TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................................

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................................................

TABLE OF CASES.......................................................................................................................

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................................................................

STATEMENT OF
FACTS.........................................................................................................XIII

STATEMENT OF
ISSUES.........................................................................................................XV

SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENTS................................................................................................XVI

CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES

HAVE
SPECIFIC POWERS TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED
RESERVATION............................................................................................................................

1.1That the State Legislature has the

Power........................................................................ 1.2 To what extent such Powers are

Available....................................................................

1.3 That such Powers are not being hit by Article 15 And/Or Article
16...........................

CONTENTION 02: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES HAVE THE POWER
TO DIRECT EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

LOCAL
CANDIDATES................................................................................................................

2.1 That Reasonable Restrictions are maintained................................................................

2.2 That the Reservations are Socially and Economically Sound and Viable.....................

CONTENTION 03: THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL

CANDIDATES ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.................................................................

3.1 The Act does not violate Article

14...............................................................................

3.2 The Act does not violate Article

16...............................................................................

3.3 The Act violates Article 19 (1)

(g)................................................................................

CONTENTION 04: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147,
148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 AND
THE HIGH COURT OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM.
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION EXTENSION

& And

s. Section

¶ Paragraph

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Anr. Another

u/s Under Section

Cr. Criminal

v. Versus

ed. Edition

etc. Etcetera

Hon’ble Honourable

i.e. that is

Govt. Government

No. Number

Ors. Others

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

STATUTES
S.NO STATUES PAGE CITED AT

01. The Constitution of India, 1949 Passim

02. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Passim

03. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Passim

04. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Passim

BOOKS AND DIGESTS

S.NO BOOKS AND DIGESTS EDITION PAGE CITED AT

01. Mahendra Pal Singh & VN. Shukla, Constitution 13th Passim
of India

02. M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 7th 9th

03. Will Circ, Principles of Circumstantial Evidence 6th 17th

04. J.V Ryan, The Law of Criminal Evidence in 18th

British India

05. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes 26th Passim

06. K.I Vibhuti, PSA Pillai Criminal Law 13th Passim

07. Anirudh Krishnan & Harini Sudersan, Law of 2008 Passim

Reservation & Anti-Discrimination
08. D.D. Basu, S.S. Subramani, D.D. Basu: 11th Passim
Commentary on Constitution of India
S.NO
ONLINE DATABASE PAGE CITED AT
01. www.jstor.org (JSTOR) Passim

02. www.lexisadvance.in (LEXIS ADVANCE) Passim

03. www.livelaw.in (LIVE LAW) Passim

04. www.S.C.C.online.com (S.C.C. ONLINE) Passim

 05. www.manupatrafast.com (MANUPATRA) Passim

ARTICLES AND JOURNALS

S. TITLE PAGE CITED AT
AUTHOR FORUM
NO
01. G. Implications of Reservations in Economic and 4th
Thimmaiah Private Sector Political Weekly

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The counsels on behalf of the Respondent humbly submit to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court under Article 32 and Article 136 of the Indiana Constitution

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 ART. 32: REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THIS
PART (PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION)

1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits
of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under
clause
(2).
4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

ART. 136: SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
India.
2. Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BRIEF SKETCH OF HISTORY

1. Devbhoomi located in the heart of Indiana is a ‘Developed State’. After elections in March
2019, Kranti Party formed Government in Devbhoomi. Infrastructural and industrial
 development followed in the state. It was the era when progress of Devbhoomi was on boost. In
2019, Mr.
Rajendra Singh Ambata was sworn in as the Chief Minister of Devbhoomi.
2. The rapid rate of development started attracting people of other States as it offered them better
standards of living. The natives expressed their resentment over this ongoing practice, as the
benefits of the state’s development were going to the outsiders and not to them. The issue of
reservation for the natives was on rise and turned into a revolution. After long protest and
widespread media coverage, Kranti Party decided to accommodate the demand of the natives
and on 1st April 2020, Devbhoomi Legislature passed the ‘Devbhoomi State Employment
Local
Candidates Bill, 2020.’

ISSUES INVOLVED

3. After the commencement of this Act, the outsiders and the private employers opposed the Act
being violative of their Fundamental Rights. They organized protests and marches for
revocation of the Act. An NGO named ‘Satat Vikas Sangh’ approached the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of Indiana through a Writ Petition demanding that the alleged Act be declared
unconstitutional. After the enactment of the Act, hostility among groups increased.
4. While this was a burning issue, two women were brutally raped and murdered. This incident
further disturbed the law-and-order situation in Uchihar. Keeping in mind the disturbed
aesthetics the Chief Minister (CM) was to address the people of Uchihar at Patel Maidan at 12
Noon on 24th May. Post this announcement, thousands of outsiders blocked the roads to
prevent the CM’s visit.
5. Subsequently, in the morning around on 24 May 2020, Mr. Teja Singh (MLA of Uchihar) along
with his 25-armed personnel started their journey to Uchihar. Near Negi Gaon, the convoy of
Mr. Teja Singh saw that around 300 protestors have blocked the road ahead and are shouting
under provocation.
6. Mr. S.P. Pandey (D.S.P., Uchihar) insisted Mr. Teja Singh upon returning but Mr. Teja Singh
reasoned that it his paramount responsibility as an MLA to ensure everything happens
peacefully

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 and he proceeded further. Seeing the convoy of Mr. Teja approaching, around 200 people
started running towards the convoy, started shouting and raising their ‘lathis’ asserted, “Today
we will give a life lesson to Teja for what he and his father have done to us.” During a heated
argument one unidentified person threw a handmade petrol bomb on Kalia’s vehicle, and the
vehicle caught fire.
7. Mr. Kalia and 5 others came out from the vehicle and warned the protestors to step back or else
people could be harmed. On the perception of immediate threat, Mr. Teja asked his associates to
rush towards Patel Maidan. Noticing this, the protestors started hitting the vehicle with Lathis
and began pelting stones. Thereupon, Mr. Teja directed his driver Mr. Vibhuti Singh to
accelerate the vehicle at maximum speed and not to stop even if stones were pelted on them.
8. In this clash, various protestors were severely injured. Three protestors died by voluntarily
coming in front of Mr. Teja’s vehicle in hopes of stopping it. After the accident, Mr. Vibhuti lost
control of the vehicle and the car crashed on road divider. Mr. Teja, Mr. Vibhuti and three others
stepped out of the car with licensed arms and open fired warning shots at the protestors who
came running towards him with their lathis and iron rods. After this incident, the protestors
found Mr.
Prashant Tamde, news reporter of ABC News who died due to a gunshot.
Subsequently, on 30th May 2020, the Government of Indiana ordered CBI inquiry.

SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENTS

9. CBI arrested Mr. Teja, Mr. Kalia, Mr. Vibhuti, Mr. Ranga and 7 others and charged them
u/s147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120-B and 34 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860. The matter was
then tried by the CBI Court and it found all the accused Guilty of the above-mentioned charges.
Aggrieved by this, the accused appealed against this judgement before the High Court of
Devbhoomi. The High Court reversed the Judgment pronounced by the CBI Court and
acquitted all the accused persons.

PRESENT STATUS

10. Dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court of Devbhoomi, the Respondents appealed to
the Supreme Court of Indiana, in January 2022, and the Hon’ble Court has admitted the Appeal.
Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court being satisfied that the Writ Petition filed by the SVS
involves substantial question of law, listed it for final hearing in the month of May 2022.
Realizing that the incident of Uchihar is the outcome of the Act passed by the Legislature of
Devbhoomi, the Chief Justice of Indiana clubbed them and placed them before the appropriate
Bench for final hearing in May 2022.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ANY SPECIFIC

POWERT TO MAKE LAW/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATIONS AND IF
YES, THEN TO WHAT EXTENT?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO DIRECT THE

EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES ACT,

2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149, 302,
307, 326, 120B AND 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES HAVE SPECIFIC

.
POWER TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATIONS

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the State legislature of Devbhoomi does
have specific power to make laws/policies for domicile-based reservation as the rationale of
giving back to the state which is followed for domicile-based reservations in educational
institutions can be applied to the private sector too. Furthermore, domicile-based reservations
should be accompanied with regional backwardness for such reservations to be legitimate. It is
submitted that in the present case the domicile-based reservations are accompanied with the
backward status of the natives of Devbhoomi. It is further submitted that such reservations are
also not being hit by Article 15 and/or by Article 16 and are put in place to ensure equality
among un-equals.

CONTENTION 2: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE POWER TO DIRECT THE

.
EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the state government have the power to
direct the employers of private sector to reserve jobs for local candidates as there is no
constitutional provision that restricts the states from making domicile-based reservation in
private jobs. Article 16 clearly talks about public employment. Further, The Constitution has
divided the power of the parliament and legislative giving each of them a sphere of legislative
capacity. In the present case, the prima facie objective of the act is employment in pursuance of
which the act targets industries, cooperative societies, companies, partnership firms, trusts,
factories to ensure social security and employment for its populace, all of which incidentally
fall within the ambit of Entry 24 and Entry 32 of State list and Entry 7, Entry 10, Entry 20,
Entry 21, Entry 23 and Entry 36 of the Concurrent list. Furthermore, it is submitted that
reasonable restrictions are maintained and the reservations are socially and economically sound
and viable.
CONTENTION 3: THAT THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES ACT,

2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL..

It is submitted that the Act is constitutionally valid therefore, not liable to be struck down. The
legislation does not violate the right to equality provided under the Constitution of Indiana as
the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia and the differentia has a rational
relation with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question along with the quantum
not being arbitrary. It is further submitted that the legislation does not violate Article 16 of the
Constitution of Indiana as this provision is not applicable on the private employment. It is
submitted that the legislation also does not violate Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana as
the rights under Article 19 are not absolute. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed are
reasonable and in the interest of general public which are furthering Directive Principles of
State Policy.

CONTENTION 4: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149,
302, 307, 326, 120-B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT

.
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS NOT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM

It is humbly submitted that all the accused are not guilty u/s 147, 148 and 149 of the Indiana
Penal Code (herein referred to as IPC) as there was no unlawful assembly and the force used
was lawful as it was in prosecution of private defence.
The accused persons cannot be held guilty under sections 120B, 326, 307 and 302 read with 34
IPC as the accused did not concord any conspiracy to do any unlawful act, all the acts done by
accused were in purport with private defence.
It is submitted that the acts of the accused persons do not amount to voluntarily causing
grievous hurt and are excusable as they were the outcome of private defence and accident. the
accused is not guilty for committing the offence of murder under Sec 302 read with Sec 300,
IPC, considering that the accused was acting in private-defence.
The defence humbly submits that the circumstance u/s 100 IPC is fulfilled, private defence was
warranted and reasonable force was used in the instant matter. Furthermore, due to faulty
evidence and other lacunas in investigation the accused persons are not guilty.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

CONTENTION 1: THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF DEVBHOOMI DOES HAVE SPECIFIC

.
POWERS TO MAKE LAWS/POLICIES FOR DOMICILE-BASED RESERVATION

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that domicile as a concept is commonplace and
protects the interests of the disadvantaged of the nation/state. Various educational institutions
employ domicile-based reservations in their respective state for the upliftment of the backward
classes. Various National Law Universities and medical colleges among others have reserved
seats on a domicile basis for local candidates. The constitutional validity of such reservations
has been upheld in landmark cases like Pradeep Jain v. Union of India1, D.P Joshi v. State of
Madhya Bharat & Ors 2. and N. Vasundara v. State of Mysore34 among others.

1.1 THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER.

2. It is submitted that the rationale of giving back to the state that is employed in educational
institutions can and should be extended to the private employment sectors since in both, the
state
is investing in the business and the benefits of the growth should be given to the people of the
state who have been deprived of the same. `122]
3. Furthermore, it was held in the case of Kailash Chand Sharma vs State of Rajasthan4, it was
held that geographical classification can be used for the categorisation of socio-economic
backwardness. In simpler words, domicile-based reservations should be accompanied by
regional backwardness for such reservations to be legitimate. It is submitted that in the present
case, domicile-based reservations are accompanied by the backward status of the natives of
Devbhoomi. The decades-old practice of outsiders coming and maintaining a monopoly over
skill-based jobs in the private sector has led to the private sector preferring outsiders over the
natives leading to the furtherance of the backwardness amongst the natives.

1 Pradeep Jain v Union of India, 1984 AIR 1420 (hereafter Pradeep Jain).
2 D.P Joshi v State of Madhya Bharat and ors, (1955) 1 SCR 1215 (hereafter D.P. Joshi).
3 N. Vasundara v State of Mysore, (1971) 2 SCC 22.
4 Kailash Chand Sharma vs State of Rajasthan, (2002), AIR2002 SC 2877.
 1.2 TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH POWERS ARE AVAILABLE.

