9

Rousseau to Kant
Gerda Ha ß ler

The following chapter examines the development of linguistic thought in

the second half of the eighteenth century, from Rousseau to Kant. The dis­
cussion will be restricted to a few outstanding language theorists in several
European countries and will only consider certain important aspects of the
extensive text production (Haßler 2000). Two ways of looking at language
will be elaborated upon here: the anthropological approach, which is inter­
ested in discovering what involvement language has in the essence of man,1
and the epistemological approach, which focuses on the elucidation of the
role of linguistic signs.

1 The Theme of Language in Rousseau’s

Thought
At the beginning of the 1750s Jean-Jacques Rousseau was drawn to the school
of thought that viewed language as an essential key to the development of
mankind and society (see Chapter 8). In his Discours sur l’origine et les fonde-
mens de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequal-
ity among Men, [1755]1985/1992; hereafter, Discourse) he subscribes to Étienne
Bonnot de Condillac’s theory of the origin of language and even declares this
to be the basis for his reflections. According to Condillac’s ([1746]1947–51) Essai
sur l’origine des connaissances humaines (Essay on the Origin of Human Understand-
ing), human language arose from a “language of gestures” (langage d’action)
which, gradually, stimulated by the needs of communication, developed into
a language of arbitrary (artificial) signs. The signs of human language oper­
ate according to the principle of analogy, i.e., a motivated relation between
signs of analogous content. The signs vary from language to language, and

1 Editors’note: Throughout this chapter, ‘man’ is used to mean ‘human being’ in certain
contexts, which is how it was used by the authors themselves in the time period studied
here (Fr.: homme, Germ.: Mensch).

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 Gerda Ha ß ler

therefore also produce different analogous relationships between ideas. It is

this analogy of signs that makes up the ‘genius’ (‘essence’) of a language, by
which its special characteristics are understood. However, Rousseau did not
accept Condillac’s assumption that human society existed before language
came into being. Rather, he thought that human beings lived in a solitary,
primordial state, isolated from each other and only mated for a brief time.
Then, in their own self-interest, the mothers raised their children. The crea­
tive achievement in communication fell to the children because they had a
greater need for it. The forager society ultimately gave rise to a multitude
of individual languages. According to Rousseau, the different languages did
not develop through the passage from one generation to another but rather
through various reactions to different living conditions.
Rousseau developed his theory by expounding on the intricacies of the ori­
gin of language, which was probably the reason why he was often criticised
for failing to give an explanation of the actual problem. Initially he empha­
sised the gap between the “natural state” (état de nature) and the “need for
language” (besoin de langue). But even assuming that this gap is bridged, a new
problem arises. Human beings need language to think, but on the other hand
thinking is needed to develop language. Rousseau did not indicate a way out
of this conundrum, but in his Essai sur l’origine des langues (Essay on the Origin of
Languages [1781a]1970/1986; hereafter, Essay) he defined the first language, the
“cries of nature” (cris de la nature), as the most universal and most vital form
of communication. Since such cries only occurred in emergency situations,
they would not manifest any characteristics supportive of thinking. These first
words had a much broader meaning than words in developed languages; they
were sentence-words that had no inflection or part of speech classification.
In explaining the origin of words Rousseau follows the ‘nominalist’
approach. He assumes that initially each single object received a name, since
the first name givers were unable to assign objects into classes and saw each
object in its individuality. For example, due to this inability to make abstrac­
tions, every single oak tree would be given its own particular name. Thus, an
extensive vocabulary is correlated with less developed thinking. As measured
against the prevailing views of ‘sensationalist’ theories of language, which
assumed that the origin of all ideas came from sensory perceptions and their
compilation through linguistic signs, Rousseau (in Discourse and Essay) made
several provocative assertions: the multiplicity of words is not the result of
gradual development, but rather a characteristic feature of the original state.
And these names denoted – in apparent contradiction to the lack of capac­
ity for abstraction – not only objects, but entire language actions. Rousseau

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 Rousseau to Kant

asserted that abstraction presupposes linguistic signs, but in his Discourse

(1985) he did not want to concern himself with the complex subject of the
origin of language, which includes, for him, the invention of abstract words,
as well as the development of verb forms, particles, conjunctions, and syntax.
At least one of the many difficulties he sees in explaining the origin of lan­
guage in Discourse was mentioned before him, namely by Frain du Tremblay in
his Traité des langues (A Treatise on Languages, 1703). How could primitive man,
who only had direct and fleeting relationships with others, understand the bene­
fit of communication? How was man without signs, i.e., without thinking, sup­
posed to be able to create a system of signs? In Rousseau’s chronology of human
development, language does not go back to the actual origins, to the natural
state of man. It is not to be found at the beginning of history, but rather on this
side of history. The origin of language lies entirely between the two revolutions
discussed in the Discourse, between the genesis of the family with the first intro­
duction of private property and the great revolution that came about through
the discovery of agriculture and metallurgy (Droixhe & Haßler 1989: 320).
The development of a verbal system of expression, whose stages Rousseau
seeks to describe in the Essay in more detail, reflects the different circumstances
and the influence of several external causes with which he explains the corrup­
tion of man. The catastrophes, floods, and violent acts of nature that compelled
mankind to unite in society also left their traces in language as it developed.
The notion of a break is emphasised even more strongly at the beginning of the
second part of the Discourse. Here Rousseau combines language, society and
inequality in a very drastic way. The first man who claimed something as his
property with the words “this is mine” and who found people who were simple
enough to believe him was, according to this hypothesis, the true founder of
civil society. If at that time someone had been there to expose this linguistic
claim to property as a lie, mankind – as Rousseau passionately proclaimed –
would have been spared crimes, wars, murders, and other sufferings.
Rousseau’s exposition of the origin of social relationships contributed to
the overcoming of ‘climate theory,’ which in particular had been developed
in Montesquieu’s (Charles de Secondat) De l’esprit des lois (The Spirit of Laws,
[1748] 1994). The notion that physiological characteristics of people were
caused by climate and that they, in turn, were the basis for the formation
of certain traits of a particular people had made it possible to assert that the
essence of language ultimately resulted from material conditions. Inevitably,
the climate theory was used to explain differences between languages, as is
evident in a number of travelogues written by people who were increasingly
interested in exotic languages and sought access to them (e.g., Bernardin de

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 Gerda Ha ß ler

Saint-Pierre 1830–1). Even from the philosophical camp attempts were soon
made to ascribe the concept of the génie de la langue (‘essence of a language’)
to physical factors in order to support the climate theory.
However, in retrospect, as Rousseau asserted in his Les Confessions ([1782,
published posthumously]/1965a): “I had perceived everything to be rad­
ically connected with politics, and that, upon whatever principles these
were founded, a people would never be more than that which the nature
of the government made them …” (p. 556). Although Rousseau claims that
social factors have the ultimate crucial role with reference to languages, the
dichotomy between natural state and social condition in his theory of lan­
guage allowed the use of several assumptions of climate theory to explain
the genesis of language. For Rousseau, the natural causes to which language
as a social institution owes its genesis are both human “needs” (besoins), for
whose expression and satisfaction a language consisting of gestures would
have admittedly been sufficient, and human passions, which are the actual
impetus for the genesis of speech.
César Chesneau Du Marsais (1769) also saw the reason for the genesis of
speech in passions, and suggestions by Giambattista Vico (1744) can also be
interpreted in this way. Rousseau elaborated this idea, however, by including
some aspects of climate theory. The kinds and intensity of needs and passions
are not the same everywhere, according to Rousseau. They depend on the
living conditions of people, which are determined in turn by the climate and
type of soil. In southern regions, where nature is so bountiful that all needs
can easily be met, all conditions were such that languages could be generated
from passions, while in the rough climate of the North their needs caused
people to undertake communication using language. At the same time the
speech organs of the people in the North were constructed more coarsely,
which also contributed to the differences between languages (Essay, p. 131).
Although the mingling of peoples and the increase in needs gradually led
to a blurring of the original character of languages, a comparison of modern
languages would still show something of the fundamental polarity of needs or
passions as the starting point for the genesis of two opposite types of languages.
French, English, and German were the “private languages” (langages privés) of
people who help each other, who reason in a cold-blooded manner, or the lan­
guage of wrathful people who are angry. In contrast, the servants of God who
announce holy mysteries, the wise men who grant laws to peoples, and the
leaders who get the masses to follow them spoke Arabic or Persian (p. 135).
Whereas Rousseau in the Discourse left open the possibility of man’s inven­
tion of language and instead raised questions, in the Essay, he gave a clear

