Arctic Policies and

Strategies — Analysis,
Synthesis, and Trends
Lassi Heininen, Karen Everett, Barbora Padrtova, Anni Reissell
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
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Arctic Policies and Strategies —
Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends
by Lassi Heininen, Karen Everett, Barbora Padrtova, and Anni Reissell
Preface
In recent years the world has been awakening to the realities of the Arctic region. The Arctic is facing challenges which, unless prop-
erly mitigated, will have an impact on the entire globe. The realities in the Arctic are changing, and changing fast. Governments and
other actors must keep up with this pace.

It is our responsibility to take action to curb the negative developments in the region and take advantage of the new opportunities.

Many governments, both in the Arctic and beyond, have recently adopted Arctic strategies or updated existing ones. Many more
will develop strategies in the near future. This is also the case in Finland which in fall 2019 will begin work on elaborating a new
Arctic strategy.

The wheel does not need to be reinvented anywhere, but it is useful to know what makes all the wheels turn. For that, this study
will provide a useful contribution.

I am confident that this publication will become a topical and useful reference book for all those involved in the drafting of Arctic
strategies. I am very pleased that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has been in a position to financially contribute to the
publication of this study.

Helsinki 23 September 2019

Petteri Vuorimäki

Ambassador for Arctic and Antarctic Affairs

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Finland

i
ii
Arctic Policies and Strategies —
Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends
by Lassi Heininen, Karen Everett, Barbora Padrtova, and Anni Reissell

Abstract
The scientific report Arctic Policies and Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis and Trends delivers a holistic analysis of the policies, strat-
egies, and declarations of the relevant Arctic stakeholders. It also includes new and/or emerging trends of Arctic governance and
geopolitics in the early 21st century. The analysis, using quantitative and qualitative methods, is based on a coding of the text of
56 policy documents (in 1996-2019), namely: i) the strategies and policies of the Arctic States and the Arctic Council Observer
States; ii) the policies and declarations of the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants); and iii) the main
Arctic Council chairmanship programs and ministerial declarations. It considers how different Arctic actors define and address
issues around the following: the human dimension, governance, international cooperation, environmental protection, pollution,
climate change, security, safety, economy, tourism, infrastructure, and science & education. Each document was read and analyzed
thoroughly; quotes were selected and coded and then used to compare and contrast (percentage-wise) how the different documents
address the above issues. For each category of stakeholder, the findings are compared within the category and then discussed with
each other category-wise. Our study shows that the most-coded quotes of the Arctic States’ policy documents relate to the Gov-
ernance, Economy, International Cooperation, and Human Dimension indicators, as well as to a new Environmental Protection
indicator (composed of Environmental Protection coupled with Pollution and Climate Change). The policy documents of the four
Indigenous peoples’ organizations explicitly address issues surrounding Indigenous rights, although in different contexts, and also
those related to the Governance indicator, both broadly and in detail. Unsurprisingly, all these documents emphasize the impor-
tance of ‘Traditional knowledge.’ The most-quoted indicator in the Arctic policies/strategies of the nine Arctic Council Observer
states is the Science and Education indicator, followed by the International Cooperation and Economy indicators. The fourth
most-quoted is the new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental Protection coupled with Pollution and
Climate Change).

The analyses generated a separate list of new/emerging trends for each stakeholder, summarizing the current main themes and
concluding trends. Based on these, there here follows a short list of the overall new and/or emerging trends of the future of Arctic
governance and geopolitics: i) Ambivalence of Arctic development, including ‘political inability,’ whenever a balance is sought be-
tween environmental protection and economic activities; ii) The domination of States within the Arctic territory due to geopolitical
stability and sovereignty vis-à-vis internationalization/globalization, and due to international treaties and self-determination; iii)
Focus on science, with all Arctic stakeholders being dependent on scientific research and international cooperation in science for
problem-solving due to climate change; and iv) Close interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g., digital security, satellites,
meteorology) due to globalization and rapidly advancing climate change in the Arctic.

iii
About the Authors
Dr. Lassi Heininen is Research Director at the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) at the University
of Helsinki, and Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland. Among his other academic
positions are Editor of the Arctic Yearbook, Head of the UArctic Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security, member of the
Advisory Board of the Arctic Circle, and chair of its Global Arctic Mission Council. Dr. Heininen’s research fields include Interna-
tional Relations, Geopolitics, Security Studies, Environmental Politics, and Arctic Studies. He lectures regularly abroad, supervises
MA students and PhD candidates, and actively publishes in international academic publications. His recent scientific publications
include Climate Change and Arctic Security. Searching for a Paradigm Shift (co-edited, Palgrave Macmillan 2019); The Global Arc-
tic Handbook (co-edited, Springer 2018); The Arctic, Baltic and North-Atlantic ‘cooperative regions’ in ‘Wider Northern Europe’,
Journal of Baltic Studies, 48-4/2017.

Dr. Karen Everett is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Canada Research Chair on Comparative Aboriginal Condition at Université
Laval (Québec City, Canada). Prior to this, she was a Research Scholar with the Arctic Futures Initiative at the International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria) (2018–2019). During her time with the Arctic Futures Initiative, Dr.
Everett worked as part of a team that analyzed and synthesized key Arctic strategies, policies, and other governance documents to
better understand regional trends. She completed her PhD at the Frost Centre for Canadian Studies and Indigenous Studies at Trent
University, Ontario, where she studied border management in the Canadian North. She is also a Fellow of the Polar Research and
Policy Initiative (PRPI) and a member of the UArctic Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security. Her research interests include
Arctic governance, security, and economy.

Dr. Barbora Padrtova is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Faculty
of Social Studies at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. In 2018–2019, she also worked as a Research Scholar affiliated
with the Arctic Futures Initiative at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), based in Laxenburg, Austria.
At IIASA, Dr. Padrtova, together with the research team, focused on a comparative study, analysis, and synthesis of Arctic states’
national policies and strategies regarding the Arctic, as well as key documents of the Arctic Council. Previously, she led a research
group at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. Dr. Padrtova regularly cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Czech Republic. She is a Czech delegate to the Social & Human Working Group of the International Arctic Science Committee
(IASC). Her research interests focus on geopolitics and security in the Arctic region, securitization theory, US–Russia relations,
and NATO–Russia relations.

Dr. Anni Reissell is Research Coordinator at the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) of the University of
Helsinki, Finland. She was a Guest Research Scholar at IIASA with the Arctic Futures Initiative (AFI). Dr. Reissell holds a PhD in
chemistry: her thesis was on ambient air and chamber studies on biogenic volatile organic compounds linking emissions, chem-
istry, meteorology and topography in the Los Angeles Basin area. Previous positions include research chemist with the Finnish
Meteorological Institute and the Air Pollution Research Center, University of California, Riverside, and Executive Director of the
Integrated Land Ecosystem–Atmosphere Processes Study (iLEAPS). Dr. Reissell has over 20 years’ experience in global change
research, international global change research programs and policies. During her career, she has brought together scientific com-
munities to work on new lines of thinking, across disciplinary and community boundaries. Her recent interests include integrative
and participatory approaches among natural and social sciences, as well as humanities.

iv
Acknowledgments
This report has been produced as part of the Analysis, Synthesis and Trends of Arctic Policies and Strategies project conducted at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) under the auspices of the Exploratory and Special Project Arctic
Futures Initiative (AFI), co-funded by IIASA and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland.

IIASA is an independent, international research institute jointly funded by 23 National Member Organizations in Africa, the
Americas, Asia, and Europe, focusing on the systems approach to solving complex interconnected problems. The MFA promotes
the security and welfare of Finland and the Finns, and works for a secure and fair world, focusing on foreign and security policy,
trade and development policy, and significant foreign policy issues and international relations in general.

The authors would like to thank a number of people who contributed to the success of this project. Ambassador Aleksi Härkö-
nen, Ambassador Petteri Vuorimäki, and Senior researcher Ossi Piironen at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland for their
support and valuable assistance, as well as Dr. Jan Marco Müller (IIASA), who kindly took care that this study and report was
finalized successfully.

The authors are grateful for the time and effort of Dr. Anastasia Emelyanova and Mr. Sergey Sizov (IIASA) in assisting on obtaining
study documents and assisting with coding data, respectively.

Dr. Daniel R. Strebe kindly provided the Peirce Quincincial map projections used as such in the report cover and as edited version in
the Introduction. The map projection with the North Pole at the center was originally developed by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1879.

We warmly thank Adam Islaam (IIASA) for the cover design, Fanny Arnold for the figures and layout, and Kathryn Platzer for the
text editing.

v
Table of Contents

Preface i
Abstract iii
About the Authors iv
Acknowledgements v
Acronyms 10
List of Figures and Tables 12
Executive Summary 14

Introduction and Methods 17

Overview Of Arctic Governance And Geopolitics 18
Earlier Studies And The Aim Of This Study 22
The Documents 22
The Procedure 24
The Indicators 25
Coding and Analysis 27
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States 29
Canada 29
Finland 41
Iceland 54
The Kingdom of Denmark 60
Norway 72
Russian Federation 89
Sweden 92
United States of America 99
Comparing the Current Strategies 108

Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations 123

Chairmanship Programs 123
Programs vis-à-vis Arctic States’ Strategies 137
Declarations 145

Part III: Permanent Participants’ Documents 163

Arctic Athabaskan Council 164
Gwich’in Council International 168
Inuit Circumpolar Council 169
Saami Council 183
Comparing and Discussing the Documents 188
 Table of Contents

Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States 193

France 194
Germany 201
Italy 206
Japan 210
The Netherlands 213
People’s Republic of China 219
Republic of Korea 224
Spain 227
United Kingdom 232
Comparing and Discussing the Strategies 241

Conclusions: Synthesis and Trends 249

Summary of Priorities of Arctic Policies/Strategies 250
New/Emerging Trends of Arctic States 251
New/Emerging Trends of AC Chairmanship Programs and Declarations 251
New/Emerging Trends of Permanent Participants 252
New/Emerging Trends of Observer States 253
New/Emerging Overall Trends 253

Bibliography 254
Appendix 263
Acronyms
AAC Arctic Athabaskan Council EU European Union
AC Arctic Council FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
ACS Arctic Council Secretariat FFO Federal Foreign Office
ACAP Arctic Contaminants Action Program FC Finnish Chairmanship
ACIA Arctic Climate Impact Assessment FIN Finland
AEC Arctic Economic Council FRA France
AEPS Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy G8 Group of 8
AHDR Arctic Human Development Report G20 Group of 20
AIA Aleut International Association GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
AIS Automatic Identification System GDP Gross Domestic Product
AIV Advisory Council on International Affairs GER Germany
AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme GCI Gwich’in Council International
AMSA Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment GLONASS GLObal NAvigation Satellite System
ARHC Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission GOS Government Offices of Sweden
ASSW Arctic Science Summit Week HABITAT III
AWI Alfred Wegener Institute United Nations Conference on Housing and
AWPPA Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act Sustainable Urban Development
BAS British Antarctic Survey HFC Hydrofluorocarbons
BASREC Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation HFO Heavy Fuel Oil
BEAC Barents European-Arctic Council HNS Hazardous and Noxious Substances
BMP Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum IASSA International Arctic Social Sciences Association
(Greenland, called Mineral Licence and Safety IASC International Arctic Science Committee
Authority since 2013) IBA Impact Benefit Agreement
BRI Belt and Road Initiative ICC Inuit Circumpolar Council
BSTF Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Sea Region ICESCR International Covenants of 1966 on Economic,
CAC U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council Social and Cultural Rights
CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (Arctic ICT Information and Communication Technology
Council working group) IGO Intergovernmental Organization
CAN Canada IHO International Hydrographic Organization
CC Canadian Chairmanship IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
CFS Canadian Forces Station ILO International Labour Organization
CHARS Canadian High Arctic Research Station IMO International Maritime Organization
CITES Convention on the International Trade of INAC Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (now
Endangered Species divided into Crown-Indigenous Relations and
CIWN Circumpolar Inuit Wildlife Network Northern Affairs Canada, and Indigenous Services
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Canada)
CNARC China–Nordic Arctic Research Center INALCO National Institute of Oriental Languages and
CNR National Research Centre Civilizations
COP Conference of the Parties INGV National Institute for Geophysics and Volcanology
DCAC Danish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council IPCAP Indigenous Peoples Contaminant Action Program
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International IPCC Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change
Trade (Canada, now called Global Affairs Canada) IPEV Paul-Emile Victor Polar Institute
DNK The Kingdom of Denmark IPO Indigenous Peoples Organization
EBM Ecosystem Based Management IPY International Polar Year
EEA European Economic Area ISL Iceland
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
EFTA European Free Trade Association ITA Italy
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment IWC International Whaling Commission
EIB European Investment Bank JOGMEC Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation
EPB European Polar Board JPN Japan
EMEC European Marine Energy Centre KMA Korea Meteorological Administration
ENEA National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and KMI Korea Maritime Institute
Sustainable Development KOFA Korea Overseas Fisheries Association
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response KOPRI Korea Polar Research Institute
ESP Spain LNG Liquefied natural gas

10
 Acronyms

LTRAP (UN Convention on) Long-range Transboundary ROK Republic of Korea

Air Pollution RUS Russian Federation
LRIT Long Range Identification and Tracking SAO Senior Arctic Official
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of SAON Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks
Pollution from Ships SAR Search and Rescue
MEPC Marine Environment Protection Committee SARiNOR Search and Rescue in the High North
MFA Ministry of/for Foreign Affairs SC Saami Council
MFAIC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
Cooperation SDI Spatial Data Infrastructure
MOE Ministry of Environment SDWG Sustainable Development Working Group
MOF Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries SINED Strategic Investments in Northern Economic
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development
MOLIT Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport SLCF Short Lived Climate Forcers
MOTIE Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
MoU Memorandum of Understanding SPC Sámi Parliamentary Council
MSIP Ministry of Science STCW International Convention on Standards of Training,
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
NAMMCO North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission SWE Sweden
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization SWIPA Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost
ND Northern Dimension TAC Total Allowable Catch
NCM Nordic Council of Ministers TRG The Russian Government
NDPHS Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health TWH The White House
and Social Well-being UN United Nations
NEAFC North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission UNCBD/CBD
NGO Non-governmental Organization United Nations Convention on Biodiversity
NLD The Netherlands UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and
NERC Natural Environment Research Council Development
NFRDI National Fisheries Research and Development UNCLOS United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
Institute UNDP United Nations Development Programme
NMMT National Master Plan for Maritime Technologies UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
NOR Norway Indigenous Peoples
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
NORDREG Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Regulations Cultural Organization
NPP Netherlands Polar Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on
NSR Northern Sea Route Climate Change
NWO Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
NWT Northwest Territories UNPFII United Nations Permanent Forum on
OGS National Institute of Oceanography and Indigenous Issues
Experimental Geophysics USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation UK United Kingdom
in Europe USC United States Chairmanship
OSPAR Protection of the Marine Environment of the USA United States of America
North-East Atlantic WHO World Health Organization
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment WIPO World Intellectual Property
PBTs Persistent, Bioaccumulative Toxic Chemicals Organization
PCBs Polychlorinated Biphenyls WTO World Trade Organization
PICES North Pacific Marine Science Organization WW World Wildlife Fund
PNRA National Antarctic Research Programme
PMO Prime Minister’s Office
POPs Persistent Organic Pollutants
PPs Permanent Participants
PRC People’s Republic of China
PTS Persistent Toxic Substances
RAIPON Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples
of the North

11
Figures Tables
Figure 1. Map of the Arctic States, Permanent Participants, Table 1. Arctic State Strategies
and the Arctic Council Observer States Table 2. Permanent Participant Documents
Figure 2. International Organizations and Treaties Table 3. Observer State Documents
Figure 3. Arctic Events – International Events Table 4. Arctic Council Documents
Figure 4. Coding the Documents Table 5. Indicator and Sub-indicator Overview
Figure 5. Scaling the Indicators Table 6. Comparing (Official) Priorities
Figure 6. Comparing Canada’s 2009 Strategy and 2010 Table 7. Describing the Region
Policy Documents Table 8. Naming the Region
Figure 7. Comparing Finland’s 2010 Strategy and Table 9. Rights and Equality
2013 Strategy Table 10. International Treaties and International
Figure 8. Iceland’s 2011 Strategy Cooperation
Figure 9. Comparing the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2008 Table 11. Environmental Protection
and 2011 Strategies Table 12. Pollutants
Figure 10. Comparing Norway’s 2014 and 2017 Strategies Table 13. Pollution Problem-Solving
Figure 11. Comparing the Russian Federation’s 2008 Table 14. Climate Action and Climate Concerns
and 2013 Strategies Table 15. Security
Figure 12. Sweden’s 2011 Strategy Table 16. How Safety is Understood
Figure 13. Comparing the United States of America’s 2009 Table 17. Safety Institutions
Directives and 2013 Strategy Table 18. Capabilities and Practices
Figure 14. Comparing the Current Strategies Table 19. Economic Activities
Figure 15. Priorities in the Chairmanship Programs Table 20. How the Economy is Prioritized
Figure 16. Arctic Council Chairmanships and Arctic State Table 21. Economic Actors
Strategies Timeline Table 22. Tourism
Figure 17. Comparison of Arctic Council Ministerial Table 23. Infrastructure
Declarations Table 24. Transportation Infrastructure
Figure 18. France 2016 Table 25. Shipping
Figure 19. Germany 2013 Table 26. Drivers behind Science and Research
Figure 20. Italy 2015 Table 27. Other Purposes of Research
Figure 21. Japan 2015 Table 28. Arctic Research Infrastructure
Figure 22. The Netherlands 2014 Table 29. Education in the Arctic
Figure 23. People’s Republic of China 2018 Table 30. Implementation Details
Figure 24. Republic of Korea 2013 Table 31. Priorities in the Chairmanship Programs
Figure 25. Spain 2016 Table 32. Naming the Region in the Chairmanship Programs
Figure 26. United Kingdom Strategy Comparison Table 33. Describing the Arctic in the Chairmanship
Figure 27. Current Observer Strategy Comparison Programs
Table 34. Ministries in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 35. The Human Dimension in the Chairmanship
Programs
Table 36. Governance in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 37. International Treaties and International
Cooperation in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 38. Environmental Protection in the Chairmanship
Programs
Table 39. Pollutants in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 40. International Treaties on Pollution and Problem
Solving Measures
Table 41. Climate Action in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 42. Safety Concerns in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 43. Responses to Safety Concerns in the
Chairmanship Programs
Table 44. Economic Activities in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 45. Infrastructure in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 46. Telecommunications and ICT in the
Chairmanship Programs
Table 47. Science Infrastructure in the Chairmanship
Programs

12
 List of Figures and Tables

Table 48. Drivers of Research in the Chairmanship Programs

Table 49. Purpose of Research in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 50. Ministerial Declaration
Priorities
Table 51. Describing the Arctic in the Arctic Council
Ministerial Declarations
Table 52. Arctic State Representation at the Arctic Council
Ministerial Meetings
Table 53. The Human Dimension in the Ministerial
Declarations
Table 54. Governance in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 55. International Treaties and International
Cooperation in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 56. Environmental Protection in the Ministerial
Declarations
Table 57. Pollutants in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 58. Pollution Treaties and Problem Solving in the
Ministerial Declarations
Table 59. Climate Action in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 60. Safety Concerns in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 61. Addressing Safety Concerns in the Ministerial
Declaration
Table 62. Economic Activities in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 63. Infrastructure in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 64. Drivers of Science in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 65. Purpose of Science in the Ministerial Declarations
Table 66. Science Infrastructure in the Ministerial
Declaration
Table 67. International Agreements and Treaties
Table 68. International Organizations
Table 69. Pollutants
Table 70. Safety
Table 71. Research Infrastructure
Table 72. Current Arctic State Strategy Indicators as a Percent
of Total Coded Quotes
Table 73. Current Observer State Strategy Indicators as a
Percent of Total Coded Quotes

13
Arctic Policies and Strategies —
Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends
by Lassi Heininen, Karen Everett, Barbora Padrtova, and Anni Reissell

Executive Summary
The scientific report Arctic Policies and Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis and Trends delivers a holistic analysis of the policies,
strategies, and declarations of relevant Arctic stakeholders. It also includes new and/or emerging trends of Arctic governance
and geopolitics in the early 21st century.

Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the study delivers a holistic and systematic analysis and synthesis of the existing
policies and strategies of the Arctic states (Member States), Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants),
and non-Arctic countries (Observer States), as well as Arctic Council chairmanship programs and ministerial declarations.

The analysis is based on coding the text of 56 policy documents: the strategies and policies of the Arctic States in 2008/10–2017;
the relevant Arctic Council chairmanship programs and ministerial declarations in 1996–2019; the policies and declarations
of the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants) in 2010–2019; and the strategies and policies of the
Arctic Council Observer states in 2013–2018.

Fourteen indicators, or themes, were selected at the beginning of the work to look at a broad range of governance issues that
would or could be addressed by the Arctic states, Permanent Participants, Arctic Council Observer States, and other (Arctic)
stakeholders. The purpose was twofold: to illuminate the different or similar priorities of these stakeholders, and to assess from
a holistic standpoint how different states and Indigenous peoples’ organizations define and address issues concerning the Arctic.

A description and understanding of how perceptions and (re)mapping of the Arctic have changed over time is the first indicator,
and implementation of policies the last. In between are the following 12 indicators, which were coded: the human dimension;
governance; international cooperation; environmental protection; pollution; climate change; security; safety; economy; tourism;
infrastructure; and science & education.

Each document was carefully read and the quotes were added to columns in a spreadsheet. The quotes were then coded, and
used to compare and contrast (percentage-wise) how the different documents address these issues. For each category of stake-
holder, the findings are: i) compared within the category, and ii) discussed with each other category-wise. Then, based on all the
analyses, new and emerging trends are recognized and formulated, as a final synthesis, to describe and define the state of the
Arctic in the 2020s.

All the Arctic states, except the United States of America, clearly state that the economy, or (socio)economic development, is a pri-
ority, and have climate change or environmental protection as another priority, which is striking. All countries, except Canada and
Sweden, state that international cooperation is a priority, which is relevant. As an overall conclusion, a comparison of the current
official national strategies and policies shows economy/economic development, international cooperation, and environmental pro-
tection to be the overarching priorities of the Arctic states. While according to our coding of different indicators, the most-coded
quotes are ordered as follows: Governance, the new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental Protection
coupled with Pollution and Climate Change), Economy, International Cooperation, and Human Dimension.

The Arctic Council chairmanship programs tend to focus on issues pertaining to the Environmental Protection indicator. In the
past few years, there has also been a focus on pollutants, which contribute to climate change. As for the social aspect, there is an
overall focus on health and wellbeing, and also on culture and/or language protection. Gender equality shows up on the agenda
every few years or so. Maritime safety, as a part of the Safety & SAR (search and rescue) indicator has also emerged as a safety con-
cern over the past few Arctic Council chairmanship programs.

The content of the ministerial declarations of the Arctic Council tends to prioritize issues around the International Cooperation,
Governance, Human Dimension and Environmental Protection indicators, showing these to be the most-quoted indicators over
time. They all mainly deal—directly or indirectly—with the two main functions of the Arctic Council: environmental protection
and sustainable development. Under the Human Dimension indicator there is also a focus on ensuring issues relating to the health

14
 Executive Summary

and wellbeing of Northerners. Issues related to the Economy and Infrastructure indicators are also discussed, although not to the
same extent as the others.

The policy documents of the four Indigenous peoples’ organizations, which are Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council,
are somewhat fragmented. They do not cover all the indicator fields in full detail, as their focus varies. There is a striking simi-
larity in that all policy documents explicitly address issues surrounding Indigenous (individual and collective) rights as a part
of the Human Dimension indicator (although in different contexts), and also those related to the Governance indicator, both
broadly and in detail. Moreover, the importance of the International Cooperation (and treaties) indicator is highlighted. Unlike
environmental protection, pollution and/or climate change is not explicitly covered by all documents. Unsurprisingly, all the
documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples to use/utilize the resources of their homelands and also the im-
portance of ‘Traditional knowledge.’

Based on the quantitative measuring carried out in this study, the indicator most-quoted by the national Arctic policies and strat-
egies of the nine observer states of the Arctic Council is the Science & Education indicator, followed by the International Cooper-
ation and Economy indicators. The fourth is the new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental Protection
coupled with Pollution and Climate Change). These top four indicators accord more or less with the official priorities, or policy
goals/aims/principles, of these states’ national policies.

Finally, there is a separate list of new/emerging trends for each stakeholder: the Arctic States; the Arctic Council chairman-
ship programs; the Arctic Council ministerial declarations; the Permanent Participants; and the Observer States. These five
lists summarize the current main themes and conclude with new and emerging trends of each category of these Arctic ac-
tors. Based on these, a brief list has been compiled of overall new and emerging trends of the future of Arctic governance
and geopolitics, as identified by the present scientific report, which follows here:

1) Ambivalence of Arctic development, including ‘political inability,’ whenever a balance is sought between environmental protec-
tion and (new) economic activities;
2) The domination of States within the Arctic territory due to geopolitical stability and sovereignty vis-à-vis internationalization/
globalization based on international maritime law & the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and
on self-determination;
3) Focus on science, with all Arctic stakeholders being dependent on scientific research and international cooperation in science
for problem-solving because of climate change;
4) Close interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g., digital security, satellites, and meteorology as a new priority area)
due to globalization and rapidly advancing climate change in the Arctic.

This scientific report is a research activity of the Arctic Futures Initiative of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA). It is supported by the Arctic Circle Assembly and the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) at the
University of Helsinki as the major partners. It is co-funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and IIASA.

15
16
Introduction and Methods

In the national strategies of the Arctic states, the ‘Arctic’ is de- Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of
scribed as being remote, scattered, and having a sparse pop- America (Alaska) (see Figure 1. The Arctic States, Permanent
ulation. Its ecosystem is considered as vulnerable, fragile, or Participants, Arctic Council Observer States). These states first
unique. While there is no strict definition of the (Arctic) region, came together at ministerial level in June 1991 to sign the Arc-
there is broad agreement that if there is a southern border to the tic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS 1991). Since then,
region, it is the 60th parallel north. they have continued their intensive, mainly functional, cooper-
ation on environmental protection in the Arctic region, as well
The ‘Arctic States’ today are group of states located in the cir- as working together for sustainable development of the north-
cumpolar Arctic around the Arctic Ocean. The countries in the ernmost regions and communities of the globe. (see Figure 1)
far North, whose territories go beyond the Arctic Circle, are:
Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland),

Arctic Member States: Permanent Participants:

Canada, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark Aleut International Association (AIA) – USA, RUS
(including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) – CAN, USA
Russian Federation, Sweden, United States of America. Gwich'in Council International (GCI) – CAN, USA
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) – CAN, Greenland/DNK, RUS, USA
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
(RAIPON) – RUS
Saami Council (SC) – FIN, NOR, RUS, SWE

90°

60°

30°

Arctic Council Observer States:

OR

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands,

AT

People's Republic of China, Poland, Republic of U

India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, EQ
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

Figure 1. Map of the Arctic States, Permanent Participants, and the Arctic
Council Observer States Credit: Daniel R. Strebe for the base map (July 17th
2019) and IIASA for all edits.
17
Introduction and Methods

Initiated by the first gathering of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of
Region in 1993 (Reykjavik Final Document 1993) and support- India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzer-
ed by Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations, the eight Arctic land, and United Kingdom.
states established the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996 as a high-level
forum for multilateral cooperation on the Arctic, in particular, Policies, strategies, and other policy documents of the Arctic
for environmental protection. The Arctic Eight (A8) became the states, the Permanent Participants, and the AC Observer states,
members of the Council. It is important to recognize that the as well as those of the Arctic Council ministerial meetings, are
Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS) preceded the all the focus of this comprehensive study. Just as none of the
Arctic Council, and that four declarations were produced under entities and actors in the Arctic sphere live in a vacuum, but are
its auspices between 1991 (in Rovaniemi) and 1997 (in Alta). cooperating with each other, and integrated with several organi-
zations as members, as well as signatories of several internation-
The Arctic Council has a rotating chairmanship whereby each al agreements (see Figure 2. International Organizations and
state serves as chair for two years. At the start of each chair, a Treaties, p.19). So this study is also not conducted in a vacuum.
program is produced by the government of the chairmanship
country outlining its agenda. Each chairmanship then con- The present scientific report has been produced by the Arctic
cludes with a Ministerial meeting and a declaration that pro- Futures Initiative (AFI)—a new-generation research project
vides guidance for the following chair (Arctic Council 2015d) coordinated by the International Institute for Applied Systems
based on a consensus of the eight member states. Since the Ot- Analysis (IIASA). It is supported by the Arctic Circle Assem-
tawa Declaration (1996) which provides the foundation for the bly, and the Institute for Atmospheric Earth System Research
work of the Arctic Council, there have been eleven Ministeri- (INAR) at the University of Helsinki as the major partners,
al Declarations from Iqaluit in 1998 to Rovaniemi in 2019, al- and co-funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
though the latter Ministerial, for the first time, failed to produce IIASA. Its aim is to map, compare, and analyze the existing
a signed declaration, as consensus could not be reached on the Arctic policies and strategies, and the chairmanship programs
issue of climate change. and declarations of the Arctic Council with a view to support-
ing public and private policymaking in Arctic and non-Arctic
When establishing the Arctic Council, the Arctic states unan- countries, Arctic residents, and civil society.
imously agreed to recognize six Indigenous Peoples Organiza-
tions (IPOs) as ‘Permanent Participants’ (PPs) in the Council. The scientific report will begin with a brief overview of the
While, in principle, a PP position is equally open to other Arc- state of Arctic governance and geopolitics.
tic organizations of Indigenous peoples with a majority Arctic
Indigenous constituency, six Indigenous Peoples Organizations
have, so far, obtained PP status. These are: the Aleut Interna- Overview Of Arctic Governance
tional Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in
Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Rus- And Geopolitics
sian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the
Saami Council. Even against a background of the general uncertainties in
world politics and continuing rhetoric on ‘Great Power rival-
While no more categories of the Arctic Council structure have ries,’ the post-Cold War Arctic has high geopolitical stability.
been created, in their Joint Communiqué on its Establishment This can be stated quite objectively, in spite of different per-
(1996), the Arctic states’ governments recognized the need to ceptions, discourses, and certain mis-/disinformation about
provide an opportunity to non-Arctic countries, governmental, the Arctic and arctic affairs disseminated in the media and by
and non-governmental organizations with Arctic interests to policy makers. This stability is based on the constructive coop-
participate actively in the work of the Council. Following this, eration affirmed by the Arctic states and Indigenous peoples’
the Declaration of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic organizations. Indeed, the first preamble of the recent joint
Council in 1998 (Iqaluit Declaration 1998) approved Observer ministerial meeting declarations and statements of the Arctic
status for several committed intergovernmental and interna- Council reaffirms “the commitment to maintain peace, stabili-
tional non-governmental organizations and non-Arctic states. ty and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (e.g., Fairbanks
Although there are certain criteria for admitting observers, as Declaration 2017; Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement
well as restrictions to their rights, the position of a (permanent) 2019). Moreover, after the confusion as to how to interpret
observership at the Arctic Council has become attractive among the first-ever crewed descent to the ocean bottom at the North
several non-Arctic states, in particular, those with scientific in- Pole by a Russian expedition in 2007, the five Arctic littoral
terest in the polar regions, and those with global economic in- states declared that cooperation over the Arctic Ocean, “which
terests. By the 11th Ministerial of the Arctic Council in May 2019 is based on mutual trust and transparency” (Ilulissat Declara-
altogether 39 states and organizations—13 non-Arctic states, 14 tion 2008), would be strengthened.
intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and
12 international non-governmental organizations—have been This high stability seems to be resilient, having been main-
approved as Observers of the Arctic Council. The non-Arctic tained despite recent, turbulent international politics (e.g.,
states with an observer status are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Clifford 2017) (see Figure 3. Arctic Events – International

18
 Introduction and Methods

Events, p. 20). It is due, on the one hand, to the common interest scientific community, and non-governmental organizations
the Arctic states have in decreasing military tension and increas- (NGOs). The post–Cold War Arctic is probably exceptional in
ing political stability in the region by transforming the Cold War international politics and relations in being more politicized
period into an era of functional environmental cooperation. It than ever before but lacking armed conflicts or serious disputes
is due, too, to certain features of Arctic geopolitics in the 1990s: over national borders. Instead, there is functional cooperation
the fact that the original militarization of the Arctic was based on in several fields and dialogue between the Arctic states, Indige-
achieving a balance of global nuclear deterrence; the high degree nous peoples, and AC observer states, as well as between them
of legal certainty in land claim agreements involving Indigenous and other Arctic actors and those from outside the region. This
peoples; and the ‘Home Rule’ model and other applications of the is clearly indicated in the policy documents that have been cod-
‘Nordic devolution’ of power (Heininen 2018). ed and analyzed in this study.

It has been in the common interest of the member states of While there is increasing uncertainty related to the scale of
the Arctic Council—the leading policy-shaping body for Arc- global warming, the estimation of the International Panel on
tic cooperation (e.g., Arctic Yearbook 2016)—and also of mu- Climate Change (IPCC 2018) is that the Arctic will warm, on
tual benefit to them to cooperate across borders and maintain average, at a faster overall rate than the Earth itself. Moreover,
good (formal and informal) bilateral and multilateral dialogues for decades the region and its communities has been heavi-
among themselves and the other Arctic actors, namely, the Arc- ly influenced by long-range air and water pollution, persistent
tic Indigenous peoples, the committed non-Arctic states, the organic pollutants (POPs), heavy metals, and radioactivity (e.g.,

UN
IMO
UNCLOS & CLCS

OSCE

NATO

EU

Arctic Council

BEAC
Arctic Five

EEA
Finland

Kingdom of
NAFTA Denmark* Sweden

Norway Iceland Nordic Council

USA Canada of Ministers

Russian
Federation

G20

Council of the Baltic Sea States

Permanent Participants

Figure 2. International Organizations and Treaties

19
Introduction and Methods

2018
Agreement to Prevent
Unregulated High Seas
Arctic Events International Events
Fisheries in the Central
Arctic Ocean (signed) 2019 2018
Agreement on Enhancing IPCC Special Report on
International Arctic Global Warming of 1.5°C
Scientific Cooperation 2017
2015
(signed) IMO Polar Code 2016
2016 Sustainable
(in force) Paris Agreement
Development Goals
Crystal Serenity voyage (COP21) (in force)
(adopted)
through the Northwest 2014
Passage Migration crisis
Arctic Economic Council 2015
established in Europe
2014
Ice extent on the Arctic Ocean Annexation of Crimea 2011
2013 at its annual minimum, again World population
Olympic flame on the Ocean plastics reach
reaches 7 billion
North Pole 269,000 tons
Fukushima nuclear
Agreement on Cooperation 2011 disaster
on Marine Oil Pollution in
Agreement on Cooperation
the Arctic (signed)
on Aeronautical and Arab Spring
Permanent Arctic Council Maritime Search and 2010
Secretariat established Rescue in the Arctic (signed) 2010 Deep Water Horizon
First Arctic Circle Assembly oil spill

2008 2008
2007
Ilulissat Ministerial of the Global economic crisis
UN Declaration on the
Arctic Ocean littoral states 2007
Rights of Indigenous
Russian expedition to the Peoples (adopted)
bottom of the North Pole 2006
China becomes biggest
carbon dioxide polluter 2005
2005 Kyoto Protocol (in force)
2004
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
2004
& Arctic Human Development Largest EU expansion
Report I launched & NATO enlargement

2001
9/11 Terrorist attacks

1996
Arctic Council established

1995

1993
First Arctic Parliamentarians 1992
Conference
Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development (signed)

