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NATO STANDARD

ATP-3.2.1.3

CONDUCT OF LAND TACTICAL

OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS
ENVIRONMENT

Edition A, Version 1

APRIL 2024

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

12 April 2024

1. The enclosed Allied tactical publication ATP-3.2.1.3., Edition A, Version 1,

CONDUCT OF LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS
ENVIRONMENT, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee
Land Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to
use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2643.

2. ATP-3.2.1.3, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt.

3. This NATO standardization document is issued by NATO. In case of

reproduction, NATO is to be acknowledged. NATO does not charge any fee for its
standardization documents at any stage, which are not intended to be sold. They can
be retrieved from the NATO Standardization Document Database
(https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your national standardization authorities.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Dimitri~ULAKIS
Lieutenant General, GRC (A)
Director, NATO Standardization Office

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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

CZE Tasks of CZE are executed without restrictions just in the low mountains
(0-2400 m AMSL).
ROU 1. the non-existence of a course within the Mountain Hunters training base
for the training of specialists according to
the specified requirements - mountain cell - point 3.1.3
2. non-existence of a C2 system compatible with the one provided. Lack of
modern research equipment, suitable for
fighting in the mountain environment.
USA A number of terms introduced in this publication do not conform to
approved NATO terminology or have been
incorrectly introduced. NATO Terminology policy is found in PO(2015)0193
NATO Terminology Directive and
procedures are in AAP-77 NATO Terminology Manual. The US recognizes
only NATO approved terms. This
reservation will be lifted when the correct NATO terms are cited and proper
procedures followed for introducing new
terms. The term “mountain warfare” is not a proper noun. The associated
abbreviation/acronym MW is not NATO
Term and therefore is not approved for use.

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Documents
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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PREFACE

1. The Fulfilment of NATO´s core tasks, collective defence, crisis engagement and
cooperative security requests the Alliance`s operational effectiveness in many
different domains, fields and geographic environments. One specific environment is
mountainous terrain, where in addition to the opponent the independent actors’ of
terrain and weather play an extremely decisive role. As military cannot change or
influence the mountainous terrain and the weather, it is one essential key for
operational success to adapt tactical principles, equipment and also training and
education to the requirements of this special environment. While Training and
Education is specified in the ATrainP-6, this publication focuses on general
Mountain Warfare (MW) principles at the tactical level.

2. Although in current and future times there are and will likely be new technological
developments, in a mountainous environment the premise is that soldiers are and
will be the centre of warfighting in mountainous terrain. The quality of soldiers and
their leaders dominates in MW over quantity and technological assets. Land tactical
operations and tactical activities in mountainous environment have always a vertical
and horizontal dimension and mountainous dangers are and remain ever-present.

3. To enhance the operational effectiveness in a NATO-led mission in Mountain

Warfare it is indispensable to provide NATO Allies and Partners with a basis of
standards, fundamentals and principles for mutual understanding, thus achieving
the necessary amount of interoperability in this special area at the tactical level.
Interoperability requires standardization and enables NATO to achieve a state of
readiness, not just an information sharing.

4. Competence for NATO operations in mountainous environment cannot be created

after emergencies occur, therefore formations, units and commanders must be
educated, prepared, trained and equipped for tactical activities in challenging
mountain terrain based on fundamentals and general principles at the tactical level.

5. This publication presents recognized fundamentals and general principles at the

tactical level as common guidance but not as universal solution. In MW there never
will be a “one size fits all” or universal solutions due to the permanent changing of
the decisive factor “nature”. The tactical approach in real life will remain in the task
force commanders’ decision on the spot.

6. The aim of the publication is to provide NATO and partner nations with a user-
friendly coherent publication forming a common basis for Mountain Warfare tactics
for individuals, sub-units, units and staffs in order to enhance interoperability during
NATO-led multinational operations in mountainous environment. This Publication
explicitly covers only Mountain Warfare specifications concerning land tactical

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operations and tactical activities - it does not claim that tactical principles and rules
not mentioned here are not valid or not also important.

7. This publication should be used in close conjunction with ATP-3.2.1 (Conduct of

Land Tactical Operations), ATP 3.2.1.1 (Conduct of Land Tactical Activities) and
should refer to ATrainP-6 (Education and Training for Mountain Warfare).

8. This Publication can be released to non-NATO entities to the NATO Information

Management Policy1 and Management of non-Classified NATO Information2.

9. Change proposals to this publication may be submitted by any nation to HQ SACT,

or to the custodian NATO MW COE. All users are invited to send
amendments/comments and suggested improvements.

1
C-M(2007)0118
2
C-M(2002)60

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Table of Contents
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. VII

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... XV

CHAPTER 1 THE MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT ................................................... 1-1

1.1 GENERAL ................................................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF MOUNTAINS ............................................................................. 1-1

1.2.1 Classification of mountains according to elevation ............................................................ 1-1

1.2.2 Classification with regard to dismounted terrain mobility ................................................. 1-2

1.2.3 Classification with regard to operational terrain levels ...................................................... 1-3

1.3 MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN .......................................................................................... 1-4

1.3.1 Terrain features .................................................................................................................. 1-7

1.3.2 Flora and Fauna................................................................................................................. 1-10

1.4 CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND WEATHER .................................................................... 1-11

1.4.1 General.............................................................................................................................. 1-11

1.4.2 Weather ............................................................................................................................ 1-12

1.5 ELEVATION .............................................................................................................. 1-16

1.5.1 High altitude effects .......................................................................................................... 1-16

1.5.2 Effects of cold – Cold stress .............................................................................................. 1-17

1.6 POPULATION........................................................................................................... 1-18

1.6.1 Environmental effects on tactical activities ...................................................................... 1-18

CHAPTER 2 FUNDAMENTALS FOR OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS

ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................... 2-1
2.1 FUNDAMENTALS AND BASIC MW PRINCIPLES ............................................................ 2-1

2.1.1 High-Ground-Control .......................................................................................................... 2-1

2.1.2 Three-Factor-Balance .......................................................................................................... 2-1

2.1.3 Use of reserves.................................................................................................................... 2-2

2.1.4 Surprise ............................................................................................................................... 2-3

2.2 PLANNING AND COMMANDING PRINCIPLES IN MW ................................................... 2-3

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2.2.1 Empowering to decentralized execution ............................................................................ 2-3

2.2.2 Risk management................................................................................................................ 2-4

2.2.3 Military engineering support in mountain warfare ............................................................ 2-7

CHAPTER 3 IMPLICATION ON ORCHESTRATING OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS

ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................... 3-1
JOINT FUNCTIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT ............................................................... 3-1

3.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) ................................................................................. 3-1

3.1.1 Leadership ........................................................................................................................... 3-2

3.1.2 Mission Command .............................................................................................................. 3-3

3.1.3 Mountain Cell...................................................................................................................... 3-4

3.1.4 The operation plan in mountain warfare............................................................................ 3-8

3.2 MANOEUVRE .......................................................................................................... 3-17

3.2.1 Manoeuvre and Decentralization ..................................................................................... 3-18

3.3 FIRES....................................................................................................................... 3-18

3.3.1 Ground based direct supporting fire ................................................................................ 3-19

3.3.2 Air based direct supporting fire ........................................................................................ 3-20

3.3.3 Indirect supporting fire ..................................................................................................... 3-21

3.4 SUSTAINMENT ........................................................................................................ 3-23

3.4.1 Combat service support in mountain warfare .................................................................. 3-23

3.4.2 Steps to the ground based supply plan in mw .................................................................. 3-25

3.4.3 Helicopter based transportation plan............................................................................... 3-29

3.4.4 Military medical care in mountain warfare ...................................................................... 3-30

3.4.4.1 Land tactical operations and tactical activities in high terrestrial elevations................... 3-31

CHAPTER 4 IMPLICATIONS TO LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN .. MOUNTAINOUS

ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................... 4-1
4.1 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................................................................................... 4-2

4.1.1 Principles in mountain warfare ........................................................................................... 4-2

4.1.2 Offensive operations in wintry conditions.......................................................................... 4-7

4.1.3 Fighting in natural caves in mountainous environment ..................................................... 4-8

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DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................................................................................... 4-9

4.2.1 Principles in mountain warfare ........................................................................................... 4-9

4.2.2 Planning considerations .................................................................................................... 4-10

4.2.3 Reconnaissance forward of the FEBA ............................................................................... 4-12

4.2.4 Engagement forward FEBA ............................................................................................... 4-13

4.2.5 Defensive operations in wintry conditions ....................................................................... 4-14

STABILITY OPERATIONS ........................................................................................... 4-15

Principles in mountain warfare ......................................................................................... 4-16

CHAPTER 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR TACTICAL ACTIVITIES IN MOUNTAINOUS

ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................... 5-1
5.1 OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................... 5-1

Attack .................................................................................................................................. 5-2

Execution of attack ............................................................................................................. 5-3

Mounting (preparation) and approach ............................................................................... 5-3

Assault ................................................................................................................................. 5-3

Crossing line of departure................................................................................................... 5-3

Break-in ............................................................................................................................... 5-4

Fighting through and clearing the objective ....................................................................... 5-5

Consolidation ...................................................................................................................... 5-5

Exploitation ......................................................................................................................... 5-5

Pursuit ................................................................................................................................. 5-6

Raid ..................................................................................................................................... 5-6

Ambush ............................................................................................................................... 5-7

Breakout of Encircled Forces .............................................................................................. 5-7

DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................... 5-8

Defence ............................................................................................................................... 5-8

Defence at/in the FEBA ..................................................................................................... 5-10

Engagement in the depth of area of responsibility (blocking position)............................ 5-11

Defending a Valley ............................................................................................................ 5-12

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Defending a Mountain Pass .............................................................................................. 5-13

Defending on Ridges ......................................................................................................... 5-13

Defending on Glaciers ....................................................................................................... 5-13

Delay ................................................................................................................................. 5-14

Planning Considerations ................................................................................................... 5-17

Establishing Contact with the Enemy ............................................................................... 5-18

Rearward Passage of Friendly withdrawing (combat) Reconnaissance Forces ................ 5-18

Temporary Defence at a Phaseline ................................................................................... 5-18

Withdrawal ....................................................................................................................... 5-18

Delay in wintry conditions ................................................................................................ 5-21

STABILITY ACTIVITIES............................................................................................... 5-21

Stability activities within the line of effort security and control ...................................... 5-21

Monitoring and surveillance in mountainous environment ............................................. 5-21

Route control .................................................................................................................... 5-22

Control of movement........................................................................................................ 5-23

Protection of essential locations, persons and objects .................................................... 5-23

Related tasks in support of line of effort initial restoration of services ........................... 5-24

Restoration of essential services after damage caused by natural forces ....................... 5-24

Restoration of essential services after damage caused by avalanches ............................ 5-25

Restoration of essential services after military actions or attacks by irregular forces ..... 5-25

Disaster Response ............................................................................................................. 5-26

ENABLING ACTIVITIES .............................................................................................. 5-27

Reconnaissance ................................................................................................................. 5-28

Terrain reconnaissance ..................................................................................................... 5-30

Terrain reconnaissance forces: small and large reconnaissance parties .......................... 5-31

Employment of specialists in reconnaissance parties ...................................................... 5-33

Reconnaissance in force.................................................................................................... 5-34

Security ............................................................................................................................. 5-34

Security in movements in mountain environment ........................................................... 5-36

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Security by screen force .................................................................................................... 5-38

March ................................................................................................................................ 5-39

March on foot in mountain warfare ................................................................................. 5-41

March with transport support in mountain warfare ........................................................ 5-41

March with vehicles in mountain warfare ........................................................................ 5-42

Advance to contact ........................................................................................................... 5-43

Crossing and breaching of obstacles................................................................................. 5-43

Meeting engagement........................................................................................................ 5-45

Link up ............................................................................................................................... 5-46

Relief of troops.................................................................................................................. 5-46

Relief in place .................................................................................................................... 5-47

Relief by forward passage of lines .................................................................................... 5-47

Relief by rearward passage of lines .................................................................................. 5-48

Withdrawal ....................................................................................................................... 5-50

Retirement ........................................................................................................................ 5-52

Demonstration and feint................................................................................................... 5-52

ANNEX A Examples as guidance ................................................................................................. A-1

ANNEX B Lexicon of terms and definitions ................................................................................ B-1
ANNEX C List of abbreviations ................................................................................................... C-1
ANNEX D References .................................................................................................................. D-1

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INTRODUCTION

1. General
The Alliance is required to maintain suited trained, interoperable, multinational forces
capable for missions in mountainous terrain. This ATP describes fundamentals,
general tactical principles, and guiding rules. It is intended to give guidance for
Mountain Warfare at planning level as well as for commanding level of MW units. Thus,
this MW tactical Publication will provide knowledge, which could be used at planning
levels as well as for executing and assessing tactical activities in mountainous terrain.

2. Purpose
The aim of this publication is to provide common understanding of tactical
considerations in MW.
It defines general principles, standard terms and special features for operations in
mountainous terrain to increase interoperability within NATO in the MW environment.
Thus operations in mountainous terrain are per se dangerous, biased understanding
on this type of battleground could easily become a risk to life and limb, even without
impact of opponent forces.
The detailed Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) are offered for national
consideration and are not intended to touch national responsibilities. Nations are free
to adapt the basic considerations presented to their specific training programs and TTP
as they judge appropriate.

3. Scope
This ATP emphasizes general tactical principles of MW addressed to planners, staffs,
decision makers and commanders at every echelon. Due to the nature of Mountain
Warfare, the tactical level of execution is in general the (reinforced) battalion and/or
battle group (see Bi-SC3), supported by enabling and supporting forces from brigade
or higher level, thus, the focus is on this echelon.
According to experience, lessons learned and research the reinforced battalion is
ordinarily the largest tactical unit whose movements a commander can effectively
control during combat and often combat takes place on underneath levels.

4. Structure
This publication is divided into 5 Chapters. Chapter 1 regards the cause and effect
relation between the mountainous environment and the tactical impacts or effects.
Chapter 2 provides fundamentals, tactical principles and basic information which is

3
The Bi-SC Capability Catalogue states that a light Mountain Infantry battalion as a variant group of an infantry
battalion must be capable of executing tactical activities especially in mountains. (Bi-SC = Bi-sectional = Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe & Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation)

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valid in every tactical activity inside Mountain Warfare. Chapter 3 stresses the
implications on orchestrating operations in Mountainous Environment (ME). Tactical
activities are part of land tactical operations which are in this respect a tailored
combination of offensive, defensive and enabling tactical activities. The land tactical
operations are addressed in chapter 4 and the tactical activities in chapter 5. The
generic principle of possible combinations of tactical activities within the land tactical
operations are layed down in ATP-3.2.1. and ATP-3.2.1.1. The Annexes provide
further guidances, details and examples.

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CHAPTER 1 THE MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

1.1 GENERAL
As mountains thrust themselves into the atmosphere, they are in turn exposed to full
power of the nature. With altitude, they not only become colder, windier and drier, but
also more exposed to solar radiation, and with increasing altitude the oxygen partial
pressure decreases. Mountains have inherent varying challenges due to the relief, and
also latent peculiarities like caves, glaciers, seracs etc. The weather is another matter.
Besides the known weather-effects, it can snow in summer, while it can be mild in
winter above the clouds and simple rain can cause torrents. Disturbances multiply in
intensity and thunderstorms and lightning can be formidable. Military tactical activities
in this environment are decisively influenced by the (often fast changing) forces of
nature, the given relief, elevation and the climatic conditions.

1.2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF MOUNTAINS

1.2.1 CLASSIFICATION OF MOUNTAINS ACCORDING TO ELEVATION
The criteria for this classification mainly considers the influence of absolute altitude on
the human body and its effects on it. This influence and its effects, and the distinction
between low, high and extremely high mountains, cannot be determined only by stating
a certain absolute elevation; there is always a threshold from one to another.
TABLE 1-1

Classification Description Impacts

LOW MOUNTAINS 0 – (~)2400 m AMSL4 No or little adaptation to
altitude needed. Low impact
on military assets and CSS5.
HIGH MOUNTAINS (~)2400 m – (~)5500 m Acclimatization necessary.
AMSL
Effects on assets and CSS.
Special trained and
equipped personnel is
needed

EXTREMELY HIGH Above (~)5500 m AMSL Necessity and adaptation for

MOUNTAINS well acclimatized, trained
and equipped personnel.
Exposure to these heights is

4
AMSL = Above Mean Sea Level
5
CSS =Combat Service Support

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possible for a short period of

time.
Severe effects on assets
and CSS.

1.2.2 CLASSIFICATION WITH REGARD TO DISMOUNTED TERRAIN MOBILITY

In addition to the general mobility classifications used in the MDMP6, (unrestricted,
restricted, and severely restricted) mountainous terrain may be categorized into three
classes based on the type of individual movement skill requirements:
TABLE 1-2

Classification Description Conclusion

EASY MOUNTAINOUS - Cross-country walking, short An adviser at advanced or
TERRAIN (WALKING, EASY and easy climbing passages, expert level 8 is recommended.
CLIMBING) snow-covered terrain.
- Equipment for safety
measures.
- Basic military mountain
training.
- UIAA7 I-II.
DIFFICULT MOUNTAINOUS - Climbing passages on fixed An adviser at expert
TERRAIN ropes or in team on rock, level is recommended and an
snow or glaciated slopes; advanced level personnel
(CLIMBING)
- Use of specialized mandatory to assess
equipment; difficulties and exposure, set
- Advanced military mountain up any fixed rope and security.
training;

- UIAA II – III.
EXTREMELY DIFFICULT - Hard alpine climbing (rock, An adviser at expert level
MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN snow or ice), is obligatory and the
(SEVERE CLIMBING) - Use of special equipment troops must have the skills and
and techniques, knowledge at advanced level.
- Expert military mountain
training,

6
MDMP = Military Decision-Making Process
7
UIAA = Union Internationale des Associations d'Alpinisme (the International Climbing and Mountaineering
Federation). The UIAA Scale of Difficulty has become a point of reference worldwide. NATO recognizes the UIAA
grades of difficulty in rock climbing. A table concerning the different difficulties is attached in Annex A-8.
8
The Levels Basic, Advanced and Expert are prescribed in ATrainP-6, 2020.

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- UIAA IV/A0 upwards.

1.2.3 CLASSIFICATION WITH REGARD TO OPERATIONAL TERRAIN LEVELS

1. Mountain operations are generally carried out at three different operational terrain
levels:

TABLE 1-3

Level Description
I Floors of valleys and main lines of communication.

II Ridges, slopes, and passes that overlook valleys.

III Dominant terrain of the summit region.

2. Level I terrain is situated on valley floors and along the main LOCs9. At this level,
heavy and medium forces operate, but manoeuvre space is restricted. Infantry and
armoured forces are normally combined since vital LOCs usually follow the valley
highways, roads, and trails. Opening, blocking or controlling these LOCs is
therefore always a tactical objective of mountain combat operations.

3. Level II terrain is situated between the valleys and the shoulders of mountains, and
is generally characterized by narrow roads and trails, that may serve as secondary
LOCs that cross this ridge system. To secure the vital LOCs, it is often necessary
to seize the contingous heights as well. Therefore, enemy positions on Level III
terrain dominate and influence the lower Level II terrain. Units take much energy to
occupy Level II terrain because it dominates level I terrain and influences
operations dramatically.

4. Level III terrain includes the dominant terrain of the summit regions. Mobility in
Level III terrain is usually the most difficult to achieve and maintain. Tactical
activities in level III terrain require well-trained units and individuals at advanced or
expert level. Level III terrain, however, can provide opportunities for well trained
units to attack the enemy from the flanks and the rear.

5. The higher the classification level, the amount of special training and capabilities
increases (advanced, expert level).

9
LOC – Line of communications

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Semi conclusion: Mountainous environments can be classified in different ways

depending on the point of view. All classifications have an impact on tactical planning
and conducting tactical activities. The difficulties of the classification with regard to the
dismounted terrain mobility (see Table 1-1) may appear also in wooded areas, at the
shore (coastal areas) and in steep valleys, canyons and gorges of lowlands.

1.3 MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

1. Mountainous terrain covers about 25% of the world’s land surface and they differ
in shape, extension, altitude, vegetation cover, and climate regime. Mountains
represent a watershed and water supply for drinking, irrigation, industry, food, and
energy production for more than half of humanity. At the same time about 20% of
the world’s population live in mountainous terrain.

2. Mountainous terrain is a geographical area characterized by major differences in

elevation, particular meteorological effects and poor or non-existent infrastructure.
It has particular characteristics such as a slope inclination of more than 15 degrees
and wide variations in ground, climate and vegetation. Mountainous terrain,
therefore, can have different vegetation, bare rocks, or snow and glaciers. It can be
extremely uneven with high, steep ridges, and deep valleys, and with cliffs and
other rocky precipices which may be near vertical or even overhanging.
Mountainous terrain generally requires adapted (enhanced) capabilities of mobility
with regard to technical means of transport and combat, as well as human mobility
of units and individual soldiers.

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FIGURE 1-1: MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OF THE WORLD (MARKED IN RED); DERIVED FROM: UNEP-
WCMC DATA, 2001

3. Mountainous terrain consists of mountain systems (mountainous regions). This

systems (regions) are subdivided into mountain ranges (groups) and these are
subdivided into mountain massifs. These are more finely divided into mountains,
peaks, secondary peaks, ridges, passes, etc. They are delimited on the one hand
by valleys and on the other hand by the transitions between the valleys.

4. Mountains are the spatially closed, higher parts of the earth’s surface that are
demarcated from their flatter surroundings by a distinct mountain foot and are
composed of single mountains, valleys, ridgelines and plateaus.

5. A glacier is a slowly moving mass of ice formed by the accumulation and

compaction of snow. There are two primary types of glacier:
a. Mountain Glaciers. Ice streams that flow through the mountain valleys
are commonly called valley glaciers. The Himalayas, the European Alps
and other mountain ranges contain this type of glacier.
b. Ice Sheets or Inland Glaciers. These are dome-shaped glaciers that flow
away from a central region and are largely unaffected by the underlying
topography (e.g. the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets).

6. Mountain glaciers can be small, only covering a portion of a mountain, or they can
be massive, with a series of glaciers covering a mountain range. The flow or
movement of glaciers is caused by gravity. Glaciers can be safer and easier to
negotiate than the surrounding ridges and peaks. Movement on glaciers is

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dangerous due to the icy conditions, seracs and deep crevasses that often
crisscross glaciers.
Mountain combat in glacier areas is extremely difficult in wind and fresh snow
conditions. Constant cold on the ground, reduced contour vision and the blowing of
danger spots as well as firing positions with snow hampers the combat significantly.
Permanent occupation of fighting and/or fire positions on the glacier ice is often
impossible due to the natural conditions. More promising on long term planning of
fighting in glacier areas is the use of important tactical elements from the adjacent
moraines and dominating key points. In general, units require specific knowledge
of the hazards, specialized training, and the appropriate equipment to move and
operate on glaciers.

7. Mountains often represent state and political borders, and due to their relative
isolation, they may offer a safe heaven for refuges of minorities and political
opposition from neighbouring countries that governments have often been wary of,
neglected, or even actively discriminated against. The inaccessibility of mountain
terrain, combined with a weak or even a complete lack of political governance could
offer insurgents, terrorists, freedom fighters and other irregular fighting forces,
areas for assembling and retreat.

8. Mountain areas are in general extremely uneven and consist of valleys, high planes
and plateaus, deep gorges, visible or hidden caves, steep mountain faces, and
ridges, and are as a rule difficult to traverse (fit for traffic). Mountains are often
covered with forests of all type depending very much on life zones (see Figure 1-2).

FIGURE 1-2: HOLDRIDGE LIFE ZONE CLASSIFICATION SCHEME; 1967

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9. Wet, cold, high altitude and hot barren terrain, combined with rapidly changing
(extreme) weather conditions, affect all courses of action in tactical activities.

1.3.1 TERRAIN FEATURES

1. Mountainous terrain is a complex form of landscape with different types of terrain,
different types of rock as well as diverse relief forms, different slopes and
exposures.

2. Mountains consist largely of rock, which is generally distinguished into two big
groups:
a. Ingeous rock (volcanic), such as Granite, porphyry, basalt, etc. These
rocks are generally compact and free from cavities.
b. Sedimentary rocks such as conglomerates, limestone, sandstone,
clay,dolomite etc. Caves and cave systems which are usable for military
purposes generally only occur in very specific types of rock. These are
primarily the limestone and dolomite rocks.

3. The type of rock influences the possibilities for systems of fortifications, fire
positions, trenches, shelters and tunnels and as well the splitter effects, especially
the one of indirect fire.

4. Rock walls may provide tactical advantages to enable actions for both friendly and
enemy forces. Rock walls can be used as natural obstacles for troop movements,
conceal troop movements, provide spotting and fire positions (overwatching,
guiding of indirect fire, snipers´ fire positions, etc.).

5. The terrain specifications determine the terrain management. Thus, the tactical
norms of a sector (defense, delay) or zone of action/attack of a tactical unit may be
overextended but as well they may be consolidated.

6. Elevation and exposure dominates the angle of incidence of sunlight, sun and
shade slopes. These factors lead to annual and diurnal variations in temperatures
and the intensity of solar radiation, and this effects environmental risk management
as well as tactical decisions and actions (for example: avalanche danger is different
between the sunny and the shady side of a mountain and additionally the angle of
incidence of the sun changes this danger permanently).

7. According to the elevation, steepness and gradient of a mountain there are

increased observation opportunities but also “dead spaces” (blind areas) that
cannot be observed nor affected by fires.

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8. Altitude has an effect on ballistics for direct and indirect fire10.

9. High altitudes are characterized by significant temperature variances. The

temperature differences also increase enormously with altitude between day and
night.

10. Precipitation generally increases with altitude and heavy rain on higher floors can
trigger mudslides. Due to the explosive effect of water that freezes into ice, rockfalls
and landslides are natural developments in the mountains. Slopes and rock slides
are inherently dangerous. Their mass accumulation in watercourses can lead to
flooding and natural catastrophes but can also be used consciously as a tactical
element.

11. The mountain snow distribution is known as very heterogeneous. Snow generally
increases with altitude, because due to the lower temperatures, precipitation falls
more than snow and the total precipitation generally increases with altitude. The
thickness of the layer of snow is distributed extremely differently due to the structure
of the terrain, the angle of incidence of the sun and the wind effects. The example
in Figure 1-3 shows the different depths of snow in a relatively small local area. The
depth of snow has to be considered in two ways, on the one hand side deep snow
increases dangers on the other hand it may be used for own survival (snow holes,
igloos, protection against enemy fire, etc.) and tactical issues.

10
Example: At an elevation of 3,060 m, a round fired at a target at a distance of 1,000 m will impact almost 1.75
m higher than at sea level.

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FIGURE 1-3: VISUALIZATION OF LOCAL DIFFERENCES IN SNOW DISTRIBUTION; SOURCE: FORUM OF

KNOWLEDGE, 2012

12. The Influence of the terrain features on the conduct of tactical activities must be
scrutinized by searching the possible benefit for own activities and the probable
limitations of the opponents‘ options by considering:
a. Quality of the movement options (including vertical parachute jumps from
helicopters).
b. Canalization(channelling) of movements.
c. Terrain difficulties (need for basic, advanced or expert skills for
negotiation).
d. Isolated operation areas.
e. Landing options for (small) combat elements.
f. “Dead spaces” (blind areas) for own and enemy activities.
g. Options of rapid change from near to long distance fighting.
h. Observation possibilities and effect on opposing connections from the
flank slopes and the back.
i. Fire positions and areas of ground based combat support by heavy
weapons.
j. Possible uses of aircraft.
k. Air defense (from top to bottom or vice versa).
l. Support possibilities.

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13. In general mountains are natural obstacles and canalize movement. Mountainous
terrain restrict and confine the mobility of forces. Due to challenging terrain features,
movements are restricted or even severely restricted, and canalized to the existing
road network. Cross country movements of dismounted forces are very exhausting
and canalized by terrain difficulties. Deep valleys, gorges, steep slopes, mountain
ridges and passes subdivide the terrain. Movements from one valley or mountain
ridge to another, is very challenging and time consuming. Deep swift-running rivers
and streams can create instant obstacles, particularly after rain or during a thaw.
Due to its rugged terrain features, often understimated large areas, differences in
elevation, narrow valleys and steep mountain slopes, dividing mountain ridges and
passes, larger military operations become divided. This leads to isolated areas of
operations where mutual support and relocation of forces is very difficult or even
impossible.

1.3.2 FLORA AND FAUNA

1. The vegetation in the mountains is divided into zones which are characteristic of a
certain altitude area. The exact vegetation also depends on local factors such as:
a. Amount of precipitation.
b. Slope alignment.
c. Geographical location.

2. In the mountains there is a small-scale sequence of climatic zones that determine

the vegetation and thus, also have an impact on tactical activities (camouflage,
protection, firewood, water storage, etc.). Figure 1-4 provides a rough overview of
the vegetation zones from a world view.

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FIGURE 1-4: ROUGH OVERVIEW OF VEGETATION IN MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS; SOURCE: ADAPTED

FROM TROLL, 1955

3. Depending on the region, there are also typical animal species in mountainous
regions. Their behavior is adapted to nature and especially in winter, mammals
descend from greater heights to overwinter. In marshalling and/or assembly areas
or bivouacs in the mountains a danger can arise due to the animals` search for
food. Care must therefore be taken to protect reserves and depots of food and
beverages. Furthermore the risk of transmission of various diseases in certain
animal species as well as endangerment by their poison (e.g. snakes, spiders,
insects, etc.) must be considered.

4. Flora and fauna influence people, leadership, movement, fire effects, observation,
camouflage, deception and require special skills and equipment

1.4 CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND WEATHER

1.4.1 GENERAL
1. Climatic conditions and weather very much determines the specific characteristics
of each major mountain range. They are mainly influenced either by the oceans
(maritime climate) or the vast inland areas (continental climate), the elevation,
latitude and exposure to atmospheric winds and air masses. It might be cold, warm,
dry wet or any mixture of these variations.

