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Consciousness
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/consciousness/ Consciousness
from the Winter 2022 Edition of the First published Fri Jun 18, 2004; substantive revision Tue Jan 14, 2014

Perhaps no aspect of mind is more familiar or more puzzling than

Stanford Encyclopedia consciousness and our conscious experience of self and world. The
of Philosophy problem of consciousness is arguably the central issue in current
theorizing about the mind. Despite the lack of any agreed upon theory of
consciousness, there is a widespread, if less than universal, consensus that
an adequate account of mind requires a clear understanding of it and its
place in nature. We need to understand both what consciousness is and
how it relates to other, nonconscious, aspects of reality.
Co-Principal Editors: Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman
1. History of the issue
Associate Editors: Colin Allen, Hannah Kim, & Paul Oppenheimer
2. Concepts of Consciousness
Faculty Sponsors: R. Lanier Anderson & Thomas Icard
Editorial Board: https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html
2.1 Creature Consciousness
2.2 State consciousness
Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054
2.3 Consciousness as an entity
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- 3. Problems of Consciousness
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP 4. The descriptive question: What are the features of consciousness?
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized 4.1 First-person and third-person data
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the 4.2 Qualitative character
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, 4.3 Phenomenal structure
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . 4.4 Subjectivity
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4.5 Self-perspectival organization
Copyright © 2022 by the publisher 4.6 Unity
The Metaphysics Research Lab 4.7 Intentionality and transparency
Department of Philosophy
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 4.8 Dynamic flow
5. The explanatory question: How can consciousness exist?
Consciousness
Copyright © 2022 by the author 5.1 Diversity of explanatory projects
Robert Van Gulick 5.2 The explanatory gap
All rights reserved. 5.3 Reductive and non-reductive explanation
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 Consciousness Robert Van Gulick

5.4 Prospects of explanatory success 1. History of the issue

6. The functional question: Why does consciousness exist?
6.1 Causal status of consciousness Questions about the nature of conscious awareness have likely been asked
6.2 Flexible control for as long as there have been humans. Neolithic burial practices appear to
6.3 Social coordination express spiritual beliefs and provide early evidence for at least minimally
6.4 Integrated representation reflective thought about the nature of human consciousness (Pearson 1999,
6.5 Informational access Clark and Riel-Salvatore 2001). Preliterate cultures have similarly been
6.6 Freedom of will found invariably to embrace some form of spiritual or at least animist view
6.7 Intrinsic motivation that indicates a degree of reflection about the nature of conscious
6.8 Constitutive and contingent roles awareness.
7. Theories of consciousness
8. Metaphysical theories of consciousness Nonetheless, some have argued that consciousness as we know it today is
8.1 Dualist theories a relatively recent historical development that arose sometime after the
8.2 Physicalist theories Homeric era (Jaynes 1974). According to this view, earlier humans
9. Specific Theories of Consciousness including those who fought the Trojan War did not experience themselves
9.1 Higher-order theories as unified internal subjects of their thoughts and actions, at least not in the
9.2 Reflexive theories ways we do today. Others have claimed that even during the classical
9.3 Representationalist theories period, there was no word of ancient Greek that corresponds to
9.4 Narrative Interpretative Theories “consciousness” (Wilkes 1984, 1988, 1995). Though the ancients had
9.5 Cognitive Theories much to say about mental matters, it is less clear whether they had any
9.6 Information Integration Theory specific concepts or concerns for what we now think of as consciousness.
9.7 Neural Theories
Although the words “conscious” and “conscience” are used quite
9.8 Quantum theories
differently today, it is likely that the Reformation emphasis on the latter as
9.9 Non-physical theories
an inner source of truth played some role in the inward turn so
10. Conclusion
characteristic of the modern reflective view of self. The Hamlet who
Bibliography
walked the stage in 1600 already saw his world and self with profoundly
Academic Tools
modern eyes.
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries By the beginning of the early modern era in the seventeenth century,
consciousness had come full center in thinking about the mind. Indeed
from the mid-17th through the late 19th century, consciousness was

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 Consciousness Robert Van Gulick

widely regarded as essential or definitive of the mental. René Descartes Leibniz exhausted its physical nature. Nowhere, he asserts, would such an
defined the very notion of thought (pensée) in terms of reflexive observer see any conscious thoughts.
consciousness or self-awareness. In the Principles of Philosophy (1640) he
wrote, Despite Leibniz's recognition of the possibility of unconscious thought, for
most of the next two centuries the domains of thought and consciousness
By the word ‘thought’ (‘pensée’) I understand all that of which we were regarded as more or less the same. Associationist psychology,
are conscious as operating in us. whether pursued by Locke or later in the eighteenth century by David
Hume (1739) or in the nineteenth by James Mill (1829), aimed to discover
Later, toward the end of the 17th century, John Locke offered a similar if the principles by which conscious thoughts or ideas interacted or affected
slightly more qualified claim in An Essay on Human Understanding each other. James Mill's son, John Stuart Mill continued his father's work
(1688), on associationist psychology, but he allowed that combinations of ideas
might produce resultants that went beyond their constituent mental parts,
I do not say there is no soul in man because he is not sensible of it
thus providing an early model of mental emergence (1865).
in his sleep. But I do say he can not think at any time, waking or
sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is The purely associationist approach was critiqued in the late eighteenth
not necessary to anything but our thoughts, and to them it is and to century by Immanuel Kant (1787), who argued that an adequate account
them it always will be necessary. of experience and phenomenal consciousness required a far richer
structure of mental and intentional organization. Phenomenal
Locke explicitly forswore making any hypothesis about the substantial
consciousness according to Kant could not be a mere succession of
basis of consciousness and its relation to matter, but he clearly regarded it
associated ideas, but at a minimum had to be the experience of a conscious
as essential to thought as well as to personal identity.
self situated in an objective world structured with respect to space, time
Locke's contemporary G.W. Leibniz, drawing possible inspiration from his and causality.
mathematical work on differentiation and integration, offered a theory of
Within the Anglo-American world, associationist approaches continued to
mind in the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) that allowed for infinitely
be influential in both philosophy and psychology well into the twentieth
many degrees of consciousness and perhaps even for some thoughts that
century, while in the German and European sphere there was a greater
were unconscious, the so called “petites perceptions”. Leibniz was the first
interest in the larger structure of experience that led in part to the study of
to distinguish explicitly between perception and apperception, i.e., roughly
phenomenology through the work of Edmund Husserl (1913, 1929),
between awareness and self-awareness. In the Monadology (1720) he also
Martin Heidegger (1927), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945) and others who
offered his famous analogy of the mill to express his belief that
expanded the study of consciousness into the realm of the social, the
consciousness could not arise from mere matter. He asked his reader to
bodily and the interpersonal.
imagine someone walking through an expanded brain as one would walk
through a mill and observing all its mechanical operations, which for

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At the outset of modern scientific psychology in the mid-nineteenth professional societies (Association for the Scientific Study of
century, the mind was still largely equated with consciousness, and Consciousness—ASSC) and annual conferences devoted exclusively to its
introspective methods dominated the field as in the work of Wilhelm investigation (“The Science of Consciousness”).
Wundt (1897), Hermann von Helmholtz (1897), William James (1890) and
Alfred Titchener (1901). However, the relation of consciousness to brain 2. Concepts of Consciousness
remained very much a mystery as expressed in T. H. Huxley's famous
remark, The words “conscious” and “consciousness” are umbrella terms that cover
a wide variety of mental phenomena. Both are used with a diversity of
How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness meanings, and the adjective “conscious” is heterogeneous in its range,
comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as being applied both to whole organisms—creature consciousness—and to
unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed particular mental states and processes—state consciousness (Rosenthal
his lamp (1866). 1986, Gennaro 1995, Carruthers 2000).

The early twentieth century saw the eclipse of consciousness from

2.1 Creature Consciousness
scientific psychology, especially in the United States with the rise of
behaviorism (Watson 1924, Skinner 1953) though movements such as An animal, person or other cognitive system may be regarded as conscious
Gestalt psychology kept it a matter of ongoing scientific concern in in a number of different senses.
Europe (Köhler 1929, Köffka 1935). In the 1960s, the grip of behaviorism
weakened with the rise of cognitive psychology and its emphasis on Sentience. It may be conscious in the generic sense of simply being a
information processing and the modeling of internal mental processes sentient creature, one capable of sensing and responding to its world
(Neisser 1965, Gardiner 1985). However, despite the renewed emphasis (Armstrong 1981). Being conscious in this sense may admit of degrees,
on explaining cognitive capacities such as memory, perception and and just what sort of sensory capacities are sufficient may not be sharply
language comprehension, consciousness remained a largely neglected defined. Are fish conscious in the relevant respect? And what of shrimp or
topic for several further decades. bees?

In the 1980s and 90s there was a major resurgence of scientific and Wakefulness. One might further require that the organism actually be
philosophical research into the nature and basis of consciousness (Baars exercising such a capacity rather than merely having the ability or
1988, Dennett 1991, Penrose 1989, 1994, Crick 1994, Lycan 1987, 1996, disposition to do so. Thus one might count it as conscious only if it were
Chalmers 1996). Once consciousness was back under discussion, there awake and normally alert. In that sense organisms would not count as
was a rapid proliferation of research with a flood of books and articles, as conscious when asleep or in any of the deeper levels of coma. Again
well as the introduction of specialty journals (The Journal of boundaries may be blurry, and intermediate cases may be involved. For
Consciousness Studies, Consciousness and Cognition, Psyche),

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example, is one conscious in the relevant sense when dreaming, Transitive Consciousness. In addition to describing creatures as conscious
hypnotized or in a fugue state? in these various senses, there are also related senses in which creatures are
described as being conscious of various things. The distinction is
Self-consciousness. A third and yet more demanding sense might define sometimes marked as that between transitive and intransitive notions of
conscious creatures as those that are not only aware but also aware that consciousness, with the former involving some object at which
they are aware, thus treating creature consciousness as a form of self- consciousness is directed (Rosenthal 1986).
consciousness (Carruthers 2000). The self-awareness requirement might
get interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would qualify as 2.2 State consciousness
conscious in the relevant sense will vary accordingly. If it is taken to
involve explicit conceptual self-awareness, many non-human animals and The notion of a conscious mental state also has a variety of distinct though
even young children might fail to qualify, but if only more rudimentary perhaps interrelated meanings. There are at least six major options.
implicit forms of self-awareness are required then a wide range of
nonlinguistic creatures might count as self-conscious. States one is aware of. On one common reading, a conscious mental state
is simply a mental state one is aware of being in (Rosenthal 1986, 1996).
What it is like. Thomas Nagel's (1974) famous“what it is like” criterion Conscious states in this sense involve a form of meta-mentality or meta-
aims to capture another and perhaps more subjective notion of being a intentionality in so far as they require mental states that are themselves
conscious organism. According to Nagel, a being is conscious just if there about mental states. To have a conscious desire for a cup of coffee is to
is “something that it is like” to be that creature, i.e., some subjective way have such a desire and also to be simultaneously and directly aware that
the world seems or appears from the creature's mental or experiential point one has such a desire. Unconscious thoughts and desires in this sense are
of view. In Nagel's example, bats are conscious because there is something simply those we have without being aware of having them, whether our
that it is like for a bat to experience its world through its echo-locatory lack of self-knowledge results from simple inattention or more deeply
senses, even though we humans from our human point of view can not psychoanalytic causes.
emphatically understand what such a mode of consciousness is like from
the bat's own point of view. Qualitative states. States might also be regarded as conscious in a
seemingly quite different and more qualitative sense. That is, one might
Subject of conscious states. A fifth alternative would be to define the count a state as conscious just if it has or involves qualitative or
notion of a conscious organism in terms of conscious states. That is, one experiential properties of the sort often referred to as “qualia” or “raw
might first define what makes a mental state a conscious mental state, and sensory feels”. (See the entry on qualia.) One's perception of the Merlot
then define being a conscious creature in terms of having such states. one is drinking or of the fabric one is examining counts as a conscious
One's concept of a conscious organism would then depend upon the mental state in this sense because it involves various sensory qualia, e.g.,
particular account one gives of conscious states (section 2.2). taste qualia in the wine case and color qualia in one's visual experience of
the cloth. There is considerable disagreement about the nature of such

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qualia (Churchland 1985, Shoemaker 1990, Clark 1993, Chalmers 1996) available for use and guidance by the organism. In so far as the
and even about their existence. Traditionally qualia have been regarded as information in that state is richly and flexibly available to its containing
intrinsic, private, ineffable monadic features of experience, but current organism, then it counts as a conscious state in the relevant respect,
theories of qualia often reject at least some of those commitments whether or not it has any qualitative or phenomenal feel in the Nagel
(Dennett 1990). sense.