1991
Arctic Environment Protection
Strategy (signed)
1990
1989
Fall of the Berlin Wall

1987
Murmansk speech by
1987
President Gorbachev

Arctic Events International Events

Agreements Events

Figure 3. Arctic Events – International Events

20
 Introduction and Methods

AMAP 1997), and more recently micro-plastics. The well-known and more strict environmental regulations, emerging influence
natural resources of the Arctic (e.g., fishes and marine mammals, of powerful international actors from outside of the region could
timber/wood & pulp, hydrocarbons and other minerals) have not only impair traditional livelihoods, values, and culture, but
been exploited for the benefit of the global economy. Intangible also cause environmental, health, and other social problems.
Arctic values are also useful as examples, if not models, in world
politics—knowledge of Indigenous/traditional konwledge, devo- This situation could all too easily increase uncertainty among
lution of power, geopolitical stability (based on transboundary Arctic populations, making it more difficult to create func-
cooperation), confidence-building (based on the interplay be- tioning local communities and sustainable livelihoods, and to
tween science, politics, and business), and productive dialogue achieve a higher level of self-determination.
among diverse stakeholders.
In fact, in addition to regional development problems, the Arc-
In the present study, this unique space with its harsh conditions tic has been facing other significant and fundamental changes
and resource-richness is analyzed as a functionally and multidi- in its geopolitical and security dynamics since the end of the
mensionally ‘changing Arctic.’ Cold War due to globalization and global (‘wicked’) problems,
including climate change (e.g. Globalization and the Circum-
The current state of the Arctic—and the entire circumpolar polar North 2010; The Fast-Changing Arctic 2013; Durfee and
North—is distinctive in that it is much more susceptible to cli- Johnstone 2019).
mate change than most other parts of the Earth system. That
said, in the sparsely populated Arctic region itself, the human Although climate change is interpreted as the most severe trig-
responses to those changes are, by definition, very limited. The ger it is neither the only nor first one. Before climate change,
warming Arctic ecosystem is becoming simultaneously more there were other problems mostly from lower latitudes, such
fragile and vulnerable at a time when the region is rapidly open- as long-range pollution from radioactive contaminants, Arctic
ing up to new, possibly mass-scale, economic and societal ac- haze, and heavy metals, all of which were sources of concern
tivities. The changes taking place will materialize as a complex to Indigenous and other local peoples, NGOs, and the research
mixture of direct climate impacts and indirect socio-economic community. Nuclear safety was defined as the main environ-
and political impacts, with the related uncertainty greatly affect- mental problem and trigger (e.g., AMAP Report 1997). This
ing the populations and communities of the region. Changes in concern was transformed first into pressure on the Arctic states’
the Arctic will have multiple feedbacks in the Earth system. governments and then into functional cooperation among them
(Climate Change and Arctic Security 2019).
From the perspective of global climate change mitigation, in-
creased access to new hydrocarbon sources, with their associat- A ‘globalized Arctic’ is being interpreted as a new geopolitical
ed CO2 and other emissions, represents a serious drawback for context and as part and parcel of the overall Earth and ocean
the Arctic. New and shorter global shipping routes through the systems, bringing with it global political, economic, technolog-
region offer significant economic and emission savings, but in- ical, cultural, and environmental changes (see, e.g., The Global
creasing transportation brings severe environmental risks, caus- Arctic Handbook 2018).
ing an ‘Arctic Paradox’ and decreasing societal security. From a
nation state perspective, the Arctic states face an array of mul- Although the Arctic as a region is the product of global pro-
tidimensional challenges and risks in reacting and adapting to cesses and impacted by them, it also has global significance
accelerating climate change, as do non-arctic countries shaping due to immaterial issues, such as cultural diversity, biodiversity,
their national policies and strategies on the Arctic. With their knowledge about the environment and climate, stemming from
sovereign status, the Arctic states have quite different footholds in both Indigenous peoples and scientific research and expertise,
the region than the observer states further south in Europe (e.g., regional and international and cooperation, and the broader is-
France and Germany), and Asia (e.g., China and Japan) whose sues of political stability and peace.
increasing interest in Arctic research, marine transport and other
economic activities, and in the environment and climate change, In the influential global studies discourse on ‘interdependence,’
is actively involving them in international Arctic cooperation. the Arctic is a perfect case in point: not only in terms of the
impacts of global changes within the region, but also in how the
From the regional perspective, and that of Indigenous popula- region affects the rest of the planet and the feedbacks it caus-
tions and other local communities of the circumpolar North, es to the global changes themselves. It is possible to argue that
increasing economic activity, based on the neoliberal and ne- the ‘wicked’ problem of combined pollution and climate change
orealist approach, is tending to outweigh the environment and puts pressure on the Arctic states and other Arctic actors to ac-
environment concerns and geopolitics is a double-edged sword: celerate their cooperation as well as reconstructing their reality
Increased economic activity, together with a growing need for and going beyond traditional power and hegemony game by
new expertise on the environment and climate, may lead to a redefined environmental protection as the ultimate aim, imple-
more diversified and robust economy if, for example, climate mented discursive devolution of power (based on knowledge)
change itself, and climate research, create new employment op- and soft-law, and applied the interplay between science, politics
portunities. However, emerging influence from southern lati- and business into a dialogue across sectors (Heininen 2018; also
tudes due to better access to Arctic resources, without proper AHDR 2004).

21
Introduction and Methods

This can also be inferred from the above-mentioned commit- of the Permanent Participants and declarations of the confer-
ment of the Arctic states “to maintain peace, stability and con- ences of the Arctic Indigenous peoples organizations. There are
structive cooperation,” as will be discussed later in this report. no studies on connections between the contents of the Arctic
Following from this, there are twelve coded indicators in this Council chairmanships and national strategies, and between the
Report, in addition to (Re)defining and (Re)mapping the Arc- national strategies and the AC ministerial declarations. These
tic and Implementation. These are: Human Dimension, Gov- various gaps in research related to Arctic policies and strategies
ernance, International Cooperation and Treaties, Environmen- were seen an opportunity for the the Arctic Futures Initiative to
tal Protection, Pollution, Climate Change, Security, Safety and examine all these policy documents to define the points of sim-
Search and Rescue, Economy, Tourism, Infrastructure, Science ilarity and difference among them, analyze interesting research
and Education. They were selected to represent the most cur- findings, and, based on those, identify the potential and emerg-
rent, relevant, and important features of Arctic governance and ing trends of Arctic governance and geopolitics.
geopolitics so that a holistic picture of a state of the governance
and geopolitics of the region could be drawn up. Furthermore, the ultimate aim of this research is thus to deliver
a systematic analysis and synthesis of existing policies and strat-
egies of the Arctic states, the Permanent Participants, and the
Earlier Studies And Aim Of observer states. This, in turn, will allow a synthesis to be made
of the entire set of Arctic policies and strategies and a holistic
This Study approach to Arctic governance and geopolitics to be drawn up.

The existing social sciences literature on the Arctic has two fo- The work for the study has been organized and carried out from
cuses. The first, inspired by national policies and intergovern- a broad range of regional, national and international perspec-
mental cooperation, is on geopolitics, security, institutions, the tives, as follows:
resource potential, (e.g., Young 1992; Heininen 1992; Interna- 1. All material relevant to the aims of the projects was systemat-
tional Relations and the Arctic 2014) and on climate change, hu- ically collected, inventoried, mapped, and analyzed: findings
man security, Arctic governance, and Indigenous peoples (e.g., were studied to elicit points of similarity and difference;
Yearbook of Polar Law 2013). The second focus is covered by a 2. A determination was made of the priorities and common in-
few multidisciplinary studies and publications on global-related terests of the Arctic states (Arctic Council members), Arctic
issues and the globalized Arctic as a part of global dynamics Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants),
in the environmental, societal, political, and economic spheres and non-Arctic states (AC observer countries) to understand
(e.g., Globalization and the Circumpolar North 2010; Nordic the stance of these entities in terms of the future develop-
Council of Ministers 2011; The Global Arctic Handbook 2018). ment of the Arctic region and their understanding of the
This study considers the global significance and implications of high level of political stability of the region;
this changing geopolitical context. 3. The relevant themes/titles, main objectives and recommen-
dations of the Arctic Council declarations and chairmanship
In the 2010s, the first comparative studies and analysis of Arctic programs were recognized, coded and analyzed;
strategies, mainly on the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, 4. Based on this work, a synthesis was made of the entire
were published. Brosnan et al. (2011) discuss how cooperation body of Arctic policies and strategies—this allowed a ho-
and conflict appear in the Arctic strategies of these states. Sum- listic approach to be taken to clarifying the current, new
mers (2010) studies the littoral states and their relations, with and emergingtrends in Arctic governance and geopolitics.
a focus on energy and the environment and on China and the
European Union as new players in the Arctic. The first compre-
hensive inventory and comparative study, including eleven indi- The Documents
cators, on the national policies and strategies of the eight Arctic
states and the European Union (Heininen 2011) is the basis for The policy documents used as a foundation for the analysis and
this deeper analysis and synthesis.1 synthesis on national strategies and policies, and declarations
and chairmanship programs, from 1996 to 2019, are as follows:
However, there have been no in-depth analyses of any of the • The national strategies and policies of the Arctic states, and
national strategies and policies of the Arctic states. There have their priorities/priority areas, objectives/goals, as well as im-
been only a couple of brief overviews on the priority areas of plementation, organizational bodies and possible budgets;
the strategies (e.g., Schulze 2017) of the Arctic Council observ- • The policies, agendas and declarations of the Permanent Par-
er countries. There has been no analysis of the Arctic policies ticipants of the Arctic Council (Arctic Indigenous peoples’

1 See also Bailes and Heininen (2012). A more detailed inventory and comparative (unpublished) study on the national strategies and policies of the Arctic states
(Heininen and Lempinen, 2012) was made for the ‘Kiruna Statement’ on the Vision for the Arctic (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013) at Arctic Council Ministe-
rial Meeting in May 2013 ordered by Foreign Ministry of Sweden.

22
 Introduction and Methods

organizations), and their priorities/priority areas, objectives/ Permanent Participants

goals, as well as implementation, organizational bodies;
• The national strategies and policies of the observer states of There are six Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations as Perma-
the Arctic Council (non-Arctic states), and their priorities/ nent Participants (PPs) in the Arctic Council: the Aleut In-
priority areas, objectives/goals, as well as implementation, ternational Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the
organizational bodies, possible budgets; Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Coun-
• The Arctic Council chairmanship programs, and the declara- cil, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
tions of the Council’s Ministerial meetings (1996–2019). (RAIPON), and the Saami Council. The PPs play an important
role in the Arctic Council and “have full consultation rights
Arctic States in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions”
(Arctic Council 2015a, para. 1). That is why they are included
The main Arctic actors are the eight Arctic states: Canada, Fin- in this analysis.
land, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Russian Feder-
ation, Sweden, and United States of America. Table 1 lists the Not all of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations have
documents analyzed for each state in reverse chronological or- produced governance documents. Only the four PPs that have—
der. Note, for Canada the 2009 document is the primary Strat- Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich’in Council Interna-
egy, as the 2010 foreign Policy deals with developing the do- tional, Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and Saami Council —
mestic priorities internationally. For the Kingdom of Denmark, are discussed in this report. Table 2 provides a list of the PPs and
even though the Faroes Island document is the most recent, it their documents. Unlike the Arctic states, the documents of the
is not a primary state document, and thus not analyzed here. PPs are a combination of strategies, declarations, and reports.

Arctic State Strategies Permanent Participant Documents

• Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, • Arctic Athabaskan Council Arctic Policy (2017)
Our Future (2009) Arctic Athabaskan Council • Europe and the Arctic: A View from the Arctic
Canada • Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Athabaskan Council (2008)
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s NORTHERN
STRATEGY Abroad (2010) Gwich’in Council • Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging
International Practices of Indigenous-Led Review (2018)
• Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 (2013)
Finland
• Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2010)
• Inuit Arctic Policy of ICC (2010)
Inuit Circumpolar Council
• A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy (2011) • Utqiagvik Declaration (2018)
• Iceland’s Position in the Arctic. Report of the Ministry for
Iceland
Foreign Affairs in Iceland on Sustainable Development in • Sami Arctic Strategy (2019)
Saami Council
the Arctic (2009) • Tråante Declaration (2017)
• Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (2011)
Kingdom of
• The Arctic at a Time of Transition: Draft Strategy for Activities Table 2. Permanent Participant Documents
Denmark
in the Arctic Region (2008)
• Norway’s Arctic Strategy: Between Geopolitics and Social
Development (2017)
Norway
• Norway’s Arctic Policy: Creating Value, Managing Resources, Observer States
Confronting Climate Change and Fostering Knowledge (2014)
• Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian The Arctic Council offers Observer status to “non-arctic states,”
Russian
Federation and National Security Efforts for the Period up “inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations,
to 2020 (2013)
Federation
• Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in global and regional,” and “non-governmental organizations”
the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond (2009) (Arctic Council 2015b, para 1). There are currently 13 Observ-
er states in the Arctic Council: France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Sweden • Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2011) Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of
India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzer-
• National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013)
United States
• National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 and
land, and United Kingdom (Arctic Council 2015b). However,
of America
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (2009) not all the Observers have produced Arctic policies or strategies.
This analysis is concerned only with the policy documents on/
Table 1. Arctic State Strategies for/towards the Arctic produced by states, as they have the ca-
pacity to create and implement national policies, namely those
non-arctic states which have the status of (permanent) observes
of the Arctic Council.

23
Introduction and Methods

Table 3 provides a list of the Observer States that do have strat-

Arctic Council
egies, and only these states will be referenced in the analysis. Chairmanship Program
Arctic Council Ministerial Declaration

Declaration on the Establishment of the

Observer States Documents -
Arctic Council (1996), Ottawa Declaration (1996)
The Great Challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for
France Canada 1996–1998 Iqaluit Declaration (1998)
the Arctic (2015)
Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines United States of America
Italy Barrow Declaration (2000)
(2015, updated 2016) 1998–2000

Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy: Finland 2000–2002 Inari Declaration (2002)
Germany
Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities (2013)
Iceland 2002–2004 Reykjavík Declaration (2004)
Japan Japan’s Arctic Policy (2015)
Russian Federation
Pole Position – NL 2.0: Strategy for the Netherlands Salekhard Declaration (2006)
The Netherlands 2004–2006
Polar Programme 2016-2020 (2014)

People’s Republic Norway 2006–2009 Tromsø Declaration (2009)

China’s Arctic Policy (2018)
of China (PRC) The Kingdom of Denmark
Nuuk Declaration (2011)
Republic of Korea 2009–2011
Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (2013)
(ROK) Sweden 2011–2013 Kiruna Declaration (2013)
Spain (ESP) Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy (2016)
Canada 2013–2015 Iqaluit Declaration (2015)
United Kingdom Beyond the Ice: UK Policy Towards the Arctic (2018)
(UK) Adapting to Change: UK Policy Towards the Arctic (2013) United States of America
Fairbanks Declaration (2017)
2015–2017
Statement by the Chair (2019)
Table 3. Observer State Documents Finland 2017–2019
Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement (2019)

Iceland 2019–2021 -
Arctic Council Documents
Table 4. Arctic Council Documents
The eight Arctic States are members of the Arctic Council (see,
Ottawa Declaration 1996). As members they all participate in
the governance of the Arctic Council, and each of them act In total, 56 documents were read, coded, and analyzed. The
as a chair of the Council, taking on two-year chairmanships large time span over which the documents were produced
(Arctic Council 2015c). The AC Chairmanship is rotated in (1996-2019) allows for a comprehensive overview of Arctic gov-
alphabetic order. Before, or at the latest, at the start of each ernance priorities and how these priorities change over time.
chairmanship, the state produces a program (with a brochure)
that outlines their two-year agenda and in most cases the pri-
orities/priority areas of the chairmanship. At the end of the The Procedure
chairmanship, there is a Ministerial meeting where the Senior
Arctic Officials (SAOs) from each state meet and create a dec- Even considering the breadth and depth of information avail-
laration that concludes the chairmanship and details its major able and the large number of documents to be coded and ana-
outcomes, as well as describing the state of the Arctic Council. lyzed, a holistic approach and systematic analysis were deemed
feasible. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used
Table 4 lists the chairmanships and the subsequent ministerial in the examination of the information to perform the different
declarations. Note: the first Canadian chairmanship program types of analyses required.
is not available and was thus not included in this analysis.
All other documents were publically available on the Arctic The methods used were as follows:
Council website.
i) Select certain variables as indicators (with sub-indicators) to
measure each strategy/policy, and declaration, emphasizing
the priorities/priority areas of each strategy/policy (either
explicitly mentioned, referred to or discussed, or implicit);

ii) Code the indicators in each document of an actor (mem-

ber states, PPs, observer states, AC chairmanship programs
and ministerial declarations) and based on that compare the
two documents of each actor between each other, if there is
more than one document, compare them between each oth-
er, searching for points of similarity and difference, as well
as priority areas. And analyse the current strategy/policy of
each actor using applied systems analysis;

24
 Introduction and Methods

iii) Compare and discuss the strategies/policies of each actor The Indicators
(member states, PPs, observer countries, AC chairmanship
programs and declarations) with each other, and on that ba- Fourteen indicators, or themes, were selected by the research team
sis analyze and conclude each category; when beginning work to address a broad range of governance is-
sues and interests that would or could be addressed by the Arctic
iv) Based on the coding, comparative studies, and analyses, rec- tates, Permanent Participants, Arctic Council observer states and
ognize and identify new and emerging main themes; other (Arctic) stakeholders. The purpose was i) to illuminate the
different (or similar) priorities of the stakeholders, and ii) to have
v) Based on the document analysis and the priorities, synthe- as holistic an approach as possible to national policies. Table 5
size the current state of Arctic governance and of Arctic ge- provides an overview of the main indicators and sub-indicators to
opolitics, as well as new and emerging trends of Arctic de- provide a more nuanced understanding of the topic.
velopment for the near future.

Indicator Sub-indicators

(Re)defining and • Which state(s) were the first to create an Arctic policy or strategy, • Who are the Arctic stakeholders? Which national government
(Re)mapping the Arctic and in what order did the other states follow? ministries are responsible for the region and and what are the names
• How is the Arctic defined as a geographical location? of the ministers?
• How is the Arctic described (e.g., High North, Arctic, etc.) and
how has this changed over time?

Human Dimension • Indigenous Peoples • Demography

• Other inhabitants/residents • Human rights
• Equality • Migration
• Culture and Languages • Health and Wellbeing

Governance • What are the existing governance structures globally, internationally, • Governance of natural resources (including fish), the blue economy,
nationally, regionally, and locally? and the licensing process.
• Self-governance and self-determination. • Public consultations, environmental impact assessments.
• Involvement in international and transboundary cooperation. • Conflict of interest between stakeholders.
• Role of Arctic Council and its working groups, and related procedures. • Decision-making processes.

International • What is the role of international cooperation and how important is it? • What countries are members (or observers) of EU, NATO, UN, BEAC?
Cooperation and • What are the major Arctic-related agreements or fora? • UN Sustainable Development Goals and how much are they considered
International Treaties • What are the global perspectives (globalization)? in relation to the Arctic?

