Journal of Philosophy of Education, VoI. 29, No.

2, 1995

Two Concepts of Multiculturalism

YAEL TAMIR

In the last two decades political reality has undergone such rapid changes that
it is hard to remember that, not long ago, Fukuyama announced that we had
reached the end of history. Liberal democracy, he argued, had been declared
the winning party. It had managed to drive all its rivals off stage; all future
debates would be no more than variations on a theme-the liberal theme.
It is now clear that such celebrations were premature and that, even though
liberal democratic values and politics have gained considerable support in the
last decades, their success was by no means conclusive. In fact more and more
liberal democrats recognise the need to find ways of functioning within a
multicultural setting. Multiculturalism, Raz argues, ‘requires a political society
to recognise the equal standing of all stable and viable communities existing in
a society’.l While some of these viable and stable communities share liberal
values and democratic convictions, others are authoritarian and illiberal. Does
the ideal of multiculturalism apply equally to both types of communities? In
order to answer this question we must distinguish between two very different
concepts of multiculturalism. The first is a thin one which involves different
liberal cultures; the second, thick multiculturalism, involves liberal as well as
illiberal cultures. The former leads to a particular type of interest-group
politics, the latter to a modus vivendi which is based on two, very different,
points of view: a liberal one which emphasises respect for different ways of life,
and an illiberal one which seeks to secure its own existence in the midst of a
liberal society.

THIN MULTICULTURALISM
The debate between the English- and French-speaking communities in Canada
is an example of thin multiculturalism. As the two communities share a set of
liberal-democratic beliefs, the debate is an intra-liberal one. It involves two
competing interpretations of liberalism which Walzer calls liberalism I and
liberalism 2. Liberalism 1 is committed to individual rights and ‘almost by
deduction from this, to a rigorously neutral state’.2 Liberalism 2, on the other
hand, ‘allows for a state to be committed to the survival and flourishing of a
particular culture’, as long as the basic rights of citizens are all protected.3
These two types of liberalism are structured to meet the needs of individuals
found in different actual circumstances: the former is more proper for
immigrant societies wishing to promote cultural integration, the latter for
members of states which are either culturally homogenous or composed of
several distinct, territorially well-defined, cultural societies.

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162 Yael Tamir

In cases of thin multiculturalism, problems of cultural relativism, a lack of

common discourse or disagreements over basic principles do not arise. The
debate over the future of Canada does not stem from French Canadians
having difficulties in understanding the culture, language or traditions of
English Canadians; there is no cultural barrier they cannot cross. In fact
part of the problem is the similarities between the two cultures which allow
for easy mobility and assimilation. The two groups thus understand each
other perfectly well but have different interests, cultural interests. This kind
of multiculturalism thus calls for a particular version of interest-group
politics.
As in cases of interest-group politics the state is supposed to remain neutral
between the different interest-groups, liberalism 1 rather than liberalism 2
seems to be the adequate solution for cases of thin multiculturalism. Indeed,
according to Walzer liberalism 2 is an exception, which allows the provincial
government of Quebec to deviate from liberalism 1 and act for the preservation
of French culture. ‘This is precisely to make an exception; the federal
government would not itself take on this Quebecan project or any other of a
similar sort. Vis-A-vis all the ethnicities and religions of Canada, it remains
neutral; it defends, that is, a liberalism of the first kind.’4 But surely the Quebec
case is no exception at all. In fact the Quebecois desire to have liberalism 2 has
come about because the Canadian government, despite its commitment to
liberalism 1, has drifted towards liberalism 2; that is, it cannot remain genuinely
neutral with regard to cultural issues. Consequently French Canadians feel
excluded and marginzlised within the greater Canadian system and want a
political system they could see as their own.
In practice the difference between the two forms of liberalism is less
profound than it may seem. In fact it is only because liberalism 1 is not a viable
practical option that liberalism 2 emerges as an alternative. Yet as this
alternative retains, in practice and in theory, a commitment to the ideal of
individual rights embodied in liberalism 1 the close affinity between the two
forms of liberalism is retained.
The difference between these two types of liberalism thus seems to lie in the
awareness of the state that it cannot but promote some particular culture(s), a
fact that is as easily noticed by members of minority groups as it is unnoticeable
to members of the majority. Hence it could be claimed that both the Quebec
and the Canadian government adopt liberalism 2. The Quebecois, however,
perceive their culture to be actively threatened in a way that the English
Canadians do not feel theirs to be; therefore, the Quebecois government is
motivated to take more extreme and explicit measures for cultural protection
than does the federal government. Were the culture of the English-speaking
community rather than that of the French-speaking community found under
threat, the cultural nature and policies of the Canadian rather than the Quebec
government might have become more evident. This suggests that the difference
between the two societies is not that Quebecois society devotes itself to a
common good, and thus deviates from the model of the neutral state which the
English society retains and fulfils to the letter. Rather, as the common good of
the English-speaking community is well protected, one needs no special
measures to protect it, and it is taken for granted. It has become a latent