4.
It is humbly submitted that to what extent domicile- As held in Pradeep Jain, “the extent of such
based reservations are constitutionally permissible depends on certain specific conditions.
reservation would depend on several factors including opportunities for professional education in
that particular area, the extent of competition, level of educational development of the area
and other relevant factors”. Further it was held that in states where there is woeful lack of
th developmental opportunities ere may be justification for reservation of a higher percentage
of “ seats … in the State and such higher percentage may not militate
against “the equality mandate viewed in the perspective of social justice.” Thus, taking into
account the backwardness of the natives of Devbhoomi and the dearth of opportunities they are
facing currently, the state legislature is constitutionally and ethically right in reserving 75% of the
seats under the pay bracket of Rs. 50,000 in the private sector.

1.3 THAT SUCH POWERS ARE NOT BEING HIT BY ARTICLE 15 AND/OR ARTICLE 16.

5. Furthermore, it is submitted that the case prosecution is making is built on the fact that the Act
violates the right to equality but a careful reading of Articles 15 and 16 and their application to
the present case reveals how the Act is promoting equality amongst un-equals. Article 15 of the
Constitution talks about discrimination based on “place of birth”. The Act gives reservation
based on domicile which is considerably different from the place of birth as held by the SC in
the case of D.P Joshi.
6. It is further submitted that claiming protection under Article 16(2) is completely misplaced as
the SC had held in its judgment in the case of Govt. of A.P. v P.B. Vijayakumar5 that the ambit
of Article 16(2) is limited in scope as it is confined to employment or office under the
government and thus the state legislature of Devbhoomi while exercising its power to make
policies for domicile-based reservations, has not violated principles laid down under Article 16. 7.
Thus, the state legislature of Devbhoomi has specific powers to make laws/policies for domicile-
based reservation.

CONTENTION 02: THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT DOES HAVE THE POWER TO DIRECT

.
EMPLOYERS OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO RESERVE JOBS FOR LOCAL CANDIDATES

5 Govt. of A.P. v P.B. Vijayakumar, 1995 AIR 1648.

8. It is humbly submitted that there is no constitutional provision that restricts the state from
making domicile-based reservations in private jobs as Article 16 only talks about public
employment. Further, The Constitution has divided the power of the parliament and legislative

giving each of them a sphere of legislative capacity. There are mainly three lists under schedule
VII6; mainly List I, List II and List III commonly known as Union List, State List and

Concurrent List respectively.

9. To determine the question of competence on the part of the legislature, the law takes into
consideration the fact that whether or not the Constitution empowers that specific legislature to
enact laws on a particular subject. So, a state legislature is competent to make laws on the
subject matter given in List-II and III. In Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail,
Calcutta7 it was held that the ‘widest possible’ and ‘most liberal’ construction be put on each

entry.

10. In the present case, the prima facie objective of the act is employment in pursuance of which
the act targets industries, cooperative societies, companies, partnership firms, trusts, and
factories to ensure social security and employment for its populace, all of which incidentally
fall within the ambit of Entry 24 and Entry 32 of the State List and Entry 7, Entry 10, Entry 20,
Entry 21, Entry 23 and Entry 36 of the Concurrent List.

11. Furthermore, for many socio-economic services, the Centre has no direct responsibility as
these
lie within the exclusive legislative sphere of the States. In the present case, since the state is
providing socio-economic services, it lies within the legislative sphere of the Devbhoomi. Thus,
the Act introduced by the Devbhoomi Government is within the ambit of the state’s entries
which are the state and concurrent list.

2.1 THAT REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ARE MAINTAINED.

12. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that reservations in the private sector do not
violate Article 19 (1) (G) as it comes under the ambit of reasonable restrictions. The restriction

6 INDIA CONST. art 246.

7 Hans Muller v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta AIR 1955 SC 367; Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commr. of
Income-tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 58; Welfare Assn. ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358.
 employed on the employer is in the best interest of people and is according to guidelines laid
down in DSP as it imposes a duty on the state to provide a livelihood.

2.2 THAT THE RESERVATIONS ARE SOCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND VIABLE.
13. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that reservations are in consonance with the

interests of the natives of the state, the outsiders as well as the nation. Such reservations are
socially and economically sound and viable.

14. Such reservations are to facilitate employment opportunities for the poor in lower-wage jobs. A
large number of migrants come from other states to Devbhoomi. These migrants compete with
the locals for limited employment opportunities. It makes it more competitive for the locals to
get a job in their home state and most of them remain unemployed as they are less skilled and
educated. The influx of migrants also acts as a strain on the infrastructure of the state. It leads
to the proliferation of slums and this, in turn, creates pressure on the local residents and the
local government to maintain their resources.

15. As a socialistic measure and a vision of welfare, the Act is definitely a measure for ensuring
the
social and economic security of the citizens of the state. Reservations in private employment
can also help with the rising unemployment levels among natives. It will also improve the
infrastructure of the state and would also lead to the mitigation of slums as there no longer will
be an influx of migrants for the low-paying job.

16. Even Ratan Tata, chief of the Tata conglomerate, agrees with the objective of the act and
responded positively stating, “Tata Group certainly understands the social responsibility that
all industries should carry to bring social justice to SC/ST and other minority or under-
privileged sections of our community. We would be happy to support your initiative”8. Thus, it
can quite clearly be seen such a step is being welcomed by employers.

17. Further, The Court reasoned that because the state incurs expenditure in imparting education, it
is only fair that the taxpayers and the state incur some benefit from it and so a reservation in
admissions to medical college for its residents to promote education within the state is a
reasonable classification. By the same rationale, a law which is to promote employment within
8 G. Thimmaiah, Implications of Reservations in Private Sector, 40, Economic and Political Weekly 8 (2005)
 the state should also qualify as reasonable. Since the government provides free land, tax
exemption, credit from government-owned banks and many other infrastructure facilities to
private industries, it is morally entitled to ask in return for reservations for socially backward
people.

18. Hence, it is humbly submitted that the state is competent enough to enact domicile-based
reservation in the private sector, as it stands both constitutional test and socio-economic test.