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 Rousseau to Kant

answer: speech as the first social institution owes its genesis exclusively to
natural causes (p. 27). As soon as one man recognised another man as a feel­
ing, thinking human being similar to himself, the need for communication
would let him find the means, derived from perception through the senses,
which are the only way of influencing a human being. (With regard to Rous­
seau’s theory of the origin of language see also Salvucci 1982; Haßler 1984;
Bourdin 1994; Edler 2001; Dauphin 2004.)
The primacy of spoken language in contrast to written language, a notion
that was already proposed in Condillac’s theory of the origin of language, was
developed further by Rousseau. In his opinion languages were primarily made
to be spoken, which led him to assume a relationship of representation in two
stages. Thinking is analysed by speech, which represents thinking through
conventional signs. Speech, in turn, is analysed by writing and represented by
it. Written language is thus only an indirect representation of our thinking.
Rousseau’s thoughts on language are characterised by the tension between
the sensationalist conception according to which language is primarily to be
understood through the economy of needs and the more idealistic ‘affective’
approach according to which language arises from the expression of human
feelings. For his part, Condillac saw speech – whose actual essence is related
to signing – as a specific expression of feeling.
In the Essay the depiction of the origin of language gained in complexity –
in contrast to a linear genesis – since Rousseau (1970) assumes a multitude of
language origins. Moreover, language in its role (ch. i), in its history and even
in its decline (chs. ii, ix, and xx) can serve the purpose of the moral, affec­
tive, and material unity of mankind. This role is a response to the separation
of people into groups, which Rousseau seemed to idealise in the Discourse.
However, this separation is ultimately characterised as an elementary infir­
mity that should constantly be overcome. The Essay does not assume that
there was a break from a good natural state and then degeneration from it, as
is found in the Discourse. Like Montesquieu, Rousseau divided early human
history into three phases: “Le sauvage est chasseur, le barbare est berger, l’homme
civil est laboureur” (‘The savage is a hunter, the barbarian is a shepherd, civil
man is an agricultural labourer’) (Essay, p. 107; see also 1750). These three
stages correspond to three types of writing: hieroglyphics, pictography, and
the alphabet. The latter analyses and mediates instead of producing an emo­
tional contact. It therefore removes language from reality and the original,
accent-rich voice.
The hunters of the first stage are described as violent and blood-thirsty,
then as warriors, conquerors, and robbers. When Rousseau referred to

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 Gerda Ha ß ler

them it was not in the context of language; however, their development is

not imaginable without language. Thus, the genesis of language does not
apply only to a certain type of person or a certain epoch. In the Golden
Age, which Rousseau viewed as the time of shepherds, a primitive lan­
guage developed in two ways. The first is directly linked to the necessities
of survival. Some of the hunters became settled, and they domesticated
animals, which provided them with more opportunities to use their speech
organs. The second has to do with the shepherd’s life, which also awakened
passions that were not simply directed to surviving. Rousseau sees these
“passions oiseuses” (‘useless passions’) as crucial for the genesis of language.
Whereas the need to survive and to search for food would cause people
to flee from each other, ‘passions’ would bring them closer together. It
wasn’t hunger and thirst, for which gestures would have been enough,
that brought forth the first oral utterances, but feelings such as love, hate,
sympathy, and rage (Essay, ch. ii).
However, such ‘useless passions,’ especially love, are made possible by
nothing else than needs oriented to survival. Rousseau asks how the auton­
omy of the self and the stability that existed during the pastoral age could be
destroyed. Just as in Discourse he believes that the disturbing influence of the
surrounding world is the cause, here – unlike in Discourse – it is not natural
catastrophes that are responsible. Rather, differences in seasons and climate
are sufficient to generate the formation of groups and cooperation within
groups. “He who willed that man be sociable touched his finger to the axis of
the globe and inclined it in line with the axis of the universe” (Essay, p. 109).
The conditions which resulted from this situation with respect to language
development are characteristic of all stages of human evolution, not just of
the end of the pastoral age. Therefore, according to Rousseau, this shatters
the reductionist view that language genesis has little to do with material
needs. Hunters were compelled to join together when the winters were too
harsh and hunting became impossible. They were thus enabled to help each
other and forced to enter a kind of convention with each other. Language
developed at the communal hearth, where, due to the preparation of food,
man was separated from animals. In the warm climate zones the necessity of
searching for water generated the first fires of love. People had to collaborate
with each other to build wells, dig canals, and give the animals enough to
drink. In these places the first festivals took place, which also led to the usage
of communication with sounds (p. 123).
It therefore seems exaggerated to imply that Rousseau contrasted a South
with a melodious language and communication based on love to a North

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 Rousseau to Kant

characterised by misfortune, inversion, and corruption (Derrida 1967d;

Philonenko 1984; Maengel 1989). Rousseau’s philosophical thought about
language cannot be reduced to dichotomous groupings and word games:
he said, concerning the peoples of the North, “the first word among them
was not love me, but help me”) (1970: 131). It is obvious that even the nature/
civilisation contrast captures only antitheses, incomplete in themselves, of
a dialectic movement that does not aim for a nostalgic view, but rather for
liberation. Just like mankind, language is debased when it mainly serves to
preserve the egotistical self, to perpetuate unjust ownership structures or to
cover up social evils. Nevertheless, language is so closely connected with the
perfection of man and is so present in the necessary process of transcending
his passive and animalistic nature, that one cannot overlook indications of the
positive power of language in his Essay. That language is a means of bridg­
ing distance and separation is apparent at different levels of human behav­
iour. At the beginning of the Essay and in Émile, ou, de l’Éducation (Rousseau
[1762]1990) this important function is discussed, starting with a general semi­
ology of the treatment of the origin of language, which was unusual for the
eighteenth century.

2 Anthropological Interpretation of the Origin

of Language Problem in the Berlin Prize
Question for 1771
Unlike most other authors, Rousseau stimulated and polarised discussions in
the European language debate. Ten of the submissions for the Berlin prize
question of 1771 on the origin of language mention him by name, and more
authors explicitly critique his arguments. Rousseau’s Essay could not be the
reason for their objections since it appeared later, three years after his death,
in a volume that contained his treatises on music (1781b). Rather, what met
with rejection was Rousseau’s ‘system of nonsociability’ (M 664:10 [1771]), in
Discourse, which contradicted the social nature of man. If at the outset gen­
eral ideas did not occur to man and if they in fact simply documented their
impressions and feelings at random with signs, then it would not be possible
to explain why much more specific words were not created, e.g., instead of
the generic oak, words for “little oak, big, light or dark oak” (M 664: 28). Even
if one added a long period of development until civilisation was created, this
would not help, since there would be nothing that could cause original and
natural man to give up his condition and that could also explain the genesis
of language (M 669: 5 [1771]).