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 Two Concepts of Multiculturalism 163

common good, and as long as it is not threatened it will not be consciously

pursued.

As governments cannot be culturally neutral, all states, including all liberal

states, are culturally biased, and may thus be either mono-cultural or
multicultural. Very few are overwhelmingly mono-cultural; Portugal, Iceland,
Norway or Japan might be examples. Most states, however, fall within the
second category and differ only with regard to the degree of their internal
diversity. They can be bi-cultural, including two cultural groups of almost
equal size and economic power, as in the case of Belgium or the former
Czechoslovakia. Some are divided between a large majority culture and one or
more minority cultures, as happens in Britain, Israel or Spain. Finally, some are
genuinely multicultural, including several cultural groups of fairly similar size,
as in Switzerland, or (to mention a much less peaceful example) the former
Yugoslavia. In each of the three types of states the different cultural groups
have specific interests they strive to protect, the most common of these being
the preservation and protection of their own cultural identity. These interest-
based struggles will not fade away, even if all the relevant cultures share liberal
beliefs and values, because members of each cultural group also entertain
communal commitments and strive to carve a place for their own culture,
history and language in the public sphere. Yet, despite the persistence of such
struggles, an overlapping consensus could be achieved between the different
liberal groups, as members of all these groups are likely to adopt some version
of Rawls’s two principles of justice, provided that cultural goods-in
particular the ability to enjoy a rich and lively cultural environment-are
added to the list of the primary goods.
The latter element is an important one as it calls for certain transformations
in the structure of the political process. Conflicts over particular interests,
whether individual or group ones, are commonly solved by allowing the
different groups to participate in democratic decision-making processes. As
long as individuals have an equal opportunity to present their views and
participate in a fair process, the fact that their preferences might be outvoted is
not regarded as unfair. Members of other groups -communists, vegetarians,
opera lovers-may find themselves time and again in a minority position,
unable to influence, let alone imprint, political institutions and culture with
their own beliefs, preferences or norms of behaviour. Yet they could hardly
claim that they have been treated unjustly or that their rights have been
violated. Where the community is pluralistic and heterogeneous, the fact that
one can be outvoted on a variety of issues is unavoidable.
Why is it, then, that the inability to protect cultural interests-even if that
inability results from a fair political process-is seen as unfair? The first
answer that comes to mind has to do with the fact that cultural interests are, by
their very nature, restricted in their reach. That is, the interests are in most cases
restricted to members of a particular group (though in some cases non-
members may also have an interest in the protection of a certain culture).
Hence such interests are unlikely to gain support in a fair democratic process.
But this is true also of some of other groups, as opera lovers or vegetarians are
also likely to remain a minority. The crux of the matter then is neither the size