CONTENTION 03: THE DEVBHOOMI STATE EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL CANDIDATES ACT,

2020 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

19. It is submitted that the Act is constitutionally valid therefore, not liable to be struck down. It
shall be proved by establishing that, [A] the legislation does not violate the right to equality
provided under the Constitution of Indiana, [B] the legislation does not violate Article 16 of the
Constitution of Indiana [C] the legislation does not violate Article 19 of the Constitution of
Indiana.

3.1 THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14.

20. It is humbly submitted that the Act is in complete consonance of the principles embodied under
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana. Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana guarantees
the right of equality and equal protection of laws to all the people. In Budhan Choudhry v.
State of Bihar9, the court laid down that Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation10. For a classification to be reasonable
two tests must be fulfilled: the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and
the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question11.

9 Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, 1955 AIR 191.

10 MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 52 (Eastern Book Company 2017). 11
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 SCC 222, Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P, (1984) 4 SCC
251.
21. The classification made is founded on an intelligible differentia: The term intelligible
differentia distinguishes, reasonably, between persons or things that are grouped together from
those that are left out of the group.11 The state may take into consideration different conditions
of communities to create a distinction to ensure equality.12 By equality, the intention is not to
provide mathematical equality.13 What is reasonable may change according to the changing

needs of time and societal exigencies therefore, the state needs to make an informed decision

about such classification.14 The state has also a positive duty to be guided by the provisions of

Articles 39(a) and 41 of the Constitution to ensure livelihood for all.

22. In the instant case, a distinction is made between natives and non-natives for providing
reservations in private jobs. Such a classification was necessary for the upliftment of native
people as they are being marginalized for a very long time because of them being less educated
and less skilled. It is submitted that this situation is prevailing in 80 out of 101 constituencies
making this classification between native and non-native, an intelligible differentia.

23. The classification made has rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act:
In Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal15 it was held that the differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question16.

24. In the present case, the objective behind enacting the Act is to employ natives which will lead
to their upliftment. The old practice of migrant influx has made the natives a marginalized
section. As a result, they are not educated and skilled leading to the employers preferring
outsiders over them. Therefore, to provide equal opportunity to all, it became imperative for
the state to reserve jobs for the natives. Thus, there lies a rational nexus of the classification
made with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.

11 D.S. Nakara and ors v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, Vajravellu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for
Land Acquisition, AIR 1965 SC 1017.
12 Anwar Ali ; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68.
13 State of Kerala v. T.P. Roshana, (1979) 1 SCC 580.
14 Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 366.
15 Kedar Nath Bajoria and Anr. v The State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 660. 16
Prabhakar Rao H. Mawle v. State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 1827.
25. In Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar1617 it was declared that where a statute itself
makes the classification and the Court finds that the classification satisfies the test of
reasonable classification, the court will uphold the validity of the law. This read with impugned
act clearly shows that there is intelligible differentia and it falls under the exception of
reasonable classification and thus is valid.

26. Furthermore, it is submitted that the states provide several incentives to businesses, including
tax benefits, infrastructure facilities, etc. If the state is spending its resources on private
businesses, it is only reasonable to expect the benefits of such incentives to come back to its
own residents. These provisions are made in the presumption that these local residents will stay
in the state and help reduce the inequalities and poverty. Thus, the classification has a
reasonable relation to the subject – matter of the legislation.

That the quantum of reservation provided is not arbitrary: Horizontal and vertical

27.

are different. Horizontal reservations cut across vertical reservations.18 The limit of
reservations
50% on reservations laid down in Indra Sawhney and reiterated in several cases is only for the
purposes of vertical reservation. Thus, domicile reservation being horizontal in nature 19 is not
limited by the cap of 50%.19202122

28. In the present case, a horizontal reservation of 75% has been provided to the native in private
jobs. As per the factual matrix, out of 101, 80 constituencies. has a dismal state when it comes
to the status of natives21. This means natives are a marginalized section in near about 79% of
Devbhoomi. Therefore, it is only rational to provide a reservation of 75% to such people in
order to ensure their proper representation in the jobs.

16 Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & Ors, 1958 AIR 538.
17 Anil Kumar v. State of U.P, (1995) 5 SCC 173; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217
(hereafter Indra Sawhney).
18 Balvinder Sangwan & Ors. vs State of Delhi.
19 Union of India v. The National Federation of Blind and Ors. 21
Factual matrix, para 6th, Line 10th.
20 Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1.

21 Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister, 2021 SCC OnLine 362.
22 Karnataka State Financial Corporation. v. N. Narasimahaiah, (2008) 5 SCC 176; Adams Express Company v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 238 US 190 (1915).
 3.2 THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 16.

29. It is submitted that the rule of interpretation that must be used for the interpretation of the
Constitution is the Literal Rule.22 Irrespective of the intention, the language used in the
constitution has to be given full effect to.2324 If the language of the Parliament is plain and
simple, the judiciary need not go into the intention of its
provisions.25
30. Article 16 denies discrimination only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place
of birth, residence, or any of them for public employment.23 Where the discrimination is not

‘only’ on such grounds mentioned under Article 16(2), the said clause cannot be. attracted and
w 16(1).24 The basis on which classification is made in the present case is domicile. In Sham
Roj vs Addl. Superintendent of Police25, it was held that ordinarily resident and domicile being
different jural concepts, the distinction has to be maintained. Thus, domicile should not be
loosely interpreted as a resident, as in the present case even migrants can be termed as residents
whereas

this Act is solely for the natives. Domicile is not mentioned as one of the grounds under Article
16 on the basis of which making a classification is prohibited.

31. It is further submitted that Article 16 denies discrimination on these grounds in public
employment, this section is not applicable on private employment which is the matter in present
case. Further, Articles 14, 15 and 16 form the same thread ensuring the right to equality and
supplementing each other.26 Article 16(1) is similar to the right of equality provided under

Article 14.27 Therefore a reasonable classification of citizens for employment is permitted under
Article 16 too.28 It has already been proven that the classification made is reasonable in nature.

Thus, the Act is not violative of Article 16.

23 INDIA CONST. art. 16, cl. 2.

24 D.D. BASU, S.S. SUBRAMANI, D.D. BASU: COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 158/351 (Lexis Nexis,
2021).
25 Sham Roj vs Addl. Superintendent of Police, AIR 1978 Cal 252.
26 State of Kerela v. N.M. Thomas, AIR 1976 SC 490.

