MEDIA LAWS AND ETHICS

Article II, Section 24

The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

Article XVI, Section 10

Section 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability
and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the
balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects
the freedom of speech and of the press.

Article XVI, Section 11

Section 11. (1) The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such
citizens. The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.

Section 11. (2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law
for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare. Only Filipino citizens or
corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens
shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.

Section 11. (2) continued….

The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be
limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of
such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.

Article III, Sections 3, 4

Section 3.
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

CASES

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, v s . HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S.

GARCIA, respondent. [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.]

FACTS:

Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against respondent Ester S. Garcia in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against respondent Ester S. Garcia in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Ramirez alleged that the private respondent Garcia, in
confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.” Ramirez supported her claim with a verbatim transcript based on a secretly
taped recording of the confrontation.

Garcia responded by filing a criminal case against Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
alleging a violation of Republic Act 4200, the Anti-Wire Tapping , due to the secret recording.

The trial court granted Ramirez's Motion to Quash the Information, stating that the facts did not constitute
an offense under R.A. 4200. Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals declared the trial court's order null
and void, holding that the allegations did constitute an offense under R.A. 4200.
Ramirez's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, leading to the petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
WON, the RA 4200 is applicable to the taping of private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation?
WON, the nature of conversation is material to a violate of RA 4200?
WON, RA 4200 penalizes the taping of PRIVATE COMMUNICATION, not a PRIVATE

RULING:
The Supreme Court DISAGREE.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

First Issue. YES

Section 1 of the RA 4200, clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier "any." Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator“ under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Second Issue. NO
The Supreme Court explain that nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices.

The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed."

Third Issue. YES

The Supreme Court said that the petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)"

Third Issue. YES. The terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.

Explanatory Note:

“It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires
of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between
individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.”

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous andleav
es us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.

CECILIA ZULUETA , petitioner, vs .

COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents. [G.R. No. 107383. February
20, 1996.]

Privacy of Communication.
The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her
husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and his
alleged paramour.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent Dr. Alfredo Martin, a doctor of medicine.
On March 26, 1982, Zulueta, accompanied by her mother, a driver, and Martin's secretary, forcibly
entered Martin's clinic. She opened drawers and cabinets without Martin's knowledge or consent and
seized 157 documents.

The documents included private correspondence between Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, canceled checks, diaries, Martin's passport, and photographs. Zulueta intended to use these
documents as evidence in a legal separation case and a case for Martin's disqualification from practicing
medicine.

Dr. Martin filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch X, seeking the recovery of
the documents and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Martin, declaring him the exclusive owner of
the seized documents and ordering Zulueta to return them. The court also awarded Dr. Martin nominal
and moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit.

Additionally, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining Zulueta from using the
documents as evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision, leading Zulueta to file a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
WON, the documents and papers seized by Cecilia Zulueta from Dr. Alfredo Martin's clinic without
his knowledge and consent are admissible as evidence?

RULING:
NO. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for
lack of merit.

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, UNION BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
OMBUDSMAN, ANGEL C. MAYOR- ALGO, JR., MARY ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC
AND JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacity as Chairman and Members of the Panel,
respectively, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of
the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where she is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were
involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB)
v. AmadoLagdameo, et al.
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail managers
checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411, pending with the office of the
Ombudsman, by virtue of its power to investigate and to require the production and inspection of records
and documentsgranted to it by RA No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989.”
The Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to accounts
in issue in line of her persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsman's order which they said as an
unjustified, and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the case; constitutes disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful order issued by this office punishable as Indirect under R.A. 6770.

Petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition
and injunctions with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman. The lower court
denied petitioner's petition. On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for
contempt, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).

Petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground
that compliance with the Ombudsman’s orders would be in violation of RA. No. 1405. But petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was dismissed.

Hence, the present petition

ISSUE:
WON, an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy
of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405)

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in NEGATIVE.

The secrecy of bank deposits law (R.A. No.1405) would reveal the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R.A. No.3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco.