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164 Yael Tamir

of the group, nor the fact that a certain interest is likely to be permanently
outvoted, but the nature of that interest. Cultural interests are identity-bound
interests, interests which relate to one’s desire to preserve one’s identity, and are
therefore of particular importance. It is this special feature of the interests that
makes them particularly worthy of respect.
Though the emergence of identity-bound interests developed only in the
aftermath of the struggle for equal rights they become part and parcel of a
liberal struggle for equal concern and respect. This development derives from
the growing recognition that state neutrality is an ideal which cannot be
achieved. In the early stages of their struggle for equal rights and integration,
members of minority cultures endorsed the image of the state as culturally and
normatively neutral. In their attempt to gain equality, members of these groups
tended to reject any deviation from universalist arguments, fearing it would
legitimise discrimination.5 As is demonstrated by the history of Blacks in
America, of Diaspora Jews, and of Sephardic Jews in Israel, disillusionment,
strangely enough, came hand in hand with success, with the political
empowerment of national and ethnic minorities.
Members of disempowered minorities soon discovered that being granted a
set of formal civic rights was insufficient to ensure equal status, and realised
that they had to decide which was the lesser of two evils: remaining estranged
and marginalised, or integrating at the price of self-effacement. Members of
such minorities thus became increasingly aware that the ideal of a culturally
neutral public sphere embodies a dangerous and oppressive illusion.6
Yet, haunted by the shadows of ‘separate but equal’ policies originally meant
to preserve segregation and social inequality in education, members of cultural
minorities were reluctant to demand special schools or classes aimed at
fostering their own tradition, language and history. They faced a dilemma:
demanding such measures would imply not only an acknowledgement but also
an acceptance of the particularised nature of the state; ignoring their need for
particularised schools and communal institutions would considerably reduce
their chances of retaining their identity. It was only when it became clear that
no struggle for equal rights could turn the state into a culturally neutral
institution that national minorities began to demand special treatment in the
name of equality. Being granted equal rights, they realised, is not enough, as
strict adherence to the principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate
oppression or disadvantage. The notion of universal citizenship had therefore
to be replaced by one of ‘differential citizenship’.
The public sphere in a multicultural state is thus supposed to be varied, to
reflect the particularities of its members. Citizens are no longer expected to
transcend their particular, self-interested lives in order to participate in public
discussions and collective decision-making; yet they do need a shared basis of
consensus in order to be able to agree on a set of basic political principles. In
the case of thin multiculturalism, Rawls’ overlapping consensus or Dworkin’s
abstrwt egalitarian principle seem well-suited to filling the need for guiding
principles. Suppose the parties in the original position, who have general
knowledge of their society’s basic features, are aware of the fact that their state
encompasses various national, ethnic and cultural groups, but do not know
which of the particular groups they belong to. Under such conditions they are

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 Two Concepts of Multiculturalism 165

likely to endorse Gutmann’s view that ‘the dignity of free and equal beings
requires liberal democratic institutions to be nonrepressive, nondiscriminatory,
and deliberative’.’ They are also likely to accept Young’s demand for providing
institutionalised means for the explicit recognition and representation of
oppressed or disadvantaged groups.8 Without such organising principles,
granting representation to the different cultural groups might lead to further
oppression, as stronger groups might abuse and oppress the weaker ones which
would, in turn, use their power to exploit those weaker than themselves.
In her critique of interest-group politics, Young argues that such politics
forestalls the emergence of public discussion and decision-making, as no group
needs to consider the interests of others ‘except strategically, as potential allies
or adversaries in the pursuit of one’s own. The rules of interest-group pluralism
do not require justifying one’s interest as right or as compatible with social
j~stice.’~The contrary, she argues, is true for a heterogeneous public ‘where
participants discuss together the issue before them, and are supposed to come
to a decision that they determine as just or most just’.IOYoung’s criticism of
interest-group politics, however, seems just as relevant to cases of ethnic and
cultural group politics. The politics of difference is no more inherently
correlated with a desire for justice than is interest-group politics.
It is puzzling to find that supporters of multiculturalism, who stress the
importance of power relations, aim to revive the old liberal belief in social
harmony inspired by an invisible hand. This belief is the unavoidable, and
unrealistic, outcome of their rejection of liberal principles as the basis of
political discussion and decision-making. If there are no general principles
upon which members of the different cultural groups can agree, then idealised,
invisible-hand solutions seem the only available fallback position. Ideally,
Young claims,

a rainbow coalition affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the
oppressed groups or political movements constituting it, and arrives at a political
program not by voicing some ‘principle of unity’ that hides differences but rather by
allowing each constituent to analyze economic and social issues from the perspective
of its experience. 1

