Dan L. Bagatell, N.H. Bar No.

268285
PERKINS COIE LLP
3 Weatherby Road
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
Telephone: 602.351.8250
Facsimile: 602.648.7000
DBagatell@perkinscoie.com

Attorney for Defendant Julie E. Schwartz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Sensa Verogna, Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-01047-LM

Plaintiff,

v.

The Hon. Andrea Johnstone et al.,

Defendants.

DEFENDANT SCHWARTZ’S OBJECTION TO

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY................................................................. 1

II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 3

III. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 4

A. Reconsideration is extraordinary relief.................................................. 4

B. The Court acted well within its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s

motion to recuse ...................................................................................... 4

C. The Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim........... 5

1. Plaintiff cannot plausibly plead the required conspiracy ........... 5

2. Verogna’s Section 1985(2) claim should also be dismissed

for failure to allege any “force, intimidation, or threat”
from the supposed conspiracy ...................................................... 7

3. The Court should also dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2)

claim because he has not suffered a cognizable injury ............... 8

D. Plaintiff does not appear to be pursuing any independent claim

under Section 1985(3) ............................................................................. 9

E. The Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1986

claim as derivative ................................................................................ 10

F. The Court correctly recognized that Plaintiff cannot bring a

Bivens claim against Schwartz ............................................................. 11

IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 12

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Alston v. Spiegel,
988 F.3d 564 (1st Cir. 2021) ................................................................................ 5, 6
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ......................................................................................... 11, 12
Brawer v. Horowitz,
535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976) ..................................................................................... 7
Brown v. Chaffee,
612 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1979) ............................................................................. 7, 9
Correctional Svcs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61 (2001) ................................................................................................. 11
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook,
680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1982) .................................................................................. 10
Earle v. Benoit,
850 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1988) .................................................................................... 5
Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007) ................................................................................................... 9
Glaros v. Perse,
628 F.2d 679 (1st Cir. 1980) .................................................................................... 6
Glass v. Pfeffer,
849 F.2d 1261 (10th Cir. 1988) ............................................................................... 8
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971) ................................................................................................. 10
Haddle v. Garrison,
525 U.S. 121 (1998) ............................................................................................... 10
Hennessy v. City of Melrose,
194 F.3d 237 (1st Cir. 1999) .................................................................................. 11
Kinnard v. Brisson,
No. C-03-3127 MMC, 2004 WL 1465693 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) ................. 8, 9
Lath v. Oak Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass’n,
No. 16-cv-463-LM, 2017 WL 1051001 (D.N.H. Mar. 20, 2017) .............................. 7
Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth.,
515 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2008) .................................................................................... 11

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

McGillicuddy v. Clements,
746 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1984) ...................................................................................... 6
McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co.,
817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................. 7
Palmer v. Champion Mortg.,
465 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................... 4
Parker v. Landry,
935 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................ 6
Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth.,
531 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2008) .................................................................................. 10
Slotnick v. Garfinkle,
632 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1980) .................................................................................. 11
Slotnick v. Staviskey,
560 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1977) ...................................................................................... 6
Swan v. Barbadoro,
520 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................... 4
United States, In re,
158 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................... 5
United States, In re,
666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981) .................................................................................... 5
Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro,
597 F.3d 423 (1st Cir. 2010) .................................................................................. 10
Verogna v. Twitter, Inc.,
No. 20-536-SM (D.N.H.) .................................................................................passim
Verogna v. Twitter, Inc.,
Nos. 20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091, 21-1317 (1st Cir.) ........................................... 2, 4
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) ..................................................................................... 11, 12

Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1985 ...................................................................................................passim
42 U.S.C. § 1986 ................................................................................................ 2, 10, 11

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

Other Authorities
D.N.H. LR 83.5, DR-1 ................................................................................................... 3
N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(c)(2) & cmt. 5 ...................................................................... 3

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 I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Court correctly dismissed this suit. This objection to Plaintiff’s “Rule

59(e) Motion to Vacate Order and Judgment” provides additional context and legal

authority in support of the Court’s Dismissal Order of January 27, 2022 [Doc. 13].

The Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim on grounds

that Plaintiff had failed to adequately allege a conspiracy. Dismissal Order 14. That

conclusion was sufficient and dispositive because an actionable “conspiracy” is the

sine qua non of a Section 1985(2) claim. But there are at least two more bases upon

which the Court may and should rely in dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim

against Ms. Schwartz.

First, the Section 1985(2) claim required Plaintiff to allege that he was

deterred from participation in a federal lawsuit by the conspiracy’s “force, intimi-

dation, or threat.” That bar is high. And here, where Plaintiff’s grievance is that

Schwartz was permitted to appear pro hac vice before this Court, it plainly cannot

be met.

Second, the Section 1985(2) claim required Plaintiff to allege that he was

directly deterred from pursuing a federal court action. As the Court has recognized,

Plaintiff’s claims “stem from a separate case, Verogna v. Twitter, 20-536-SM.”

Dismissal Order 3. The Dismissal Order states that “Judge McAuliffe dismissed the

case” and that a resultant appeal had been “dismissed … for failure to comply with

an order to pay a filing fee.” Id. at 4. That is not entirely correct, as neither

Verogna’s district court case nor his First Circuit appeal has been dismissed. The

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district court litigation was stayed pending resolution of the First Circuit appeal.

Verogna/Twitter, Docket Entry of Sept. 28, 2020 (“[T]his court will stay further

action pending resolution of plaintiff’s appeal[.]”).1 And, after a number of

separately filed appeals and consolidations, the First Circuit appeal has not been

dismissed; it has been fully briefed and awaits decision. Verogna v. Twitter, Inc.,

Nos. 20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091, 21-1317 (1st Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (notice that the

consolidated cases are submitted on the briefs without oral argument). The fact

that the Verogna/Twitter Litigation remains pending provides another basis for

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim because Plaintiff cannot plausibly

allege that he has been “deterred” from participating in a federal court action when

that action remains pending.

Plaintiff’s other criticisms of the Dismissal Order have no merit. The Court

acted well within its discretion in rejecting Plaintiff’s recusal request. Plaintiff

concedes that he is not pursuing an independent claim under Section 1985(3). And

Plaintiff also recognizes that his derivative Section 1986 claim must be dismissed if

his Section 1985(2) claim fails.

The Court should therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion. If it takes any action

beyond that, it should supplement its Dismissal Order by identifying the two

additional grounds discussed above for dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim.

1The Court was correct that Judge McAuliffe suggested that dismissal of that case
was “inevitable” for failure to comply with the Court’s unmasking order, Dismissal
at 4 n.3, but that case has not been dismissed yet.

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 II. BACKGROUND

As the Dismissal Order observes (at 3–4), Plaintiff’s claims in this case arise

out of the Verogna/Twitter Litigation. In particular, they stem from his objection to

Schwartz’s appearance pro hac vice in the Verogna/Twitter Litigation and the fact

that her name appeared on Twitter’s Motion to Dismiss, which was signed by New

Hampshire-licensed attorney Jonathan Eck with the notation (consistent with New

Hampshire ethical rules) that Schwartz’s pro hac vice application was forthcoming.

Plaintiff complained about her participation when objecting to her pro hac vice

motion. Verogna/Twitter Litigation, Doc. 12. He complained about it when moving

to strike Twitter’s motion to dismiss. Id. Doc. 14 ¶ 3. He later raised it again (id.

Doc. 28), and again (id. Doc. 34), and again (id. Doc. 39), and again (id. Docs. 46,

46-1). As the Dismissal Order notes (at 4), Verogna’s objections to Schwartz’s

representation of Twitter were repeatedly rejected in that litigation. And properly

so. See N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 5.5(c)(2) & cmt. 5 (a lawyer admitted in another U.S.

jurisdiction may provide legal services in New Hampshire on a temporary basis if

those services are reasonably related to a proceeding before a tribunal and the

lawyer reasonably expects to be authorized to appear in that proceeding); D.N.H.

LR 83.5, DR-1 (adopting the N.H. Rules of Professional Conduct).

