Arab Revolt (1916)
Following British assurances, Sherif Hussein and his sons Ali, Faisal and Abdullah led a
revolt against the Ottoman rulers in June 1916.
During WWI, greatest symbol of Arab nationalism was the Arab revolt.
The revolt was a sign that Arabs wanted both political and territorial independence.
Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)
British representative Mark Sykes and French representative Francois-Georges Picot
had negotiated secret agreements to divide much of the Ottoman Empire between
themselves.
This agreement denied British promises to Arabs.
When the Bolsheviks released the papers to Turks following Revolution in 1917, the
agreement was not secret any more.
It was a shock for the Arabs.
Puppet Kingdoms
Arabs received minimum while they expected maximum.
New nation states under the mandated authority of either British and French –
puppet kingdoms were created for the Hashemites in Iraq, Syria and Transjordan.
From then on Arab nationalist demands increased.
Shaping the Middle East
British and French went some considerable way.
Very few escaped impact of Europeanization of politics, economy, culture and society
in the region.
By promoting puppet rulers
Imposing an artificial leadership on people
Creating subjects in a new state
Establishing new boundaries under a new flag, anthem etc.
British were actually sowing the seeds for conflict and internal instability.
Arab reaction to communism
Arab leaders frequently jailed national Communist Party leaders and followers.
Nasser imprisoned members of the Communist Party shortly after assuming power.
Iraqi General Qasim did the same after bloody confrontations between Bathist and
Iraqi Communist Parties.
US interests in the Middle East
American involvement in the Middle East began following the World War II.
Two key objectives came to define US interests in the region:
1) the containment of Soviet influence,
2) the protection of oil production and exports from the Persian/Arab Gulf (the ‘Gulf’).
These interests were pursued through policies aimed at regional stability,
which included economic and military support for friendly regimes; Arab and non-
Arab alike.
Since the end of the Cold War, the protection of the free flow of oil into the global
market has remained the constant of US interests in the Gulf,
reinforced by the imperatives of combating terrorism following the September 2001
terrorist attacks and countering Iranian influence.
The priority afforded to energy security in US policy towards the Middle East arises
from the fact that the US is dependent on energy to drive its economic growth.
With the largest economy in the world, the US consumes more energy than any other
state.
Although self-sufficient in coal and natural gas, the US became a net oil importer in
1970, coming to depend upon foreign oil for at least half of its total consumption.
As a consequence, the US economy is especially vulnerable to oil price increases, a
high proportion of which (though not all) have been triggered by political instability in
the Middle East.
This is due to the strategic significance of the Gulf area in supplying oil to the global
market.
For many years, the US prioritized stability in the Middle East and even cooperated
with the authoritarian regimes of the region.
US and the Arab Spring
The Arab uprisings have renewed longstanding debates about the balance between
security and democracy as the focus of US policy in the Middle East.
The US was initially uncertain about how to respond to the wave of mass protests
that swept the region.
There was concern about the instability that might follow the collapse of long-time
allies – however autocratic they were – and the likelihood that Islamist political actors
would be the principal beneficiaries of regime change.
Economic context
Economically, the US experienced the worst recession since the Great Depression.
It sharply limited possibilities for a significant increase in funding for foreign aid
programs in the Middle East, even as the region began its most significant political
transformations in recent history.
Political context
Politically, the Administration’s response to the Arab uprisings has been heavily
influenced by the legacies of the Bush Administration,
including the negative economic effects of US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan
on foreign aid budgets and a view of foreign assistance that is heavily inflected by
considerations of national security and the Global War on Terror.
When Barak Obama took office in January 2009, he was determined to redefine US
foreign policy and overcome what he and his supporters viewed as the disastrous
legacies of the Bush presidency.
The Middle East was a focal point of the Administration’s efforts to distance itself
from its predecessor, including democracy promotion policies that were ‘badly
damaged from [their] prior association with the war in Iraq and with forcible regime
change more generally’.
Obama Administration sought to free itself from tensions and contradictions that
have long been evident in US policy toward the Middle East.
Attempts at distancing itself from the aggressive unilateralism of the Bush era and to
repair damaged relations between the US and the Muslim world.
Like its predecessors, Obama administration struggled to reconcile America’s interest
in security and stability with its commitment to democracy.
Its foreign aid programs starting with 2011 continued to reflect a deep mistrust of
political Islam, and the (mutual) hostility that tended to define US relations with
Islamist political movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Obama Administration did not make significant adjustments in funding for MENA
foreign aid during its first three years in office.
US foreign assistance in the first years of the Obama Administration exhibited a
striking degree of continuity with the patterns that developed in the wake of 9/11
under the Bush Administration.
Other than funding levels, the Obama Administration also preserved the structure
and content of the MENA foreign assistance programs it inherited from its
predecessor, George W. Bush.
US response to Arab uprisings
Uncertainty surrounded initial US responses to protests in Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain
and even Syria.
It was not until 19 May 2011 that President Obama forcefully expressed US support
for the demands of protesters, indicating that the US faced an ‘historic opportunity’
in the Middle East.
Remarks by the President Obama on the Middle and North Africa, May 19, 2011.
European interests in the region
European interest in the region has mainly four grounds:
1) increasing migration from region to Europe,
2) energy dependence of the EU on the region,
3) bilateral trade and economic relations between the EU and the regional states, and
4) concerns on security/counterterrorism.
1)Increasing migration from region to Europe
European concerns over growing migratory flows from the Southern shores of the
Mediterranean.
2)Energy dependence of the EU on the region.
MENA has become the leading region for energy supplies to Europe.
EU attaches great importance to the security of transferring energy supplies to EU
member states.
3)Bilateral trade and economic relations between the EU and the regional states.
Support for political reform in the region has an underlying logic of creating a stable
environment where economic cooperation, trade and investment can take place in a
smooth way.
4) Concerns on security/counterterrorism.
EU perceived democracy promotion in regional states as a part of tackling the root
causes of terrorism in the region.
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
The EU started to pay greater attention to political and economic reform in the
Mediterranean Arab states by the mid-1990s, initiating the EMP during 1995
Barcelona Summit.
With this partnership, the EU declared its commitment to encourage democratization
and human rights in the Arab Mediterranean states.
The partnership consisted of a series of bilateral association agreements among the
EU and the Arab states (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine,
Syria, Tunisia).
It included intensive network of cooperation with state and non-state actors in the
region.
Through this cooperation, the EU has penetrated into economies and societies of the
Arab Mediterranean states with the aim of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean
identity.