But promoting an illusion of harmony within diversity is as dangerous and

oppressive as the old liberal illusion of neutrality. It is only when this illusion is
rejected that we are able to consider various models of conflict resolution,
appreciate the advantage of the liberal democratic model and fashion the
educational tools necessary for its construction and endurance.
The evident national, cultural and religious diversity of a society makes
necessary a thin layer of civic education, introducing children to the liberal
discourse of rights and rationality. Without that thin civic education, it will be
impossible to generate cross-cultural discussions based on equal respect and
concern for all participants.
In a multicultural political system, be it a town, a state, a federation, a
regional organisation or a global society, it is especially important that all
children learn to respect others who have different life styles, values and
traditions and learn to view them-qua members of the political system-as

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166 Yael Tamir

equals. Beyond this thin layer each cultural group can foster among its youth
knowledge which is relevant to their own particular community, its history,
language and traditions. Civic education should therefore create civic
friendship among all members of the political community; but it should
attempt to do so, not by assimilating all members into one culture, but by
respecting cultural diversity. All children should thus acquire some knowledge
of the culture, history and tradition of all national groups that share their
political system, and be taught to respect them.
Hence it is the strengthening of multiculturalism, and with it of demands for
allowing particular cultural groups to deviate from the public school system,
that highlights the importance of civic education, and it is a respect for and a
belief in the importance of belonging to thick cultures that motivates the search
for a thin layer of agreement.
Democratic education in a multicultural state thus seems to demand three
layers of education: a unified stratum of civic education (which in fact will be
similar in all multicultural societies), a particularistic stratum of communal
education, and a shared stratum of cross-cultural education which will
introduce children to the diversity of their own society. This threefold structure
is assumed to meet the cultural needs of members of minority communities,
while still attempting to preserve a somewhat fragile but nevertheless stable
political union based on equal participation in a shared political process. All
that democratic education demands, Walzer argues, is that all children be
taught the history, the philosophy and the political practice of democracy. But
this suggestion, as he acknowledges, is not as minimal as it might seem:
democracy, especially liberal democracy, ‘has a substantive character; it is not a
neutral procedure but a way of life’. Democratic education could thus be seen,
by cultures which foster illiberal and undemocratic values, as ‘a program for
cultural subordination’, and they are thus likely to resent it.’* Such resentment,
which features in cases of thick multiculturalism where the debate is not an
intra-liberal one but one between liberal and illiberal cultures, may make social
agreement impossible.

THICK MULTICULTURALISM
We should then look at this second type of multiculturalism which raises far
more difficult issues, as it calls for a compromise between a liberal and an
illiberal point of view. Here questions of cultural relativism and the inability to
converse across conflicting systems of belief may arise. Take for example the
recent debate in France between supporters of French tradition, culture, and
(especially) the traditional French understanding of the notion of citizenship,
on the one hand, and Muslim citizens of France on the other. The debate
concerns the right of girls and women to wear a hidjab in schools and
universities. According to the French civic tradition these institutions are to be
culturally and religiously neutral and hence before entering such public
institutions individuals should shed all distinguishing features, be they a hidjab,
a skull cap, a turban or whatever. These garments could, of course, be worn in
the private sphere, which is the proper sphere in which to express particular
identities. Hence the French education minister, Frangois Bayrou, asked

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 Two Concepts of Multiculturalism 167