The Supreme Court ruled that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The
bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman
would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.

Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that" [e]very person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and
punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds
public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to cease and desist from
requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order
dated October 14,1998, and similar orders. No costs.

Philippine Constitution provisions related to Media

Section 4, Article III
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, ...
Philippine Constitution provisions related to Media

SECTION 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION , petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000.]

FACTS:

ABS-CBN Corporation filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
Supreme Court assailing the en banc Resolution No. 98-1419, issued by the Commission on Elections,
dated April 21, 1998.

The Resolution issued by the COMELEC provides:

"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS- CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same."

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . Vote during the elections for national ocials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."

The electoral body believed that such project might confIict with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

The Supreme Court, on May 9, 1998, issued a Temporary Restraining Orders prayed for by the petitioner
ABS-CBN Corporation and directed the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist, until further orders,
from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any
[other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the . . . May 11 elections."

RULING:
The Supreme Court found the Petition for Certiorari meritorious.

On the issued of MOOT AND ACADEMIC

The Supreme Court found that the issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred
speciffcally to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of
expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the
resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent
a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,
when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely
urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available for future elections.

On the issued of Validity of Conducting Exit Polls

Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more
narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this
question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of speech and of the press.

Freedom of Speech and of the Press

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, the Supreme Court enunciated that at the very least,
free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without prior restraint.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of
securing participation by the people in social and political decision- making, and of maintaining the
balance between stability and change.

Validity of Restrictions to Freedom of Speech and of Expression

The Court, citing the Cabansag vs Fernandez case, stated there are two theoretical tests: clear and present
danger rule and dangerous tendency rule.

Clear and Present Danger Rule:

Means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. . . ."

Dangerous Tendency Rule:

If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about
the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent."

The Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test.

A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justifed only by a danger of such substantive
character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger
must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be
probable but very likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify
a clamp over one’s mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.

Justification for a Restriction:

Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction
is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the
presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act
that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, so it has been said.

Justification for a Restriction:

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be
curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.
We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional
right as free speech."

Justification for a Restriction:

True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting
places that are safe and accessible. It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the
sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the people's
freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far
outweigh them.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on
May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en
banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST

ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and
GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent ..
[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998.]

FACTS:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of

lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting
stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.

The Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale or donation of
print space or air time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners challenge the
validity thereof on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the period of election.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner TELEBAP and GMA Network, Inc. have the legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is violation of due process and the eminent domain provision, hence,
entitled to just compensation.

RULING:

First Issue.
The Supreme Court held that Petitioner TELEBAP has no standing in the instant case.
A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the
operation of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

First Issue.
Members of Petitioner TELEBAP have no interest as a registered voters since this case does not
concern their right of suffrage, nor have interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending power, or nor they have standing to assert the rights of radio and
television broadcasting companies. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast
industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.

First Issue.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the other Petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., have the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
campaign and other political purposes.

Airing of COMELEC Time, a Reasonable Condition for Grant of Petitioner’s Franchise

As pointed out in our decision in Osmeña v . COMELEC , Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 90
and §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity
of candidates in an election in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns.

The law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and air time to the candidates and
requires the COMELEC instead to procure print space and air time for allocation to the candidates. It will
be noted that while Section 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to procure print space which, as
we have held, should be paid for, Section 92 states that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free
of charge.

Petitioners contend that Section 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations
without payment of just compensation.

Petitioners’ argument is without merit.

All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . .
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
service

It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same treatment under the free speech
guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are important differences in the characteristics of
the two media, however, which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the
physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast
frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and
regulation of the print media.

Petitioners' assertion therefore that Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of the law
has no basis. In addition, their plea that Sec. 92 (free air time) and §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid
political ads) should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime where moneyed
candidates could monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage of candidates with less resources.

That is what Congress tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to set
aside the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent failure of interested parties to have the
law repealed or at least modified.

