Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of the Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath

Author(s): Talukder Maniruzzaman

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1975: Part II (Feb., 1976), pp. 119-129
Published by: University of California Press
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 BANGLADESH IN 1975:
THE FALL OF THE MUJIBREGIME
AND ITS AFTERMATH

TalukderManiruzzaman

As S. M. Lipset has emphasized,the way that a nation

is born conditionsmuch of its later political development.Bangladesh
was born througha bloody revolutionwhich spawned ideas that dis-
rupted the pre-revolutionconsensus among the Bangladesh leaders
about the adoption of parliamentarygovernment.The groups espous-
ing the view that the salvationof the poverty-striken masses could be
accomplishedonly througha social revolutionon the Chinese model
acquired arms and ammunitionduring the liberationwar. Afterhav-
ing recruitedcadresfromthe frustrated youngMukti Bahini members,
thesegroupsemergedas strongforceschallengingthe Sheikh MAujibur
Rahman (Sheikh Mujib) governmentand questioning the suitability
of the Westernparliamentarysystemas a catalystforradical economic
reforms.Moreover,while Sheikh Mujib was able to rouse mass senti-
mentfora nationalistrevolution,he provedunequal to the more chal-
lengingtaskof runningthe problem-ridden new state.As the polariza-
tion betweenhis centristAwami League (AL) and the radical revolu-
tionariesbecome more seriousby the end of 1974,1Sheikh Mujib gave
up the facade of parliamentarygovernmentand resortedto the device
of a one-partydictatorshipand totalitariancontrol.This touchedoffa
chain of armycoups afterAugust 15, 1975,which in the ultimateana-
lysisseem to have furthersharpenedthe ideological cleavagesin Bang-
ladesh.

Coup of January25, 1975:

The Constitutional
The Introduction
of a PresidentialOne-partySystem
The author learned fromauthoritativesourcesthat the idea of a
systemwas firstsold to Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni (Sheikh
single-party
1 For a detailed study of the polarization of the Awami League and the radical
parties,see T. Maniruzzaman,"Bangladesh: An UnfinishedRevolution?", The Jour-
nal of Asian Studies, XXXIV:4, August 1975, pp. 891-911.
119

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120 TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN

Mujib's nephewand Chairmanof theAwamiJubo [Youth]League) and

to MionsoorAli (the Home Ministerin the Mujib cabinet) by the em-
bassyof the most powerfulsocialiststate. The pressureof the radical
opposition, constantprodding by Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni (Sheikh
Moni), Monsoor Ali and otherpro-Moscowleaders,and Mujib's own
proclivityfor total power and his desire to subordinatethe admini-
strators(most of whom had been recruitedby Pakistan) to his party
cadres,all propelled Mujib into the decision to introducea one-party
system.
On January25, 1975,on the initiativeof SheikhMujib and against
the privatesentimentsof the majorityof the membersof parliament
belongingto theAwami League, the Constitutionwas amended to pro-
vide fora presidentialformof government.The Presidentwas author-
ized to formone "National Party"and to suspend the activitiesof all
political groups that refusedto join the "new" party.The amendment
furtherprovided that "Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
Father of the Nation" would be the Presidentof the countryfor five
yearsfromthe date of the constitutionalamendment.
The constitutionalamendmentbill was passed withoutanyreading
and discussionin parliament,since thenormalrulesof procedureof the
House were suspended,and the whole processof amendmentwas com-
pleted withinhalf an hour. Thus, as has been the case with manyone-
partystates,"the single-partypowerwas seized,not grantedby voters."-
In his bid to outdo the slogan-mongering Sheikh
of the revolutionaries,
Mujib dubbed his constitutionalcoup as a "Second Revolution" to
bringabout "the democracyof the exploitingmasses."3
Sheikh Mujib announced on June 6 the constitutionof the Na-
tional Party, called the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League
(Bangladesh Peasants, Workersand Peoples' League or BKSAL) and
nominatedthe membersof the Party'sExecutiveCommitteeand Cen-
tral Committeeas well as the ExecutiveCommitteesof the fivewings
of the BKSAL. Despite SheikhMujib's repeatedappeals to all political
parties to join the BKSAL, the radical parties [i.e., the partyled by
Serajul Alam Khan as well as its frontorganization,the Jatio Sanaj-
trantricDal (JSD); the Purbo Bangla Sarbohara Party (East Bengal
CommunistParty) whose leader Siraj Sikdar had been arrestedand
killed in the firstweek of January1975; the Purbo Bangla Sammobadi
Dal-Marxbadi-Leninbadi(East Bengal CommunistParty-Marxist-Lenin-
ist); theEast PakistanCommunistParty-Marxist-Leninist, and the Ban-
gladesh Communist Party (Leninist)] abstained from joining the
BKSAL. The pro-Moscowfactions,ofcourse,hailed the formationof the
BKSAL. But only a few of theirleaders were included in the party's
115-member Central Committee.The Supremebody of the BKSAL-