The Verogna/Twitter litigation remains pending. In fact, Twitter’s motion to

dismiss in that lawsuit—the lone motion underpinning all of Verogna’s complaints

about Schwartz’s participation—was denied. Verogna/Twitter Litigation, Endorsed

Order of March 8, 2021. This bears repeating. Plaintiff maintains an active lawsuit

against Twitter, and none of his claims have been dismissed from that lawsuit. That

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litigation is merely stayed pending appellate resolution of an ancillary issue:

whether Plaintiff may proceed anonymously. Verogna/Twitter, Docket Entry of

Sept. 28, 2020. That appeal also remains pending. Verogna v. Twitter, Inc., Nos. 20-

1933, 20-2005, 20-2091, 21-1317 (1st Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (notice of submission on

the briefs without oral argument).

III. ARGUMENT

A. Reconsideration is extraordinary relief

“The granting of a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy

which should be used sparingly.” Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30

(1st Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). “To obtain relief, the movant must demonstrate either

that newly discovered evidence (not previously available) has come to light or that

the rendering court committed a manifest error of law.” Id.

B. The Court acted well within its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s

motion to recuse

The Court identified Swan v. Barbadoro, 520 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2008), as

holding that recusal is unnecessary where the underlying litigation is frivolous.

Dismissal Order 7. The Court was right to rely on Swan, as this litigation is frivo-

lous. Moreover, “a judge must avoid yielding in the face of unfounded insinuations.”

In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998). “A party cannot cast sinister

aspersions, fail to provide a factual basis for those aspersions, and then claim that

the judge must disqualify herself because the aspersions, ex propio vigore, create a

cloud on her impartiality.” Id. Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Chief Judge of this

Court is beholden to a magistrate judge whom she supervises is absurd. Because

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Plaintiff alleges no factual basis for any bias, and because the underlying lawsuit is

meritless, the Court was well within its “range of discretion” to deny Plaintiff’s

recusal motion. In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981).

C. The Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim

Section 1985(2) provides a private right of action when “two or more persons

in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any

party … in any court of the United States from attending such court … or to injure

such party … in his person or property on account of his having so attended[.]”

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (ellipsized to remove irrelevant provisions regarding witnesses).

The Court correctly dismissed this claim on one ground, and two other grounds also

support the dismissal.

1. Plaintiff cannot plausibly plead the required conspiracy

The Court correctly rejected Plaintiff’s 1985(2) claim for a lack of “factual

allegations from which a plausible inference of conspiracy can be made[.]” Dismissal

Order 14. Plaintiff’s motion provides no basis to reconsider that central ruling, and

the lack of a conspiracy is dispositive because a Section 1985(2) claim requires a

conspiracy. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (liability when “two or more persons … conspire”).

A conspiracy is a “combination of two or more persons acting in concert to

commit an unlawful act.” Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1988). In this

context, that conspiracy must include “an agreement among the conspirators to

deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights.” Alston v. Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 577–78 (1st

Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “Vague and conclusory allegations about persons working

together, with scant specifics as to the nature of their joint effort or the formation of

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their agreement, will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 78; see also

Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977) (“It has long been the law in

this and other circuits that complaints cannot survive a motion to dismiss if they

contain conclusory allegations of conspiracy but do not support their claims with

references to material facts.”). The material facts about the conspiracy must move

“beyond the realm of speculation.” Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2019)

(further holding that for a complaint like this to proceed to discovery, the plaintiff

must offer “facts sufficient to create a reasonable expectation that discovery would

be anything more than a shot in the dark.”). This standard requires conspiracy facts

to be “pled in some detail.” Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 685 (1st Cir. 1980);

McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 77–78 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting same and

holding that plaintiff’s allegations of speculative facts in alleging that defendant

acted “jointly in concert” with state actors were insufficient to allege conspiracy).

Even construed liberally, Plaintiff’s Complaint includes no specific allega-

tions of material facts sufficient to support even an inference of an unlawful

conspiracy. As outlined above, Plaintiff’s only factual allegation against Schwartz is

that her name appeared on a motion to dismiss, with the notation that her pro hac

vice application was forthcoming, before that pro hac vice application was granted.