Environmental • How the Arctic is defined (e.g., fragile, unique, etc.) • Flora and fauna, invasive species, north–south movements of species
Protection • What are the priorities, how are they defined, what sectors? (e.g., migrating fish, polar bears etc.), and what topics are taken
• Does using the term ‘environmental’ mean environmental protection? seriously?
• What agencies are in charge of implementation, and how much budget • Biodiversity.
is allocated? • Assessment/monitoring sea for pollutants.
• Are protected areas discussed?

Pollution • Within and outside of the region and which is more important? • Who are the polluters?
• What are the pollutants in the Arctic? • What international treaties are mentioned and what are the
• How many times is a pollutant mentioned before there problem-solving tactics at the different levels?
is action; what needs to happen before the pollutant is taken seriously?

Climate Change • Mitigation vis-a-vis adaptation. • What are the consequences, both positive and negative?
• What agreements and frameworks are mentioned? • What is the societal impact?
• If Asia is mentioned there? • Environmental refugees.
• Are the voices of the scientific community heard, and if so, how? • Climate change as a security factor.

Security • How is security defined, and what are the security priorities? • What measures are implemented/needed to increase security?
• Is sovereignty mentioned, and if so, how is it defined? • Is NATO mentioned, and if so, what kind of role does NATO play?
• How are borders defined? • Is it addressed that the Arctic Council does not include
• Is (high) stability/stability-building mentioned, and how is it military security?
defined and possibly linked to security? • Is military spending mentioned?
• How has the interpretation of security changed over time? • Military capabilities.
• Role of armed forces. • Is the role of the Coast Guard mentioned, and if so, what is it?

Safety and Search and • How is safety defined and what terms are used? • What kind of infrastructure or capabilities do the countries
Rescue (SAR) • Is safety in tourism addressed? have for safety?
• When did safety become a concern? • Is there mapping and monitoring of sea ice, depth, etc.?
• How are SAR agreements defined and is implementation mentioned, • Who are the different authorities (e.g., levels of government)
is the Polar Code mentioned? involved and what role do they have?
• Are national safety systems integrated? • Is Coast Guard cooperation discussed?

continue on next page

25
Introduction and Methods

Indicator Sub-indicators

Economy • How are resources utilized, including fisheries? • How much does the North contribute to the national economy?
• Energy. • How is the economy/business prioritized in the national strategies?
• Sustainable development. • Are economic activities are regulated and, if so, how?
• What kind of economic activities are mentioned and what is prioritized? • Is there recognition of the Arctic Economic Council?
• Who are the actors (e.g., State, state-owned businesses, transnational, • Are sanctions and counter sanctions addressed and, if so, how?
local entrepreneurs, Indigenous, etc.)? • Trade, imports and exports.
• What are the economic volumes in terms of dollar amounts and number
of businesses?

Tourism • How are safety and security defined in this context? • In the cruise industry, what are the different types of activities
• How tourism is defined (e.g., industry, adventure, etc.)? (e.g., transit vs. destination)?
• Who runs tourism and how is it organized? • What is the impact of tourism with regard to the environment, society,
• Who are the actors (e.g., foreign businesses, Indigenous businesses, etc.)? economy, culture?
• What is the scale of the industry (e.g., income generation), the volumes, • How much does the state support tourism?
and where do the tourists come from? • What are the possible side-effects (e.g., cultural conflicts) and how can
they be mitigated (e.g., sustainability)?

Infrastructure • Transportation. • Innovation and technology.

• Icebreakers. • Shipping.
• Telecommunications and ICT. • Energy.
• Housing.

Science and Education • What does the science infrastructure consist of (e.g., research stations)? • What is access to higher education like; is there an education gap?
• What are the purpose and aims of science (e.g., having a presence in • What are the educational attainment levels?
the region)? • Is the UArctic mentioned, what importance is it given, and how are
• What are the drivers of science (e.g., pollution, climate change, etc)? courses used?
• How big are the research budgets? • Are there options for distance learning?
• How is knowledge defined, what is the role of traditional knowledge, • How are innovation and technology addressed?
and what is the interplay between the two? • Is space factored into these agendas?

Implementation • Does the strategy have a list of action items for implementation? • Is there follow-up?
• Is there a budget for the different action items, or for the • Is there evaluation?
strategy overall?

Table 5. Indicator and Sub-indicator Overview

(Re)defining and (Re)mapping the Arctic relates to under- The International Cooperation and International Treaties in-
standing how the different actors define and describe the Arc- dicator reflects the role and importance of international coop-
tic region. Do they self-identify as Arctic actors/stakeholders eration. It also includes the major agreements and/or forums.
and/or redefine their country/state related to the Arctic, and The indicator attempts to address the global perspectives—
if so how? It also seeks to understand who the different stake- globalization— in the strategies. Moreover, this indicator high-
holders are and which government ministries have regional lights whether the particular state is a member (or observers) to
responsibilities. EU, NATO, UN, BEAC and/or potentially other international
organizations. The indicator also considers the UN Sustainable
The Human Dimension indicator addresses the different as- Development Goals and if (and how much) they are reflected in
pects of human life in the Arctic. It focuses on: the role of Indig- the strategies.
enous peoples and how culture and language are preserved and
protected; how other inhabitants/residents are noted and identi- The Environmental Protection indicator assesses the extent to
fied; the demographics of the different states and whether there which the strategy actually advocates for environmental pro-
is regional migration; if and how equality and human rights are tection and how this work is prioritized. It also addresses the
addressed; and health and wellbeing. amount of discussion on protected areas, flora and fauna (in-
cluding invasive species and migration),the importance of bio-
The Governance indicator looks at the different ways the Arc- diversity, and if there are plans for monitoring the sea for pol-
tic is governed. This identifies what structures are currently in lutants. This indicator also looks for a description of the Arctic
place, how much cooperation takes place, and in what contex- from an environmental perspective (e.g., fragile, etc.).
t(s); it looks, in particular, at the Arctic Council and its proce-
dures. It examines how self-governance and self-determination The Pollution indicator seeks to elicit how the different strate-
are addressed and supported by state actors, what mechanisms gies recognize various pollutants, where they come from, and
are in place for natural resources utilization, the extent to which who are polluters. What is being done to address pollution
public consultations and environmental impact assessments are through either international treaties or other problem solving
encouraged, how decisions are made, and if there are any con- actions? Additionally, how long does it take for a state to take
flicts of interest among the different stakeholders. action against pollution?

26
 Introduction and Methods

The Climate Change indicator identifies the consequences, both The Infrastructure indicator identifies the different agendas
positive and negative, of climate change on the region and how and priorities for infrastructure projects, including transporta-
this may impact Arctic societies. Similarly, has climate change tion, icebreakers, telecommunications and ICT, housing, ship-
affected maritime safety, become a security factor, decreased ping, and projects to ensure northerners have access to energy.
access to freshwater, or created environmental refugees? It also This indicator also addresses how innovation and technology
asks what states are doing with regard to mitigation vis-a-vis ad- can help facilitate investments in these areas.
aptation, what climate agreement or frameworks are identified, The Science and Education indicator addresses science and
and if and how the scientific community is being heard. education separately. For science, the indicator asks what sort
of science infrastructure exists or is being planned (this in-
Due to Environmental Protection, Pollution and Climate cludes material goods and networks); what drives science and
Change often being written about together as single issues in what purpose or aims science serves; how research budgets are
the documents, these three indicators will be later interpreted addressed; how knowledge and traditional/Indigenous knowl-
and discussed as a new meta-indicator. edge are discussed and if there is any interplay between the
two; the role of innovation and technology; and if space (not
The Security indicator addresses how security is defined, and satellites) is a factor in any of these agendas. The education
what the security priorities are. It also covers if/and how sover- component looks for discussion on access to education, edu-
eignty is mentioned and defined by individual states. It includes cation attainment levels, and if the UArctic and other forms of
reflection on borders and how they are addressed/defined. The distance learning are mentioned.
indicator tries to capture if (high) stability and stability-build-
ing are mentioned. One of the key phenomena is how the inter- The Implementation indicator identifies the different ways the
pretation of security has changed over time. It also enquires into state plans to implement the strategy. This includes the pro-
the role of armed forces and what the listed military capabilities vision of recommendations or action items, if any additional
are, including the Coast Guard (in some states, this is outside budgets have been created, if and how the state will follow-up
the armed forces). The indicator also reflects measures being on the strategy, and if there will be any evaluation processes.
taken to increase security. Last, but not least, the indicator fo-
cuses on whether NATO is mentioned, and if so, what kind of
role it plays in the Arctic. Coding and Analysis
The Safety and Search and Rescue (SAR) indicator captures As there were many documents and indicators/sub-indicators
the different safety and emergency issues identified in the doc- and to be analyzed, a spreadsheet was used to organize the
uments. It also seeks to better understand what safety and SAR information by document type and country. For the Arctic
agreements are in place (or being developed), what capabilities states, for example, each country had its own tab with a ta-
the different states have, whether integration of safety at a re- ble to capture the coding by document and by (sub)indicator.
gional level is desired, and what authorities are involved in safe- Figure 4 provides an example of a blank sheet for the human
ty and SAR, including the role of the Coast Guard. dimension indicator that provides for the capture of quantita-
tive and qualitative data.
The Economy indicator seeks to identify various economic ac-
tivities in/concerning the Arctic region of the different states,
including resources, energy, transport and trade. It also looks at
what contributions these activities make to the national econ-
omy. Other important economic considerations are the role of
sustainable development, how economic activities are regulated,
if sanctions are addressed, what economic actors are involved,
and additionally, how economic activities are prioritized in the Figure 4. Coding the Documents
documents.
Each document was carefully read and the quotes were added
The Tourism indicator seeks to understand how tourism is de- to the middle column and any thoughts or comments about the
fined in the Arctic context, who the tourism actors are and how quote were added to the comments column. The quotes were
tourism is organized. The indicator looks at whether and how then used to compare and contrast how the different documents
safety is defined in connection to tourism. It aims to capture the address these issues.
scale and volume of the industry. In the cruise industry, it looks at
the different types of activities and how much the state supports The column on the left for ‘scale’ was used to calculate how many
tourism. Importantly, the indicator targets the impact of tourism quotes were assigned to each sub-indicator and totaled for each
with regard to the environment, society, economy, and culture— indicator. Figure 5 provides an example of the scaling for Cana-
what the possible side-effects are and how to mitigate them. da’s 2009 and Finland’s 2013 national strategies. The table shows
both the total number of quotes for each indicator and docu-

27
Introduction and Methods

ment, and the percentage of total quotes for each indicator. The This quote was assigned to both the Human Dimension and the
percentage is the important number. For example, if only the to- Economy indicators and would thus be counted twice.
tal number of quotes is compared, it shows that Finland speaks
to the Human Dimension more than Canada does. However, as Second, not all (sub)indicators can provide quantitative analy-
the Finnish document is longer than the Canadian one and has sis. In particular, the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic
more than twice as many quotes coded for the entire document, and the Implementation indicators are qualitative in nature, as
this kind of comparison is misleading. For a more accurate com- they seek to capture only descriptive information. They provide
parison, the focus must be on the percentage of quotes. better insights into how the region is defined and understood,
what actors are involved, and the different approaches to strate-
gy implementation.

Third, many of the strategies provide recommendations or

‘action items’ throughout the document, such as that of the
Kingdom of Denmark. These quotes were usually applied to
the most relevant (sub)indicator(s) and are accounted for in the
scaling and indicator percentage for each document. In con-
trast, both the Finnish and Russian documents provide more
detailed implementation plans at the end of their strategies than
most of the other documents. As such, this information was ac-
counted for in the comments section of the coding sheets and
not counted in the total number of quotes; it will, however, be
discussed in the Implementation indicator discussion.
Figure 5. Scaling the Indicators
Note: the percentages have been rounded to the closest full number and may Fourth, note that although we use U.S. spelling, in quotes the
thus not equal exactly 100  % due to a rounding error. spelling reflects the original text.

The total number of quotes paints a different picture. Figure As a conclusion, several rounds of coding, description, com-
5 shows that Canada actually spoke more to the Human Di- parative study (points of similarity and difference), analysis
mension (15 %) than Finland (9 %). As all the documents are and conclusion have been carried out for each category of Arc-
different lengths, turning the actual number of quotes into tic States’ policies and strategies, Permanent Participants’ pol-
percentages allows for a comparison between documents to icies and declarations, Arctic Council Observer States’ policies
more accurately identify which document prioritizes certain and strategies, and Arctic Council chairmanship programs
indicators and which do not. These numbers are then turned and ministerial declarations. Based on these analyses there is
into bar graphs for easy comparison to show trends over time a synthesis and conclusion, as well as a list of main themes
and across countries. in each category that can be seen and interpreted as new and
emerging trends of the state of Arctic governance and geopol-
Four factors must be taken into consideration for this analysis: itics at the early 21st century.

First, one quote may be used in more than one indicator based
on its complexity. For example, the current strategy for Finland
states that
“For the Arctic regions, it is vital to be able to reconcile tradi-
tional livelihoods with the modern industrial-scale exploita-
tion of natural resources. For example, reindeer husbandry
is of deep-seated social and cultural significance while at the
same being a source of income. For the Saami, reindeer hus-
bandry is an integral part of the Indigenous language and
culture. Yet the area designated for reindeer husbandry in
Finland is much larger than the Saami region extending far
south of the Polar Circle.” (Finland. Prime Minister’s Office
[PMO]. 2013, 12)

28
Part I:
Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The Arctic States are a group of countries located in the entire Canada
North, at the top of the world. Territories extending into the Arc-
tic Circle, as the main criteria of an Arctic country, are Canada, The Arctic has long been a political priority for the Canadian gov-
Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland ernment (see, e.g., Cavell and Kropf 2016). In 2000, the Cana-
and the Faroe Islands), Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, dian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
and the United States of America (due to Alaska). (DFAIT) published a paper entitled The Northern Dimension
of Canada’s Foreign Policy which was to form an important
These states first came together at the government ministerial part of Canada’s foreign policy (Canada DFAIT 2000). The
level in June 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland, to sign the Declaration guiding principles of the paper are: “to enhance the security
on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi Dec- and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and Ab-
laration 1991) and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strate- original peoples [and] to assert and ensure the preservation of
gy (AEPS 1991). Since then, they have cooperated intensively to Canada’s sovereignty in the North”, as well as “to establish the
protect the Arctic environment and to promote the sustainable circumpolar Region as a vibrant geopolitical entity” and “pro-
development of the northernmost regions of the globe. In 1996, mote the human security of northerners and the sustainable
supported by Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations, they es- development of the Arctic (2000, 2).
tablished the Arctic Council, a high-level forum for multilateral
cooperation. The eight Arctic states, also called the Arctic Eight However, it was not until 2009 that Canada created its first
(A8), are the members of the Arctic Council. Arctic strategy, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our
Heritage, Our Future (Canada INAC 2009) with 41 pages, in-
The first section of this scientific report deals with the national cluding maps and pictures. In 2010, the government released
strategies and policies of the eight Arctic states with respect to its Arctic foreign policy with the Statement on Canada’s Arctic
Arctic regions and Arctic affairs. It provides a holistic, multi-di- Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s
mensional understanding of current Arctic governance and geo- Northern Strategy Abroad, with 27 pages, no maps or pictures
politics through an examination of the national strategies and (Canada DFAIT 2010).
policies of the Arctic States. Each state is analyzed individually—
indicator by indicator—so that a comparison can be made be- Canada began the process of updating its Arctic policy in 2017
tween states’ strategies and policies and how these have evolved with the release of the Arctic Policy Framework Discussion
over time. This detailed comparison helps to elicit the similarities Guide (Canada INAC 2017). This was used as the foundation
and differences between the current governance priorities of the for a series of public consultations that would inform the final
policies of the Arctic Council members, first indicator by indica- policy document. The new policy is also partly influenced by
tor, and then more generally. A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model (Simon 2017). Canada’s
Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, with eight empha-
As all eight Arctic states are primary actors in the Arctic Coun- sized pillars, was finally published in September 2019. Thus,
cil and ultimately responsible for governing the Arctic region, a due to this late release, the 2009 and 2010 documents remain
deep holistic analysis of this kind is essential information for de- the most current and are the focus of the analysis here.
cision-makers, politicians, civil servants, businesses, researchers,
and planners, not just in the Arctic community but worldwide. The 2009 northern strategy (here the 2009 Strategy) is taken as
The analysis also contains data that will be of value and interest Canada’s primary strategy document as the 2010 foreign policy
from the scientific and educational point of view—both ‘lessons (here the 2010 Policy) was designed to facilitate the same over-
learned’ to date and lessons to-be-learned for the future. arching themes, but at an international level (2010, 4). The four
priority areas outlined in the 2009 Strategy are: “exercising our
Arctic sovereignty; promoting social and economic development;
protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and improving
and devolving northern governance” (2009, paragraph 3 of Min-
ister’s message).

The 2010 Policy repeats these priorities, but also states that “in
pursuing each of these pillars in our Arctic foreign policy, Can-
ada is committed to exercising the full extent of its sovereignty,

29
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the region” (2010, 4), sug- ernment approach. Since taking office, the Prime Minister and
gesting that sovereignty is of the utmost importance in the glob- many federal cabinet ministers have made regular visits to Can-
al arena. The 2010 Policy lists 13 additional items to facilitate ada’s North” (2010, 6), although there is no mention of which
Canada’s Arctic agenda that cover issues including improving cabinet ministers were included in these visits.
the living conditions and wellbeing of northerners, trade, ad-
dressing environmental concerns, and a range of international To understand where the Canadian government places its prior-
governance issues. ities, Figure 6 provides a comparison of how many quotes were
assigned to the different indicators, given as a percentage of the
Comparison by Indicator total number of coded quotes in the document (rounded to the
nearest whole number), thus allowing for the identification of
The quotes in the (Re)defining and (Re)mapping the Arctic in- priority changes.
dicator provide insights into how the federal government under-
stands the region and what it means for Canada’s identity. For
example, the 2009 Strategy states that “Canada’s far North is a
fundamental part of Canada – it is part of our heritage, our fu-
ture and our identity as a country” (2009, 1). Similarly, the 2010
Policy states that “the Arctic is fundamental to Canada’s national
identity...The Arctic is embedded in Canadian history and cul-
ture, and in the Canadian soul. The Arctic also represents tre-
mendous potential for Canada’s future” (2010, 3). This suggests
that the government sees the Arctic as more than just an eco-
nomic opportunity and that there should be interest in all aspects
of Canada’s northern governance actions (see Berger 1977).