2 "Power to Mlujib's Private Army,"Far Eastern EconomnicReview, 87:2, Janu-

ary 10, 1975.
3 The author and one of his colleagues were the only two persons presentin the
visitors'gallery during the session of Parliament on January25, 1975.

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 BANGLADESH 121

the ExecutiveCommittee-consistedof SheikhMujib as Chairmanand

14 othermembers,all of whomwereclose followersof Mujib and, with
one exception,prominentleaders of the formerAwami League. The
General Secretariesand a majorityof the membersof the Executive
Committeesof the fivewingsof the partynominatedby Sheikh Mujib
were all formerleaders of the AL and AL-affiliatedlabor, student,
youth,peasant and women'sorganizations.An analysisof the compo-
sition of the variouscommitteesthus showed that BKSAL was in fact
the Awami League under a different name.
The formationof the BKSAL was followedby otherauthoritarian
measures.All newspaperswere broughtunder governmentalmanage-
ment.Through a PresidentialOrdinance on June 21, 61 districtswere
created by breakingup the existing 19 districts.On July 16, Sheikh
Mujib announced the names of 61 governor-designates who were to
take over districtadministrationon September1, 1975. The governor-
designateswere givenspecial political trainingstartingJuly21 which
was to continueuntilAugust16. The plan was to place half a battalion
of theJatioRakkhiBahini (theJRB or "National SecurityForce,"with
recruitsdrawnmainlyfromorganizationsaffiliated with the AL) under
each governor,whilethegovernorswere to be directlyunder the control
of PresidentMujib. It was furtherplanned that the JRB units would
be increasedannually so that by the end of 1980 the total strengthof
whatwas in facta partymilitiawould be 130,000.One regimentof JRB
would thanbe placed under thecommandof each governor.4
The BKSAL Committeemembersand districtgovernor-designates
were selectedby Sheikh Mujib, Sheikh Moni, Abdur Rab Sarniabad
(a Minister in Mujib's Cabinet, Mujib's brother-in-law and Sheikh
Moni's father-in-law)-thehard-coreof the political elite since Sheikh
Mujib's returnto Bangladesh in January 1972. As time passed, the
BKSAL leaders began to equate the partywith the state. It seemed
obvious that the new systemof "copying the Soviet methodsbut re-
jectingits ideology"was designed to suppresseveryvestigeof opposi-
tion and perpetuatethe corruptrule of the "Sheikh MUjib Tribe" in
the "softest"statein the world.

The Coup of August 15

- Sheikh Mujib's blueprint for total control had one lacuna. He
completelyoverlooked the possible reaction of the regular armed
forces(i.e., other than the JRB) to the new system.With his inflated
ego and obsessionwith the leftists,he brushedaside the suggestionof
the pro-Moscowleaders and Sheikh Moni to take some precautionary
measuresagainsta possible armycoup.
4 The JRB officers were initially trained by Indian army officersin their head-
quiartersat Savar near Dacca. Because of the growing anti-Indian sentimentwithin
Bangladesh, however, the venue of training for the JRB officerswas changed to
Dehra Dun-India's Sandhurst. The firstgroup of JRB officerswas flown to Dehra
Dun in July 1974. Far Eastern Econom7zic Review, January 10, 1975.