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2. Locally, due to all of these individual factors, and especially because of specific
relief features a huge variety of local climates may appear. These different patterns
of weather are known as micro climates. In general the effects of the weather are
more extreme in this environment. Climatic disruption magnifies risks of extrême
and fast changing weather conditions, huge rain, cold, snow and sudden natural
disasters. Bad weather can adversely affect operations, but it can also provide an
advantage. Therefore, operations during adverse weather conditions , such as bad
visibility or precipitation, should be tactically exploited to provide an advantage.

3. In general there are two given facts:

a. The higher a mountain range, the greater the climatic differences in the
mountain area, since the air temperature decreases with increasing
altitude.
b. In most mountainous regions there is a winter and a summer season,
which has a crucial impact on moving, fighting and surviving of
individuals and troops and requires specific knowledge and skills.

1.4.2 WEATHER
1. The weather conditions in the mountains are often characterized by extremes:
intense solar radiation, which strains the skin and eyes, rapid weather changes,
strong nocturnal cooling, high wind speeds or extreme snowfall are some
examples.

2. Assessing the environmental factors is essential for tactical decisions and for the
planning in the military decision-making process.

3. Weather forecasts from the meteorological services are to be used as a basis for
assessment. Additional advice should be sought from indigenous sources and
services available whenever possible. For example, clearance of bad weather may
be delayed for several hours or fog may persist in the mountains long after sunshine
has returned to the valley. Frequent and rapid changes in the weather result in
changed combat and operating conditions, and often require an adjustment to the
planning and conduct of operations and Command and Control, as well as a
changes in the method of fighting.

4. The key point in planning and conducting a successful operation is the adequacy
of equipment, technical and tactical capacities and the concept of manoeuvre.

5. Effects of weather on tactical procedures and activities:

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TABLE 1-4

Weather Description Tactical impact

phenomenon
Wind Wind chill effect11 Enhances coldness, thus
reducing the battle worthiness of
soldiers.

Effect trajectory, especially

Strong winds. trajectory of indirect fire.

Limits helicopters´ Service

Support and Combat Service
Support and Combat Fire support.

Limits the usage of UAS13

Increases avalanche danger and

thus affects tactical decisions and
actions

// wind can be used for energy

Snow loads (cornices) due to wind effects production
on the lee-side12 of mountain ridges

Heat Overheating of people. More logistics needed.

Enhances dehydration and

heat stress.

Increases overheating of vehicles and all

Effect on performance of
powered equipment.
machines.

In wintry conditions the sunny side has

 more comfortable, warm up
positive physical effects.
opportunity.

Coldness Higher energy consumption by humans, More logistics needed

animals and machines;

Cold injuries (freezing and non-freezing); Special medical capabilities are

Hypothermia, Cold Stress. required

11
Wind chill is the phenomenon that the cooling effect of the air increases with intensity, so that the apparent
temperature is (much) colder than the actual air temperature. Annex A-4 provides the Wind Chill Chart.
12
Lee side: Situated on the side turned away from the wind
13
UAS = Unmanned Aircraft Systems

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//decreases combat effectiveness.

Snowfall and Creates and/or enhances avalanche Affects all kinds of tactical
snowstorm danger. decisions and activities.

Covers roads, trails and paths with snow. Can be tactical hindrance for
enemy but as well for own
movements by making roads and
paths impassable.

Snow covers bumps in the terrain. Makes terrain passable if the

required capabilities and
ressources are available.

Decisive impact on (tactical)

Snow has a different and changing quality mobility and manoeuvres.
and quantity (depth) and
transformational gradients (temperature
of the air, orientation of slopes,
temperature of the ground and air).

Snowfall and snowstorm worsens

Effects for aiming and firing.
visibility.
Effects for covered movement
and camouflage.

Forces are needed to clear the

snowpack.

Offers possibilities for quick and

easy creation of battle positions.
Snow

Reduces technical performance.

Binds forces to clean from snow/
ice.

Snow creates heavy loads on shelters and Technological assets/elements

buildings for tactical purposes, and recce,
log and combat by UAV/UAS
(drones) do not lead to the desired
outcomes.

Wet snow and/or wet conditions creates

ice shields or rime on metallic weapons,
equipment and radio antennas.

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Wet snow/snowstorm causes frozen

sensors and hampers UAV/UAS.

Fog/clouds Limits visibility Limits visibility of own

movement as well as the enemy
and it’s facilities.

Limits the use of aviation

Limits the use of direct and

indirect fire.

Hampers orientation

Frost Frozen sensors. Minimizes usability of

technological assets.
Limited performance of metallic devices
such as antennas. weapons, and
ammunition if there is rime on metallic
surfaces.

Solar Radiation Increased sun radiation in high Reduces battle worthiness of

mountains14. soldiers by:
Sunburn or/and snow blindness,

Sunstroke,

Interrupted eyesight due to

dazzle,

Radiation can be used for energy

production.

Storm, rain Soaks the soil, makes torrents and flush Decreases mobility.
and/or other floods.
types of
meteorological
conditions Landslides and mudslides.
Requires road cleaning
capabilities (engineers).

Reduce trafficability.

14
The UV radiation in the mountains increases enormously with altitude under snow conditions. If there is 100 %
UV radiation at 200 m above sea level, it is 190 % at 2500 m and 200 % at 3500 m. In snow conditions the values
increase in 1500 m to 390 % and in 3500 m to 480 %. Source; Franz, H., Ökologie der Hochgebirge, 1979, Stuttgart,
Ulmer (Phythologie).

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Storms makes the use of UAV/UAS or Requires a switch back to

drones impossible. conventional methods
(contingency-planning).

Hampers the trajectory of indirect fire

support. Lowers the effectiveness of
tactical fire.

Lightning Lightning strike on opened or exposed Requires protection measures

places (summits, ridges). for troops – slows down the speed,
limits timely use of exposed
positions, etc.,

Limits the timely the use of

radios.

1.5 ELEVATION
1.5.1 HIGH ALTITUDE EFFECTS
1. The impact of cold, mountainous, high-altitude terrain is severe and can even be
life-threatening. There is a significantly adverse effect on personnel with increased
non-combat attrition, as well as a reduction in the performance of weapons and
equipment.

2. High-altitude cerebral edema (HACE), high-altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE),

acute mountain sickness (AMS), and other non-battle illnesses can negatively
impact tactical activities and operations. HACE is the most severe illness and can
progress to death over 1 to 3 days and in some instances in less than 12 hours, if
left untreated. HAPE can also be rapidly fatal and is the most common cause of
death among the altitude illnesses. The most common illness at high altitudes is
the acute mountain sickness (AMS), which is caused by rapid ascent to high
altitudes. Rapid ascent is defined as altitude gain (approx. over 1,800 m) in 24
hours or less. According to research results, 10 to 20 % of soldiers who ascend
rapidly (in <24 hours) to altitudes between 1,800 - 2,500 m experience some mild
symptoms. Rapid ascent to 3,000 m causes mild symptoms in 75 % of personnel.
Rapid ascent to elevations of 3,600 - 4,300 m will result in moderate symptoms in
over 50 % of soldiers and 12–18 % may have severe symptoms. Rapid ascent to
5,000 m causes severe, incapacitating symptoms in almost all individuals. Vigorous
physical activity during the ascent or within the first 24 hours after the ascent will
increase both the incidence and the severity of the symptoms15.

15
. USARIEM Technical Note 94-2 : Medical Problems In High Mountain Environments. A Handbook For Medical
Officers, U.S. Army Research Institute Of Environmental Medicine, Natick, MA, 1994; Tersch, R., (2009) Examining

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1.5.2 EFFECTS OF COLD – COLD STRESS

1. The higher we go, the colder it gets. As a general rule the temperature decreases
with elevation and mountains are more exposed to winds, rain and snow. For every
100 m in elevation gain there is a decrease of 0.65°C to 1°C 16 in still air
temperature, and for every increase of 10 km/h in wind speed there is a decrease
of 4°C on the bare skin. The phenomenon of additional thermal strain of cold winds
on the body is called wind chill. Wind chill charts are commonly made available by
weather services and represent the freezing time of the skin directly exposed to the
air (see Annex A-4). For example, at a temperature of -20°C, with a windspeed of
10 km/h, the freezing time of the naked skin is about 30 minutes, while at 30 km/h
it can be as low as 10 minutes.

2. Acute cold exposure enhanced with combination of wind and humidity/moisture

may cause cold damage in two ways:
a. Hypothermia, which means the whole body cools down, and thus it can
be life threatening17.
b. Frostbite, mainly on extremities of the body.

3. Acute cold exposure results in rapid vasoconstriction at the extremities, reducing at

first the blood flow to the skin. If the cold stress is prolonged and/or intense, the
blood flow is more heavily diverted to the body core and can compromise blood
delivery to the muscles. Blood flow and skin/muscle temperature can be reduced
to such an extent that the extremities may become functionally impaired and the
individual may be incapacitated for many tasks, thus the battle worthiness for
tactical activities will decrease and in the worst case cold can kill.

4. Coldness in general leads to a degration of physical and mental effectiveness.

the results of certain effects of high altitude on soldiers using modelling and simulating Results of Certain Effects
of High Altitude.

16
Environmental lapse rate = 0.65°C/100 m (The rate at which the temperature decreases as altitude increases
(air with moisture); The actual rate at which the temperature drops with altitude is called the environmental
lapse rate. In the troposphere, the average environmental lapse rate is a drop of about 6.5°C for every
1,000 meters in increased height (Danielson, Levin, and Abrams, 2003).
Dry, adiabatic lapse rate (ideal gas!) = 1°C /100 m; The dry adiabatic lapse rate for air depends only on the specific
heat capacity of air at constant pressure and the acceleration due to gravity. The dry adiabatic lapse rate for the
Earth’s atmosphere equals 9.8 °C per 1,000 meters.

17
Hypothermia sets in when the core temperature reaches 35°C or less. 4 levels of hypothermia are known:
1.moderate hypothermia (35-32°C; intensive shivering); 2.Severe hypothermia (32 to 28°C; shivering stops,
waling becomes impossible; 3. Deep hypothermia (28 to 24°C); hypertonic coma; 4.lifeless appearance (core
temp < 24°C)

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Cold and extreme cold can be a major limitation to compete and sustain the
missions. These conditions require proper equipment, training, acclimatization and
the experience of officers and NCOs. In planning and conducting tactical action,
coldness requires more frequent rotation of troops and it must be considered that
more time is needed to organize and execute a task.

1.6 POPULATION
1. Mountain regions are mostly characterized by a relatively low density of population
and highly uneven distribution. In general, the concentration of the population is in
the valleys and along the axes of movement. The population living in the mountains
is used to and adapted to their region, and likely have the best knowledge of the
terrain, the weather conditions, seasonal specifications (tendencies) and manifest
and latent infrastructure issues.

2. Mountain regions are home to an immensely diverse range of cultures and ethnic
groups. Many areas also have a long history of culture, trading or conflict
relationships with other regions. In mountainous areas the existence of clans and
tribes is still present and in some cases the ethnicity and tribe is more important to
the locals then national borders and nationalities.

3. In terms of tactical activities the military must take in consideration that the people
use the same scarce infrastructure and resources which are also needed for military
operations. The cultural awareness of the specialities of people living in
mountainous regions must be taken into account in the decision making process
and knowledge and expertise from locals should be used as knowledge resource.

1.6.1 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

1. All these above mentioned environmental factors have decisive impact on
conducting land operations in a mountainous terrain. The planning and execution
of tactical activities must involve these environmental impacts in the risk
management process, as a crucial part of the leading and decision making process.
2. The environmental factors can change very quickly, so planning and execution of
tactical activities is a permanently challenging and dynamic process in which the
enemy and the environment/nature gets a vote.
3. The level of skills and knowledge of individuals and collectives facing the
environmental challenges determines the latitude of operations and their courses
of actions. The higher the level of skills and education, the more options for tactical
courses of actions exist in the usage of the environment for own purpose.
4. Elevation and especially high altitude lowers down every performance. Without
adaption this can be a life-threatening to personnel/soldiers. For tactical activities
in high altitude terrain, smaller but well-trained and adapted forces are in general
more suitable than not-adapted masses of soldiers. The environment affects
tactical, behavioural, and logistic challenges in a crucial way. It is crucial to be
aware that not only extreme temperatures, wind, ultraviolet radiation, snow and ice,

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but also waste lands and especially hypoxia make mountain warfare especially
difficult and demands agile decision making and taking action.
5. Infrastructure in mountainous environment is generally limited and their use, in
concurrence with local population, heavily affects military operations. It is
necessary to manage their usage for tactical activities, for support or rescue and
evacuation operations and for the use of the locals.
6. Enabling assets, MilEng and CSS always must be planned in support of manoeuvre
either to improve or build suitable infrastructue in support of the military operation.
7. Cultural awareness is a decisive component in the decision making process.
8. It is also imperative that troops, as well as the commanders, are familiar with the
mountainous terrain for successfful terrain management to accomplish a mission.

FIGURE 1-5: FACTORS WITH DECISIVE IMPACT ON TACTICAL ACTIVITIES IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

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CHAPTER 2 FUNDAMENTALS FOR OPERATIONS IN

MOUNTAINOUSENVIRONMENT
2.1 FUNDAMENTALS AND BASIC MW PRINCIPLES
Mountain Warfare (MW) is the employment of forces in terrain with major differences
in elevation, particular meteorological effects, and poor or non-existent infrastructure.
According to the terrain features in NATO-led missions or tasks, it is necessary in
planning and force generation to have interoperable forces or an interoperable task
organization, based on common tactical principles and a common understanding of
the tactical approaches to Mountain Warfare.

2.1.1 HIGH-GROUND-CONTROL
1. In a mountainous environment, the sparse road and path network plays such a
crucial role, that operations usually aim to get and/or keep roads, tracks, paths, and
passes under control (i.e. in one´s own hands), to keep them undisturbed for own
use and to make the use of them by the opponent/enemy more difficult or at best
impossible.

2. The key points of mountainous terrain are, in general, of crucial importance, and
are mostly located at elevations which allows to affect the use or non-use of the
road and path network. Most of these key points are located in dominant terrain,
which is on high ground from which you can control tactical activities in the valleys.
It is always crucial to also assess the counter slopes to the own movements and to
control them in order to minimize the tactical risk (high priority task).

3. Controlling the dominant terrain creates the tactical benefit of constituting a high
level of vulnerability for the opponent and keeps the possibility of a wide range of
options open.

4. To achieve these goals the high-ground control of the battlefield and/or area of
operation is indispensable for any tactical operation in mountainous environment
and tactical activities in mountainous terrain.

2.1.2 THREE-FACTOR-BALANCE
1. When warfighting in mountainous terrain it is crucial to find the most suitable and
efficient balance between the three factors:
a. Mobility.
b. Firepower.
c. Protection.

2. Speed and agility in difficult mountainous terrain often means better security and
protection than the most protective dress code.

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3. As soon as any factor begins to dominate, the others will be harmed.

FIGURE 2-1: 3-FACTOR-BALANCE IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE

2.1.3 USE OF RESERVES

1. Tactical commanders must decide whether to plan and use a central reserve
according to infantry principles in the lowlands, or whether to use small local
reserves. In dependency on the weather and the available means of transport, it is
often better to have more small local reserves which are held as close to the front
lines as possible. Otherwise, the unpredictable conditions of terrain and weather
may delay their arrival for the crucial phase of battle.

2. Reserves in Mountain Warfare must have the same mobility level as the troops in
the front line. According to the season, they need also “winter-mobility“, that is,
being able to move and fight on skies or snowshoes and/or by using over-snow
vehicles.

3. Planners and decision-makers must be aware that reserves cannot be shifted

rapidly in mountainous terrain, and their mobility level is affected by the factors of
training and environmental conditions. The option of air transport can speed up the
shifting of reserves and enforce the surprise effect.

4. In high and extremely high mountains, the reserve forces must have at least the
same level of acclimatization as the front-line forces.

5. Once reserves are committed the commander must reconstitute it as soon as

possible.

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2.1.4 SURPRISE
1. Surprise is a basic principle to gain an adavantage in Mountain Warfare tactics.
Proficiency in using the factors of terrain, time, and environmental effects
(especially weather conditions) for the own purposes creates the tactical advantage
of surprise. Surprise offers the advantage of possessing the initiative in a terrain
compartment or under weather conditions where it is not expected under normal
cirumstances.

2. Surprise can be achieved by:

a. The ability to use obviously inaccessible terrain by superior mobility.
b. The ability to make adverse terrain usable by installing safety and rope
installations.
c. Using adverse weather conditions for unexpected tactical activities and
unrecognized movements.
d. Efficient firepower and manpower on the spot through the tactical
principle of “move separately - strike together” (but avoid own crossfire).
e. Bringing superior or unexpected weapons into force at key points, which
the opponent is not able to stand and defend against.

2.2 PLANNING AND COMMANDING PRINCIPLES IN MW

2.2.1 EMPOWERING TO DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION
1. The control of the battle by the higher commander is limited largely to a
preconceived and thorough plan, since the uncertain channels of signal
communication usually prevent them from intervening effectively in operations once
the battle has begun.

2. Due to the often narrow terrain compartments in the mountains, unified control is
very often possible only over small units. Higher commanders depend to a great
extent on subordinates of all grades to carry out their plans.

3. In Accordance with the requirements of the terrain and meteorological effects,

lower level leaders must be empowered for decentralized execution. Accurate
planning of time available, resources available and needed competencies is
therefore crucial. In the planning stage some special factors must be considered:
a. Planning of movements and manoeuvres in mountainous terrain require
the consideration of heights + valleys, considering elevation + distance,
and forming a suitable Task Organization dependent on the
environment + the mission.
b. Risk management in general must consider the tactical risk as well as the
accident risk.
c. The operation plan must respect the real environment with natural
obstacles, hindrances and dominating key points.
d. The main effort of tactical activities must be clearly planned by
anticipating tactical and environmental/natural situations, because a shift

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in the tactical main efforts is difficult once the forces have been
distributed. Every shift in the main effort is time consuming.
e. Planning in Mountain Warfare always requires minimum two schemes of
manoeuvre (good and bad weather scheme of manoeuvre alternative
planning).
f. The planning of reserves requires a decision on whether to use one
central reserve located on the backward area, according to tactical
infantry norms, or to use small local reserves located close to the front
line. This affects the force structure, the task organization and equipment.
g. Planning in Mountain Warfare often aims to close, dominate or control
the lines of movement and overwatch the terrain in between.
h. Planning in Mountain Warfare includes the usage of natural obstacles
and natural effects for warfighting.
i. Simplicity in planning enables success in execution.
j. The range of weapon systems is often a limiting factor to effectiveness
and battle worthiness and thus can create vulnerability.
k. The enemy and nature both get a vote in MW. In general, the options for
“shoot (fight), move, survive and communicate” are significantly
dependent on the “independent variable, nature”. Nature, especially
meteorological effects, changes often, and often very fast.
l. Planners (staff) must understand that mountainous terrain and
meteorological effects adversely affects time and space. Realistic
timetables must be made based on reconnaissance, the commander’s
practical knowledge of the mountain battlefield, and consultancy and
recommendations from experts.
m. Supply and Resupply is crucial in Mountain Warfare and must be planned
accurately, realistically and seriously (see Chapter 3, number 3.4.1).
n. Planning includes Risk Management, and in MW it is always double
headed. There is the tactical risk, and there is also always an accident
risk (mountain hazard) in mountainous terrain caused, by the changing
effects of nature.

2.2.2 RISK MANAGEMENT

1. Commanders and their staff must practice Risk Management. They must cope with
the risks and, in the event of failed Risk Management, there must also be an
emergency plan. Risk Management is the basis for making an informed decision to
implement a suitable COA (Course of Action), and Risk Management does not aim
to remove risk altogether, or to support a “zero defects” mindset. Risks do not only
contain dangers - they also contain opportunities. The military has a mission or a
task to fulfil – so a zero-risk mindset is seldom possible, and inaction seldom
guarantees a favourable outcome. Therefore military commanders in MW must
take disciplined initiative to accomplish a military mission or tactical activity. Risks
should be taken when they are justified and necessary for mission accomplishment
and when the tactical element can stand the potential consequences.

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FIGURE 2-2: DOUBLE-HEADED RISK IN MW

2. Risk Management is always double-headed, and must cope with both tactical
risk(s) and accident (environmental) risk(s). Superficial knowledge and ignorance
or underestimation of mountain hazards may result in failure. In addition to facing
tactical risk management, there must also be a correlation of terrain and weather
with the proficiency of the soldiers/troops in the planning and executing of actions
and tactical activities.

3. The leading question in identifying the environmental risk(s) is: What can happen
in the field of:
a. Nature (avalanches, rockfall, severe icing, mudslides etc) affecting
manoeuverability and sustainability, causing damage and threatening
lives (e.g. large avalanche can completely cut off the whole valley).
b. Action or inaction (you own or opponent’s) – both can have
consequences in task failure or in lives lost by taking no or the wrong
action.
c. Material (damage, loss, usability, etc.), as the replacements cannot be
made instantly and may endanger the success of the mission.
d. Human/soldiers (death, injury, illness, etc.) as the highest price that could
be paid, with all the consequential effects and costs.
A systematic approach to the answers can be taken by the use of the hazard
identification Matrix (Annex A-1/ see also ATrainP-6, 2020).

4. The mountain cell must process recognized environmental risks and prioritize them
to recommend possible courses of action to:
a. Avoid the risk(s), and/or
b. Minimize the risk, and/or
c. Transfer the risk, and/or

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d. Accept the highest tolerable level of risk and assesses the situation
throughout the mission.

5. With these recommendations the commander must be enabled to make decisions

on the best course of action for accomplishing a mission/task in a comprehensive
way. Risk Management in this way should be executed in 4 steps (Figure 2-3). Due
to the fact that environmental risks can change very quickly and often, Risk
Management in MW is an ongoing, dynamic process.

FIGURE 2-3: 4-STEP RISK MANAGEMENT IN MW

6. In general, the following recommendations are given:

a. Do not take unnecessary risk in MW. Risk Management does not aim to
remove risk altogether, or to support a zero defects mindset. The
military has a mission or a task to fulfil, so a zero risk mindset is seldom
possible, and inaction seldom guarantees a favorauble outcome. Risk
should be taken when they are justified and necessary for mission
acomplishment and when the tactical element can stand the potential
consenquences.
b. All actions must serve the mission.

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c. Balance benefit and investment (time/soldier/equipment/etc.).

d. Follow (national/international) safety regulations.
e. Obey the Rules of Engagement.

2.2.3 MILITARY ENGINEERING SUPPORT IN MW

1. Military engineering is a function in the support of operations which shapes the
operating environment (OE). It achieves desired objectives:
a. By enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility.
b. Developing, maintaining, and improving infrastructure.
c. Supporting the survivability and sustainability of forces.

2. Tactical effects are achieved through tasks inherent to the five areas of expertise
of MILENG: engineering, explosives ordnance disposal (EOD), environmental
protection, military search and management of infrastructure.

3. At the tactical level the Chief MILENG ((C)MILENG) is responsible for coordinating
with MILENG related organizations that execute tasks effecting the operating
environment.

4. Considering the MILENG support to manouvre in MW, the related tasks for its
enablement falling mainly into mobility, counter-mobility and survivability.

5. MILENG gives support to mobility in MW by:

a. Reconnaissance, breaching, and if necessary, clearing of natural
obstacles.
b. Recce, marking and breaching of adversary obstacles.
c. Providing and operating means for gap crossing (including wet gap).
Replacement/improvement of mountain bridges in an advance may be of
the utmost importance in combat (offensice tactical activities).
d. Bridging mountain streams and wherever possible, bridging gorges,
ditches and trenches at least for mountain infantry troops to gain speed
and the surprise effect.
e. Improving load carrying capacities for crossing glaciers and their seracs
and crevasses.
f. Marking, provisional build up and maintenance of existing steep tracks
and trails (construction and replacement of via ferratas, fixed alpine
paths, etc.).
g. Enhance the vertical mobility by constructing and using cableways and
footbridges.
h. Supporting the artificial triggering of avalanches in order to make the
terrain usable for own movements.
i. Ensuring the routes network availability including the snow and ice
clearing tasks.
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j. Providing explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and military search

capabilities. EOD task included explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR) and
improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD).
k. Support for forward aviation by constructing of forward airstrips
(dedicated capabilities needed) and landing sites or zones such as
Helicopter Landing Sites (HLS).

6. MILENG support to counter-mobility in MW:

a. Hampering the adversary’s manoeuvre and movements by placing or
reinforcing existing obstacles.
b. Planning and executing demolitions of bridges, tunnels, and
embankments along major roads and railways especially during
defensive or enabling tactical activities (defence, withdrawal and
retirement).
c. Trigering artificial avalanches in order to create a hindrance for opponent
troops.
d. Ice blasting to hamper adversary mobility along the frozen waterways.

7. MILENG support to survivability in MW:

a. Providing planning advice and construction capabilities for infrastructure
in order to enhance their protection both from adversary actions and
natural hazards (i.e. avalanches, extreme cold, etc), respectively
enhancing the passive defences and/or advising on site location and
protective measures.
b. Providing water and energy distribution regardless the terrain and
weather conditions.
c. Supporting the sustainment of troops by enabling supply routes
availability, providing vertical mobility capabilities (cableways) and
protecting the supply storage sites (both from natural hazards and
adversary actions).
d. Providing support to MW specialist, in triggering landslides or avalanches
in order to protect the force from natural hazards.
e. Providing EOD capabilities: explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR),
explosive ordnance clearance (EOC), explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD), and improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD).
f. Construction of avalanche defence structures (avalanche snow bridges,
snow racks or nets).
g. Supporting with camouflage, concealment and deception.

8. Given the fundamental assumption that MILENG units personnel might have the
same training of the supported units, due to the peculiarity of mountain environment
that inherently impedes the use of all the MILENG heavy equipment, MILENG

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support to MW operations will take more time and more personnel than they would
in a flat area, furthermore MILENG units in MW needs dedicated equipment for the
above-mentioned tasks.

9. The request of mountain infantry for MILENG support must be ordered timely and
in advance and a MILENG advisor must be always present at the supported unit
HQ to prioritize the MILENG support.

10. Doctrinally18 the MILENG support observe the principle of centralized control and
de-centralized execution.

11. MILENG advice and support level:

a. Highest MILENG unit commander will provide MILENG advise to the
supported Infantry Bn.
b. Mountain infantry battalion  company.
c. Mountain infantry company MILENG support by mountain engineer
platoon.

Given the dedicated equipment and training, the main focus on MILENG support in
Mountain Warfare are:
a. Construction and/or removal of major obstacles. The destruction of bridges,
tunnels, and embankments along major roads and railways in defence and
retreat and the replacement of mountain bridges in an advance maybe of the
utmost importance in tactical activities.
b. Bridging of gaps including wet gaps as moutain streams and wherever possible
gorges. The bridging of torrential streams with steep banks and higly variable
water levels, and the constructiion of light, emergency bridges require special
skill and equipment.
c. Improvement of supply routes in sector of special importance by:
- Blasting routes and paths in rock and ice.
- Building bridges.
- Building cable railways.
- Building supply slides in collaboration with SMEs in MW (expert level).
- Snow and ice clearing in the main supply routes network.
d. Triggering of avalances both for tactical and safety reasons.
e. Ice blast on frozen waterways.
f. Building/constructing protected and sustainable infrastructure including
locations high/exposed points.
g. Support the troops survivability and sustainability.

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CHAPTER 3 IMPLICATION ON ORCHESTRATING OPERATIONS IN

MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

JOINT FUNCTIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

General
The joint functions as described in AJP-3 – “Allied Joint Operations” and AJP-3.2 –
“Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations” and specified for land operations in ATP-
3.2.1 – “Conduct of Land Tactical Operations” are an analytical tool for commanders
and staff in all kinds of land operations. They provide a complete description of all the
functions that military organisations do in planning, conducting and consolidating
operations. The factors that need greater emphasis in a mountainous environment are
explained within each of the following joint functions.

3.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

General
1. Command and control (C2) in the land OE is challenged by the specifics of land
operations as multiple tactical levels and the variety of capabilities that need to be
directed and synchronized towards a common objective. Command authority is
based on the establishment of specific command relationships. Those relationships
in land operations must meet the requirements of mission command, the combined
arms approach and other land specifics.
2. Mountainous terrain and/or unpredictable weather conditions creates difficulties for
command and coordination, as well as mobility and manoeuvre.

3. The environmental conditions affect communications at high altitudes. Satellite

communications and the use of command and control (C2) aircraft can offset some
terrain limitations and reduce reliance on bulky radio equipment. Satellite
communication can be hampered by steep mountains and gorges19.

4. The environment often requires the use of relay stations (including UAS) to enable
command and control effectiveness in battle management.

19Concerning satellite communication (SATCOM) there are satellite networks of Iridium, Inmarsat and Thuraya are currently
available. To be able to use their services, they require "visual contact" to the satellite, that is, a free connection line (clouds
are not a problem). The Iridium satellite network can be used worldwide as it utilizes a fleet of low-orbiting satellites that fly
over the poles, spanning the globe. However, steep mountains can hide the view to the satellite, so that some time can pass
before the next satellite comes into view. In contrast, Thuraya and Inmarsat use geostationary satellites that are high above
the equator and thus always overlook the same part of the earth's surface. The Inmarsat offers world-wide coverage outside
the polar regions. Even with these systems communication in the mountains can fail if the view is shifted in the direction of
the equator, which can be the case in steep ravines or on a steep mountain wall.

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5. The possibility of an air mobile command post, for example an air transportable
container system (internal or external load), is helpful to be timely operational in C2
issues, thus being ready for coordination of fire at the target engagement authority.