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Obviously, in the reception of Rousseau’s language theory, ideas from the

Discourse were intermingled with ideas from his treatise – which won the
prize in 1750 – on the influence of the arts and sciences on moral development
(Si le rétablissement des Sciences et des Arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs, ‘Has
the restoration of the arts and sciences had a purifying effect upon morals?’).
Unanimous disagreements with Rousseau’s depiction of the original human
condition prevailed in the periodicals, the typical medium of the period. A
deeper, critical reading of the author’s texts was not necessary. Accordingly,
some of the aspirants to the prize explicitly expressed the thought that Rous­
seau’s system actually failed to explain the origin of language.
Language as a question topic had been discussed in the Berlin Academy even
before 1771. In the second half of the eighteenth century five prize questions of
the Prussian Academy were devoted to the subject of language. Significantly,
four of them were proposed by philosophers (see Haßler 1999). Assuming that
the academies endeavoured to concentrate their collective efforts on espe­
cially relevant scientific problems, these prize questions of the Berlin Academy
are certainly an indication that questions concerning the theory of language
were considered important and in need of scientific treatment. For 1759 the
question that was posed was oriented toward the relativity of languages as
a means of cognition and communication. This indicates that the Academy
had a specific purpose in mind, namely, ways of making language perfect as
a means of communication, and above all as a means of thinking. Ultimately,
the search for the perfect language, with reference to Gottfried Wilhelm Lei­
bniz’s characteristica universalis (1666), was expressed therein (see Chapters 7
and 8). This search, however, did not need to be undertaken in a universalistic
way, starting with pre-established universal ideas and determined in its con­
struction by a given ideal. Rather, starting from the advantages and disadvan­
tages of empirically given languages, potential improvements were sought.
This way of proceeding presupposed that languages influence human knowl­
edge according to their specific characteristics in different ways and that – as a
means of expressing knowledge – they are relative.
In addition, a historical dimension of the problem posed was already given
in the text of the announcement inviting submissions: first, certain specific
modes of thinking are given linguistic forms of expression and thus become
fixed in language. Secondly, these fixations in turn affect our thinking and
can thus stop its further development and stabilise prejudices. This proposi­
tion had been one of the basic tenets of the ‘sensationalist’ language discus­
sion since John Locke (see Chapter 8), and it stimulated further theoretical
expositions on the subject by Condillac, Du Marsais, Denis Diderot, and also

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 Rousseau to Kant

by Gabriel Girard, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, and Jean Le Rond

d’Alembert (see Aarsleff 1982; Haßler 1984; Ricken 1984, 1990; Gessinger &
Rahden 1989; Formigari 1993; Haßler & Neis 2009; and Chapter 8). Thus, it
became a topos of the language discussion in the middle of the eighteenth
century. However, it was very differently understood by the individual
authors who submitted essays for the prize competition.
The significance ascribed to the treatise of the prize winner Johann David
Michaelis (1760) is indicated by the fact that it was soon translated into several
languages.2 Michaelis’s actual contribution to the language discussion of the
Enlightenment is that it was characterised by a democratic language concept
oriented toward usage. Thus, Michaelis extended the demand already made
by adherents of the French Enlightenment to contribute to the improve­
ment of language and thus to facilitate it as a means of expressing knowl­
edge. Michaelis saw the possibility of language enrichment for everyone,
even the uneducated speaker. Nevertheless, an individual cannot induce lan­
guage change, for a consensus is always needed; it is the people themselves
who have supremacy over language and who can accept or reject innova­
tions. Michaelis’s argumentation concerns the philological field, and it can be
assumed that he was less focused on carrying on a fundamentally anthropo­
logical discussion when he recommended the following question as a topic
for a prize essay to the Academy: “How can a language come into being
among people who had no prior language, and how can this language achieve
its present perfection and elaboration?” (Michaelis 1760: 78). Also, some of
Michaelis’s rivals had already concerned themselves with this question before
it had even been posed.
In 1748 Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, the president of the Berlin
Academy, had developed in his Réflexions philosophiques sur l’origine des langues
et la signification des mots (Philosophical Reflections on the Origin of Languages
and the Meaning of Words) a model of a sign system to express thoughts with­
out the existence of language, just by using faculties of reason. According
to Maupertuis, translation between distant languages is virtually impossible,
and signs are not strictly valid in regard to reality. He neither foresaw the
consequences of this opinion nor was he up to the philosophical discussion of

2 The French translation of Michaelis’s treatise by Merian and Prémontval (Michaelis 1762,
reissued 1974) became in turn the basis of the English translations, which appeared in
1769 (Michaelis 1769); it was also translated into Dutch in 1771. Whereas in the European
discussion on language this work became an exemplar of the transnational influence of
a text, in Germany the reception of Michaelis’s writing remained rather reserved: Moses
Mendelssohn stressed its significance while at the same time offering much criticism; cf.
72. Brief, 13.12.1759, in Mendelssohn 1991: 106.

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a mathematisation of the sign problem, which he intended in his Philosophical

reflections. Maupertuis’s Dissertation sur les differens [sic] moyens dont les hommes
se sont servis pour exprimer leurs idées (Essay on the Different Means People Use for
Expressing Their Ideas), published in 1756 (1988), clearly shows the continuous
influence of Condillac. Maupertuis subscribed without any restrictions to the
belief that speech originated from the language of gestures, without, how­
ever, drawing conclusions that could contribute something new to the eluci­
dation of anthropological questions, such as the issue of what role language
plays in the nature of man.
What also led to the fact that the problem of the origin of language was
finally posed as a prize question was Johann Peter Süßmilch’s essay, Versuch
eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht vom Menschen, sondern
allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe (1766; ‘Attempt to Prove that the First Lan­
guage Received Its Origin Not from Man, But Alone from the Creator’).
Süßmilch, who wanted to have his essay explicitly understood as a reaction
against Maupertuis, but who also argued against Condillac and Rousseau,
read his work before the Academy in 1756. With its publication ten years later,
he revived the debate on the origin of language once again, and he devel­
oped the thesis of the inseparable relationship of language and thinking as
the central argument against the possibility of the generation of language by
man. According to Süßmilch, language is the necessary prerequisite for the
activity of reason. However, it is such a complicated and perfect product that
its inventors must have possessed reason, which in turn would have been
impossible without language. As the only way out of this dilemma, which
was also formulated by Rousseau, Süßmilch claimed that one must see lan­
guage as a gift from God.
With the (1771) prize question the Academy did not intend any undermin­
ing of the dogma of language as a gift from God in the debate with Süßmilch,
but rather wished to encourage a serious scientific investigation of the anthro­
pological basis of language. Thus, in 1771 the problem was formulated as
follows: “When left to their natural inclinations are people able to invent lan­
guage, and in which manner would they come to such an invention?” (Neis
2003: 95). In the French announcement, the title of the prize question already
directed attention to the relationships between language and human nature:
“En supposant les hommes abandonnés à leurs facultés naturelles, sont-ils
en état d’inventer le langage?” (Neis 2003: 95. ‘Are men able to invent lan­
guage if they can only rely on their natural capacities?’). If it was to be deter­
mined whether people left to their natural abilities would have been able to
invent language and by which means they would have arrived at such an