Both documents use the terms the “Arctic” and the “North” to
describe the region in question. This is not surprising as the
2009 Strategy primarily focuses on the three northern territories Figure 6. Comparing Canada’s 2009 Strategy and 2010 Policy Documents
(Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut) which generally start Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
at or around the 60th parallel. At the same time, the document and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
acknowledges that many of Canada’s northern Indigenous com-
munities are not found solely within political boundaries and The Human Dimension indicator, which accounts for 15 % of
that “the lands just south of the Arctic Circle have been occu- the total coded quotes of the 2009 Strategy and 6 % for the 2010
pied for thousands of years by the ancestors of today’s Aboriginal Policy (see Figure 6), has three major themes: i) demographic
peoples including the Dene, Gwich’in, Cree and Métis. Today, issues and their effect on regional equality; ii) Indigenous culture
these Aboriginal peoples live in communities across the Yukon, and language; and iii) health and wellbeing.
southern Northwest Territories and northern border regions of
mainland provinces” (2009, 3). The map on page 29 of the 2009 With respect to Canada’s northern demographics and equality
Strategy also shows that Inuit land treaties have been settled not in the 2009 Strategy, the federal government states that there is
only in Nunavut and parts of the Northwest Territories, but in “a small population in communities spread over vast distances”
northern Quebec and Labrador. This broader definition of the (2009, 31). There are also inequalities between the Canadian ter-
North is found in the 2010 Policy as the region “is home to many ritories and between northern and southern Canada, generally.
Canadians, including Indigenous peoples, across the Yukon, the These three northern territories “have very different economies
Northwest Territories and Nunavut, and the northern parts of and very different infrastructure requirements, which is why
many Canadian provinces” (2010, 3). There are also other “small Canada is working closely with the territorial governments to
populations” (2009, 31). The documents recognize other de- develop tailored responses to local needs” (2009, 17). It is also
scriptors that are used for the region, such as “fragile and unique why the federal government is “continuing to ensure North-
ecosystems” (2009, 24), “unique and fragile environment” and erners in remote and isolated communities have access to good
“magnificent ecological region” (2010, 16, 17). quality, nutritious food at affordable prices” (2009, 22). In con-
trast, efforts to address regional inequalities of the North, com-
Both documents identify some of the federal ministries with re- pared to southern Canada, is not addressed in the 2010 Policy.
gional responsibilities, but there are differences as to how these
are discussed in the two documents. The 2009 (northern) Strat- The 2009 Strategy discusses the land claim process for Indige-
egy identifies Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, nous peoples, stating that “Aboriginal people throughout the
and Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada as minis- North have negotiated land claim and self-government agree-
tries with Arctic responsibilities, along with the Canadian Coast ments that give them the institutions and resources to achieve
Guard, and Defence Research, and Development Canada as oth- greater self-sufficiency” (2009, 4).
er government bodies playing a role (2009). In contrast, the 2010
(Arctic foreign) Policy states: “we are taking a whole-of-gov-

30
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The 2009 Strategy further comments on the economic opportu- social services” (2009, 19). The federal government will also “con-
nity provided to Indigenous peoples through northern mining tinue to work collaboratively with Northerners on issues such as
projects, especially through the Mackenzie Gas Project (2009, health promotion and disease prevention” (2009, 22). Wellbeing
15). The document also acknowledges that “Canada works close- is also linked to economic prosperity; among other things, “the
ly with the six international Indigenous peoples groups that have territories also receive federal support for targeted initiatives to
Permanent Participant status—three of which have strong roots address specific challenges in the North, such as for labour mar-
in Canada: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council ket training” (2009, 21).
International, and the Inuit Circumpolar Council” (2009, 13).
The 2010 Policy also discusses the health and wellbeing of north-
The 2009 Strategy also addresses Indigenous culture and recog- erners and on the role the Arctic Council. For instance, it stress-
nizes that “long before the arrival of Europeans, Inuit hunters, es that “Canada has been supporting efforts through the Arctic
fishers and their families moved with the seasons and developed Council and International Polar Year research to better under-
a unique culture and way of life deeply rooted in the vast land” stand the issues and then develop and implement appropriate
(2009, 3). Furthermore, “the Government of Canada recognizes health policies” (2010, 15). Additionally, “Canada will continue
its responsibility to preserve and protect Canada’s rich Northern to encourage a greater understanding of the human dimension
heritage in the face of new challenges and opportunities” (2009, of the Arctic to improve the lives of Northerners, particularly
39). Interesting here is the lack of discussion around current through the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council’s Arctic Human
cultural practices and how the Indigenous peoples themselves Development Report was the first comprehensive assessment of
would identify. human well-being to address the entire Arctic region” (2010, 15).

Similarly, the 2010 Policy acknowledges the importance of land The quotes in the Governance indicator, which accounts for 14 %
claims as “Indigenous communities are developing made-in-the- of the total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 19 % for the
North policies and strategies to address their unique economic 2010 Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30) capture the existing governance
and social challenges and opportunities” (2010, 22). Unlike the structures mentioned in the two documents, including forms of
2009 Strategy, the 2010 Policy recognizes the importance of lan- self-governance/determination, approaches to natural resources
guage preservation, stating that “the 2008 Arctic Indigenous Lan- and blue economy governance, and the extent to which interna-
guages Symposium ... underlined the importance of preserving tional and transboundary cooperation is depicted.
and strengthening Indigenous languages” (2010, 15). However,
the majority of quotes about Indigenous peoples in the 2010 Pol- The 2009 Strategy mentions a few of the existing governance
icy were in the context of supporting the Permanent Participants structures. These include the Ilulissat Declaration, the Interna-
at the Arctic Council. For example, the document states that tional Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations, the
“Canada will encourage other Arctic Council states to support the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
participation of their Permanent Participant organizations” and (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
that “as interest by non-Arctic players in the work of the Coun- Sea (UNCLOS), and the Arctic Council (2009, 36, 37). Consid-
cil grows, Canada will work to ensure that the central role of the ering Canada’s role in the formation of the Arctic Council, the
Permanent Participants is not diminished or diluted” (2010, 23). Strategy states, not surprisingly, that “the Arctic Council is an im-
portant venue for deepening global understanding of the Arctic
The 2010 Policy differs from the 2009 Strategy in its discussions and has played a key role in developing a common agenda among
around protecting the human rights of Indigenous peoples. For Arctic states” (2009, 35). This statement indicates Canada’s con-
instance, the document recognizes that “Canada is taking steps to tinued support for the Council and the value it has for the region.
endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples in a manner fully consistent with Canada’s Con- The 2010 Policy mentions a few more governance structures
stitution and laws” (2010, 22), although Canada did not actually than the northern Strategy does, in particular, the Arctic
support the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig- Council, the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians for the
enous Peoples (UNDRIP) until 2016 (INAC 2017). The Policy Arctic Region, Northern Forum, IMO, United Nations Frame-
stresses, too, that “Canada is committed to defend sealing on the work Convention on Climate Change, UNCLOS, United Na-
international stage” (DFAIT 2010, 16), presumably in response tions Convention on Biological Diversity, the Inuit Circumpo-
to the 2009 European Seal ban that came into effect in 2010 (see: lar Council, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
European Commission 2019). Pollutants, the Copenhagen Accord, the Migratory Bird Treaty
(Canada–USA), and the Agreement on the Conservation of
Health and wellbeing are addressed in both documents. In the Polar Bears (Canada–Kingdom of Denmark–Norway–Russia–
2009 Strategy, it relates to increased access to health services, es- USA) (2010, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20, 26).
pecially through funding transfers from the federal government
to the territories. For example, the Strategy states that “in order The Policy also recognizes that in general, more and more ac-
to support healthy and vibrant communities, the Government of tors are becoming involved in the region, which will inevitably
Canada today provides annual unconditional funding of almost have governance implications. At the same time, it makes clear:
$2.5 billion … which enables territorial governments to fund pro- “While many of these players could have a contribution to make
grams and services such as hospitals, schools, infrastructure and in the development of the North, Canada does not accept the

31
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

premise that the Arctic requires a fundamentally new gover- abroad about the role of this new research facility and a feasi-
nance structure or legal framework. Nor does Canada accept bility study is being conducted to determine where the facility
that the Arctic nation states are unable to appropriately manage will be located” (2009, 25–6). However, for the latter, the extent
the North as it undergoes fundamental change” (2010, 9). to which the public (i.e., local residents) was engaged is unclear.

Both documents have a section on ‘Improving and Devolving The 2010 Policy makes clear the importance of consultations
Northern Governance’ which addresses the increasing role of and states that “the Government of Canada is moving forward
the territorial governments and Canada’s northern Indigenous in consultation with communities and industry to add nearly
peoples. The 2009 Strategy explains that “in the past few decades 70,000 square kilometres to Canada’s Northern protected ar-
Northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for eas network…The creation of the majority of existing national
many aspects of their region’s affairs. One exception was con- parks in the Arctic proceeded hand-in-hand with land claim
trol over lands and resource management, which stayed with the negotiations, as are all of the new national park proposals”
federal government” (2009, 28). This means that the Northern (2010, 19). The document mentions increasing consultations
governments do not yet have full economic self-responsibility. with the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants, stating that
Similarly, the 2010 Policy states: “In recent decades, Canada’s “Canada will engage with Northerners on Canada’s Arctic for-
Northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for eign policy. Through the Canadian Arctic Council Advisory
many aspects of their region’s affairs” (2010, 22). Committee, Northern governments and Indigenous Perma-
nent Participant organizations in Canada will have the oppor-
On Indigenous self-governance, both documents make similar tunity to actively participate in shaping Canadian policy on
statements that land-claim settlements are leading to increased Arctic issues” (2010, 23). Additionally, the document states that
autonomy for Indigenous peoples (2009, 30; 2010, 22). In the “Canada will engage with Northern governments and Perma-
context of land claims, the 2009 Strategy notes that progress has nent Participants to ensure that the Arctic Council continues
been made in all three Territories as “11 of 14 Yukon First Na- to respond to the region’s challenges and opportunities, thus
tions have signed self-government agreements. A majority of the furthering our national interests” (2010, 25). The decision to
Northwest Territories is covered by Comprehensive Land Claims use the word ‘engage’ in the first and third quotes is interesting
Agreements that give Aboriginal people the authority to manage because engagement is suggestive of greater collaboration (see:
their lands and resources. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Open University n.d.).
led to the creation of Canada’s newest territory in 1999, provid-
ing Inuit of the Eastern Arctic with some 350,000 square kilome- Despite the previous statements on consultation and increased
ters in the largest Aboriginal land claim settlement in Canadian self-governance capabilities for Indigenous peoples, these
history” (2009, 30); it also mentions land claims in Labrador. groups may not have much influence in federal-level decision
making. For example, the 2009 Strategy and the 2010 Policy
Natural resources and the blue economy are also subject to dif- state that science is integral to the decision-making process
ferent governance practices. However, neither document pays (2009, 24; 2010, 22). That said, the 2010 Policy notes that “Can-
much attention to this. The 2009 Strategy only addresses the ada recognizes and values the important role Northern govern-
continental shelf extension and notes that “research will ensure ments, Arctic Indigenous organizations at the Arctic Council ...
Canada secures recognition for the maximum extent of its conti- and other Northerners have played, and will continue to play,
nental shelf in both the Arctic and Atlantic oceans when we pres- in shaping Canada’s international actions” (2010, 23). Thus, at
ent our submission to the United Nations Commission on the a domestic level, at least, the territories and Indigenous peoples
Limits of the Continental Shelf by the end of 2013” (2009, 12). are gaining the ability to make their own decisions. However,
The 2010 Policy also mentions the continental shelf and possible they may not be able to affect federal-level decisions. Thus, co-
changes to oil extraction processes. In particular, it states that “in operation is a key factor in Arctic regional governance.
the wake of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, we are furthering
our collaboration at the appropriate levels, in particular with the The International Cooperation and International Treaties in-
United States and Denmark/Greenland in light of our common dicator, accounting for 11 % of the total coded quotes of the
interests in the Arctic marine environment” (2010, 13). Gover- 2009 Strategy and 13 % of the 2010 Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30),
nance of resources, therefore, includes control over access and demonstrates the importance of international cooperation to
environmental protection. Canada’s Arctic efforts. Indeed, both documents state that “co-
operation, diplomacy and international law have always been
Both documents address the need for public consultations and/ Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic” (2009, 33; 2010,
or environmental impact assessments in some capacity. The 2009 27). The 2009 Strategy also remarks that “Canada has a strong
Strategy states that “any company now undertaking industrial history of working with our northern neighbours to promote
development in the North must undertake a rigorous environ- Canadian interests internationally and advance our role as a re-
mental assessment, establish a site closure and remediation plan, sponsible Arctic nation” (2009, 33), yet at the same time, “as in-
meet standards for operational and environmental safety and ternational interest in the region increases, effective Canadian
satisfy the requirements of various laws including the Fisheries stewardship of our sovereign territory and the active promo-
Act” (2009, 28). It also covers the creation of a new northern re- tion of Canadian interests internationally are more important
search station, stating that “extensive consultations at home and than ever before” (2009, 33). Similarly, the 2010 Policy states

32
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

that “the rapid pace of change and growing importance of the The 2010 Policy also recognizes the importance of cooperation
Arctic requires that we enhance our capacity to deliver on Can- at all levels. For example, the document states that “facing the
ada’s priorities on the international scene” (2010, 24). challenges and seizing the opportunities that we face often re-
quire finding ways to work with others: through bilateral rela-
International cooperation is important as Canada has “common tions with our neighbours in the Arctic, through regional mech-
interests with, and things to learn from, our other Arctic neigh- anisms like the Arctic Council, and through other multilateral
bours – Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland” (2009, institutions” (2010, 24).
35). For example, the 2009 Strategy discusses different forms of
cooperation with Arctic partners, such as Canada’s “long histo- The Environment Protection indicator, which accounts for 9 %
ry of effective collaboration and cooperation with the United of the total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 10 % of the
States and [will] continue to deepen cooperation on emerging 2010 Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30). Both documents position the
Arctic issues, bilaterally and through the Arctic Council and Arctic environment and ecosystems as “fragile” and “unique”
other multilateral institutions” (2009, 34). The document also (2009, 24; 2010, 16), while the 2010 Policy also recognizes the
mentions cooperation with “non-Arctic states on Arctic issues. Arctic as a “magnificent and unspoiled region” (2010, 17). It is
For example, Canada and the United Kingdom signed a Mem- not surprising, therefore, that both documents make statements
orandum of Understanding for cooperation in polar research” about prioritizing environmental protection. For example, the
(2009, 35). Cooperation, therefore, is an important aspect of 2009 Strategy states that “Canada is committed to helping en-
regional governance. sure these ecosystems are safeguarded for future generations”
and that “the Northern tradition of respect for the land and
The 2010 foreign Policy addresses cooperation with the USA in the environment is paramount and the principles of responsi-
military terms through Operation Nanook and through polar ble and sustainable development anchor all decision-making
bear management (2010, 7, 18). This relationship is important and action” (2009, 24, 1). The 2010 foreign Policy stresses that
because “the United States is our premier partner in the Arctic “Canada is committed to planning and managing Arctic Ocean
and our goal is a more strategic engagement on Arctic issues” and land-based activities domestically and internationally in an
(2010, 24). Canada is also working on the continental shelf de- integrated and comprehensive manner that balances conser-
limitation (2010, 9) and the government is “working with Rus- vation, sustainable use and economic development—ensuring
sia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland to advance benefits for users and the ecosystem as a whole” (2010, 17).
shared interests such as trade and transportation, environmen- Furthermore, the 2009 northern Strategy states that “the Gov-
tal protection, natural resource development, the role of Indig- ernment of Canada is introducing measures to ensure that reg-
enous peoples, oceans management, climate change adaptation ulatory systems across the North protect the environment in a
and scientific cooperation” (2010, 24). Canada also wishes to predictable, effective and efficient manner” (2009, 15). The 2010
work with its Arctic Council partners on organizational change. foreign Policy stresses Canada’s history of maritime pollution
In particular, “Canada will work with other member states to prevention through the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
address the structural needs of the organization. While the cur- (AWPPA). Its continuing protection efforts through meteoro-
rent informal nature of the body has served Canada well for logical monitoring “will also enhance environmental protection
many years, the growing demands on the organization may re- of the Arctic marine environment, support Northern residents
quire changes to make it more robust” (2010, 26). in their maritime activities, and provide necessary services for
coastal and marine-based resource development” (2010, 14).
As discussed in the governance indicator, a number of interna- Additionally, the 2010 Policy recognizes that “as part of its man-
tional agreements or forums in which Canada partakes, such date, the Arctic Council has been playing a lead role in identify-
as the Arctic Council, the IMO, UNCLOS, the UNFCCC, are ing large marine ecosystems in the region and determining best
identified by both documents. Canada also works bilaterally practices in ocean management” (2010, 18).
with other states on shared issues; for example, the 2009 Strat-
egy stresses that “the United States remains an exceptionally The commitment to environmental protection is further ad-
valuable partner in the Arctic. Canada and the United States dressed through recognition of Canada’s efforts to develop pro-
share a number of common interests in the Arctic, such as en- tected areas. The 2009 Strategy states that “Canada is taking a
vironmental stewardship, sustainable resource development comprehensive approach to the protection of environmentally
and safety and security” (2009, 34). There is also cooperation sensitive lands and waters in our North, ensuring conservation
at the government ministry level between countries, with the is keeping pace with development” (2009, 26); this includes col-
Strategy specifically mentioning that “the Memorandum of Un- laboration with Indigenous peoples in Labrador and Nunavut.
derstanding signed between the Department of Indian Affairs Furthermore, “in the Northwest Territories, Canada has pro-
and Northern Development Canada and the Russian Ministry tected large areas from development through land withdrawals
of Regional Development to examine cooperative projects with and work is underway on a number of conservation initiatives”
Indigenous Peoples is a recent example of Canada’s bilateral ef- (2009, 26). The 2010 Policy recognizes Canada’s domestic com-
forts with Russia, which include new trading relationships and mitment to environmental protection, stating that “Canada has
transportation routes, environmental protection and Indige- made significant progress in establishing protected areas in over
nous issues” (2009, 34). 10 percent of our North, designating 80 protected areas cover-
ing nearly 400,000 square kilometres” (2010, 19).