6. The command post architecture must be adapted to the mission/operation and

environment.

7. The integration of a mountain cell in the command post is crucial for Risk
Management with regard to accident risk caused by the environment.

8. Dispersed and compartmented troops will find it harder to have the same
operational picture as the command post, and vice versa. Commanders will often
only have a mixture between “truth on the ground” and a “truth at the command
post”. To manage this problem, commanding by the principle of mission command
has been found to be the most suitable.

3.1.1 LEADERSHIP
1. In compartmentalized mountainous terrain, combat is often decentralized and takes
place at the company, platoon or even squad level. Direct leadership is therefore
more decisive in MW, and the mountainous environment requires junior leaders to
set an example of physical fitness, will power, endurance and proficiency.
Mountainous terrain, adverse weather conditions and the environment demands
that leaders are on the spot and set the example, which often means acting out of
their comfort zone.

2. Leaders at all echelons must practice Risk Management related to tactical dangers
(tactical risks from the enemy), and also environmental dangers (accident risks
from natural effects). This is the basis for a disciplined initiative, thus taking “the
sweet spot20” for successful tactical activities in MW.

3. Leaders need to know their soldiers as well as their tactical tools and assets within
their responsibility. Their knowledge of the abilities and limits of their personnel and
material enables a successful direct - and organizational leadership21.

4. Particularly in poor and/or cold weather conditions, leaders in the field must look
after the resilience and staying power of combat readiness of their soldiers by

20
Sweet spot = latitude of courses of action by evaluation of the proper amount of risk that a military element
can stand for being successful in mission accomplishment.
21
Direct Leadership = leading personnel in face-to-face communication. Organizational leadership = managing
standard situations by the use of the possessed resources in the proper way according to learned rules and
principles in order to fulfil a task in the best way (cp. ATrainP-6, 2020).

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suitable measures, such as relief in time, providing the opportunity to warm up, to
dry clothing, and to maintain equipment.

5. The translation of the principle of “mission command” into real action or the use of
“mission command” in commanding subordinate leaders must be understood.

6. Leadership is one of the key factors when conducting operations in a mountainous

environment.

3.1.2 MISSION COMMAND

1. In order to carry out their plans, higher commanders depend to a great extent on
their subordinate leader(s) and soldiers of all grades, including the best enlisted
soldiers.

2. To face this peculiarity of MW, the principle of mission command is a powerful and
required leadership instrument. Mission command is in general the conduct of
military operations based upon mission-type orders. The aim is that soldiers use,
by their own will, their whole intelligence and personality within their area of
responsibility, on behalf of the commander´s intention to accomplish the distinct
contribution to a mission or task.

3. Responsibility and initiative must be taken at all echelons to fulfil the common task
or mission.

4. Commanders must have trust in their subordinate leaders, and give them the
necessary freedom of action and flexibility to act independently according to the
reality-situation on the ground. It is therefore crucial for subordinates to understand
the superior commander´s intent and what is their distinct contribution to a greater
purpose.

5. For mission command a commander must be clear on what is his intention (time,
effects, quality, etc.). For mission command it is vital that the receiver of the mission
has understood the mission, the purpose and the intent of the superior. In this way,
it enhances agility and flexibility in general, and also allows each leader to focus on
their own level of responsibility and tasks. In Mountain Warfare the uncertainty of
the environment, in particular meteorological effects such as the wheather, require
this special amount of flexibility on the spot, because they have real-time
information and the relevant »ground truth«.

6. Mission command needs a leadership fundament with a trust-culture in contrary to

a control-culture. It bases on assance in force transformational leadership style22,

22
Transformational leadership assumes that the leader´s behaviors and processes can change and transform the
individuals. It assumes that leaders can impact followers´ emotions, values, ethics and long-term goals and

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which makes the given mission to the taken mission at the execution level, and
creates an intrinsic motive to accomplish the given task.

7. Furthermore, mission command allows a commander time to focus on his efforts to

deal with truly important issues at his leadership level. Mission command is the
basic principle of commanding in MW.

8. Fundamentals of mission command:

Commanders: provide clear intention, mission, achievable objectives, required
resources, forces and time.

Subordinates: execute responsibility to fulfil the commanders intent.

The principles of mission command are:
a. Responsibility (Acceptance of responsibilities [at echelon levels]).
b. Unity of outcome (Making the commanders intent to ones own intent/goal by
own willingness and strong believe ensure a common achievement.
c. Freedom of action (Enables the subordinates to act independently.)
d. Trust (Trust culture upwars and downwards the formal hierarchy.)
e. Mutual understanding (Making the commanders intent to ones own intent/goal
by own willingness and strong believe.)
"Nowhere more than in the mountains does the lowest leader have the opportunity to
work independently”23.

3.1.3 MOUNTAIN CELL

1. The Mountain Cell is a recommended feature of MW. It is part of the command post
and/or HQ. It can be an own cell or a subcell in the S2/J2 or S3/J3 cell depending
on the echelon of command, national or task force regulations, and/or orders.

2. The general tasks of the mountain cell are to:

a. Assess and evaluate the environmental situation in the area of
responsibility and in the area of interest with regard to risk management.

change them to a better. Highly moral leaders inspire their followers to fully engage in a common project/goal
for the overall good of the organization. Under the transformational leadership approach, a leader translates his
followers’ values and motivations to a higher level, thus changing their needs and preferences to suit the
intended goal, i.e., transforming their motivation to fulfil a task to the intrinsic level. In contrary, transactional
leadership works on reward and punishment basis, and thus a follower or subordinate is only extrinsic motivated
for action in order to avoid punishment or achieve a reward. In conclusion, effective mission command is
correlated with psychological facets of transformational leadership.
23 Franz Freiherr Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld (1817-1896), Theorist of Mountain Warfare.

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b. Advise the commander with regard to the environmental risk and the
options to mitigate them.
c. Develop the Mountain Situation Plan, provide it as an Annex (Overlay) to
the operation plan, and keep it up to date.

3. To accomplish these tasks, the mountain cell works systematically and

continuously as part of the command and control process by assessing the
situation, relating this to the operation planning, and presenting the resulting
conclusions in a Mountain Situation Plan.

4. This advice should enable the tactical commander to also consider the objective
hazard aspects of the mountains in the estimation of the situation before making
decisions, issuing orders and ordering measures. The mountain cell practises
environmental risk assessment and proposes possible options (courses of actions)
from an environmental danger point of view, thus enabling the tactical commander
to make an informed decision.

5. The mountain cell must be run by experts.

6. The role of an expert in Mountain Warfare is multifaceted. Subject Matter Experts

for Mountain Warfare (MW SME) are individuals with mountaineering skills and
knowledge at expert level, together with a deep understanding of the processes
and procedures which impact tactical activities in mountainous terrain in positive
and negative ways. They have completed a formal training and education which is
certificated by a national and/or international qualification or licence, such as
Military Mountain Guide, Mountain Leader or similarly valuated qualifications. What
an expert is able to do is precisely defined in ATrainP-6 (2020).
Generally speaking the expert has standard tasks in the different fields, as shown
in Figure 3-1.

FIGURE 3-1: GENERAL TASKS OF MW SME

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a. Advice and consultancy in the planning process

The expert on the frontline gives advice to the tactical commander on the front line,
and also provides the mountain cell in the rearward area with information and data
from the spot. The expert(s) inside the mountain cell collect all this data and
information, enhancing them with extra information and data available at the command
post or HQ, such as Geo-Meteo services and products. Based on this data and
information the SMEs assess the potential environmental and technical risks and
develop alternative options to manage or mitigate them to an acceptable level. Thus
SMEs give advice or recommendations (rational evaluated options) to the tactical
commander and/or planner with regard to environmental Risk Management. They
propose alternative options or risk mitigation measures with realistic scores in time and
ressource requirements. Some examples are march planning (scheduling/equipment),
weather assessment, assessment of the snow and avalanche situation, and so on.
They develop and contribute to orders with relevant annexes and overlays, such as
the “Mountain Situation Plan” which is part of the tactical operation plan. (see ATrainP-
6, 2020; see Annex A-1).
The system of information flow to the staff in the command post or HQ is as shown in
Figure 3-2.

FIGURE 3-2: ROLE OF EXPERTS ON THE MOUNTAINOUS BATTLEFIELD

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b. Special combat tasks

In adverse terrain and weather conditions, which require special skills and experience
the SMEs´ tasks can be:
1) Bringing external military personnel or tactical elements, such as snipers,
Joint Fire Support Elements, Joint Terminal Attack Controller, etc. to their
place of operation.
2) Prepare the terrain for tactical use by safety or risk reduction measures
(safety systems, rope installations, blasting of avalanches, etc.).
3) Plan, lead and execute special tactical tasks in difficult and extremely
difficult terrain with a »task-force team« of advanced or
expertpersonnel24.
4) Give advice on survival measures in mountainous terrain.
5) Trigger avalanches in order to make the terrain usable for your own
manoeuvres (avalanche risk reduction) or to use the triggering of
avalanches to harm the enemy.

c. Rescue tasks:
1) In the event of an emergency SMEs, advise and give consultancy advice
to the responsible planners and coordinators of all kind of mountain
rescue/evacuation activities (including Personnel Recovery in
mountainous terrain).
2) SMEs are qualified to carry out all kinds of technical rescue missions,
such as terrestrial rescue, sub-terrestrial rescue, water rescue and as
well air rescue in the role of the rescuer on the spot.
3) SMEs contribute to hazard response issues as well as to personnel
recovery in mountainous terrain (mountain assistance in evacuation).
4) SMEs are able to perform a planner function in execution of an
rescue operation in mountainous terrain.

d. Training and education tasks

In the field of training and education in order to prepare troops for Mountain Warfare,
MW experts, plan, prepare, execute and/or supervise individual and collective
education and training according to current NATO standards (see ATrainP-6, 2020).
They are also responsible for the implementation of new technical equipment and
techniques following lessons learned and best practices.

e. Material testing and evaluating tasks (material check)

Depending on national regulations, the SMEs´ tasks can include the checking of
mountain equipment and material in order to meet current safety norms and/or
standards.

24
This is an additionally course of action for tactical decision makers in MW, if the environment requires expert
skills and SOF with this capability is not available in time or are not available in general.

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3.1.4 THE OPERATION PLAN IN MW

“If you fail to plan, you plan to fail”

1. Proper planning and preparation enhance the probability of being able to cope in
the mountainous environment, and to ensure the optimal efficiency of the deployed
troops. Depending on the mission, the battle space must be analyzed according to
the accident (environmental) risks, the tactical risks, and the suitability of the
available forces and resources.

FIGURE 3-3: TRIANGLE OF VARIABLES IN MW

2. Especially in MW the MDMP is extremely important, because it is difficult to make

changes later, and due to the frequent delegation of authority (mission command
principle), the commander´s plan must be unambiguous.

3. The operation plan is, in general, determined by the environment, so the “matrix” of
infantry principles must be modified to fit the high and rugged terrain.

4. Planners (staff) must understand that mountainous terrain adversely affects time
and space, but by using the terrain in the optimum way with suitable
resources/forces it may also be an enormous advantage.

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5. In planning a tactical activity, realistic timetables must be made based on

reconnaissance, the commander’s practical knowledge of the mountain battlefield,
consultation with experts and the capability of own forces.

6. According to mission command, the planning triad of two levels up and down must
be respected. That is, the own area of responsibility must be mastered in any case,
at one level up and down the intention of this echelon must be understood, and at
the second level up and down the plan should be known. As a simple example, a
battalion commander must understand the next higher and lower commander`s
tactical idea and the battalion´s tactical role inside this idea or the platoon level
must know the Battalion Aid Station (BAS). This basic principle is shown in Figure
3-4.

FIGURE 3-4: 2-LEVEL UP AND DOWN PRINCIPLE IN MW, EXAMPLE: BATTALION LEVEL

7. The operation plan is a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to

subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of
an operation and consists of the Operation-Order (OPORD) plus the necessary
Annexes, such as the Graphical Operation Plan (=Operations Overlay); the Field
Artillery Support Plan (FASP); the Barrier plan; the Mountain Situation Plan;
Logistic Plans (Transport Plan with helicopter support and Supply Plan as all-
weather plan), and others depending on situation and task. In MW the Operation

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Order and the operations overlay are dominated by the assessment of the terrain,
thus the terrain ( environment) dominates in MW the matrix of the operation plan.

FIGURE 3-5: OPLAN: OPORD AND ANNEXES (AS A GUIDELINE)

8. For the development of the operation plan and the graphical operation plan
(operations overlay) the following steps are recommended as a guideline.

9. The sequence of the steps and also the template of the task organization is
intended as a guidance, this may be different between the nations. The contents of
the operations overlay are obligatory to achieve realistic interoperability within MW.

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Exploration of the Operation Plan (Example: Defensive Steps

Operation)

Step 1. CONTROL AND COORDINATION

LINES:

 Definition of Lines of control and

coordination in according to real
terrain.The matrix of control and
coordination lines is determined by the
terrain.

 Lines of control and coordination must be

clear in the real battle field. If the lines
are in the region of ridges, streets, paths,
rivers etc.,it must be clear by the lines,
who is responsible for the ridge
(“high ground control”), the routes, etc.

 In planning don`t put these lines exactly

on the ridges (or streams, roads etc.).

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Step 2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

 Make a decision on where and how to use

the available resources and forces.

 The COM has to decide which forces will

be attached, detached or have the
directive to support (FULLCOM;.TACOM;
OPCOM; OPCON)

 The reinforcement via task organization

by tactical elements or assets must be in
accordance with the ordered main effort
in the OPORD and the operations overlay.

 The task organization goes along with the

central decision on whether to use a
central reserve or local reserves.

Step 3. ORGANIZATION OF COMBAT

(Terrain Management)

 Provide the next echelon with their area

of responsibility and their mission/ tasks,
according to the terrain.

 The terrain dominates in MW the matrix.

 Decide whether to order :

- Clear Battle Positions25 (BP) /
i.e. defence positions; or

25
Clear defensive position = no withrawal from this position in backward alternate position without the
allowance of the next tactical echelon.

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- A sector, i.e. defense sector26, or

only

- An area of operation27.

 Use a numbering system for tactical

coordination issues.

Step 4. MAIN EFFORT AND ASM28:

 Decide where and on whose

responsibility the main effort is for the
planned conduct of the battle.

 The main effort never overlaps levels of

responsibility.

 The main effort can be built by:

- Reinforcement with (an) additional
tactical element(s) (cp. TO) and /or
- Reinforcement by (a) tactical asset(s)
(cp.TO) and/or
- A smaller area of responsibility
- Reinforcement of battle positions (fire
positions) and/or
-Prioritizing the CS or/and CSS in this area.

 Plan ASM.

26
Defense sector = Combat begins at this position but using alternate positions in the own backward area is on
the responsible tactical decision maker in this area of responsibility.
27
Ordering an area of operation without specifications means fully mission command how to use the own area
of responsibility for the mission.
28
ASM = Airspace Management

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Step 5. RESERVES

 Decide whether to use one central

reserve in the backward area or local
reserves close to the front line.

 Decide place(s), ways and engagements

by considering their manoeuverability.

Remark: Reserves in MW must have the

same mobility level as the troops in the
front line.

 Be aware central reserves cannot be

shifted rapidly.

Step 6. COMMAND AND CONTROL

FACILITIES

 Decide where to post in reality the

command posts MAIN, REAR, FWD and, in
case of need, the TAC.

 The MAIN Command Post should not

disrupt the area of next lower echelon of
responsibility.

 MAIN and REAR needs infrastructure.

 Before placing symbols for facilities

always consider terrain and weather and
radio link possibilities.

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Step 7. MEDIC FACILITIES

 The Casualty Collection Point (CCP) must

be planned as close as possible to the
front line, but it must be ensured that the
transportation of injured people to the
Battalion Aid Station (BAS) is possible
under all weather conditions (take in
account terrain and weather)

 The BAS should be planned approx. 800-

1000m away from the Main Command
post. Infrastructure must be available
(e.g. water, energy, road system).

Step 8. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)

 Plan CSS facilities according to the actual

terrain and required infrastructure.

 Decide and plan one-way or two-way

traffic, and deconflict tactical and/or
support use and the use of the traffic
network by locals.

 Before placing tactical symbols consider

terrain and weather impacts.

STEP 9. FIRE SUPPORT (DIRECT AND

INDIRECT)

 Generate the Field Artillery Support Plan

(FASP) or Fire Support Overlay (experts in
the fire support cell will do this).

 Sign in the position area for artillery

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(PAA) and/or

 Sign in firing position areas and

alternative fire position areas for mortars
according to their terrain requests.

 Be aware of mountainous hindrances to

the trajectories of indirect fire systems.

STEP 10. MOUNTAIN SITUATION PLAN

(MW specific Annex)

 Use systematic risk management and

create the mountain situation plan
(experts in the mountain cell will do this;
see. Annex A-1 ).

 Make proposals for courses of action

concerning risk mitigation measures with:
- the resources needed,
- the time needed,

see Mountain Situation Plan (overlay) in

Annex A 1 as a reference.

STEP 11. LOGISTIC PLANS

 Create the ground based Supply Plan (a

logistic expert in collaboration with the
mountain cell will do this).

 Create the Transportation Plan

(a logistic expert in collaboration with the
mountain cell will do this).

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see Logistic plans (overlay) in Annex A-2 and

A-3 as references.

STEP 12. ADDITIONAL ANNEXES AND

OVERLAYS

 Create the additional needed Annexes

and overlays, such as barrier plan, CBRN
facilities, FASP etc. There is no special
peculiarity to infantry warfare.

3.2 MANOEUVRE
General
1. Manoeuvre is defined as the employment of forces on the battlefield through
movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of
advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. In land
operations it is the means of concentrating land forces at the decisive point to pre-
empt, dislocate or disrupt the enemy’s cohesion through shock, surprise,
destruction or any other intended effect against his capabilities.

2. Manoeuvre - the combination of fire and movement, supplemented by barriers - is

the primary means of achieving objectives by land forces in combat. Those
elements of manoeuvre interact with each other and complement each other. Whilst
one element may be briefly dominant, the commander must coordinate them to
create their full effect on the object. The combination of the elements also helps to
protect the troops. Strength of the fire, speed and direction of the movement provide
protection against enemy weapon effects and determine the momentum of the
manoeuvre force. The joint function of manoeuvre is therefore closely related to the
function of fires.

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3.2.1 MANOEUVRE AND DECENTRALIZATION

1. Due to the narrow terrain compartments in mountainous terrain, unified control is
often only possible over small units. Mountain combat is therefore in most cases
decentralized. In dependency on the environment, small units march separately but
strike together when this is the best course of action.

2. The compartmentalization of mountainous terrain can also require a decentralized

combat. In such cases the companies, platoons or even squads fight in isolation,
even if they are geographically close together.

3. Movement in mountainous terrain is in general much slower but, especially in winter

(depending on the snow conditions and relief), it can also speed up decisively with
over-snow vehicles and if the necessary skills (e.g. skiing proficiency) are at an
advanced or expert level.

4. Actions in contact are as they trained; however simple actions become difficult in
MW, and difficult actions are impossible in adverse weather and terrain. Mutual
trust inside the unit and through the echelons is essential for MW. Generally quality
takes precedence over quantity in MW. This is an environment where human
capital cannot be replaced by technology.

3.3 FIRES
General
1. Fires means the use of weapons to create a physical and psychological effect on a
target and, in combination with movement, create manoeuvre. Fires may be
delivered by land elements or by joint means in support of land forces and their
objectives. Fires will be a central part of the commander’s plan.

2. Mountainous terrain significantly influences fire support. Hard-to-locate and well

protected targets on peaks, in ravines, and on reverse slopes require a proper
combination of recce/observation fires and ammunition 29 . Often no continuous
front-line exists, and weather conditions are unpredictable and challenging.

3. Gun and/or fire positions that are ideal for range and coverage may not be suitable
because of the intervening features and masking fire. At other times a location
might be tactically sound but is an area prone to avalanches, flash floods or
mudslides.

4. Mountain Warfare troops in good visibility have the advantage of seeing long
distances, but in general they have the disadvantage of being limited in firing at
middle and long distances and being limited in their lethality effect.

29
Balance of caliber and amount of ammunition

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3.3.1 GROUND BASED DIRECT SUPPORTING FIRE

1. Ground based direct supporting fire with heavy long range weapons should be part
of the courses of action, even if they can only be used statically. They can be
brought to decisive key points as static tactical element(s) by suitable means of
transport, such as helicopters, pack animals or arial railways.

2. Exposing fire positions of static systems out of their own weapons range has to be
avoided.

3. Once direct supporting fire elements are deployed, major engineering as well as
logistic efforts may be necessary to ensure their resupply, their security, and the
options to withdraw them or to shift them to alternate locations in a timely fashion.

4. Direct supporting fire elements are, in general, not part of the table of organization
and equipment (TOE), i.e. they are either directed to provide direct support or they
are attached in the task organization.

5. To ensure load reduction and the efficiency of fire power the MW principle of “more
ammunition, fewer weapon systems” is also in force for direct fire support elements.
Take in account the downsizing of the calibre of weapon systems as the elevation
increases, due to supply and reposition restrictions.

6. A peculiarity of MW is the opportunity to overshoot own troops by high ground

posted fire positions, thus building a kind of “fire-umbrella” for own movements.

7. The capability of ground based Air Defence (AD) is crucial for self defence and
survivability (ground-to-air).

8. Demanding mountainous environment poses challenges to air defence operations,

especially in the AD units employment. Appropriate positions are rare and there is
a lack of transportation routes. As a consequence, air defence weapons may not
be able to deploy to the suitable locations and, in addition man-portable air defence
systems may be the only way of providing direct air defence protection of the units.
Movement to and taking up firing positions in mountainous terrain requires
additional time.

9. Mountainous environment degrades the electronic target acquisition capabilities of

air defence systems and makes it more difficult for the air defence planner to locate
and select adequate positions to provide appropriate coverage for the units.
Continuous visual observation must be established, particularly along possible air
avenues of approach.

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10. The support of MW experts can improve the mobility of ground based fire support
elements.

11. Direct Fire with explosives may as well be used for triggering avalanches for tactical
purposes.

3.3.2 AIR BASED DIRECT SUPPORTING FIRE

1. The air based direct supporting fire systems which support with air-to-ground fire in
MW are:
a. Close Combat Attack (CCA).
b. Close Air Support (CAS).

2. Close Combat Attack in MW is mostly carried out by helicopters, and it is an

incredibly important tactical element for quick and agile direct fire support.

3. Close Combat Attack elements are a tactical tool directly requested by a

commander. The Weapons release and effects control are in responsibility of the
aircrew commander. In the task organization they normally have the directive to
provide direct fire support, or they can be attached. Due to the close proximity of
friendly forces, detailed integration is required. Due to the unique capabilities of the
aircraft and the enhanced situational awareness of the aircrews, terminal control
from ground units or controllers IS NOT necessary. As a tactical element they can
be used for:
a. Quick fire support in the event of emergency.
b. Cover by fire.
c. Concentrate fires; and/or
d. Mass fires.

4. Close Air Support is not directly requested by the commander and there is the need
to call for fire through the chain of command, and for detailed information on this
air based fire support and integration with the fire and movements on the ground.
The Weapon release and effects control are in responsibility of the qualified Joint
Fire Support Element. Close Air Support in MW is generally used as a tactical
element to:
a. Clarify emergency situations.
b. Support planned mass fires.
c. Build the main effort by fire power.

5. Commanders and planners must be aware that in all cases the Time of Flight (TOF)
and the amount of ammunition is limited.

6. The performance of helicopters is severely limited at high altitudes and their

employment is also affected in adverse weather conditions. The same limitations
are valid for the use of UAVs/UAS for direct supporting fire.

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3.3.3 INDIRECT SUPPORTING FIRE

1. If there is indirect supporting fire from external fire positions (ground, naval or air
fire support) a Company Joint Fire Support Element is needed on the spot to
conduct observation and fire direction and a deciding Battalion or Brigade Joint Fire
Support Element is needed to ensure the fire support.

2. If the indirect supporting fire element(s) is/are inside the doctrinal organization, or
in case such an element is attached or directed to provide support, a forward
observer is needed on the spot to conduct observation and fire direction and the
decision authority is then on the tactical commander.

3. Undulating mountainous terrain and intervening crests require a larger number of

observers in comparison with flat terrain, located in the region of dominating heights
to cover the entire area of operations.

4. The mobility and survivability of Joint Fire Support Elements or forward observer(s)
can be enhanced by the support of an MW expert in bringing them by a safe
(mountainous) route to their designated position.

5. Indirect supporting fire has multiple sources such as artillery and mortars, and these
elements have different fire power and battle worthiness according to their calibres
and technical data.

6. Especially in MW Joint Fire Support Elements and Fire Direction Centres need to
plan their fire in advance by calculating trajectories and maximum elevation (in
shooting over a summit or mountainous ridge) as well as minimum and maximum
distance of fire support. A planning matrix for the system according to the task
organization is the basis for successful indirect supporting fire.

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FIGURE 3-6: TRAJECTORY SPECIFICATIONS OF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY – SYSTEMS (LE) AND AN EXAMPLE OF A
PLANNING MATRIX (RI)

7. Trajectory problems caused by the terrain will certainly impact on its use.
Additionally, distances become more difficult for forward observers to judge and
abrupt changes in the weather can rapidly negate computational firing data. By
planning indirect fire support the tactical planner must be aware that indirect fire
can be hampered by:
a. The absolute height.
b. The relative height.
c. The trajectory-distance from hindrances (summits/peaks).
d. The angle of possible fire.
e. The suitability of the fire positions.
f. The time required, depending on the environment and weather conditions,
to change the fire position.

8. In general, mortars are more prone and effective in MW because their trajectory
enables to engage targets on reverse slopes and to negotiate high mountains.
Furthermore they can be shifted or/and readjusted to their fire positions by air as
well as on the ground, by different means of transport such as helicopters, pack
animals, cable cars and even by carriage.

9. In all cases a realistic time planning for displacing of artillery and/or mortars must
be calculated.

10. In general, artillery and mortar units need the capability of ensuring optimum fire
support under all circumstances and all weather conditions.

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11. In MW, air burst and variable time fuzes are more effective than point-detonating
artillery rounds.

12. Another possibility of ground based indirect Fire support can be provided the
tactical asset of guided missiles. The tactical added value of such systems is, that
due to their range, reconnaissance can be prevented at an early stage or in any
case the own troops are veiled because they only have to use their direct weapons
later during a tactical activity. The deployment of such systems in the mountains in
firing positions from which they come into effect can be a challenge. The
harmonization of fire and air space management taking into account national and
international rules of use, such as ROE´s and caveats requires complex planning.
Modern systems allow the approach to the target area to be tailored to the day and
the conditions, in the direction and altitude, over the entire range up to the target
approach.

13. Indirect Fire with explosives can cause avalanches and must be considered when
using them. Avalanche triggering can also be used for tactical purposes.

3.4 SUSTAINMENT
General
Sustainment provides for the comprehensive provision of personnel, logistics,
medical, general military engineering (MILENG) support, finance and contract
support required to maintain combat power throughout all phases of the operation.

3.4.1 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE

1. Combat Service Support is the support provided to combat forces, primarily in the
fields of administration and logistics30.

2. Logistics poses the greatest challenges in Mountain Warfare and the system of
logistic determines the feasability of operations in the mountains. A number of
natural factors such as differences in elevation, difficulties in terrain, lack of roads
and infrastructure, snow, ice, etc., hinder the usual (combat) service support

30
Combat service support may include, but is not limited to, administrative services, chaplaincy, civil affairs,
financial, legal, medical and health services, military police, supply, maintenance, transportation, construction,
acquisition and disposal of real estate, facilities engineering, topographic and geodetic engineering, food
services, graves registration, laundry and dry cleaning services, sanitary installations, and property disposal (APP-
19). Inside this ATP the focus is only on logistic according to tactical activities, as there is a fundamental difference
between Mountain Warfare and Warfare in other environments. The issues of transportation, mentioned there,
hold also true in all kinds of evacuation or support in this environment.

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system and procedures. Difference in elevation, for example, represent a major

logistic challenge, and in general the mountainous environment hinders logistic
simply by restricting movement or slowing down its speed.

3. The delivery of supply goods (classes of supply) is challenging, and additionally the
logistical requirements are far above average in comparison to normal infantry
fighting, and special mountain equipment may be crucial.

4. From the Logistic Base to the frontline, the supply goods (classes of supply) go
through a chain of supply which must be planned and executed very carefully by
considering both the tactical situation and the environment (example; The height of
tunnels may be a hindrance for supply vehicles). The supply plan, which is an annex
to the operation plan, is the outcome of this planning.

5. Depending on the terrain features, there is the need to plan, prepare and run
transhipment points and to plan the suitable means of transport (Helicopters
{landing/dropping/abseiling}, drones, cable cars, all-terrain vehicles, over-snow
vehicles, pack animals, sledges, porters, carriers, etc.).

6. If resupply can be made by helicopter, the point of resupply should be planned as

close as possible, to the front unit, considering the tactical and environmental
situation. If there is a drop zone or depot system the same principle is in force. For
helicopter transport the supplies must be prepared and packed in supply packages
and the transport must be issued by a transport plan, recording the packages for
the different landing points, drop zones and/or abseiling points (see Annex A-3).
7. For planning the supply in MW, the terrain is divided in supply sectors, and it is a
rule of thumb that the supply sector changes with the change in means of transport
at transhipment points or zones.

8. To ensure the sustainability in operations under these factors, requires a very

flexible “logistic-system of systems”. Decision-makers adapt logistic plans to the
frequently changing facts imposed by nature. This logistic system of systems
contains both horizontal (distance) and vertical (elevation) adaptations of the
means of transport of the “push and pull systems31”. Furthermore, the decision-
makers responsible for supply must take into account that due to weather and
environmental conditions it may be possible that not even this “system of systems”
will work. In this cases, and in order to enhance the self-sustainability of front
troops, the »depot-system” is another option. With the “depot-system” materiel,
equipment and supply is prepositioned to overcome enemy interdiction and/or
resupply problems caused by natural factors such as adverse weather, increasing
avalanche danger, etc.