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 Rousseau to Kant

invention, the focus was no longer, as in Michaelis’s philological perspective,

a weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of the individual languages
as a means of human cognition. The subject under discussion was rather lan­
guage as such, as a fundamental, universal characteristic of human nature.
Insights into the clarification of this characteristic, according to the view of
the Enlightenment, cannot be gained by multiplying original linguistic data
and by considering as many languages and their differences as possible. For
many authors, the basis for reflection is in fact ‘empirical sensationalist,’ i.e.,
they viewed people’s sensory perceptions as their primary source of knowl­
edge. An individual’s given competence in a language was considered suffi­
cient as an empirical basis for notions about the origin of language. Along
with the attacks on Rousseau mentioned above, the dominance of moments
of psychological language observation on the basis of the knowledge of one
language is apparent in the essays submitted in the prize competition.
Even the prize winner Johann Gottfried Herder devoted himself to the
description of the relationship between human feelings and linguistic signs
and thus joined those who took a psychological approach to language (see
Chapter 8). He began the first part of his treatise (1772) with the often misun­
derstood sentence “Already as animals humans have language”; he did not
at all want to imply that man originally was an animal and evolved from
the animal to the human state. Indeed, he adamantly refused to interpret
Rousseau’s ‘savage man’ in this way. Neither did Herder want to assert that
man had language from the beginning of time and that the question of the
origin of language, as a consequence, would be unjustified. With the opening
sentence, Herder did not mean articulated speech, but those natural, sponta­
neous, and emotional cries that both many animal species and man give out.
And just as for Condillac they are a component of the language of gestures
(see Neis 2003: 564; Haym 1954). The spontaneous expressions of feeling are
for Herder a direct and non-manipulable language, a form of sound utterance
with which living creatures were equipped by nature. Both men and animals
can feel and even express their feelings. In the artificial language of civilised
people there are still vestiges of natural language, which break through espe­
cially in moments of arousal (Herder 1978: 10).
Whereas the “language of nature” in civilised society only comes to the
fore in moments of the highest emotions, relics of natural language are much
more frequent in so-called primitive languages (Herder 1978: 12). Thus, the
origin of language becomes not only a fictitious, pseudo-historical topic of
speculation but also a criterion of merit. Origin and primitiveness have posi­
tive connotations. They are ideals that can no longer be achieved by language

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 Gerda Ha ß ler

in Herder’s era and in the future. For Herder, the oriental languages and the
languages of the native peoples of America, which are “eternally inexpressi­
ble for foreigners in this inward, lively tone” (p. 13) are a model of expressive­
ness. The natural languages described by Herder, however, stubbornly resist
a convincing written fixation. Spoken language seemed to him to be a divine
breath; a written letter by contrast was for him a corpse, something that relin­
quished its divine originality due to the domestication of its original power
through a rational process of transcribing oral language into writing (p. 15).
His criticism of the transcription process made him also reject the “letter
hypothesis” attributed to Süßmilch, according to which “the sounds of all lan­
guages known to us can be represented by some twenty letters” (Herder 1978:
13). Yet although he postulated that language originated in savageness, in the
tradition of Epicurus who had already advanced the natural origin of lan­
guage, he clearly distanced himself in his argumentation from an explanation
of the development of human language out of the language of gestures. For
Herder an irresolvable conflict existed between the animal-instinctive nature
of the language of gestures and the arbitrariness and intentionality of articu­
lated speech. However, since reflection is indispensable for the intentional
use of language, Herder did not see any possibility of a transition from the
language of gestures to articulated speech. He rejected Condillac’s concept of
the ‘transformed sensation’ and the hypothesis of a natural, situation-related
creation of signs, but accepted Locke’s dualism of sensation and reflection (see
Ricken 1984: 180; Chapter 8).
Central to Herder’s language origin theory is the concept of Besonnenheit
(‘reflective discernment’ or ‘circumspection’) that he developed in his com­
parison of the abilities of man and animal. In Herder’s anthropological con­
ception man is the homo loquens, the ‘speaking person,’ who distinguishes
himself from animals through language. Thus, Herder assumed parts of the
Cartesian viewpoint against which he had polemicised at the beginning of his
treatise. But he neither wished to subordinate his views to the sensationalism
of Condillac, for whom the difference between man and animal is purely a
matter of gradation, nor did he wish to concur with Rousseau, who placed
man in his natural state dubiously close to animals. For Herder, the charac­
teristic typical of humans is the endlessness of their radius of action. And due
to their “loss of instinct” they may choose among an infinite sphere of action
patterns, for which language is ultimately responsible (Gehlen 1979: 83).
Initially his assertion that language is as essential to man since he is man
sounds redundant, like a tautology. He tried to resolve this tautology with
the aid of the category of ‘circumspection,’ which defines what is specifically

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 Rousseau to Kant

human. On the one hand, circumspection is linked to the concept of con­

sciousness; on the other it expresses a non-directional approach to the activity
of man and the possibility of freely developing powers. In the course of the
argumentation, circumspection is also equated with “reason” and ultimately
with reflection. The term ‘reason’ means here a kind of natural common
sense, which is clearly distinguished from the reasoning of statesmen and
scholars (see Herder 1978: 29). In the end, Herder used the terms ‘circum­
spection’ and ‘reflection’ synonymously and the distinction between them
became vague and blurred (Neis 2003: 582).
The significant role that Herder was acknowledged as playing in the lan­
guage debate has somewhat outshone a number of other insightful writings.
The prize questions did not remain limited to the national context; responses
were also submitted from other countries. It is interesting to consider here
the differences in perspective. With ‘circumspection,’ Herder had shifted the
focus to a universal anthropological characteristic and applied the develop­
ment of language to it as well. Thus, he provided a solution for the dilemma,
stated by Rousseau and Süßmilch, which any hypothesis asserting that man­
kind invented language must come up against. Retrospectively, considering
the language-philosophical developments in Germany in the nineteenth
century, Herder was pigeonholed as a pre-Romantic. In the context of the
“Volksgeist” (‘national character’) issue, contemporary authors distanced
themselves from his views. It is often forgotten that this is not the only area
Herder contributed to, and that in addition Herder was not the only one who
submitted thoughts on the topic of the prize question. The acceptance of
anthropological principles provided space for examining languages in their
specificity, including the limits and possibilities that result from their distinc­
tive characteristics. Accordingly, this distinctiveness alone was supposed to
be useful for human knowledge; the focus, however, was primarily on lan­
guages that were considered to be primordial or exotic enough to lead back
to the principles of human nature.

3 Epistemological Treatment of the Sign

Problem by the Ideologues
When Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy proposed the term Idéologie for
the “science of ideas” ([1803–5]1824–6: vol. i, part 1: Idéologie proprement dite),
he was clearly aware of the fact that he was giving a new name to something
that already existed. This is why Bacon, Locke, or Condillac could initially be
termed ‘ideologues’ without any hesitation. The ideologues evolved from a