See Complaint ¶ 99. Plaintiff presents no details about any agreement formed

between Schwartz and a state actor, no information about when any such agree-

ment was formed, and no explanation of how that agreement was designed to

deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights. Simply put, Plaintiff offered no facts sufficient to

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take Plaintiff’s conspiracy theory beyond the realm of wild speculation, and the

Court’s Dismissal accurately recognized that deficiency. See Dismissal Order 16

(“Verogna acknowledges in the complaint that he has no facts to support his theory

that the judges and counsel in his case against Twitter conspired with each other to

deprive him of constitutional rights.”).

2. Verogna’s Section 1985(2) claim should also be dismissed for

failure to allege any “force, intimidation, or threat” from the
supposed conspiracy

To allege a claim under Section 1985(2), a plaintiff must plausibly allege that

he was deterred from attending court or otherwise injured as a result of a defen-

dant’s “force, intimidation, or threat.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). It is not enough that a

defendant interferes with a federal action, even if that interference alters the result.

See, e.g., McLean v. Int’l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1218 (5th Cir. 1987) (in-court

perjury insufficient to allege Section 1985(2) claim because such allegation is not

“direct deterrence of testimony by force, intimidation or threat.”); Brawer v.

Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976) (same with respect to perjured testimony

and concealed evidence); Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir. 1979)

(conspiracy to prevent litigant from defending himself in previous civil litigation not

actionable under Section 1985(2) because that was not “direct deterrence” of

participation). Moreover, when a plaintiff does allege intimidation or threat, that

allegation cannot be conclusory; it must identify “who did what to [the plaintiff] to

threaten or intimidate him.” Lath v. Oak Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, No. 16-cv-

463-LM, 2017 WL 1051001, at *13 (D.N.H. Mar. 20, 2017). And such a threat must

be a product of the conspiracy, not of a lone defendant. Id. at *13 n.14.

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 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains only the conclusory allegation that the

defendants used “concealment, force, judicial intimidation, coercion or threats, to

deter or stop the PLAINTIFF from attending and continuing his CASE in the

COURT.” Complaint ¶ 256. That allegation is plainly insufficient. It offers no

details about who did what to whom when. The Complaint also fails to allege how

any such threat was the product of any conspiracy. And it fails to allege how those

threats deterred Plaintiff from attending court. Those failures independently justify

dismissal of the Section 1985(2) claim.

3. The Court should also dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1985(2) claim

because he has not suffered a cognizable injury

To maintain a claim under Section 1985(2), Plaintiff must allege that he was

deterred from “attending ... court,” or “injure[d] … in his person or property on

account of his having so attended[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); see Glass v. Pfeffer, 849

F.2d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 1988) (affirming sanctions against plaintiff who asserted

Section 1985(2) claim but failed to allege that he was “in any way intimidated or

deterred … from subsequently pursuing this action in federal court.”). A plaintiff

who alleges a “conspiracy to coerce him into giving up his lawsuit” does not state a

Section 1985(2) claim unless he has actually “abandoned any of the claims of his

lawsuit as a result of the alleged conspiracy.” Kinnard v. Brisson, No. C-03-3127

MMC, 2004 WL 1465693, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2004) (dismissing Section

1985(2) claim where plaintiff had “continued to litigate the action vigorously”).

Plaintiff’s Complaint did not and could not allege any cognizable injury.

Plaintiff is still vigorously pursuing and participating in the Verogna/Twitter

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Litigation, so he cannot plausibly allege that he has been deterred from partici-

pating in that case. His underlying district-court case against Twitter remains

pending and active, stayed only by the appeal Plaintiff is pursuing in the First

Circuit, which similarly remains pending and active. As in Kinnard, the fact that

Plaintiff “continue[s] to litigate the action vigorously” necessarily precludes his

Section 1985(2) claim here.

It would be impossible for Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to adequately

connect any alleged “injury” to his lone allegation against Schwartz, which is that

she “illegally” participated in the Verogna/Twitter litigation. That is untenable. As

the Court has recognized, the real reason for the “inevitable” dismissal of the

Twitter/Verogna litigation stemmed from Plaintiff’s own action: his refusal to use

his real name in that litigation. Dismissal Order 4. Schwartz’s participation pro hac

vice in that litigation had absolutely no bearing on that result. Indeed, Schwartz

and Twitter did not substantively oppose Verogna’s request to proceed anony-

mously. See Verogna/Twitter Litigation, Doc. 27 (“Twitter respectfully requests

that the Court evaluate Plaintiff’s requests under the Megless standard to deter-

mine whether proceeding anonymously is justified under the circumstances.”). That

is the opposite of the type of “direct deterrence” needed for a Section 1985(2) claim.