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Sec.
4 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the first place, what the COMELEC is
authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use
by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC)
prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Petition.

In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is
another fallacy for petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit.
This may have force if the object of the power were the same.

HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs .

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,INC., LETTY
JIMENEZ MAGSANOC, ROSAURO G. ACOSTA, JOSE MARIA NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T.
ENGRACIA, JR., RAFAEL CHEEKEE, and
MANILA DAILY BULLETIN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, BEN F.
RODRIGUEZ, ARTHUR S. SALES, CRIS J.
ICBAN, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Hector C. Villanueva was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during
the May 11, 1992 elections. On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate,
petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was
denied by the COMELEC.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published
the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-
NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave
abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor's oEce of Bais
City.

Likewise, on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar
story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for
mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority
and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayor's office in the city.

On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held scheduled. The petitioner lost in the said
election. Petitioner filed against respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin, as well as their publishers and
editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City alleging that the articles published by the respondents
were maliciously timed to defeat him.

Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not
know petitioner and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were
privileged in nature.

On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner. The trial court found the
news items derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s reputation and candidacy. It faulted respondents for
failing to verify the truth of the news tips they published and held respondents liable for negligence, citing
Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub. Co., Inc. 11 The trial court also ruled that because the news items lacked
truth and fairness, they were not privileged communications.

On appeal by respondents, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. It explained that although the
stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof they were obtained from a press conference or
release, respondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There was also no proof that
petitioner's supporters junked him due to the reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making
his action unfounded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is required to prove malice to be entitled to damages.
RULING:
The Supreme Court favored the argument of the respondents. PDI and its officers argue that petitioner's
complaint clearly lays a cause of action arising from libel as it highlights malice underlying the
publications. Manila Bulletin and its officers claim that petitioner changed his theory, which must be
disallowed as it violates respondents' right to due process.

The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public
character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew public attention not
only to the election itself but to the candidates.

Consequently, as the issue of malice was raised, it was incumbent on petitioner to prove the same. The
basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. As correctly stated by the
Court of Appeals, while the questioned news item was found to be untrue, this does not necessarily render
the same malicious. The Supreme Court found no conclusive showing that the published articles in
question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or
not.

Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error, inaccuracy
or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme
of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not
be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of
language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving
them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in
our democracy.

We find respondents entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of
constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights. We cannot punish journalists including publishers for an
honest endeavor to serve the public when moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by their sense of
responsibility as news media to report what they perceived to be a genuine report. Media men are always
reminded of their responsibilities as such. This time, there is also a need to remind public figures of the
consequences of being one.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Amended Decision dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54134 is AFFIRMED.

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN

GOVERNANCE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 189546. September 21, 2010.] FACTS:
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance
(CenPEG), a non-government organization, wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the
source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and
congressional

FACTS:

On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-
government organization, wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing
System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the
COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs called the Data
Capturing System (DCS) utilities.

CenPEG invokes Section 12 of Republic Act 9369 : Once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and
open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. And Section
2 (12) of the same law that describe the source code as the “"human readable instructions that define what
the computer equipment will do."

On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the CCS, but
denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a "system used in processing the Lists of Voters which is not
part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369." According to
COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change
the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain candidates or parties.

The COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it said it was approving for
release. Consequently, on July 13, 2009, CenPEG once more asked COMELEC for the source code of the
PCOS, together with other documents, programs, and diagrams related to the AES. CenPEG sent follow-
up letters on July 17 and 20 and on August 24, 2009.

The COMELEC, on August 26, 2009, replied that the source code did not yet exist for the reasons:
1) that it had not yet received the baseline source code of the provider, Smartmatic, since payment to
it had been withheld as a result of a pending suit;
2) its customization of the baseline source code was targeted for completion in November 2009 yet;
3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369, the customized source code still had to be reviewed by "an
established international certification entity," which review was expected to be completed by the end
of February 2010; and
4) only then would the AES be made available for review under a controlled environment.