secondary school principals to ban ‘ostentatious signs’ of religion, a code

phrase for headscarves. The French, says a government official, want Muslims
to behave like them. ‘If Muslims want to impose their costumes, wear veils, that
generates a backlash. Muslims born in France who don’t want to become
French are fanatics or invaders.’13 Our only ambition, replies Abdallah Ben
Mansour, president of the Union of Islamic Organisations in France, ‘is to
become at the same time good Muslims and good French citizens. But as long
as people wage campaigns on the peril of Islam, as long as we let rancours and
frustrations accumulate, we will encounter all forms of radi~alization.”~ Hence
what French officials see as imposing neutrality Muslims see as a campaign
against Islam. This is not an incidental disagreement: it reflects the cultures of
both groups, as the idea that religion or culture could remain strictly private is
one that fits well a Western Christian society but is daunting to Muslims or
Jews whose religion cannot be restricted to the private sphere. No orthodox
religious Jew can agree to take off his skull cap at school, or in court, or in
parliament -God’s commands apply everywhere and could not be overridden
by state law. Why should we change Islam, radical Muslims ask. ‘The second a
Muslim makes a reconciliation, he’s disobeying Allah. Divine law goes ahead of
any other law.’l5 If the law of God, or of the tribe, takes priority over state law,
then the conflict seems to be unsolvable (unless the law of God, or the tribe’s
tradition, is a liberal democratic one). ‘When a conflict involves systems of
values so opposed that the adherents of each not only think the other
completely wrong, but they cannot accord the others freedom to act on their
values without betraying themselvesY,’6 it cannot be resolved by agreement on a
set of governing principles or by achieving an overlapping consensus.17
Can a thick multicultural society find a way to counter cultural conflicts?
This question cannot be ignored as most multicultural societies include illiberal
as well as liberal cultures. The need to come to an agreement with such cultures
motivates Rawls’ attempt to draw guidelines for a Law of Peoples which will be
acceptable to members of both liberal and illiberal communities. Rawls
attempts to bridge the gap between liberal and illiberal cultures by introducing
an intermediary notion of well-ordered hierarchical societies, or reasonable
societies. These societies, though illiberal, follow four principles: (a) they are
peaceful and gain their legitimate aims through diplomacy and trade; (b) their
system of law is sincerely and not unreasonably seen as guided by a common
good conception of justice; (c) their institutions include a reasonable
consultation hierarchy; and (d) citizens are seen as responsible members who
can recognise their moral duties and obligations and play a part in social life.
Moreover, such societies admit a measure of liberty of conscience and freedom
of thought, even if these freedoms are not in general equal for all members. For
these reasons, Rawls argues, reasonable societies could agree to a Law of
Peoples which is based on thin 1iberalisrn.ls
Rawls’ attempt might seem futile as most illiberal societies are not
reasonable ones and are unlikely to agree to the Law of Peoples he offers unless
forced to do so. Yet his attempt is important as it draws the limits of a
possible compromise between liberal and illiberal cultures. Such a compromise
becomes possible as a result of a distinction between two kinds of liberalism:
rights-based and autonomy-based liberalism. The former takes the rights of

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168 Yael Tamir

individuals to be paramount without conceiving of those rights as grounded in

autonomy-entitlement and choice prerogatives. Hence it can express not only
toleration but also respect for decent illiberal cultures which do not foster the
ideal of personal autonomy but which respect their members and allow them
some means of participation and social influence. Autonomy-based liberalism,
on the other hand, tolerates and respects only autonomy-supporting
cultures -namely liberal ones. It thus cannot avoid the trivialisation of
pluralism.
Many liberals may take personal autonomy to be paramount; they
understand human dignity to consist largely in autonomy, that is ‘in the
ability of each person to determine for himself or herself a view of the good
life’.l9 Membership of cultural, religious or national groups is thus seen as
valuable only to the extent that it provides a context for choice, an evaluative
horizon (to use Taylor’s term). Espousing the ideal of an autonomous life,
autonomy-based liberalism ranks communities by their potential contribution
to the conditions of autonomy: namely by their contribution to their members’
ability to develop ‘appropriate mental abilities, a suitable range of options, and
independence’.20 Using this categorisation, autonomy-based liberalism judges
illiberal cultures to be inferior to liberal ones.
As members of such cultures insist on ‘bringing up their children in their own
ways’, Raz writes, they are, ‘in the eyes of liberals like myself, harming them’.
According to an autonomy-based liberalism liberals have a right, or perhaps
even a duty, to promote the assimilation of illiberal cultures. Raz thus suggests
that liberals are justified in taking action to assimilate minority cultures,
including the destruction of separate schools, even at the cost of letting the
culture die or at least be considerably changed by absorption and the break-up
of the community.21
Yet assimilation is not the necessary conclusion of a rights-based liberalism,
which places at its core a commitment to equal concern and respect for
individuals, their preferences and interests, regardless of the way these were
formed. In fact liberalism, in its more traditional form, was committed to
protecting a set of freedoms which were meant to allow individuals to pursue
their preferences, desires and interests, regardless of whether these were formed
autonomously or were forced upon individuals by their culture or tradition.
Developing a detailed distinction between autonomy-based and rights-based
liberalism ranges beyond the scope of this paper, yet it is important to see the
implication of this distinction for the issue of multiculturalism.
Since autonomy-based liberalism regards communities which do not foster
autonomy as inferior to ones that do, it endorses toleration towards illiberal
cultures only as a means for a slow, yet permanent, liberalisation of such
cultures. Rights-based liberalism, on the other hand, is devoted to the
protection of all cultures which provide their members with a decent
environment and life chances. ‘Given that even oppressive cultures can give
people quite a lot, it follows that one should be particularly wary of organized
campaigns of assimilation and discrimination against “inferior” and oppressive
cultures. They provide many of their members with all that they can get.’22On
this view respect for illiberal, reasonable communities which are valued by their
members, even if they fail to provide (or even prevent) the chance to develop

