ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT, YEAR IV

JULY 23, 20211

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP MEETING Online discussion panel via Zoom

HAS CHINA WON?

THE CHINESE CHALLENGE
TO AMERICAN SUPREMACY
 www.cebri.org
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ASIA PROGRAM
The Program promotes a systematic monitoring
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ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT, YEAR IV
DECEMBER 2, 2021
CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP MEETING Online discussion panel via Zoom

HAS CHINA WON?

THE CHINESE CHALLENGE
TO AMERICAN SUPREMACY
Report by: Kamila Aben Athar

SUPPORT:

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In July 2021, CEBRI`s China Group held a special
meeting for the launch of the Brazilian edition of
the book “Has China won?: The Chinese Challenge
to American Primacy”, which counted with the
participation of its author, Professor Kishore
Mahbubani, as keynote speaker. Notably, this was
China Group meeting with the highest level of
participation in 2021. During the event, Professor
Mahbubani and other participants discussed the
structuring forces surrounding the US-China
dispute, as well as the future perspectives on
the conflict, and how the COVID-19 pandemic
has affected such relations. In addition, the
participants discussed the positions of other
actors around this dispute, especially Brazil’s
in this complex scenario. Given the format of
the event, this report largely reflects Professor
Mahbubani`s opinion on the matter, while
following the standard format for China Analysis
Group reports.
Table of Contents

Guiding Questions 07

Meeting Report 08

Participants 17
Guiding Questions

To help us analyze these complex and dynamic issues, at its Meeting,

the China Analysis Group proposes three themes and questions to our
speakers and audience:

1. What are the structural forces that drive the U.S-China

contest? What were the mistakes made by the United States
and China that aggravated this contest?

2. Who will win the contest, the United States or China? How
did Covid-19 impact U.S-China relations?

3. What do other countries of the world think of this contest?

How to prevent worst-case scenarios and spillover effects
emerging from this contest, especially in Brazil?

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP - SPECIAL MEETING 7

 Meeting Report

1. What are the structural forces that drive the U.S-China

contest? What were the mistakes made by the United States
and China that aggravated this contest?

A
ccording to Professor Kishore Mahbubani, the U.S-China geopolitical contest
will shake the world for the next 10 years. As stated in the first paragraph
of the book, in some ways, Biden’s election demonstrated that “although
President Donald Trump launched the first round [of the dispute] in 2018, it
will outlast his Administration”. This demonstrates that the U.S-China dispute is driven
by deep structural forces.

The first structural force reflects a 2000-year rule of power politics, in which whenever
the world’s number one emerging power — which today is China — is about to overtake
the world’s number one power — which today is the United States of America —,
the most powerful nation always pushes down the emerging nation. Thus, Professor
Mahbubani stressed that the U.S endeavor in preventing China from taking the lead is
normal behavior, especially because Washington did not expect this to happen as fast.
In 2000, the United States’ GNP in nominal market terms was eight times the size of
China’s; today, it’s only 1.5 times larger. Within 10 years, China will grow even more and
is likely to surpass the United States. Therefore, it is normal for the United States to want
to remain the number one power.

The second structural force relates to the fact that decisions are made not only through
rationality but also through emotions. For the past nine hundred years, the Western
imagination repressed the fear of the yellow peril; however, this emotional element
has been present on several occasions. In 1882, the United States Congress passed
the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act that prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers
to the United States. Nowadays, yellow peril is a concept that is not considered to be
politically correct in Western societies. Nevertheless, the United States’ strong reaction
to the return of China shows that this contest is driven by rational and emotional
considerations, including the yellow peril perception, with a deep reluctance from the

8 CEBRI - ASIA PROGRAM

West to accept a world in which a non-western power is number one. As a result, anti-
Chinese incidents happen more frequently within the United States.

The third structural factor concerns the belief the United States had for China to
open its economy and political system, becoming a liberal democracy. From the U.S
perspective, a young country with less than 250 years of history and one-quarter of
the Chinese population could transform China, which has four times the U.S population
and four thousand years of history. However, China does not show any signs that it will
become a democratic regime anytime soon or ever. This arrogant assumption of the
United States being able to transform China has led Washington feeling a deep sense of
disappointment with Beijing. The United States did not understand that their success in
the last 130 years was exceptional. Now, the world is returning to normalcy. Over the
last 2000 years, the two largest economies of the world were always China and India.