Brown, 612 F.2d at 502.

D. Plaintiff does not appear to be pursuing any independent claim

under Section 1985(3)

The Court construed the Complaint liberally. Dismissal Order 2 (citing

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Under that liberal construction, the

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Court read the Complaint to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which

requires a plaintiff to allege that “(1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendants had ‘a

conspiratorial purpose to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws,’

(3) the defendants committed an ‘overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,’ and

(4) the plaintiff suffered ‘injury to person or property, or a deprivation of a consti-

tutionally protected right.” Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 432 (1st Cir.

2010) (quoting Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 2008)).

But Plaintiff’s Motion now makes clear that he never intended to assert any

independent claim under Section 1985(3). Instead, he merely refers to that section

because it “specifies the remedy for conspiracies proscribed by Section 1985(2).”

Motion 14; see also Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 n.2 (1998) (“Section

1985(3) contains the remedial provision granting a cause of action for damages to

those harmed by any of the conspiracies prohibited in § 1985.”). Nothing in

Plaintiff’s Motion contests the Court’s dismissal of any Section 1985(3) claim. And

even if Plaintiff had brought an independent Section 1985(3) claim, that claim

would be doomed to fail for the reasons that the Court identified: a lack of conspir-

acy and Plaintiff’s failure to allege “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).

E. The Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1986 claim as
derivative

Plaintiff’s Section 1986 claim fails because he failed to state a valid claim

under Section 1985 and failed to adequately allege any conspiracy. See Creative

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Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 834–35 (1st Cir. 1982) (a Section

1986 claim must have a viable Section 1985 claim supporting it); Hennessy v. City of

Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 244 (1st Cir. 1999) (lack of conspiracy under Section 1985

“dooms [a] a section 1986 claim”); Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 31

(1st Cir. 2008) (“absent a showing of conspiracy, she has no claim under § 1986”).

Plaintiff’s Motion only confirms that the Court acted properly in dismissing this

claim. See Motion 23 (arguing that the Section 1986 claim should be reinstated if

the Section 1985(2) claim is resurrected).

F. The Court correctly recognized that Plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens

claim against Schwartz

The Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against Schwartz

because she is not a “state or federal actor.” Dismissal Order 14; see also Ziglar v.

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017) (“[A] Bivens claim is brought against the

individual official for his or her own acts, not the acts of others.”); Correctional Svcs.

Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (Bivens provides a cause of action against

“federal officers”). To assert a Bivens claim against a federal official, “a plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

676 (2009). Plaintiff’s conclusory mentions of Schwartz’s participation in a

“conspiracy” are inapposite and inadequate, as the Supreme Court has refused to

expand Bivens claims to “private entities acting under color of federal law.”

Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66; see also Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir.

1980) (participation by a private party in litigation, without more, does not

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constitute state action). And “expanding the Bivens remedy is now considered a

disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1848 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

675). As discussed above, the Court properly recognized that Plaintiff failed to

adequately allege any conspiracy involving Schwartz that could otherwise sustain a

Bivens claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion.

Dated: March 10, 2022 PERKINS COIE LLP

By: /s/ Dan L. Bagatell

Dan L. Bagatell, N.H. Bar No. 268285
3 Weatherby Road
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
Telephone: 602.351.8250
Facsimile: 602.648.7000
DBagatell@perkinscoie.com

Attorney for Defendant Julie E. Schwartz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Dan L. Bagatell, certify that on this date this document was electronically
filed using the court’s electronic filing system and served via ECF to all counsel of
record. I further certify that on this date I served this document upon the Plaintiff
via email.

Dated: March 10, 2022 /s/ Dan L. Bagatell

Dan L. Bagatell, N.H. Bar No. 268285

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