31
Push = bring supply goods to the supply point; pull = supply point distribution.

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9. The using of local available goods can be as well considered as an option.

FIGURE 3-7: LOGISTIC SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS

10. In general, the possibilities and requirements of supply determine the course of the
fight in the mountains much more than in the plains. A weak infrastructure, including
few, and poor quality roads and landing points or sites, are leading to significant
mobility and resupply challenges.

11. In general the proportion of supply troops to combat troop’s increases, and the
protection of logistic bases in the mountainous environment is crucial and must also
be initiated. A tactical commander can be forced to use tactical combat elements
for the own supply loosing these elements for operational combat activities.

3.4.2 STEPS TO THE GROUND BASED SUPPLY PLAN IN MW

For the development of the ground based supply plan the following steps are
recommended as a guideline. The sequence of the steps is intended as a guidance,
this may be different between the nations. The contents of the supply plan are
obligatory to achieve interoperability.

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Exploration of the Supply Plan in MW Steps

STEP 1.

 Assessment of the terrain in

correlation with the available
means of transport.
Definition of the supply sectors
according to the outcome of the
assessment.
As a general rule, the supply
sector changes with the means of
transport.

 By using pack animals it is

recommended to plan in a
direction, which enables the
return at the same day32

STEP 2.

 Definition of the intended routes,

tracks, paths and ways, taking in
account the usability as two-way
traffic, alternating traffic, or only
one way traffic.

 Whenever possible separate the

routes of warfighting and supply.

 Deconflict the military and civilian

use of the sparse traffic network

 Nature and the tactical situation

determine the usage of LOCs.

32 The supply of pack animals with food, water and a suitable place to stay overnight is a regular problem
in mountainous terrain.

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STEP 3.

 Risk Management:
The risk of mountainous dangers
and tactical dangers along the
intended LOCs and at the places
of logistic facilities and/or
transshipment points must be
assessed and evaluated in detail,
section by section by an expert.

 The Mountain Cell will provide

recommendations with the
Mountain Situation Plan
concerning the environmental
risk. The tactical risk must be
considered by a tactical SME.

 Decision making which LOCs are

to be used by which means of
transport.

STEP 4.

 Planning of packages (classes of

supply) and computing of realistic
times and capacities33 according
to the suitable and available
means of transport in correlation
with the LOCs and environmental
dispositions.

33 In order to make aware of realistic time planning and resource planning concerning CSS an example shows the
specification in MW: Example: Day of supply for a company with ammunition and food (at low intensity) with
horizontal distance of the supply route 60 km and a vertical distance of 1500 m in altitude. The data are taken from
a real life exercise at battalion level, on a normal autumn day, and the resources were; Bell UH 1D (Helicopter type),

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STEP 5.

 Creation of the supply plan as

overlay to the operations
overlay with a calculating table.

 The Supply Plan is an Annex in the

Operation Order. (see Annex A-
2).

donkies (pack animal type), and mountain inf soldiers at basic level (soldiers skills). As the factors are determining
the outcome, these data cannot be generalized in direction of a rule.

Porter/carrier/ soldier Pack animal (donky) Helicopter

25 hrs Marching time 17 hrs Marching time 30 min Flying time

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3.4.3 HELICOPTER BASED TRANSPORTATION PLAN

1. For carry-to-customer supply operations, helicopters are the most efficient means
of transport. However, the use of helicopters may be restricted or prevented by bad
weather, high elevation, and enemy activities and therefore an alternative plan
(without using helicopters) must be done in any case.

2. Helicopters in most cases, only have time-limited availability, so their usage as a

means of transport must be planned and prepared in time.

3. To ensure that helicopters are used efficiently, the airlift and the airdrop must be
planned, arranged, ordered and coordinated by an air controller (see airspace
management in the Op-Plan):
a. Landing sites, landing points or drop zones must be planned as close to
the force as the tactical situation and the terrain allows.
b. The landing sites or points must be prepared by the force to be supplied
by:
1) Setting reference point(s) especially in winter).
2) Providing a navigation by a person on the ground (showing also
the wind direction).
3) Preventing the “white-out-effect” by compressing loose snow, or
removing it.
4) Providing tactical ground security.
5) Providing personnel to ensure rapid unloading.
c. In the loading area the packagers for each landing point or site must be
prepared (“package adaption”). If the transport is planned as an
uderslung load, the packages must be prepared in the helicopter slings
or cargo nets.

4. A transportation plan must be created and briefed to the helicopter crew (see Annex
A-3). This must be done in the format of an overlay and an additional explanatory
table. This is, on the one hand, an annex to the operation plan, and on the other
hand it is the basis for briefing the helicopter crew. The overlay of the transportation
plan shows the different landing points or sites, and the table provides information
about the load, the grids for the landing points or sites, and the circumstances on
the spot. In following information must be included in detail:
a. The elements to be supported (by unit and supply package (standard day
of supply/class of supply).
b. Consecutively numbered and dispersed landing sites or points for the
planned conduct of the supply.
c. The air routes, considering obstacles and the Fire (Support) Plan (in
accordance with airspace control and the Field Artillery Support Plan).

5. The (air) Transportation Plan is distributed to the relevant tactical commanders, the
forces carrying out the supply actions, and the helicopter crew.

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6. The air transportation plan facilitates quick control and efficiency of air
transportation activities. An example as guidance is shown in Annex A-3.

3.4.4 MILITARY MEDICAL CARE IN MW

1. Mountains can pose a variety of health threats and most of them increase with
altitude. Hypobaric hypoxia is a relevant feature in mountainous environment and
in combination with other conditions it requires comprehensive and permanent
force health protection.

2. Military Medical personnel in MW must focus on care under harsh environmental

extremes, including difficult mountainous terrain, high altitudes, and cold weather.
These conditions put strain and harm on the battle worthiness of individual soldiers
and tactical elements.

3. In particular, high altitude effects must be very severly considered from both, the
tactical and the medical points of view. The rapid deployment of unacclimatized
troops to high mountainous environments minimizes their battle worthiness and
may have debilitating effects on soldiers´ health. It is highly recommended that the
physical and mental performance of soldiers who have to operate in high
mounainous environments is maximized by proper acclimatization, but
unfortunately, operational scenarios often limit the time available.

4. In addition to the classical feature of hypobaric hypoxia connected to the low

atmospheric pressure, factors such as rugged terrain, extreme temperatures, wind,
solar radiation, wastelands frequently covered in snow and ice represent the main
threats for non-battle injuries and lower performance in Mountain Warfare.
Moreover, the combination of such factors negatively impacts on the ability of the
body to recover quickly from minor affections among infectious diseases or wounds
and also to effectively respond to traditional sea-level treatments.
Environmental illnesses (= nonbattle injuries) may become a significantly higher
burden for the healthcare support system compared to trauma injuries. Table 3-1
provides a summarized overview of the most possible medical problems.

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TABLE 3-1: MEDICAL PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED AT ALTITUDE WHEN ASSESSING THE MEDICAL ESTIMATE AND THE
POSTURE OF THE MEDICAL SUPPORT SERVICES.

MEDICAL PROBLEMS IN MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

RELATED TO HYPOXIA

Mainly affecting the first two weeks of DUE TO OTHER FACTORS

deployment Possible anytime

Altitude illness (AMS34, HAPE, HACE) Trauma due to rugged terrain

High-altitude peripheral edema Cold and heat stress and injuries

Sleep disturbances UV radiation-related problems

High-altitude retinopathy Malnutrition

High-altitude Pharyngitis/Bronchitis Dehydration

Thromboembolism Scarce hygiene

Exacerbation of preexisting disease Lightning strikes

Slowed Wound Healing CO poisoning

Immune system reduced response Constipation/Hemorrhoids

Poisonous snakes, insects and plants

Trauma due to lack of specific training (knees,

back, shoulders).

5. As a general rule, the number of casualties who need evacuation from operations
in the mountains is expected to be much higher compared to the same manoeuvres
at low altitude (i.e. >10-fold higher according to figures derived from training
exercises in the first days of activity).

3.4.4.1 LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND TACTICAL ACTIVITIES IN HIGH

TERRESTRIAL ELEVATIONS
1. Deployment of troops to high and extremely high mountains requires great
considerations and a proper approach. The effects of high altitude on

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unacclimatized soldiers are well documented and researched (see AJMedP-4 and
relared documents). The impact of a stress caused by hypobaric hypoxia can result
in significantly diminished performances, and in the worst cases it can be even fatal
to unacclimatized soldiers. Following the latest researches, the impacts to health
and performance are as listed below35:
a. Mission requirements that demand sustained physical activities are most
affected by altitude. Soldiers will fatigue sooner or must reduce their pace
and/or lighten their load in order to accomplish many activities. As the
demand for sustained physical activities increases, so does the risk of
developing altitude sickness.
b. Altitude induces many adverse symptoms, such as shortness of breath and
rapid heart rate, in most soldiers and altitude illness in many. These
symptoms can produce unwarranted concerns in soldiers who are unfamiliar
with this environment.
c. Altitude contributes to impaired neuropsychological function and mood
changes that may adversely affect the morale of the troops.
d. Continuous exposure to altitude contributes to increased disease and non-
battle injury since sick and injured soldiers are susceptible to medical
complications produced by hypoxia.
2. The magnitude of the hypoxic stress is determined by the altitude, the rate of ascent
and the length of exposure. Factors that contribute to the severity of symptoms
include:
a. The level of physical exertion.
b. Individual susceptibility.
c. Body mass index.
d. Hydration status.
e. Age, and co-existing medical problems.

3. Consequently, commanders, staff and the medical department should provide

capabilities for mitigating altitude stress by the following next procedures:
a. An altitude risk assessment which is limited to two acclimatization states,
unacclimatized and fully acclimatized. It also depends on how rapidly the
ascend on altitude above 2400 m must be made, as well as what physical
work tasks need to be performed.
b. Altitude illness detection and diagnosis; the earliest manifestation is based
on the presence of signs and symptoms such as headache, nausea, fatigue,
etc.

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c. Altitude acclimatization that is based on continuous exposure to altitude with

cycles of graded ascents and descents back to lower altitudes, also known
as “work high, sleep low”36.
d. Nutritional and hydration guidelines for optimizing physical performance at
altitude, as well as maintaining the health status of soldiers at low
temperatures.

4. In general medical personnel is challenged to minimize the damaging effects of the

harsh environment, to maximize survival rates, and to preserve combat
effectiveness. Doctors, medical staff and other medics must be capable of
recognizing and treating high-altitude related injuries and illnesses, as well as
special MW-related injuries and damages such as frostbite, snow blindness, and
so on. They should have the basic Mountain Warfare capabilities, with scalable
skillsets depending on their roles and tasks.

5. Medical personnel should be able to work together with MW Experts (see systems
of bringing medic personnel to the injured persons).

6. All MW personnel should be trained in first aid of this conditions and caregivers
skilled in more advanced treatment options according to their qualifications.

7. MILMED in Mountain Warfare contains:

a. Force Health Protection.
b. Emergency Medical Care System (EMC).
c. Medical Supplies & Logistics.

8. The most challenging thing in Mountain Warfare is the forward MEDEVAC and/ or
CASEVAC, as this is in adverse terrain including the vertical dimension. It is
important to assess well in advance during the pre-deployment planning phase at
what point of the casualty evacuation process the medical responsibility starts. This
point identifies when the medical responsibility is handed over from the unit to the
EMC (Emergency Medical Care) System which now becomes primarily responsible
for patients. Before this point the combat unit is assumed to be engaged in direct
combat and medical interventions are prioritized according to the tactical
requirements more than the clinical needs. In such conditions, the Emergency
Medical Care System can only act as a supporting force for the delivery of medical
interventions.

9. To ensure best medical care under these circumstances a very close collaboration
between medical personnel and mountain rescue personnel is required.

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10. To ensure medical care in extremely difficult mountainous terrain there are four
systems of collaboration usual and experienced:
a. A wounded person/soldier is brought to the doctor/medical personnel by
mountain rescue soldiers or a mountain rescue team skilled as first
responders and in mountain rescue techniques (CASEVAC - “pick and go
system”).
b. The doctor/medical personnel (mobile teams of medical professionals)
trained for mountain rescue) is brought to the injured by a mountain rescue
expert of mountain rescue team, using the best available and possible
means of transport (including ground safety installations).
c. A mix of these 2 systems is applied, when tactical and/or environmental
situation requires it.
d. A Forward Surgical Team (FST) or ROLE 2 Forward (R2F) can be co-located
at the ROLE 2 MTF, ready to be redeployed during specific occasions in
proximity of targets to accelerate the delivery of surgical care to combat
units. However, FSTs/R2Fs have a limited autonomy if projected as stand-
alone capabilities into remote and austere areas and must be continuously
supported by MEDEVAC and resupply.

11. In the common operational picture, the admission to a first Medical Treatment
Facility (Role 1 MTF) such as the Battalion Aid Station (BAS) with ROLE 1 or in
some cases ROLE 2 MTF sets the point from where a casualty is lost by the unit
and becomes a patient until completion of the medical treatment. However, many
other solutions are possible according to different national approaches or in
consideration of specific circumstances. Forward MEDEVAC (Figure 3-8), even if
enhanced with medical emergency response teams (MERT) or other national
physician-led solutions, is not outlined a primary medical responsibility because of
the significant operational constraints that may impede the delivery of expected
clinical standards. EMC System is thus in a supporting position towards the unit
mission accomplishment.

12. In some deliberate operations or even in case of safe areas, the handover of
medical responsibility can be planned closer to the point of injury/disease (i.e. at
the Casualty Collection Point or at the Helicopter Landing point, site or zone) in a
location not directly exposed to enemy threats where medical teams can perform
prehospital emergency care interventions and evacuation procedures unimpeded
by security constraints.

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FIGURE 3-8: EVACUATION PHASES OVERVIEW EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE (EMC) SYSTEM IN MW

13. The Casualty Collection Point (CCP) and the Battailion Aid Station (BAS) must be
planned in collaboration with the tactical commander(s) on the spot. The system of
evacuation from the location of injury to the CCP must be ordered, whether this is
planned by CASEVAC or by a forward MEDEVAC. The responsibility for
transportation of injured personnel from CCP to BAS must be ordered by installing
a push or pull system. The responsibility of these CASEVAC or Forward MEDEVAC
issues is on the tactical Commander.

14. One of the main features of deployed emergency medical systems is the timely
evacuation of casualties from the battlefield to definite care. Agreed timelines are
reported in relevant NATO publications in order to provide a commonly acceptable
medical response, especially for the initial interventions in emergency situations.
Currently, the “10-1-2(+2) timeline” is applied as a standard approach in support to
ground operations:
a. 10 minutes of injury or onset of severe symptoms to provide effective first
aid, bleeding and airway control for the most severely injured casualties.
b. 1 hour of injury or onset of acute symptoms to provide medical service
personnel, qualified trained and equipped for emergency care to start
advanced resuscitation and pre-hospital emergency care.
c. 2 hours of injury or onset of acute symptoms to provide medical service
personnel qualified, trained and equipped for surgical and resuscitative
emergency care to complement prehospital emergency care by life limb and

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function preserving surgical and resuscitative procedures as soon as

possible;
d. +2 hours of tactical evacuation to provide further surgical, resuscitative,
diagnostic and specialist care capabilities necessary to stabilize the patient
for strategic evacuation.

15. These generally accepted timelines can be used as planning references in order to
allocate medical resources in the tactical area in general and shape the deployed
emergency medical system in the battlespace. In MW scenario some specific
situations mainly caused by weather and the mountainous environment may
require adaptive approaches or dedicated solutions.

16. In general, the goal is to ensure the 10-1-2(+2) timeline principle. In extreme cases
and in the event that the 10-1-2(+ 2) timeline principle is not possible, there must
be the capability of offering prolonged field care to the wounded personnel in mobile
heated systems (huts/ tents) to treat and stabilize injured personnel until they can
be transported further on in the standard organized rescue chain. In general, the
closer to the battlefield a medical service is, the more agile and tactically skilled it
should be, so that the full spectrum of medical capabilities must be able to move,
operate and communicate together with the force they support. The more the
supported unit or tactical element is isolated the more medical capabilities are
needed and the supporting medical unit must be experienced, equipped, and
shaped to the mission requirements.

17. The main factors to be considered when configuring a deployed mountain

healthcare support system are summarized in Table 3-2.

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TABLE 3-2: TYPICAL CONSTRAINTS TO MEDICAL SUPPORT AND SUGGESTED MITIGATIONS.

CONSTRAINTS OF MEDICAL
MITIGATIONS
SUPPORT

Tactical Units Small, disconnected, isolated, highly First responders skilled in

mobile, limited in load carriage, mountain rescue, wilderness
exposed to enemy threats. medicine and prolonged field care.

Transportation Vulnerable lines of communication, Place medical resources in a

rugged terrain, limited accessibility to network, differentiating
motor vehicles, harsh weather. connection routes, platforms and
methods of evacuation.

Medical Specific equipment and supplies, Increase the number of medical

resources uneven mobility skills, increased personnel, provide mountain
workload and decreased performance, medicine courses, increase
increased hold times. medical supplies in combat
support area, train mobility and
retrieval skills for pre-hospital
operators.

18. In the event of crisis management, especially caused by natural hazards, additional
medical resources for the management of physical and psychological
consequences will be needed to restore baseline readiness of the unit.

19. Helicopters are an extremely worthwhile resource as a means of casualty

evacuation. By calling for help by air rescue use the 9-Liner and obey the following
principles:
a. In a wilderness location and away from roads, an accurate map reference is
crucial; note the grid reference.
b. Don’t risk lives or waste valuable time if there are obstructions nearby that
may make an air rescue unsafe or untenable.
c. Mention artificial obstacles such as masts, cable car wires, electricity wires
and pylons which are in the area.
d. Stay focused on the casualty and keep others away from the helicopter.
e. Make sure that there are no people milling around at the landing point/site.
f. Secure all loose kit (downwash).
g. Follow the direction of the helicopter crew.
h. In winter: set a reference point (referrer) and prepare the landing point by
compressing snow or removing it, thus avoiding the white-out effect.

Military tactics determine military medical solutions. Forward MEDEVAC and

CASEVAC is in the responsibiltiy of the tactical commander. Care under Fire, the

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evacuation to Casualty Collection Points (CCP) and the timely care and recovery of
injured and diseased soldiers is crucial and complicated in MW, it needs planning and
the necessary capabilities tailored to the mission and the terrain

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CHAPTER 4 IMPLICATIONS TO LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN

MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

General
1. Land tactical operations are conducted through a balanced combination of different
activities that reflects the nature of the operation, the threat and the
strategic/operational objectives. The resources and emphasis placed on each type
of activity will depend upon a number of situational factors and will reflect the nature
of the land tactical operation. The character of land tactical operations at a distinct
tactical level is determined by its purpose, the operation’s objective and the
dominance of a specific category of tactical activities related to it. In principle three
types can be distinguished:
a. offensive operations;
b. defensive operations;
c. stability operations.

2. Whatever type, all land tactical operations are supported by activities in the
information environment influencing the audience relevant to the attainment of
objectives. Commanders need to be aware that information activities, however,
cannot be restricted to an assigned AOR.

3. Land tactical operations are a tailored combination of offensive, defensive,

stabilizing and enabling tactical activities. The generic principle of possible
combinations of tactical activities within the land tactical operations are layed down
in ATP 3.2.1. The term “operations” is a sequence of coordinated actions with a
defined purpose. This chapter describes the implications to land tactical operations
in a mountainous environment.

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FIGURE 4-1: A STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW OF LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND TACTICAL ACTIVITIES.

4.1 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The main purpose of offensive operations is to impose one’s own will upon the enemy
be defeating him through the use or threat of force. The effect is created by putting the
enemy in an unfavourable position through manoeuvre by removing terrain or strategic
points and curtailing his defensive abilities as well as through aligned information
activities. Within operations on a wider scale offensive operations may have also the
purpose to disrupt or pre-empt an enemy’s offensive action, to deceive or divert the
enemy, to seize ground and to fix enemy forces.

4.1.1 PRINCIPLES IN MW
1. Mountainous terrain limits offensive force deployments along restricted mobility
corridors, splitting offensive formations along independent directions, so the
principle of “march separately and strike together” is often used. In general the
operational tempo is reduced in mountainous environment. In the case of wintery
conditions, with an advanced or expert level of the soldiers in mobility on skis, it
can be speeded up, thus gaining a decisive tactical advantage.

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2. Offensive operations in mountainous environment are difficult and costly. Not only
must the soldiers fight the enemy, they must also brave the elements of the harsh
terrain and extreme weather conditions.

3. Vertical envelopments improve offensive capabilities and decrease the reliance on

only and costly frontal attacks.

4. In general in mountain combat holding the high ground (hills, ridges, saddles, etc.)
is tactically important. Tactical planning is not only to assess either high ground or
valley, it is necessary to combine assesses of mountain (high ground) and the
valley attack (see Figure 4-2). The same applies to the standard procedure of deep
interdiction to prevent the deployment of enemy reserves or reinforcements and
supply actions.

FIGURE 4-2: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM: "MOUNTAIN AND VALLEY ATTACK"

5. In mountainous terrain an approach on surrounding high ground is usually

necessary in order to get sufficient forces close to the enemy and/or to drive off
enemy forces into the valley. An approach in the valley only holds promise of
success if reconnaissance findings reveal the possibility of springing a surprise on
weaker enemy forces.

6. Ensuring interaction of all the attacking forces with regard to the objective is
essential (mass fires-strike together).

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7. Characteristics of offensive operations in mountainous environment:

a. Attacking on high ground generally means infantry making a slow approach.
b. Due to the terrain, often only a deep-echeloned order of battle and/or one of
approaching separately and striking together is often possible.
c. Isolated deployment areas often mean operating without adjacency (e.g.
flanking support).
d. Possession of the surrounding high ground is required at all times.
e. Ensuring the interaction of all the attack forces (striking together) is of vital
importance.
f. The terrain allows not only flanking fire but also firing over friendly forces (a
fire umbrella) to provide them with cover.
g. Vertical and horizontal envelopments are time-intensive but allow surprise
in terms of space and time.
h. Any approach is generally slow and time-consuming, whereas assault and
penetration must be surprising and swift; the approach can be speeded up
by airlifts, but in this case the altitude effect has to be considered.
i. It is often necessary to deviate from tactical norms due to the terrain and
weather (long lines of sight, and short lines of sight can change quickly due
to weather conditions).
j. The tactical commander needs to have insight into the terrain in which the
attack is to take place, to use the terrain as an advantage.
k. Heavy weapons should be included and used as far forward as possible in
a leapfrog mode.
l. Attacking from high ground has several advantages (saving energy, gain
speed, etc.).

8. Several intermediate objectives should be selected as a way to achieve the assault

objective.

9. It is often necessary, at an early stage, for small elements to seize parts of the
terrain that are crucial for further operational command and control (e.g. dominating
high ground, passes, river and valley crossing sites) and take the enemy by surprise
(raids). Mountain forces will often approach across difficult terrain and/or use bad
weather or poor visibility conditions for that purpose.

10. Small elements with expert-level teams or rope parties, free-fall operation teams
(parachute skills in mountainous environment) and/or paragliders as well as forces
landed by helicopters are often a tactical approach conducive to this end.

11. The moment of surprise in terms of space and time is a basic principle in mountain
combat. The goal, at all times, must be to use the full strength available by the
attacker, against the temporal weakness of the enemy.
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12. Helicopters directed to cooperate should be used to land forces by surprise and to
provide close combat support.

13. Vertical envelopments should always be a goal. They will maintain the force's
sustainability for the combat task in hand and expedite the course of action.

14. Elements may be tasked to attack in a broadly enveloping and forward-echeloned

manner in order to reach the enemy's flanks or rear. In highly desired terrain they
will have to fight in most cases on their own sometimes without direct
communication. They will often have to rely on poorly accessible terrain or climbing
areas for protection against threats to the flanks.

15. Frequently the terrain will make it possible to tie down and isolate the enemy with
few forces and assets, thus providing the opportunity to destroy the enemy
piecemeal.

16. Despite the necessary echelonment in depth, manoeuvre elements should be kept
forward to exploit any success before the enemy can possibly reorganize.

17. If the terrain does not permit any (central) repositioning of reserves, this should be
taken into account in the planning from the outset, keeping them near to the point
of main effort and sometimes it is useful to hold the reserve on disposal on
separated places. Any massing of forces should be avoided.

18. Task organization should enable the forces to conduct operations independently in
isolated areas.

19. Reinforcement with personnel trained to operate in mountainous environment, as

well as with engineers, JFS-Elements, snipers, antitank weapons, transportation
assets, carrier capacities and pack animals, is required in most cases.
20. Offensive operations in mountain warfare are usually preceded by reconnaissance,
which should provide the information required concerning the type, location,
strength and behaviour/aim of the enemy. If need be, enemy fire should be
deliberately drawn by means of reconnaissance in force, so as to determine their
exact location. Reconnaissance is the key to success when attacking in
mountainous environment. Whenever and wherever possible, a direct view of the
terrain in which the attack is to take place should be obtained. Only by having an
information edge is it possible to initiate a surprise attack efficiently in terms of
space and time.

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When attacking in mountain combat: "Do not proceed without

reconnaissance!"

21. Reconnaissance must particularly identify:

a. Employment options for enemy reserves, and the possibilities for containing
or disrupting the movement options of enemy reserves.
b. Any enemy forces in parts of the terrain dominating the axes of Movement.
c. Possibilities for assessing the positioning of enemy forces, as well as
transport options.
d. Enemy communications facilities.
e. Forward-echeloned enemy reconnaissance, observation and security
forces.

22. Terrain reconnaissance must particularly identify:

a. Options for friendly forces to approach and reposition.
b. Possibilities for bypassing obstacles, barriers and enemy positions.
c. Negotiable terrain which, if exploited, would make it possible to surprise the
enemy.
d. Possible positions for organic/friendly supporting arms and observation
posts.
e. Areas, routes, and transfer points for supply actions.
f. Landing points or sites for helicopters.
g. Hazards in the mountains when staging an attack.

23. Tactical planning for offensive operations in mountain combat includes the
following tactical activities:
a. Planning and ordering of reconnaissance.
b. Planning and ordering of mountain and valley attack.
c. Interdiction of possibilities for deep enemy access, supply and
reinforcement; through indirect fire/airlifting of forces/free-fall
operations/other forces/other measures.
d. Seizure of the objective.
e. CSS issues (medical care issues, recovery, etc).

24. If the terrain permits it, then the infantry norms and orders of battle employing
formations will apply. In cases where the mountainous terrain requires a splitting of
forces or does not allow proper deployment, it is often advantageous for the
companies/tactical manoeuvre elements to make their approaching and advance

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to contact separately. This will also involve using poorly accessible terrain and/or
climbing areas, which specially qualified personnel at expert level (army mountain
guides/army mountain leaders/specialized mountain infantry squads and/or
platoons) must make negotiable for mountain infantry soldiers and requisite combat
support in accordance with the recommendations of the mountain cell. The principle
of coordinating the forces in terms of time and space will then apply so that they
can strike/defeat the enemy together (principle march separately and strike
together). This will involve coordinating different locally assessed and calculated
times needed to reach the lines of departure.

4.1.2 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN WINTRY CONDITIONS

1. The decrease in energy levels among the attacking forces, greatly restricted
mobility, and more difficult supply conditions impair the conduct of offensive
operations. For these reasons, attacks conducted in wintry mountainous terrain
target close-lying objectives.

2. Time spent unprotected in tactical marshalling areas, assembly areas, at the line of
departure, or after seizure of the objective should be kept to a minimum, especially
in very cold weather and under consideration of mountain hazards.

3. Surprise attacks carried out as part of raid or as actions against enemy supplies
are effective options.

4. If surprise is not possible, then fire superiority will be required for any attack to be
successful. This must be ensured through indirect fire and/or air support, since
continuous support by means of heavy infantry weapons will hardly be possible due
to constant changes of position and the difficulty of ammunition resupply.

5. In the case of deep-snow situations, the following method can be used:

a. Combat patrols on skis or wearing snowshoes identify the exact location of
enemy bases and the depth of the enemy's operational area.
b. For deception purposes, weak forces pin down the enemy in a frontal attack.
c. Selected seasoned and winter-mobile mountain troops infiltrate or achieve
deep penetration through gaps. They then attack the enemy's rear and
interdict in depth the employment of the enemy's reserve and supply forces.

6. If the operation is in danger of failing due to unacceptable environmental and/or

tactical riks, it should be aborted in good time and the troops left in, or withdrawn
to, favourable and, most importantly, weather-protected parts of the terrain. The
operation should be resumed under more favourable conditions. (For more detailed
information see ATP-3.2.1.5)

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4.1.3 FIGHTING IN NATURAL CAVES37 IN MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

1. A peculiarity in MW may be the necessity to fight in caves in order to gain tactical
control in an area of responsibility. Caves in the mountains can be used as retreats,
hiding places and/or storage places (depots). They are the best place to hide,
especially for irregular, hostile forces or equipment and ammunition. Fighting in
caves presents particular dangers and sets new challenges. Caves can also be an
option to achieve a tactical goal. The concept for this is simple: Dig a tunnel long
enough to reach under the target, emplace explosive, and hit the detonator.

2. In caves there is generally darkness. Smoke that arises either does not escape at
all or only very slowly. Vital functions such as ventilation and installed light are not
available always/everywhere or are not available at all, or can fail without warning.
Furthermore, ventilation and/or light can be consciously used and controlled by the
opponent for their own purposes.

3. The availability of sufficient breathing air without harmful gases is not guaranteed.
Toxic gases could become life-threatening within a few moments. Therefore,
tactical activities in caves require the ability to fight under respiratory protection and
under confusing light conditions.