In addition, the U.S-China geopolitical contest is also driven by the mistakes made by
both sides. Professor Mahbubani dedicated an entire chapter to approach how China
wrongfully alienated the U.S business community. For a long time, this community was
China’s main advocate in Washington, making large amounts of profits in China. As an
example, Boeing’s second-largest customer is China, only after the United States. General
Motors, the world’s largest automobile company, and the U.S largest company, earns
more profits from the Chinese market than it does from the U.S market. Apple is also
very dependent on China. However, because of mandatory technology transfer in joint
ventures, the losses of intellectual property in China, and unequal level playing field in
the competition between a U.S company and a Chinese company, participants stressed
that the complaints of U.S businesses were legitimate. Then, when Trump launched the
trade war in 2018 against China, the U.S business community, which once would have
intervened on China’s behalf, became silent.

In the case of the United States, Professor Mahbubani argued that Washington
inappropriately launched a geopolitical conscience against China without working out a
comprehensive long-term strategy. In the year 2009, the size of the retail goods market
in China was 1.8 trillion dollars, whereas the size of that same market in the United States
was 4 trillion dollars. In 2019, two years after Trump’s trade war and the imposition of
tariffs, sanctions, restrictions to damage the Chinese economy, the size of China’s retail
goods market reached 6 trillion dollars, while the U.S market went from 4 trillion to
5.5 trillion. For exporters, the Chinese market became bigger than the U.S market, and
this gap will grow further. Thus, the trade war launched against China did not harm the
Chinese market; instead, the American workers, farmers, and consumers. As a result, the
bipartisan consensus against China has not been upheld, and the Biden Administration
still struggles to reverse the tariffs put in place by the Trump Administration, which
reflects a lack of strategy towards China.

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP - SPECIAL MEETING 9

 In addition, the contest was framed as “democracies versus autocracies” of the world,
entering in a national security strategy launched in March 2021 by Washington, and
in official statements, such as the G7 communiqué, which emphasized the spirit of
the so-called “exclusive multilateralism” and explicitly mentioned core and sensitive
issues to China, such as Xinjiang, Hong Kong, South China Sea, Taiwan, and other
topics. Nevertheless, Professor Mahbubani highlighted that a democratic China could
pose more challenges to U.S-China relations. The Chinese people still carry memories
of the humiliation and destruction caused by Western powers in the 19th and 20th
centuries. This would result in the election of a more nationalist leader in comparison
to President Xi Jinping. Although criticized by U.S authorities and citizens, Xi delivers
a global public good by containing the Chinese nationalism, bearing in mind China’s
century of humiliation.

The United States’ strong reaction to the return of China

shows that this contest is driven by rational and emotional
considerations, including the yellow peril perception, with a deep
reluctance from the West to accept a world in which a non-
western power is number one.

Because of mandatory technology transfer in joint ventures, the

losses of intellectual property in China, and unequal level playing
field in the competition between a U.S company and a Chinese
company, the complaints of U.S businesses were legitimate. Then,
when Trump launched the trade war in 2018 against China, the
U.S business community, which once would have intervened on
China’s behalf, became silent.

10 CEBRI - ASIA PROGRAM

2. Who will win the contest, the United States or China? How
did Covid-19 impact U.S-China relations?

P
rofessor Mahbubani mentioned that it is inconceivable for the United States
to consider the possibility of losing the trade war against China. From the U.S
perspective, this is a contest between a vibrant democracy in the United States
and a rigid and inflexible communist party system in China. Thus, as it happened
with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States will be victorious.
Nevertheless, looking at the current U.S society, the United States is no longer a
democracy; rather, it became a plutocracy. For the past 30 years, all the rewards of
development have gone to the top 1% of the population, and the bottom 50% have
not seen any improvement in their standard of living. As life expectancy in the United
States declines and infant mortality increases, a “sea of despair” spreads among the
white American working classes, which explains the election of Donald Trump in 2016.

