) had

continued to elaborate their potentials outside the mainstream. These enclaves
were also energized by the cognitivists’ penchant for removing the emotions

from the ledger. It was with a sense of righteous indignation - and possibly an eye
towards establishing a unique professional profile - that the earlier metaphors
were once again resuscitated. Leventhal and Tomarken’s (1986) chapter in the

Annual Review of Psychology, ’Emotion : Today’s Problems’, is illustrative:

... much of the conflict and confusion in this area stems from an
unwillingness to grant independent conceptual status to emotion. This
’begrudging’ attitude has three components: (a) the behavioristic legacy
and its suspicion of subjective concepts; (b) the traditional cognitive hold
on our thinking in which emotion is a combination of arousal and

cognition... ; and (c) the reluctance of cognitively oriented scientists to

view an emotion as anything more complex than a ’stop’ or interrupt rule
in the simulation of mental operations.... Admitting a richer concept of
emotion to the lexicon could generate major upheavals in cognitive theory
as emotions theory addresses the growing theoretical and empirical

knowledge in neuroscience and molecular biology. (1986: 566)

With this concluding sentence, the biological metaphor again springs to life.
Support is garnered in this case from a variety of studies in brain lateralization.
Research is used to argue that the right cortical hemisphere plays a major role in
the control and expression of moods, and the recognition of emotion in others.
The left hemisphere is said to be ’non-emotional’ (Tucker, 1981). It was noted
earlier that the biological metaphor could be segmented, the one viewing
emotions as physiological events, and the other as animal behavior. Armed with
the second metaphor, another phalanx of investigators attempted to identify
emotions as intrinsic patterns of organismic expression. Perhaps the most widely
heralded of these endeavors are those of Paul Ekman and his colleagues, who -
following in Darwin’s footsteps - amassed data to prove that the expression of
’the basic’ emotions in human beings is universal (Ekman et al., 1982). These
efforts were also supported by animal behavior specialists who argued for the
evolutionary benefits derived from various emotional expressions (cf. Eibl-
Eibelsfeldt, 1979; Plutchik, 1986). The two biological metaphors are finally
collapsed - or at least, a harmony is sought - in Blanchard and Blanchard’s
contribution to the 1988 volume of the Annual Review of Psychology.
The drive energy metaphor has also reappeared in full regalia. This is
unabashedly so in the therapeutic community, where popular selling volumes on
the primal scream, co-counseling and 12-step programs celebrate the elemental
force of the emotions. More subtly, the metaphor has resurfaced in a number of
scholarly treatises attempting not so much to replace the cognitive and the
biological views, as to perform interpolations in which motivational forces are
given a primary role. For example, in Frijda’s broad overview (1986), the

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 17

emotions are treated as forms of action potential (with traces of unleashed

drives). ’The emotions’, he writes, ’can be defined as modes of relational action

readiness, either in the form of tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a
relationship with the environment or in the form of modes of relational readiness
as such’ (1986: 71) Similarly, in his elaborate integration of the literature, Lazarus

(1991) not only stresses the concept of emotion as motivation (drawing from the
17th-century concept of the passions), but posits a vast array of innate ’action
tendencies’ that determine the course of anger, envy, love, sadness and so on.
Thus, in spite of the generalized hegemony of the cognitive movement, we
find that as emotion has returned full force as a discursive object, the profession is
once again fragmented. The fault-lines are precisely those of the century’s

beginning. Differing camps construct research programs, generate literatures,

hold conferences and generally organize themselves around contrasting tropes.
Illustrative of this climate of contestation is George Mandler’s (1984) troubled
query:
Is there a cohesive psychology of emotion? It may be symptomatic that
...

the best summary was provided by Madison Bentley. He knew in 1928

what too many psychologists still fail to accept today, that there is no
commonly, even superficially, acceptable definition of what a psychology
of emotion is about.... Bentley concludes: ’Whether the term [emotion]
stands for a psychological entity upon which we are all researching I do not
know. Whether it is the common subject of our varied investigations I am
not sure enough to be dogmatic.’ (1984: 16)