Phenomenal states. Such qualia are sometimes referred to as phenomenal Narrative consciousness. States might also be regarded as conscious in a
properties and the associated sort of consciousness as phenomenal narrative sense that appeals to the notion of the “stream of
consciousness, but the latter term is perhaps more properly applied to the consciousness”, regarded as an ongoing more or less serial narrative of
overall structure of experience and involves far more than sensory qualia. episodes from the perspective of an actual or merely virtual self. The idea
The phenomenal structure of consciousness also encompasses much of the would be to equate the person's conscious mental states with those that
spatial, temporal and conceptual organization of our experience of the appear in the stream (Dennett 1991, 1992).
world and of ourselves as agents in it (see section 4.3). It is therefore
probably best, at least initially, to distinguish the concept of phenomenal Although these six notions of what makes a state conscious can be
consciousness from that of qualitative consciousness, though they no independently specified, they are obviously not without potential links, nor
doubt overlap. do they exhaust the realm of possible options. Drawing connections, one
might argue that states appear in the stream of consciousness only in so far
What-it-is-like states. Consciousness in both those senses links up as well as we are aware of them, and thus forge a bond between the first meta-
with Thomas Nagel's (1974) notion of a conscious creature, insofar as one mental notion of a conscious state and the stream or narrative concept. Or
might count a mental state as conscious in the “what it is like” sense just if one might connect the access with the qualitative or phenomenal notions
there is something that it is like to be in that state. Nagel's criterion might of a conscious state by trying to show that states that represent in those
be understood as aiming to provide a first-person or internal conception of ways make their contents widely available in the respect required by the
what makes a state a phenomenal or qualitative state. access notion.

Access consciousness. States might be conscious in a seemingly quite Aiming to go beyond the six options, one might distinguish conscious
different access sense, which has more to do with intra-mental relations. In from nonconscious states by appeal to aspects of their intra-mental
this respect, a state's being conscious is a matter of its availability to dynamics and interactions other than mere access relations; e.g., conscious
interact with other states and of the access that one has to its content. In states might manifest a richer stock of content-sensitive interactions or a
this more functional sense, which corresponds to what Ned Block (1995) greater degree of flexible purposive guidance of the sort associated with
calls access consciousness, a visual state's being conscious is not so much the self-conscious control of thought. Alternatively, one might try to define
a matter of whether or not it has a qualitative “what it's likeness”, but of conscious states in terms of conscious creatures. That is, one might give
whether or not it and the visual information that it carries is generally some account of what it is to be a conscious creature or perhaps even a

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conscious self, and then define one's notion of a conscious state in terms of Since the demise of vitalism, we do not think of life per se as something
being a state of such a creature or system, which would be the converse of distinct from living things. There are living things including organisms,
the last option considered above for defining conscious creatures in terms states, properties and parts of organisms, communities and evolutionary
of conscious mental states. lineages of organisms, but life is not itself a further thing, an additional
component of reality, some vital force that gets added into living things.
2.3 Consciousness as an entity We apply the adjectives “living” and “alive” correctly to many things, and
in doing so we might be said to be attributing life to them but with no
The noun “consciousness” has an equally diverse range of meanings that meaning or reality other than that involved in their being living things.
largely parallel those of the adjective “conscious”. Distinctions can be
drawn between creature and state consciousness as well as among the Electromagnetic fields by contrast are regarded as real and independent
varieties of each. One can refer specifically to phenomenal consciousness, parts of our physical world. Even though one may sometimes be able to
access consciousness, reflexive or meta-mental consciousness, and specify the values of such a field by appeal to the behavior of particles in
narrative consciousness among other varieties. it, the fields themselves are regarded as concrete constituents of reality and
not merely as abstractions or sets of relations among particles.
Here consciousness itself is not typically treated as a substantive entity but
merely the abstract reification of whatever property or aspect is attributed Similarly one could regard “consciousness” as referring to a component or
by the relevant use of the adjective “conscious”. Access consciousness is aspect of reality that manifests itself in conscious states and creatures but
just the property of having the required sort of internal access relations, is more than merely the abstract nominalization of the adjective
and qualitative consciousness is simply the property that is attributed when “conscious” we apply to them. Though such strongly realist views are not
“conscious” is applied in the qualitative sense to mental states. How much very common at present, they should be included within the logical space
this commits one to the ontological status of consciousness per se will of options.
depend on how much of a Platonist one is about universals in general. (See
There are thus many concepts of consciousness, and both “conscious” and
the entry on the medieval problem of universals.) It need not commit one
“consciousness” are used in a wide range of ways with no privileged or
to consciousness as a distinct entity any more than one's use of “square”,
canonical meaning. However, this may be less of an embarrassment than
“red” or “gentle” commits one to the existence of squareness, redness or
an embarrassment of riches. Consciousness is a complex feature of the
gentleness as distinct entities.
world, and understanding it will require a diversity of conceptual tools for
Though it is not the norm, one could nonetheless take a more robustly dealing with its many differing aspects. Conceptual plurality is thus just
realist view of consciousness as a component of reality. That is one could what one would hope for. As long as one avoids confusion by being clear
think of consciousness as more on a par with electromagnetic fields than about one's meanings, there is great value in having a variety of concepts
with life. by which we can access and grasp consciousness in all its rich complexity.
However, one should not assume that conceptual plurality implies

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referential divergence. Our multiple concepts of consciousness may in fact on what one says about the others. One can not, for example, adequately
pick out varying aspects of a single unified underlying mental answer the what question and describe the main features of consciousness
phenomenon. Whether and to what extent they do so remains an open without addressing the why issue of its functional role within systems
question. whose operations it affects. Nor could one explain how the relevant sort of
consciousness might arise from nonconscious processes unless one had a
3. Problems of Consciousness clear account of just what features had to be caused or realized to count as
producing it. Those caveats notwithstanding, the three-way division of
The task of understanding consciousness is an equally diverse project. Not questions provides a useful structure for articulating the overall
only do many different aspects of mind count as conscious in some sense, explanatory project and for assessing the adequacy of particular theories or
each is also open to various respects in which it might be explained or models of consciousness.
modeled. Understanding consciousness involves a multiplicity not only of
explananda but also of questions that they pose and the sorts of answers 4. The descriptive question: What are the features of
they require. At the risk of oversimplifying, the relevant questions can be consciousness?
gathered under three crude rubrics as the What, How, and Why questions:
The What question asks us to describe and model the principal features of
The Descriptive Question: What is consciousness? What are its
consciousness, but just which features are relevant will vary with the sort
principal features? And by what means can they be best discovered,
of consciousness we aim to capture. The main properties of access
described and modeled?
consciousness may be quite unlike those of qualitative or phenomenal
The Explanatory Question: How does consciousness of the relevant
consciousness, and those of reflexive consciousness or narrative
sort come to exist? Is it a primitive aspect of reality, and if not how
consciousness may differ from both. However, by building up detailed
does (or could) consciousness in the relevant respect arise from or be
theories of each type, we may hope to find important links between them
caused by nonconscious entities or processes?
and perhaps even to discover that they coincide in at least some key
The Functional Question: Why does consciousness of the relevant
respects.
sort exist? Does it have a function, and if so what is it? Does it act
causally and if so with what sorts of effects? Does it make a
4.1 First-person and third-person data
difference to the operation of systems in which it is present, and if so
why and how?
The general descriptive project will require a variety of investigational
The three questions focus respectively on describing the features of methods (Flanagan 1992). Though one might naively regard the facts of
consciousness, explaining its underlying basis or cause, and explicating its consciousness as too self-evident to require any systematic methods of
role or value. The divisions among the three are of course somewhat gathering data, the epistemic task is in reality far from trivial (Husserl
artificial, and in practice the answers one gives to each will depend in part 1913).

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First-person introspective access provides a rich and essential source of person, third-person and perhaps even second-person (Varela 1995)
insight into our conscious mental life, but it is neither sufficient in itself interactive methods will all be needed to collect the requisite evidence.
nor even especially helpful unless used in a trained and disciplined way.
Gathering the needed evidence about the structure of experience requires Using all these sources of data, we will hopefully be able to construct
us both to become phenomenologically sophisticated self-observers and to detailed descriptive models of the various sorts of consciousness. Though
complement our introspective results with many types of third-person data the specific features of most importance may vary among the different
available to external observers (Searle 1992, Varela 1995, Siewert 1998) types, our overall descriptive project will need to address at least the
following seven general aspects of consciousness (sections 4.2–4.7).
As phenomenologists have known for more than a century, discovering the
structure of conscious experience demands a rigorous inner-directed 4.2 Qualitative character
stance that is quite unlike our everyday form of self-awareness (Husserl
1929, Merleau-Ponty 1945). Skilled observation of the needed sort Qualitative character is often equated with so called “raw feels” and
requires training, effort and the ability to adopt alternative perspectives on illustrated by the redness one experiences when one looks at ripe tomatoes
one's experience. or the specific sweet savor one encounters when one tastes an equally ripe
pineapple (Locke 1688). The relevant sort of qualitative character is not
The need for third-person empirical data gathered by external observers is restricted to sensory states, but is typically taken to be present as an aspect
perhaps most obvious with regard to the more clearly functional types of of experiential states in general, such as experienced thoughts or desires
consciousness such as access consciousness, but it is required even with (Siewert 1998).
regard to phenomenal and qualitative consciousness. For example, deficit
studies that correlate various neural and functional sites of damage with The existence of such feels may seem to some to mark the threshold for
abnormalities of conscious experience can make us aware of aspects of states or creatures that are really conscious. If an organism senses and
phenomenal structure that escape our normal introspective awareness. As responds in apt ways to its world but lacks such qualia, then it might count
such case studies show, things can come apart in experience that seem as conscious at best in a loose and less than literal sense. Or so at least it
inseparably unified or singular from our normal first-person point of view would seem to those who take qualitative consciousness in the “what it is
(Sacks 1985, Shallice 1988, Farah 1995). like” sense to be philosophically and scientifically central (Nagel 1974,
Chalmers 1996).
Or to pick another example, third-person data can make us aware of how
our experiences of acting and our experiences of event-timing affect each Qualia problems in many forms—Can there be inverted qualia? (Block
other in ways that we could never discern through mere introspection 1980a 1980b, Shoemaker 1981, 1982) Are qualia epiphenomenal?
(Libet 1985, Wegner 2002). Nor are the facts gathered by these third (Jackson 1982, Chalmers 1996) How could neural states give rise to
person methods merely about the causes or bases of consciousness; they qualia? (Levine 1983, McGinn 1991)—have loomed large in the recent
often concern the very structure of phenomenal consciousness itself. First- past. But the What question raises a more basic problem of qualia: namely

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that of giving a clear and articulated description of our qualia space and richly intentional and involves not only sensory ideas and qualities but
the status of specific qualia within it. complex representations of time, space, cause, body, self, world and the
organized structure of lived reality in all its conceptual and nonconceptual
Absent such a model, factual or descriptive errors are all too likely. For forms.
example, claims about the unintelligibility of the link between experienced
red and any possible neural substrate of such an experience sometimes Since many non-conscious states also have intentional and
treat the relevant color quale as a simple and sui generis property (Levine representational aspects, it may be best to consider phenomenal structure
1983), but phenomenal redness in fact exists within a complex color space as involving a special kind of intentional and representational organization
with multiple systematic dimensions and similarity relations (Hardin and content, the kind distinctively associated with consciousness (Siewert
1992). Understanding the specific color quale relative to that larger 1998). (See the entry on representational theories of consciousness.)
relational structure not only gives us a better descriptive grasp of its
qualitative nature, it may also provide some “hooks” to which one might Answering the What question requires a careful account of the coherent
attach intelligible psycho-physical links. and densely organized representational framework within which particular
experiences are embedded. Since most of that structure is only implicit in
Color may be the exception in terms of our having a specific and well the organization of experience, it can not just be read off by introspection.
developed formal understanding of the relevant qualitative space, but it is Articulating the structure of the phenomenal domain in a clear and
not likely an exception with regard to the importance of such spaces to our intelligible way is a long and difficult process of inference and model
understanding of qualitative properties in general (Clark 1993, P.M. building (Husserl 1929). Introspection can aid it, but a lot of theory
Churchland 1995). (See the entry on qualia.) construction and ingenuity are also needed.