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122 TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN

The Bangladesh armed forceswere about 55,000 strong;of these,

approximately28,000 (including 1100 officers)were repatriatesfrom
Pakistanwhile the restconsistedof soldiersof what had been the East
Bengal Regimentpriorto 1971and selectedrecruitsfromthe guerrillas
and sector-troops of the Liberation Armyof 1971. For a number of
reasons,mostof the armypersonnelwere rabidly anti-Indian.Almost
all membersof the armed forceswho had belonged to the Liberation
Armyhad the feelingthat the Indian Army"just walked in Bangla-
desh,when we had alreadyfinishedthe job," thus robbingthe Libera-
tion Armyof the gloryof liberatingBangladesh.The poorlyequipped
armedforceswere also bitterabout the factthatthe Indian Armytook
away to India all the sophisticatedweapons and vehiclescapturedfrom
the PakistanArmyforceswhen theysurrenderedin December 1971.
The anti-Indiansentimenton the part of the armed forcesgrad-
ually developed an anti-Mujib orientation.The yearlybudget provi-
sion forthe armedforceswas quite slimi.In successiveannual budgets
since 1972, only about 13% of total expenditureswere allocated for
defense.The armed forcesfurthercomplained that most of this mod-
est allocationwas spenton buyingarmsand ammunitionforthe JRB,
whose patriotismwas suspectedby the regularforces.The plan to in-
crease the strengthof the JRB fromabout 25,000 in 1975 to 130,000
in 1980,while recruitmentto the regular armed forceswas virtually
stopped,aroused the hostilityof the latter to the Mujib government.
The officers and soldiersrepatriatedfromWest Pakistan also resented
the factthat theywere not paid a salary for the 18 monthstheyhad
spent in "concentrationcamps" in Pakistan before being repatriated
to Bangladesh.SheikhMujib furtheralienated the officers of the armed
forcesby demotingand sackingseveralarmyofficers on the prompting
of some AL leaders who had personal scoresto settlewith the officers
concerned.Thus, in 1975,anyone talkingto the jawans (soldiers)and
officerscould easily feel that,given resolute leadership,the armywas
preparedat any momentto topple the Mujib government.
The detailsof thebloody coup stagedin the earlyhoursof August
15 are well-knownin the politicalcirclesof Dacca. Three dismissedof-
ficersof the armyin collaborationwith 90 to 30 majors and captains
(all in theirlate twentiesor early thirties)of the two battalions (tank
and artillery)of the armoredcorpsof the Bangladesharmy,)supported
by about 1400 soldiers,made simultaneousattackson the residencesof
Sheikh Mujib, Sheikh Moni and Abdur Rab Sarniabad. Afterhaving
eliminatedthe "Sheikhdynasty,"a smallrebel forceoccupied theradio
stationat Dacca and announced the killingof Sheikh Mujib and the
"fendof theera of tyranny."The remainingforcessurroundedtheJRB
5 The Bangladesh army had only 33 tanks, three of them left-oversof the Pak-
istan armyand 30 Soviet-madetanks that had been bought fromEgypt.The artillery
had only some World War II type heavy guns that were given to Bangladesh by In-
dia in response to the demand by the Bangladesh governmentfor the return of the
arms surrenderedby the Pakistan army and taken as "booty" to India by the Indian
forcesafterDecember 16, 1971.