Hence, the present petition for mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source
codes available to CenPEG and other interested parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the COMELEC is compel by mandamus to release the source code as requested by the
CenPEG and other interested parties.

RULING:
The Supreme Court found the petition for mandamus and last manifestation by the CenPEG meritorius.

The COMELEC claimed in its comment that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and well-
defined right that was enforceable by mandamus because COMELEC's duty to make the source code
available presupposed that it already had the same and restated the explanation it gave in its August 26,
2009 letter to CenPEG.

In its manifestation and omnibus motion CenPEG did not believe that the source code was still
unavailable considering that COMELEC had already awarded to an international certification entity
the review of the same and that COMELEC had already been field testing its PCOS and CCS machines.

On June 21, 2010 CenPEG filed a manifestation and omnibus motion, reiterating its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case notwithstanding the fact that the elections for which the
subject source code was to be used had already been held. It claimed that the source code remained
important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in
the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud."
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and
open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.“

The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only
excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and,
subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security reason, "under a controlled
environment." The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and DIRECTS the COMELEC to make
the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369
immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for independent
review..

PRIOR RESTRAINT AND SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS:

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

Constitutional Basis: Freedom of Speech and Expression

The Constitution of the Philippines guarantees freedom of speech and expression under Article III,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

"No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."

This provision reflects the importance of free speech in a democratic society. It ensures the right of
individuals to express their ideas and opinions without fear of government censorship or punishment.
However, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against other societal interests, including public
order, national security, and the rights of others.

PRIOR RESTRAINT: DEFINITION AND EXCEPTIONS

Prior restraint refers to government actions that prevent speech or expression before it occurs. It is
considered the most extreme form of censorship because it stops the expression before it can reach the
public. As a general rule, prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional and is viewed with hostility by
courts because it directly interferes with the freedom of expression.

The landmark U.S. case of Near v. Minnesota (283 U.S. 697, 1931) greatly influenced the development of
this doctrine and has been adopted in Philippine jurisprudence. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the government cannot restrain the publication of news, except in exceptional circumstances. The
Philippine Supreme Court has also echoed this presumption against prior restraint, except in a few
narrowly defined instances.

Exceptions to Prior Restraint

The Philippine legal system recognizes certain narrow exceptions where prior restraint may be valid,
namely:

National Security – When the expression endangers the existence of the state, such as in times of war or
emergency, prior restraint may be imposed. For example, the publication of sensitive military information
that could jeopardize operations may be subject to prior restraint. The clear and present danger test is
often employed to determine if prior restraint is justified.

Obscenity – Materials considered obscene can be subject to prior restraint. In the Philippines, this is
governed by the Obscene Publications Law (Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code). The test for
obscenity was laid down in Miller v. California (413 U.S. 15, 1973), adapted in Philippine jurisprudence,
where content is deemed obscene if it appeals to prurient interests, depicts sexual conduct in an offensive
manner, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Libelous Speech – Defamatory statements may be restrained if they clearly violate the law on libel under
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code. However, such restrictions are still subject to careful judicial
scrutiny to avoid suppressing legitimate criticisms of public officials and matters of public interest.

Incitement to Violence or Lawless Action – Speech that directly incites imminent violence, rebellion,
sedition, or lawless action may be restrained. The test is whether the speech creates a clear and present
danger of producing substantial harm.

Contempt of Court – Certain restrictions may be imposed on the press and public commentary about
ongoing judicial proceedings to preserve the impartiality of the court and prevent undue influence on
judicial decisions. However, such restraints must be balanced against the public's right to information.

Philippine Cases on Prior Restraint

Gonzales v. Comelec (G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969): This case involved a law prohibiting the
publication of election surveys before elections. The Court held that prior restraint could be justified only
when there is a clear and present danger of substantive evil.

Chavez v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008): The Court struck down the government’s
attempt to stop media outlets from broadcasting a controversial wiretapped conversation of the President,
ruling that it constituted an unjustified prior restraint. The clear and present danger rule was not met, as
there was no immediate threat to public order.

SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT: DEFINITION AND SCOPE

Subsequent punishment refers to penalties imposed after speech or expression has already been made.
Unlike prior restraint, which prevents expression before it occurs, subsequent punishment allows the
expression to happen but holds the speaker accountable for any illegal or harmful consequences. Common
forms of subsequent punishment include criminal sanctions, civil damages, or administrative penalties.

While subsequent punishment is more tolerable than prior restraint, it is still subject to constitutional
limitations to avoid the chilling effect on free speech.

Grounds for Subsequent Punishment

Libel: Libelous statements, particularly those that are false and malicious, can be subject to subsequent
punishment under Articles 353 to 362 of the Revised Penal Code. However, Philippine courts have
recognized that public officials are held to a higher threshold for libel suits, as they must prove "actual
malice" or knowledge of falsity, as outlined in New York Times v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254, 1964).

Sedition, Rebellion, and Incitement to Lawless Violence: Statements that incite rebellion or lawless
violence may be punished after the fact if they threaten the public order. The Court has repeatedly upheld
the constitutionality of laws punishing such expressions if they pose a clear and present danger.

Obscenity: Subsequent punishment is allowed for obscene materials, with courts determining obscenity
based on community standards and applying the test of whether the material is utterly without redeeming
social value.

Violation of Election Laws: The Omnibus Election Code prohibits certain forms of speech during
election periods, such as electioneering within polling precincts. Violations of these rules may result in
subsequent punishment.

Defamation of Public Officials: While criticisms of public officials are generally protected, defamatory
falsehoods with malice can result in civil and criminal penalties. However, the standards are higher for
public officials and figures, as their actions are subject to public scrutiny.

Philippine Cases on Subsequent Punishment

Adiong v. Comelec (G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992): In this case, the Court invalidated a COMELEC
resolution prohibiting the display of election posters in private vehicles, ruling that it constituted an
unjustified curtailment of the freedom of expression. The ruling affirmed that restrictions on speech, even
after the fact, must be justified by a legitimate state interest.

Borjal v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999): The Supreme Court held that public
officials and figures must prove actual malice when suing for defamation. The case highlighted the need
for a balance between the right to protect one's reputation and the right to criticize public officials.
MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines (G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003):
This case involved libel against a religious group. The Court held that subsequent punishment for libel
must be imposed with caution, as free speech, especially involving matters of public interest, should not
be stifled unless there is clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.

STANDARDS USED IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH

Courts in the Philippines employ various tests to evaluate whether restrictions on speech—whether prior
restraint or subsequent punishment—are constitutionally valid:

Clear and Present Danger Test: This test requires that the government show that the restricted speech
poses a real, imminent threat to public safety, security, or other legitimate interests. This is commonly
applied in cases involving incitement to violence or rebellion.

Dangerous Tendency Test: A more lenient test compared to the clear and present danger test, the
dangerous tendency test allows restrictions on speech if the speech has the potential to lead to a
substantive evil. This was used in early sedition cases but is now considered outdated, having been
replaced by the clear and present danger standard.

Balancing of Interests Test: This test weighs the individual's right to free speech against the
government's interest in restricting the speech. Courts balance these competing interests and determine
which has more weight in a particular situation.

O’Brien Test (for Symbolic Speech): Adopted from U.S. jurisprudence, this test applies to cases
involving non-verbal speech or symbolic expression. The Court asks whether the restriction on expression
furthers an important government interest, is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and whether
the incidental restriction on speech is no greater than essential.

CONCLUSION

The freedom of speech and expression in the Philippines is a fundamental right but is not absolute. Prior
restraint is almost always unconstitutional except in cases where there is a clear and present danger, such
as threats to national security, obscenity, or incitement to violence. Subsequent punishment is permissible
but subject to stringent safeguards to prevent the suppression of legitimate speech. Courts have
consistently emphasized that any restriction on speech must be carefully justified, ensuring that freedom
of expression is maintained as a cornerstone of Philippine democracy.