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autonomous lives, is derived from respect for the right of individuals to live
according to their values, traditions and preferences, as long as these do not
involve harm to others. Hence for rights-based liberalism the question is not
which cultures allow individuals to develop their autonomy in a better, more
comprehensive way, but rather which societies individuals would like to live in.
As Mendus forcefully claims, autonomy-based liberalism prevents us from
appreciating other cultures: ‘as autonomy valuers we lack the moral language
with which to provide an explanation of their humility as anything other than
oppression’.23 Hence we may fail to appreciate that ‘there are virtues which are
valuable, yet which cannot properly be accommodated within a moral
framework which gives centrality to self-assessment and autonomy’.24Rights-
based liberalism might be more open-minded about the set of values offered by
different cultures and attempt to listen to their different voices. Moreover,
rights-based liberalism might see multiculturalism as a way of enriching the
liberal perspective and as a means for self-understanding. Feinberg sees
multiculturalism in a similar light, as a policy of ‘decentring and of coming to
terms with otherness’. This, he argues, is the major task for the education of a
democratic public in a multicultural society.25
Rights-based liberals might then respect other cultures and see
multiculturalism as a valuable tool for learning about others as well as
about themselves; yet for defenders of illiberal cultures such encounters are
much less welcome. Illiberal groups, Wringe argues, see such reflective
ventures not only as ‘misguided and spiritually dangerous to their members
but as threatening to their group’s identity and even its continuous
existence’.26 Halstead supports this claim, bringing into the discussion the
point of view of religious minorities. Such minorities, he argues, cannot accept
an education in which ‘for 95% of the time their children were subject to a
neutral or a secular curriculum while 5% was devoted to their own cultural or
religious beliefs and practice^'.*^ This asymmetry is well expressed also in the
Mozert case discussed by Macedo. In this case some fundamentalist and
evangelical families demanded that their children be excused from
participating in a reading programme which they claimed interfered with the
free exercise of their religion by ‘exposing the children to a variety of religious
points of view in an even-handed manner, thus denigrating the truth of their
particular religion’.28This asymmetry is reflected in the divergent attitudes
held towards the idea of cross-cultural exchanges in Israel. While liberal
Israelis, whether secular, Jews, Muslims or Christians, endorse the idea of
multiculturalism out of respect for others, thus allowing all cultures to
introduce their traditions and values in schools, as well as on public television
or radio, and are constantly ready to make efforts to allow members of such
cultures to retain their ways of life, their openmindedness is not reciprocated.
Exposure to cultural exchanges is therefore not mutual; liberals expose their
children to illiberal forms of life while defenders of illiberal cultures make a
special effort to shelter their children from any form of cultural diversity.
Taking into account that complete closure is impossible, members of illiberal
cultures also make sure to disparage other cultures, religions and traditions as
sources of knowledge and self-reflection. In fact they often ridicule the idea of
self-reflection, contrasting it with the idea of absolute truth proclaimed