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circle that had been meeting in the salon of Madame Helvétius since 1771 and
was closely linked to representatives of the Enlightenment, such as Condillac,
d’Alembert, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, and Marie-Jean-Antoine de Con­
dorcet. Like Volney (real name: Constantin Chassebœuf), they were in part
committed to the Tiers état (‘Third Estate’, i.e., the bourgeoisie and the free
peasants) during the political struggle and debate prior to the French Revolu­
tion. After their disillusionment regarding the possibilities of a constitutional
monarchy, the ideologues became moderate republicans (supporters of the
first French republic).
Their endeavour to adopt and continue the epistemological and language-
theoretical legacy of the Enlightenment began with a new impetus in a
period when they had temporarily lost their influence on the direct shaping
of social-political processes. It seems quite plausible that the ideologues read
Condillac for the first time while imprisoned during Robespierre’s rule (1793).
Later, Destutt de Tracy, in Idéologie proprement dite (1824–6: vol. i, ch. 9: 10)
was to defend the concerns of the ideologues about the “novateurs effrénés,
coiffés d’un bonnet rouge” (‘frantic innovators wearing a red hat’) and identified
himself expressly with the Enlightenment and its struggle against prejudices.
After the 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), the overthrow of Robespierre and his
cohorts, and the end of the Terror, the ideologues seized the opportunity to
influence the system of education for the French ‘citizen’ (citoyen), and thus
to shape society. Most of the ideologues took public office, including P.-J. G.
Cabanis, P.-C.-F. Daunou, P.-L. Ginguené, C. F. Dupuis, J. Lakanal, M.-F.-P. G.
Maine de Biran, who at that time still belonged to the circle of the ideologues,
and later also J. M. Degérando. A decree prepared by Daunou demanded
the establishment of central schools in all départements (‘counties’). The task
of these schools was to provide education in proper thinking, and based on
this, in responsible action, and it was to include preparation for useful profes­
sions. Languages and literature, natural science and mathematics, and moral
and political sciences were named the three pillars of education. The focus,
besides mathematics, was on the analysis of ideas with the aid of linguistic
signs (Désirat & Hordé 1975, 1981; Chevalier 1986: 207). This linguistic control
of knowledge promised both equality of educational opportunities and appli­
cability to various sciences, since each science ultimately operated with signs.
From 1795 until 1802 the ideologues thus had the best preconditions for
their implementation of educational policy and organisation of the sciences.
During the ‘Thermidorean Reaction,’ an eventful period in which one could
initially hardly expect language-theoretical topics to become a central subject
of discussion, the ideologues were primarily concerned with sign problems.

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 Rousseau to Kant

They strove for the homogenisation of knowledge especially on a semiotic

basis. In the Institut National founded in 1795, the ideologues’ stronghold was
a section of the ‘Class of Moral and Political Sciences,’ which was named –
characteristically fitting their programme – ‘Analysis of Sensations and Ideas’.
In 1797 this class announced a prize problem: ‘Determine the influence of
signs on the formation of ideas.’ The aim was to stimulate reflections on how
to improve scientific languages as analytic methods. Degérando received the
prize in 1799 for a work published a year later (Degérando 1800a). The works
of P. F. Lancelin and P. Prévost, which had each received an ‘honourable
mention,’ were published as well (Lancelin 1801; Prévost 1799). The Society
of the Observers of Man, the majority of whose members were ideologues,
encouraged language-theoretical reflections in the framework of anthropo­
logical problems (Prévost 1799; Degérando 1800b; Lancelin 1800–3; cf. Jauffret
1909–11; Acton 1959; Chevalier, Désirat, & Hordé 1976; Staum 1980; Busse &
Trabant 1986; Azouvi 1992; Ganault 1992).
The ideologues wanted to create educational and scientific institutions that
would guarantee an optimal way for humans to achieve perfection. They
based this endeavour on the thesis that thinking could be improved through
perfect sign systems. Condillac had already established that even people
who were not necessarily geniuses were at least able to learn one language,
which then in turn, according to its structure, could lead them to correct
thoughts (see Condillac [1746]1947–51: i, 99–106, and Chapter 8). When grant­
ing a central position to an analysis that used linguistic signs in all processes of
acquiring knowledge, the ideologues followed Condillac’s doctrine. The rela­
tionship of language and thinking was characterised for the ideologues and
also for Condillac by ‘reciprocity.’ If the only means of finding truth accord­
ing to Condillac is in analytical thinking, this is itself dependent on signs. The
development of the ability to think thus is built upon the degree of perfection
of languages. Within the sensationalist, genetic, and semiotic epistemological
programme of the ideologues, the history of humankind was represented as
“the history of man’s self-construction via ever better sign systems until its
perfection” (Schlieben-Lange 1984: 25).
But there were some ideologues who revised the fundamental position of
the cognitive function of language. This can be explained in part by a change
in the conception of science, which became oriented especially toward the
observation of positive facts. Furthermore, the pedagogical objective of the
ideologues had an influence, which led to the striving for a homogenised ‘sum’
of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and also to a self-imposed pragmatic
limitation that led to the forgoing of theoretical coherence. Finally, also the

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conscious changes of philosophical positions under the post-revolutionary

conditions that had developed in France were a possible distinguishing factor.
The concept of language of the ideologue Dominique Joseph Garat, who gave
lectures from 1795 to 1797 on the ‘analyse de l’entendement’ (‘analysis of cogni­
tion processes’), met with objections from his circle of listeners. In particular,
Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, who was a central figure in the French Illuminati
(freethinkers who were an offshoot of the Enlightenment), presented arguments
which – although they followed Enlightenment thought – also included Rous­
seau’s ideas, all of which were more or less excluded by the ideologues. In his
lectures, Garat presented an introduction to the study of the sciences on the basis
of Condillac’s analytical method and, in an exaggerated comparison of thinking
with arithmetic, pointed out that both depended on signs and could be improved
by perfecting sign systems. Signe (‘sign’) would therefore be a more appropri­
ate term than parole (‘speech’) or langue (‘language’), because all languages only
served to represent our ideas (Garat in Séances, 1800: 30). Saint-Martin’s criti­
cism was directed against this instrumentalist reduction of language to its sign
dimension (in Débats, 1800–1: vol. iii, 85). He accused his opponent of simplifying
and overestimating the institutionalised character of signs. The reason why our
languages are so different, according to him, is that they are the expression of
our thoughts and judgements. This difference contrasts with the uniformity of
communication modes of all animal species, which are not capable of rational
thought. Thus, he by no means viewed the differences between languages as a
communicative expression of different contents of thought, but asserted that
language and thought have a common development from one source. For him,
language arose from being created by God. It not only occurs as mediator of
knowledge, rather its primary function is poetic. The concept of language as
‘poesis,’ as a consequence of mystic thinking, stands here in clear contrast to the
instrumental and analytical concepts of the ideologues.
The clearly emerging opposing tendencies in the assessment of the role of
signs in cognitive processes can be described as a semiotisation and a desemi­
otisation of the theory of knowledge. The starting point of the semiotisation
of ideology as meta-science is the constitutive role that Condillac had already
granted to linguistic signs, the role of explaining higher thinking processes. At
the same time, it was exactly on this point that many ideologues stressed their
difference of opinion with Condillac, because they under no circumstances
wanted him to be viewed as chef de secte (‘head of the sect’). On the one hand,
they aspired to innovations and therefore distanced themselves from their
teacher; on the other hand, distancing themselves from him seemed neces­
sary due to increasing allegations of materialistic tendencies.