27 MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, supra note 10.

28 MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, supra note 10.

 3.3 THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 19 (1) (G).

32. It is submitted that the Act does not violate Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana as the
rights provided under Article 19 are not absolute and the restrictions imposed are reasonable in
nature.

33. The rights provided under article 19 are not absolute: It is humbly submitted that article 19(1)
provides six different fundamental rights provided to the citizens of India2930. Article 19(1)(g)

guarantees the right to freedom of trade and occupation to the citizens of Indiana. It provides a
right to each citizen to practice any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation. 31

The rights guaranteed under Article 19 are not absolute in nature.3332 Thus, both these rights are

subject to restrictions as provided under clauses (2) to (6) of the Constitution of Indiana.

The restrictions imposed are reasonable in nature: The rights mentioned under Article 19 may
34.

be abridged by future laws to the extent of the restrictions mentioned under clauses (2) to (6) of
Article 19 of the Constitution of Sapota. The state is allowed to impose reasonable restrictions
on the said rights. The exact definition of what is reasonable is not laid down and the test varies

from case to case as well as on a right-to-right basis.33

While determining the reasonableness of
a provision, Directive Principles of State Policy, the nexus of the restriction with the object
sought to be achieved by it and the interest of the general public has to be taken into
consideration.

35. There is a nexus of the restriction with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation: In
a case where there is a nexus of the restriction imposed with the object sought to be achieved by
29 MAHENDRA PAL SINGH, supra note 10.
30 Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1989 SC 1988; State of Bombay v. R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699; Unnikrishnan J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645; T.M.A. Pai
Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
31 Supra note 27 at 7
32 State of Madras. v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196; Gujarat Water Supply v. Unique Electro (Gujarat), (1989) 1 SCC
532.
33 M.C.V.S Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 300, 5; V.G. ROW, supra note 56, at 16.
 the legislation, the constitutionality of said Act is presumed in a stronger sense. 35 In the present
case, the restriction placed is to declare the number of natives working in every private
organization. The object sought to be achieved by the legislation is to provide a livelihood to
the natives for their upliftment and protect them from being swamped by outsiders. Thus, there
is a reasonable nexus of the restriction with the object sought to be achieved by the restriction
imposed.

36. The restriction imposed are in the interest of general public: Whether the restrictions are
reasonable or not is to be judged from the standpoint of the interests of the general public. 34 The
restrictions imposed must strike a balance between the rights conferred by the constitution and
the social control as provided under clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. While judging the validity
of a law, social factors35 and the urgency of the evil sought to be remedied have to be taken into
consideration36 and must be as per the requirement of the general public which change from
time to time and the restrictions must be adjudged based on such changes 37 thereby absorbing
the current socio-economic conditions.

37. In the present case, the restrictions imposed on the right to trade, occupation and business of the
private organizations as conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana, are intended to
uplift the natives and provide them livelihood. In the absence of any efforts made by the
government to this effect, the natives will suffer poorly at the hand of migrants and

34 M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 S.C. 731.

35 Pathumma v. State of Kerela, AIR 1978 SC 771 14; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1971 1 SCC 712 8.
36 Union of India v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan, AIR 2012 SC 2453, 23; Assam Roller Flour Mills Association v.
Union of India, AIR 1998 Gau 119 16; Ivory Traders & Manufacturers Association v. Union of India, 2 (1997)
CLT 273 30.
37 Jyoti Pershad v. UT of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 24.
 unemployment. Providing jobs shall promote the upliftment of people and will ensure equal
opportunity to all, and thus it can safely be said that such restriction is in the interest of the
public.

38. The restrictions further the Directive Principles of State Policy: The courts while interpreting
the reasonability of a provision have to keep in mind the directive principles of state policy. If a
restriction is imposed in order to further the Directive Principles of State Policy, the restriction
is considered to be a reasonable one.38

39. Article 38 (2) states that the state shall strive to minimize the inequalities in opportunities.
Further Articles 39 and 41 empower the state to make effective provisions for providing

38 State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318, 46; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat,
(2005) 8 SCC 534, 46.
 adequate livelihood to all. In addition, Article 46 states that the state shall promote the
economic interests of the weaker section.

40. In the present case, the state aims to provide equal opportunity to all by reserving low-paid jobs
to minimize inequality. Further, the said provision aims at providing livelihood to the natives,
which they earlier found difficult to achieve because of them bei=ng less skilled and educated
than outsiders. Thus, the state, by providing reservations to the native is promoting the
economic interests of the weaker section. Since the action of the state furthers the Directive
Principles of State Policy cast upon the state, the restrictions imposed by the state on the rights
conferred under Article 19 are reasonable.

41. Therefore, it is submitted that the Act does not infringe the rights of the citizens conferred
by
Article 19 of the Constitution of Indiana.

CONTENTION 04: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE U/S 147, 148, 149,
302, 307, 326, 120-B AND 34 OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 AND THE HIGH COURT

.
OF DEVBHOOMI HAS ERRED IN ACQUITTING THEM

42. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the acquittal of the accused persons by
the Hon’ble HC is justified as the acts of the accused persons were not unlawful and thus, they
shouldn’t be punished u/s 147,148,149,302,307,326,120B and 34 of the Indiana Penal Code.

4.1 THE ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 147 IPC.

43. It is submitted before the bench that since the essentials u/s 146 are not being fulfilled, the
accused cannot be held guilty u/s 147. It is contended that there was no unlawful assembly and
the force used was lawful as it was in the prosecution of private defence.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

44. There was no Unlawful Assembly: To constitute an 'unlawful assembly', it should be
established that there was an unlawful assembly of five or more persons 3940, who have a
common object among41 the five specified u/s 14644. In the present case, Mr. Teja Singh was
accompanied by 25

armed personnel to Uchihar. However, those 25-armed personals were a part of the security
detail provided to an MLA, and thus they cannot be termed as an assembly of 5 or more
persons.

45. It is submitted that the common object has to be essentially inferred from the facts and
circumstances of each case, the nature and number of injuries inflicted, the manner of executing
the common object and so on42. It can clearly be ascertained that the only objective that Mr.
Teja Singh had was to reach his constituency to overlook the arrangements and welcome the
Chief Minister. It was his constitutional duty to reach at the designated place and voice the
concerns on behalf of the constituents. Further, it is his duty to handle the constituent’s
problems and be answerable to its people. Keeping into account all of this, Teja Singh was just
exercising his duty.