In order to ease the tensions, participants argued that Biden must tackle the challenges
faced by the bottom 50%, who largely voted for Trump. The U.S President should not
pinpoint China as the number one enemy. Instead, it should be Donald Trump, whose
re-election could pose more risks to the world. To prevent Trump from returning to the
presidency, Biden should tone down the geopolitical contest with China, and focus on
improving the economic development of the American people, lowering wage inequality.
This also means decreasing its defense military expenditures. For example, the United
States spends almost 10 billion dollars to build an aircraft carrier, which can be sunk by
a hundred-thousand-dollar Chinese hypersonic missile. Thus, the United States needs
to understand that it cannot treat China like the Soviet Union. Instead of investing
massively in defense, it should spend more on improving the livelihood of its people,
which will be good for Biden, the United States, and the world.

As stated in Chapter 6, unlike the rigid inflexible communist party that ran the Soviet
Union, China became a meritocracy, selecting the most capable individuals to run the
society. For decades, China could not harvest the best brains in the country. Now, the
Chinese government can attract top professionals to work for the Chinese communist
party. In a population of 1.4 billion people, only the number one student can join the
Chinese communist party, and this demonstrates the quality of brainpower that the
Chinese communist party accumulated. In addition, the successful case of China and the
failed case of the United States while managing the Covid-19 shows the discrepancy in
the competency level. Although the pandemic started in China, the Chinese government

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP - SPECIAL MEETING 11

 efficiently mobilized efforts and managed to stop the total number of deaths in five
thousand. If the U.S government had the same number of deaths per million as China,
instead of having 600,000 deaths, the United States would have a total of 1,000 deaths.
Thus, the United States wrongfully underestimates China.

In parallel, Professor Mahbubani stressed that China must not underestimate the United
States. The United States continues to be the most successful society in world history.
The amount of power the country accumulated across a wide range of areas is far greater
than what most societies achieved. The United States still has the advantage of attracting
the best experts from all around the world. For example, some of the biggest companies
in the United States, such as Google and Microsoft, are run by foreigners. In addition, as
a means of upholding the tech competition against China, the Biden administration is
currently seeking approval for the largest long-term investment program in infrastructure,
with a focus on clean technologies and power transportation. The U.S government made
bold state-funded investments in science and technology and streaming to industrial
policy, as seen in Chapter 5. Also, to counter back the Chinese dual circulation and the
opening of China’s financial market, the United States used a wide range of investments
not only from the United States, but also from the whole investments in the portfolio,
and increased the level of FDI.

According to participants, the pandemic caused enormous losses economically and

socially. There was an increase in political uncertainties and polarization, despite all
the significant efforts and the handling of the pandemic by China and other important
examples in Asia. Nonetheless, participants argued that there was no leadership
emerging from this in terms of the necessary strengthening for multilateralism and
multilateral organizations.

Therefore, Professor Mahbubani pinpointed that the outcome depends on the ability
of a nation in creating the impression of knowing what it wants, coping successfully
with the problems of its internal life, coping with the responsibilities of world power,
and having a spiritual vitality before the international community. Considering the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the former was ahead on all
these points. Today, in the contest between Washington and Beijing, the latter may be
ahead on all four points. In the last 40 years, the Chinese people witnessed a greater
improvement in their standard of living and quality of life in 4,000 years of Chinese
history. Yet, Americans still wonder the reasons why the Chinese people continue to
support the Chinese communist party, whose support went from 86% in 2003 to 93%
in 2016.

12 CEBRI - ASIA PROGRAM

The United States needs to understand that it cannot
treat China like the Soviet Union. Instead of investing
massively in defense, it should spend more on improving
the livelihood of its people, which will be good for Biden,
the United States, and the world.

The outcome depends on the ability of a nation in

creating the impression of knowing what it wants,
coping successfully with the problems of its internal
life, coping with the responsibilities of world power,
and having a spiritual vitality before the international
community. […] Today, in the contest between
Washington and Beijing, the latter may be ahead on
all four points.

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP - SPECIAL MEETING 13

 3. What do other countries of the world think of this contest?
How to prevent worst-case scenarios and spillover effects
emerging from this contest, especially in Brazil?

D
uring the Cold War, many countries sided with the United States against
the Soviet Union. The U.S government counted on the support of European
countries, East Asian nations, such as Japan, South Korea, and even China, as
well as major third world countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
Currently, some countries concur with the notion of China further opening its markets,
creating a more level playing field for business, and accepting additional norms
internationally. Nonetheless, unlike the Cold War, very few countries enthusiastically
endorse Washington in the geopolitical contest against Beijing. As an example, all QUAD
members claim that the organism is not an anti-China alliance, especially because China
is their number one trading partner. For this matter, they cannot afford to alienate China,
which explains the motivations of not mentioning China in their final communiqué after
their summit in March 2021.