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 BANGLADESH 123

headquarters.Lacking armor and artillery,the JRB surrendered.At

11 a.m., KhondokharMushtaq Ahmed,the ForeignTrade Ministerin
the Mujib cabinet,told the nation over the radio thatthe armed forces
had takenover,and that in responseto "historicnecessity"he had as-
sumed the Presidentshipof the country.
The news of the putsch that overthrewand killed Sheikh Mujib
was firstbrokento the world by the State Departmentin Washington,
quotingits Dacca Embassy.6Pakistanwas the firstcountryto recognize
the Mushtaqgovernment,
only a fewhoursafterthe coup.7 Saudi
Arabia, which had withheldrecognitionof Bangladeshfornearlyfour
years,recognizedthe new governmenton the day afterthe coup.8 Ac-
cordingto one report,"Chinese and Indian forcesclashed in the wake
of the August 15 coup. . . China had re-inforced
- its Sino-Indianbor-
der garrisonson hearingthe news of the move against the Sheikh....
The move paid off: the anti-Mujib forcesswiftlyconsolidated their
grip on Bangladesh and Dacca and Peking establisheddiplomaticre-
lations."9 Taheruddin Thakur, Minister of State, Informationand
Broadcastingin the Mujib government,emergedas the second-most
importantman in the post-coupMushtaq government.The circum-
stancialevidence,thus,givessome credibilityto the thesisthat the Au-
gust 15 coup was preplannedand that Mushtaq and Thakur had col-
laboratedwith the disgruntledofficers
of the armyto bring about the
coup with the knowledgeand supportof certainforeignpowers.

Post-coup Bangladesh
The new governmentheaded by PresidentMushtaq retained ten
of theeighteenMinistersand eightof the nine Ministersof stateof the
Mujib government.There was no resistanceat all fromthe people. In
the firstfewdays the situationat the top remainedfluid,with the ma-
jors who led thecoup stayingwithPresidentMushtaq at Banga Bhavan
guardedby tanks,while the sullen seniorofficersremainedin the Can-
tonment.The fearof an Indian intervention, however,had a sobering
effecton both the leadersof the coup and seniorofficers,
and negotia-
tions went on between them. In the second week after the coup, a
major reshufflingin thearmytookplace. Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman,
theDeputyChiefof Staff,replacedMajor-GeneralSafiullahas the Chief
of Staffof theArmy.Some of the seniorofficersand manyof thejunior
officerswere promoted.A revolutionarycouncil consistingof the five
majors who had led the coup and senior officersof the defenseforces
was formed.While the Mushtaq governmentcarriedon the civil ad-
ministration,the revolutionarycouncil devoted itself to the task of

6See "Bangladesh's New Friends," New Statesman,August 22, 1975, p. 217.

7See The Daily Ittefaq (Decca), August 16, 1975. Pakistan soon after donated
$50 million worthof rice and cloth.
8See The Bangladesh Times (Dacca), August 17, 1975.
9Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 1975, p. 5.

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124 TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN

national security,recoveryof unauthorizedarms, an anti-corruption

driveand the like.
The Mushtaq governmentdropped the district reorganization
scheme and ordered the retentionof the original 19 districtswith
DeputyCommissionersas the head of the districtadministration.Pres-
ident Mushtaq promulgatedordinancesbanning political parties,re-
pealed the part of the constitutionwhich provided for one National
party,and dissolvedthe BKSAL. Thirty-twopersons-six Ministersof
the Mujib government,ten MP's (including Tajuddin Ahmed), four
civil servants,one educationistand twelvebusinessmenwere arrested
on chargesof misuseof power and corruptionunder the Maritial Law
Regulations.On October 3, PresidentMushtaq announced that the
parliamentary systemof governmentwould be restored,political activi-
tieswould be revivedfromAugust 15, 1976 and generalelectionswould
be held on February28, 1977.