33
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Initiatives also include animal protection. The 2010 Policy states mestic and global partners” (2009, 27), and also the introduc-
that “Canada has signed a Memorandum of Understanding tion of “new ballast water control regulations that will reduce
with the United States for the conservation and management of the risk of vessels releasing harmful aquatic species and patho-
a shared polar bear population. In addition, Canada has devel- gens into our waters” (2009, 11).
oped agreements with other Arctic nations to jointly manage po-
lar bears, narwhals and belugas” (2010, 18). Further to this, “the The 2010 Policy recognizes both domestic and international ef-
Council has recently developed the Arctic Species Trend Index, forts, such as the role of AWPPA (2010, 16), and by “providing
which provides decision-makers with a valuable tool for manag- $3.5 billion over 15 years to address federal contaminated sites,
ing and predicting Arctic wildlife populations. Tracking the in- with the majority of resources directed to contaminated sites in
dex over time will facilitate this prediction of trends and identify the North” (2010, 21) as part of the Federal Contaminated Sites
species and groups experiencing rapid change” (2010, 18). Action Plan. Canada’s international effort is “committed to con-
tributing to the global effort by taking action to reduce Canada’s
The topic of biodiversity is a point of difference between the two greenhouse gas emissions through sustained action domesti-
documents as the term ‘biodiversity’ is not mentioned in the cally to build a low-carbon economy, working with our North
2009 Strategy. The 2010 foreign Policy mentions that “Canada American partners and constructively engaging with our inter-
will continue to lead the Arctic Council’s Circumpolar Biodi- national partners to negotiate a fair, environmentally effective
versity Monitoring Program to ensure information on pop- and comprehensive international climate change regime based
ulation status and trends for Arctic species and ecosystems is on the Copenhagen Accord” (2010, 20). The 2010 Policy also
available and supports initiatives such as the Arctic Biodiversity states that “Canada and the Inuit Circumpolar Council played
Assessment” (2010, 18). an important role in the negotiation of the Stockholm Conven-
tion on Persistent Organic Pollutants” (2010, 21).
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 5 % for the 2010 Policy (see For the Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 4 % of
Figure 6, p. 30), provides insights into Canada’s understanding the total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 8 % of the 2010
of, and approach to, pollution in the Arctic, although to different foreign Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30), both documents recognize
extents. For example, the 2009 Strategy identifies mining waste different consequences of climate change. For example, the 2009
and pathogens (2009, 28, 11), whereas the 2010 Policy recogniz- Strategy states that “the North also has fragile and unique eco-
es oil, black carbon, carbon dioxide, mercury, greenhouse gas- systems which are being negatively affected by the impacts of
es, and Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (2010, 12, 20, 21). climate change” (2009, 24) and that “the effects of environmen-
Both documents recognize that some pollutants come from out- tal change, such as shifting and melting permafrost, melting gla-
side of the region. The 2009 Strategy recognizes the harm from ciers, shrinking ocean ice and a shortened season for ice roads
ballast waters and has “also amended the Arctic Waters Pollu- could have significant cultural and economic consequences for
tion Prevention Act to extend the application of the Act from the people of the North, and the entire nation” (2009, 8). Sim-
100 to 200 nautical miles from our coastline...This amendment ilarly, the 2010 Policy states that “the resulting rapid reduction
gives us pollution prevention enforcement jurisdiction over an in Arctic multi-year sea ice has had, and will continue to have,
additional half million square kilometres of our waters” (2009, profound consequences for the peoples and communities of the
11-12). The 2010 Policy further recognizes that the “persistent Arctic. What happens in the Arctic will have global repercus-
organic pollutants and mercury, released far from the Arctic, sions on accelerating climate change elsewhere” (2010, 16). Fur-
have had serious impacts on Arctic peoples” (2010, 21). thermore, “decreasing ice cover will lead, over time, to increases
in shipping, tourism and economic development in the Arctic
Both documents name the extractive resources industry as the Ocean region.” Therefore, “Canada and other Arctic Ocean
source of pollutants. The 2009 Strategy states that “new devel- coastal states must begin to prepare for greater traffic into the re-
opment projects may increase the number of pollutants, threat- gion, with sometimes negative effects” (2010, 9, 10). To this end,
ening Northerners’ health and the region’s fragile ecosystems” the 2010 Policy also acknowledges the security consequences of
and that “just as important are our clean-up programs to repair an increasingly accessible Arctic Ocean.
or remediate environmental damage at abandoned mines and
other contaminated sites throughout the North” (2009, 8, 28). Both documents recognize the need for mitigation vis-à-vis
The 2010 Policy notes that mercury and greenhouse gases often adaptation. In the 2009 Strategy, the federal government states
come “from coal-fired electricity generating plants” (2010, 21), that this may include learning from other Arctic states, and
but does not say if these are from Canada, other Arctic states, or also come through scientific contributions like the 2007–2008
from other parts of the world. International Polar Year (IPY) that “focused on two key priori-
ties: climate change impacts and adaptation; and the health and
Both documents also identify different approaches to address- well-being of Northerners and Northern communities” (2009,
ing Arctic pollution. For instance, the 2009 Strategy identifies 24). The 2010 Policy also recognizes some of Canada’s domestic
various different domestic efforts, such as the previously men- efforts, for example: “over 60 projects have been funded in the
tioned AWPPA extension, “Canada’s Health of the Oceans ini- Canadian Arctic that have led to the development of commu-
tiative, which strengthens the ability of Northern communities nity and regional adaptation plans, increasing knowledge and
to respond to pollution and fosters greater cooperation with do- understanding of climate-related implications and the develop-

34
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

ment of strong partnerships essential to implementing adapta- the integrity of our borders, is the first and foremost respon-
tion action” (2010, 21). sibility of a national government. We are resolved to protect
Canadian sovereignty throughout our Arctic” (2010, 10). It
More formal international climate action structures are also is therefore not surprising that the document makes similar
mentioned in both documents. For instance, the 2009 Strategy statements about Canada’s sovereignty: “Canada’s sovereignty
states that “there are other forums that provide opportunities is the foundation for realizing the full potential of Canada’s
to raise Arctic issues. These include … discussions and nego- North, including its human dimension. This foundation is
tiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli- solid: Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is long-standing, well es-
mate Change” (2009, 36). The 2010 Policy recognizes the Co- tablished and based on historic title, founded in part on the
penhagen Accord, the “Arctic Council’s recent Vulnerability and presence of Inuit and other Indigenous peoples since time
Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic project,” and “the immemorial” (2010, 5). Furthermore, “Canada exercises its
International Maritime Organization and the United Nations sovereignty daily through good governance and responsible
Framework Convention on Climate Change [which are work- stewardship. It does so through the broad range of actions it
ing] towards global solutions to issues like polar shipping regu- undertakes as a government—whether related to social and
lations and climate change” (2010, 20, 26). economic development, Arctic science and research, environ-
mental protection, the operations of the Canadian Forces or
Finally, both documents recognize the importance of scientific the activities of the Canadian Coast Guard and Royal Canadi-
research. Indeed, the 2009 Strategy, as mentioned above, ac- an Mounted Police” (2010, 6). The document also recognizes
knowledges the contributions made to climate change knowl- the well managed boundary disputes and reasserts Canada’s
edge through the IPY, and the 2010 Policy also mentions that sovereignty, stating that “through our Arctic foreign policy,
“the Arctic Council’s 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment we are also sending a clear message: Canada is in control of
heightened global awareness of the problem” (2010, 19). its Arctic lands and waters and takes its stewardship role and
responsibilities seriously” (2010, 27).
The Security indicator accounts for 10 % of the total coded
quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 12 % of the 2010 Policy (see There is a heavy focus on the role of the Canadian Forces for
Figure 6, p. 30) and shows that security is very much linked to security and sovereignty purposes. For example, the 2009
sovereignty; both documents define regional security in this Strategy states that “the Canadian Forces, in cooperation
context. Indeed, rather than having a section on security, the with other federal departments and agencies, will continue
first section of both documents is about sovereignty. To this to undertake operations in the North, such as Operation NA-
end, the 2009 Strategy states that “we patrol and protect our NOOK, conduct regular patrols for surveillance and security
territory through enhanced presence on the land, in the sea purposes, monitor and control Northern airspace as part of
and over the skies of the Arctic” (2009, 2); similarly, the 2010 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD),
Policy states that “since 2007, the Government of Canada has and maintain the signals intelligence receiving facility at CFS
announced a number of initiatives to enhance our capacity in Alert, the most northern permanently inhabited settlement in
the North and to exercise, responsibly, our sovereignty there” the world” (2009, 11). Additionally, “significant investments
(2010, 6). To facilitate these efforts, “Canadian Forces will also in new capabilities on the land include establishing an Army
take advantage of new technologies to enhance surveillance Training Centre in Resolute Bay on the shore of the Northwest
capacity of our territory and its approaches” (2010, 7). Passage, and expanding and modernizing the Canadian rang-
ers – a reserve Force responsible for providing military pres-
As sovereignty is a significant component of both documents, ence and surveillance and for assisting with search and rescue
they further explain how sovereignty is practiced. The 2009 in remote, isolated and coastal communities of Northern Can-
Strategy explains that “Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is long- ada” (2009, 10).
standing, well-established and based on historic title, founded
in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples Correspondingly, the 2010 Policy states that “the Canada First
since time immemorial,” and that “in a dynamic and chang- Defence Strategy will give the Canadian Forces the tools it
ing Arctic, exercising our sovereignty includes maintaining a needs to provide an increased presence in the Arctic” and that
strong presence in the North, enhancing our stewardship of “Canada and the United States work together to better moni-
the region, defining our domain and advancing our knowledge tor and control Northern airspace through our cooperation in
of the region” (2009, 9). The document also recognizes the NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defence Command”
boundary disputes over Hans Island and the Lincoln Sea with (2010, 6, 7). Investments are also being made to increase op-
Denmark and in the Beaufort Sea with the USA, but explains erational capabilities, for example, “Canada is investing in
that “all of these disagreements are well-managed and pose no new patrol ships that will be capable of sustained operation
sovereignty or defence challenges for Canada In fact, they have in first-year ice to ensure we can closely monitor our waters
had no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and as they gradually open up and maritime activity increases”
cooperatively with the United States, Denmark or other Arc- (2010, 6) Furthermore, “Canada is also expanding the size and
tic neighbours on issues of real significance and importance” capabilities of the Canadian Rangers, drawn primarily from
(2009, 13). The 2010 Policy also stresses the importance of Indigenous communities, that provide a military presence and
sovereignty, stating that “protecting national sovereignty, and Canada’s “eyes and ears” in remote parts of Canada” and that

35
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

“a new Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre is also being da’s northern waters. Yet “although the Northwest Passage is not
established in Resolute Bay” (2010, 7). expected to become a safe or reliable transportation route in the
near future, reduced ice coverage and longer periods of naviga-
Unlike the 2009 Strategy, the 2010 Policy also addresses the role bility may result in an increased number of ships undertaking
of NATO and expresses that “the increasing accessibility of the destination travel for tourism, natural resource exploration or
Arctic has led to a widespread perception that the region could development” (2009, 5).
become a source of conflict. This has led to heightened interest
in the Arctic in a number of international organizations includ- The 2010 Policy, as part of the Canadian sovereignty agenda ad-
ing NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation dresses “Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as
in Europe” (2010, 26). It also recognizes that “Canada does not public safety” (2010, 9), which can have a broad meaning. The
anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that document also mentions that increased maritime activity can
the region is well managed through existing institutions, partic- lead to “an increase in environmental threats, search and res-
ularly the Arctic Council” (2010, 26). cue incidents, civil emergencies and potential illegal activities”
(2010, 3) which the government will need to take into consider-
Finally, the foreign Policy is different from the northern Strate- ation, as mentioned earlier (2010, 10).
gy, in recognizing the civilian aspect of security: as mentioned
earlier, the government “will need to consider how to respond Only the 2010 Policy addresses formalized safety and search-
to issues such as emergency response and search and rescue ca- and-rescue agreements. In particular, it states that “the current
pability and potential future problems related to emergencies negotiation of a regional search and rescue agreement (the first
(including environmental), organized crime, and illegal traf- ever attempt at a binding instrument under the rubric of the
ficking in drugs and people” (2010, 10). Arctic Council) will serve as an important test case and will in-
form the scope for future policy endeavours” (2010, 25). It also
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 5 % of the total cod- mentions that “the 2009 Arctic Council Ministerial supported
ed quotes of the 2009 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 Policy (see the development of a mandatory polar code for shipping by
Figure 6, p. 30). The documents show that safety is understood the International Maritime Organization (IMO)” (2010, 13).
in different ways: they mention search and rescue (SAR), as well Within the circumpolar context, Canada appears to support co-
as maritime and environmental safety, including marine pollu- operation and collaboration rather than large-scale integrated
tion. For SAR, the 2009 Strategy states that “Canada is working safety efforts. Indeed, the Policy states that “regional solutions,
with Northern communities and governments to ensure that its supported by robust domestic legislation in Arctic states, will be
search and rescue capacity meets the needs of an ever-changing critical. Canada will work in concert with other Arctic nations
North” (2009, 12). In the 2010 Policy, SAR is mentioned in the through the Arctic Council ... with the five Arctic Ocean coastal
context of other safety issues, which will be addressed shortly. states on issues of particular relevance to the Arctic Ocean, and
bilaterally with key Arctic partners” (2010, 10).
Regarding the environment, the 2009 Strategy explains that “any
company now undertaking industrial development in the North Finally, both documents address Canada’s safety capabilities.
must undertake a rigorous environmental assessment, establish The 2009 Strategy, for example, comments that “Transport Can-
a site closure and remediation plan, meet standards for oper- ada continues to assess Canada’s capacity to respond to marine
ational and environmental safety and satisfy the requirements pollution in the Arctic and ensure that the Canadian Coast
of various laws including the Fisheries Act” (2009, 28). It also Guard and communities have the necessary equipment and
explains that “Transport Canada continues to assess Canada’s response systems in place for emergencies” (2009, 27–28). As
capacity to respond to marine pollution in the Arctic and ensure for the 2010 Policy, “within the IMO context, Canada has also
that the Canadian Coast Guard and communities have the nec- assumed responsibility for providing navigational warning and
essary equipment and response systems in place for emergen- meteorological services to facilitate the safe management of ma-
cies” (2009, 27–28). The 2010 Policy mentions environmental rine traffic in two Arctic areas …. Through this initiative, Can-
safety in a longer list of other safety issues (also addressed short- ada will deliver services that help mitigate the risks associated
ly) and that “in August 2009, the application of the AWPPA was with increased Arctic shipping” (2010, 14). Furthermore, “Can-
extended from 100 to 200 nautical miles. In addition, regula- ada is playing a key role in the creation of the Arctic Regional
tions requiring vessels to report when entering and operating Hydrographic Commission to improve our understanding of
within Canadian Arctic waters have been finalized and are in the features of the Arctic Ocean and its coastal areas [which is]
force from July 1, 2010” (2010, 16). essential knowledge for safe navigation” (2010, 14). There is no
mention of the Coast Guard in the context of safety.
Shipping safety is mentioned in the 2009 Strategy: “we are es-
tablishing new regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 The Economy indicator, which accounts for 11 % of the total
to require all vessels entering Canadian Arctic waters to report coded quotes in the 2009 Strategy and 11 % of the 2010 Policy
to the Canadian Coast Guard’s NORDREG reporting system” (see Figure 6, p. 30) provides insights into Canada’s northern
(2009, 12) which applies to vessels over 300 tonnes or “carrying economy. That said, the 2009 Strategy gives more information
as cargo a pollutant or dangerous good” (Northern Canada Ves- on the breadth of economic activities in the region. Notably, it
sel Traffic Services Zone Regulations 2010, s.3(c)) through Cana- states that “from the development of world-class diamond mines