4. The psychological stress of cave fighting is extremely diverse in terms of its

intensity and impact on the individual soldiers, and ranges from manageable stress
to fear, blockage or panic.

5. Under rainy conditions and/or in phases of heavy snow melt, certain spots inside a
cave can be flooded and water can isolate parts of a cave. In the worst case water
can be a crucial hindrance to getting out of the cave again. A precise assessment
of the probability of rain and/or heavy snow melt during a cave fighting period of
time is indisputable for tactical decisions.

6. If the entrance into a cave is only possible in a vertical manner, a fixed rope must
remain as a safe backup for ascend on the rope in case of need. This must be
protected.

7. In general, the part of risk management in the leading and decision-making

processes takes on a new dimension when fighting in caves, and requires specialist
advice from experts who are familiar with this environment. Emergency plans for
rescuing injured personnel from caves must be set up.

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Caves, natural cavities and tunnels belong to the category one of sub-terrain fighting. They may be rudimentary
but may also be sophisticated by structural reinforcement. Category two = urban subterranean systems. Category
three = underground facilities; complex structures specifically designed and built to provide maximum
concealment and protection for people and equipment within them.

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8. Tactical principles such as fire support from the air, indirect fire or armored forces
are not possible. Technical guidance and radio communications work poorly or not
at all. Central command and control of troops is impossible and mission command
is of particular importance.

9. Opposing forces can use cave structures for their own operations. Due to the
tightness of the subterranean space, forces are channeled and the approach is
made considerably more difficult for own forces. The use of night vision goggles
with residual light amplifiers in connection with infrared devices on weapons may
not work, which makes the use of own marking systems and artificial light sources
indispensable.

10. In going into a cave fight the protection against arising endangerment from outside
must be assured at all costs. This can be achieved by protection forces in an inner
security circle (cordon principle), which must be close to the entrance(s) as well as
to the possible exits, and an outer security circle (cordon principle) posted at a
distance to cover the possible approaching ways, paths and possibilities.

11. Caves and tunnels are very often booby-trapped by mines and IEDs. This type of
operations should therefore be supported by engineer personnel.

12. Tactical leaders must be aware in their planning and warfighting that there is a
different pace in sub-terrain and terrain fighting.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The main purpose of defensive operations is to oppose an enemy’s offensive actions
and to deny the enemy his aim or objective. Defensive operation is defined as
operation that defeats an enemy attack, gains time, economizes forces, or develops
conditions favourable for offensive operations. This could be by containing,
destroying or attriting down portions of his forces, to hold and control ground or a
combination of both. Defence requires a combination of different tactical activities to
be successful, including information activities to break the enemy’s cohesion and
firmness.

4.2.1 PRINCIPLES IN MW
1. Mountainous terrain is advantageous for defensive operations where relatively
small forces can hold key passes and valleys or other key terrain (dominating
heights) against superior forces, using natural obstacles to support an in-depth
defensive system.

2. When planning defensive operations in the context of mountain warfare, after an

assessment of the terrain and the situation, it must be decided whether the tactical
elements should form a closed defensive position, or whether the tactical elements
(usually companies) should defend in isolated areas. This fundamental decision will

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have an essential influence on the disposition of forces, their employment, and the
type of reserve(s), as well as on combat support and sustainment (task
organization). In general the shifting of the Main Effort in MW is time consuming
and demanding.

3. When conducting defensive operations in mountain combat environment, overall it

is important to have high ground control over dominating heights, passages and
passes, and also to maintain the main axes (LOC; LoO 38). This means holding
these sections of terrain, including the slopes and heights dominating them, against
any attacks. Even more than in flat environments, defensive strength in
mountainous terrain is based on selecting and exploiting favourable terrain.

4. Enemy forces advancing in intermediate terrain39 should be engaged by means of

indirect fire or air support, blocked by reserve forces, or annihilated.

5. Mountain mobile raiding parties (e.g. highly skilled expert teams such as mountain
guide-team, mountain leader team, and mountain infantry platoon at expert level,
etc.) should be additionally deployed to take back possession of important parts of
the terrain or to fight the attacking enemy force in the intermediate terrain.

4.2.2 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. In defencive operations there are the planning and excution stages of the Stage
forward the FEBA and in the Stage from the FEBA to the depth of the designated
area of responsibility (AOR).

2. In Mountain Warfare the chronological planned course of battle IOT defend an area
is divided into the following phases:
a. Reconnaissance forward FEBA up to the FLOT.
b. Engagement in front of the FEBA.
c. Defence at/in the FEBA.
d. Engagement in the depth of area of responsibility (blocking positions).

3. The planning is presented graphically in the operation plan (see Chapter 3.1.4.)
and detailed in the operation order issued for defensive operation. Special Annexes
in MW provide a quick overview of specifications in MW (e.g. Mountain Situation
Plan, Supply Plan, see ANNEX A.1. and A.2.).

38
Lines of Operation (AAP 06)
39
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4. Commanders will issue orders concerning:

a. Reconnaissance/combat reconnaissance (with special attention to
counterslopes/opposing sides of the valley).
b. Terrain management (including airspace management, helicopter landing
points or/and sites, drop zones, forward deployed supply facilities (e. g.
depots), etc.).
c. Sectors, position areas and/or positions (principle of overwatching the
enemy, often covering areas broader than normal).
d. Main effort.
e. Employment of assigned forces (task organization).
f. Firing position areas for mortars/grenade launchers (consideration of
transportability on pack animals and by helicopters).
g. Elevated positions of machine guns, antitank platoons and supporting
armoured combat vehicles with regard to the possibility of transportation by
helicopter(s).
h. Assembly areas for the support units.
i. Position and tasks of reserves when deployed together in close formation
(e.g. possibilities of deployment at hubs in different valleys; mobility; time
availability; where air transportable reserves are concerned, collocating the
assembly areas with air movement assets is expedient).
j. Barrier-free zones (barrier gaps).
k. Areas to be left unoccupied, kept under surveillance or secured by forces.
l. Blocking positions in the depth.
m. Barriers to be emplaced by engineers (including effective life).
n. Employment of combat service support, in particular supply elements
(“mountain-specific” support plan).
o. Coordination of fire support.
p. Liaison and coordinating points.
q. Main fire efforts.
r. Coordination of fire and movement during the engagement of the reserve(s).

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FIGURE 4-3: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF AN OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR A DEFENSIVE OPERATION IN MOUNTAINOUS
ENVIRONMENT (EXCERPT )

4.2.3 RECONNAISSANCE FORWARD OF THE FEBA

1. In mountainous terrain the area of reconnaissance forward of the FEBA will
generally be larger, given the longer reaction times. Depending on the terrain, this
will be manageable using own forces, since only a few hubs need to be
reconnoitred and the enemy has fewer deployment options due to channelling.
Reconnaissance will therefore be echeloned far forward, covering all trafficable
axes of movement. Any reconnaissance forward of the FEBA (outside the area of
responsibility) must be coordinated in detail with the next-higher level of command.

2. Withdrawal of reconnaissance forces while maintaining contact with enemy

attacking forces is often not possible due to the difficult features of mountainous
terrain, so the reconnaissance forces must be deployed mainly statically and deep-
echeloned, often remaining in the rear of the enemy forces. From there enemy
movements can be observed further on from behind the enemy line or/and can be
fought by JFS observers of own reconnaissance forces.

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3. Reconnaissance in force is often employed in the mountains. It serves to:

a. Disrupt and deceive the enemy.
b. Activate barriers between enemy groupings of forces.
c. Engage the enemy’s flanks or rear.
d. Destroy important enemy weapons and equipment.

4. If a favourable opportunity arises, attacking enemy forces may be induced to deploy

prematurely and/or to undertake time-consuming envelopments/bypassing
movements.

4.2.4 ENGAGEMENT FORWARD FEBA

1. Mountainous terrain is conducive to employing forces forward FEBA. Guard forces
deployed forward of the FEBA will be employed at strong natural
obstacles/obstructions, which should to be reinforced with barriers. Their
circumvention must be made difficult and time-consuming. If the terrain is suitably
exploited, even weak yet agile guard forces will be able to not only to hold up the
enemy for a lengthy period of time but also to cause them substantial losses.

2. Favourable parts of the terrain forward of the FEBA may be used for ambushes and
raids; this also applies to weaker forces. Enemy reconnaissance forces are to be
destroyed and countered forward of the FEBA.

3. Guard forces will defend temporarily to:

a. Receive friendly forces.
b. Counter enemy reconnaissance.
c. Identify the enemy’s intent and their main effort early on.
d. Force the enemy to deploy prematurely, using chiefly indirect fire, antitank
weapons and long-range direct fire weapons.
e. Deny the enemy insight into friendly defence positions for as long as
possible and deceive their forces.

4. Guard forces will be deployed so that:

a. They are able to destroy primarily armoured and mechanized enemy forces
with surprise fire using subordinate heavy direct fire weapons at primary
egagement range as well as indirect-fire support and JFS.
b. Dismounted forces prevent any enemy infantry from infiltrating or pushing
their way through.
c. Friendly guard forces can withdraw in one move.

5. Guard forces disengage on command and generally withdraw with armoured

elements often doing so under pressure - to the ordered positions and/or battle
positions or the defensive sector, or to the area where the reserves are situated.

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6. Contact with the enemy is to be maintained in the process. The withdrawal of these
forces should be supported (e.g. indirect fire support, etc.).

7. During darkness and in poor visibility the main effort is to shift to the roads and
paths leading into the assigned area. In this respect it should be kept in mind that
hostile forces often do not move directly along a road/path itself but use it as a
navigational aid. They will frequently march adjacent to it at "night vision range".

"Block the axes of movement and screen the intermediate terrain".

Engagement forward FEBA gives the troops time to prepare for defensive
activities.

8. The phases defence in/at the FEBA and engagement in the depth of AOR are
described in detail in the defensive activity defence in chapter 5.

4.2.5 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN WINTRY CONDITIONS

1. Combat in winter conditions in the mountains is a challenge, but in broad terms it
favours the defenders because they can protect themselves better from the
weather and meteorological features, and can prepare positions, shelters, logistics,
etc.

2. The following points must be considered in advance:

a. Parts of the terrain and supply routes may become unusable due to the risk
of avalanches, severe icing etc.
b. Suitable means of transportation must be provided and supply elements
reinforced so as to avoid any extra burden on manoeuvre elements due to
carrier duties.
c. There has to be timely provision and delivery of materials for the construction
of positions and accommodation, as well as of necessary supplies for
protection against the weather.
d. Allocation of specialist personnel with suitable technical equipment for
extended and rapid development of the positions and accommodation.

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3. The aim of selecting a defence position, is to force the attacker to have as few
protection and cover options (woods, populated places, mountain huts) as possible.

4. In wintry mountainous terrain, crest positions should be used more often because
they offer extensive observation as well as favourable firing positions for heavy
direct-fire weapons. This offers the defending forces opportunities for opening fire
early. Shelters should be developed in direct proximity on the rear slope.

5. In wintry mountainous terrain reserves should be kept ready close-by.

6. Surveillance of possible approach routes and of unoccupied terrain has to be

ensured to prevent any surprise attacks in poor visibility (fog, snow storm, heavy
snow fall, etc).

7. So as to maintain combat effectiveness in winter conditions in high mountains and

at high altitudes, special attention should be paid to relief arrangements in order to
prevent cold damages. The more difficult the terrain and the poorer the
accommodation and weather conditions, the more often relief will be necessary.
As a recommendation relief during such circumstances may follow the principle of
splitting the forces into three parts:
a. Forces occupying positions in the high and/or extremely mountains.
b. Forces as local reserves in the nearby area.
c. Forces resting in the valley (regeneration/restoration of combat
effectiveness/training etc.).

8. The following relief cycle is recommended:

– From manning of positions to the valley  from valley to reserves  from
reserves to manning of positions.
9. In good weather the troops will spend around one week at each station, and in bad
weather a few days (recommended as a practical rough rule of thumb).

10. For more detailed information see ATP-3.2.1.5.

STABILITY OPERATIONS
1. Stability operations are military operations with the purpose to set the
conditions that enable authorities and other organizations to function
properly and maintain or create the conditions in which the risk for outbreak,
escalation and recurrence of conflict is reduced to acceptable levels, leading
to a more secure and less threatening environment.

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2. Stability operations, in dependency of the specific purpose (line of effort), contribute

to:
a. Security and Control.
b. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).
c. Support to Initial Restoration of Services.
d. Support to Initial Governance Tasks.

3. Tactical Activities within stability operations are currently categorized as shown in

Figure 4-4 (ATP 3.2.1; ATP 3.2.1.1). General considerations to the different tactical
activities, concerning land forces, are laid down in ATP 3.2.1.1.

PRINCIPLES IN MW
1. Considered in the following, therefore, are only the Line of Effort of ´Support to
Initial Restoration of Services´ and ´Stability Activities´ which have features and
specifications particular to Mountain Warfare capabilities.

FIGURE 4-4: SCHEMATIC STRUCTURE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS, THE LINES OF EFFORT AND STABILITY TACTICAL
ACTIVITIES

2. Particular during stability operations, a strong coordination and close cooperation

are desirable with following main elements:
a. Medical units40.

40 Due to the compartmented terrain, and severity of the environment, air evacuation is the preferred method
of MEDEVAC (conduct also CASEVAC). However, medical personnel must be trained, equipped, and ready to
perform prolonged field care, as disruption of air movements and limited ground lines of communications are
likely in the mountains, and it can and will delay both ground and air MEDEVAC (CASEVAC) .

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b. Maintenance and recovery units.

c. MILENG capabilities as EOR / EOD, general engineering.
d. Military Police.
e. Liaison Teams of civil (HN or alliance) police.
f. Fire support personnel.
g. Engineer units.
h. Route reconnaissance elements (including UAV/ micro UAV).
i. Tactical PSYOPS teams (TPT).
j. Supporting governmental agencies and NGOs.

Therefore, it is essential that these units have a basic training41 in mountainous terrain
in advance.

3. A basic requirement for stability operations is force impartiality. Freedom of

movement for the troops as well as control of the area by them are indispensable
for any stability operations and must therefore be established without delay. The
basic principle for such control is extensive presence in the assigned AOR. As a
rule, area organisation is "non-linear". Stability operations within MW are generally
a balancing act between mission, self-protection and Risk Management.

4. The commodities, key-points, areas, lines of communication (LOC’s) and borders

requiring protection, as well as refuges for hostile and irregular forces, are often
located in mountain environments. For that reason stability operations can also
encompass defensive and/or offensive tactical activities involving even high-
intensity combat against irregular forces in difficult and extreme terrain and this is
particularly aggravated under winter conditions. The intensity of operations can
change quickly and can differ at the various tactical levels. A deployed unit must
have the ability to switch from low intensity to high intensity operations rapidly.

5. For stability operations in mountainous terrain it is extremely important that the

commander should focus in employing mission command with small units (platoon
and squads size). Moreover it is important to solve the question, how can
geographically dispersed but well-networked tactical units be protected against
attacks from the air, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum in the face of
effective battlefield reconnaissance.

41Combat support elements, Combat Service Support Elements engaged in Mountain Warfare must train their
personnel on specific selected topics to basic individual level. In some cases, particular branches or branch
elements should also have some individuals with advanced and expert level of knowledge and skills. Collective
training for Combat Support Elements, Combat Service Support Elements units and staff for Mountain Warfare
in some cases is necessary.

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6. Kinetic weapon systems are only one part of the response to unmanned aerial
vehicles. In addition, there is a need for electronic warfare units to be attached
directly to combat units in order to, on the one hand, disrupt the radio link between
enemy drones and their control stations and, on the other hand, use electronic
reconnaissance to determine the coordinates of these control stations in order to
combat them.

7. Many times, government and civil agencies will not be able to reach mountainous
isolated/difficult areas so the involvement of the deployed mountain units in
supporting local population will be higher than in flat terrain. This involvement will
contribute to win their hearts and minds.

8. In order to establish permanent security and control planning must be geared

towards ensuring that the tactical manoeuvring elements mentioned above ensure
that there is a presence in the area of responsibility as continuous as possible, even
in difficult and extremely difficult terrain. This requires planning the presence in the
area with forces based on space, time and the required mobility. For this purpose,
the manoeuvring elements are used in shifts.

9. Keeping a kind of reserve ready as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) with a short
notice-to-move (NTM) time is essential in order to react on unforeseen crisis
situation. The QRF and the NTM time, is usually ordered by the higher-level
leadership. If a unit is isolated or used separately, the QRF principle of availability
applies at this level. In order to ensure responsiveness and speed QRFs should be
used in conjunction with rotary wing assets.

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FIGURE 4-5: NON-LINEAR OPERATIONAL PLAN IN STABILITY OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAIN TERRAIN ( OP PLAN + SHIFT
PLAN, SEE ANNEX A9 )

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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CHAPTER 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR TACTICAL ACTIVITIES IN MOUNTAINOUS

ENVIRONMENT

General
A distinction is made in this regard between the basic enabling activities and
offensive, defensive, and stability activities geared to a specific target/purpose.
Individual tactical activities are subject to the requirements laid down in the relevant
national command and control regulations. Only those tactical activities
encompassing features particular to mountain warfare, therefore, will be considered
in the following chapter.

5.1 OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

1. Offensive activities generally serve the purpose of attacking and degrading the
enemy in order to hinder them in achieving their intentions. Offensive activities are
often the key to destroying or splitting the enemy (the “portioning” principle) and
can also be applied in all kind of land tactical operations (offensive, defensive,
stability). In addition, they may also focus on seizing or securing terrain such as
vital ground.

2. Offensive activities are generally subject to requirements laid down in relevant

national command and control regulations. Considered in the following, therefore,
are only offensive activities encompassing features particular to mountain combat.
These particular features are addressed in the order below:

FIGURE 5-1: SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW OF CURRENT OFFENSIVE TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

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ATTACK
Principles
1. Offensive tactical activities are defined as activities in which forces seek out the
enemy in order to attack him. To attack is to take offensive action against a specific
objective. The primary purpose of an attack in MW is to destroy the enemy`s
capability to resist and subsequently to destroy his will and cohesion.

2. The purpose of an attack is to destroy enemy forces and/or to seize terrain. The
intention is to bring about a decisive engagement. In some situations an attack is
also conducted to repulse, deceive or reconnoiter the enemy, or to relieve the
pressure on friendly forces. An attack inside a stability operation must serve the
purpose of SASE42 and applies the principles of “clear, hold and build” or “shape,
clear, hold and build”.
3. The objective of an attack in mountainous terrain is to breach or block the passes
and main connecting routes (axes of movement) in valleys. This mostly involves
the seizure of commanding heights ("high ground control"). The first approach is
critical since rapid reorganization is rarely possible.

4. The tactics and technique of "marching separately – striking together" make enemy
reconnaissance more difficult, are conducive to the element of surprise, and create
the conditions for a high-potential attack on the objective. The separating effect of
the terrain often imposes and facilitates these tactics and technique, as opposed to
deep echeloning.

5. If the first approach is unsuccessful, a new attack will in most cases be necessary,
following an estimate of the situation during combat.

6. A downhill attack is generally preferable. Attacking downhill reduces the physical

strain on the troops and increases their attack momentum. It often means attacking
over the forward slope, however. This is conducive to the use of long-range direct
fire weapons for the attacker as well as for the defender. Local fire superiority must
be ensured.

7. The aim must be to approach and break into the enemy position via the downhill
slope or on the same level. Force echelonment geared to the terrain and the
enemy´s situation, as well as the elevation, usually creates the conditions needed
for an attack to succeed in a mountainous environment. Direct fire from higher
ground will support the assaulting elements.

8. If an uphill attack must be conducted, there is often the advantage of a covered or

covert approach option being available as far as the assault position. This,

42
SASE = Safe And Secure Environment

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however, will require more time and effort. Effective, long-range direct supporting
fire extending right up to the break-in point is often possible.

9. If the aim is to spring a surprise, any large-scale preparation to attack involving

high-angle fire will be dispensed with. The capability to move during night and poor
visibility is the baseline to achieve surprise by the main forces.

10. The frontages for attack sectors in mountainous environment are dictated by the
isolated engagement areas and by the enemy forces deployed there. The attacking
forces should also be assigned the surrounding higher ground. Standard frontages
are applicable only to an extent.

EXECUTION OF ATTACK
The planning and conduct of the offensive (attack) activity usually takes place in three
phases:
a. Approach/Mounting.
b. Assault.
c. Consolidation.

MOUNTING (PREPARATION) AND APPROACH

1. In mountain warfare an approach is generally made as far as a tactical assembly
area. The marshalling will, if possible, take place close to the enemy so as to be
able to strike in a lethal manner. Tactical assembly areas must be kept undetected,
if possible, as well as secured. No more than 24 hours should be spent in these
areas, so as to avoid detection. These areas are also used for resupply during
attacks.

2. It is often difficult at the beginning of an attack for all forces to interact. Enveloping
elements that must overcome large differences in elevation or difficult terrain have
to start their approach march at a suitably earlier time in order to be in time at the
line of departure. It is particularly important that these forces are not detected early
on. Reporting at passage points and exact timing coordination are essential.

ASSAULT
An assault begins with the crossing of the line of departure (LD) at H-hour. It comprises:
a. Crossing line of departure.
b. Break-in.
c. Fighting through.

CROSSING LINE OF DEPARTURE

1. Roads, paths and steep tracks are to be used for as long as possible for crossing
the line of departure and during advancing to contact.

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2. Difficult terrain offering ample cover and limited visibility conditions (fog, darkness,
snowfall, etc.) is often exploited for the advance to contact. Open terrain above the
tree line can only be overcome in limited visibility (bad weather/night-time/fog/etc.)
and in a widely dispersed formation.

3. Supporting the assault with indirect and heavy direct fire is generally indispensable.
Pack animals escorting the operation, as well as special-purpose vehicles (e.g.
quads, skidoos, ATVs), facilitate swift movement of important weapons to the
positions of the covering elements, thus taking the enemy by surprise. This energy-
conserving mode of transportation also increases the operational effectiveness of
the follow-on forces significantly.

4. In wide, largely open mountain valleys, attacks should be conducted along the
valley edges, which offer cover, or by way of the surrounding high ground. Forces
employed there can protect the attacking forces in the valley from fire and
counterattacks from the flanks. This will usually require their forward echelonment.

5. In open and particularly at-risk parts of the terrain, the attacking forces will have
additional security through their own higher-positioned security elements.

6. Forces advancing on slopes on both sides of a valley will support each other
through flanking observation and fire.

7. If over watched enemy positions cannot be neutralized, they must be suppressed,

bypassed or cut off. They can be neutralized later.

BREAK-IN
1. The aim should be to conduct a downslope or same-level assault and break in
against the enemy positions.

2. The break-in will usually take place at one location and be expanded from there, so
the preferred offensive manoeuvring will be penetration due to restricted terrain.
The best options for a surprise approach and swift break-in at the enemy positions
should be used. The local environmental conditions (e. g. snow depth and
consistency), the level of training, and the mobility of the forces will dictate the type
of break-in. All possible courses of action that offer prospects of success must be
taken into consideration in this regard. Speed and surprise will increase the
likelihood of success and often minimize friendly casualties. The possibilities of a
break-in on foot, on snowshoes, on skis, or even on skidoos or ATVs, should be
carefully weighed against each another.

3. Often, a support element comprising long-range direct fire weapons (machine gun,
automatic grenade launcher, precision approach radar, guided missile), and/or also
individual weapons must be used for direct fire support. Where a lengthy distance

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to break-in has to be covered, leapfrogging use of the support elements should be

planned in advance.

FIGHTING THROUGH AND CLEARING THE OBJECTIVE

1. Once the objective has been seized and held, it is necessary to maintain contact
with the enemy so as to detect the first signs of any counterattack.

2. Fighting through in mountain combat principally involves dislodging the enemy,

followed by the occupation of key terrain and, often, pursuit. In particular, forces
qualified for missions in the mountains can also be employed in combat patrol
operations to destroy withdrawing enemy forces, including in difficult and extremely
difficult terrain.

CONSOLIDATION
1. Once the positions have been seized, they are then held. After the enemy has been
dislodged and/or the objective seized, the consolidation begins. Consolidation is
not a phase of the assault. It follows immediately after the assault and includes
medical care for casualties and replenishment of supply items
(ammunition/rations/etc.). It generally includes preparations to occupy the objective
for a certain period of time and in mountain warfare specifically involves creating
and improving the basis for survivability.

2. The tactical commander will issue orders concerning the measures needed to be
able to hold the seized objective if counterattacked from the ground and/or the air.

3. The measures ordered for this in mountain combat are:

a. A three-way split in the order of battle:
 Forces protecting positions (security);
 Maintenance of fighting strength; and
 Support of supply and logistic elements, including the construction of
positions. The forces for maintaining fighting strength are also
generally the local reserve.
b. The emplacement of barriers.
c. The optimization of combat service and fire support, if need be by
requesting additional forces and
d. The evacuation of casualties, KIAs (killed in action casualty) and
prisoners of war.

EXPLOITATION
1. Exploitation is an offensive activity which usually follows a successful attack, and
is aimed at disrupting the enemy's order in depth and preventing them from
reorganizing their defence. The exploitation (of success) in Mountain Warfare is
characterized by a rapid advance against decreasing resistance, predominantly
oriented towards possessing high ground control as far and as soon as possible.

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Disruption of the enemy´s sustaining operations and disruption of logistic measures

are of special interest in warfighting in mountainous terrain.

2. The effect of exploitation is both physical and psychological and on both sides.
Exploitation in Mountain Warfare is tricky and must always go in line with tactical
and environmental risk management, thus avoiding advancing into a tactical or
environmental trap by just following the enemy.

PURSUIT
1. Pursuit is an offensive activity with the primary goal of intercepting or cutting off
evading enemy forces in order to destroy them or force them to surrender. In
contrast to the exploitation (of success), it is force-oriented. Pursuit can begin when
hostile forces are shaken and begin to dissolve. It can be initiated within an
operation if the enemy loses its ability to operate effectively and tries to disengage.
It often follows a successful attack that forces the enemy to quickly dodge. Pursuit
in MW is similar to exploitation; tricky if the opposing forces are pursued without
risk management. Because of the terrain conditions, pursuit in mountain combat
can involve the high risk of becoming caught in an ambush or of neglecting
mountain hazards.

2. In winter in particular, the pursuit of the enemy´s tracks can be dangerous because
this may lead very easily into an ambush or into dangerous avalanche terrain, so
an informed decision on the spot (mission command) is recommended.

3. If there is an intention to conduct a pursuit in mountainous terrain, then only forces

with a greater mobility than the withdrawing enemy forces should be employed. The
set of forces should by all means include personnel who are qualified to operate in
the mountains and also to assess the environmental risks.

4. It is essential to plan and ensure supply arrangements, survivability, and the

evacuation of wounded and/or injured personnel before any pursuit in the
mountains is initiated.

RAID
1. The purpose of a raid is to annihilate or eliminate enemy forces or facilities by
surprise and to disengage immediately afterwards.

2. After marshalling, raids are essentially conducted like attacks, although the
attackers remain at the scene of the raid for only a short time and/or only engage
the target with fire.

3. The commander in charge selects the target of the raid and specifies the required
effect. Continuous reconnaissance (seamless surveillance of the raid target) should
be ensured until the raid takes place.

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4. Following preparation, raids are mostly conducted with suitable units against
command posts, supply and liaison facilities, or camps (containing withdrawn
elements). If the conditions are favourable, however, it will be possible to achieve
a greater effect with fire raids, for example, and long-range direct fire weapons.

5. Characteristics of raids in mountain environments:

a. The terrain is conducive to advancing unnoticed under cover (preferably
downslope) to the raid target.
b. Sudden surprise opening of fire using long-range weapons from positions
on higher ground.
c. The possibility of forming an assault element by exploiting difficult and
extreme terrain.
d. Swift disengagement from the enemy and withdrawal using a small number
of forces on crests and dominating high ground.
e. Keep the reserve close by.
f. Enhancement of the mobility of own forces (over snow vehicles, all-terrain
vehicles, paragliders, etc.).

AMBUSH
1. An ambush has the purpose of annihilating moving enemy forces, if possible,
without giving them the opportunity for a counter-attack or local hasty
counterattack. Ambushes are mostly conducted with squad to platoon-strength.
Mountain terrain is favourable for executing ambushes. Mountain Terrain features
(hills, slopes, deep valleys, etc.) can be suitable for two-sides point ambushes
which can strike the enemy from both flanks without friendly fire risk.

2. Characteristics of an ambush in mountain environments:

a. The terrain is conducive to taking up positions under cover and to breaking
off combat, as well as to employing covering forces.
b. By means of a surprise fire and weapons effect from a position on higher
ground, the enemy is, if possible, to be engaged at a “channeling” location
offering few opportunities for withdrawal and cover.
c. If conditions are favourable (e.g. in combination with strong barriers, indirect
fire, use of long-range direct fire weapons), a small number of forces can be
more effective. The positions occupied for this are intended only for a brief
engagement.
d. Mobility, especially in winter conditions, is a decisive capability for successful
ambush.

BREAKOUT OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

1. In the event of an outbreak, trapped forces take offensive actions to restore link-up
with the main forces. The outbreak is said to surprise the enemy and is most

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promising if it is carried out as early as possible after the enemy has successfully
enveloped.

2. Normally a break out is ordered by the superior commander. Due to the often
possible lack of communication in mountainous terrain the commander of the
encircled force must make the decision to break out based on the superior’s intent.
Usually in mountainous features the force is organized into small elements that
move on separate routes to join with friendly forces.

3. In mountainous terrain a breakout by own power is mostly impossible, as long as

the enemy has the high ground control.

4. The outbreak can be supported by other forces by tying up or wiping out the enemy
forces (relief).

DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES
Defensive activities are executed to resist enemy offensive activities and to deny the
enemy own objectives. There is a differentiation in two types of defensive activities
which are defence and delay (see ATP 3.2.1.1).