Coup of November 3
All theradical partiesin Bangladeshinitiallywelcomedthe change
of governmentand congratulatedthe "patrioticsection of the armed
forces"whichbroughtabout the overthrowof the Mujib regime.They
were particularlyjubilant over the Chinese recognitionof Bangladesh
on August 31. But soon aftertheybegan to complain about the con-
tinued detentionof political prisonersbelongingto the leftistparties.
The JSD condemnedthe rightistorientationof the Mushtaq cabinet
and called for the oustingof the civilian cabinet. The pro-Mujib and
pro-Moscowgroups were at firstcompletelybewildered and terrified
by the killingof Sheikh Mujib, but soon began to work fora backlash
in favorof Mujib. On October 16, when PresidentMushtaq met the
membersof the National Assembly,the vast majorityof the members
made blisteringattackson the "murderersof Bangabandhu." Shortly
thereafter, the pro-Mujib labor leaders fomentedlabor unrestin the
Adamjee Jute Miills which led to the killing of several workers b.y thie
forceson duty. On October 23, leafletsblaming the Mushtaq govern-
mentforthe killingof Sheikh Mujib and the workersin the Adamjee
Jute Mills were distributedwidely in Dacca. Soon other leafletsfol-
lowed demandingthe punishmentof the "Killers of Sheikh Mujib"
and the restorationof constitutionalgovernmentby the release of the
arrestedBKSAL leaders.
On November3, several senior officersled by Brigadier Khaled
Musharrafstageda second coup. In supportof the new coup leaders,a
processionconsistingmainly of leaders and studentsof pro-Moscow
groups was taken out from the Dacca Universitycampus to Sheikh
Mujib's formerresidence to observe "Bangabandhu Memorial Day."
The leadersof the November3 coup negotiatedwith PresidentMush-
taq, and allowed a safe passage to Bangkok for the 15 militaryofficers

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 BANGLADESH 125
who were widelyknown to be connectedwith the August 15 coup.'0
BrigadierKhaled Musharrafwas promotedto the rank of Major-Gen-
eral and appointed Chief of the ArmyStaffin place of Major-General
Ziaur Rahman,who was reportedto have resignedearlier.The leaders
of the November3 coup and theirsupporters,however,lost heartwhen
the news spread in the eveningof November4 that the fourleaders of
the BKSAL-Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Monsoor Ali
and A. H. M. Kamruzzaman-were found dead in the Dacca Central
Jail. However,on November 5, Khaled Musharrafand his associates
forcedMushtaq to hand over the presidencyto the ChiefJusticeof the
SupremeCourt,A. M. Sayem.

"Sepoy Revolution" of November 7

In the meantimeleafletswere circulatedamong the jawans of the
Armyat the Dacca Cantonmentby the JSD and Sammobadi Dal ac-
cusingKhaled Musharrafof being a paid agent of the Indian govern-
ment,describingthe November3 coup as an attemptby the Delhi-
Moscow axis to reestablishtheircontrolover Bangladesh,and urging
the jawans to revoltagainst Khaled Musharraf.The JSD had already
establishedsome cells of theirmilitaryfront-the Biplobi Gono Ba-
hini (RevolutionaryPeoples' Army)-in the army,and the jawans be-
longing to this organizationtook the lead in organizing,at midnight
of November6, a Sepoy (Soldiers') Revolution. The jawans of Dacca
Cantonmentin a body revoltedagainst Khaled Musharrafand his as-
sociates. Khaled Musharrafwas killed while tryingto flee from the
Cantonment.The jawans thenfreedZiaur Rahman who had been kept
underhouse arrest.In theearlyhoursof November7, the jawans came
out in the cityon tanks,trucks,jeeps, and buses,firingblank shotsin
the air to celebratethe victoryof the "nationalist"forces.Thousands
of people fromall strataof societygreetedthemwith wild jubilation
and joined the jawans in shoutingslogans-"Bangladesh Zindabad,"
"General Zia Zindabad" and "Sepoy Revolution Zindabad."
By the evening of November 7, things took a more organized
shape. Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman was reinstalledas the Chief of
Staffof the Bangladesharmy.Mushtaq in a radio broadcastpraised the
"unparalleledrevolutionin defenceof independenceand sovereignty of
Bangladesh" and urged the continuationof JusticeSayem as "a non-
political and non-partisan"Presidentof the country.PresidentSayem
became the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the threeChiefsof
Serviceswere appointedas Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators.
The new governmentdeclared thatelectionswould be held according
to the schedule earlier announced by the Mushtaq government.Soon
a nine-member Council of Advisersto the President,consistingof the

10All but one of these officerslater went to Libya.