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170 Yael Tamir

through revelation or the handing down of wisdom from one generation of

sages to another. By claiming that the only valid source of knowledge is
internal to the group they attempt to lessen the importance of multicultural
exchanges and to render them less harmful.
Despite all the attempts illiberal cultures make to stave off the threats posed
by multiculturalism, the threats remain. Members of such groups thus feel that
they have been forced to join a liberal game, which places liberal values such as
pluralism and diversity at its core. Liberals may attempt to present this ‘game’
as embodying a concession to the demands and needs of members of illiberal
groups, but this concession is motivated from within the liberal tradition and its
acceptance of a set of beliefs which celebrates the plurality of cultures, ways of
life and conceptions of the good. This set of values is, however, external to
illiberal traditions which hold a particular, closed, often authoritarian
conception of the good life and reject pluralism and diversity. Demanding
that such groups open up and respect other ways of life amounts to a demand
that they compromise their beliefs and face the risk of assimilation. This
suggests that while defenders of liberal cultures have a reason to accept certain
compromises in pursuit of a modus vivendi with illiberal groups, defenders of
illiberal cultures have reasons to reject such compromises.
The recognition that illiberal forces play a significant political role both
within liberal democratic states and in the international arena, and the
recognition consequently of the need to find ways of communicating with, and
if necessary accommodating, these cultures, forces liberals to acknowledge the
contextual nature of the liberal political tradition and to seek ways of reaching
beyond it. This is a case in which practical necessity reshapes theory; it compels
liberals to re-examine their ideological inventory, make good use of their
theoretical tools and expose their communal sensitivities. This re-examination
allows them to go a long way towards respecting the needs of members of
illiberal cultures, but the process cannot be reciprocated, as illiberal cultures do
not have the theoretical foundations that would allow them to pay genuine
respect to liberal ones. The result is an asymmetric process whereby liberals
compromise, for principled reasons, their own principles in an attempt to
accommodate illiberal cultures, while illiberal cultures endure liberal cultures
merely out of necessity as their own principles do not leave room for a more
fundamental type of concession.
So why would members of illiberal cultures adopt the compromises
demanded by the idea of multiculturalism? The reason could not be any
moral principle, yet it might still be possible to call on their self-interest to
support an uneasy truce in preference to all-out war. ‘But that will not show
that the parties can agree that this is the right outcome; rather each side might
reasonably reject accommodation if it could win the conflict outright, but will
be willing to accept a modus vivendi as the second-best solution if the only real
alternative is still worse.’29If members of illiberal communities are convinced
that it is better for them to come to terms with liberal communities and gain
protection, respect and representation than to find themselves in a constant
state of struggle they might decide to cooperate. This type of argument is,
however, contingent on the illiberal community being found in a minority
position. Were the community in a position to impose its own ways and values

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it would do so. The compromise from the point of view of the illiberal
community is not even a principled modus vivendi, based on a ‘live and let live’,
but a conditional one which is based on fear rather than respect.
The two parties thus have different motivations to enter into an agreement:
while its endorsement by liberals is grounded in respect for the lifestyles of
others, its endorsement by illiberal cultures is grounded in arguments of lesser
evil. Hence the idea of a thick multicultural society raises the following
difficulty: if supported by autonomy-based liberalism on the ground that it will
allow a gradual and peaceful transformation of all cultures into autonomy-
respecting ones, it might be resented and rejected by defenders of illiberal
cultures. If, on the other hand, it is supported on the grounds of genuine respect
for others, then liberalism is placed on the defensive as it asymmetrically opens
itself to illiberal influences.