DEFENCE
General
The purpose of defence may be to deter or defeat an enemy force by holding ground.
Defence is to be understood as a ground holding activity. ATP-3.2.1.1 No. 3.3.
Transforming this purpose into reality in MW means:
a. Hold a certain area.
b. Attrite enemy forces or minimum weaken them and degrade their offensive
power.

Principles
1. Characteristics of defence in mountainous terrain:
a. Influence of surrounding high ground on the axes of movement.
b. Channelling of enemy forces into terrain that is unfavourable for them, with
the aim of defeating them there.
c. Timely reconnaissance at hubs (far forward) to assess the situation and the
intent of the enemy by forward-echeloned forces at the foreward line of own
troops (FLOT) or the latest at the phase line of security (security line).
d. Reconnaissance (mostly terrain reconnaissance) before moving into
position.
e. Forward-echeloned early seizure of important parts of the terrain (key terrain
and/or key points) if moving into position under time constraints.
f. Consideration of rapid changes in the weather and visibility conditions during
planning and operation.

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g. Difficulty with regard to the timely availability of sufficiently mobile reserves.

This often demands the crucial decision to form either a (relatively big)
integrated reserve (reserve of the tactical unit) or small local reserves
(reserves of tactical subunits).
h. Local reserves available at company level, with the aim of deploying those
reserves quickly, by keeping them close by and, if possible, on higher
ground.
i. Necessity for sufficient mobility when employing an integrated battalion
reserve (availability of suitable means of transportation such as helicopters,
adequate off-road vehicles, cableways, etc.), to be able to respond in good
time and in any weather, especially in winter conditions.
j. Endeavor to have an air transportable reserve and the permanent availability
of air transport assets for the employment of an integrated battalion reserve.
k. Availability of reserves in depth of area in order to fight enemy forces that
have penetrated or air-landed43.
l. Sectors are often overextended due to the formation of the main effort in key
terrain(s) and tolerance of monitored gaps.

2. If seamless occupation of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is not possible
due to the terrain conditions, then occupation of key parts of the terrain by small
elements44 should be ensured so that non-occupied terrain along the FEBA can at
least be observed. Liaison between the elements, (if necessary by hand signals) is
crucial. This method of fighting often results in a deviation from tactical norms 45
and, consequently, overextended combat sectors, depending on the terrain
conditions.

3. For a defence task a battalion is generally assigned a defensive area which in the
forward direction is limited by the FEBA.

4. The FEBA should be selected and planned in such a way that the attacker is
impeded in his operational command and control and, if possible, is forced to attack
uphill. Blind areas (areas that cannot be seen and hit by fire) used by the enemy
must be prevented through flanking observation or observation from a counter
slope and through long-range weapons.

5. For Defence in mountainous terrain, blocking positions must be planned in the

rearward area of responsibility as a normal part of tactical planning.

43
Typical mountainous areas for air-landing and/or penetration are plateaus, valleys, saddles and passes.
44
Small elements = team/squad/platoon-sized.
45
A rough ball park` figure for the defence area of an infantry battalion: 4 km x 5 km (details are laid down in
national regulations and therefore may be different).

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DEFENCE AT/IN THE FEBA

1. If tactical elements are deployed in close formation, commanders will lead the
defence themselves directly at the FEBA. As a specification of MW, they can be
deployed in isolated areas, then the commander (COM) will issue clear, broadly
formulated tasks (mission command).

2. The FEBA in mountainous terrain is selected in a way that will impede the attackers
in the conduct of their operations. Terrain that is difficult to access or climbing areas
makes direct attack on the positions more complex. Terraces, crests, defiles,
passages etc. running transversely to the direction of attack are used as the FEBA
in most cases. It should be selected so, that the enemy must attack uphill. The
enemy’s use of non-monitorable and non-targetable areas is prevented through
observation from a counterslope and flanking weapons effect.

3. The FEBA serves to synchronize and coordinate fire and movement. The terrain is
often conducive to firing from/onto counterslopes.

4. Often the terrain does not allow continuous manning of the FEBA. Since direct
contact is frequently impossible to maintain, it must be ensured between the
individual combat elements through communication measures – if necessary by
means of relays or/and visual signals.

5. Situational information from the commander to the elements, as well as situation

reports from subordinate units to the commander are crucial in mountain
environments because of the need to initiate combat management measures early
(e.g. for isolated mission areas, longer time required to deploy reserves, etc.).

6. The aim of any firefight is to annihilate the enemy with concentrated fire before they
reach the positions, or to inflict such heavy losses that their momentum of attack is
broken. Optimum exploitation of the terrain after selecting the positions will facilitate
this enormously.

7. If the enemy breaks into a set of positions in such a way that they cannot be
dislodged by any local hasty counter attacks, the break-in location should be
blocked off and a counter-attack by the reserve initiated.

8. Local hasty counter attacks to gain suitable positions on higher ground so as to

block off follow-up enemy elements will have priority over engaging the enemy
forces that have broken in. The latter are to be suppressed for the time being and
dislodged and annihilated later. In this respect the preparations to conduct local
hasty counter attacks must also include traversing difficult or extreme terrain.

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9. Once an attack by the enemy has been repelled, the aim must first of all be to re-
occupy and restore any positions and emplacements that were lost. Resolute
defence of a position, including against a superior enemy force, generally costs
fewer casualties than giving it up and later re-taking it in a counter-attack.

10. Positions that the enemy temporarily seized must be searched by explosive
ordnance disposal/reconnaissance personnel for ordnance, hidden charges and
IEDs.

11. In the event of defending the enemy attack at the FEBA, the contact must be
maintained or re-established through combat reconnaissance.

12. Combat breaks should be used to:

a. Treat the wounded and transport them to the casualty collection point(s)
or/and BAS.
b. Repair any damage to barriers and positions.
c. Replenish ammunition stocks.
d. Recover damaged materiel and evacuate it with the support of supply and
logistic elements.
e. Issue rations.
f. Perform maintenance and servicing.
g. Recover those killed in action.
h. Rest under the protection of manned positions.

13. Commanders will assess the conduct of the defence so far (estimate of the
situation) as to adapt the plan, if necessary. As a matter of principle during combat
breaks (literal pauses in combat) detailed situational information should be given to
subordinate elements, and a situation report sent to the higher command.

ENGAGEMENT IN THE DEPTH OF AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (BLOCKING

POSITION)
1. Rear-deployed forces (supported by engineers) must block off enemy elements that
have broken through and counter any enemy air manoeuvre operations.

2. Forces that have not been subjected to attack must prepare for retirement. They
will be employed in blocking positions or as reinforcement. Because of the lengthy
amount of time required, force redeployments must be ordered at an early stage.

3. If it is no longer possible to hold the defence positions at the FEBA over a broad
front, or if the cohesion of the defence is no longer assured, a decision must be
made whether to give up the FEBA and re-establish a cohesive defence in the
depth of the defence area.

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DEFENDING A VALLEY
1. When attacked by an enemy in a valley, it is advisable to allow them to become
stranded and then have (forward-echeloned) forces on higher ground destroy them
from several directions at once.

2. If a valley is located in a defence area, it should be defended by barriers emplaced,

at the very least, at the valley entrance and in the rear/depth. The barriers in the
valley (entrance and rear barriers) should be emplaced so that the enemy is forced
onto unfavourable terrain, e.g. onto the accompanying slopes, where they can be
destroyed from the valley as well as from the counterslope and higher ground, or
be forced to take a long way round.

3. Barriers (obstacle belts) prepared by engineers can easily block a main valley with
little effort for a lengthy period, thereby freeing up more forces for the reserve(s),
who can be employed not only for standard tasks but also flexibly for counter-
attacks.

4. Smaller passes leading from side valleys into the main valley must be
screened/guarded and/or defended.

FIGURE 5-2: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF MOUNTAIN COMBAT INVOLVING VALLEY BARRIERS (REFERENCE EXAMPLE)

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DEFENDING A MOUNTAIN PASS

1. If a pass is located in a defence area, it must be occupied immediately by own
advance forces, even unreconnoitred and even before own reconnaissance parties
or the bulk of own forces begin the ascent.

2. A pass can only to be held successfully if adjacent higher ground, secondary

roads/paths and gaps are under own control.

3. If the top of the pass is of some length, the defence positions should not be located
too far to the rear otherwise there will be the risk of being pushed aside into the
valley even as a result of minor break-ins. Early engagement with indirect fire/JFS
and/or long-range weapons will force the enemy to deploy prematurely or push
them into unfavourable terrain.

4. Local reserves should be employed nearby to counter any bypass attempts.

DEFENDING ON RIDGES
1. When defending a ridge, individual weapons often suffer the disadvantage of
having a short range of fire. This disadvantage must be minimized through flanking
use of weapons.

2. Hilltop/crest positions on ridges are difficult to attack with indirect fire and air assault
forces. In most cases projectiles will explode on the forward or rear slopes, with the
outcome that these positions will be difficult to overcome by means of fire.
Nevertheless, massive fire must be expected, given the key character of this terrain.

DEFENDING ON GLACIERS
1. A particular challenge in mountain combat is defending at such great heights that
glaciated terrain forms part of the assigned area. Continuous glacier surfaces are
often conducive to the enemy's freedom of movement.

2. The combat effectiveness of defenders is low when engaging from glacier

positions, particularly in periods of bad weather. The surface of the glacier changes
constantly due to snowfall and snowdrifts. Manning positions on the bare, coverless
glacier surface for lengthy periods is difficult or impossible. The most important
weapons, and whenever possible the defence positions, should therefore be
deployed on surrounding moraines and higher ground.

3. The glacier tongue should, if possible, be blocked behind (broad) crevasses to

preclude enemy movements, and any existing snow bridges should be collapsed.
If positions on the glacier are necessary, they can either be carved from the ice by
means of a chainsaw or be emplaced on the ice using blocks of ice or a mixture of
ice and debris.

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4. The points of access to the positions must be made safe should there be any
danger of falling/slipping. The paths, routes and security arrangements must be
tended to and maintained at all times. Positions constructed in this way can offer
adequate protection and (effects) capabilities. The approach and withdrawal routes
to and from these positions should be prepared so that they can be used without
crampons in the event of an alert.

DELAY
General
1. Delay is generally conducted when a force is being pressed by an enemy, and is
required to trade space for time, reducing the enemy´s momentum and inflicting
damage without itself becoming decisively committed. In general, this tactical
activity serves in MW to win time for the preparation of other tactical activities. The
core of delay in MW is the agile changing of activity between fire fights and
detachment from the enemy, and there are in general two principles of delay: one
is to withdraw from one phase line to the next in one move, and the other is to
withdraw in a fighting manner by short-distanced counterattacks while avoiding
close engagement with the enemy. With this mode of tactics some units will fight
and some units will organize the battle positions in the next phase line.

2. In the following only MW principles and features within this activity are stressed.

Principles
1. Focusing on the main axes of movement, the aim of delaying actions is to wear
down the enemy’s spearheads with the support of natural/terrain obstacles and
barriers, as well as with artificial obstacles and barriers, combined with long
distance fire, to thus create conditions conducive to own tactical activities.

2. Depending on the situation and intent, the purpose of delaying actions is to:
a. Gain time.
b. Steer the enemy in certain directions.
c. Temporarily hold up and wear down the enemy.
d. Enable friendly forces to evade the threat of annihilation by superior enemy
forces.
e. Create favourable conditions for an attack by the main forces.

3. Long-distance fire positions offered by high ground in combination with (natural)

barriers, are an effective means for delaying action and manoeuvres. In this way,
superior enemy forces can be slowed down and weakened.

4. The delaying zone is limited at the sides by boundary lines, and to the front and
rear by phase lines (= PL) or a handover line; and in mountain environments this is
often a valley with its accompanying high ground. PL are control lines in the
delaying zone to help the tactical commander preplan the intended course of the

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delaying action. For lengthy delaying actions it is expedient to set up and use
command posts at alternate positions.

5. To conduct rearward passage movements, a C2 facility for the delaying forces

should usually be linked to the command post of the receiving force, for which
purpose a tactical command post would be suitable.

6. If the delay is to be followed by a defence, the hand over line forward the FEBA will
be the rear boundary.

7. Mountainous terrain is particularly conducive to carrying out a delay actively,

aggressively, and with agility. Wherever possible, the aim is to surprise, deceive
and wear down the enemy. Given the diversity of terrain features, it is not possible
to lay down norms for the width and depth of delaying zones in mountain
environments. Delay in mountainous terrain allows the exploitation of massive
natural obstacles and barriers so as to avoid any close engagement with the enemy
and provide the possibility for friendly evasive actions. Terrace/hilltop positions
allow observation and long-range direct fire as well as indirect fire, which are
conducive to swift withdrawal. Front and/or rear slopes are unfavourable,
particularly as withdrawal from a front slope has little prospect of success, and
withdrawal from a rear slope can give enemy forces pursuing on skis the terrain
advantage, who may even ”run into” or “overrun” withdrawing forces. The
withdrawal routes, particularly for withdrawing in reduced visibility, must be marked,
if necessary.

8. Difficult/extreme parts of the terrain should also be used for disengagement from
the enemy and for withdrawal; SMEs and engineers play a supporting role in this
respect. Delay withdrawal takes more time.

9. Generally, a distinction is made between:

a. Temporary defence along the relevant phase lines for a stipulated period of
time, followed by withdrawal.
b. Manoeuvre to delay, which also includes combat between the relevant
phase lines and, therefore, a withdrawal.

10. Once an order for a delay has been received, the first step is to reconnoitre the
terrain.

11. Terrain reconnaissance will give the commander an overview of the delaying zone
as a whole. For time reasons this is usually conducted collectively for several
command echelons, including subordinate elements. It is preferable to have a
reconnaissance flight by helicopter and/or UAVs, or to go to a high ground point
which allows a comprehensive overlook of the features of the mountainous terrain.

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For conducting an active and successful operation it is also helpful to use the
regional knowledge of local people.

12. The focus of reconnaissance is on:

a. Positions for temporary defence (preferable from high ground, ridges,
passes etc.).
b. Passage routes/axes for movements of own and enemy forces.
c. Possibilities for covering fire by snipers, heavy weapons and JFS/indirect
fire, (preferable from high ground positions with long distance observing and
firing options).
d. Movement possibilities, and parking and turning areas for vehicles.
e. Tracks for dismounted movements, (also for pack animals´-movements).
f. Tracks for (dismounted) movements for sideways withdrawal 46.
g. Helicopter landing sites.
h. Possibilities for combat involving barriers (triggered avalanches, rockfalls,
etc.).
i. Possibilities for destruction of infrastructure for own purpose (bridges, dams,
cable cars, ferratas, etc.).
j. Unusable or damaged infrastructure for own purpose.
k. Location and tasks of the reserves.
l. Options open to the enemy.

13. Mountainous terrain is conducive to a delay carried out by mountain infantry forces;
it is often possible to slow the enemy down (e.g. through barriers, ambushes by
weak elements, indirect fire). Favourably used terrain and deep-echeloned
positioning of barriers, enables small combat elements to have a major impact.

14. Important parts of the terrain such as defiles, bridges, crossover sites and passes
should be occupied throughout the depth of the area of responsibility so as to avoid
being cut off by enemy forces. Intermediate terrain important for the conduct of
operations can be effectively monitored from high ground positions. The
employment of combat patrols in conjunction with JFS and/or indirect-fire weapons,
and/or air support or barriers, can save a significant amount of time.

15. Because of the channelling effect of the mountainous terrain, it is usually possible
to employ heavy direct-fire weapons at focal points (slopes, ridges, etc.), as well as
echeloned in depth, along the axes of movement.

46
It is a peculiarity in MW to withdraw either backwards as usual or sideways, for example over a
ridge, so the re-deployment against the depth of the channelled enemy is often possible. If this
converges or leads into another area of responsibility (a neighbour), it is necessary to synchronize
and coordinate this withdrawal with the neighbour.

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16. The JFS /indirect fire weapons and air support are to be coordinated precisely and
support the combat elements by:
a. Destroying enemy spearheads along the axis of movement.
b. Engaging any enemy forces infiltrating through open flanks and gaps, and
monitoring disengagement from the enemy.
c. Supporting disengagement or withdrawal.

17. The focus of combat service support in a delay in mountainous terrain is mainly on:
a. Quickly establishing the transportability of wounded personnel for the
medical services (every available transport capacity is to be considered,
possibly including transport helicopters; if necessary, the rescue station is to
be planned along logistic routes).
b. Coordinating the employment of the mobile medical/surgical team with the
troops’movement.
c. Recovery and evacuation.
d. Mobile47 provision of logistic packages (supply goods).

18. In mountain combat it is often advisable to set up logistic depots/stores

(ammunition; etc.) in the vicinity of the phase lines so as to be more mobile and
also to ensure (emergency) supplies in the event that the normal chain of supply is
not possible.

19. In most cases, forces are to be provided only for one, nonrecurrent, mission. If a
further deep mission is intended, the time required for retirement, including across
intermediate terrain, as well as for preparations and supply actions, must be taken
into account. The use of helicopters for the retirement of forces facilitates the
conduct of operations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. The course of the battle planned for a delay in mountain combat is as follows:
a. Establishment of contact with the enemy (combat reconnaissance).
b. Rearward passage of friendly withdrawing (combat) reconnaissance
elements.
c. Temporary defence at the ordered phase line(s).
d. Withdrawal. Contact with the enemy should generally be maintained in the
process and/or re-established forward of the new phase line.

47
Mobile provisions can be ensured by specific means of transport such as over-snow vehicles, UAVs, pack
animals, etc.

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ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY

1. If there is no contact with the enemy prior to the start of a delay, combat
reconnaissance forces will establish that contact (on a broad front) to begin with.
They should repel the enemy's reconnaissance forces and particularly identify the
direction and organization of the main body.

2. Combat reconnaissance and indirect fire serve to destroy enemy reconnaissance,

deceive the enemy, inflict losses on them, and force them to deploy prematurely.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF FRIENDLY WITHDRAWING (COMBAT)

RECONNAISSANCE FORCES
Often it is only possible for mountain reconnaissance units to retire via the
intermediate terrain (between two phase lines). They can retire sideways and also
over difficult and extremely difficult terrain, besides the normal axes of movements.

TEMPORARY DEFENCE AT A PHASELINE

1. Once the rearward passage of withdrawing reconnaissance forces has been
completed and forward-emplaced barriers have been activated, the delaying forces
will begin to engage with temporary defence in accordance with (IAW) the situation
on spot, based on the foremost phase line. Depending on the situation, the fire fight
in the delaying action will be conducted either over a long distance or at short
distances in the form of a surprise fire raid.

2. If temporary defence offers the prospect of success beyond the time envisaged,
the position(s) may be held as long as the mission, own intent, and cohesion of the
conducted operations allow. In this case it must be coordinated with neighbour(s)
and reported to the higher echelon.

WITHDRAWAL
1. During a delay, the troops must switch frequently between temporary defence and
withdrawal, so as to re-position themselves at the next phase line.

2. Every opportunity to further weaken or destroy already degraded and worn-down

enemy forces by attacking them should be used in a delay. Locally available
reserves may be employed for that purpose.

3. Contact with the enemy should be maintained at all times during the withdrawal.

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FIGURE 5-3: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF AN OPERATION PLAN FOR A DELAY IN MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT
(EXCERPT)

4. Withdrawal will be covered by indirect supporting fire (e.g. JFS). Pre-planned and,
therefore, quickly installed scatterable minefields (if angle of slope allows) will
prevent the enemy from rapid pursuit. Keeping means of transportation
(helicopters/skidoos, ATVs, etc.) on stand-by at the rear slope to support the
withdrawal will increase the operational effectiveness and speed of the delaying
forces. In winter, ski mobility will be a precondition for the delaying forces to be able
to withdraw quickly on their own. Once engagement has been broken off at the
phase line, a fast descent downhill will possibly provide a time advantage while
pursuing enemy forces are still ascending.

5. If withdrawal is to take place by vehicle and snow levels are high, or if there is strong
snowfall, the withdrawal routes must be prepared by means of snow-clearing
measures. The forces and assets for this purpose are to be kept ready, and the
mountain cell provides information on expected snowfall as part of the mountain
situation briefing.

6. Wherever possible, withdrawal via counterslopes, especially in winter conditions,

should be supported by means of transport (e.g. skijoring). If this is not possible, at
least tracks should be prepared for the own delay and also as a deception. Where

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all tracks are concerned, it must be ensured that they do not lead directly (from the
front) into the positions at the new phase line.

7. Long-range weapons effects through JFS (e.g. guided indirect fire) and/or long-
range weapon systems (e.g. snipers) provide the capability for agile manoeuvre
involving the elements of fire fight, surveillance and evasive movement.

8. There are generally two possibilities for withdrawing from one phase line to the next
or to the FEBA:
a. Unnoticed while overwatched (by JFS, snipers, etc.).
b. In a fire fight under covering fire.

9. For withdrawing unnoticed, use of darkness and/or poor visibility to mask the
withdrawal have to be considered.

10. For withdrawing under covering fire and disengaging from the enemy, this can be
done either under the cover of indirect fire and long-range weapons, or in phases,
leaving behind a guard force. The guard force must then disguise the withdrawal of
the own forces by means of an intensive fire fight. In the latter case the best
mountain-mobile elements are to be employed as the guard force, and it must be
ensured, by means of redistribution, that the guard force has an adequate amount
of ammunition and explosive ordnance at its disposal.

11. The responsible commander will give the order concerning the timing, type
(simultaneous or echeloned) and sequence of the withdrawal.

12. Usually, the evacuation of casualties will take place first, accompanied by,
wherever possible, the evacuation of disabled/damaged materiel, before the actual
withdrawal in an echeloned manner or in one move begins. If withdrawal takes
place with helicopter support, the helicopter landing site(s) must be prepared
(terrain reconnaissance/marking/ground guide(s) at the spot). If the withdrawal is
to be supported by other means of transport, a guide must be kept ready at the
vehicle parking area for coordination purposes. Where the "skijoring procedure" is
used as transport support, the towing vehicles should be prepared in advance.

13. MILENG capabilities must be kept ready to block, fix and clear axes of movement.
They will also be required to dispose of scatterable mines and unexploded
ordnance.

14. The activation of deep barriers will require particular consideration of the few
retirement options open to the combat elements.

15. The combat action of the delaying forces will generally end with the rearward
passage of lines.

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DELAY IN WINTRY CONDITIONS

1. Wintry conditions, particularly deep snow, are favourable for the delaying forces
because the attacker is compelled to adhere to axes of movement to a greater
degree.

2. The following points should be proactively considered:

a. Increase in rehearsals and briefings concerning the planned conduct of
operations (e.g.risk management concerning mountainous dangers).
b. Withdrawal routes should be prepared by the creation of tracks or through
snow-clearing measures, and the tracks should be marked.
c. During snowfall, severly limited visibility can be partially countered through
forwards screening measures and alternate positions.

3. Troops with oversnow vehicles, skis or snowshoes are to be deployed as a guard

force (snow mobility).

STABILITY ACTIVITIES
General
The overall general purpose of stability activities is to re-establish a safe and secure
environment (SASE). General considerations of stability activities are prescribed in
ATP 3.2.1.1. Mountain Warfare forces, within military stability activities, have the
capability to create and sustain security and control in mountainous environment within
the line of effort of Security and Control. In the ´line of effort´ of Support to Initial
Restoration of Services they have some specific capabilities to help and support
civilian agencies, GOs and NGOs and distinctive capabilities to support in disaster
response in the mountainous environment and/or mountainous terrain.

STABILITY ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LINE OF EFFORT SECURITY AND

CONTROL
Stability activities in the mountains are subject to the same challenges as described
for enabling, offensive and defensive activities. The AOR is usually not linear. The
safety and control of the lines of movement (lines of communications) is an
indispensable requirement during any stability activities in mountainous terrain.

MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN MOUNTAINOUS ENVIRONMENT

1. For monitoring and surveilling the area of responsibility, the following tactical
manoeuvring elements are common in mountainous terrain:
a. Checkpoints at hubs, passes and bottlenecks.
b. Temporary checkpoints at unexpected locations.
c. Observation points (OP) at elevated overview points
d. Forward Operation Base (FOB).
e. Control points.

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f. Framework patrols.
Light patrols:
- With unarmored vehicles (mounted or with transport support),
- By foot, snowshoes, skies,
- Horse riding patrols.
Medium patrols:
- With partially armored vehicles (Light wheeled vehicle, Off road
and oversnow vehicles).
Heavy patrols:
- With armored vehicles.

2. Checkpoints and observation posts must be set up in such a way that they may not
be jeopardized neither by opposing forces nor by objective mountainous dangers
from the surrounding elevation. High ground control in this nearby vicinity must be
ensured.

3. Permanent checkpoints are used for the obvious control of people and vehicles and
for the show of force. Temporary Checkpoints must be lined up according to the
terrain in unexpected locations in order to achieve surprise. They are used for
surprising personnel and vehicle controls to uncover illegal activities (e.g. tactical
element for disarming). For this purpose temporary checkpoints are often behind
curves, tunnels or bottlenecks, thus to prevent escapes from the control. The
monitoring is carried out by observation posts at elevated overview points.

ROUTE CONTROL
1. Routes in mountain environments are particularly easy to disrupt (e.g. by blowing
up bridges, tunnels and slopes, through intentionally triggered rockslides, snow
avalanches and rockfalls). Providing security for routes is very manpower-intensive
and in most cases can be ensured only for short distances and at specific locations.
Maintenance of routes (lines of communication) are essential especially in winter
time, in case of snowfall. Special equipment (wheel chains, cables, etc.) must equip
vehicles. A snow removal network of the routes (lines of communication), should
be planned and organized on the base of military and civilian snow plows or specific
all-terrain vehicles.

2. The destruction of traffic installations has more serious implications than in the
lowland. Area control measures for which mountain environments are conductive:
a. Establishment of checkpoints (CP) at hubs, passes and defiles.
b. Setting-up of temporary checkpoints (CPT)48 at very short notice.

48 CPT = temporary checkpoint

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c. Surveillance by observation posts at elevated vantage points.

d. Patrols (including foot patrols and ski or horseback patrols in difficult and
extreme terrain).

CONTROL OF MOVEMENT
1. The purpose of the activity is to control the movement of persons and goods in
order
to counter the adversary’s activities and permit the safe movement of the civilian
population. The activity includes the implementation of rules which permit, limit or
deny access or possession of goods or support the appropriate local authorities to
do so. Restricting movement and access or possession of goods, will affect
adversaries,
spoilers and criminals since it will limit their options, disrupt their plans and denies
their support. It may also allow the identification and the arrest of individuals who
may be wanted for war crimes or other offenses. Restrictions may also be required
to separate parties or to (re-) establish control in a selected area where turmoil or
civil disturbance is ongoing or expected.

2. Through analysis it is decided which parts of the terrain need to be kept under
surveillance, secured or defended. Characteristics in mountain environments:
a. Routes are more difficult to protect due to the lack of cover and concealment
as well as man-made structures;
b. Missions are very manpower-intensive;
c. Reconnaissance and security have to focus chiefly on those parts of the
terrain from which fire fights can be conducted with (light) infantry weapons
(counter slopes and higher ground);
d. Important parts of the terrain must be occupied and held in echelons;
e. Motorized patrols or armored combat vehicles and aircraft (e.g. also
unmanned systems) should be employed for surveillance and control
purposes.
f. Reserves should be kept mountain-mobile - if possible, airmobile - and at
the ready.
PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL LOCATIONS, PERSONS AND OBJECTS
1. Vulnerable key-points in mountain environments primarily include power and water
supply facilities as well as lines of communication and communication installations.

2. Key-point protection in the mountains should be provided through long-distance

surveillance of channelling approach routes and by security forces directly in
proximity of the essential locations and/or project to be protected. In operations
planning, long-distance surveillance of the channelling approach routes will form

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an outer ring, and the security arrangements in proximity of the key-points an inner
ring.

3. Forces should occupy parts of the terrain from which the secured key-points can
be engaged; this will mean increased manpower requirements. Covert surveillance
must also be striven for in mountain environments so as to increase efficiency and
self-protection.

4. Mountain forces will secure and protect key-points in most cases. Mechanised
forces at such sites will serve primarily as a "show of force". Mountain- and air-
mobile forces are to be kept at the ready for deployment as reserves.

5. If local security forces are available, minor facilities could be protected by them.

RELATED TASKS IN SUPPORT OF LINE OF EFFORT INITIAL

RESTORATION OF SERVICES
1. In mountainous terrain, essential services can be seriously disrupted by hostile
military action, irregular forces, emergency situations, simple events as well as
extraordinary accidents. Soldiers qualified for missions in mountain environments
have to be called on for the swift initial restoration of those essential services.

2. Disasters, simple events, extraordinary accidents, as well as hostile military actions

or attacks by irregular forces are often characterized by their propensity to cause
chaotic conditions and overburden the local forces and assets that are available to
begin with. The main challenge then lies in turning the effects of such events
around, from a phase of chaos into a phase of order. Restoring essential services
in an organized and coordinated manner forms the basis for this.

RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AFTER DAMAGE CAUSED BY

NATURAL FORCES
1. Effects of water, such as floods, obstructed waterways, dam breaches or
mudslides, can destroy vital infrastructure, especially in mountain environments. To
then restore essential services in the fastest and most orderly manner possible, it
is indispensable to make contact with the head of the local authorities and other
civil emergency response and relief organisations. The necessary measures then
have to be arranged with these partners so that the forces and assets available at
the time are used efficiently and in a wholly coordinated manner.

2. Concerning the transport supplies (e. g. water/rations/sanitary goods/medications)

in the mountains, the characteristics particular to supply operations in mountain
environments should be considered and a sustainable supply plan prepared.