46. Furthermore, the common objective that the alleged accused had in the present case does not
fall under any of the clauses mentioned under Section 141. In State of Bihar v. Mathu Pandey43
it was held that Section 141 I.P.C. must be read with Sections 96 to 106 I.P.C. An assembly
whose common object is to defend property or body by use of force within limits prescribed by
law cannot be designated as unlawful assembly. Thus, in the present case there was no unlawful
assembly.

47. Further, it is submitted that, in order to establish the crime of rioting, an unlawful assembly
must use force or violence which should be in the prosecution of a common object. Common
law has always recognized the right of a person to protect himself from attack and to act in
defence of others. In this process, he can inflict violence on another, if necessary 44.

39 Khajah Noorul Hossein v C Fabre-Tonnerre, 24 WR 26, p 27; Masalti v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC
40 ; State v Banamali Maharana, 25 Cut LT 433; State of Kerala v KJ Thomas, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 661; Upendra Nath v
State, (1968) Cut LT 226.
41 Amar Singh v State of Punjab, (1953) S.C.R. 418. 44
Sheik Yusuf v Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 127.
42 Nimba Ram & Ors. v State of Rajasthan, 2018 S.C.C. OnLine Raj 1237.
43 State of Bihar v. Mathu Pandey, AIR 1970 SC 27.

44 JUSTICE K T THOMAS & M A RASHID, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. 553 (33RD ed. 2016).
 Furthermore, the person who is about to be attacked does not have to wait for the assailant to
attack first45. In the present case, Mr. Teja and his armed personnel even though used force and
violence, it was to repel the force and the imminent danger posed by the protestors 49. Thus, the
force used was lawful as it was in the prosecution of private defence.

4.2 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY U/S 148 IPC.

48. To constitute an offence under Section 148, In the present case, a person must be a member of
such an unlawful assembly which along with being guilty of the offence of rioting under
Section

146 is also armed with a deadly weapon. In the present case, it has already been established that
there was no unlawful assembly and they were not guilty of rioting u/s 146. Furthermore, the
weapons carried were for security purposes. Thus, no essential of Section 148 IPC is being met
and the accused persons cannot be charged under the same.

49. Furthermore, it was held in Sheo Poajan & Ors v State of Uttar Pradesh 46 If a rioter is armed
with a deadly weapon, he is punishable u/s 148, IPC. It is not possible to find him guilty both
under s 147 and 148, because, however many weapons he may be armed with, he commits only
one offence of rioting in the course of the same riot.

4.3. THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 149 IPC.

50. It is submitted that s. 149, IPC applies only where there is an unlawful assembly 48. However, in
the present case, it has already been established that the accused did not form unlawful

45 Backwford v. Queen, (1988) 1 AC 130 PC. 49

Fact Matrix, para 19th, Line 1st.
46 Sheo Poajan & Ors v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1998) Cr LJ 2864 (All); Mijajilal v State of UP, 2009 Cr LJ
(NOC) 824; Nadimpalli Bangaruraju AIR 1942 Mad 58; Ram Lakhan v State of Rajasthan (1980) Cr LR 30 (Raj). 48
State of Bihar v Nathu Pandey AIR 1970 SC 27; Achhey Lal v State of Uttar Pradesh 1978 SC 1233; Harwant
Singh v State of Haryana AIR 1969 NOC 79.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 assembly as their common object was to reach the Uchihar constituency and later on to protect
their body and property.

51. Further, while this section creates an offence a person cannot be tried and sentenced under s
149, IPC alone because no punishment is provided by the section, but, by virtue of this section,
he is guilty of the substantive offence committed and is liable for punishment provided for that
offence47. There is, therefore, no meaning in charging a person merely with s 14948.

52. Furthermore, it is submitted that in Md Ankoos v Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. 49 it
was held that where an accused is charged under s 148, IPC and acquitted, the conviction of
such accused under s 302 read with s 149, IPC cannot be legally recorded. In Kishore Prasad v
State of Bihar50 it was held that here the accused persons have a right of private defence of
person or property, they cannot be convicted under ss 147, 148 or 149, IPC. In the present case,
all the accused exercised their right of private defence against unlawful forces of the protestors
and thus cannot be convicted under ss 147, 148 or 149, IPC.

4.451 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 120B.

53. It is submitted that the counsel humbly submits that the accused did not concord any conspiracy
to do any unlawful act, all the acts are done by the accused were in purport with private
defence. On a bare perusal of s.120A of the IPC, it is manifestly clear that for imputing a person
as a conspirator there has to be the existence of an agreement between two or more persons 56
either to do an illegal act or to do a legal act through illegal means.

54. However, in the present case, the accused’s only objective was to reach Uchihar to look after
arrangements, and nowhere it could be asserted that the acts of the accused were to plot any
kind of conspiracy, as there was no agreement between them to do illegal things. Furthermore,
no illegal act took place or a legal act through illegal means. The accused just exercised his
right to private defence when their life was in peril.

47 Theetumalai Gounder AIR 1925 Mad 1210 (FB).

48 Bharosha Mistri v State of Bihar 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 55 (Pat).
49 Md Ankoos v Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P, 2010 Cr LJ 861 (SC).
50 Kishore Prasad v State of Bihar, (1969) Pat LJR 17 (SC); Sivapada v State AIR 1969 Cal 28; State of Assam v
Manohar Ali (1987) 1 Crimes 748; Brahim Pal v State (1979) All Cr C 231.
51 Madanlal vs State of Punjab,1967 SCR (3) 439.3K.S. Narayan v. S. Gopinathan, 1982 CrLJ 1611 (Mad).
55. It is a well-settled proposition that an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been
established on mere suspicion, surmises or inferences that are not supported by cogent or
acceptable.52 In State of Kerela v. P. Sugathan & Anr53 it was held that a few bits here and a
few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the
accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. Hence, in the present case, no
evidence clearly establishes that this whole act was pre-planned, and thus they should be
acquitted under the charge of s.120 B.

4.5 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 326 IPC.

56. The counsel humbly submits that the accused persons are not guilty of voluntarily causing
grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means to the protestors and thus should be acquitted
under Section 326 of IPC. In the present case all the essentials u/s 326 are not being fulfilled.
Grievous hurt is hurt of an aggravated form. However, in the present case, the factual matrix
clearly states that in the clash protestors were severely injured 59. Nowhere it is mentioned who
caused this injury nor the type of injury: whether on vital or non-vital parts of the body.