4.3 Phenomenal structure There has been recent philosophical debate about the range of properties
that are phenomenally present or manifest in conscious experience, in
Phenomenal structure should not be conflated with qualitative structure, particular with respect to cognitive states such as believing or thinking.
despite the sometimes interchangeable use of “qualia” and “phenomenal Some have argued for a so called “thin” view according to which
properties” in the literature. “Phenomenal organization” covers all the phenomenal properties are limited to qualia representing basic sensory
various kinds of order and structure found within the domain of properties, such as colors, shapes, tones and feels. According to such
experience, i.e., within the domain of the world as it appears to us. There theorists, there is no distinctive “what-it-is-likeness” involved in believing
are obviously important links between the phenomenal and the qualitative. that Paris is the capital of France or that 17 is a prime number (Tye, Prinz
Indeed qualia might be best understood as properties of phenomenal or 2012). Some imagery, e.g., of the Eiffel Tower, may accompany our
experienced objects, but there is in fact far more to the phenomenal than having such a thought, but that is incidental to it and the cognitive state
raw feels. As Kant (1787), Husserl (1913), and generations of itself has no phenomenal feel. On the thin view, the phenomenal aspect of
phenomenologists have shown, the phenomenal structure of experience is perceptual states as well is limited to basic sensory features; when one

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sees an image of Winston Churchill, one's perceptual phenomenology is behind claims regarding what Frank Jackson's (1982) hypothetical Mary,
limited only to the spatial aspects of his face. the super color scientist, could not understand about experiencing red
because of her own impoverished history of achromatic visual experience.
Others holds a “thick” view according to which the phenomenology of
perception includes a much wider range of features and cognitive states Whether facts about experience are indeed epistemically limited in this
have a distinctive phenomenology as well (Strawson 2003, Pitt 2004, way is open to debate (Lycan 1996), but the claim that understanding
Seigel 2010). On the thick view, the what-it-is-likeness of perceiving an consciousness requires special forms of knowing and access from the
image of Marilyn Monroe includes one's recognition of her history as part inside point of view is intuitively plausible and has a long history (Locke
of the felt aspect of the experience, and beliefs and thoughts as well can 1688). Thus any adequate answer to the What question must address the
and typically do have a distinctive nonsensory phenomenology. Both sides epistemic status of consciousness, both our abilities to understand it and
of the debate are well represented in the volume Cognitive their limits (Papineau 2002, Chalmers 2003). (See the entry on self-
Phenomenology (Bayne and Montague 2010). knowledge.)

4.4 Subjectivity 4.5 Self-perspectival organization

Subjectivity is another notion sometimes equated with the qualitative or The perspectival structure of consciousness is one aspect of its overall
the phenomenal aspects of consciousness in the literature, but again there phenomenal organization, but it is important enough to merit discussion in
are good reason to recognize it, at least in some of its forms, as a distinct its own right. Insofar as the key perspective is that of the conscious self,
feature of consciousness—related to the qualitative and the phenomenal the specific feature might be called self-perspectuality. Conscious
but different from each. In particular, the epistemic form of subjectivity experiences do not exist as isolated mental atoms, but as modes or states
concerns apparent limits on the knowability or even the understandability of a conscious self or subject (Descartes 1644, Searle 1992, though pace
of various facts about conscious experience (Nagel 1974, Van Gulick Hume 1739). A visual experience of a blue sphere is always a matter of
1985, Lycan 1996). there being some self or subject who is appeared to in that way. A sharp
and stabbing pain is always a pain felt or experienced by some conscious
On Thomas Nagel's (1974) account, facts about what it is like to be a bat subject. The self need not appear as an explicit element in our experiences,
are subjective in the relevant sense because they can be fully understood but as Kant (1787) noted the “I think” must at least potentially accompany
only from the bat-type point of view. Only creatures capable of having or each of them.
undergoing similar such experiences can understand their what-it's-
likeness in the requisite empathetic sense. Facts about conscious The self might be taken as the perspectival point from which the world of
experience can be at best incompletely understood from an outside third objects is present to experience (Wittgenstein 1921). It provides not only a
person point of view, such as those associated with objective physical spatial and temporal perspective for our experience of the world but one of
science. A similar view about the limits of third-person theory seems to lie meaning and intelligibility as well. The intentional coherence of the

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experiential domain relies upon the dual interdependence between self and Some such integrations are relatively local as when diverse features
world: the self as perspective from which objects are known and the world detected within a single sense modality are combined into a representation
as the integrated structure of objects and events whose possibilities of of external objects bearing those features, e.g. when one has a conscious
being experienced implicitly define the nature and location of the self visual experience of a moving red soup can passing above a green striped
(Kant 1787, Husserl 1929). napkin (Triesman and Gelade 1980).

Conscious organisms obviously differ in the extent to which they Other forms of intentional unity encompass a far wider range of contents.
constitute a unified and coherent self, and they likely differ accordingly in The content of one's present experience of the room in which one sits
the sort or degree of perspectival focus they embody in their respective depends in part upon its location within a far larger structure associated
forms of experience (Lorenz 1977). Consciousness may not require a with one's awareness of one's existence as an ongoing temporally extended
distinct or substantial self of the traditional Cartesian sort, but at least observer within a world of spatially connected independently existing
some degree of perspectivally self-like organization seems essential for the objects (Kant 1787, Husserl 1913). The individual experience can have the
existence of anything that might count as conscious experience. content that it does only because it resides within that larger unified
Experiences seem no more able to exist without a self or subject to structure of representation. (See the entry on unity of consciousness.)
undergo them than could ocean waves exist without the sea through which
they move. The Descriptive question thus requires some account of the Particular attention has been paid recently to the notion of phenomenal
self-perspectival aspect of experience and the self-like organization of unity (Bayne 2010) and its relation to other forms of conscious unity such
conscious minds on which it depends, even if the relevant account treats as those involving representational, functional or neural integration. Some
the self in a relatively deflationary and virtual way (Dennett 1991, 1992). have argued that phenomenal unity can be reduced to representational
unity (Tye 2005) while others have denied the possibility of any such
4.6 Unity reduction (Bayne 2010).

Unity is closely linked with the self-perspective, but it merits specific 4.7 Intentionality and transparency
mention on its own as a key aspect of the organization of consciousness.
Conscious systems and conscious mental states both involve many diverse Conscious mental states are typically regarded as having a representational
forms of unity. Some are causal unities associated with the integration of or intentional aspect in so far as they are about things, refer to things or
action and control into a unified focus of agency. Others are more have satisfaction conditions. One's conscious visual experience correctly
representational and intentional forms of unity involving the integration of represents the world if there are lilacs in a white vase on the table (pace
diverse items of content at many scales and levels of binding (Cleeremans Travis 2004), one's conscious memory is of the attack on the World Trade
2003). Center, and one's conscious desire is for a glass of cold water. However,
nonconscious states can also exhibit intentionality in such ways, and it is
important to understand the ways in which the representational aspects of

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conscious states resemble and differ from those of nonconscious states many externalist theories of mental content that ground meaning in causal,
(Carruthers 2000). Searle (1990) offers a contrary view according to which counterfactual or informational relations between bearers of intentionality
only conscious states and dispositions to have conscious states can be and their semantic or referential objects.
genuinely intentional, but most theorists regard intentionality as extending
widely into the unconscious domain. (See the entry on consciousness and The view of conscious content as intrinsically determined and internally
intentionality.) self-evident is sometimes supported by appeals to brain in the vat
intuitions, which make it seem that the envatted brain's conscious mental
One potentially important dimension of difference concerns so called states would keep all their normal intentional contents despite the loss of
transparency, which is an important feature of consciousness in two all their normal causal and informational links to the world (Horgan and
interrelated metaphoric senses, each of which has an intentional, an Tienson 2002). There is continued controversy about such cases and about
experiential and a functional aspect. competing internalist (Searle 1992) and externalist views (Dretske 1995)
of conscious intentionality.
Conscious perceptual experience is often said to be transparent, or in G.E.
Moore's (1922) phrase “diaphanous”. We transparently “look through” our Though semantic transparency and intrinsic intentionality have some
sensory experience in so far as we seem directly aware of external objects affinities, they should not be simply equated, since it may be possible to
and events present to us rather than being aware of any properties of accommodate the former notion within a more externalist account of
experience by which it presents or represents such objects to us. When I content and meaning. Both semantic and sensory transparency obviously
look out at the wind-blown meadow, it is the undulating green grass of concern the representational or intentional aspects of consciousness, but
which I am aware not of any green property of my visual experience. (See they are also experiential aspects of our conscious life. They are part of
the entry on representational theories of consciousness.) Moore himself what it's like or how it feels phenomenally to be conscious. They also both
believed we could become aware of those latter qualities with effort and have functional aspects, in so far as conscious experiences interact with
redirection of attention, though some contemporary transparency each other in richly content-appropriate ways that manifest our transparent
advocates deny it (Harman 1990, Tye 1995, Kind 2003). understanding of their contents.

