The Constitutional Commissions
The Constitutional Commissions
Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can
for purpose of calling to court’s or administrative board’s claim a majority in the En Banc Resolution of November
attention any error, omission, or oversight in first 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more than a record of
consideration. A retrial of issues presumes notice to voters, lacking in legal effect despite its pronouncement
parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be of reversal of the First Division Resolution. According, the
heard." (italics supplied). But as held in Samalio v. Court Comelec did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
of Appeals, ordering a rehearing.23 (italics supplied; citation omitted)
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all In the present case, it appears from the records that the
instances essential.1âwphi1 The requirements are Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and of the case in view of the filing in the interim of the
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the cases
controversy at hand. of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the
cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find
additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and that a remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec
amplifying their arguments; whereas, a re-consultation en banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of
involves a re-evaluation of the issues and arguments Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
already on hand only by the members of the tribunal,
without the participation of the parties. SECTION 7
3. CUA VS. COMELEC
In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Facts:
Banc on therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration In SPC No. 87-454 and SPC No. 87-467, the First
was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an Division of the COMELEC rendered a 2-1 decision on
August 10, 1987, favoring the herein petitioner Cua but dismissed, also for the same reason, resulting in the
nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in decision being regarded as affirmed in accordance with
the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack Rule 56, Section 11 of the Rules of Court applied
of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in suppletorily, reading as follows:
COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2, 1984.
Pursuant to said rules, private respondent Puzon filed on SEC. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. —
August 14, 1987 a "motion for reconsideration/appeal" of Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where on the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
October 28, 1987, three members voted to sustain the reheard, and if on re-hearing no decision is reached, the
First Division, with two dissenting and one abstaining action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
(one member having died earlier). On the strength of this court; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters,
canvassers, which reconvened on November 9, 1987, the petition or motion shall be denied.
and granted his motion. Cua took his oath the same day,
but the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an For their part, the respondents insist that no decision was
urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation or to annul reached by the First Division on August 10, 1987,
or suspend its effect if already made. On November 11, because the required unanimous vote was not obtained
1987, the COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three and there was therefore nothing to be affirmed on appeal
days later it issued a restraining telegram enjoining Cua by the COMELEC en banc and nothing to reconsider
from assuming the office of member of the House of either. Additionally, they argue that in any case no valid
Representatives. The petitioner then came to this Court to decision was reached by the COMELEC en banc
enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and because only three votes were cast in favor of the
enforcing its restraining order. petitioner and these did not constitute a majority of the
body.
Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 reads as Issue: whether or not the 2-1 Decision reached by the
follows: First Division of COMELEC is valid under Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution despite Section 5 of
SEC. 5. Quorum: votes required; substitution. — Two COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 which reads as follows:
members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
the official business of the Division. A case being heard by it shall be decided with the
unanimous concurrence of all three Commissioners and
A case being heard by it shall be decided with the its decision shall be considered a decision of the
unanimous concurrence of all three Commissioners and Commission. If this required number is not obtained, as
its decision shall be considered a decision of the when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be
Commission. If this required number is not obtained, as appealed to the Commission en banc, in which case the
when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the
appealed to the Commission en banc, in which case the Commission. ...
vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the
Commission. ... Held: Yes. The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division
was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
The position of the petitioner is that the 2-1 decision of Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted
the First Division was a valid decision of the COMELEC to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five
itself despite the above rule because of Article IX-A. members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and
Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each their decision is also valid under the aforecited
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua
members any case or matter brought before it." He on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid
argues that this applies to the votings of the COMELEC act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House
both in division and en banc and that the private of Representatives.
respondent himself recognized this when he filed the
motion for reconsideration/appeal with the COMELEC en 4. ACENA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
banc.
Facts:
Cua also contends that Puzon's move, treated as a Raymundo Acena was appointed as Administrative
motion for reconsideration, is deemed denied for lack of Officer at Rizal Technological Colleges (RTC) on October
the necessary majority to overturn the challenged 18, 1982.
decision. As an appeal, it should be considered
His appointment was later approved as permanent by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409 dated June 8,
Acena received a promotional appointment to Associate 1978, provides that:
Professor effective November 1, 1985, and was
designated as Acting Administrative Officer on October Sec. 8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission.