CONCLUSION
Multicultural debates in a democratic state could lead to an overlapping
consensus if they are intra-liberal debates. If, however, both liberal and illiberal
cultures are involved, the most one can achieve is a conditional modus vivendi
based on respect on the part of the liberal cultures and compliance with their
position as a minority on the part of the illiberal ones. This suggests that
liberals should limit both their demands towards and their expectations of
illiberal cultures. This does not commit liberals to cultural relativism; it is
merely a requirement of caution, on the part of ‘those who make, and above all
apply, moral judgements, especially if they are powerful and do so in alien
moral cultural contexts’.30
These features of thick multiculturalism make it impossible to achieve a
political agreement which would be seen as ideal by either of the parties. The
most that can be achieved is an untidy compromise which all parties resent to
some extent. There is then no right solution, but a set of reasonable ones. Such
solutions cannot be defined a priori but must be the product of constant
political discussions and negotiations. Philosophers thus seem to have little to
say about the nature of such agreements and should leave politicians to search
for practical solutions.
Does this mean that the theoretical discussions concerning multiculturalism
have exhausted themselves? This conclusion is only partly true. In discussing
current issues political philosophers hope to analyse an issue in a way that
would allow for better understanding of what ought to be done; but they also
hope to reflect upon their own concepts, principles and theories. While the
contribution of the present debate to the former end might be quite restricted,
its contribution to the latter is considerable as it forces political philosophers to
look back at the foundation of their own thinking. The phenomena of
multiculturalism invite a reconsideration of most of the concepts used in
political theory: membership, boundaries, citizenship, sovereignty, group rights
and individual rights, pluralism, toleration, democracy, representation. No such
concept can be used in its traditional guise; they must all be reshaped and re-
justified. But most of all multiculturalism demands a redefinition of

0 The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Grear Britain 1995.

172 Yael Tamir

educational ends and means. This process of self-reflection may, however,

reflect back on actual disputes and policies.
It is in this light that the following essays should be read. All the papers in
this volume -Lukes’ discussion of cultural diversity, Walzer’s analysis of
multicultural citizenship and democratic education, Mendus’s exploration of
the limits of toleration, Rorty’s view of the virtues of a multicultural
curriculum, Macedo’s inquiry into the nature and scope of liberal demands
and McLaughlin’s, Halstead’s and Lorberbaum’s discussions of religious
rights -use multiculturalism to reflect on the liberal democratic tradition and
in so doing allow us better to understand its scope as well as its limits.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Raz, J., Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 69.
2. Walzer, M., Comment, in: A. Gutmann (Ed.) Multiculturalirm and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 99.
3. Ibid., p.99.
4. Ibid., p. 100.
5. Not all cultural minorities desired integration. Some may have recognised from the beginning the
implausibility of this ideal. Others wished to retain their identity even at the price of exclusion, or hoped
for secessionist arrangements which would allow them to preserve their identity within their own territory.
6. Young, I., Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship, Ethics, vol. 99,
demonstrates how gender issues followed the same pattern.
7. Gutmann (op. cit.), p. 12.
8. Young I., Justice and the Politics of Dzflerence (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990).
9. Young 1989, p. 267.
10. Young Ibid.
11. Young Ibid., p. 265.
12. Walzer, M., Education, democratic citizenship and multiculturalism, below, p. 181.
13. Kamm, T., Clash of cultures: rise of Islam in France rattles the populace and stirs backlash, Wall Street
Journal, 5 January 1995.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Nagel, T., Equality and Partiality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 169.
17. One could portray this debate differently, as a conftict not between French liberalism and Muslim
illiberalism, but between French illiberalism and legitimate Muslim ways of life. The goal of neutrality
does not authorise violations of negative liberty such as restricting what garments can be worn. No
compromise of liberalism is necessary to allow the wearing of the scarves; indeed liberalism demands such
freedoms be respected. Alternatively one could claim that this is an encounter between two illiberal
cultures. (I am grateful to Jacob Levi for pointing this out to me.)
18. Rawls, J., The law of peoples, in: S. Shute and S. Hurley (Eds.), On Human Rights (New York, Basic
Books, 1994), p. 43.
19. Taylor, C., The politics of recognition, in: A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism (op. cit.), p. 57.
20. Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 372.
21. Zbid., pp. 4234.
22. Raz, op. cit. 1994, p. 76.
23. Mendus, S., Toleration and recognition: education in a multicultural society, below, p. 191.
24. Ibid.
25. Feinberg, W., Liberalism and the aims of multicultural education, below, p. 203.
26. Wringe, C., Educational rights in multicultural democracies, below, p. 285.
27. Halstead, M., Voluntary apartheid? Problems of schooling for religious and other minorities in
democratic societies, below, p. 257.
28. Macedo, S., Multiculturalism for the religious right? Defending liberal civic education, below, p. 223.
29. Nagel (op. cit.), p. 169.
30. Lukes, S., Moral diversity and relativism, below, p. 173.

0 The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1995.