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND THE

METAPHORICAL INFLECTION

Thus far we find that as various movements in psychology have gained

ascendance - within the discipline, within the academy more generally, or within
the broader cultural and economic context of mental health practice - emotional
discourse has been shaped or suppressed accordingly. The various metaphors of
the emotions have variously served to justify, credit, excoriate, build allegiances,
sustain effective relations and secure employment for a broad array of
disciplinary subcultures. Abundant traces of earlier contests remain, as discursive
regimes wax and wane in strength. However, the story does not thereby
terminate. There is yet a final chapter to be added, one that dramatically alters the
rhetorical landscape. We confront now the possible emergence of a new form of
monophony.
For early behaviorists, the absence of research on emotions seemed largely
derived from a commitment to a logical empiricist metatheory. However, since
the 1950s logical empiricist philosophy has become subject to increasing
criticism, and since the 1960s there has been a general erosion of interest in

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18

projects designed to establish rational foundations of scientific method. Moving

from the more conservative critiques, for example, of Popper and Quine, to the
more radical incursions of theorists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, philosophy
has entered what most consider a ’post-empiricist’ phase. This erosion of
confidence in the philosophical justification for scientific psychology has also
invited broad-scale critique of the science, and fostered lively discussion of a ’new
psychology’.’
As many now recognize, perhaps the chief contender for a successor project to
logical empiricism is some form of social constructionism. Drawing importantly
from emerging developments most prominently in the history of science, the
sociology of knowledge, ethnomethodology, rhetorical studies of science,
symbolic anthropology, feminist theory and poststructuralist literary theory,
social constructionism is not so much a foundational theory of knowledge as an
anti-foundational dialogue. Primary emphases of this dialogue are placed on the
following: the social-discursive matrix from which knowledge-claims emerge
and from which their justification is derived; the values/ideology implicit within
knowledge-posits; the modes of informal and institutional life sustained and
replenished by ontological and epistemological commitments; and the distri-
bution of power and privilege favored by disciplinary beliefs. Much attention is
also given to the creation and transformation of cultural constructions; the
adjudication of competing belief-/value-systems; and the generation of new
modes of pedagogy, scholarly expression and disciplinary relations.
Given these investments - in loosening the grip of the empiricist world-view,
and building towards a positive alternative - what posture can constructionist
psychologists take towards the emotions? In this instance none of the central
metaphors of the preceding century is felicitous. The biological, the sensory (and
its cognitive derivative) and the energic metaphors all conflict with the
assumptions of constructionist metatheory. The earlier metaphors, instantiated
at the theoretical level, blunt the impetus towards change at the level of

metatheory. The most prominent failings may be enumerated as follows. 1) Each

of the traditional metaphors essentializes the emotions - treating them as
biological, sensory-cognitive, or energic givens - there in nature, to be
interrogated by science. In effect, the metaphors portend the existence of an
obdurate domain outside the realm of social construction. 2) Each metaphor
derives from and rationalizes a dualistic conception of human functioning. Not
only is dualism a primary constituent of the empiricist view of knowledge (with
the mental representations of individuals serving as the locus of knowledge), but
it favors psychological explanations of human action as opposed to the
micro-social explanations central to constructionism. 3) In their focus on
individual process, each of the metaphors favors an ideology of the self-
contained individual, a commitment that most constructionists see as inimical to
cultural well-being. Feminist critics have been particularly vocal in their critiques
of the biological metaphor and its contribution to the cluster of androcentric

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binaries that valorize reason, culture and masculinity, at the expense of emotion,
nature and femininity.
Confronted with the unattractive options offered by the tradition, and
desirous of appropriating this significant discursive realm, it has been necessary
for constructionists to draw from alternative repositories of cultural intelligi-
bility. The result is a resuscitation of a family of interrelated but (until now) more
marginal metaphors within the culture. Primary among these are: life as theater
(the dramaturgic), as game (the ludic), as literature (the narrative) and as cultural
ritual (the tribal). These metaphors not only furnish the constructionist with a
novel and intelligible set of alternatives to the discourses favored by empiricist
psychology, but simultaneously function to reinforce the social constructionist
alternative to empiricist metatheory. The metaphors thus carry a dual function,
serving as explanatory vehicles in scholarly research on the emotions, and as
rhetorical supports for the overarching attempts at metatheoretical ascendance.
To elaborate, each of the new metaphors first draws attention away from
individual, psychological process, and gives primacy to the social sphere: to the
play (see, for example, Sarbin, 1986; Averill, 1982), the game (Bailey, 1983), the
text (Gergen and Gergen, 1988), or the tribal ritual (Rosaldo, 1980; White and