According to Professor Mahbubani, Biden’s strategy towards China is flawed because the
United States cannot ask countries to choose sides since they want to do business with
both powers. In Asia, there was the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, which was an important step for the Asian economic space. In Europe,
there was the EU-China investment agreement, and the carryout of the Russian-German
pipeline, Nordstrom 2. In Latin America, China is now the main destination for Brazilian
exports, accounting for around 34% of the total trade value, ahead of other important
partners such as the United States, who take the share of 10%, and even local partners,
such as Argentina. In addition, ASEAN became China’s largest trading partner. In 2000,
ASEAN trade with the United States was 130 billion dollars, whereas with China was
only 40 billion dollars. However, similar to what happened to Brazil, ASEAN trade with
China has grown, and by 2019, United States trade with ASEAN went from 130 billion
to 300 billion, whereas ASEAN trade with China went up from 40 billion to 660 billion.
Therefore, participants argued that most countries are not capable of choosing between
the United States and China.

For instance, as argued in the last chapter of the book, Professor Mahbubani concluded
that this contest is inevitable and avoidable. Thus, other countries must send a consistent
message to Washington and Beijing so they can help avoid further damages. Indeed,
structural forces are driving this contest. Nonetheless, human intervention can make

14 CEBRI - ASIA PROGRAM

a difference at some point. There are 7.8 billion people in the world, with 1.4 billion
living in China and 330 million living in the United States. Participants affirmed that it
is important for the remaining six billion people around the world to speak out more on
this U.S-China geopolitical contest. It is important for all other 191 countries collectively
to tell the United States and China to stop this contest and focus on taking care of more
important matters.

Regarding China, Professor Mahbubani stressed that, although Beijing has become
more assertive, it did not become as aggressive as it could. Inevitably, China behaves
according to the size of its economy. The Chinese GNP, which was 10% the size of U.S
purchasing power priority terms in 1980, is now bigger than the U.S size. For instance,
all great powers are going to have a greater impact on the world, and the international
community must adjust to the arrival of a new great power such as China. Countries
should persuade Beijing to accept that it is in China’s best interest to support the rules-
based order that the West created, advocate for the United Nations, and defend the
international law, instead of criticizing China publicly as did by the Trump and Biden
administrations.

Concerning the United States, Professor Mahbubani mentioned that it is not clear what
Washington aims to accomplish recently with China – whether is trying to prevent China
from becoming the number one economy in the world, isolate China, or overthrow the
Chinese communist party –. The United States must understand what can or cannot be
done. Participants affirmed that if partners such as Brazil emphasize the importance of
China for its economy, this can have an impact on Washington. In the Brazilian case, the
United States and China have been the most important trade partners of Brazil over the
past decade. Since China was the country that reacted and responded more vividly to
the pandemic, the consequences for the Chinese growth were diminished, as well in its
trade partners. For this matter, even though the Brazilian labor market has not recovered
because of its external sector, the partnership between China and Brazil resulted in
weaker negative impacts. This declaration could make the U.S government adopt a more
intelligent policy that will be better for the American and Chinese peoples.

Lastly, Professor Mahbubani highlighted that there are non-contradictions in the U.S-
China relations, in which they have common interests that could reduce the tensions
and promote further cooperation. The first area of mutual interest is improving the well-
being of their people. Biden’s priority should be to improve the living conditions of the
American people by focusing on their economic development and not on the geopolitical
contest. The United States has spent five to six trillion dollars fighting unnecessary wars.
Reallocating those resources to the bottom 50% would result in each citizen receiving
approximately 30,000 dollars. This could change the situation of several vulnerable
families living in the United States, especially because 60% of the population does not

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP - SPECIAL MEETING 15

 have access to 500 dollars in emergency cash. Instead of devoting efforts and assets
to a geopolitical contest, participants highlighted that both countries should focus on
improving the well-being of their citizens so they can collaborate, considering that the
trade war is neither helping the United States nor damaging China. The second area
where Washington and Beijing can collaborate is in tackling common global challenges,
such as Covid-19 and climate change. As mentioned in the second last paragraph of the
book, if the United States and China continue fighting while climate change is happening,
historians will describe them as two tribes of apes that continued fighting each other
while the forest around them was burning. With the advent of globalization, all nations
are interdependent and, thus, there’s a larger common interest in humanity that the
United States and China should pay attention to.