30, 1985. –– Decision of the Board involving the removal of officers
Following a leadership change, Dr. Josefina Estolas and employees from the service shall be subject to
revoked Acena’s designation as Acting Administrative automatic review by the Commission. The Commission
Officer on April 8, 1986. shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other
Acena contested the revocation, claiming it violated his decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the
security of tenure, and filed a complaint for injunction and Commission shall be subject to review only by the Courts.
damages against Estolas and her successor, Ricardo
Salvador. Implementing the above provisions, Section 7 of CSC
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) initially Resolution No. 81-1329 dated November 23, 1981
dismissed Acena's complaint but later reversed its likewise provides that:
decision on March 23, 1988, recognizing him as the
legitimate Administrative Officer. Sec. 7. Cases appealable to the Commission. Decision of
On October 9, 1989, the CSC issued Resolution No. the merits Systems Board on contested appointments
89748, nullifying the MSPB's order and upholding and other non-disciplinary cases are appealable to the
Estolas's revocation. Commission by the party adversely affected within fifteen
Acena received the CSC resolution on October 24, 1989, (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis
and filed a petition for review on certiorari on November supplied).
15, 1989.
Based on the above provisions of law, the decision of the
ISSUE: The jurisdictional issue for resolution is whether MSPB is appealable to the Civil Service Commission
or not the public respondent Civil Service Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy thereof.
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave Perfection of the appeal within the prescribed period is
abuse of discretion when it set aside the order dated jurisdictional so that the failure to perfect an appeal within
March 23, 1988 of the MSPB. the reglementary period has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory (De Los Santos v. NLRC,
RULING: G.R. No. 83927, June 28, 1989; Andaya et al. v. NLRC,
It is a settled rule, that a respondent tribunal, board or G.R. Nos. 73726-28, August 2, 1990). Moreover, the right
officer exercising judicial functions acts without to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to
jurisdiction if he does not have the authority conferred by avail himself of the same must comply with the
law to hear and decide the case (Banco Espanol Filipino requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to
v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 [1918]). There is excess of appeal is lost (Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
jurisdiction where the respondent has the legal power to 83281, December 4, 1989).
decide the case but oversteps his authority (Rocha & Co.
vs. Crossfield, 6 Phil. 355 [1906]; Blanco v. Ambler 3 Phil. Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service Commission
358 [1904]). And there is grave abuse of discretion where has the jurisdiction to review the decision of the
the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary MSPB.1âwphi1 However, said authority to review can
or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment only be exercised if the party adversely affected by the
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. (Alafriz v. Noble, 72 Phil. decision of the MSPB has filed an appeal with the
728 [1941]; People v. Vallarta, 77 SCRA 476; F.S. Commission within the reglementary period.
Divinagracia Agno Commercial, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
104 SCRA 180; Young v. Sulit, 162 SCRA 639; Filinvest Here, it is admitted by public respondent Commission and
Credit Corporation v. IAC, 166 SCRA 155; Carson et al. v. not disputed by private respondent Estolas that the
Judge Pantanosa, Jr., G.R. No. 75934, December 15, petition for review which can be considered as an appeal
1989). from the decision of the MSPB dated March 23, 1988 was
filed outside the reglementary period. This being so, the
In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact by no less than public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction when it
the public respondent Civil Service Commission that entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with the
private respondent Estolas' petition for review filed on Office of the President. Having exceeded its jurisdiction
June 16, 1988, with the Office of the President was filed public respondent committed a reversible error when it
out of time and with the wrong forum (pp. 7-11, Comment, set aside the order dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB
dated February 20, 1990, Civil Service Commission). which had long become final and executory. Final
decision or orders of the MSPB is an adjudication on the " ** (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of
merits conclusive on the parties, hence, it can no longer appellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical
be subject to review (San Luis, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal.
et al., G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989).
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever
While it is true that under exceptional circumstances, submitted nor appeal therefrom essayed to the Supreme
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by
grounds of substantial justice and equity, the delay must, the Constitution.[3] Consequently, the resolution
however, be excusable and the appeal must be became... final, on September 21, 1988.
impressed with merit. (Legasto v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 76834-60, April 25, 1989). De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital--
Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of the National
In the instant case, private respondent Estolas has not Children's Hospital,[4] demanding implementation of the
even bothered to offer an explanation why she incurred Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred "de la
delay and why she filed a petition for review with the Fuente's... claims to the Department of Health Assistant
Office of the President. Such being the case, the public Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or
respondent Civil Service Commission cannot legally action * * (She did this allegedly because, according to
invoke and justify the assumption of jurisdiction on the Solicitor General, she was) unaware when and how a
grounds of equity and substantial justice. CSC Resolution becomes final and executory, whether
such
5. VITAL-GOZON V CA
Facts: Resolution had in fact become final and executory and
whether the DOH Legal Department would officially assail
In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive the mentioned Resolution."[5] But she did not answer Dr.
Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by President de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him of the
Corazon C. Aquino -- reorganization of the various offices referral... thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose
of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices simply to await "legal guidance from the DOH Legal
were abolished, transfers of personnel effected. Department." On the other hand, no one in the DOH
Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente,
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise
Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children's compliance, with the final... and executory Resolution of
Hospital, having been appointed to that position on the Civil Service Commission. In fact, de la Fuente claims
December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post that Vital-Gozon had "actually threatened to stop paying
of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was... ** (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he has
promoted in 1977 after serving as Medicial Specialist I of as yet no 'approved' appointment even as 'Medical
the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971). Specialist II'
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28,
from the Department of Health that he would be re- 1988 an action of "mandamus and damages with
appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to be a preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the
demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the
of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution...
of the Civil Service Commission.
DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was
ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer.
Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. It also issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for,
In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining and required the respondents to show cause why it
to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and should not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction.
were... allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, The record shows that the respondents prayed for... and
Jr. were granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their
answer "through counsel, who," as the Court of Appeals
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service was later to point out,[8] "did not bother to indicate his
Commission in a Resolution dated August 9, 1988. In that address, thus notice was sent to him through the...
Resolution, the Commission made the following individual respondents. * * (However, no) answer was
conclusion and disposition, to wit: filed; neither was there any show cause (sic) against a
writ of preliminary injunction." It was a certain Atty. Jose vehicle nor is the Court the forum for ** (said) claim of
Fabia who appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf damages."
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the
same Court a "Supplemental/Amended Petition" dated judgment, by motion filed through new counsel, Atty.
February 2, 1989. The second petition described as one Ceferino Gaddi.[14] He insisted that the Appellate Court
for "quo warranto" aside from "mandamus," added three had competence to award damages in a mandamus
respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and... action. He... argued that while such a claim for damages
alleged inter alia that he (de la Fuente) had "clear title" to might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in
the position in question in virtue of the final and executory the Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P. Blg.
judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after 129 because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue
the Commission's judgment had become final and such writs only 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the...
executory and been communicated to situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which
three levels of courts -- the Supreme Court, the Regional
Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed "Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as 'OIC Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferred
Professional Service' to further usurp, intrude into and concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the
unlawfully hold and exercise the public office/position of Court of Appeals was given power to conduct... hearings
petitioner (under a duly approved permanent appointment and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require
as 'Chief of Clinics' since 1978). him to separately litigate the matter of damages, he
continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is
Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the abhorred by the law.
respondents. Again, none was filed. The petitions were
consequently "resolved on the basis of their allegations More than a month later, or more precisely on September
and the annexes." The Appellate Court promulgated its 27 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated another
judgment on June 9, 1989.[11] It held that -- Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion for
reconsideration of June 29, 1989.[22] It modified the
"The question of whether petitioner may be divested of Decision... of June 9, 1989 by (a) deleting its last
his position as Chief of Clinics by the expedient of having paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b)
him appointed to another, lower position is no longer an consequently describing and treating it as a "PARTIAL
issue. It ceased to be such when the resolution in CSC DECISION," and (c) scheduling "further proceedings for
Case No. 4 became final. The said... resolution is explicit the purpose of receiving evidence (of damages)," since
in its mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de said question
jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical Professional
Staff) of the National Children's Hospital, and by this "cannot be resolved by mere reference to the
token, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally pleadings."[23] This was done in reliance on Section 3,
entitled to the... office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la Fuente,
Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the which reads as follows:[24]
matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was ill-
advised of principal respondent, and violative of the rule "SEC. 3. Mandamus. -- When any tribunal, corporation,
of law, that the resolution has not been obeyed or... board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
implemented.",... and accordingly ordered an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
" * * respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, * * excludes another from the use and... enjoyment of a right
to forthwith comply with, obey and implement the or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and) * * Dr. Jose D. other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, * * to course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
immediately cease and desist from further... performing verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
and acting as OIC Professional Service." certainty and praying that... judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages -- founded specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect
essentially on the refusal of Gozon, et al. to obey the final the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different of the... defendant."
forum -- was denied by the Court of Appeals on the...
ground that the "petitions (for mandamus) are not the In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the
Court of Appeals -- and obtain "the ultimate and corollary
relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuente's claim for
damages" -- the Solicitor General's Office has instituted The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said
the special civil action of certiorari... at bar. It contends Section 9 for an explicit and specific statement regarding
that the Court of Appeals is not legally competent to take "actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding
cognizance of and decide the question of damages in a none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been
mandamus suit. It argues that - granted competence to assume cognizance of... claims
for such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section
B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of
of Appeals to hear, as a trial court, claims for moral and Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference
exemplary damages; whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages,"
and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all;... yet
assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and
over the claims for damages, it lost the power to take decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of
cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9, 1989 damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of
had, by its own pronouncement, become final and cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The
executory; a Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is... a
mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of
The Solicitor General's Office argues that since mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it
jurisdiction is conferred only by law, not by agreement implies that a claim for damages arising from the
of... the parties, or acquiescence of the court, and since omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus
the law conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, suit may be litigated separately from the... latter, the
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, makes no reference to "actions matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the
for moral and exemplary damages, as those claimed by ** cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the
(de la Fuente)," it follows that the Court of Appeals... has case.