3. Mountain experts, such as air rescue personnel or Army mountain guides, can be
employed for the transportation of specialists, e. g. physicians, medical personnel
and other specialists to locations that are not readily accessible. Infrastructure that
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has been washed way, such as bridges and crossing points, can be replaced by
makeshift conveyor lines or rope bridges as a makeshift measure, constructed and
operated by personnel at advanced or expert level.

RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AFTER DAMAGE CAUSED BY

AVALANCHES
1. If essential services in inhabited areas are disrupted by the occurrence of large
avalanches, mountain troops are qualified to make the following contributions within
the framework of existing laws and regulations:
a. Provision of mountain-specific logistics by means of special-purpose
transport vehicles (e. g. ATV/Oversnow vehicles such as BV and/or
skidoos).
b. Transportation of physicians, medical personnel and other specialists to
locations that are not readily accessible.
c. Evacuation of patients by means of special-purpose transport vehicles (e. g.
BV 206) if helicopter transportation is unavailable or flight operations are not
possible due to the environmental conditions.
d. Minimisation of avalanche risk along the supply and transport routes by
Army mountain guides and/or mountain engineers artificially triggering
avalanches with explosives and/or advising local authorities on their risk
management.
e. Support through the employment of mountain-mobile troops for other
general activities in the course of restoring essential services.
f. Support with snow clearing equipment/all terrain vehicles at the very first
stage.
g. Teaching locals about Risk Management concerning avalanche dangers.

RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AFTER MILITARY ACTIONS OR

ATTACKS BY IRREGULAR FORCES
1. Essential services such as energy, water and food supplies as well as basic medical
care for a society can easily be disrupted in the mountains by hostile military or
irregular forces. The supply routes are a fundamental variable for essential
services. They can easily be destroyed by environmental impacts or by military
and/or irregular attacks and are particularly vulnerable to external influences.

2. The employment of mountain troops for restoring essential services can be divided
into three areas:
a. Liaison,
b. Security, and
c. Transportation.

3. Mountain troops can ensure establishment of contact for an assessment of the

situation. Securing transports and transport routes can be a military task in stability
activities in the mountains. The security provided for transports in mountainous
terrain can be of the escort variety or stationary (see security in movements in MT).

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Where necessary, special-purpose vehicles can be used by the mountain troops to

transport supplies in difficult terrain.

DISASTER RESPONSE
1. Disaster response is primarily a national and social task which may grow up to the
requirement of international military forces for help. Mountain forces at different
proficiency levels (expert, advanced, basic and beginners) gives the Alliance the
means to respond and/or support swiftly to various types of disaster or emergency
contexts within mountainous environment along the timeline (see Figure 5-4).

2. The distribution of tasks requires clear responsibilities, knowledge, skills and

equipment. It has to be clear:|
a. Who knows what.
b. Who is trained and equipped in what.
c. Who is trained and not or not sufficient equipped and
d. Where are the necessary tools such as the rescue teams, medic teams,
helicopters (typesperformance level in correlation with altitude, weather
and visibility conditions), reserves (back up personnel) etc.

3. The planning and organization of a disaster response operation demands a

synopsis of ressources, body of knowledge and skills, equipment, time, area and
disaster assessment.

FIGURE 5-4: LEVEL OF DISASTER AND TERRAIN DIFFICULTY IN CORRELATION WITH FORCES AVAILABLE, TIME AND SPEED

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4. In case of alert in a mission it is necessary to transport suitable and/or available

personnel and material to the site of the disaster when required, in order to support
the rescue forces/operational forces employed there. As a guidance what has to be
organized inside the camp, Figure 5-5 gives a rough overview as a rough example
in an avalanche disaster response context.

5. Military weather forecast station and existing prevision systems (satellite imaging,
mountain expert observations on the ground, etc.) could be used to implement a
temporary forecasting service to prevent mountain hazards in order to carry out
stabilization missions and protection of local population.

FIGURE 5-5: ORGANIZATION WHEN STARTING AN ORGANIZED AVALANCHE RESCUE OPERATION (EXAMPLE AS
GUIDANCE)

ENABLING ACTIVITIES
General
Enabling activities are a standing task in each tactical commander's responsibilities,
and are contingent on the level or echelon concerned. They are essential for seamless
transitions between offensive, defensive and stability activities, and form the basis for
those tactical activities as well as for planning and conducting land tactical operations.

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RECONNAISSANCE
General
1. In mountain environment, command and control (C2) is far more dependent on
timely and reliable tactical and terrain reconnaissance than it is in lowland regions.
Early and forward-echeloned reconnaissance is essential for flexible operational
command and control and for units to respond in a timely manner.

2. Reconnaissance is therefore a C2 priority. The often-channeling effect of

mountainous terrain on hostile movements is conducive to friendly reconnaissance.
Command and control, and support and supply elements, in particular, rely mostly
on efficient axes of movement. The more difficult the terrain and weather conditions
are, the less likely movements away from such axes will be49.

3. Since a rapid shift in the friendly point of main effort is not generally possible due
to the terrain, the initial deployment in most cases is crucial. Reconnaissance must
provide the basis of the assessment required for this.

4. The areas far forward of the friendly main forces which offer hostile forces several
options to approach must be reconnoitered as a priority. The hubs 50 where the
enemy is forced to select his point of main effort are also important in such
reconnaissance.

5. Modern reconnaissance tools, such as thermal imaging devices, battlefield radar,

sensors, UAV, etc. greatly facilitate area reconnaissance. They enable the
monitoring of the axes of movement and the areas vulnerable to airborne attack
with fewer forces. However, terrain characteristics and extreme weather conditions
limit the effectiveness of these reconnaissance assets. Technological tools provide
information but the interpretation must be done by a Mountain Warfare expert on
the ground.

6. Particular weather conditions in the high mountains (wind factor, icing, hail, heavy
snowfall, etc.) also require consideration when using unmanned, airborne imaging
reconnaissance.

7. Thermal imaging devices are impeded by heat emitted from the background,e.g.
irradiated rocks. Fog and precipitation also limit their usability, and their
effectiveness is reduced significantly by snowfall.

49
The more difficult the terrain and weather conditions are the less likely movement away from axes the more
mountaineering capability is needed.
50
An example for such a hub could be a crossing where two axes split and the decision must be done in which
direction the main effort goes ahead.

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8. Reconnaissance in force serves to optimize the common operational picture and

the gathering of information. The aim is to compel a significant enemy reaction.
Further details can be found in ATP 3.2.1.1.

9. As movements in mountain environments are usually easy to detect,

reconnaissance is often conducted by reconnaissance posts. These
reconnaissance patrols move into their positions (reconnaissance posts) at night or
in poor visibility, if possible, exploiting difficult terrain along the axes of movement.
It is often necessary to have the reconnaissance forces infiltrating the enemy's rear
or to leave them deep, behind advancing enemy forces.

10. As a rule, combat is to be avoided unless reconnaissance in force is deliberately

taking place for tactical considerations. Reconnaissance in force and/or including
combat patrol operations is ordered at battalion command level.

11. When conducting reconnaissance in force, enemy reconnaissance or security

forces are to be penetrated using the tactics and fighting methods of a raiding party
in order to seek and maintain contact with the enemy's main body.

12. This makes it possible to gain detailed information about the enemy
(location/strength/methods/weaponry/main weapons) and the key points of the
terrain.

13. Reconnaissance elements in mountain warfare are often reinforced by observers

(JFS-elements) and snipers. They are able to respond in time to threatening
situational developments, forward of the friendly main body as well as on the flank
and to the rear (guard and screen). They thus give the main forces time to take
countermeasures.

14. Reconnaissance in mountain environments requires specially trained soldiers

because of the difficulties presented by the terrain, the weather and the avalanche
situation. They do not only have to reconnoiter without being detected, but must
also be able to assess the impacts their reconnaissance findings will have on
combat operations conducted by friendly forces. The hazards posed by the
mountainous terrain to missions conducted by friendly forces and to combat
operations conducted by the battalion must be also assessed.

15. Any planned use of airborne imaging reconnaissance assets needs to be taken into
account in the airspace management for the area of responsibility and interest.

16. The width and depth of the reconnaissance depends primarily on the situation and
terrain. It must be such that a formation/unit is protected from any surprises, and
the intelligence on hostile forces and the terrain must be available in time, so that
it can be input into the mission/operations planning and conduct of operations. The
terrain characteristics may have an energy-saving effect (principle of the economy
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of forces), because vantage points, exposed parts of the terrain, crests, and forward
slope positions and so on can be exploited for that purpose.

TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE
1. Terrain reconnaissance in mountain environments is particularly important because
the terrain and the influences of the weather and the season, as well as the hazards
encountered in mountain areas can significantly influence operations.

2. The aim of terrain reconnaissance is to collect information on the transport network,

terrain (tactical use), installations, environmental influences and population.
Reconnaissance information is essential for the movement and commitment of
forces. Terrain reconnaissance using air assets saves time.

3. Once a mission has been assigned, the first thing to do is map reconnaissance.
Studying military geographical material/data, guide books, tour descriptions and
illustrations of the mountains (photographs, drawings), together with internet
services, local experts/guides often provides valuable insights when preparing
terrain reconnaissance locally. These information enhances the Battle
Management System (BMS).

4. Practical terrain reconnaissance is conducted on the basis of insights gained during

map reconnaissance and/or reconnaissance gained by technical devices.

FIGURE 5-6: OVERVIEW RECONNAISSANCE TOOLS AND LIMITS

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TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE FORCES: SMALL AND LARGE

RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES
1. The following are committed at battalion or battalion size task force level for terrain
reconnaissance:
a. A small reconnaissance party for roads, locations, and organization of the
operational areas of the command posts.
b. A large reconnaissance party for employment in mountain combat.

2. A large reconnaissance party will be supported by reconnaissance parties from

assigned units or forces directed to cooperate.

3. A reconnaissance party may include specialists such as experts in MW, CBRN

reconnaissance forces and, IT/signal forces, as well as MILENG capabilities and
medical forces etc.

4. Terrain reconnaissance by the commanders and their personal assessment of the

terrain are essential. During any terrain reconnaissance, the command and control
(C2) capability of the battalion and its companies must be maintained.

5. Terrain reconnaissance is generally based on the preliminary operation plan of the

battalion commander.

6. When conducting terrain reconnaissance, the leader of the reconnaissance party

will initially seek a rough overview of the assigned terrain and, in doing so, evaluate
the possibilities open to friendly and hostile forces. He will subsequently give
individual reconnaissance orders to the subordinate tactical command personnel of
the reconnaissance party.

7. Terrain reconnaissance is intended to determine:

a. Soil texture and ground conditions.
b. Trafficability of the terrain or measures needed to achieve trafficability.
c. Security, cover, concealment and dispersal options.
d. Observation and engagement capabilities.
e. Capacity of roads, tracks and bridges.
f. Time required to move across obstacles, or along routes.
g. Defiles and passes, as well as the possibility to bypass, breach, clear,
reinforce or block them.
h. Options for protecting defiles against hostile ground and air forces.
i. Bridging and fording sites at bodies of water.
j. Degree and extent of devastation and destruction as well as radioactive and
toxic contamination of the terrain.
k. Suitability of areas for command posts, logistic services, depots, mobile aid
stations and decontamination facilities.
l. Connectivity.

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m. Influence of local geospatial factors, particularly objective mountain

Hazards.
n. Situation with regard to the population.
o. Helicopter landing points, sites or zones as well as drop zones (if required).
p. Options with regard to security, cover and concealment, the construction of
positions, and the emplacement of obstacles and casualty collection points.
q. Space and routes for reserves.

8. Where satellite communication is concerned, the quasi-optical line of sight between

the ground station and the satellite must not be impaired, as a function of the
elevation angle, by vegetation and/or terrain features. Also, the options open to
hostile forces must always be assessed during terrain reconnaissance.

9. The reconnaissance parties need to have all the available geoinformation data and
products as well as civilian documentation at their disposal. This may include:
a. General and special maps such as cross-country movement maps, road and
bridge maps.
b. Aerial and satellite photos.
c. Forestry maps,
d. Engineer-specific command and control information and
e. Avalanche hazard maps, Recreational Guidebooks, Route logs, and trip
reports.

10. They must have any information available from the authorities and population at
their disposal.

11. Transhipment points (e.g. loading, unloading, reloading of cargo from vehicles onto
pack animals/carriers/soldiers and company supply points) must be reconnoitered
so that vehicles, pack animals and loads have space for dispersal and camouflage
protection, the route itself remains open, and vehicles are able to turn around
(optimal solution: roundabout).

12. Command post locations are to be reconnoitered so that:

a. C2 capability can be ensured by means of the requisite communication links.
b. Security options exist (e. g. based on terrain that serves as an obstacle, and out
of objective mountainous hazards).
c. There is adequate accessibility and parking possibilities for command, control,
and communications vehicles.
d. Favourable possibilities exist for friendly radio stations to emit direct to distant
stations or at least to relay stations.
e. Command post relocations are possible.
f. There are possibilities for protection against weapons effects and weather
conditions (cold/wind/precipitation).

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13. The location of command posts in the mountains is dictated primarily by possibilities
to establish and maintain communications.

14. The situation may require additionally allocating forces to a reconnaissance party
for the purpose of security and combat reconnaissance.

15. Often, terrain reconnaissance includes marking out and signposting tracks/paths.
Marking out tracks/paths is frequently necessary for:
a. Routes where there are no paths (e.g. alpine pastures).
b. Dangerous sections of roads such as edges, loose or unstable surfaces.
c. Routes that are impassable or can be observed by hostile forces.
d. Locations that offer hardly any point of reference for orientation (vast boulder
and debris fields, cirques, bare rocks, glaciers).
e. Branch-offs or junctions of paths/tracks (hubs).
f. Fog, driving snow, darkness.
g. Terrain sections at risk from rockfall, stone or snow avalanches.

EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIALISTS IN RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES

1. Subject Matter Experts (expert level in individual skills e.g. army mountain
guides/military mountain guides/military mountain leaders) primarily evaluate the
hazards existing in mountainous areas and reconnoiter possibilities for movement
in difficult-to-extreme terrain.

2. Engineers, motor vehicle experts, supply personnel and pack animal handlers
reconnoiter the roads and paths they are set to use. They suggest possible
improvements and how to use transport assets.

3. Reconnaissance from MILENG point of view will additionally focus on:

a. General Engineer support: assessing existing infrastructure development
and (or infrastructure build up in support of operations).

b. Survivability:
1) Assessing the passive protection measures and infra
vulnerabilities related to the main threats in the operational area.
2) Assessing the possibilities about power generation and water
distribution.
3) Assessing the possibility to set cable ways for suatinment of
mobility purposes.

c. Counter mobility: assessing about the obstacles replacement and barrier

plan implementation.

4. Signals and IT personnel conduct reconnaissance with regard to the employment

of communications, which are more difficult in mountain environments, and to the
possibilities of transmitting data.
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5. Medical personnel conduct reconnaissance with regard to the employment of Role

1 medical care (mobile aid station/battalion aid station [BAS]), which is more difficult
in mountainous areas, and rescue routes.

6. Air support and fire support personnel conduct reconnaissance with regard to their
field of responsibility.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
1. Orders for reconnaissance in force is issued usually at battalion command level or
above.

2. Reconnaissance in force involves employing raiding party tactics and techniques

to penetrate (through) enemy reconnaissance or security forces, with the aim of
seeking and maintaining contact with the enemy's main body by using units at
minimum advanced MW level. This serves to gain details about the enemy location,
strength, behavior, mobility and weaponry and to eliminate important weapons
and/or occupy key points at high ground in the mountainous terrain.

3. Reconnaissance in force patrols operations may also:

a. Result in prisoners being taken.
b. Eradicate enemy observation posts.
c. Eliminate heavy weapons that are impeding friendly combat operations, or
lead to important points in the terrain being temporarily occupied and held.
d. Pursue withdrawing forces so as to identify the areas of retreat of enemy
Forces.
e. Disrupt supply lines by MW techniques such as triggering avalanches.
f. Reconnoitre and destroy command and control facilities.
g. Disrupt and surprise enemies intentions and organizational structure.

4. Usually forces up to platoon strength are employed as reconnaissance in force.

5. Reconnaissance elements optionally reinforced by snipers, engineers and

observers (JFS-elements), are more often given combat missions in mountainous
terrain. They are able to respond in good time to threatening situational
developments ahead of, on the flanks and in the rear of the friendly main force.
They thus allow the main unit/force enough time for countermeasures. After a
reconnaissance in force mission in difficult and/or extremly difficult mountainous
terrain, these elements are usually no longer employable for reconnaissance due
to necessary recovery.

SECURITY
General
1. In understanding of this chapter special security measures in mountainous
environment are not related to the joint function force protection. Security in
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Mountain Warfare must be considered from two points of view at the same time.
There is a need for tactical security, and also a need for security measures against
the ever-present environmental dangers. In mountainous terrain there is a general
consensus that 100% protection against environmental threats is not possible. A
mountainous rest-risk 51 will always exist but can be reduced by adequate risk
management (see Chapter 2.2.2 and 3.1.3).

2. In the field of Mountain Warfare it is necessary to deal equally with the best risk
management against the environmental risks and parallel with tactical security.

3. Tactical security can be enhanced/improved by obeying tactical security principles.

Principles
1. Security in mountain combat has the purpose of protecting friendly forces against
surprises sprung by hostile forces and/or of providing friendly forces with time to
prepare themselves and establish combat readiness. Tactical security
encompasses security measures, the employment of security forces.

2. Mountainous terrain and certain meteorological situation always pose the risk of a
surprise. Surprise in general can be significantly increased if the enemy has a
superior or a high level of air mobility and/or specific mobility capabilities such as
skiing, climbing etc.

3. The most effective security measure generally is to have seamless

reconnaissance52 echeloned forward as well as at the rear and on the flanks.

4. Security forces may include:

a. Forces in forward positions/along the phase line of security (= first phase
line).
b. Combat outposts and supporting forces on high ground to provide cover for
movements.
c. Reconnaissance in force.
d. Security Screen outposts, CBRN observation outposts and air spotters.

5. Security forces should be employed so that:

a. From vantage points, any hostile threats on the ground and in the air can be
identified early on.
b. Directly along the axes of movement, any surprise approaches, especially
in poor visibility, will be prevented.

51
A not predictable risk thus a remaining risk that cannot be eliminated
52
Seamless reconnaissance is meant in this context that there is no gap.

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c. Any landings of hostile forces in the rear and on the flanks, as well as
encircling and bypassing forces, will be detected early on.
d. Any landings of hostile forces can be rapidly destroyed.
e. At night and in poor visibility, increased use of reconnaissance patrols for
liaison purposes will, if possible, prevent any hostile elements from slipping
through unnoticed.

6. Slopes and valleys can best be monitored from the valley expanses forward and
opposite. This will avoid areas offering no visibility and require fewer security forces.
It will thus be possible to observe the forward movement of hostile forces until they
reach friendly forces. If required, observation posts are to be augmented by forces
qualified for observation and engagement over long distances (e. g. observers and
controllers of indirect fire [JFS-elements, snipers]).

7. In difficult and extreme terrain, a small number of guard forces (e. g. snipers, JFS,
MG on mount) can secure broad areas, large gaps and exposed flanks. Even
against a numerically superior enemy, guard forces in well-chosen positions along
the axes of movement can hold their ground over an extended period.

8. Positions should be selected mainly at access points or crossing sites in connected

areas and along the peripheries (ridges, crests) of those areas.

9. In snowy conditions, it is usually advantageous to use reconnaissance teams on

skis/snow shoes along security tracks. Doing so will make it easier to detect any
hostile elements, and will save resources.

SECURITY IN MOVEMENTS IN MOUNTAIN ENVIRONMENT

1. In mountain environments, movements are generally more exposed to hostile
observation and hostile fire due to the channeling effects of the terrain, the lack of
cover and concealment possibilities, and the few lines of communication.

2. Wherever possible, therefore, battalions should march along more than one route
(separate marching). This will shorten the march duration, reduce hostile
observation and heighten a battalion's own response capability. Poor visibility
conditions are to be exploited, if possible.

3. If stationary and/or escort security is required for movements (e.g. marches), then
security forces with long-range observation and engagement capabilities should be
assigned wherever possible for "high ground control". These should be sent ahead
of the march in a timely manner.

4. Security for large vehicle movements in mountainous areas is particularly

imperative if the threat situation is high and the march route runs along a slope or
a narrow valley, thus reducing to zero any evasion options when under fire and
making ballistic attack from opposing heights possible.
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5. Where escort security for movements is required, small elements suited to long-
range observation and engagement will then be employed as guard forces in a
leapfrog fashion along the slopes and heights running parallel to the direction of
movement. These are to be supported for the movements, wherever possible, by
transportation assets (such as rotary-wing aircraft, skidoos, ATVs [all-terrain
vehicles] or mounted units).

6. If there is no possibility of dispatching guard forces to a forward position on higher

ground in good time, the only remaining option will be to secure the movement with
an advance guard along the axis of movement, in which case general infantry
principles for securing movements will apply.

7. A higher degree of dispersal with greater distances between vehicles is usually

chosen as the format for movements involving vehicles/motor marches.

8. For foot marches, depending on the situation, security will be provided through:
a. Dispersal.
b. Assignment of an advance guard with a generally larger time gap.
c. Forward-echeloned employment of forces, temporally and spatially, at key
dominating points in the terrain.
d. Far-forward combat patrols that each reconnoitre or screen at least the next
tactically related tract of terrain and the axes of movement leading into it.
e. Employment of flank security in leapfrog mode, provided by combat patrols
on the surrounding slopes and heights.
f. Integration of heavy direct-fire weapons, JFS-elements / forward observer(s)
and MILENG assets far forward.
g. Employment of grenade launchers, mortars, antiaircraft guns and long-
range direct-fire weapons in leapfrog mode to screen wide, open areas.

9. As a general security principle in MW there should be no movement without

overwatching the adjacent high ground (high ground control). This can be done by
stationary security forces or with the method of flying-picketing by escort security
(see Figure 5-7) enhanced by indirect fire support.

10. If possible security forces should be deployed by means of helicopter transport,

thus achieving an adequate rate of movement as well as saving a great amount of
time. Accompanying flank security without helicopter transport is very rarely
possible. New technologies such as drones could be an alternative option in the
future.

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FIGURE 5-7: SCHEMATIC PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY PROVIDED FOR MOVEMENTS IN MW

SECURITY BY SCREEN FORCE

1. Related to the ATP-3.2.1.1 security forces are distinguished between screen,
guard, covering, area security and local security forces. Due to the outstanding
importance in the mountain environment, the focus for this Chapter is exlucively on
the screen force. The screen force provides security by surveillance,
reconnaissance or a combination of both. The purpose of such surveillance, using
widely deployed forces and assets, is to gain information about what is happening
in areas, without securing or retaining them, so as to deduce the action required in
response to possible situation developments. Surveillance can focus, for example,
on areas, sites, or the behaviour of the enemy.

2. The axes of movement at the rear and on the flanks will require intensified
surveillance.

3. Where operating conditions for helicopters in mountain environments are

concerned, areas vulnerable to airborne attack at the rear and on the flanks are in
need of screening.

4. The characteristics of area surveillance in mountain environments include:

a. Increased force requirement due to extension of the employment area, gaps,
and higher risk of air landings.
b. Exclusion of tracts of terrain (according to the principles of security).

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5. Surveillance of expansive areas is often only possible with the aid of an integrated
reconnaissance system (e. g. JF-elements 53 ). Electronic warfare measures,
ground-based and airborne technical reconnaissance assets and sensors of all
kinds then support the surveillance.

6. Surveillance mainly takes place through observation and reconnaissance at access

points and crossing sites in tactically related areas, along the borders of those
areas, and at hubs.

7. In difficult high ground terrain and in good visibility small force numbers can monitor
wide areas, large gaps and exposed flanks. Mounted units (vehicles, helicopters,
animals), because of their high mobility, are particularly suited to monitoring difficult
or not readily accessible terrain.

8. Night-time and conditions of changing visibility call for the agile use of forces. If the
terrain makes repositioning impossible, additional forces need to be provided for
this.

9. Screen forces should be able to engage unexpectedly appearing hostile forces in

self-protection immediately with observed fire. The firing position areas for the
indirect fire units and the plan for conducting the fire support are to be prepared so
that the screen force can be supported in different areas.

10. The tactical commander will order area surveillance if he does not wish, is not
expected, or is unable to fully secure or defend his area of responsibility (area
assigned) with forces. The area will then be kept under surveillance at the
location(s) where, according to an estimate of the situation, the enemy appears
unlikely to attack.

MARCH
General
1. Often there are only a few low-capacity axes of movement available for marches
and movements in the mountains. The particular features of the terrain and the
influences of the weather can compound the situation.

2. March organization takes on a particular importance because any changes along

narrow axes of movement are difficult to implement.

3. March and movements in mountain warfare have the particular characteristic that
they are often a combination of marching with support by forms of transport. This

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JFS = Joint Fire Support

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support is used as far as possible in order to arrive at the march destination in

fighting-fit condition.

FIGURE 5-8: STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION OF MARCH OPTIONS IN MW

4. In high mountains it is purposeful to make use of all available routes in the AOR to
induce the enemy air force to dissipate its effort. Risk management according to
environment threats must be carried out at every echelon. (Greater intervals are
prescribed in places where there is danger of rockfalls and avalanches and/or these
dangers has to be minimized by other means, such as triggering avalanche by
experts/drones, etc.)

5. The march intervals of advance and rear guards depend entirely on the situation
and the terrain, which often give the enemy better opportunities for observation and
effective fire than on the flat.

6. The main body should not start up movements on roads or paths when the slopes
on either side are bare and difficult to climb, nor should it descend bare slopes
visible to the enemy until ridges in the direction of the enemy are in the hands of
the advance guard (high ground control). The main body can frequently move up
only at night or in reduced sight (for enemy recce).

7. With soldiers able to move over all kinds of steep rock, snow, and ice, and skilled
in military skiing in high mountains even under the most difficult conditions (high
level of mobility including winter mobility), the command has a basis for remarkable
achievements.

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8. Neither tracked vehicles nor cross-country wheeled motor vehicles can negotiate
steep slopes, and no vehicle should cross difficult terrain alone. Help from other
vehicles with tow ropes and winches must be available at the hand. Generally, there
is more wear and tear and a higher fuel consumption in mountainous terrain than
in the lowlands.

9. Major movements cannot escape detection from the air in fairly favorable weather.

MARCH ON FOOT IN MW
1. The terrain and the weather place high demands on soldiers during foot marches
in the mountains. The rate of march depends largely on the differences in elevation
that must be overcome, the difficulties of the terrain, the weather conditions, the
absolute altitude, the weight of loads being carried, and the soldiers' fitness.

2. Every opportunity should be used for heavy weapons, equipment and combat
supplies to be carried or subsequently brought along by means of transport. In
cases where the terrain is non-trafficable, pack animals and ropeways are
particularly suited for this, in addition to the use of helicopters.

3. Reconnaissance of the march route terrain is crucial for movement planning,

especially for preparing a realistic schedule. Reconnaissance parties will report:
a. The conditions along the march route.
b. Danger spots.
c. Possibilities for circumvention.
d. Areas favourable for halts and rest.
e. Any march-/movement-specific measures that are necessary.

4. Experts (individual Expert level see ATrainP-6) will provide support through:
a. Selection of the correct route(s).
b. Briefings.
c. Setting-up of fixed-rope installations.
d. Triggering of avalanches.
e. Laying of energy-conserving tracks for ascent and descent in snow.

5. Difficult locations are to be marked on the mountain situation plan. Where waiting
times are unavoidable, waiting areas protected from hostile threats and alpine
hazards are to be planned for, set up and operated. Realistic calculation of the
march duration is crucial in planning any tactical activity.

MARCH WITH TRANSPORT SUPPORT IN MW

1. Where the march route is still trafficable by using particular individual vehicles but
will not accommodate a motorized march, transport support will be called in. The
tactical commander will, in this regard, use the means that are available and
suitable to lighten the burdens being carried by those marching and/or to make the
onward movement of the soldiers easier.
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2. If transport support is to be provided by pack animals, these will be integrated into

the march formation as the situation allows. Transport support in the form of pack
animals carrying loads will require the assignment of a track-laying team if the snow
depth is roughly 50 cm or greater. It has proven practical to include pack animals
behind the second-last section in platoons or, in case of all the pack animals being
employed in one unit, in the second-last marching section of battalions/task force.
If the pack animals are dispatched separately, they should have the special
protection of combat forces.

3. In the case of transportation by air transport assets or transport support by

helicopters, the regulations on the conduct of air landings and air movements will
apply. The significantly reduced transport capacity of helicopters due to increasing
altitude and potential wind influences is an important characteristic for planning and
conducting air transports in mountain environments. In tactical situations enhanced
by adverse terrain, airlifting and depositing units and formations en bloc is mostly
not possible. The landing zones are then divided into individual landing sites or
even individual landing points.

4. "Skijoring" is an effective transport support procedure (option) in snow covered

terrain on flat ground and gentle slopes.

MARCH WITH VEHICLES IN MW

1. Generally, the principles of vehicular movement apply to motorized marches in
mountain environments. A significant danger in the mountains is the risk of vehicles
slipping or falling off precipices and possible hostile fire from higher (opposing)
slopes. Particularly difficult or hazardous routes and ordered risk minimization
measures need to be clearly indicated on the mountain situation plan.
2. By using over snow vehicles (tracked vehicles) the rate of march, decreases
significantly with increasing snow depth. On routes with many slopes and curves,
as well as when marching through snow, energy consumption can be as much as
30 - 500%54 higher than on flat, snow-free roads.

3. This will have a considerable effect on tactical planning. Reconnaissance parties

will reconnoiter the trafficability of tracks and roads. They will report:
a. Road conditions.
b. Steep slopes and gradients.
c. Load-bearing capacity of bridges, potential fording sites.