36
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

and massive oil and gas reserves, to the growth of commercial aims to strengthen and ensure the sustainable development of
fisheries, to a thriving tourism industry that attracts visitors the Arctic Ocean” (2010, 18).
from around the globe, the enormous economic potential of the
North is being unlocked” and that “the North is also home to The 2009 Strategy prioritizes Canada’s interests in two differ-
vast renewable and cultural resources that make important con- ent ways. First, the Canadian government seeks to support in-
tributions to its economy and society” (2009, 5, 16). Canada is creased employment opportunities through skills development
also working on developing “new trading relationships” (2009, and has “invested in a range of supportive programs … to create
34) with Russia. The 2010 Policy mentions, too, the importance sustainable employment for Aboriginal people across Canada in
of “resource development,” including the “responsible and sus- major industries like mining, oil and gas, and hydro-electricity”
tainable development of oil and gas in the North” (2010, 3, 12). (2009, 19–21). Second, “a new economic development agency
Other economic activities also include “living marine resources for the North is being established. A core activity for this agency
such as fisheries,” ecotourism, and other “trade and investment will be delivering the renewed Strategic Investments in North-
opportunities” (2010, 11, 14, 19). ern Economic Development Program” (2009, 14). At the inter-
national level, the 2010 Policy seeks to improve northern Cana-
Resources and energy are important economic activities in both da’s trade opportunities, stating, for example, that “Canada will
documents. The 2009 Strategy notes that “mining activities and enhance its trading ties with other Arctic states. We have recent-
major projects such as the Mackenzie Gas Project are the cor- ly implemented a free trade agreement with the European Free
nerstones of sustained economic activity in the North” (2009, Trade Association (EFTA) member countries, which include
15). Moreover, the Strategy recognizes that “the full extent of Iceland and Norway” (2010, 14). Additionally, “these Northern
the natural resources potential in the Arctic is still unknown” commercial relationships can serve as conduits to expand trade
and because of this, “the Government of Canada announced a and investment relations not only with our immediate Northern
significant new geo-mapping effort – Geo-Mapping for ener- neighbours but also with other states such as those in central
gy and Minerals – that will combine the latest technology and Asia and Eastern Europe” (2010, 15).
geoscientific analysis methods to build our understanding of
the geology of Canada’s North” (2009, 16). The 2010 Strategy Economic activities are not without regulation. The 2009 Strat-
also discusses the importance of resource development, but also egy recognizes existing regulatory practices and mechanisms
notes that “Canadians and our Arctic neighbours can be assured like “the Northern Regulatory Improvement Initiative” that is
that no drilling will occur in Canada’s deep Beaufort Sea until at “helping resolve the complex approval process for development
least 2014,” apparently for “safety and environmental” (2010, 12) projects, to ensure new projects can get up and running quickly
reasons. The 2010 Policy also recognizes that the “seal hunt is an and efficiently” (2009, 15). The Strategy also notes efforts made
economic mainstay for numerous rural communities in many to “improve the regulatory environment under which develop-
parts of Canada including the North” (2010, 16). ment can occur” (2009, 14). The 2010 Policy recognizes Cana-
da’s regulatory efforts. It stresses the need for regulation in the
Despite this diverse range of economic activities, there is little energy and resources sectors (2010, 12). One such example is
discussion about how the regional economy contributes to Can- that “the Arctic Council, with significant Canadian participa-
ada’s national economy. Only the 2009 Strategy broaches this tion, updated its Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in
topic and only in relation to the mining and gas industries. In 2009. These guidelines recommend standards, technical and en-
particular, the document explains that “diamond mining in the vironmental best practices, management policy and regulatory
North is now a $2-billion-per-year industry, which is about half controls for Arctic offshore oil and gas operations” (2010, 13).
of the economy of the Northwest Territories. The Mackenzie
Gas Project – now estimated at over $16 billion – will provide The Tourism indicator accounts for 1 % of the total coded quotes
direct benefits to Aboriginal communities through the develop- for the 2009 Strategy and 1 % of the 2010 Policy (see Figure 6,
ment of a new model for Aboriginal participation” (2009, 15). p. 30). Although much of this discussion is generally mentioned
in passing, the 2009 Strategy notes that there may be some safe-
Both documents address the importance of sustainable devel- ty concerns associated with cruise ship tourism. It also appears
opment. The northern Strategy wishes “the vast potential of the that its primary focus is on supporting Indigenous cultural
Arctic region is realized in a sustainable way” and states that in tourism. For instance, “the Government is providing increased
terms of offshore oil and gas activities, “Canada will continue to funding for tourism promotion and for local and community
support the sustainable development of these strategic resource cultural and heritage institutions” (2009, 16).
endowments” (2009, 14, 16). Similarly, the 2010 Policy mentions
the importance of sustainable development of natural resources, The 2010 foreign Policy states that “Canada will continue to es-
but focuses on how sustainable development will be practiced. tablish terrestrial and marine protected areas in the Arctic and
Indeed, it states that “ensuring sustainable development in the monitor biodiversity and ecological integrity” and that “they
Arctic involves working closely with territorial governments also provide significant ecotourism opportunities to an expand-
and Northerners and through key international institutions like ing market of Canadians and international visitors” (2010, 19).
the Arctic Council to build self-sufficient, vibrant and healthy In this case, the focus is on ecotourism, whereas the 2009 Strat-
communities” (2010, 12), and that “Canada will play a leader- egy mentions cruise ship and cultural tourism.
ship role in the Arctic Council’s Arctic Ocean Review which

37
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 8 % of the total Housing infrastructure is also addressed in both documents.
coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 4 % of the 2010 Poli- The 2009 Strategy stresses the importance of housing, stating
cy (see Figure 6, p. 30). The two documents identify multiple that “working with the territories, significant investments have
areas where improvements could be made. For transportation been made to improve the quality and availability of housing,
infrastructure, the 2009 Strategy stresses that “modern public particularly in Nunavut where core housing need is the great-
infrastructure will contribute to a stronger economy, a cleaner est. These investments are helping reduce the problems of over-
environment, and safer and more prosperous communities in crowding and substandard housing and improving the health
the North. Northerners also need crucial infrastructure to move and well-being of Northerners” (2009, 19). The document also
their goods to markets in southern Canada and other parts of connects housing (and other forms of infrastructure) to eco-
the globe” (2009, 17), especially with the “opening of new trans- nomic opportunities (2009, 5). The 2010 Policy links housing
portation routes” (2009, 5) in the Arctic. The economic aspect to the economy, stating that “the Government of Canada has
of transportation infrastructure is further emphasized in a joint made a wide variety of recent commitments related to promot-
report by Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Government of ing Northern social and economic development. These include
Nunavut, according to which, “a commercial fisheries harbour measures to … address infrastructure needs including housing”
is being constructed in Pangnirtung to help support the devel- (2010, 11).
opment of fisheries in the territory” (2009, 17). The 2010 Policy
also recognizes the economic aspect of transportation in that Neither document addresses energy infrastructure.
“improving air and sea transportation links to create enhanced
access across the polar region can help encourage Arctic trade The Science and Education indicator accounts for 8 % of the
and investment opportunities. For instance, investments have total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010
been made to upgrade the Port of Churchill, Manitoba” (2010, Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30). Quotes can generally be divided by
15). Both documents also mention that investments are being topic—science or education. For science, in the 2009 Strategy,
made for a “berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik” (2009, the drivers behind Canada’s scientific activity appear to be re-
10; see also: 2010, 6), although this appears to be primarily in lated to health and climate. For instance, the Strategy states that
the context of security. “increasing our understanding of and attention to Arctic hu-
man health issues continues to be an emerging priority among
Shipping is another aspect of transportation infrastructure. The circumpolar countries. Canada has been at the forefront of
2009 Strategy recognizes this, stating, for instance, that “re- these issues and will continue to support domestic and interna-
duced ice coverage and longer periods of navigability may result tional research on Arctic human health” (2009, 22). Further, as
in an increased number of ships undertaking destination travel part of the IPY 2007–2008, Canada financed “the largest-ever
for tourism, natural resource exploration or development” and global program dedicated to polar research... focused on two
that structures like “the International Maritime Organization key priorities: climate change impacts and adaptation; and the
[are] where guidelines are being developed for Ships Operat- health and well-being of Northerners and Northern communi-
ing in Arctic Ice-covered Waters” (2009, 5, 36). The 2010 Policy ties” (2009, 24). The 2010 Policy also mentions health research
recognizes the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment which notes through the IPY (2010, 15), as well as research about the envi-
“that Arctic shipping has increased significantly, with more voy- ronment and animal management. In terms of the environment
ages to the Arctic and between Arctic destinations” (2010, 13). and animals, the document states that “these activities fall under
international conventions and agreements such as the United
Despite the Northwest Passage becoming more accessible and Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, the Migratory Bird
shipping needs growing, icebreakers are only mentioned once Treaty, and the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears.
in each document in the sections on security and sovereignty. International collaborative Arctic science and research is a fun-
The 2009 Strategy states that “in the sea we are establishing a damental aspect of the Government of Canada’s participation in
deep-water berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik and pro- such agreements” (2010, 18).
curing a new polar icebreaker, the largest and most powerful
icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast Guard fleet” (2009, 10). Research can also have different purposes. The 2009 Strategy
The 2010 Policy similarly states that “within the next decade, suggests that science can contribute to Canada’s regional sover-
Canada will launch a new polar icebreaker. This will be the larg- eignty through “scientific studies to determine the full extent of
est and most powerful icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast our continental shelf as defined under UNCLOS. This research
Guard fleet” (2010, 6). will ensure Canada secures recognition for the maximum extent
of its continental shelf in both the Arctic and Atlantic oceans”
Technology, specifically telecommunications and ICT services, (2009, 12). Additionally, the document suggests that science
are only addressed in the 2009 Strategy, which states: “Territo- is useful for building relationships. Indeed, “through scientific
rial governments and communities in the North are benefitting collaboration with organizations such as the United Nations,
greatly from investments in a range of infrastructure programs, World Meteorological Organization, International Maritime
including Broadband, recreational and Green infrastructure, to Organization and the Arctic Council, Canada is building the
lay a much-needed foundation for a growing North” (2009, 17). baseline of knowledge on the Arctic environment and forming
It appears that broadband is connected to economic growth. important partnerships around the world” (2009, 25). In the
2010 Policy, research is used to support economic decisions.

38
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

For example, “Canada will take steps to create the appropriate In terms of education, only the 2009 Strategy addresses issues of
international conditions for sustainable development” as Arctic educational attainment and access to education. With regard to
research and traditional knowledge have indicated (2010, 12). attainment, the document does not discuss actual educational
Moreover, the document recognizes the importance of research attainment levels. Rather, the focus is on ensuring people have
to the Arctic Council, stating that “Canada will also work to en- skills training.
sure that the research activities of the Council continue to focus
on key emerging issues to ensure that solid knowledge under- As for access to education, in a statement about federal transfers
pins the policy work of the Council” (2010, 25). Regarding policy to the territories, education is mentioned in passing. Indeed,
development, both documents make almost identical statements the 2009 Strategy states that “The Canada Social Transfer pro-
about the outcomes of science being used for “the knowledge vides territories with substantial on-going and growing funding
necessary for sound policy and decision-making” (2009, 24; see in support of social programs, including programs for children
also: 2010, 22). and for post-secondary education” (2009, 21). The 2009 Strate-
gy also mentions that the government is “establishing graduate
To support this work, both documents briefly mention devel- student fellowships on Canada’s role in the circumpolar World”
oping science infrastructure. In particular, the future of the Ca- (2009, 22), although there is no mention of whether the fellow-
nadian High Arctic Research Station (Government of Canada ships are specifically for students from Northern Canada.
Polar Knowledge Canada, n.d.). The 2009 Strategy states: “our
vision is that the new Arctic research station will serve as the It is not surprising that the 2010 Policy does not address educa-
hub for scientific activity in our vast and diverse Arctic,” and tion, as this is a national and provincial/territorial issue. How-
therefore “there have been extensive consultations at home and ever, it does recognize the University of the Arctic, in passing, in
abroad about the role of this new research facility” (2009, 26). the context of cooperation and partnership (2010, 26).
The 2010 Policy states that “to ensure that Canada remains a
global leader in Arctic science, the Government of Canada has Both documents cover much ground, as seen. However, where
committed to establishing a new world-class research station in they are lacking is in Implementation. The 2009 Strategy states
the High Arctic that will serve Canada and the world” (2010, 22). only that “Canada’s Northern Strategy sets out a clear action
Both documents also mention other kinds of support for science plan for the North that will leave a lasting legacy and enrich
infrastructure. For example, the 2009 Strategy mentions “an Arc- the lives of Canadians for generations to come” (2009, 39); yet,
tic Research Infrastructure Fund” (2009, 26) and the 2010 Policy it does not provide any clear recommendations or courses of
notes that “Canada has also invested in upgrading existing re- action the government should take to achieve its goals. There
search facilities in over 30 sites across the Arctic” (2010, 22). The is, however, a statement about funding tourism (2009, 16), but
2010 Policy further mentions that “Arctic-specific organizations it is not clear if this funding is a result of a tourism strategy or
such as the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians for the Arc- other funding priorities. Similarly, the 2010 foreign Policy says
tic Region, the Northern Forum, and the University of the Arctic nothing about how such measures would be implemented.
are important partners on a variety of issues” (2010, 26), which
suggests that networks are a form of infrastructure as well. To sum up

Technology and innovation are an important aspect of science. Figure 6 at the beginning of the Canada section also shows that
For example, the 2009 Strategy states that geo-mapping will be between the 2009 Strategy and 2010 Policy, discussions declined
used “to build our understanding of the geology of Canada’s on the Human Dimension and increased on Governance. The
North, including in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago” (2009, figure also shows that in 2009 Human Dimension and Gover-
16). The 2010 Policy notes that “autonomous underwater vehi- nance were the two most coded indicators, with International
cles—with Canadian technology at their heart—are being used Cooperation tying with Economy in third place. In 2010 the
to collect some of the needed data” (2010, 8). three most-coded indicators are Governance, International Co-
operation, and Economy. This is not very surprising, as the 2009
As mentioned above, science, and thus knowledge, is used to Strategy focuses on domestic issues and the 2010 Policy on in-
help inform decision-making. Both documents recognize the ternational issues. Figure 6 also shows that the three least-coded
importance of Indigenous knowledge in scientific practice. The indicators in 2009 are Tourism, Pollution and Climate Change,
2009 Strategy remarks that “Aboriginal people and Northerners and Safety and SAR, while the three least-coded in 2010 are
played a significant role in the planning, coordination and im- Tourism, Infrastructure, and Pollution.
plementation of IPY and were actively engaged in science and
research activities” (2009, 24–25). The 2010 Policy recognizes The documents show that the North is a vital part of Canada’s
the importance of Indigenous knowledge, stating that “Canada’s national identity and that asserting and maintaining sovereign-
commitment to Northern economic and social development ty is a key aspect of Canada’s domestic strategy and foreign
includes a deep respect for Indigenous traditional knowledge, policy. Yet, the most important theme for the Canadian gov-
work and cultural activities” and “recognizes the importance ernment in the 2009 Strategy is the Human Dimension which
of Indigenous knowledge and the need to use it in tandem with includes discussions on Indigenous peoples. This is followed
Western science in our efforts to better understand polar bears by the Governance, International Cooperation and Economy,
and their habitat” (2010, 16, 18). and then Security indicators (see Appendix). This suggests that

39
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

the priorities of “social and economic governance” are met, al- ument itself “sets out a clear action plan for the North” (2009,
though the economic governance discussion primarily focuses 39) and mentions a handful of government ministries, it speaks
on the extractive resource industry. The priority of “improving more to issues rather than providing concrete steps to achieve
and devolving governance” is reflected in the Governance indi- Canada’s regional priorities. As mentioned, the 2010 Policy does
cator through quotes on land-claim agreements. It is, howev- not mention anything in this regard. This could be problematic
er, difficult to determine the extent to which devolving north- for Canada when it comes to actually achieving its priorities and
ern governance is addressed in relation to other governance goals, especially as there is no clear plan for action or account-
topics because the indicator is not analyzed by percentages of ability. Second, both documents address a variety of infrastruc-
sub-indicators. Nevertheless, the strategy provides a detailed ture needs, but fail to address an energy infrastructure to better
description of the then current state of Canada’s land claims and serve northern residents. This is a surprising omission because
explains how land-claim settlement can provide greater auton- at the time these two documents were produced, regional ener-
omy for Canada’s northern Indigenous peoples. “Exercising our gy infrastructure needed improvement due to the high cost of
Arctic sovereignty” is another priority of the 2009 Strategy and energy for northerners (National Energy Board 2011; Canadian
is addressed in the Security indicator. Although analysis is not Polar Commission 2014).
performed at the sub-indicator level and security is not one of
the top three quoted indicators, it does come a close fourth in There are also some differences between the two documents,
the 2009 Strategy and, as previously mentioned, sovereignty is and three examples are discussed here. First, the 2010 Policy
clearly of utmost importance to the Canadian government. makes clear statements about Canada’s support for UNDRIP at
the international level, but UNDRIP was omitted from the 2009
At the other end of the spectrum, Tourism is the least discussed Strategy. Although the government of Canada did not formally
theme in the 2009 Strategy, followed by Climate Change and support UNDRIP at the time, support for it at the international
Pollution. As the Economy indicator focuses on resource de- level sends different and conflicting messages as to how Canada
velopment, it is not surprising that tourism is overlooked. It is supports Indigenous peoples domestically and internationally.
surprising, however, that climate change and pollution are not Moreover, the omission of UNDRIP from the 2009 Strategy
discussed in more detail, especially as Canada demonstrated could have implications for the Strategy’s support for self-gov-
environmental leadership through the creation of the Arctic ernance and the recognition of land-claims agreements. Second,
Council. That said, the Strategy does demonstrate a commit- the 2010 Policy’s approach to understanding pollution is more
ment to protected areas, and when the percentage of quotes in comprehensive than the 2009 Strategy. While the 2009 Strategy
the Environmental Protection, Pollution, and Climate Change mentions only two pollutants, the 2010 Strategy names six. It is
indicators are added together, and quoted as a percentage of the almost as if the 2009 Strategy is removing Canada from the larg-
total coded quotes, they come higher than the Human Dimen- er circumpolar context in this regard. Third, both documents
sion, indicating that the priority of “protecting the North’s en- recognize similar safety issues and the importance of maritime
vironmental heritage” is also met. There could, however, have regulation, albeit in different ways. Although both documents
been more discussion around pollution and Canada’s plans for recognize the importance of AWPPA, the 2009 Strategy focus-
climate change action. es on the role of the domestic NORDREG program while the
2010 Policy discusses the IMO and the development of the Polar
There are also some connections between the different indicators Code. While this division is not surprising based on the domes-
and themes. For example, positive consequences of economic tic/international nature of the two documents, it reads as if the
activity, such as improved wellbeing and infrastructure devel- domestic and international safety structures are each in a vacu-
opment are found in the Human Dimension and Infrastructure um and do not affect one another.
indicators, while negative consequences of increased activity are
addressed in the Pollution, Climate Change, and Safety Indica- Overall, the two documents provide a consistent message with
tors. There are also less obvious connections, such as between regard to Canada’s Arctic priorities, even if the priorities are to
the Human Dimension and Security and between Indigenous be achieved differently at the domestic and international lev-
peoples and Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The Science and Ed- els. However, as previously mentioned, Canada only recently
ucation indicator is also connected to the Governance and In- released their new policy. Further analysis is required to deter-
ternational Cooperation indicators, as research is used to build mine if, and how much, priorities have changed over the past
relationships and inform governance activities. These examples decade, as the “new Arctic Policy Framework [was] co-devel-
show that different issues are not found in a vacuum and that oped in collaboration with Indigenous, territorial and provincial
decisions made in one area can affect those in another. partners” (Canada Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern
Affairs n.d.), or, when the new priorities will be implemented.
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant sim-
ilarities and the three most relevant differences are discussed.