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126 TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN

threeDeputy Chief Martial Law Administrators, three educationists,

one formercivil servant,one doctorand one femalesocial worker,was
set up. The advisersweregiventherank of Ministersand the President
allocated responsibilitiesforMinistriesand divisionsamong them.

Crackdownon theJSD: Possiblybecause of the role of theJSD in or-

ganizingthe Sepoy Revolution,the Sayem governmentreleased M. A.
Jalil and A. S. M. Abdur Rab and some other JSD leaders who had
been imprisonedduringthe Mujib regime.The JSD leaders,however,
called for an "uninterruptedrevolution"under the leadershipof the
Biplobi Gono Bahini. Through leafletsand theircells in the army,the
JSD leadersurgedjawans to formBiplobi Sainik Parishad (Association
of RevolutionarySoldiers) units with a four-pointprogramof action:
(1) removalof differences betweenofficers and jawans; (2) discontinua-
tion of the use of jawans for privatehousehold worksby the officers;
(3) the classification
of J.C.O.s co-operatingwith officers
as anti-revolu-
tionaryelements;and (4) non-surrender of arms by the jawans until
the above-mentioneddemands were met. The JSD-sponsoredleaflets
also chargedthat Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman, who had been "freed"
by the revolutionary jawans, was being led in anti-revolutionary
direc-
tions by "the rightistre-actionariesand pro-U.S.A. elements."These
activitiesof theJSD instigatedthejawans to takeaction againstofficers,
includingthekillingof severalin theDacca and Rangpur Cantonments.
In a statement,the newlyfreedJSD leaders,M. A. Jalil and A. S. M.
AbdurRab, urgedthe formationof "revolutionary councils"among the
jawans, industrialworkers,peasants and intellectualsto help the Bi-
plobi Gono Bahini usherin a proletariatrevolution.
Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman, however,was able to restoredisci-
pline among the bulk of the soldiers." The governmentarrested19
JSD leaders,includingM. A. Jalil, A. S. M. Abdur Rab, and Colonel
Abu Taher (the Chief of the Biplobi Gono Bahini) on November23
and 24. Most of the districtJSD leaders were also reported to have
been arrestedon thosetwodays.In a hard hittingspeechover the radio
in the early hours of November 25, Major-General Ziaur Rahman
warnedthe "foreignagentsengagedin conspiracyagainstour indepen-
dence."'12
All theotherradical partiesissuedleafletsaccusingtheJSD leaders
of being covertIndian agents and of destroyingthe Bangladesh front
line of defenseby killing trainedarmyofficers and creatingdissension
among thesoldiers.The JSD leadersreplied thatBangladeshcould not
be defendedby thepoorlyequipped Bangladesharmed forces,but only
throughthe revolutionaryunityof the oppressedclasses who formed
11 A tinyminorityof soldiers who joined Khaled Musharrafreportedlydeserted
the army,taking along their arms.
12 See The Bangladesh Times, November 25, 1975. According to unconfirmed
reports,the Biplobi Gono Bahini with the help of their supporters in the Army
planned a coup on the night of November 24. But the coup bid was foiled and two
dissident battalions were disarmed on November 24.

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 BANGLADESH 127
95% of the people of the country.The JSD leaders assertedthat their
partywas the truenationalistpartyof theproletariat,and chargedthat
the other "so-called" revolutionaryparties had been behaving in the
patternof various "pseudo revolutionary"partiesof Russia who had
accused Lenin of being a Germanagentbeforethe October Revolution
of 1917. The main targetof the radical parties' attack,Sirajul Alam
Khan, the leader of the undergroundorgan of the JSD, and his under-
ground cadres,however,escaped arrest.