54
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/8125990_Energy_requirements_of_military_personnel#pf12
»Energy expenditures can increase by as much as 30% for locomotion on hard-packed snow and up to 500% for
deep snow compared to values measured on a blacktop road« (McCarroll et al., 1979).

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d. Choke points and single-traffic locations.

e. Narrow curves and turns.
f. Locations at risk from rockfall and avalanches.
g. Locations in need of widening.
h. Give-way and turning possibilities.
i. Rest areas.
j. Necessary movement-specific measures such as increased distances, use
of chains, snow grips/grousers, traffic control etc.
k. Alternative routes.
l. Potentially dangerous zones concerning tactical and environmental risks
(hazards).

4. MILENG capabilities should be included among the march lead elements.

Recovery parties should be kept at the ready at critical locations for towing
purposes. Vehicles with winches should be included at regular intervals. Especially
in wintry conditions, all vehicles should be equipped with snow chains and towing
equipment.

5. Marking and signposting will usually be required since many roads and tracks have
dead ends and offer only limited turn-around possibilities. In cases where mountain
roads are trafficable only in one direction, strict traffic control is to be ordered (e. g.
strictly separated time slots for up- and downhill vehicle movements). The
procedure in the event of vehicle breakdowns must also be clear in order to avoid
traffic jams and thus greater vulnerability.

ADVANCE TO CONTACT
1. Advance to contact is an intended search to gain contact or re-establishing contact
with opponent forces, thus enabling a following tactical activity to execute an
informed and successful action. Units in advance to contact are more vulnerable to
attack and ambush. In general, as mobility is reduced in mountainous terrain, units
use a smaller force to establish contact. During a movement to contact, the advance
guard advances in column, moving continuously or by bounds until contact is made.
In this phase, enemy observation should be avoided. In general, commanders must
focus on high ground control or clearance of ridgelines and/or key points that
dominate the planned avenues of approach. Reconnaissance information is
essential for the movement and commitment of forces.

2. Advance to contact normally ends when the main force predominates the terrain
for the activity according to the commander´s tactical operation plan.

CROSSING AND BREACHING OF OBSTACLES

1. Obstacles are often emplaced on the main avenues of approach. In mountainous
terrain these are valleys, saddles and mountain slopes. Therefore making gaps and
crossing of obstacles must be planned on less expected places. This requires well
trained and more mobile breaching forces which also need to be well
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secured/protected. Usually, tactical obstacles are well-protected by the enemy

positioned at higher points, which requires taking control of these first. They are
often positioned to canalize or slow down opponent security forces, consequently
slowing down the progression of the main forces or loss of their protection.

2. In mountainous environment, there are also deep and water-conducting gaps

(gorges) and difficult and extreme terrain features that constitute essential natural
obstacles. The briefing on the mountain situation will then provide information on
whether and how preparations can be made for the tactical use of such terrain
obstacles, and what is required in terms of materiel, personnel and time.
Deliberately surprising the enemy by exploiting such parts of the terrain, for
example by installing/using fixed-rope installations e.g. fixed ropes/transport
tracks/rope bridges, may lead to success. This advantage should be used
purposefully in the mountains, especially at night and/or in poor visibility.

3. Fixed-rope installations can be used, for instance, for:

a. The forward-echeloned securement of terrain by forces to subsequently
enable the deployment of the main body.
b. Follow-up by additional forces.
c. Saving time and effort through shortcuts.
d. Supply actions.

4. The use of fixed-rope installations generally requires prior reconnaissance.

Specially trained forces (Expert level, e.g. army mountain guides/army alpine
specialists or similarly qualified personnel, other SMEs) should be employed for the
terrain reconnaissance and use of fixed-rope installations or cable ways. The
materials required for the fixed-rope installations must be ascertained, and
additional forces employed to deliver them.

5. Such fixed-rope installations can be used over the short or the longer term,
depending on their intended purpose. This must be taken into account during
planning and construction. Fixed-rope installations must be used so that terrain
which would otherwise be non-trafficable can be overcome by troops with as little
effort as possible, even when carrying very heavy burdens. The setting-up and
operation of extensive fixed-rope installations that will be in place over a lengthy
period of time should be secured by separate forces, as required by the threat
situation. When used over the longer term, expert level forces will be required to
periodically re-inspect these installations and make necessary repairs/adjustments.

6. Entry points, key locations and exit points of such fixed-rope installations as well as
the path between installations should be marked for night-time use. The
construction party must report the coordinates of the entry and exit points of long-
term fixed-rope installations through the chain of command to the tactical
commanders.

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7. Where lengthy fixed-rope installations are to be used, larger distances between the
organizational elements should be ordered so as to avoid any massing of forces
upstream of or within the installations.

8. During the use of such a fixed-rope installation the unit should keep qualified
soldiers at advanced or expert level at the entry points, key locations and exit points
to ensure that things go smoothly, as well as for any rescue measures.

9. The areas at the entry and exit points to and from such fixed-rope installation are,
in principle, not to be used as rest or assembly areas.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT
1. Meeting engagement is an unexpected and unintended contact with opposing
forces. It may occur during movements and in any type of tactical activity or
operation, as well as with troops waiting in assembly areas. It is characterized by
an unclear situation and by the need for prompt action.

2. The aim in a meeting engagement is to force the enemy to give ground or to bring
them to a halt, and to destroy inferior enemy forces. If confronted by superior enemy
forces, the aim is to defend from favourable terrain (crest/hilltop/higher positions)
until forces deployed by the higher command join the battle. It is important to at
least reduce the enemy's options for taking countermeasures and to maintain one's
own freedom of action.

3. The characteristics of meeting engagements in mountain environments include:

a. By swiftly securing fighting positions on higher ground, it is possible to
engage in depth and against the enemy from covered positions.
b. By thrusting into the flank of the enemy along surrounding heights as well as
across difficult terrain, it is possible to engage the enemy by surprise.
c. The decisive moment usually arrives in the first few minutes in favour of the
side who can seize key terrain (e. g.: heights, passes, crests).
d. The exploitation of the terrain reinforced by barriers facilitates the transition
to limited defensive activities.

4. In a meeting engagement situation it is often not possible to wait until heavy

weapons are operational, so agile decision-making and execution is crucial.
Blocking the opponents´ movement and attacking them in the flanks by using
surrounding high ground is a basic tactical principle. If this is not possible the
meeting engagement can shift to limited defensive activities. According to the
terrain and weather features, a meeting engagement situation in Mountain Warfare
is much more likely to appear than in lowlands.

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FIGURE 5-9: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM – MEETING ENGAGEMENT IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN “BLOCK IN THE VALLEY –
STRIKE FROM HIGH GROUND”

LINK UP
1. Link-up may be very likely in a mountainous terrain, where forces are separated in
march or movements but will be linked up for fighting together. It may be foreseen
and planned in advance or may be conducted consequently. The terrain and enemy
power should be reconnoitered carefully. A link-up in MW maybe a tactical decision
to apply the principle of “March separately - strike together” as the best course of
action.

2. In all cases the speed of the actions of the forces to link up in particular, should be
planned realistically and executed carefully by a link-up point.

RELIEF OF TROOPS
General
1. The purpose of relief is to replace one force with another. The incoming force will
then assume responsibility for continuing the operation under the same or a new
mission.

2. This may be done as:

a. Relief in place (for the outgoing force).
b. Relief by forward passage of lines, or
c. Relief by rearward passage of lines.
3. Characteristics of relief in mountain environments:
a. Terrain conditions usually allow a covered approach for the incoming force.

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b. The relief must be screened by indirect fire assets (JFS) and long-range
direct fire weapons.
c. Greater attention must be paid to concealment (in particular the concealment
of tracks in winter).
d. Reserves are relieved last, and extracted only once the relief in place has
been completed.
e. The combat support elements are not extracted at the same time as the
combat force. JFS must also be ensured throughout the period of relief.
Command responsibility remains with the tactical commander of the
outgoing force until the relief has been completed.

RELIEF IN PLACE
Relief in place usually occurs in the course of a defensive operation, the tactical activity
defence and/or security tactical activities within a stability operation and can be
conducted either simultaneously or locally and successively, depending on the
situation. The incoming force will make contact early for that purpose.

FIGURE 5-10: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RELIEF IN PLACE

RELIEF BY FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

Relief by forward passage of lines is when an advance force attacks through an in-
place force, or attacks via the flanks. This type of relief will be conducted if:
a. An attack is to be continued with fresh or more suitable forces.
b. The in-place force is closely engaged with the enemy, or,
c. The advance force must seize key terrain to continue the operation.

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FIGURE 5-11: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RELIEF BY FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

RELIEF BY REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

1. Relief by rearward passage of lines will usually take place after delay. It is also
possible in other types of operation, however, if terrain can be relinquished. The
withdrawing force moves through the in-place force to its rear.

FIGURE 5-12: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM - RELIEF BY REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

2. The purpose of a rearward passage of lines is to withdraw friendly forces in an

orderly manner.

3. The in-place force are deployed in positions in the rear of the withdrawing force.
The in-place force have the task of:
a. Screening and supporting the withdrawal of the withdrawing force and, if
necessary, of keeping crossing sites, passages and defiles open for them.
b. Repelling pursuing hostile forces.
c. Creating the conditions for the withdrawing force to pass rearward without
being pressed by enemy forces, or to prepare all or some of its elements for
defensive actions in the receiving force position.

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d. Continuing, after the rearward passage of lines, to engage any pursuing

hostile forces, either on their own or together with the rearward passing
forces.

4. Characteristics of a rearward passage of lines in mountain environments:

a. Crest positions are especially suitable for covering the rearward passage of
lines.
b. Pursuing or enveloping hostile forces can be repelled more easily in
intended terrain.
c. Receiving force positions often have to be set up for defence purposes so
as to ensure the movement of the the withdrawing force through channeling
tracts of terrain,
d. Crossing sites, passages and defiles must be kept open for the forces
withdrawing away from the main axis of movement.

5. The rearward passage of lines is coordinated via a handover line (HL), in the course
of which receiving positions must be established.

6. The in-place force positions should:

a. Nestle against strong terrain features (e. g. crests).
b. Allow observation and firing over long distances.
c. Be difficult for the enemy to bypass.
d. Allow covered movement of the rearward passing forces.

7. It is often possible for friendly/own forces to retire and reorganize under cover
behind summits, bends, crests, saddles and passes.

8. The in-place force positions must always be held until the last elements of the
withdrawing force have passed rearward.

9. Any rearward passage of lines in mountainous terrain must be planned, ordered

and prepared as early as possible, taking into consideration the greater amount of
time that is required. The withdrawing force should make contact with the in-place
force early on and coordinate details for the rearward passage of lines. In the
process the tactical commanders of the withdrawing force and in-place force will
exchange C2 documents (operation plans, mountain site maps, mountain situation
plan, barrier documentation, fire support plan, and documentation on signal
communications).

10. Information particularly to be coordinated includes:

a. The course of the handover line in the terrain.
b. The sequence and composition of the withdrawing force along the passage
routes.

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c. Identification of the withdrawing force and passage routes, particularly in

limited visibility.
d. Ground guides and their liaison with one another.
e. Combat reconnaissance.
f. Barriers.
g. Movements through the engagement area, possible assembly areas,
coordination of JFS-elements.
h. Transport of casualties,
i. Logistic support (means of recovery and evacuation).
j. Command posts.

11. After the rearward passage of lines, measures aimed at supporting and maintaining
the sustainability of the in-place force must be provided.

12. Should the road network allow it, troops fighting on foot should be transported
onward by motorized means after the rearward passage of lines.

WITHDRAWAL
1. The purpose of withdrawal is to disengage the force from physical contact with an
enemy. Contact may be maintained through means such as indirect fire,
reconnaissance or surveillance. Withdrawal is also used to change conditions on
the ground, to allow a reinvestment of combat power in a different way und thereby
achieve greater freedom of action. It may be expedient or necessary in any land
tactical operation if:
a. The objective of an operation has been achieved or cannot be achieved and
the force is threatened.
b. To avoid battle in unfavorable tactical or environmental conditions,
especially in mountainous terrain when the fore can no longer be sustained.
c. To conform to the movements of adjacent friendly forces.
d. The military commander wishes to employ the force elsewhere or to relocate
it to a more favorable position.
e. The force concerned is seeking to switch to a different type of operation
unnoticed.

2. Withdrawal during mountain combat calls for a tactically organized and efficient
disengagement from the enemy. This can take place either cohesively (on all levels
simultaneously) and unnoticed, over watched by JFS/indirect fire and long-range
weapons, or successively while leaving behind a security elements and their
covering fire. For the security elements a temporary defence followed by a
sideways withdrawal is often expedient instead of withdrawing backwards 55.

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The sideways withdrawal may often deliver the advantage of being quickly out of sight of opponent troops and
pursuing enemy forces if the terrain features support this. It can only be done if there is high ground control and
no conflict with adjacent units.

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3. With both types of withdrawal, distance from the enemy should be sought as quickly
as possible.

4. The characteristics of disengaging from the enemy in mountainous environments

include:
a. Crest positions make it easier to break off combat and disengage.
b. The terrain is conducive to placing obstacles and carrying out ambushes
along the disengagement route.
c. Supply actions such as medical evacuation, relocation of supply units, other
evacuation measures etc. must be initiated at an early stage.

5. Poor visibility makes disengagement easier, while good visibility and open terrain
make it more difficult. Armoured/mechanized forces need covered or greatly
indented mountainous terrain to be able to disengage unnoticed. In the
mountainous terrain, generally more time is required to disengage from the enemy
and withdraw.

6. Any decision to disengage from the enemy must be made early, giving due
consideration to the time required for movements. Orders concerning the
disengagement must be given as early as possible.

7. In general a formation/unit will only disengage from the enemy on its own initiative
if:
a. It is the only way of accomplishing the mission,
b. Annihilation threatens, and/or
c. Swift action is necessary, when there is no possibility of receiving or waiting
for a decision from the higher command.

8. The following phases should be considered for the conduct of battle:

a. Evacuation of casualties, removal of equipment/materiel no longer required,
and redeployment of logistic and medical facilities.
b. Preparation for rearward passage, ensuring JFS/indirect fire, emplacement
of obstacles and creation of other conditions needed for orderly
disengagement from the enemy.
c. Deployment of a security element under unified command.
d. Disengagement of the bulk of the forces engaged in combat.
e. Disengagement of the security element.

9. Requiring particular attention in this regard:

a. Heavy weapons need to be withdrawn earlier.
b. Greater time requirements must be taken into consideration for manoeuvre
elements that must overcome difficult terrain.

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c. The manoeuvre elements directly along the axis of movement can be the
last to break off combat if the cover and mobility options are good.

10. Liaison should be ensured between the security element and the JFS/indirect fire
observers, who are often deployed some distance away.

11. Separating landforms lead to isolated engagement areas for the security element.
In favourable parts of the terrain they can also delay superior enemy forces for a
lengthy period of time.

12. Good barrier options will allow employment of a weaker security element. With
sufficient mobility they will be able to use closed and difficult terrain to their
advantage for disengagement.

13. JFS and indirect fire will destroy or blind pursuing enemy forces.

14. Helicopters can support the disengagement from the enemy, in particular by
engaging any pursuing enemy forces, guarding open flanks, evacuating casualties,
and transporting important supplies and the security element.

15. If the terrain conditions are difficult, the coordination of withdrawing elements must
be carried out with particular care. Coordinating combat with neighbouring units is
crucial at locations where valleys converge or axes of movement lead from one
area of responsibility into another.

16. If a road network exists, an armored/mechanized reserve force should be included

whenever possible. A mobile reserve, reinforced by MILENG assets to support
mobility and counter mobility, should be kept ready at vital locations.

17. Key parts of the terrain and high-ground control along the passage route must be
seized early on to prevent isolation.

18. As soon as the situation permits, withdrawing forces should use trafficable axes of
movement.
19. Roads and valleys in the rear area must be cleared in good time for movements of
combat forces. Traffic control will take on particular importance.

RETIREMENT
Forces retire when there is no longer contact with the enemy. The procedures and
particular features for retirement in mountainous environment are then equivalent to
those for withdrawal, as given above.

DEMONSTRATION AND FEINT

1. Demonstration is a deceptive activity without direct enemy. Force demonstration is
a (mock) attack or show of force in a battle section where a decision is not sought.

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The goal in Mountain Warfare, is to distract the enemy's attention without seeking
combat. It is part of the plans for deception. The forces used for demonstration use
firepower, movement and electronic combat to influence the conviction and
perception of the enemy´s military leaders. It should also target critical sections of
the enemy defence to successfully mislead them.

2. The main purpose of feint is to support the development of the main effort
elsewhere on the battlefield by fixing an element of the enemy using contact and
so distracting their commander. Feint and the demonstration of forces are forms of
deception. It aims to distract the attention and action of enemy forces by actively
seeking battle with the them, and it is most effective when it meets the enemy`s
expectations and appears to them as a significant threat. It manipulates the
perception of the enemy´s military leaders in order to make them make
inappropriate decisions.

3. In MW deceptive methods and techniques are used to convey disinformation,

distract focus and mislead the enemy commanders by using deceptive methods
and techniques. In mountains these are:
a. Feint movements and contacts.
b. False ski (snowmobiles) tracks in the snow.
c. False triggering of avalanches or rocks as a fictive case of action to provoke
the enemy to react.
d. False fire in an unexpected place.
e. The use of shiny reflective objects on mountain ridges (drones) to show false
activities, together with false radio communication.

4. Such activities in the mountains are often run in limited and/or confined manoeuvre
space, which restricts the number of avenues of approach for heavier forces. When
a fake attack is intended, it must be carried out with sufficient strength (strength
and composition) in order to bring about the desired reaction of the enemy.

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ANNEX A Examples as Guidance

A.1. Mountain Situation Plan (reference example); Matrix & Overlay

1) Hazard identification Matrix to create Mountain Situation Plan (reference

example)
Meteorological factors (M)
M1 Visibility range in daylight (restrictions due to fog, rain,
snow) with time (from-to or at)
M2 Rainfall forecast (rain, snowfall, hail, thunderstorm (risk of
lightning strike)) with time
M3 Wind (wind direction, foehn storm, wind chill factor) with
time
M4 Temperature (maximum and minimum temperature,
freezing point in relation to altitude, melting of snow)
M5 Air pressure (rising, dropping)
M6 Weather forecast (for the planning period)
M7 …..

Geological/geographical factors (GG)

GG1 Passability (e. g. with crampons or by setting up fixed-rope
climbing)
GG2 Trafficability according to vehicle type (wheeled/tracked,
measurements, military load classification, weight)
GG3 Risk of slipping/falling (for people, animals, and vehicles)
GG4 Danger of rockfall/rockslide
GG5 Danger of sinkholes in the employment area
GG6 Volcanic phenomena in the employment area
GG7 Avarage steepnees/ Steepest places…..
GG8 Max. Elevation
GG9 …

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Hydrological factors (H)

H1 Flooding
H2 Undercutting (of roads, tracks and bridges)
H3 Water depths (of streams and rivers)
H4 Icing (passable, trafficable, ice cover)
H5 Water resources (drinking or service water)
H6 …..
Nivological factors (N)
N1 Avalanche risk 1-5 (European Scale)
A. Level of risk forecasted according to civilian service
if existing.
B. Level of risk evaluated by mountain experts from the
mountain cell including data from the military weather
forecasting service.
N2 Depth/consistency of snow (deep snow, load-bearing)
N3 Passability (with skis, snowshoes, crampons)
N4
Trafficability of tracks and trails, possibly intermediate
terrain (vehicle type, vehicle weight, pack animals)
N5 …..
Botanical factors (B)
B1 Vegetation
B2 Forest line (e. g. deciduous forest, coniferous forest, young
forest, mountain pine fields, steep meadow slopes)
B3 Fire hazard (risk of forest fire, grass fire, steppe fire)
B4 …..
Glaciological factors (G)
G1 Glaciation and danger of crevasses (crevasse width,
usable glacier bridges)
G2 Falling ice, seracs (glacial towers)
G3 Scree movements

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G4 Glacial swamps, glacial lakes

G5 …..
Zoological factors (Z)
Z1 Deer population (rockfall)

Z2 Livestock (helicopter employment)

Z3 Dangerous and poisonous animals (e. g. snakes in coves)

Z4 …..

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2) Mountain Situation Plan as Overlay (reference example)

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A.2. Supply Plan (reference example); All weather supply plan

Supply sector 1 Supply sector 2 Supply sector 3

Quantity structure (Standard 1/ II 1/ V 1/ I

day of supply/ supply class)

Location: - Transshipment Transshipment point 1 Transshipment point 2 Pickup supply

point (wheeled vehicles to pack animals) (end point pack animals) "backpack logistics"
-End point

Condition of tracks/hazard Paved tracks up to transshipment Foot trails/mule tracks from Terrain without tracks/deep snow
situation point 1 transshipment point 1 onward

Means of transport Wheeled vehicles/carry-to- Pack animals/carry-to-customer Carriers & pulkas/ pickup from
customer customer

Time schedule … … …

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A.3. Transportation Plan (reference example); Supply with helicopter(s)

No. Force(s) Cartesian Terrain Capacity Remarks Planned

to coordinates description time
support

1 Combat patrol UT 923 542 Ridge 1 Bell UH 1D Approach from DTG56

NE
Elevation Point
2600 m 1 Supply Rate /
Class of supply
V for 1 Platoon

2 … … … … … …

56 DTG = Date-Time-Group

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A.4. Windchill Chart

WIND
AIR TEMPERATURE
SPEED

0 km/h 10 °C 5 °C 0 °C −5 °C −10 °C −15 °C −20 °C −30 °C −40 °C −50 °C

5 km/h 9,8 4,1 −1,6 −7,3 −12,9 −18,6 −24,3 −35,6 −47,0 −58,3

10 km/h 8,6 2,7 −3,3 −9,3 −15,3 −21,2 −27,2 −39,2 −51,1 −63,0

15 km/h 7,9 1,7 −4,4 −10,6 −16,7 −22,9 −29,1 −41,4 −53.7 −66,1

20 km/h 7,4 1,1 −5,2 −11,6 −17,9 −24,2 −30,5 −43,1 −55,7 −68,3

25 km/h 6,9 0,5 −5,9 −12,3 −18,8 −25,2 −31,6 −44,5 −57,3 −70,2

30 km/h 6,6 0,1 −6,5 −13,0 −19,5 −26,0 −32,6 −45,6 −58,7 −71,7

40 km/h 6,0 −0,7 −7,4 −14,1 −20,8 −27,4 −34,1 −47,5 −60,9 −74,2

50 km/h 5,5 −1,3 −8,1 −15,0 −21,8 −28,6 −35,4 −49,0 −62,7 −76,3

60 km/h 5,1 −1,8 −8,8 −15,7 −22,6 −29,5 −36,5 −50,3 −64,2 −78,0

Temperatures in the blue boxes implicit the danger of frostbite in 30 minutes or less.
There is in general a risk of frostbite when the skin temperature reaches -4.8 °C, above
frostbite occurs for about 5% of people.

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A.5. Task Organization (reference example)

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A.6. Operations Overlay Defensive Operation (simplified reference example)

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A.7. Operations Overlay Defensive Operation (simplified reference as principle

example for phaseline-principle in delaying)

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A.8. UIAA Grade list

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A.9. Operations Overlay and shift plan for stabilizing activity “Secure and
Control” (simplified reference as principle)

Shift

Operating RES Operating

PATROL Technical NTM/45 Min
service/rest
& Rest
Operating RES Operating
PATROL Technical NTM/45Min
service/rest 45 Min

PATROL Operating Technical RES

service/rest NTM/45 Min
1 & Rest
CK Technical
Operating service/rest Operating
& Rest
2
CK RES
Operating Technical
NTM
service/rest
45 Min
& Rest
Technical RES
Operating NTM/45Min Operating
service/rest
& Rest Min
RES QUICK REACTION FORCE (QRF) NTM 15 Min

18. 19. 20. 21.

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ANNEX B Lexicon of terms and Definitions

R2F Highly mobile and deployable into remote, austere, or unsecure tactical
environments enabling forward projected resuscitative and surgical treatment to
control bleeding, maintain circulation, save life, restore perfusion, preserve limb
and function.
(AJP 4.10(C), NATOTerm, Bi-SC Capability Codes and Capability Statements
(2020)

FST Forward Surgical Team, Highly mobile and deployable into remote, austere, or
unsecure tactical environments enabling forward projected resuscitative and
surgical treatment to control bleeding, maintain circulation, save life, restore
perfusion, preserve limb and function.
(AJP4.10 ©)

MERT Medical Emergency Response Team, A medical team trained and equipped to
provide pre-hospital emergency medical care. Usually physician-led and
deployed with forward air evacuation assets but also capable of advanced field
and en-route care in other than direct combat.
(AJP-4.10(C), NATOTerm, AMedP-1.8, AMedP-1.7)

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ANNEX C List of Abbreviations

AAP Allied Administrative Publication

AD Air Defense
AJMedP Allied Joint Medical Publication
AMS Acute Mountain Sickness
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
AOR Area of Responsibility
ASM Airspace Management
ATCHD Attached
ATP Allied Tactical Publication
ATrainP Allied Training Publication
BAS Battalion Aid Station (no NATOTerm)
BP Battle Position
C2 Command & Control
CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (Edit in the text)
CCA Close-Combat Attack
CCP Casualty Collection Point
CIMITT Civil Military Transition Team
COA Course of Action
COM Commander (-in-chief)
CP Control Point (Checkpoint)
CPT Temporary Check Point
CS Combat Support
CSS Combat Service Support
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DTG Date-Time Group

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EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EOR Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
EMC Emergency Medical Care57
FASP Field Artillery Support Plan
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FOB Forward Operation Base
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
FST Forward Surgical Team
FWD Forward Command Post
HACE High Altitude Cerebral Edema
HAPE High Altitude Pulmonary Edema
HLS Helicopter Landing Site
HIDACZ High-density airspace control zone
HN Host Nation
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IT Information Technology
JFSG Joint Fire Support Group (Cell)58
JFS Joint Fire Support
JFST Joint Fire Support Team
JPR (Joint) Personnel Recovery
KIA Killed-in-Action casualty
LOC Lines of Communications
LoO Lines of Operations
LD Line of Departure
MDMP Military Decision - Making Process (NATO agreed)

57
EMC – Electromagnetic Compatibility (AAP-15)
58
Fire Support group futher divided to fire support units and fire support elements (AAP-6).

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MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

MERT Medical Emergency Response Team
(C)MILENG (Chief) Military Engeneering
MTF ROLE ROLE Medical Treatment Facility
MW In this publication used as Mountain Warfare
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NSO NATO Standardization Office
NTM Notice to Move
OE Operating Environment
OPLAN Operation Plan
OPORD Operation Order
PAA Position Area for Artillery
PL Phase Line
POE Point of Embarkation
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
QRF Quick Reaction Force
RIP Relief in Place
ROE Rules of Engagement
ROLE 2, ROLE 2, Forward
R2F
SATCOM Satellite Communication
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOF Special Operations Force
SSR Security Sector Reform
TAC; TAC Tactical Command Post
CO
TO Task Organization
TOF Time of Flight

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TOE Table of Organization and Equipment

TPT Tactical PSYOPS Team
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UIAA Union Internationale des Associations d'Alpinisme (The
International Climbing and Mountaineering Federation)
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicles
UNEP United Nation Environment Programme, World Conservation
WCMC Monitoring Centre

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ANNEX D References

1. C-M(2007)0118 THE NATO INFORMATION MANAGEMENT POLICY

2. C-M(2002)60 THE MANAGEMENT OF NON-CLASSIFIED NATO INFORMATION

3. AAP-28 (STANAG 2631) TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LAND FORCES

4. Bi-SC CAPABILITY CODES AND CAPABILITY STATEMENTS (2020).

5. Bi-STRATEGIC COMMAND DIRECTIVE 075-002, BI-SC EDUCATION AND TRAINING

(E&TD) 075-002 (Sept. 2016).

6. Bi- STRATEGIC COMMAND DIRECTIVE 075-003, BI-SC COLLECTIVE TRAINING AND

EXERCISE DIRECTIVE (CT&ED) 075-003, (Update Dec 2014).

7. MC 0458 NATO ETEE POLICY

8. NATOTERM DATABASE

9. RTO-TR-HFM –RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATION – TECHNICAL

REPORT – HUMAN FACTORS AND MEDICINE

10. STANAG 2190 (AJP 2) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE,COUNTER

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

11. STANAG 2437 (AJP 1) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE

12. STANAG 2490 (AJP 3) OPERATIONS

13. STANAG 2288 (AJP 3.2) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OOPERATIONS

14. STANAG 2605 (ATP 3.2.1) CONDUCT OF LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS

15. STANAG 2606 (ATP 3.2.1.1.) CONDUCT OF LAND TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

16. STANAG 6509 (ATP 3.2.1.2) CONDUCT OF LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN URBAN
ENVIRONMENT

17. STANAG 2999 (ATP 49) USE OF HELICOPTERS IN LAND OPERATIONS

18. STANAG 2394 (ATP 52 (b) LAND FORCE MILITARY ENGENEER DOCTRINE

19. STANAG 2484 (AArtyP-5) NATO FIRE SUPPORTDOCTRINE

20. STANAG 2248 AAP 39 HANDBOOK OF LAND OPERATIONS TERMINOLOGY

21. STANAG 6525 (ATrainP-6) MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING AND EDUCATION

(2020)

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22. STANAG 2199 (ATP 3.2.2.) COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIED LAND FORCES

23. STANAG 2490 (AJP 3) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF
OPERATIONS, 2019.

24. STANAG 2285 (ATP 3.9.2) ALLIED TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR LAND TARGETING,
2018.

25. STANAG 2526 (AJP-5) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR OPERATIONAL-LEVEL

PLANNING, 2019.

26. STANREC 4739 (ARAMP-1) NATO RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE FOR ACQUISITION
PROGRAMMES, 2013.

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