Kirkpatrick, 1985). Ineffect, psychological explanations are replaced by

processes of cultural meaning-making. Second, the kind of essentialism posited
by the empiricists is placed in critical relief, as each of the metaphors views the
emotions as socially constituted - with emotional action paralleling, for example,
the performance of Hamlet (the dramaturgic), or hitting a ’home run’ in baseball
(the ludic); to achieve an emotion is thus similar to writing a climax to a short
story (the narrative), or participating in a rite of passage (the tribal). There simply
is no reality of emotion independent of the community of interlocutors.
Further, each of these metaphors operates against the empiricist claims of
universality - casting aspersions on formulations of human functioning that
discount history and culture. Rather, each invites sensitivity to the sociocultural
circumstances giving rise to various forms of emotional performance. Construc-
tionist scholarship thus lays special emphasis on the specific cultural functions
played by various emotional expressions (see, for example, Lutz, 1988), and the
historical conditions giving rise to various forms of emotion (Badinter, 1980;
Stearns,1989). Finally, each of these metaphors opens the way to social critique.
The empiricist family of metaphors were all consistent with a world of Humean
causality; individual behavior is simply a causal byproduct of antecedent
conditions (physiology, stimuli, human constitution). Persons themselves have
no responsibility for their actions. For constructionists, such a view of human
action not only favors the status quo (’people simply do what they must do’), but
leads to myopic claims to ethical neutrality. Yet the alternative metaphors of the
stage, the game, the text and the tribe all emphasize the optional nature of the
actions in question. Contemporary patterns of action are scarcely required, and
they could be otherwise. (See, for example, Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1990.)

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20

Further, it is one of the responsibilities of the scholar to challenge problematic

patterns of action, to engage in forms of social critique.

CONCLUSION

As we find, the view of a unitary hegemonic discourse, subtly expanding and

subverting alternative intelligibilities, scarcely fits the history of American
psychology. Rather, we find a discipline that is at once attempting to legitimate
itself with respect to differing audiences (the academic and the general populace
in particular), and fraught with internecine warfare concerning the image of
science. Further, these investments are significantly manifest in the theoretical
content of the field. As emphasized here, the view taken of ’the emotions’ is

scarcely neutral - derived from a pre-existent observation base - but plays an

important role in the varying attempts at professional ascendance. The
metaphorical construction of the emotions thus serves to buttress or reinforce
claims to legitimacy. In certain cases, claims to superior position have lent
themselves to theories that exclude or marginalize emotions discourse. However,
because ’the emotions’ are integral to the culturally sedimented belief-systems,
exclusionary projects are limited in lifespan. They are vulnerable to competing
movements that, by reinstating the emotions, gain important cultural advantage.
There is, then, substantial institutional power derived from compelling meta-
phors of the emotions. While various movements in psychology have attempted
to eradicate the emotions, the resilience and resurgence of the discourse reveal the
overarching significance of the broader context of meaning.
Further, when emotions discourse has played a central role in justifying the
scientific project, it has confronted an obfuscating polyphony. A variety of
compelling metaphors have been available for elaboration. However, attempts at
a polyphonic blending have not sutured the conflicting figurations. And, with

variegated metaphors still creditable, the temptation towards monophonic

reductionism remains ever salient. The move towards a social constructionist
science significantly alters the political complex. Constructionists abandon each
of the traditional metaphors - and thus both the long-standing tendencies
towards polyphony and monophony. Rather, the constructionist relies on a
family of textually related metaphors that blur the distinction between
polyphony and monophony. And, while these metaphors are not likely to carry
rhetorical weight within the natural science domain, they are highly congenial
with the shift towards a human (as opposed to a behavioral) science more
generally within the academy. We thus confront a new array of tensions, the
results of which are certain to ramify throughout forthcoming disquisitions on
emotion.

Swarthmore College, PA

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 21

NOTES

I wish to thank David Schaub and Rebeckah Flowers for their valuable assistance in this
research, and the William Fulbright Foundation, Washington, DC, and Fundacion
Interfas, Buenos Aires, for making the funds and facilities available for its completion.
1 See, for example, Armistead (1974), Harré and Secord (1972) and Gergen (1982).

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