Conscious thoughts and experiences are also transparent in a semantic 4.8 Dynamic flow
sense in that their meanings seem immediately known to us in the very act
of thinking them (Van Gulick 1992). In that sense we might be said to The dynamics of consciousness are evident in the coherent order of its
‘think right through’ them to what they mean or represent. Transparency ever changing process of flow and self-transformation, what William
in this semantic sense may correspond at least partly with what John James (1890) called the “stream of consciousness.” Some temporal
Searle calls the “intrinsic intentionality” of consciousness (Searle 1992). sequences of experience are generated by purely internal factors as when
one thinks through a puzzle, and others depend in part upon external
Our conscious mental states seem to have their meanings intrinsically or
from the inside just by being what they are in themselves, by contrast with

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causes as when one chases a fly ball, but even the latter sequences are 5. The explanatory question: How can consciousness
shaped in large part by how consciousness transforms itself.
exist?
Whether partly in response to outer influences or entirely from within,
The How question focuses on explanation rather than description. It asks
each moment to moment sequence of experience grows coherently out of
us to explain the basic status of consciousness and its place in nature. Is it
those that preceded it, constrained and enabled by the global structure of
a fundamental feature of reality in its own right, or does its existence
links and limits embodied in its underlying prior organization (Husserl
depend upon other nonconscious items, be they physical, biological,
1913). In that respect, consciousness is an autopoietic system, i.e., a self-
neural or computational? And if the latter, can we explain or understand
creating and self-organizing system (Varela and Maturana 1980).
how the relevant nonconscious items could cause or realize
As a conscious mental agent I can do many things such as scan my room, consciousness? Put simply, can we explain how to make something
scan a mental image of it, review in memory the courses of a recent conscious out of things that are not conscious?
restaurant meal along with many of its tastes and scents, reason my way
through a complex problem, or plan a grocery shopping trip and execute 5.1 Diversity of explanatory projects
that plan when I arrive at the market. These are all routine and common
activities, but each involves the directed generation of experiences in ways The How question is not a single question, but rather a general family of
that manifest an implicit practical understanding of their intentional more specific questions (Van Gulick 1995). They all concern the
properties and interconnected contents (Van Gulick 2000). possibility of explaining some sort or aspect of consciousness, but they
vary in their particular explananda, the restrictions on their explanans, and
Consciousness is a dynamic process, and thus an adequate descriptive their criteria for successful explanation. For example, one might ask
answer to the What question must deal with more than just its static or whether we can explain access consciousness computationally by
momentary properties. In particular, it must give some account of the mimicking the requisite access relations in a computational model. Or one
temporal dynamics of consciousness and the ways in which its self- might be concerned instead with whether the phenomenal and qualitative
transforming flow reflects both its intentional coherence and the semantic properties of a conscious creature's mind can be a priori deduced from a
self-understanding embodied in the organized controls through which description of the neural properties of its brain processes. Both are
conscious minds continually remake themselves as autopoietic systems versions of the How question, but they ask about the prospects of very
engaged with their worlds. different explanatory projects, and thus may differ in their answers (Lycan
1996). It would be impractical, if not impossible, to catalog all the
A comprehensive descriptive account of consciousness would need to deal possible versions of the How question, but some of the main options can
with more than just these seven features, but having a clear account of be listed.
each of them would take us a long way toward answering the “What is
consciousness?” question. Explananda. Possible explananda would include the various sorts of state
and creature consciousness distinguished above, as well as the seven

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features of consciousness listed in response to the What question. Those about consciousness (Kim 1998). Brute links, whether nomic or merely
two types of explananda overlap and intersect. We might for example aim well confirmed correlations, could provide a logically sufficient bridge to
to explain the dynamic aspect either of phenomenal or of access infer conclusions about consciousness. But they would probably not allow
consciousness. Or we could try to explain the subjectivity of either us to see how or why those connections hold, and thus they would fall
qualitative or meta-mental consciousness. Not every feature applies to short of fully explaining how consciousness exists (Levine 1983, 1993,
every sort of consciousness, but all apply to several. How one explains a McGinn 1991).
given feature in relation to one sort of consciousness may not correspond
with what is needed to explain it relative to another. One could legitimately ask for more, in particular for some account that
made intelligible why those links hold and perhaps why they could not fail
Explanans. The range of possible explanans is also diverse. In perhaps its to do so. A familiar two-stage model for explaining macro-properties in
broadest form, the How question asks how consciousness of the relevant terms of micro-substrates is often invoked. In the first step, one analyzes
sort could be caused or realized by nonconscious items, but we can the macro-property in terms of functional conditions, and then in the
generate a wealth of more specific questions by further restricting the second stage one shows that the micro-structures obeying the laws of their
range of the relevant explanans. One might seek to explain how a given own level nomically suffice to guarantee the satisfaction of the relevant
feature of consciousness is caused or realized by underlying neural functional conditions (Armstrong 1968, Lewis 1972).
processes, biological structures, physical mechanisms, functional or
teleofunctional relations, computational organization, or even by The micro-properties of collections of H2O molecules at 20°C suffice to
nonconscious mental states. The prospects for explanatory success will satisfy the conditions for the liquidity of the water they compose.
vary accordingly. In general the more limited and elementary the range of Moreover, the model makes intelligible how the liquidity is produced by
the explanans, the more difficult the problem of explaining how could it the micro-properties. A satisfactory explanation of how consciousness is
suffice to produce consciousness (Van Gulick 1995). produced might seem to require a similar two stage story. Without it, even
a priori deducibility might seem explanatorily less than sufficient, though
Criteria of explanation. The third key parameter is how one defines the the need for such a story remains a matter of controversy (Block and
criterion for a successful explanation. One might require that the Stalnaker 1999, Chalmers and Jackson 2001).
explanandum be a priori deducible from the explanans, although it is
controversial whether this is either a necessary or a sufficient criterion for 5.2 The explanatory gap
explaining consciousness (Jackson 1993). Its sufficiency will depend in
part on the nature of the premises from which the deduction proceeds. As Our current inability to supply a suitably intelligible link is sometimes
a matter of logic, one will need some bridge principles to connect described, following Joseph Levine (1983), as the existence of an
propositions or sentences about consciousness with those that do not explanatory gap, and as indicating our incomplete understanding of how
mention it. If one's premises concern physical or neural facts, then one consciousness might depend upon a nonconscious substrate, especially a
will need some bridge principles or links that connect such facts with facts

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physical substrate. The basic gap claim admits of many variations in (Chalmers 1996). However, the very strength of such an epistemological
generality and thus in strength. claim makes it difficult to assume with begging the metaphysical result in
question. Thus those who wish to use a strong in principle gap claim to
In perhaps its weakest form, it asserts a practical limit on our present refute physicalism must find independent grounds to support it. Some have
explanatory abilities; given our current theories and models we can not appealed to conceivability arguments for support, such as the alleged
now articulate an intelligible link. A stronger version makes an in conceivability of zombies molecularly identical with conscious humans
principle claim about our human capacities and thus asserts that given our but devoid of all phenomenal consciousness (Campbell 1970, Kirk 1974,
human cognitive limits we will never be able to bridge the gap. To us, or Chalmers 1996). Other supporting arguments invoke the supposed non-
creatures cognitively like us, it must remain a residual mystery (McGinn functional nature of consciousness and thus its alleged resistance to the
1991). Colin McGinn (1995) has argued that given the inherently spatial standard scientific method of explaining complex properties (e.g., genetic
nature of both our human perceptual concepts and the scientific concepts dominance) in terms of physically realized functional conditions (Block
we derive from them, we humans are not conceptually suited for 1980a, Chalmers 1996). Such arguments avoid begging the anti-
understanding the nature of the psychophysical link. Facts about that link physicalist question, but they themselves rely upon claims and intuitions
are as cognitively closed to us as are facts about multiplication or square that are controversial and not completely independent of one's basic view
roots to armadillos. They do not fall within our conceptual and cognitive about physicalism. Discussion on the topic remains active and ongoing.
repertoire. An even stronger version of the gap claim removes the
restriction to our cognitive nature and denies in principle that the gap can Our present inability to see any way of closing the gap may exert some
be closed by any cognitive agents. pull on our intuitions, but it may simply reflect the limits of our current
theorizing rather than an unbridgeable in principle barrier (Dennett 1991).
Those who assert gap claims disagree among themselves about what Moreover, some physicalists have argued that explanatory gaps are to be
metaphysical conclusions, if any, follow from our supposed epistemic expected and are even entailed by plausible versions of ontological
limits. Levine himself has been reluctant to draw any anti-physicalist physicalism, ones that treat human agents as physically realized cognitive
ontological conclusions (Levine 1993, 2001). On the other hand some systems with inherent limits that derive from their evolutionary origin and
neodualists have tried to use the existence of the gap to refute physicalism situated contextual mode of understanding (Van Gulick 1985, 2003;
(Foster 1996, Chalmers 1996). The stronger one's epistemological McGinn 1991, Papineau 1995, 2002). On this view, rather than refuting
premise, the better the hope of deriving a metaphysical conclusion. Thus physicalism, the existence of explanatory gaps may confirm it. Discussion
unsurprisingly, dualist conclusions are often supported by appeals to the and disagreement on these topics remains active and ongoing.
supposed impossibility in principle of closing the gap.

If one could see on a priori grounds that there is no way in which

consciousness could be intelligibly explained as arising from the physical,
it would not be a big step to concluding that it in fact does not do so

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5.3 Reductive and non-reductive explanation might opt for a similar criterion for interpreting the How question and for
what counts as explaining how consciousness might be caused or realized
As the need for intelligible linkage has shown, a priori deducibility is not by nonconscious items. However, some critics, such as Kim (1987), have
in itself obviously sufficient for successful explanation (Kim 1980), nor is challenged the coherence of any view that aims to be both non-reductive
it clearly necessary. Some weaker logical link might suffice in many and physicalist, though supporters of such views have replied in turn (Van
explanatory contexts. We can sometimes tell enough of a story about how Gulick 1993).
facts of one sort depend upon those of another to satisfy ourselves that the
latter do in fact cause or realize the former even if we can not strictly Others have argued that consciousness is especially resistant to
deduce all the former facts from the latter. explanation in physical terms because of the inherent differences between
our subjective and objective modes of understanding. Thomas Nagel
Strict intertheoretical deduction was taken as the reductive norm by the famously argued (1974) that there are unavoidable limits placed on our
logical empiricist account of the unity of science (Putnam and Oppenheim ability to understand the phenomenology of bat experience by our inability
1958), but in more recent decades a looser nonreductive picture of to empathetically take on an experiential perspective like that which
relations among the various sciences has gained favor. In particular, characterizes the bat's echo-locatory auditory experience of its world.
nonreductive materialists have argued for the so called “autonomy of the Given our inability to undergo similar experience, we can have at best
special sciences” (Fodor 1974) and for the view that understanding the partial understanding of the nature of such experience. No amount of
natural world requires us to use a diversity of conceptual and knowledge gleaned from the external objective third-person perspective of
representational systems that may not be strictly intertranslatable or the natural sciences will supposedly suffice to allow us to understand what
capable of being put into the tight correspondence required by the older the bat can understand of its own experience from its internal first-person
deductive paradigm of interlevel relations (Putnam 1975). subjective point of view.

Economics is often cited as an example (Fodor 1974, Searle 1992). 5.4 Prospects of explanatory success
Economic facts may be realized by underlying physical processes, but no
one seriously demands that we be able to deduce the relevant economic The How question thus subdivides into a diverse family of more specific
facts from detailed descriptions of their underlying physical bases or that questions depending upon the specific sort or feature of consciousness one
we be able to put the concepts and vocabulary of economics in tight aims to explain, the specific restrictions one places on the range of the
correspondence with those of the physical sciences. explanans and the criterion one uses to define explanatory success. Some
of the resulting variants seem easier to answer than others. Progress may
Nonetheless our deductive inability is not seen as cause for ontological
seem likely on some of the so called “easy problems” of consciousness,
misgivings; there is no “money-matter” problem. All that we require is
such as explaining the dynamics of access consciousness in terms of the
some general and less than deductive understanding of how economic
functional or computational organization of the brain (Baars 1988). Others
properties and relations might be underlain by physical ones. Thus one
may seem less tractable, especially the so-called “hard problem”

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(Chalmers 1995) which is more or less that of giving an intelligible relevant to explaining its evolutionary origin, though of course its present
account that lets us see in an intuitively satisfying way how phenomenal or function, if it has one, need not be the same as that it may have had when
“what it's like” consciousness might arise from physical or neural it first arose. Adaptive functions often change over biological time.
processes in the brain. Questions about the value of consciousness also have a moral dimension
in at least two ways. We are inclined to regard an organism's moral status
Positive answers to some versions of the How questions seem near at as at least partly determined by the nature and extent to which it is
hand, but others appear to remain deeply baffling. Nor should we assume conscious, and conscious states, especially conscious affective states such
that every version has a positive answer. If dualism is true, then as pleasures and pains, play a major role in many of the accounts of value
consciousness in at least some of its types may be basic and fundamental. that underlie moral theory (Singer 1975).
If so,we will not be able to explain how it arises from nonconscious items
since it simply does not do so. As with the What and How questions, the Why question poses a general
problem that subdivides into a diversity of more specific inquiries. In so
One's view of the prospects for explaining consciousness will typically far as the various sorts of consciousness, e.g., access, phenomenal, meta-
depend upon one's perspective. Optimistic physicalists will likely see mental, are distinct and separable—which remains an open question—they
current explanatory lapses as merely the reflection of the early stage of likely also differ in their specific roles and values. Thus the Why question
inquiry and sure to be remedied in the not too distant future (Dennett may well not have a single or uniform answer.
1991, Searle 1992, P. M.Churchland 1995). To dualists, those same
impasses will signify the bankruptcy of the physicalist program and the 6.1 Causal status of consciousness
need to recognize consciousness as a fundamental constituent of reality in
its own right (Robinson 1982, Foster 1989, 1996, Chalmers 1996). What Perhaps the most basic issue posed by any version of the Why question is
one sees depends in part on where one stands, and the ongoing project of whether or not consciousness of the relevant sort has any causal impact at
explaining consciousness will be accompanied by continuing debate about all. If it has no effects and makes no causal difference whatsoever, then it
its status and prospects for success. would seem unable to play any significant role in the systems or organisms
in which it is present, thus undercutting at the outset most inquiries about
6. The functional question: Why does consciousness its possible value. Nor can the threat of epiphenomenal irrelevance be
exist? simply dismissed as an obvious non-option, since at least some forms of
consciousness have been seriously alleged in the recent literature to lack
The functional or Why question asks about the value or role or causal status. (See the entry on epiphenomenalism.) Such worries have
consciousness and thus indirectly about its origin. Does it have a function, been raised especially with regard to qualia and qualitative consciousness
and if so what is it? Does it make a difference to the operation of systems (Huxley 1874, Jackson 1982, Chalmers 1996), but challenges have also
in which it is present, and if so why and how? If consciousness exists as a been leveled against the causal status of other sorts including meta-mental
complex feature of biological systems, then its adaptive value is likely consciousness (Velmans 1991).