no competence to act on said claim of damages. And
Section 3 of Rule 65, which authorizes the petitioner in a Now, at the time of the enactment of B.P. 129, the
mandamus suit to pray for judgment commanding the issuance of the extraordinary writs above mentioned was
defendant inter alia "to pay the damages sustained by the controlled by the Rules of Court of 1964, as they continue
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of... the to date to be so controlled. More particularly, the principal
defendant," is "nothing more than a procedural rule writs of mandamus, prohibition and... certiorari were (and
allowing joinder of causes of action, i.e., mandamus and continue to be) governed by Rule 65; the writ of habeas
damages," and such an award of damages is allowable corpus, by Rule 102; and the writ of quo warranto, by
only in actions commenced in Regional Trial Courts but Rule 66. The so-called auxiliary writs were (and continue
not in the Court of Appeals or this Court. to be) also governed by the same code -- e.g.,
preliminary... attachment, by Rule 57; preliminary
Issues: injunction, by Rule 58, receivership, by Rule 59; writ of
seizure or delivery in a replevin suit, by Rule 60.
whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special At that time, Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it
civil action of mandamus. continues to authorize to date) rendition of judgment in a
mandamus action "commanding the defendant,
Ruling: immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the...
The argument is specious. It cannot be sustained. petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section defendant."[39] The provision makes plain that the
9, B.P. 129 as the legal provision specifying the original damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's
and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The wrongful act... in failing and refusing to do the act
section pertinently declares that the "Intermediate required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of
Appellate Court (now the Court... of Appeals) shall 1940 had an identical counterpart provision.[40]
exercise . . ," among others:
Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized, as it
" ** Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, continues to authorize to date, the filing of the petition "in
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the acts or
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid... of omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board,
its appellate jurisdiction ** ."[38] officer or person, in a Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) having jurisdiction Facts:
thereof," as well as "in the Court of Appeals (whether or The case involves "Filipinas Engineering and Machine
not)[41] in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Shop v. Ferrer."
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop (Filipinas) filed a
Worthy of note, too, is that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court lawsuit against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
similarly authorizes the recovery of damages in a quo and Acme Steel Manufacturing Company (Acme).
warranto action against a corporate officer -- an action The dispute arose from a COMELEC invitation to bid on
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals -- September 16, 1969, for the manufacture and delivery of
as follows:[42] 11,000 voting booths.
Filipinas and Acme were among the seventeen bidders.
"SEC. 14. Liability of officer neglecting to deliver property Filipinas submitted bids priced at P128.00 and P123.00
of corporation to receiver. -- An officer of such corporation per unit, while Acme's bid was P78.00 per unit.
who refuses or neglects, upon demand, to deliver over to The COMELEC Bidding Committee initially recommended
the receiver all money, property, books, deeds, notes, Filipinas for the contract.
bills, obligations, and... papers of every description within After an ocular inspection, COMELEC awarded the
his power or control, belonging to the corporation, or in contract to Acme on October 9, 1969, subject to certain
any wise necessary for the settlement of its affairs, or the conditions.
discharge of its debts and liabilities, may be punished for Filipinas filed an injunction suit with the Court of First
contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court, Instance of Manila on October 16, 1969.
and... shall be liable to the receiver for the value of all The suit was dismissed by the respondent Judge on
money or other things so refused or neglected to be November 15, 1969.
surrendered, together with all damages that may have Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied, leading
been sustained by the stockholders and creditors of the to an appeal to the Supreme Court.
corporation, or any of them, in consequence of such
neglect or... refusal." ISSUE:
An award of damages was and is also allowed in RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court
connection with the auxiliary writ of preliminary has jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the
attachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which COMELEC's award of contracts, as these are purely
the Court of Appeals has the power to issue in common administrative and civil in nature.
with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial The Supreme Court explained that the COMELEC's
resolution awarding the contract to Acme was not a "final
Courts,[43] payable by the sureties of the bond given in order" rendered in a legal controversy before it, but rather
support of the writ, upon seasonable application and an administrative action.
summary hearing.[44] Therefore, it was not reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court.
Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and The Court emphasized that the COMELEC's powers
incorporating in BP 129, the provision governing the include both adjudicatory and administrative functions,
jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court and the resolution in question fell under the latter.
of Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant
of the relevant provisions of the Rules of 7. MATEO V. CA
Facts:
Court just cited, as well as the rule against multiplicity of Petitioners: Aniceto G. Mateo, Maximo San Diego,
actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court of Quirino Mateo, Daniel Francisco, and Leonila Kuizon,
Appeals original jurisdiction over the special civil action of Board Members of the Morong Water District (MOWAD).
mandamus, among others, as well as over the issuance Respondent: Edgar Sta. Maria, General Manager of
of auxiliary writs or processes, the MOWAD.
Incident: On December 13, 1992, following complaints
Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that said Court from some employees, the petitioners investigated Sta.
should exercise all the powers then possessed by it under Maria and placed him under preventive suspension.
the Rules of Court in relation to said action of mandamus Acting General Manager: Maximo San Diego was
and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages designated as Acting General Manager.
to the petitioner in the action in... appropriate cases. Dismissal: On January 7, 1993, Sta. Maria was dismissed
from his position.
6. FILIPINAS ENGR AND MACHINE SHOP V. FERRER
Legal Action: Sta. Maria filed a Special Civil Action for MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction PHILIPPINES.
on January 18, 1993, challenging his dismissal.
Claims: Sta. Maria alleged violations of his security of SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of
tenure, procedural due process, and unlawful usurpation Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of
of his position by San Diego. Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.
Petitioners' Argument: The petitioners moved to dismiss
the case, claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction, which 1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from
lies with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and that judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
quo warranto was not the proper remedy. from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
RTC Decision: The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
the subsequent motion for reconsideration. its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Appeal: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
65 to the Court of Appeals. Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land
Court of Appeals Decision: The petition was dismissed for Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office
lack of merit, and the motion for reconsideration was of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
denied. Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
ISSUE: National Telecommunications Commission, Department
of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Court of Rizal does not have jurisdiction over the case Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
involving the dismissa.. Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission,
Quasi-Public Corporation: MOWAD is a quasi-public Board of Investments, and Construction Industry
corporation created under Presidential Decree No. 198 Arbitration Commission.
(Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973).
Jurisdiction: Employees of government-owned or 2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not
controlled corporations with an original charter fall under apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Code of the Philippines.
Relevant Case Law: The Court referenced Davao City
Water District v. Civil Service Commission, which 3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules
confirmed CSC's jurisdiction over such employees. may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period
Legal Framework: The Civil Service Law and its Rules and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
and Regulations govern the hiring and firing of employees involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
in these entities. fact and law.
Appeal Process: Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive
Order No. 292, and Rule II, Section 1 of Memorandum 4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken
Circular No. 44 (1990) allow an aggrieved party to appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
to the CSC within fifteen days of a termination decision. judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its
Further References: The Court also mentioned Mancita v. last publication, if publication is required by law for its
Barcinas, which stated that CSC decisions are effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new
unappealable and only subject to certiorari by the trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the
Supreme Court. governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1)
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper
SC REVISED ADMIN CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket
fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
16, 1995 (15) days only within which to file the petition for review.
No further extension shall be granted except for the most
(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91) compelling reason and in no case to exceed another
period of fifteen (15) days.
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT 5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by
CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of
a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or
agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such
for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
petitioner.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay such other pleadings or documents as may be required or
to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of
and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the
costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima
lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed
the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or
grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the modification of the award, judgment, final order or
motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course
lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The
from notice of the denial. findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for the Court of Appeals.
review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the
case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as 11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15)
petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise days from notice that the petition has been given due
statement of the facts and issues involved and the course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or
grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible
by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed under review. The record to be transmitted may be
from, together with certified true copies of such material abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding.
portions of the record as are referred to therein and other The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent
supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material correction of or addition to the record.
dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary
period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn 12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay
certification against forum shopping as required in the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
Revised Circular No. 28-91. reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to 13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is
comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for oral argument or require the parties to submit
for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from
of and the documents which should accompany the notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision
petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum
thereof. required by these rules or by the Court itself.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals 14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for
may require the respondent to file a comment on the certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and The
petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending
notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this
finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein petitions for review hereunder and shall be transferred to
are too unsubstantial to require consideration. the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions
for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995
filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and
copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same
copies of such material portions of the record referred to purpose.
therein together with other supporting papers. It shall
point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal
statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by
the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or
referred to it shall be considered as the date of the filing
thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals
may require the filing of amended or supplemental
pleadings and the submission of such further documents
or records as it may deem necessary in view of and
consequent to the change in the mode of appellate
review.