57. It is submitted that s. 326 illustrates what dangerous weapons as ‘instrument for shooting,
stabbing or cutting or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause
death.’ In the present case, nowhere in the factual matrix, it has been mentioned who caused the
injury and with the help of what instrument. The CBI investigation report found two iron rods
covered with blood on the scene (Annexure 4) however it was the protestors who carried the
iron rod and lathis54. This creates a reasonable doubt in the mind regarding the actual accused of
such grievous hurt.

58. The acts of the accused do not amount to voluntarily causing grievous hurt and are excusable as
they were the outcome of private defence and accident. The counsel submits that when the

52 In Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao.

53 State of Kerela v. P. Sugathan & Anr, 1988 CriLJ 1036. 59
Fact Matrix, para 20th, Line 1st.
54 Fact Matrix, Para 20th, Line 8th.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 protestors threw a petrol bomb55 at the car and pelted stones56, the accused accelerated the car in
order to escape and prevent themselves from the impending harm. Therefore, the accused
exercised his right to private defence, as he had reasonable ground for believing that his act was
necessary to prevent themselves.

59. Furthermore, it is submitted that it is not even required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
his act was of private defence57, since making out a prima facie case would suffice. The mens
rea or the criminal intention is absent and the actus rea is an outcome of acting in good faith.
Thus, it is pleaded that the accused should not be charged with grievous hurt.

4.6 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 307 IPC.

60. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused has not committed an offence
u/s 307 IPC and shouldn’t be charged with an attempt to murder. To prove the crime u/s 307,
analysis of different stages of crime is important. The first stage is the intention to commit the
crime, secondly, the preparation to commit the crime; and thirdly, an attempt to commit it. It is
essential that the act must be capable of causing death 58 and the existence of the intention of the
offender to cause death59 should be present.

61. For a conviction under this section, the accused don't need to complete every stage in the actual
offence, except the final action. It is enough if in the attempt he did an act towards the
commission of the offence60.

62. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court in the case of Jodha v. St. of Rajasthan61, the
court ruled that in order for an offence to fall under the ambit of Sec 307, the injury has to be

55 Fact Matrix, Para 18th, 7th.

56 Fact Matrix, Para 19th, 6th.
57 Dharminder v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2002) 7 SCC 488.
58 St. of Maharastra v. Kashirao, (2003) 10 SCC 434.
59 Jage Ram v. St. of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366.
60 Raghunath alias Ram Singh, (1940) 16 Luck 194.
61 Jodha v. St. of Rajasthan, 1994 SCC OnLine Raj 161.
 caused on a vital part of the body. In Kaluram vs State of Assam62, the court found that the
accused had a dangerous weapon but he inflicted only minor injuries on the victim, which
clearly showed that he had no intention to murder and hence he was not convicted under section
307 IPC.

63. Similarly in the present case, the act done by the accused of firing the shots were warning shots
for the 300 hundred protestors to back off as they were posing an imminent threat and danger.
In the prosecution of this, no injury was caused to anyone. (Prashant Tamde – discuss late in
murder).

4.7 THAT THE ACCUSED PERSONS ARE NOT GUILTY U/S 302 IPC.

64. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the accused is not guilty for committing
the offence of murder under Sec 302 read with Sec 300, IPC, considering that the accused was
acting in private-defence. The defence humbly submits that the circumstance u/s 100 IPC is
fulfilled, private defence was warranted and reasonable force was used in the instant matter.

65. CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER S.100 IS MADE OUT: Section 100 IPC enumerates that the right
to private defence of property can extend to causing death to cause in circumstances which
have been listed in the provisions of s.100. Assault that reasonably causes apprehension of
death (s. 100[1]) and grievous hurt (s. 100[2]) is mentioned in said provision of the act. In the
case at hand, the protestors threw a petrol bomb and blew off the car, further even pelted stones
at the accused65. They were carrying lathis, daratis, and iron rods which should be considered as
dangerous weapons. Further, the language of the protestors – “we will teach a life lesson to
Teja and his father” clearly shows their criminal intent. It is pleaded that such circumstances
fall under the ambit of private defence.

66. PRIVATE DEFENCE IS WARRANTED: Every person has a right to private defence. To plead
a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that

62 Kaluram vs St. of Assam 1977 CR LJ 98. 65

Supra note 61, 62 at 14.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death
or grievous hurt would be caused to him63.

67. It is submitted that in the case of Vidhya Singh v The State of Madhya Pradesh 64, the Court
observed that the right of self-defense is very valuable, serving a social purpose and should not
be construed narrowly. The person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to himself cannot
be probable to modulate his defenses tier by tier, similar to a man in ordinary times or under
normal circumstances.

68. In the matter at hand, the above provisions of law can be used by virtue of the protestors posing
an imminent danger to the accused which has been proved above. In prosecution to this, private
defence was exercised by the accused at two moments. One when he tried to escape the crowd
and the protestors died by voluntarily coming in front of the car. Second, after this accident
when protestors started gathering around Mr. Teja with criminal intent, the cautionary shots
shot by him and his associates also come under the exception of private defence.

69. ACCIDENT: THE ACT OF ACCELERATING THE CAR: Under Sec 80, IPC, a criminal act
that is an accident is not punishable as it is excuses the accused from punishment due to a lack
of mens rea, and it for the prosecution to prove requisite intention or knowledge in cases of
murder68. The word ‘accident’ is something that happens unexpectedly or happens
unintentionally73. The purely accidental result of a man’s voluntary conduct will not be imputed
to him if he had no criminal intention or knowledge, his conduct was lawful and his
consequences were purely lawful.74

70. The amount of caution that is to be followed under this section is not that which is of the
highest order, but that which is a reasonable precaution when seeing the facts of each case. In
the case at hand, it could be seen that- the imminent danger was posed by the protestors, in the
effect of which the accused opted to escape instead of retaliating and in the hope of this he
accelerated the car.

63 State of Uttar Pradesh v Gajey Singh (2009) 11 SCC 414; Darshan Singh v State of Punjab AIR 2010 SC 1212
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chatur Singh (2005) 13 SCC 360.
64 Vidhya Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 1857. 68
Chakru Sattiah v. State of A.P., AIR 1960 AP 153. 73
NELSON R. A. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 528 (10th Ed. 2008). 74 Mohan
Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 Punj 291.
71. However, it was the protestors who jumped in front of the car, which can clearly be
corroborated from the confession of PW (4) where he states that the protestors tried to stop the
car. The car was coming at high speed and it was the protestors who jumped in front of it in the
hope of the car getting stopped, but any reasonable and prudent man would be aware of the fact
that one cannot stop the high speed immediately. Thus, it can be inferred that the accused’s
alleged criminal actions were accidental ones and he had no mens rea to commit such a crime,
and without intent, a conviction cannot be made against the accused.