This contest is inevitable and avoidable. Thus, other countries

must send a consistent message to Washington and Beijing
so they can help avoid further damages. […] If partners such
as Brazil emphasize the importance of China for its economy,
this can have an impact on Washington, […] and make the
U.S government adopt a more intelligent policy that will be
better for the American and Chinese peoples.

There are non-contradictions in the U.S-China relations, in

which they have common interests that could reduce the
tensions and promote further cooperation. The first area of
mutual interest is improving the well-being of their people.
[…] The second area where Washington and Beijing can
collaborate is in tackling common global challenges, such as
Covid-19 and climate change.

16 CEBRI - ASIA PROGRAM

Participants

Cecília Machado
Chief-Economist at BOCOM BBM Bank and a professor at the Brazilian School of Economics
and Finance of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (EPGE/FGV). She is a columnist for Folha de
São Paulo newspaper, where she writes every two weeks. She is an associate researcher
at the IZA, and associate editor of EconomiA magazine. She has research projects funded
by international agencies (Gates Foundation and IDRC) and national ones (Young Scientist
of Our State by Faperj and Research Productivity Grant by CNPq). She holds a bachelor’s
degree in economics from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, a master’s degree in
economics from PUC-Rio, and a PhD in economics from Columbia University.

Kishore Mahbubani
Diplomat and author of eight books. Mahbubani is currently a Distinguished Fellow at
the Asia Reseach Institute of the National University of Singapore, and former President
of the UN Security Council and the Founding Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy. His books and articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times
and Foreign Affairs have earned him global recognition. He was inducted into the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in October 2019.

Ricardo Mioto
Editor of Intrínseca, responsible for books on business, economics and contemporary
issues. He was previously a reporter and editor at Folha de S.Paulo, communications
director of the Empiricus investment platform, and, as partner of the FSB agency,
communications consultant for multinationals such as McKinsey and Twitter.

Tatiana Rosito
Senior Fellow at CEBRI. She was also the founder and coordinator of CEBRI’s China
Analysis Group. She is a diplomat and an economist, currently working as a consultant at
the New Development Bank (NDB) in Shanghai. She was Petrobras’ Chief-Representative
in China and General Manager for Business Development in Asia.Previously, she was
Executive Secretary at the Brazilian Foreign Trade Board (CAMEX) and Special Advisor to
the Ministers of Finance and Planning. She is also an invited member of the Consultative
Committee of the Brazil-China Business Council. She holds a Master’s degree in
International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School and an Executive MBA from
INSEAD and Tsinghua University.

CHINA ANALYSIS GROUP - SPECIAL MEETING 17

 Board

Chairman CEO
José Pio Borges Julia Dias Leite
Emeriti Chairman
Fernando Henrique Cardoso Board of Trustees
André Clark
Vice Chairmen Anna Jaguaribe (in memoriam)
Jorge Marques de Toledo Camargo Armando Mariante
José Alfredo Graça Lima Armínio Fraga
Tomas Zinner Clarissa Lins
Vice Chairmen Emeriti Claudio Frischtak
Daniel Klabin Demétrio Magnoli
José Botafogo Gonçalves Edmar Bacha
Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves Henrique Rzezinski
Rafael Benke Ilona Szabó
Izabella Teixeira
Trustees Emeriti Joaquim Falcão
Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa José Aldo Rebelo
Luiz Fernando Furlan José Luiz Alquéres
Marcos Azambuja Luiz Ildefonso Simões Lopes
Pedro Malan Marcelo de Paiva Abreu
Rubens Ricupero Marcos Galvão
Winston Fritsch Paulo Hartung
Founders Renato Galvão Flôres Jr.
Carlos Mariani Bittencourt Roberto Abdenur
Celso Lafer Roberto Jaguaribe
Daniel Klabin Ronaldo Veirano
Gelson Fonseca Jr. Sergio Amaral
João Clemente Baena Soares Vitor Hallack
Marcus Vinicius Pratini de Moraes
Maria do Carmo (Kati) Nabuco de Almeida Braga
Roberto Teixeira da Costa
Eliezer Batista da Silva (in memoriam)
Luciano Martins de Almeida (in memoriam)
Luiz Felipe Palmeira Lampreia (in memoriam)
Luiz Olavo Baptista (in memoriam)
Sebastião do Rego Barros Netto (in memoriam)
Walter Moreira Salles (in memoriam)