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 Rousseau to Kant

One of the striking lines of thought is Cabanis’s (1805) exaggeration of

the sensationalist hypotheses with respect to physiology. According to him,
without signs there would be no thinking and possibly even no perceptions
that could be differentiated from each other. Via the nerve channels, the
sensory perceptions, which are unordered and isolated from each other, are
conducted to the brain, where they undergo a process similar to digestion.
Although he assumed from the start the unity of mankind and held physiol­
ogy, epistemology, and ethics to be three sides of one and the same science,
his claims about the true relationships of language with other manifestations
of human life remained speculative. However, this is where he used language
determinism as an explanation for the differences between peoples, because a
reference to historical and social factors would probably not be appropriate to
explain them. And he derived modes of thought and behaviour as well as the
possibilities of the intellectual and political development of different peoples
from the global characteristics of the languages they speak.
In the course of the semiotisation of the theory of knowledge implemented
by some of the ideologues, a change in orientation took place in compari­
son to Condillac’s sensationalist language theory: he had assumed that all
human capabilities developed from sensory perceptions with the aid of lin­
guistic signs. But according to Destutt de Tracy ([1803–5]1824–6), only the
capability of perception can have various ‘contents’: the sensory perceptions
themselves (“sensations”), the memory of them (“mémoire”), the relationships
between them (“jugement”), and human will (“volonté”). The epistemological
problem of the role of signs in the transformation of sensory perceptions into
complex ideas is thus transferred to the semantic question of the nature of the
contents denoted by linguistic signs.
Moreover, in the last years of the eighteenth century there were several
practical impetuses to rethinking sign-theoretical problems. It was mainly
because of the language of chemistry that the description of the influence of
signs on the formation of ideas was explicitly placed in relation to the pro­
gress of the sciences in the Institut National’s prize question of 1797: Déter-
miner l’influence des signes sur la pensée (‘Determine the influence of signs on
thought’). Besides, what needed to be dealt with regarding physiology were
suggestions for a universal writing system and the results of instruction for
deaf-mutes (see Chapter 7). From these problems ensued the question of the
nature of those signs that are necessary for acquiring knowledge. The ideo­
logues supposed that the problem of compensation for areas of perception
that did not exist in some individuals (e.g., hearing, vision) – much discussed
during the Enlightenment – was a matter of semiotics and to be dealt with in

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 Gerda Ha ß ler

the framework of sign theory (see Sicard [1800a]1803, [1800b]1808, [1808]1818;

Bébian 1817). Moreover, in 1798, the ideologue Pierre Laromiguière pub­
lished Condillac’s unfinished work on the language of arithmetic, where in
particular he describes science as a “well-formed language” (langue bien faite)
(Laromiguière 1805). This gave rise to unequivocally hostile statements by
the ideologues about the influence of signs on the development of sciences.
The ideologues countered Condillac’s thesis that one must start with the
improvement of languages to make the sciences perfect, with arguments
aimed at desemioticising the concept of science. Thus P. Prévost (1799)
stressed that observation hardly depended on language and that it would ulti­
mately not suffice for a science to build up a nomenclature. Destutt de Tracy,
who, in the first volume of Éléments d’idéologie ([1803]1824), treated, like Con­
dillac did, the language of algebra in which analogy is perfect as an example
of a language of science, added a rather lengthy annotation (in [1805]1826)
in which he took the critical discussion among the ideologues into account.
Language does not determine the cognitive possibilities of speakers; it is not
words that lead to things. Language can only be made perfect in relation to
the development of knowledge-immanent cognitive means, and it can thus
positively influence cognitive processes. Using the example of numbers (often
cited in this connection), Degérando (1800a) asserts in the conclusion to his
prize essay that underdeveloped signs do not represent any impediment to
thinking, but are rather a manifestation of the need to focus more attention
onto the particular area of knowledge to which they belong.

4 Maine de Biran’s Enhancement of the Value

of Inner Activity and the Signe Intérieur
The tendency to enhance the value of the inner activity of humans that is to
a great extent independent of the physical organisation of the body and of
sensations was pursued with even more zeal by Maine de Biran. He defined
an “inner sign” (signe intérieur), as a manifestation of volition, and he ascribed
to it the ability to process sensations through ideas (see Maine de Biran 1802,
1807; Azouvi 1995). Although by doing so he reverted from the semiotic
approach of the ideologues back to Condillac’s epistemological approach,
he reinterpreted the central point of the sensationalist theory of language,
the definition of higher intellectual processes, as “transformed sensations”
(sensations transformées). Originally, he had adhered to Condillac’s doctrine,
which incited him to study philosophy at the Institut National. In his theory
of language, he followed the doctrine of Condillac and the ideologues,

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 Rousseau to Kant

conceiving of language primarily as a phenomenon that had developed his­

torically and can be explained on the basis of a number of social needs and
physiological conditions. The idea that speech grew out of gestural language
pervades his Mémoire sur l’influence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser (‘Treatise
on the Influence of Habit on the Capacity of Thinking,’ [1802]1987), which
for good reason has been called a ‘defense and illustration of ideology.’ This
idea also permeates his Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée (‘Treatise on
the Decomposition of Thought,’ [1802]1988) and his Essai sur les fondements de
la psychologie (‘Essay on the Foundations of Psychology,’ [1812]2001). Maine
de Biran also made clear his judgement of the significance of the analytical
method, the discovery of which he declared to be the greatest finding of the
eighteenth century.
The fact that Maine de Biran increasingly distanced himself from the ide­
ologues is due to the emergence of his theory of dualism, i.e., the dualism
of “activity” (effort voulu) and “sensitivity” (impressions), whereby he equates
sensitivity with passivity. For him ‘activity’ is the determining principle with
which all functions of signs were linked from the start. It is not because of
language that man is endowed with “attention” and “imagination.” Instead,
it is because he is an active, thinking creature that he created language. On
the basis of these premises Maine de Biran criticised Condillac, especially his
concept of the role of language in transforming sensations. The rejection of
‘transformed sensation’ and the acceptance of the dualism of activity and
sensitivity are usually attributed to the influence of Rousseau. Although this
influence is certainly important, one should see here a continuation of the
course of thought already established by the ideologues. In order to develop
Maine de Biran’s concept of dualism one would only have to combine
Cabanis’s idea of sensibilité interne (‘internal sensibility’) and Destutt de Tra­
cy’s mobilité volontaire (‘voluntary mobility’). Even Maine de Biran’s concept
of the sign, because it emphasises a cause–effect relationship, is reminiscent
of the conceptions of the French Illuminati and can be considered as belong­
ing to this withdrawal from the ideologues. Destutt de Tracy’s ([1801]1992)
and J. François Thurot’s (1830–3, 1837) theories allowed such a wide scope
for the classification of arbitrary signs that even Maine de Biran’s diffusely
defined signe intérieur (‘interior sign’) could fit within it. Maine de Biran
defines the interior sign as a manifestation of volonté (‘effort,’ ‘will’), which
is capable of changing impressions into ideas. By doing so, he only formally
goes back to Condillac and in reality, reinterprets the central proposition of
sensationalist language theory that had assigned this function to words and
not to interior signs.

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The direction of Maine de Biran’s philosophical development was influ­

enced by Degérando, not only because the latter was helpful to him (due to
his influence under Napoleon) but also because Maine de Biran considered
himself to be his student. Thus, it was Degérando to whom Maine de Biran
first confided his fears that he could be reproached for materialism, arguing
that philosophy and science should operate according to the physical world,
and that is all that exists. Sensualist theory, still present in Maine de Biran’s
Treatise had several analogies with materialism. It argued that all complex
ideas came from sensations and were composed with the help of signs. The
distinction between the active capacity of perceiving and passive feeling
and the assumption of a free will that is constitutive of the active individual
become the best arguments against materialism, which tries to explain all
intellectual abilities on the basis of the organisation of the human body and
ascribe them to propriété sensitive (‘sensory property’) and sensation transformée
(‘transformed sensation’).
For Maine de Biran the secondary role of language follows from the
assumption that mankind inherently has the capability of abstraction. The
use of words presupposes the perception of the relationships they express.
Words facilitate and enhance the cognition of abstract relationships, but
they cannot be supposed to be the principle and the source of this cognition.
Maine de Biran takes up the dilemma of language genesis already found in
Frain du Tremblay and Rousseau: how could languages have been formed
if the capability of abstraction had not preceded their invention? According
to him ([1812]2001), language is only constitutive of thought that is empty
of meaning. Thinking that only relies on linguistic signs and the habits pro­
moted by them would constantly run the risk of missing the true essence of
things. Thus, his central theme of habit includes language, which is depicted
as an instrument of habit. However, for Maine de Biran proper thinking is
characterised precisely by the fact that it frees itself from habit through “con­
scious effort” (effort voulu).
The fundamental limitation of the influence of language on proper think­
ing, which grants language only a helping function, excludes the possibility for
different languages to be the source of different ways of producing thought.
Each language would have sufficient possibilities for the development of all
human abilities. If a language should in fact contain obstacles for the develop­
ment of certain abilities, people would still be able, on the basis of their ‘will,’
their ‘effort,’ to overcome these obstacles and to develop themselves even
more vigorously. But this is purely hypothetical, since in reality all languages
are always adequate for the needs of their speakers.