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Both metaphysical and empirical arguments have been given in support of initiating cause, more like a post facto printout or the result displayed on
such claims. Among the former are those that appeal to intuitions about one's computer screen than like the actual processor operations that
the conceivability and logical possibility of zombies, i.e., of beings whose produce both the computer's response and its display.
behavior, functional organization, and physical structure down to the
molecular level are identical to those of normal human agents but who Once again the arguments are controversial, and both the supposed data
lack any qualia or qualitative consciousness. Some (Kirk 1970, Chalmers and their interpretation are subjects of lively disagreement (see Flanagan
1996) assert such beings are possible in worlds that share all our physical 1992, and commentaries accompanying Velmans 1991). Though the
laws, but others deny it (Dennett 1991, Levine 2001). If they are possible empirical arguments, like the zombie claims, require one to consider
in such worlds, then it would seem to follow that even in our world, qualia seriously whether some forms of consciousness may be less causally
do not affect the course of physical events including those that constitute potent than is typically assumed, many theorists regard the empirical data
our human behaviors. If those events unfold in the same way whether or as no real threat to the causal status of consciousness.
not qualia are present, then qualia appear to be inert or epiphenomenal at
If the epiphenomenalists are wrong and consciousness, in its various
least with respect to events in the physical world. However, such
forms, is indeed causal, what sorts of effects does it have and what
arguments and the zombie intuitions on which they rely are controversial
differences does it make? How do mental processes that involve the
and their soundness remains in dispute (Searle 1992, Yablo 1998, Balog
relevant sort of consciousness differ form those that lack it? What
1999).
function(s) might consciousness play? The following six sections (6.2–
Arguments of a far more empirical sort have challenged the causal status 6.7) discuss some of the more commonly given answers. Though the
of meta-mental consciousness, at least in so far as its presence can be various functions overlap to some degree, each is distinct, and they differ
measured by the ability to report on one's mental state. Scientific evidence as well in the sorts of consciousness with which each is most aptly linked.
is claimed to show that consciousness of that sort is neither necessary for
any type of mental ability nor does it occur early enough to act as a cause 6.2 Flexible control
of the acts or processes typically thought to be its effects (Velmans 1991).
Increased flexibility and sophistication of control. Conscious mental
According to those who make such arguments, the sorts of mental abilities
processes appear to provide highly flexible and adaptive forms of control.
that are typically thought to require consciousness can all be realized
Though unconscious automatic processes can be extremely efficient and
unconsciously in the absence of the supposedly required self-awareness.
rapid, they typically operate in ways that are more fixed and
Moreover, even when conscious self-awareness is present, it allegedly predetermined than those which involve conscious self-awareness
occurs too late to be the cause of the relevant actions rather than their (Anderson 1983). Conscious awareness is thus of most importance when
result or at best a joint effect of some shared prior cause (Libet 1985). one is dealing with novel situations and previously unencountered
Self-awareness or meta-mental consciousness according to these problems or demands (Penfield 1975, Armstrong 1981).
arguments turns out to be a psychological after-effect rather than an

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Standard accounts of skill acquisition stress the importance of conscious sort most obviously linked to such a socially coordinative role, narrative
awareness during the initial learning phase, which gradually gives way to consciousness of the kind associated with the stream of consciousness is
more automatic processes of the sort that require little attention or also clearly relevant in so far as it involves the application to one's own
conscious oversight (Schneider and Shiffrin 1977). Conscious processing case of the interpretative abilities that derive in part from their social
allows for the construction or compilation of specifically tailored routines application (Ryle 1949, Dennett 1978, 1992).
out of elementary units as well as for the deliberate control of their
execution. 6.4 Integrated representation
There is a familiar tradeoff between flexibility and speed; controlled More unified and densely integrated representation of reality. Conscious
conscious processes purchase their customized versatility at the price of experience presents us with a world of objects independently existing in
being slow and effortful in contrast to the fluid rapidity of automatic space and time. Those objects are typically present to us in a multi-modal
unconscious mental operations (Anderson 1983). The relevant increases in fashion that involves the integration of information from various sensory
flexibility would seem most closely connected with the meta-mental or channels as well as from background knowledge and memory. Conscious
higher-order form of consciousness in so far as the enhanced ability to experience presents us not with isolated properties or features but with
control processes depends upon greater self-awareness. However, objects and events situated in an ongoing independent world, and it does
flexibility and sophisticated modes of control may be associated as well so by embodying in its experiential organization and dynamics the dense
with the phenomenal and access forms of consciousness. network of relations and interconnections that collectively constitute the
meaningful structure of a world of objects (Kant 1787, Husserl 1913,
6.3 Social coordination Campbell 1997).

Enhanced capacity for social coordination. Consciousness of the meta- Of course, not all sensory information need be experienced to have an
mental sort may well involve not only an increase in self-awareness but adaptive effect on behavior. Adaptive non-experiential sensory-motor
also an enhanced understanding of the mental states of other minded links can be found both in simple organisms, as well as in some of the
creatures, especially those of other members of one's social group more direct and reflexive processes of higher organisms. But when
(Humphreys 1982). Creatures that are conscious in the relevant meta- experience is present, it provides a more unified and integrated
mental sense not only have beliefs, motives, perceptions and intentions but representation of reality, one that typically allows for more open-ended
understand what it is to have such states and are aware of both themselves avenues of response (Lorenz 1977). Consider for example the
and others as having them. representation of space in an organism whose sensory input channels are
simply linked to movement or to the orientation of a few fixed
This increase in mutually shared knowledge of each other's minds, enables mechanisms such as those for feeding or grabbing prey, and compare it
the relevant organisms to interact, cooperate and communicate in more with that in an organism capable of using its spatial information for
advanced and adaptive ways. Although meta-mental consciousness is the flexible navigation of its environment and for whatever other spatially

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relevant aims or goals it may have, as when a person visually scans her celebrity”, i.e., of its ability to have a content-appropriate impact on other
office or her kitchen (Gallistel 1990). mental states.

It is representation of this latter sort that is typically made available by the This particular role is most directly and definitionally tied to the notion of
integrated mode of presentation associated with conscious experience. The access consciousness (Block 1995), but meta-mental consciousness as
unity of experienced space is just one example of the sort of integration well as the phenomenal and qualitative forms all seem plausibly linked to
associated with our conscious awareness of an objective world. (See the such increases in the availability of information (Armstrong 1981, Tye
entry on unity of consciousness.) 1985). Diverse cognitive and neuro-cognitive theories incorporate access
as a central feature of consciousness and conscious processing. Global
This integrative role or value is most directly associated with access Workspace theories, Prinz's Attendend Intermediate Representation (AIR)
consciousness, but also clearly with the larger phenomenal and intentional (Prinz 2012) and Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) all
structure of experience. It is relevant even to the qualitative aspect of distinguish conscious states and processes at least partly in terms of
consciousness in so far as qualia play an important role in our experience enhanced wide spread access to the state's content (see section 9.6).
of unified objects in a unified space or scene. It is intimately tied as well to
the transparency of experience described in response to the What question, 6.6 Freedom of will
especially to semantic transparency (Van Gulick 1993). Integration of
information plays a major role in several current neuro-cognitive theories Increased freedom of choice or free will. The issue of free will remains a
of consciousness especially Global Workspace theories (see section 9.5) perennial philosophical problem, not only with regard to whether or not it
and Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information theory (section 9.6 below). exists but even as to what it might or should consist in (Dennett 1984, van
Inwagen 1983, Hasker 1999, Wegner 2002). (See the entry on free will.)
6.5 Informational access The notion of free will may itself remain too murky and contentious to
shed any clear light on the role of consciousness, but there is a traditional
More global informational access. The information carried in conscious intuition that the two are deeply linked.
mental states is typically available for use by a diversity of mental
subsystems and for application to a wide range of potential situations and Consciousness has been thought to open a realm of possibilities, a sphere
actions (Baars 1988). Nonconscious information is more likely to be of options within which the conscious self might choose or act freely. At a
encapsulated within particular mental modules and available for use only minimum, consciousness might seem a necessary precondition for any
with respect to the applications directly connected to that subsystem's such freedom or self-determination (Hasker 1999). How could one engage
operation (Fodor 1983). Making information conscious typically widens in the requisite sort of free choice, while remaining solely within the
the sphere of its influence and the range of ways it which it can be used to unconscious domain? How can one determine one's own will without
adaptively guide or shape both inner and outer behavior. A state's being being conscious of it and of the options one has to shape it.
conscious may be in part a matter of what Dennett calls “cerebral

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The freedom to chose one's actions and the ability to determine one's own to the mental systems and processes in which it is present (Humphreys
nature and future development may admit of many interesting variations 1992).
and degrees rather than being a simple all or nothing matter, and various
forms or levels of consciousness might be correlated with corresponding Other suggestions have been made about the possible roles and value of
degrees or types of freedom and self-determination (Dennett 1984, 2003). consciousness, and these six surely do not exhaust the options.
The link with freedom seems strongest for the meta-mental form of Nonetheless, they are among the most prominent recent hypotheses, and
consciousness given its emphasis on self-awareness, but potential they provide a fair survey of the sorts of answers that have been offered to
connections also seem possible for most of the other sorts as well. the Why question by those who believe consciousness does indeed make a
difference.
6.7 Intrinsic motivation
6.8 Constitutive and contingent roles
Intrinsically motivating states. At least some conscious states appear to
have the motive force they do intrinsically. In particular, the functional and One further point requires clarification about the various respects in which
motivational roles of conscious affective states, such as pleasures and the proposed functions might answer the Why question. In particular one
pains, seem intrinsic to their experiential character and inseparable from should distinguish between constitutive cases and cases of contingent
their qualitative and phenomenal properties, though the view has been realization. In the former, fulfilling the role constitutes being conscious in
challenged (Nelkin 1989, Rosenthal 1991). The attractive positive the relevant sense, while in the latter case consciousness of a given sort is
motivational aspect of a pleasure seems a part of its directly experienced just one way among several in which the requisite role might be realized
phenomenal feel, as does the negative affective character of a pain, at least (Van Gulick 1993).
in the case of normal non-pathological experience.
For example, making information globally available for use by a wide
There is considerable disagreement about the extent to which the feel and variety of subsystems and behavioral applications may constitute its being
motive force of pain can dissociate in abnormal cases, and some have conscious in the access sense. By contrast, even if the qualitative and
denied the existence of such intrinsically motivating aspects altogether phenomenal forms of consciousness involve a highly unified and densely
(Dennett 1991). However, at least in the normal case, the negative integrated representation of objective reality, it may be possible to produce
motivational force of pain seems built right into the feel of the experience representations having those functional characteristics but which are not
itself. qualitative or phenomenal in nature.