18
International Board Senior Fellows

Albert Fishlow Adriano Proença

Alfredo Valladão Ana Célia Castro
André Corrêa do Lago Ana Paula Tostes
Antonio Patriota Ana Toni
Felix Peña André Soares
Flávio Damico Benoni Belli
Hussein Kalout Carlos Milani
Jackson Schneider Daniela Lerda
Leslie Bethell Denise Nogueira Gregory
Marcos Caramuru Diego Bonomo
Marcos Jank Evangelina Seiler
Monica de Bolle Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini
Paolo Bruni Fernanda Magnotta
Sebastião Salgado José Mario Antunes
Larissa Wachholz
Leandro Rothmuller
Leonardo Burlamaqui
Lia Valls Pereira
Lourival Sant’anna
Mário Ripper
Matias Spektor
Miguel Correa do Lago
Monica Herz
Patrícia Campos Mello
Paulo Sergio Melo de Carvalho
Pedro da Motta Veiga
Philip Yang
Ricardo Ramos
Ricardo Sennes
Rafaela Guedes
Rogerio Studart
Ronaldo Carmona
Sandra Rios
Tatiana Rosito
Vera Thorstensen
Victor do Prado

19
 Members

Institutions
Aegea Huawei
Altera IBÁ
BAMIN IBRAM
Banco Bocom BBM Icatu Seguros
BASF Instituto Clima e Sociedade
BAT Brasil Itaú Unibanco
BDMG JETRO
BMA Advogados Klabin
BNDES Lazard
BRF Light
Bristow Associados
Brookfield Brasil Machado Meyer
Captalys Investimentos Mattos Filho Advogados
CCCC/Concremat Michelin
Consulado Geral dos Países Baixos no Rio de Janeiro Museu do Amanhã
Consulado Geral da Irlanda em São Paulo Neoenergia
Consulado Geral do México no Rio de Janeiro Paper Excellence
Consulado Geral da Noruega no Rio de Janeiro Petrobras
CTG Brasil Pinheiro Neto Advogados
Dannemann, Siemsen, Bigler & Ipanema Moreira Prumo Logística
EDP Repsol Sinopec
Eletrobras Sanofi
Embaixada da China no Brasil Santander
Embaixada da República da Coreia Shell
Embraer Siemens
ENEVA Siemens Energy
ENGIE Brasil SPIC Brasil
Equinor State Grid
ExxonMobil Suzano
FCC S.A. Tecnoil
Galp Total E&P do Brasil
Grupo Lorentzen Unilever
Grupo Ultra Vale
Haitong Veirano Advogados
Vinci Partners

20
CEBRI Team

CEO
Julia Dias Leite
Director of Projects
Luciana Gama Muniz
Director of External Relations
Carla Duarte

Projects Communications and Events

Deputy Director of Projects Deputy Director of External Relations
Marianna Albuquerque Betina Moura
Projects Coordinators Events Coordinator
Hugo Bras Martins da Costa Nana Villa Verde
Lea Reichert Communications Officer
Marina Liuzzi Paula Reisdorf
Projects Analysts Events Analysts
Thais Jesinski Batista Nana Maria Barbosa
Eduardo Neiva Priscila Carvalho
Intern Executive Secretary
Larissa Vejarano Rigmor Andersen

Institutional Relations Administrative and Financial

Partnerships Coordinator Administrative-Financial Coordinator
Cintia Hoskinson Fernanda Sancier
Institutional Relations Coordinator Administrative Officer
Fernanda Araripe Kelly C. Lima
Special Projects Coordinator
Caio Vidal
Special Projects Analyst
Lucas Bilheiro
Intern
Heron Fiório

21
WHERE WE ARE:
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Gávea, Rio de Janeiro – RJ - Brazil
22451-044

Tel: +55 (21) 2206-4400

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