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 Rousseau to Kant

5 Language in the Scottish School of

Common Sense
Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense, which
places the criterion of truth in human common sense (see Chapter 8), insisted
that our knowledge is based on principles that are evident and recognised as
such by common sense. From these original principles found in all normal
minds, man derives a body of primordial “truths of common sense” that serve
as a sort of general fund of knowledge for mankind. The philosophy of com­
mon sense, sometimes called the “Scottish School” due to the nationality of
its exponents, represents one phase of the reaction against the ‘idealism’ of
Berkeley and Hume. Berkeley contended that there are no mind-independent
things, that, in the famous phrase, esse est percipi (aut percipere) – ‘to be is to
be perceived (or to perceive)’ – esse est percipi implies that existence is entirely
composed of immaterial ideas. Hume agrees with Locke about perception
as the foundation of our ideas, and with Berkeley that we cannot justifiably
make a distinction between primary and secondary qualities of perception,
but disagrees with Berkeley about God as the universal mind controlling
those perceptions.
Reid, whose dissent from Locke’s doctrines turned him away from sen­
sationalist epistemology, set out to vindicate the common sense, or natural
judgement, of people, by which the real existence of both subject and object
is held to be directly known. He argued that if it cannot be proved that there
is any real external world or continuously existing mind, the true conclusion
is not that these have no existence or are unknowable, but that our conscious­
ness of them is a basic fact, which neither needs, nor is capable, of proof,
but is itself the ground of all proof: “All knowledge and all science must be
built upon principles that are self-evident; and of such principles every man
who has common sense is a competent judge” (Reid [1785]1827: 272). Dugald
Stewart, who followed Reid’s theory without serious modification, was more
precise, and gave greater prominence than Reid to his doctrine of “sugges­
tion,” or the association of ideas (Stewart 1810). Mention must also be made
of Reid’s contemporary, the eccentric author of Antient Metaphysics, or the Sci-
ence of Universals (1779–99), namely, James Burnett, Lord Monboddo.
Monboddo developed his origin-of-language theory as a historical sup­
plement to universal grammar and pursued with it the objective of creating
a counter-position to Locke’s epistemology (see Chapter 8). He restored a
neo-Platonic ontology according to which ideas are “models or archetypes of
all material forms; of such ideas the intellectual world is composed of which

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the material is no more than a copy” (1773–92: i, 80). On the other hand, Mon­
boddo had taken note of the works of French missionaries about ‘primitive’
languages, which gave a different orientation to his theoretical reflection.
He sought to determine how language developed to its most perfect state
and from there to arrive at the true history and philosophy of mankind. For
Monboddo language came into being only after the formation of ideas and
had its origin in unarticulated screams. Moreover, it can only have emanated
from socialised human beings, for whose needs it had become essential. With
this thesis, Monboddo explicitly responded to the question that Rousseau left
open in the Discourse. Regarding the origin-of-language question, he distanced
himself from the assumption of a revealed language and proposed a model
of human genesis, in which the linguistic, rational, and cultural characteris­
tics specific to human beings are neither innate nor natural, but have been
brought about through a gradual historical development which man himself
has produced. Instinctual behaviour is not what leads to language genesis,
but rather reflective observation and experience, which gradually lead to the
development of habits (1792: i, 171). Monboddo points to the significance of
“fact and experience” (p. 131) in order to learn a language. According to him,
it is indisputable that children initially do not have any precise ideas, and only
very inadequate sensory perception. Thus, the acquisition of ideas and lan­
guage does not take place with the aid of nature, but is rather the result of
“instruction” and “conversing with elderly persons” (ibid.).
James Beattie (1788a) popularised the principles of the philosophy of
common sense and applied them to theological controversy. Like Mon­
boddo, he stressed the special significance of imitation for children’s
language acquisition. However, he pointed out that despite all physical
predisposition, language acquisition does not by any means take place
without problems; it is rather “the effect of daily exercise continued for
several years from morning to night” (ibid.). Beattie argued that there was
no motivation for primeval human beings, described as animal-like crea­
tures, to suddenly communicate using articulated speech, which would
exceed their intellectual abilities by far, and he rejected the Epicurean con­
ception of the natural origin of language. If there ever was a time when
all of mankind was a speechless and brutal race of animals, all mankind
should, in the ordinary course of things, have continued to be mute to
this day. To such animals, speech could not be necessary, since they are
supposed to have existed for ages without it; and it cannot be imagined
that dumb and beastly savages would have ever thought of contriving
unnecessary arts, since they had no examples of them in the world around

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 Rousseau to Kant

them (Beattie 1788a: 96; see also Beattie 1771). The first human beings,
who lacked a parental model, could only have acquired language through
“immediate inspiration.” According to Beattie, mankind’s original lan­
guage, in contrast with the further development and differentiation of sep­
arate languages, was not the product of human invention and imitation,
but could only have come into being through divine inspiration.
Authors like Monboddo and Beattie – with different results – rejected the
explanation that language came into being through the spontaneous behav­
iour of people on the basis of sensory perceptions. On the other hand, lin­
guistic empiricism underwent a radicalisation initiated by John Horne Tooke,
who in his Diversions of Purley ([1786]1805/2002), reintroduced a radical nom­
inalism based on Locke (see also Bergheaud 1990: 49 and Chapter 8). Tooke’s
work stimulated Stewart’s critical treatment of language-theoretical nominal­
ism according to which general or abstract terms and predicates exist, while
universals or abstract objects, which are sometimes thought to correspond to
these terms, do not exist. From 1792 until 1827 Stewart became increasingly
preoccupied with a theory of language problems in relation to epistemology
and moral theory. He rejected (1810) the concept of meaning as the juxtapo­
sition of the semantic property of individual words, which is reconstructed
from etymology. He proposed instead that meaning is determined synchroni­
cally and textually. This questioned the interpretative value of historical stud­
ies of language, and metaphysical conclusions were rejected when they go
beyond etymological statements.