Trendsin BangladeshEconomy
The economic conditionof Bangladesh improvedsignificantly in
the year 1975 fromthe totallydismal picture that had prevailed in
1974. By January1975 the priceof rice (the staple food in Bangladesh)
had risenby 500% overthe 1969-70level. By Julythe price came down
to 300%. FromJulyto Septemberthe price of rice fellby another37%
and the costof livingindex fellby 9%O.During the same period money
supplydeclinedby 3.5% and bank depositsby 5.6%.13 Declining trends
in thepriceofrice,thecostof livingindex, themoneysupplyand bank
depositscontinuedin the monthsfollowingSeptember.
The most importantreason for the downward trend in the con-
sumer-price and cost-of-livingindiceshas been the good harvestin 1975
-a year which was not marked by the vagaries of nature such as
drought,floodsand cyclones.It was estimatedthata totalof 13.6 million
tonsof foodgrains,including200,000tonsof wheat,would be produced
by the end of the year. As the yearlyrequirementof foodgrainsfor
Bangladeshis about 12.8million tons,therewill be a surplusof 800,000
tons. Besides, 1.3 tons of foodgrainshave already been received from
abroad as aids, loans and grants,and another 700,000 tons are in the
pipeline. Thus, the totalsurplusof food grainsin 1975 shouldbe about
2.8 milliontons.14The secondimportantreasonfortheimprovementin
economicconditionsin 1975was thevariousfiscalmeasuresadopted by
the governmentto check the run-awayinflationthat had plagued the
Bangladesheconomysince liberation.First,the governmentfromthe
beginningof 1975 adopted a "credit squeeze" policy. Secondly, the
governmentin April 1975 demonitized100-Taka notes and thusdrove
some "black money" out of circulation.Thirdly, the governmentre-
duced customduties on certainessentialconsumergoods. Anotherfac-
tor in the improvementof economicconditionsin Bangladeshwas the
reductionin the scale of smuggling.Here again the dernonitizationof
100-Taka notes destroyed,to some extent,the "black money" in the
hands of the smugglerson both sides of the border.More importantly,
since the August 15 coup, the smugglersin Bangladesh have lost the
patronageof powerfulcirclesin the formerMujib government.

13 The figureswere supplied to the author by A. N. A. Rahim, Economic Ad-

viser, Bangladesh Bank, Dacca.
14 The Daily Ittefaq, November 25, 1975. ffl

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128 TALUKDERMANINUZZAMAN

Primarilybecause of the devaluationof the Taka as of May 17, ex-

port earningsin the firstquarterof the 1975-76 financialyearrose by
24% over the figuresforthe same period in 1974-75.Productionin all
industries,with the importantexceptionof the jute industry,went up
significantlyin the last half of 1975 over the correspondingperiod in
1974. However,a self-reliant Bangladeshis still a distantprospect.The
trade deficitin 1975-76 is estimated at about 1000 million dollars,
which has to be made up by foreignloans, grantsand aids. The total
commitmentof foreigneconomic assistance to Bangladesh for 1975
was about 1279.712million dollars (including 439.464 million dollars
in food aid).15The newspaperreportsindicatedthat theseaid commit-
mentswere maintained and that since the August 15 coup, freshaid
commitments forfutureyearswere being successfully negotiated.