Just how this might be so remains less than clear, and perhaps the The fact that in us the modes of representation with those characteristics
appearance of intrinsic and directly experienced motivational force is also have qualitative and phenomenal properties may reflect contingent
illusory. But if it is real, then it may be one of the most important and historical facts about the particular design solution that happened to arise
evolutionarily oldest respects in which consciousness makes a difference in our evolutionary ancestry. If so, there may be quite other means of

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achieving a comparable result without qualitative or phenomenal parallel the standard mind-body options including the main versions of
consciousness. Whether this is the right way to think about phenomenal dualism and physicalism.
and qualitative conscious is unclear; perhaps the tie to unified and densely
integrated representation is in fact as intimate and constitutive as it seems 8.1 Dualist theories
to be in the case of access consciousness (Carruthers 2000). Regardless of
how that issue gets resolved, it is important to not to conflate constitution Dualist theories regard at least some aspects of consciousness as falling
accounts with contingent realization accounts when addressing the outside the realm of the physical,but specific forms of dualism differ in
function of consciousness and answering the question of why it exists just which aspects those are. (See the entry on dualism.)
(Chalmers 1996).
Substance dualism, such as traditional Cartesian dualism (Descartes 1644),
asserts the existence of both physical and non-physical substances. Such
7. Theories of consciousness
theories entail the existence of non-physical minds or selves as entities in
In response to the What, How and Why questions many theories of which consciousness inheres. Though substance dualism is at present
consciousness have been proposed in recent years. However, not all largely out of favor, it does have some contemporary proponents
theories of consciousness are theories of the same thing. They vary not (Swinburne 1986, Foster 1989, 1996).
only in the specific sorts of consciousness they take as their object, but
Property dualism in its several versions enjoys a greater level of current
also in their theoretical aims.
support. All such theories assert the existence of conscious properties that
Perhaps the largest division is between general metaphysical theories that are neither identical with nor reducible to physical properties but which
aim to locate consciousness in the overall ontological scheme of reality may nonetheless be instantiated by the very same things that instantiate
and more specific theories that offer detailed accounts of its nature, physical properties. In that respect they might be classified as dual aspect
features and role. The line between the two sorts of theories blurs a bit, theories. They take some parts of reality—organisms, brains, neural states
especially in so far as many specific theories carry at least some implicit or processes—to instantiate properties of two distinct and disjoint sorts:
commitments on the more general metaphysical issues. Nonetheless, it is physical ones and conscious, phenomenal or qualitative ones. Dual aspect
useful to keep the division in mind when surveying the range of current or property dualist theories can be of at least three different types.
theoretical offerings.
Fundamental property dualism regards conscious mental properties as
basic constituents of reality on a par with fundamental physical properties
8. Metaphysical theories of consciousness such as electromagnetic charge. They may interact in causal and law-like
ways with other fundamental properties such as those of physics, but
General metaphysical theories offer answers to the conscious version of
ontologically their existence is not dependent upon nor derivative from
the mind-body problem, “What is the ontological status of consciousness
any other properties (Chalmers 1996).
relative to the world of physical reality?” The available responses largely

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Emergent property dualism treats conscious properties as arising from involve any such feel, it is not clear how they are any better able than
complex organizations of physical constituents but as doing so in a radical physical properties to account for qualitative consciousness in solving the
way such that the emergent result is something over and above its physical Hard Problem.
causes and is not a priori predictable from nor explicable in terms of their
strictly physical natures. The coherence of such emergent views has been A more modest form of panpsychism has been advocated by the
challenged (Kim 1998) but they have supporters (Hasker 1999). neuroscientist Giulio Tononi (2008) and endorsed by other neuroscientists
including Christof Koch (2012). This version derives from Tononi's
Neutral monist property dualism treats both conscious mental properties integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness that identifies
and physical properties as in some way dependent upon and derivative consciousness with integrated information which can exist in many
from a more basic level of reality, that in itself is neither mental nor degrees (see section 9.6 below). According to IIT, even a simple indicator
physical (Russell 1927, Strawson 1994). However, if one takes dualism to device such as a single photo diode possesses some degree of integrated
be a claim about there being two distinct realms of fundamental entities or information and thus some limited degree of consciousness, a consequence
properties, then perhaps neutral monism should not be classified as a which both Tononi and Koch embrace as a form of panpsychism.
version of property dualism in so far as it does not regard either mental or
physical properties as ultimate or fundamental. A variety of arguments have been given in favor of dualist and other anti-
physicalist theories of consciousness. Some are largelya priori in nature
Panpsychism might be regarded as a fourth type of property dualism in such as those that appeal to the supposed conceivability of zombies (Kirk
that it regards all the constituents of reality as having some psychic, or at 1970, Chalmers 1996) or versions of the knowledge argument (Jackson
least proto-psychic, properties distinct from whatever physical properties 1982, 1986) which aim to reach an anti-physicalist conclusion about the
they may have (Nagel 1979). Indeed neutral monism might be consistently ontology of consciousness from the apparent limits on our ability to fully
combined with some version of panprotopsychism (Chalmers 1996) understand the qualitative aspects of conscious experience through third-
according to which the proto-mental aspects of micro-constituents can person physical accounts of the brain processes. (See Jackson 1998, 2004
give rise under suitable conditions of combination to full blown for a contrary view; see also entries on zombies, and qualia: the
consciousness. (See the entry on panpsychism.) knowledge argument.) Other arguments for dualism are made on more
empirical grounds, such as those that appeal to supposed causal gaps in the
The nature of the relevant proto-psychic aspect remains unclear, and such chains of physical causation in the brain (Eccles and Popper 1977) or
theories face a dilemma if offered in hope of answering the Hard Problem. those based on alleged anomalies in the temporal order of conscious
Either the proto-psychic properties involve the sort of qualitative awareness (Libet 1982, 1985). Dualist arguments of both sorts have been
phenomenal feel that generates the Hard Problem or they do not. If they much disputed by physicalists (P.S. Churchland 1981, Dennett and
do, it is difficult to understand how they could possibly occur as Kinsbourne 1992).
ubiquitous properties of reality. How could an electron or a quark have
any such experiential feel? However, if the proto-psychic properties do not

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8.2 Physicalist theories Type-type identity theory is so called because it identifies mental and
physical types or properties on a par with identifying the property of being
Most other metaphysical theories of consciousness are versions of water with the property of being composed of H2O molecules. After a
physicalism of one familiar sort or another. brief period of popularity in the early days of contemporary physicalism
during the 1950s and 60s (Place 1956, Smart 1959) it has been far less
Eliminativist theories reductively deny the existence of consciousness or at widely held because of problems such as the multiple realization objection
least the existence of some of its commonly accepted sorts or features. according to which mental properties are more abstract and thus capable
(See the entry on eliminative materialism.) The radical eliminativists reject of being realized by many diverse underlying structural or chemical
the very notion of consciousness as muddled or wrong headed and claim substrates (Fodor 1974, Hellman and Thompson 1975). If one and the
that the conscious/nonconscious distinction fails to cut mental reality at its same conscious property can be realized by different neurophysiological
joints (Wilkes 1984, 1988). They regard the idea of consciousness as (or even non-neurophysiological) properties in different organisms, then
sufficiently off target to merit elimination and replacement by other the two properties can not be strictly identical.
concepts and distinctions more reflective of the true nature of mind (P. S.
Churchland 1983). Nonetheless the type-type identity theory has enjoyed a recent if modest
resurgence at least with respect to qualia or qualitative conscious
Most eliminativists are more qualified in their negative assessment. Rather properties. This has been in part because treating the relevant psycho-
than rejecting the notion outright, they take issue only with some of the physical link as an identity is thought by some to offer a way of dissolving
prominent features that it is commonly thought to involve, such as qualia the explanatory gap problem (Hill and McLaughlin 1998, Papineau 1995,
(Dennett 1990, Carruthers 2000), the conscious self (Dennett 1992), or the 2003). They argue that if the conscious qualitative property and the neural
so called “Cartesian Theater” where the temporal sequence of conscious property are identical, then there is no need to explain how the latter
experience gets internally projected (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992). More causes or gives rise to the former. It does not cause it, it is it. And thus
modest eliminativists, like Dennett, thus typically combine their qualified there is no gap to bridge, and no further explanation is needed. Identities
denials with a positive theory of those aspects of consciousness they take are not the sort of thing that can be explained, since nothing is identical
as real, such as the Multiple Drafts Model (section 9.3 below). with anything but itself, and it makes no sense to ask why something is
identical with itself.
Identity theory, at least strict psycho-physical type-type identity theory,
offers another strongly reductive option by identifying conscious mental However, others contend that the appeal to type-type identity does not so
properties, states and processes with physical ones, most typically of a obviously void the need for explanation (Levine 2001). Even if two
neural or neurophysiological nature. If having a qualitative conscious descriptions or concepts in fact refer to one and the same property, one
experience of phenomenal red just is being in a brain state with the may still reasonably expect some explanation of that convergence, some
relevant neurophysiological properties, then such experiential properties account of how they pick out one and the same thing despite not initially
are real but their reality is a straight forwardly physical reality. or intuitively seeming to do so. In other cases of empirically discovered

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property identities, such as that of heat and kinetic energy, there is a story reversed qualia or none at all. The status of such possibilities is
to be told that explains the co-referential convergence, and it seems fair to controversial (Shoemaker 1981, Dennett 1990, Carruthers 2000), but if
expect the same in the psycho-physical case. Thus appealing to type-type accepted they would seem to pose a problem for the functionalist. (See the
identities may not in itself suffice to dissolve the explanatory gap problem. entry on qualia.)

Most physicalist theories of consciousness are neither eliminativist nor Those who ground ontological physicalism on the realization relation
based on strict type-type identities. They acknowledge the reality of often combine it with a nonreductive view at the conceptual or
consciousness but aim to locate it within the physical world on the basis of representational level that stresses the autonomy of the special sciences
some psycho-physical relation short of strict property identity. and the distinct modes of description and cognitive access they provide.