6 Historical Enthusiasm as a Basis for

Philology
In contrast, Friedrich von Schlegel, the theoretical head of the German
Romantic School, had declared ‘historical enthusiasm’ to be the basis of
philology, which he wanted to be understood as an art and not a science
([1797]1928: 17, 21–3, 26; see Nuesse 1962). He presupposed, just like Johann
Gottlob Fichte, a dual history in which an empirical history determined by the
needs of society is justified by a principle granted a priori. He rejected the nar­
rowing of philology to the study of Greek and Latin texts and wanted to have
the oriental languages as well as newly discovered languages acknowledged
and integrated. In addition, he emphasised the difference between “scientific
thoroughness” and the “empirical linguistic knowledge of a citizen” (1836: 8).
According to Schlegel, philology encompasses all language scholarship, since
linguistic science is the epitome of many different kinds of knowledge. For

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 Gerda Ha ß ler

example, he stated that one cannot understand words if one does not know
the things they denote (p. 8). Therefore, philology is for him only an ancillary
science (p. 9), although he did stress its enormous extent.
In his work Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder (‘On the Language and
Wisdom of the Indians,’ [1808]1977), Schlegel not only developed a specula-
tive principle on the origin of language, but also criticised all previous theo-
ries of the origin of language and proposed a dichotomy between the genesis
of inflected and uninflected languages. He considered that since Sanskrit is
inflected, i.e., it modifies word forms to handle grammatical relations and
relational categories, therefore it is organic: Sanskrit roots have produc-
tive vitality like living organisms. In uninflected languages, however, only
mechanical forms that always have the same shape can be found which are
attached to the root words externally. Thus, Schlegel attributed an organic
character only to inflected languages, preferentially to the European lan-
guages. Semitic languages are for him not inflected and he considers them
to be ‘agglutinative’ languages (agglutination is the morphological process of
adding affixes to the base of a word). Whereas an unbridgeable chasm seems
to exist between inflected and agglutinative languages, Schlegel postulated a
developmental process between Sanskrit and the existing inflected ‘daugh-
ter’ languages (e.g., Greek, Germanic, or Latin), a process of deterioration
and decline from original purity (Formigari 1999: 241). For example, the first
person singular of the Sanskrit verb form results in different final syllables
(here based on the root meaning ‘to bear’): bhárami ̄ in Vedic Sanskrit, φέρω
in Ancient Greek, fero ̄ in Latin, baíra/bεra in Gothic, biru in Old Irish, and ber0̨
in Old Church Slavic. Schlegel’s metaphors, which compare languages with
living organisms, are striking. The benefit of organic metaphors in philoso-
phy was sanctioned by Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775–1854), who stressed
the priority of the whole over the metaphor and thus postulated the necessity
of a holistic concept that would take precedence over an explanation of the
parts (see Schmitter 1999).
However, Schlegel’s assumption of the difference in quality of inflected
and agglutinative languages compared with ‘isolating’ languages (with no
affixes) rendered the monogenesis of language, which had dominated the
eighteenth century, an impossible thesis/principle for him. For uninflected
languages he proposed ([1808]1977) the hypothesis of a natural language ori-
gin: they had a rich source of metaphoric expressions. Metaphors were con-
sidered to be a creative source of language development because they allow
the expression of abstract thoughts with words expressing related concrete
ideas. Onomatopoeic expressions were still close to their sensual origins and

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 Rousseau to Kant

distant from abstract meanings. In contrast, for Schlegel, the origin of San­
skrit is only imaginable as holistic, since it had a complete and perfect struc­
ture from the start.

7 Kant’s Challenge to Language Theory

Several approaches to language-theoretical thought at the end of the eight­
eenth century problematised the sensationalist explanation of the genesis and
function of language. But even greater were the challenges that arose from
the philosophy of Immanuel Kant; they were influential both in parallel to,
and in combination with, the schools of thought described above (see Lieb­
rucks 1977; Villers 1997; Simon 2003).
Kant’s concept of transcendentalism, according to which there are a priori
valid judgements that need not be derived from experience, questioned the
cognitive model that had functioned for two centuries, in which the expla­
nation of human knowledge predominantly arose from the sensory percep­
tions. This experience-based epistemology led, among other things, to an
independent theory of semantics based on an anthropological interpretation
of the antithesis between arbitrariness and naturalness. Arbitrary signs, which
unlike natural signs are not produced as spontaneous reactions to situations,
require a determination by convention and allow a higher quality of mental
operations. Rationalistic grammar and empirical epistemology were quite
compatible with each other as long as the structures of grammar and thought
were considered to be the same. Language was viewed as experience that
was semiotically shaped and transformed. By contrast, the new transcenden­
tal form concept countermands the compatibility of the concept of language
and thought content (see Kant [1781]1979, [1783]1979, and [1798]1964).
The responses of language theories to the transcendental challenge can be
classified as taking three different directions (see Formigari 1994: 9–12):
(1) Attempts to re-establish a general grammar based on Kant’s transcen­
dental logic led to a rejection of the empirical method and thus of the
professional philologists whose work used historical-comparative meth­
ods current during that period (see Chapters 11 and 12). Because the a
priori nature of the assertions of general grammar, as well as general
grammar as such, had fallen into disrepute, pre-Kantian grammar was
rejected as well. (General grammar is defined as a description of lan­
guage according to principles superordinate to individual languages and
which lead to results that are applicable to all languages.)

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(2) The philosophy of language, represented primarily by Humboldt (see

Chapter 10), no longer viewed language as an element of analysis, but as
an independent force whose influence cannot be explained biologically
or from the structure of the world. Language itself thus becomes a tran­
scendental element.
(3) Retracing what is non-arbitrary regarding the linguistic forms back to
the organic constitution of man allowed the restoration of the unity
between language and the world. This is the basis of Herder’s position in
his Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Metacritique on the Critique of
Pure Reason ([1799]1969), but as a position within the entire development
it remained a markedly minority opinion.
Although Kant outlined approaches to semiotics, they were not inte­
grated into his transcendental philosophy. Semiotic ideas can be found in
Kant’s Criticism of Judgement ([1781]1979) in the definition of linguistic signs
as “Charakterismen” (‘characterisations’), which do not allow establishing
a relation between designations and their corresponding concepts. Even
the Schemata (‘schemes’) cannot be ascribed a semantic quality, since they
are free of content and, as a priori existing cognitive units, organise empir­
ical concepts. This did not impede Fichte (Von der Sprachfähigkeit und dem
Ursprung der Sprach [‘Language Capability and the Origin of Language’],
1795) from establishing a relationship between Kant’s Schemata and Locke’s
nominalist explanation of word meanings (see Chapter 8). Schelling (1800)
even went so far as to submit the verification of Kant’s doctrine to the anal­
ysis of languages.
The few statements that can be found in Kant’s writings on language
issues, e.g., the question of a transcendental meaning of tenses and adverbs
or the formulation of thinking as inner use of language, do not fundamentally
change the fact that Kant was silent on the subject of language. Yet Kant
must have been aware of the intense language discussion ongoing during his
time (see Formigari 1994). An explanation for this surprising situation can be
found in an interpretation of Metacritique referring back to Kant. Herder had
argued against Kant that language was a phenomenon determined by bio­
logical structure and had ultimately suggested that thought was determined
by language. This view, which led away from pure reason, was far removed
from Kant’s view, as is evident in his “purification of philosophy,” in which
pure reason should be observed without the aid of forms such as signs that
are perceivable through the senses. This could also explain why in the period
of German Romanticism, Herder’s Metacritique ([1799]1969) was ignored.

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 Rousseau to Kant

The critical treatment of Kant’s concept of the transcendental finally led

Herder to reconstruct the empirical genesis of principles of thinking such as
time and space. The point is that the latter are not given a priori, but are grad­
ually consolidated into language via experience. Via language they work as a
historical and objective substratum and give form to thought. The antithesis
between Herder and Kant can be summarised with the following simple for­
mula: Kant’s transcendental analysis, according to Herder, releases the soul
from every experience, whereas Herder’s analysis of language is based on a
historical and empirical method.
The period from Rousseau to Kant, which encompassed the second half
of the eighteenth century, was marked by profound changes in linguistic-
theoretical thought. The tenet of sensationalism that linguistic signs had a
formative influence on human thought and the theory of differences of lan­
guages as means of cognition were predominant around the middle of the
eighteenth century. In subsequent decades, however, the influence of sen­
sationalism began to wane. Various authors and schools of philosophy por­
trayed the influence of language on thought as exaggerated. Finally, Kant
purified his epistemology by omitting language and only admitted non-verbal
categories to validate truth.

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