Foreign Relations: LivingwithIndia

There has been a "new thrust"in the foreignpolicyof Bangladesh
since the August 15 coup. It was widelyknown that,contraryto the
declared policy of non-alignment,the Mujib governmentwas closely
allied withDelhi and Moscow. The recognitionof the post-coupMush-
taq governmentby Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and particularlyChina;16
completeabsence of any referenceto Indian aid in the liberationwar
in foreignpolicy statementsby formerpresidentMushtaq and Presi-
dent Sayem; the decision by Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan
and China to exchangediplomaticenvoysat the ambassadorlevel-all
theseclearlyindicate that Bangladesh wants to come out fromunder
the "domination" by the Indo-Sovietaxis.
New Delhi, however,made no secretof its disapprovalof the first
coup of August 15 and its welcomeof the second coup of November3;
nor is it disguisingits anxieties over the November 7 coup.17 That
India can fomentdisorderand subversionwithinBangladeshhas been
a constantconcernto the Bangladesh governmentand people. There
have been reportsthat New Delhi has been helping pro-Mujib and
pro-Sovietforces(who had crossedthe borderinto India afterthe Au-
gust 15 coup) in makingpreparationsfor launchinganotherguerrilla
war in Bangladesh.Kader Siddiqui, a toughguerrillaleader of the 1971
liberationstruggle,is reportedto have occupied four border posts in
Mymensinghdistrictwith the help of Indian artillery.Siddiqui is
reportedto have sent messagesto pro-Mujib groups in Dacca that he
would "liberate" Bangladeshby December 1975. It is, however,quite
unlikelythat the people would give spontaneous and unstintedsup-
15 Figures supplied by USAID office,Dacca. Eighty percent of the foreigneco-
nomic assistanceto Bangladesh was committedby internationalaid agencies and the
Bangladesh Aid Club. The remaining 20% was from Middle Eastern Countries,
Eastern Countries and the Socialist Bloc.
16China also contractedto import 14,000 tons of raw jute from Bangladesh.
17 The Bulletin (Sidney), November 22, 1975, p. 45.

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 BANGLADESH 129
port to pro-Indianguerrillasthis time as theydid in 1971. The wide-
spread anti-Indianfeelingin Bangladeshis likelyto preventIndia from
takingdirectmilitaryaction in Bangladesh,but at the same time the
compulsionsof geographywill have a moderatinginfluenceon the
Bangladesh government,which will seek to avoid overt hostilityto-
wards India.18
To sumup, at theend of 1975 Bangladeshenteredinto a period of
greateruncertaintythan was the case under the Mujib regime.With
the removalof the charismaticleadershipof Sheikh Mujib, conflicting
political forcesare takingdefiniteshape. There is the likelihood of a
coalition betweenthe formerIslamic partiesand the right-wing of the
formerAL. The pro-Mujib and pro-Moscowgroups are also likely to
work togetherto seek the covertsupport of India to capture power.
The pro-Chineseradical partiesother than the JSD are likelyto sup-
port the presentgovernmentled by nationalist army officers for the
time being,while the JSD will probablyfollow a 'go it alone' policy.
Except for the rightists,all the other groups possess arms and would
not hesitateto use these to capture power if the opportunityshould
arise. The post-coupgovernmentshave been tryingto recover these
undergroundarms.If thisprogramfails,freeelectionscan not be held
and a civiliangovernment can not be restored.19
It is probable thatthe
presentmilitarygovernmentwill continueto be harassedby insurgent
groupsbacked by India and by the guerrillaoperationsof the Biplobi
Gono Bahini. Moreover,the stabilityof the presentmilitaryregimeit-
selfmightbe affectedby the personal ambitionsof senior officers and
factionalismin the armed forcesbetween the "repatriates"and "free-
dom fighters."

18 The reportsthat a "live grenade" was found in the Indian High Commission
officeand, a few days later, that the Indian High Commissionerto Bangladesh was
wounded led to fairlystrongverbal reactionsin New Delhi. There was some appre-
hension in Bangladesh that these indidents would be used to justify overt Indian
intervention.But to date (mid-December1975), New Delhi would seem to be playing
a waitinggame to see if a relationshipthat protectsIndia's basic interestin this area
can be established with the new Bangladesh regime.
19 Since the August 15 coup, the governmenthas arrested about 6,000 persons
possessing illegal arms and recovered huge quantities of sophisticated arms and
ammunition. The drive against unauthorized arms continues.

TALUKDER MANIRUZZAMAN is Professorof Political Science of the University

of Dacca, Bangladesh.

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