Among the common variants are those that take conscious reality to Non-reductive physicalism of this sort denies that the theoretical and
supervene on the physical, be composed of the physical, or be realized by conceptual resources appropriate and adequate for dealing with facts at the
the physical. level of the underlying substrate or realization level must be adequate as
well for dealing with those at the realized level (Putnam 1975, Boyd
Functionalist theories in particular rely heavily on the notion of 1980). As noted above in response to the How question, one can believe
realization to explicate the relation between consciousness and the that all economic facts are physically realized without thinking that the
physical. According to functionalism, a state or process counts as being of resources of the physical sciences provide all the cognitive and conceptual
a given mental or conscious type in virtue of the functional role it plays tools we need for doing economics (Fodor 1974).
within a suitably organized system (Block 1980a). A given physical state
realizes the relevant conscious mental type by playing the appropriate role Nonreductive physicalism has been challenged for its alleged failure to
within the larger physical system that contains it. (See the entry on “pay its physicalist dues” in reductive coin. It is faulted for supposedly not
functionalism.) The functionalist often appeals to analogies with other giving an adequate account of how conscious properties are or could be
inter-level relations, as between the biological and biochemical or the realized by underlying neural, physical or functional structures or
chemical and the atomic. In each case properties or facts at one level are processes (Kim 1987, 1998). Indeed it has been charged with incoherence
realized by complex interactions between items at an underlying level. because of its attempt to combine a claim of physical realization with the
denial of the ability to spell out that relation in a strict and a priori
Critics of functionalism often deny that consciousness can be adequately intelligible way (Jackson 2004).
explicated in functional terms (Block 1980a, 1980b, Levine 1983,
Chalmers 1996). According to such critics, consciousness may have However, as noted above in discussion of the How question, nonreductive
interesting functional characteristics but its nature is not essentially physicalists reply by agreeing that some account of psycho-physical
functional. Such claims are sometimes supported by appeal to the realization is indeed needed, but adding that the relevant account may fall
supposed possibility of absent or inverted qualia, i.e., the possibility of far short of a priori deducibility, yet still suffice to satisfy our legitimate
beings who are functionally equivalent to normal humans but who have

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explanatory demands (McGinn 1991, Van Gulick 1985). The issue Higher-order theories come in two main variants that differ concerning the
remains under debate. psychological mode of the relevant conscious-making meta-mental states.
Higher-order thought (HOT) theories take the required higher-order state
9. Specific Theories of Consciousness to be an assertoric thought-like meta-state (Rosenthal 1986, 1993). Higher-
order perception (HOP) theories take them to be more perception-like and
Although there are many general metaphysical/ontological theories of associated with a kind of inner sense and intra-mental monitoring systems
consciousness, the list of specific detailed theories about its nature is even of some sort (Armstrong 1981, Lycan 1987, 1996).
longer and more diverse. No brief survey could be close to
comprehensive, but seven main types of theories may help to indicate the Each has its relative strengths and problems. HOT theorists note that we
basic range of options: higher-order theories, representational theories, have no organs of inner sense and claim that we experience no sensory
interpretative narrative theories, cognitive theories, neural theories, qualities other than those presented to us by outer directed perception.
quantum theories and nonphysical theories. The categories are not HOP theorists on the other hand can argue that their view explains some
mutually exclusive; for example, many cognitive theories also propose a of the additional conditions required by HO accounts as natural
neural substrate for the relevant cognitive processes. Nonetheless grouping consequences of the perception-like nature of the relevant higher-order
them in the seven classes provides a basic overview. states. In particular the demands that the conscious-making meta-state be
noninferential and simultaneous with its lower level mental object might
9.1 Higher-order theories be explained by the parallel conditions that typically apply to perception.
We perceive what is happening now, and we do so in a way that involves
Higher-order (HO) theories analyze the notion of a conscious mental state no inferences, at least not any explicit personal-level inferences. Those
in terms of reflexive meta-mental self-awareness. The core idea is that conditions are no less necessary on the HOT view but are left unexplained
what makes a mental state M a conscious mental state is the fact that it is by it, which might seem to give some explanatory advantage to the HOP
accompanied by a simultaneous and non-inferential higher-order (i.e., model (Lycan 2004, Van Gulick 2000), though some HOT theorists argue
meta-mental) state whose content is that one is now in M. Having a otherwise (Carruthers 2000).
conscious desire for some chocolate involves being in two mental states;
one must have both a desire for some chocolate and also a higher-order Whatever their respective merits, both HOP and HOT theories face some
state whose content is that one is now having just such a desire. common challenges, including what might be called thegenerality
Unconscious mental states are unconscious precisely in that we lack the problem. Having a thought or perception of a given item X—be it a rock, a
relevant higher-order states about them. Their being unconscious consists pen or a potato—does not in general make X a conscious X. Seeing or
in the fact that we are not reflexively and directly aware of being in them. thinking of the potato on the counter does not make it a conscious potato.
(See the entry on higher-order theories of consciousness.) Why then should having a thought or perception of a given desire or a
memory make it a conscious desire or memory (Dretske 1995, Byrne
1997). Nor will it suffice to note that we do not apply the term “conscious”

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to rocks or pens that we perceive or think of, but only to mental states that (Gennaro 1995, Van Gulick 2000, 2004) with such views overlapping with
we perceive or think of (Lycan 1997, Rosenthal 1997). That may be true, so called reflexive theories discussed in the section. Other variants of HO
but what is needed is some account of why it is appropriate to do so. theory continue to be offered, and debate between supporters and critics of
the basic approach remains active. (See the recent papers in Gennaro
The higher-order view is most obviously relevant to the meta-mental 2004.)
forms of consciousness, but some of its supporters take it to explain other
types of consciousness as well, including the more subjective what it's like 9.2 Reflexive theories
and qualitative types. One common strategy is to analyze qualia as mental
features that are capable of occurring unconsciously; for example they Reflexive theories, like higher-order theories, imply a strong link between
might be explained as properties of inner states whose structured similarity consciousness and self-awareness. They differ in that they locate the
relations given rise to beliefs about objective similarities in the world aspect of self-awareness directly within the conscious state itself rather
(Shoemaker 1975, 1990). Though unconscious qualia can play that than in a distinct meta-state directed at it. The idea that conscious states
functional role, there need be nothing that it is like to be in a state that has involve a double intentionality goes back at least to Brentano (1874) in the
them (Nelkin 1989, Rosenthal 1991, 1997). According to the HO theorist, 19th century. The conscious state is intentionally directed at an object
what-it's-likeness enters only when we become aware of that first-order outside itself—such as a tree or chair in the case of a conscious perception
state and its qualitative properties by having an appropriate meta-state —as well as intentionally directed at itself. One and the same state is both
directed at it. an outer-directed awareness and an awareness of itself. Several recent
theories have claimed that such reflexive awareness is a central feature of
Critics of the HO view have disputed that account, and some have argued
conscious mental states. Some view themselves as variants of higher-order
that the notion of unconscious qualia on which it relies is incoherent
theory (Gennaro 2004, 2012) while others reject the higher-order category
(Papineau 2002). Whether or not such proposed HO accounts of qualia are
and describe their theories as presenting a “same-order” account of
successful, it is important to note that most HO advocates take themselves
consciousness as self-awareness (Kriegel 2009). Yet others challenge the
to be offering a comprehensive theory of consciousness, or at least the
level distinction by analyzing the meta-intentional content as implicit in
core of such a general theory, rather than merely one limited to some
the phenomenal first-order content of conscious states, as in so called
special meta-mental forms of it.
Higher-Order Global State models (HOGS) (Van Gulick 2004,2006). A
Other variants of HO theory go beyond the standard HOT and HOP sample of papers, some supporting and some attacking the reflexive view
versions including some that analyze consciousness in terms of can be found in Krigel and Williford (2006).
dispositional rather than occurrent higher-order thoughts (Carruthers
2000). Others appeal to implicit rather than explicit higher-order
understanding and weaken or remove the standard assumption that the
meta-state must be distinct and separate from its lower-order object

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9.3 Representationalist theories and reflects all the intentional or contentful aspects of representation
without being sensitive to mere differences in underlying non-contentful
Almost all theories of consciousness regard it as having representational features of the processes at the realization level. Thus most
features, but so called representationalist theories are defined by the representationalists provide conditions for conscious experience that
stronger view that its representational features exhaust its mental features include both a content condition plus some further causal role or format
(Harman 1990, Tye 1995, 2000). According to the representationalist, requirements (Tye 1995, Dretske 1995, Carruthers 2000). Other
conscious mental states have no mental properties other than their representationalists accept the existence of qualia but treat them as
representational properties. Thus two conscious or experiential states that objective properties that external objects are represented as having, i.e.,
share all their representational properties will not differ in any mental they treat them as represented properties rather than as properties of
respect. representations or mental states (Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996).

The exact force of the claim depends on how one interprets the idea of Representationalism can be understood as a qualified form of
being “representationally the same” for which there are many plausible eliminativism insofar as it denies the existence of properties of a sort that
alternative criteria. One could define it coarsely in terms of satisfaction or conscious mental states are commonly thought to have—or at least seem
truth conditions, but understood in that way the representationalist thesis to have—namely those that are mental but not representational. Qualia, at
seems clearly false. There are too many ways in which states might share least if understood as intrinsic monadic properties of conscious states
their satisfaction or truth conditions yet differ mentally, including those accessible to introspection, would seem to be the most obvious targets for
that concern their mode of conceptualizing or presenting those conditions. such elimination. Indeed part of the motivation for representationalism is
to show that one can accommodate all the facts about consciousness,
At the opposite extreme, one could count two states as representationally perhaps within a physicalist framework, without needing to find room for
distinct if they differed in any features that played a role in their qualia or any other apparently non-representational mental properties
representational function or operation. On such a liberal reading any (Dennett 1990, Lycan 1996, Carruthers 2000).
differences in the bearers of content would count as representational
differences even if they bore the same intentional or representational Representationalism has been quite popular in recent years and had many
content; they might differ only in their means or mode of representation defenders, but it remains highly controversial and intuitions clash about
not their content. key cases and thought experiments (Block 1996). In particular the
possibility of inverted qualia provides a crucial test case. To anti-
Such a reading would of course increase the plausibility of the claim that a representationalists, the mere logical possibility of inverted qualia shows
conscious state's representational properties exhaust its mental properties that conscious states can differ in a significant mental respect while
but at the cost of significantly weakening or even trivializing the thesis. coinciding representationally. Representationalists in reply deny either the
Thus the representationalist seems to need an interpretation of possibility of such inversion or its alleged import (Dretske 1995, Tye
representational sameness that goes beyond mere satisfaction conditions 2000).

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Many other arguments have been made for and against that make differing behavioral demands) may elicit different answers
representationalism, such as those concerning perceptions in different about the person's conscious state. Moreover, according to the MDM there
sense modalities of one and the same state of affairs—seeing and feeling may be no probe-independent fact of the matter about what the person's
the same cube—which might seem to involve mental differences distinct conscious state really was. Hence the “multiple” of the Multiple Drafts
from how the relevant states represent the world to be (Peacocke 1983, Model.
Tye 2003). In each case, both sides can muster strong intuitions and
argumentative ingenuity. Lively debate continues. The MDM is representationalist in that it analyzes consciousness in terms
of content relations. It also denies the existence of qualia and thus rejects
9.4 Narrative Interpretative Theories any attempt to distinguish conscious states from nonconscious states by
their presence. It rejects as well the notion of the self as an inner observer,
Some theories of consciousness stress the interpretative nature of facts whether located in the Cartesian Theater or elsewhere. The MDM treats
about consciousness. According to such views, what is or is not conscious the self as an emergent or virtual aspect of the coherent roughly serially
is not always a determinate fact, or at least not so independent of a larger narrative that is constructed through the interactive play of contents in the
context of interpretative judgments. The most prominent philosophical system. Many of those contents are bound together at the intentional level
example is the Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness, advanced as perceptions or fixations from a relatively unified and temporally
by Daniel Dennett (1991). It combines elements of both extended point of view, i.e., they cohere in their contents as if they were
representationalism and higher-order theory but does so in a way that the experiences of a ongoing self. But it is the order of dependence that is
varies interestingly from the more standard versions of either providing a crucial to the MDM account. The relevant contents are not unified because
more interpretational and less strongly realist view of consciousness. they are all observed by a single self, but just the converse. It is because
they are unified and coherent at the level of content that they count as the
The MDM includes many distinct but interrelated features. Its name experiences of a single self, at least of a single virtual self.
reflects the fact that at any given moment content fixations of many sorts
are occurring throughout the brain. What makes some of these contents It is in this respect that the MDM shares some elements with higher-order
conscious is not that they occur in a privileged spatial or functional theories. The contents that compose the serial narrative are at least
location—the so called “Cartesian Theater”—nor in a special mode or implicitly those of an ongoing if virtual self, and it is they that are most
format, all of which the MDM denies. Rather it a matter of what Dennett likely to be expressed in the reports the person makes of her conscious
calls “cerebral celebrity”, i.e., the degree to which a given content state in response to various probes. They thus involve a certain degree of
influences the future development of other contents throughout the brain, reflexivity or self-awareness of the sort that is central to higher-order
especially with regard to how those effects are manifest in the reports and theories, but the higher-order aspect is more an implicit feature of the
behaviors that the person makes in response to various probes that might stream of contents rather than present in distinct explicit higher-order
indicate her conscious state. One of the MDM's key claims is that different states of the sort found in standard HO theories.
probes (e. g., being asked different questions or being in different contexts

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Dennett's MDM has been highly influential but has also drawn criticism, which it coheres. The capacity limits on the workspace correspond to the
especially from those who find it insufficiently realist in its view of limits typically placed on focal attention or working memory in many
consciousness and at best incomplete in achieving its stated goal to fully cognitive models.
explain it (Block 1994, Dretske 1994, Levine 1994). Many of its critics
acknowledge the insight and value of the MDM, but deny that there are no The model has been further developed with proposed connections to
real facts of consciousness other than those captured by it (Rosenthal particular neural and functional brain systems by Stanislas Dehaene and
1994, Van Gulick 1994, Akins 1996). others (2000). Of special importance is the claim that consciousness in
both the access and phenomenal sense occurs when and only when the
From a more empirical perspective, the neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga relevant content enters the larger global network involving both primary
(2011) has introduced the idea of an “interpreter module” based in the left sensory areas as well as many other areas including frontal and parietal
hemisphere that makes sense of our actions in any inferential way and areas associated with attention. Dehaene claims that conscious perception
constructs an ongoing narrative of our actions and experience. Though the begins only with the “ignition” of that larger global network; activity in
theory is not intended as a complete theory of consciousness, it accords a the primary sensory areas will not suffice no matter how intense or
major role to such interpretative narrative activity. recurrent (though see the contrary view of Victor Lamme in section 9.7).