72. DEATH OF A REPORTER U/S 106: It is submitted that it is a well-established fact that
private defence is only available against the assailant, however, Section 106 of IPC lays down
an exception. The law protects a man exercising the right of private defense, if some innocent
person is killed or injured in the exercise of such right. In the case of Wassan Singh v. the State
of Punjab65, the accused received nine injuries and in exercising private defense, he shot at the
assailants with his gun, which hit an innocent woman bystander, causing her death. The SC held
that the accused had the right of private defence and hence was acquitted.

73. Similarly in the present case, the accused was just exercising his right of private defence when
he was shooting cautionary shots which hit an innocent reporter, Prashant Tamde causing his
death. Thus, the accused should not be charged with the murder of Prashant Tamde.

74. REASONABLE USE OF FORCE: It is well established that a person faced with imminent
peril of life and limb of himself or another is not expected to weigh in “golden scales 70” the
precise force needed to repel the danger. Even if he at the heat of the moment carries his
defence a little further than what would be necessary when calculated with precision and
exactitude by a cairn and unruffled mind, the law makes due allowance for it66.

75. In the present case, the accused could not be expected to measure his use of force on golden
scales as the situation required urgency in thought and action, as the protestors were in
possession of petrol bombs and further used to blow up one car. In addition to these 300
protestors gathered around their vehicles and started hitting those vehicles with stones and

65 Wassan Singh v The State of Punjab, 1996 SCC (1) 458. 70

Supra note 73 at 16.
66 Mohd Remzani v. State of Delhi AIR 1980 SC 1341.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 lathis posing an imminent danger, therefore the accused’s use of force was reasonable
considering the circumstances at hand, and not excessive in any manner.

76. FAULTY EVIDENCE: It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble court that the conviction of
the accused cannot be sustained upon improper investigation. When there are material
infirmities because of improper investigation, benefit of doubt should be given to the
accused67in the present matter the investigation is faulty and benefit should be given to the
accused68.

77. In cases where injuries are caused by firearms, the opinion of the Ballistic Expert is of
considerable importance where both the firearm and the crime cartridge are recovered during
the investigation to connect an accused with the crime. Failure to produce the expert opinion
before the trial court in such cases affects the creditworthiness of the prosecution case to a great
extent74. In the instant case, even though the death has been caused by a firearm and nine bullet
shells have been found on the crime scene and yet prosecution has not relied on any ballistic
evidence.

78. With no blood found on any of the bullets, there is a high ambiguity as to exactly what bullet
was fired, which gun was used and by whom. Even the bullet that stroked through the heart of
Prashant Tamade was not found and no investigation took place in furtherance. Even the
postmortem fails to mention the diameter of the wound which could have helped to find the
bullet that caused his death.

79. Further, no guns of the accused have been tested through which it can substantially be
established whether the said gun was fired or not at the crime scene. Neither it has been
established that the nine bullet shells that have been found at the crime scene and the bullet that
killed Prashant Tamade, are shot by the accused or the protestors as no eyewitness can
corroborate the prosecution’s story regarding the same.

80. The Apex Court has held that in cases where there are several infirmaries in the evidence of the
eyewitnesses the benefit of the doubt is given to the accused 75, bearing in mind that no witness

67 State of Uttarakhand v. Jaimal Singh,

68 Kailash Gaur v state of Assam, 2012 (1) LRC 81. 74
Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 367.
75
 had seen the accused commit the actus reus of shooting the shot that killed Prashant Tamade. It
would thus be highly unsafe to convict the accused for the crime.

81. Moreover, no injuries have been clearly specified that have been inflicted on other protestors.
The factual matrix clearly says in the clash protestors got severely injured. There exists a strong
possibility that during the clash, an attack that the protestors wanted to direct at the convoy of
Mr. Teja and his associates hit their fellow protestors instead since there was a heavy crowd of

300 agitated protestors. Furthermore, no injury has been clearly specified for it to amount to
grievous hurt.

82. In light of all the aforementioned arguments, the accused humbly submits that the prosecution’s
arguments are leaning towards the fact that the crime ‘may have been committed by the
accused’ There exists reasonable doubt69 and hence all the accused should be acquitted of the
crime.

83. It is humbly submitted that s.34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive
offence. It does not create a distinct offence. It lays down a principle of liability. Further, to
constitute Section 34 two factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii)
participation of accused in the commission of an offence70.

84. However, in the present case, it has already been established that there was no criminal act that
took place and they all did not share any common intention to do an offence. The accused
persons peacefully wanted to reach Uchihar and any act that they did was in lieu of private
defence. In a murder case, the accused persons had no plans for inflicting assault on the
deceased and to cause his death. Hence essential ingredients of section 34 were lacking 78.
Further, In Fateh Chand v Emperor71 , it was held that when an assault on victims is isolated
and there is no common intention or object, s.34 does not apply. Similarly in the present case,
since there is no common intention present and thus section 34 is not applicable.

69 Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai Cr LJ 2004 Sc 36.

70 Jai Bhagwan & Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1083. 78
Sasthi Bagdi v State, 2007 Cr LJ 2600 (Cal).
71 Fateh Chand Agarwalla v Emperor, 38 Ind Cas 945.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsels on behalf of the Respondent humbly pray before the Hon’ble Court to kindly adjudge
and declare that: -

a. That the State Legislature of Devbhoomi have specific power to make laws/policies
for domicile-based reservations.
b. That the State Government have the power to direct the employers of private sector to
reserve jobs for local candidates.
c. That the Devbhoomi State Employment of Local Candidates Act, 2020 is
Constitutional.
d. That the accused are not guilty of the offence u/s 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 120B
and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the High Court of Devbhoomi has not
erred in acquitting them.

AND/OR

Pass any other order which the bench deems fit in the best interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience, and for this act of kindness, the Counsels on behalf of the Prosecution as
in duty bound shall forever pray.

All of which is respectfully submitted

__________________________
SD/Counsels for Prosecution