9.5 Cognitive Theories Attended Intermediate Representation. Another cognitive theory is Jesse
Prinz's (2012) Attended Intermediate level Representation theory (AIR).
A number theories of consciousness associate it with a distinct cognitive The theory is a neuro-cognitive hybrid account of conscious. According to
architecture or with a special pattern of activity with that structure. AIR theory, a conscious perception must meet both cognitive and neural
conditions. It must be a representation of a perceptually intermediate
Global Workspace. A major psychological example of the cognitive property which Prinz argues are the only properties of which we are aware
approach is the Global Workspace theory. As initially developed by in conscious experience—we experience only basic features of external
Bernard Baars (1988)) global workspace theory describes consciousness in objects such as colors, shapes, tones, and feels. According to Prinz, our
terms of a competition among processors and outputs for a limited awareness of higher level properties—such as being a pine tree or my car
capacity resource that “broadcasts” information for widespread access and keys—is wholly a matter of judging and not of conscious experience.
use. Being available in that way to the global workspace makes Hence the Intermediate Representational (IR) aspect of AIR. To be
information conscious at least in the access sense. It is available for report conscious such a represented content must also be Attended (the A aspect
and the flexible control of behavior. Much like Dennett's “cerebral of AIR). Prinz proposes a particular neural substrate for each component.
celebrity”, being broadcast in the workspace makes contents more He identifies the intermediate level representations with gamma (40–80hz)
accessible and influential with respect to other contents and other vector activity in sensory cortex and the attentional component with
processors. At the same time the original content is strengthened by synchronized oscillations that can incorporate that gamma vector activity.
recurrent support back from the workspace and from other contents with

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9.6 Information Integration Theory 9.7 Neural Theories

The integration of information from many sources is an important feature Neural theories of consciousness come in many forms, though most in
of consciousness and, as noted above (section 6.4), is often cited as one of some way concern the so called “neural correlates of consciousness” or
its major functions. Content integration plays an important role in various NCCs. Unless one is a dualist or other non-physicalist, more than mere
theories especially global workspace theory (section 9.3). However, a correlation is required; at least some NCCs must be the essential substrates
proposal by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi (2008) goes further in of consciousness. An explanatory neural theory needs to explain why or
identifying consciousness with integrated information and asserting that how the relevant correlations exist, and if the theory is committed to
information integration of the relevant sort is both necessary and sufficient physicalism that will require showing how the underlying neural
for consciousness regardless of the substrate in which it is realized (which substrates could be identical with their neural correlates or at least realize
need not be neural or biological). According to Tononi's Integrated them by satisfying the required roles or conditions (Metzinger 2000).
Information Theory (IIT), consciousness is a purely information-theoretic
property of systems. He proposes a mathematical measure φ that aims to Such theories are diverse not only in the neural processes or properties to
measure not merely the information in the parts of a given system but also which they appeal but also in the aspects of consciousness they take as
the information contained in the organization of the system over and above their respective explananda. Some are based on high-level systemic
that in its parts. φ thus corresponds to the system's degree of informational features of the brain, but others focus on more specific physiological or
integration. Such a system can contain many overlapping complexes and structural properties, with corresponding differences in their intended
the complex with the highest φ value will be conscious according to IIT. explanatory targets. Most in some way aim to connect with theories of
consciousness at other levels of description such as cognitive,
According to IIT, consciousness varies in quantity and comes in many representational or higher-order theories.
degrees which correspond to φ values. Thus even a simple system such a
single photo diode will be conscious to some degree if it is not contained A sampling of recent neural theories might include models that appeal to
within a larger complex. In that sense, IIT implies a form of panpsychism global integrated fields (Kinsbourne), binding through synchronous
that Tononi explicitly endorses. According to IIT, the quality of the oscillation (Singer 1999, Crick and Koch 1990), NMDA-mediated
relevant consciousness is determined by the totality of informational transient neural assemblies (Flohr 1995), thalamically modulated patterns
relations within the relevant integrated complex. Thus IIT aims to explain of cortical activation (Llinas 2001), reentrant cortical loops (Edelman
both the quantity and quality of phenomenal consciousness. Other 1989), comparator mechanisms that engage in continuous action-
neuroscientists, notably Christof Koch, have also endorsed the IIT prediction-assessment loops between frontal and midbrain areas (Gray
approach (Koch 2012). 1995), left hemisphere based interpretative processes (Gazzaniga 1988),
and emotive somatosensory hemostatic processes based in the frontal-
limbic nexus (Damasio 1999) or in the periaqueductal gray (Panksepp
1998).

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In each case the aim is to explain how organization and activity at the to such theories, the nature and basis of consciousness can not be
relevant neural level could underlie one or another major type or feature of adequately understood within the framework of classical physics but must
consciousness. Global fields or transient synchronous assemblies could be sought within the alternative picture of physical reality provided by
underlie the intentional unity of phenomenal consciousness. NMDA-based quantum mechanics. The proponents of the quantum consciousness
plasticity, specific thalamic projections into the cortex, or regular approach regard the radically alternative and often counterintuitive nature
oscillatory waves could all contribute to the formation of short term but of quantum physics as just what is needed to overcome the supposed
widespread neural patterns or regularities needed to knit integrated explanatory obstacles that confront more standard attempts to bridge the
conscious experience out of the local activity in diverse specialized brain psycho-physical gap.
modules. Left hemisphere interpretative processes could provide a basis
for narrative forms of conscious self-awareness. Thus it is possible for Again there are a wide range of specific theories and models that have
multiple distinct neural theories to all be true, with each contributing some been proposed, appealing to a variety of quantum phenomena to explain a
partial understanding of the links between conscious mentality in its diversity of features of consciousness. It would be impossible to catalog
diverse forms and the active brain at its many levels of complex them here or even explain in any substantial way the key features of
organization and structure. quantum mechanics to which they appeal. However, a brief selective
survey may provide a sense, however partial and obscure, of the options
One particular recent controversy has concerned the issue of whether that have been proposed.
global or merely local recurrent activity is sufficient for phenomenal
consciousness. Supporters of the global neuronal workspace model The physicist Roger Penrose (1989, 1994) and the anesthesiologist Stuart
(Dehaene 2000) have argued that consciousness of any sort can occur only Hameroff (1998) have championed a model according to which
when contents are activated with a large scale pattern of recurrent activity consciousness arises through quantum effects occurring within subcellular
involving frontal and parietal areas as well as primary sensory areas of structures internal to neurons known as microtubules. The model posits so
cortex. Others in particular the psychologist Victor Lamme (2006) and the called “objective collapses” which involve the quantum system moving
philosopher Ned Block (2007) have argued that local recurrent activity from a superposition of multiple possible states to a single definite state,
between higher and lower areas within sensory cortex (e.g. with visual but without the intervention of an observer or measurement as in most
cortex) can suffice for phenomenal consciousness even in the absence of quantum mechanical models. According to the Penrose and Hameroff, the
verbal reportability and other indicators of access consciousness. environment internal to the microtubules is especially suitable for such
objective collapses, and the resulting self-collapses produce a coherent
9.8 Quantum theories flow regulating neuronal activity and making non-algorithmic mental
processes possible.
Other physical theories have gone beyond the neural and placed the
The psychiatrist Ian Marshall has offered a model that aims to explain the
natural locus of consciousness at a far more fundamental level, in
coherent unity of consciousness by appeal to the production within the
particular at the micro-physical level of quantum phenomena. According

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brain of a physical state akin to that of a Bose-Einstein condensate. The not—but these four provide a reasonable, though partial, sample of the
latter is a quantum phenomenon in which a collection of atoms acts as a alternatives.
single coherent entity and the distinction between discrete atoms is lost.
While brain states are not literally examples of Bose-Einstein condensates, 9.9 Non-physical theories
reasons have been offered to show why brains are likely to give rise to
states that are capable of exhibiting a similar coherence (Marshall and Most specific theories of consciousness—whether cognitive, neural or
Zohar 1990). quantum mechanical—aim to explain or model consciousness as a natural
feature of the physical world. However, those who reject a physicalist
A basis for consciousness has also been sought in the holistic nature of ontology of consciousness must find ways of modeling it as a nonphysical
quantum mechanics and the phenomenon of entanglement, according to aspect of reality. Thus those who adopt a dualist or anti-physicalist
which particles that have interacted continue to have their natures depend metaphysical view must in the end provide specific models of
upon each other even after their separation. Unsurprisingly these models consciousness different from the five types above. Both substance dualists
have been targeted especially at explaining the coherence of and property dualists must develop the details of their theories in ways that
consciousness, but they have also been invoked as a more general articulate the specific natures of the relevant non-physical features of
challenge to the atomistic conception of traditional physics according to reality with which they equate consciousness or to which they appeal in
which the properties of wholes are to be explained by appeal to the order to explain it.
properties of their parts plus their mode of combination, a method of
explanation that might be regarded as unsuccessful to date in explaining A variety of such models have been proposed including the following.
consciousness (Silberstein 1998, 2001). David Chalmers (1996) has offered an admittedly speculative version of
panpsychism which appeals to the notion of information not only to
Others have taken quantum mechanics to indicate that consciousness is an explain psycho-physical invariances between phenomenal and physically
absolutely fundamental property of physical reality, one that needs to be realized information spaces but also to possibly explain the ontology of
brought in at the very most basic level (Stapp 1993). They have appealed the physical as itself derived from the informational (a version of “it from
especially to the role of the observer in the collapse of the wave function, bit” theory). In a somewhat similar vein, Gregg Rosenberg has (2004)
i.e., the collapse of quantum reality from a superposition of possible states proposed an account of consciousness that simultaneously addresses the
to a single definite state when a measurement is made. Such models may ultimate categorical basis of causal relations. In both the causal case and
or may not embrace a form of quasi-idealism, in which the very existence the conscious case, Rosenberg argues the relational-functional facts must
of physical reality depends upon its being consciously observed. ultimately depend upon a categorical non-relational base, and he offers a
model according to which causal relations and qualitative phenomenal
There are many other quantum models of consciousness to be found in the
facts both depend upon the same base. Also, as noted just above (section
literature—some advocating a radically revisionist metaphysics and others
9.8), some quantum theories treat consciousness as a fundamental feature

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of reality (Stapp 1993), and insofar as they do so, they might be plausibly Bayne, T. 2010. The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University
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Robert Van Gulick
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