The two similarities are now discussed. First, neither the Strat-
egy nor the Policy provides information on how they will be
implemented. Although the 2009 Strategy claims that the doc-

40
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Finland Comparison by Indicator

Finland has produced two national Arctic strategies. The first, The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator ex-
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, was released in 2010 plains how Finland defines the region in both documents. The
(Finland PMO 2010). This was followed in 2013 by Finland’s 2013 Strategy, for example, recognizes that “there are various
Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 (Finland PMO 2013). Both definitions of the Arctic region in different contexts, one be-
documents are considered in this analysis. In addition, the ing the area demarcated by the Polar Circle. Although Finland
Government of Finland in an evening session in October 2012 has no coastline on the Arctic Ocean, much of its territory lies
adopted the main principles for Arctic policy—Finland as an north of the Polar Circle” (2013, 8). Here, both the Arctic Ocean
active, responsible, and capable Arctic actor that respects sus- and the Polar Circle could be used to define the region. Yet, the
tainable development principles and the environment, and is Strategy also states that the Arctic can have multiple definitions
active in international Arctic cooperation (Finnish Government depending on the context, although smaller communities are
Tiedote 309/2012—10.10.2012 17.51; also, Finland PMO 2013, typically found in Lapland (2013, 10, 19). Despite recognizing
17). In 2017 Finland also released the Action Plan for the Update Lapland as the most northerly part of Finland, the Strategy’s
of the Arctic Strategy that “concerns the following priorities in flexibility in defining the region allows Finland to suggest that
the update: Finland’s foreign and EU policy in the Arctic re- the entirety of Finland is situated in the Arctic. The document
gion, Finland’s arctic expertise, sustainable tourism, and infra- states that “Finland as a whole is a truly Arctic country: after
structure solutions that support these” (Finland PMO 2017, 1). all, one third of all the people living north of the 60th paral-
However, because this is not yet a strategy, it is not considered lel are Finns” (2013, 17). This is a shift from the 2010 Strategy
in this analysis. which differentiates between the Arctic and subarctic parts of
the country (2010, 8). In other words, the 2013 Strategy consid-
The two strategies take somewhat different approaches to ers almost all of Finland to be in the Arctic, whereas the 2010
Finland’s Arctic. According to the 2010 Strategy (94 pages in- Strategy narrows this down to the northern parts of the country.
cluding maps and appendices), “the purpose of the policy con-
cerning the Arctic Region is to focus mainly on the aspect of In terms of how the region is referred to, both strategies use
external relations in Arctic policy” (2010, 57). The 2013 Strat- the “Arctic” and “circumpolar” when discussing more than one
egy (67 pages including maps and appendices) is based on the Arctic state (2013, 14; 2010, 9). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy
above-mentioned main principles of Arctic policy, and differs uses the “North,” and the “High North” that originally used in
in that “the new strategy is more wide-reaching in scope” (2013, the Norwegian terminology (2013, 19, 35). The 2013 Strategy
7). As its priorities, the 2013 Strategy “examines the possibilities goes on to describe that the Arctic environment as “one of the
for bolstering Finland’s position regarding the Arctic region; purest and best preserved in the world” and “highly exception-
the creation of new business opportunities; the Arctic environ- al” (2013, 8, 38). It also remarks that the region is “strategic” for
ment and the region’s security and stability; the position of the economic and security reasons (2013, 8, 19, 38). Similarly, the
northern parts of Finland; international cooperation; and Arc- 2010 Strategy recognizes the strategic and economic value of the
tic expertise in the widest sense of the term” (2013, 7). This lines region, but considers the Arctic environment to be “fragile”, a
up with the “four pillars of policy outlined by the Government: term that is not used in the newer strategy (2010, 8, 9).
an Arctic country, Arctic expertise, Sustainable development and
environmental considerations and International cooperation” A similar process was used to prepare each strategy: “the stra-
and “it is Finland’s objective to promote growth and actions to tegic review was prepared by a working group appointed by the
enhance competitiveness in the region with due regard to its Prime Minister ... in which all the ministries were represented”
environment” (2013, 7). (2013, 17; see also: 2010, 7). In addition to a representative from
the Prime Minister’s Office, the working group comprised rep-
The table of contents for the 2010 document identifies the fol- resentation from the eleven ministries, among others
lowing section headings: “Fragile Arctic Nature, Economic • Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Activities and Know-How, Transport and Infrastructure, In- • Ministry of Justice
digenous Peoples, Arctic Policy Tools, The EU and the Arctic • Ministry of the Interior
Region” (2010, 5)—these can also be taken to be Finnish priori- • Ministry of Defence
ties. The 2013 Strategy identifies the following section headings: • Ministry of Finance
“Vision for Arctic Finland, Finland’s Arctic population, Educa- • Ministry of Education and Culture
tion and research, Finland’s business operations in the Arctic, • Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Environment and stability, International cooperation in the • Ministry of Transport and Communications
Arctic” (2013, 5). As the 2013 Strategy is an update of the 2010 • Ministry of Employment and the Economy
Strategy, similar issues are addressed in both documents. The • Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2013 only)
analysis that follows, however, will uncover the similarities and • Ministry of the Environment (2013, 64; 2010, 58)
differences between the two policy documents.
Certainly, Finland appears to take a whole-of-government ap-
proach to the Arctic. One interesting observation is that that

41
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Ministry of Defence was not initially a part of the 2010 work- 3 on the Sámi, which recognises the obligations and commit-
ing group and the representative was appointed after work had ments of Finland and Sweden with regard to the Sámi under
commenced (2013, 64; 2010, 58, 64). national and international law and considers that traditional
Sámi culture and livelihood are dependent on natural sources of
To begin the analysis of the Finnish strategies, Figure 7 provides livelihood, such as reindeer husbandry in the traditional areas
a comparison of how many quotes are assigned to the different of Sámi settlement” (2010, 32–33).
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. Both documents address different ways in which the Indigenous
rights are protected. For instance, the strategies comment that
the Finnish Constitution guarantees the rights of the Saami, and
mention the desire to ratify ILO Convention No. 169 (2013, 11,
22, 23; 2010, 8, 32). Furthermore, both strategies recognize that
government consultation with Indigenous peoples is of the ut-
most importance, and they support Indigenous involvement in
the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic council (2013,
22; 2010, 30, 31). International cooperation is important for
rights protection, and the 2010 Strategy remarks that “Finland
participated actively in the drafting process of the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN Gener-
al Assembly in September 2007” (2010, 31; 2013, 10).

The issue of health and wellbeing is also addressed in both docu-

ments. The 2013 Strategy acknowledges that with “global warm-
Figure 7. Comparing Finland’s 2010 Strategy and 2013 Strategy ing and increased economic activity, the conditions in the Arc-
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number tic have changed in a way that will have implications for health,
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. well-being and the living environment” (2013, 20). To address
this, the government uses the term ‘welfare,’ which according to
The Human Dimension indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the the 2013 Strategy “encompasses mental and material well-being,
total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 9 % for the 2010 access to work, efficient basic services, equality, security and ed-
Strategy (see Figure 7), provides information on the Arctic and ucation” and must be “tailored for northern conditions” (2013,
the Finnish Arctic’s demography. The numbers they provide are 11). The document also recognizes that “the Partnership in Pub-
similar. The 2013 Strategy recognizes that “the Arctic region has lic Health and Social Well-being has made a great contribution
a total population of about four million, of whom Indigenous towards limiting epidemics (HIV, TB) and promoting healthy
peoples account for about 10 per cent. There are over 180,000 lifestyles” (2013, 45-46). The 2010 Strategy also recognizes the
inhabitants in Finnish Lapland,” approximately 5,000 of whom consequences of pollution and climate change, especially in
are Saami (2013, 20, 23; 2010, 30). Considering the regional relation to the wellbeing of Indigenous peoples, and that “the
demographics, it is not surprising that both strategies address Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social
topics related to Indigenous peoples. Well-being (NDPHS) has been supplemented with an expert
group promoting the health and well-being of Indigenous peo-
Protecting Indigenous culture and language is raised in both ples” (2010, 49, 30).
strategies. For instance, both documents stress that preserv-
ing the different Saami languages and cultures through revival Only the 2013 Strategy addresses equality in the context of re-
programs is considered a right (2013, 22; 2010, 32). The 2013 gional differences (e.g., north vs south Finland), and connects this
Strategy further states that efforts to do this are under way as to migration. The Strategy states that “life in northern Finland is
“in March 2012, a working group appointed by the Ministry complicated by long distances, an ageing population, labour mar-
of Education and Culture submitted its proposals for a pro- ket issues and the inadequacy of the resources necessary for pro-
gramme to revive the Saami language. Efforts to reinforce the viding government services” (2013, 20). The solution, it seems,
Saami language and culture need to be continued” (2013, 23). is that increased economic opportunities in the North may help
The 2010 Strategy also addresses preservation efforts across reduce some of these challenges. Thus, labour migration seems to
borders. For instance, “for 16 years, Finland’s Kindred Peoples be a solution (Finland. PMO 2013, 20). To this end, the Strategy
Programme has supported the languages and cultures of Fin- suggests that “as neighbouring countries, Finland, Sweden and
no-Ugric peoples living in Russia by means of grassroots-level Norway can advance in many areas important to the Arctic by
cooperation projects in the target areas” (2010, 31). Both docu- facilitating the movement of experts and employees proficient in
ments also recognize the need to protect Indigenous culture and languages across the national borders” (2013, 21). The possibility
livelihoods in the wake of a growing natural resources industry of an increased labor force also comes from “potential visa-free
(2013, 12; 2010 15). The 2010 Strategy notes that this balance is, travel between the EU and Russia, the intensifying economic ac-
in part, assisted through the EU. In particular, “the Treaty on the tivity in the Arctic and the growing population” (2013, 36).
accession of Finland to the European Union includes Protocol

42
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The Governance indicator accounts for 13 % of the total coded enous peoples when issues affecting their status are addressed.”
quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 19 % for the 2010 Strategy (see Therefore, “Finland finds it important to guarantee that the or-
Figure 7, p. 42). The indicator focuses on the existing structures, ganisations of the Indigenous people represented in the Arctic
as well as to support decision-making institutions and proce- Council are able to participate in the work of the Council at the
dures. “The recommendations given by the Arctic Council pro- various levels” (2013, 11). Finland also highlights “the need to
vide a sound basis for political decision making” (2013, 44). As, consult Indigenous peoples and to offer them adequate oppor-
“it is vital for society as a whole, including the policy makers, to tunities to be involved in various actions, particularly when they
understand what this transition in the Arctic is all about”, here, have a direct impact on their living conditions” (2013, 22). At
“research plays a key role in the area of planning, licensing pro- global level, Finland takes part in cooperation concerning In-
cedures and evaluation of risks and threats in connection with digenous peoples especially within the United Nations Perma-
the various activities.” (2013, 13, 24). nent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII), which “promotes the
status of Indigenous peoples in cooperation with governments.”
As, “one of Finland’s key objectives is to bolster its position as Additionally, “The Permanent Forum is an advisory body to the
an Arctic country and to reinforce international Arctic cooper- UN Economic and Social Council” (2010, 31, 37).
ation”, the country is actively involved in “multilateral cooper-
ation at the global and regional levels to achieve its own Arctic The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
goals and to pre-empt global threats” (2013, 43). Furthermore, dicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total coded quotes for the
since the “treaty system is fragmented” which may “lead to am- 2013 Strategy and 11 % of the 2010 Strategy (see Figure 7, p. 42),
biguities regarding liability for damages”, Finland aims for con- highlights the priority of bilateral and multilateral cooperation
sistent regulation and action based on “cooperation outlined in as “an essential element of Finnish foreign policy” as well as be-
international conventions”. Therefore, “it is advisable to review ing one of the four pillars of Finland’s Arctic policy. Here the
the adequacy of the existing conventions regarding the region. objectives of “Finland’s Arctic policy are associated with its gen-
Finland plays an active role in drafting supplementary regula- eral policies regarding the promotion of stability, cooperation
tions” (2013, 43, 44). Furthermore, on the national level “a more and sustainable development. At the same time, they are linked
active dialogue is required between the parties representing the to the interests of Finnish business and research communities”
research community, business and industry, local communities (2013, 8, 14; 2010, 52). One of those key objectives, as well as a
and the civic society - internally and with the public sector” “foundation for Finland’s activities in the Arctic” is “to bolster its
(2013, 12) to support decision making. position as an Arctic country and to reinforce international Arc-
tic cooperation” (2013, 14, 43). Finland underlines, that “pend-
For Finland, foundations of preparedness lie on “a comprehen- ing issues and any disputes need to be settled in accordance with
sive concept of security, which consists in securing the vital international law”. At the same time, “all claims concerning con-
functions of society through close cooperation between the au- tinental shelves [need to be dealt with] in accordance with the in-
thorities, industry, NGOs and citizens” (2013, 14, 40). The 2013 ternational law of the sea” (2013, 19, 44; 2010, 10, 11). By focus-
Strategy further highlights that “aside from cooperation in the ing on international organisations and agreements dealing with
context of the Barents region, regions and municipalities are not the Arctic in which Finland is a member, the 2010 Strategy also
truly represented in Arctic cooperation” (2013 10). Therefore, “emphasizes external relations”, in particular on the forms, “that,
Finland advocates for a policy that would support their position either directly or indirectly, apply to Finland’s northern regions
as regional actors. Further, the Strategy recognizes “the North- and population, as well as their environment, climate, business,
ern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics [which] culture, social relations, security and stability” (2010, 7).
provides a useful platform for the development of northern
transport services” (2013, 10). The 2013 Strategy also refers to Finland participates in several international fora (e.g. Arctic
the Coastnet which is “a government communications network Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, European Union, United
primarily intended for border authorities but [that] can also be Nations and its sub-organisations), scientific and other expert
used for non-urgent sea rescue operations and the prevention of networks, as well as in bilateral relations. Here, Finland consid-
environmental damage” (2013, 41). ers “the Arctic Council as the primary cooperation forum for
addressing Arctic matters”. For this reason, “Finland supports
A considerable part of the governance indicator is dedicated to the plan to establish the Council as an international treaty-based
the issue of protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, especial- organisation”. The Council also provides equal representation of
ly, “the rights of the Saami [which shall] be promoted through the Arctic Indigenous peoples (2013, 8, 14, 19, 44; 2010, 9, 34,
active participation in the international cooperation geared to 37, 38, 39). The 2013 Strategy recognizes that “Finland has been
enhance the legal and actual protection of Indigenous peoples.” an active member of the Arctic community for a long time. It
In terms of human rights, Finland strongly supports the rights played a key part in calling the first ever minister-level meet-
of Indigenous peoples. Domestically, “the duties related to au- ing for Arctic countries (1991), which marked the beginning
tonomy are managed by the Saami Parliament elected by public of international environmental cooperation in the region, to be
ballot. Finland seeks to improve the living conditions of Indige- followed by the ‘Rovaniemi process’ which eventually led to the
nous peoples so as to allow communities and cultures to survive establishment of the Arctic Council” (2013, 8), as mentioned
and evolve on their own terms” (2013, 10, 22, 23). At the interna- earlier. Hence, “Finland will build on this foundation and con-
tional level, “Finland seeks to ensure the participation of Indig- tinue to pursue a proactive and responsible role in the context

43
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

of international cooperation in the Arctic” (2013, 15). Further, to conciliate the sometimes conflicting interests.” The UNCLOS
in 1997, Finland also initiated the Northern Dimension policy, also regulates shipping and “sets out the general principles
“subsequently adopted by the European Union”, and is “based and provides a framework for supplementary regulation at the
on an equal partnership between the EU, Russia, Norway and global, regional or national level based on the division of legal
Iceland. In Nordic cooperation, it remains the only forum for a competencies.” Additionally, “of special relevance to the Arctic
coordinated formulation of EU policies” (2013, 8, 45, 48). Fol- region in this respect are the Commission on the Limits of the
lowed from this, Finland “pursues a proactive role in fostering Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the International Seabed Author-
Northern Dimension Partnerships” (2013, 15), as “the Northern ity (ISA), both organisations formed under UNCLOS” (2013,
Dimension and related partnerships offer a forum for address- 44; 2010, 10, 28, 34, 35). The 2013 Strategy also “addresses the
ing collaborative issues regarding the northern parts of Europe resolutions adopted by the UN Rio+20 Conference,” by which
and creating a forum for hands-on cooperation” (2013, 47). “the UNCLOS is to be provided with additional tools for pro-
tecting biodiversity” (2013, 44).
“The European Union plays a key role in Finland’s Arctic
policy.” Therefore, “it is important to support the formulation Furthermore, both strategies address the role of the Internation-
of the EU’s policy towards the Arctic and the reinforcement of al Maritime Organization (IMO), which prepares regulations
its role in the region” (2013, 15, 47; 2010, 7, 9, 11, 44), as well and “instructions for vessels operating in ice-covered Arctic
as to support the EU to be “approved as an observer member of seas” (2013, 37), as well as handling “maritime regulation, in-
the Arctic Council, and [that] the EU establishes an Arctic In- cluding the maritime security, environmental concerns, techni-
formation Centre in conjunction with the Arctic Centre of the cal cooperation and legal matters” (2010, 36). Both strategies
University of Lapland” (2010, 44). also refer to the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCMs), which
“creates a basis for cooperation between other key multi-part-
The ultimate objective of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region is to ner actors, principally the Arctic Council and the Barents Eu-
build cross-border “cooperation between Russia and the Nordic ro-Arctic Council” (2013, 19, 37, 46; 2010, 9, 28, 34, 35, 41).
countries” (2013, 45). International cooperation is crucial for se- In addition, there are a few other important cooperative orga-
curing “the stability and prosperity of the northernmost” parts nizations, such as “the North Calotte Council, funded by the
of Europe, as “climate change and other environmental hazards Nordic Council of Ministers and comprising Finland, Sweden
are not contained by national borders, international coopera- and Norway.” This Council “operates by initiating and funding
tion ... Russia’s active participation in measures contributing to various regional cooperation projects … as such, the Council
common goals is of special importance for Finland” (2010, 14, can be characterised as a cross-border partnership between the
42, 45). “The Barents Regional Council is often referred to as the authorities and the economy” (2010, 41). The 2010 Strategy fur-
‘engine’ of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, sustained by local ther recognizes the work of NATO and “its willingness to coop-
expertise and traditions.” This Council introduces “a regional erate with Russia and to avoid measures that might give rise to
perspective to the more general Arctic policies” and has “played confrontation” (2010, 11).
a part in establishing permanent networks for cross-border
cooperation” (2013, 15, 19, 45; 2010, 9, 34). Finland is further The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 6 % of the
“considering other bilateral Arctic partnerships as well as mul- total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the 2010
tilateral partnerships with Norway and Sweden” (2013, 15, 45). Strategy (see Figure 7, p. 42) and addresses Finland’s environ-
mental priorities. According to the 2013 Strategy, “Finland’s
Both strategies also highlight the intensified cooperation in for- Arctic policy focuses on understanding the effects of climate
eign, security and defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic re- change and transboundary pollutants; the sustainable use of
gions, as well as include cooperation “for crime prevention and Arctic natural resources; the identification of the constraints
the fight against organised crime.” In order to assess and prevent imposed by the environment; and environmental protection in
security threats it is necessary to enhance “cooperation between all areas of activity” (2013, 38), which suggests tension between
the authorities in the region and internationallly” (2013, 14, 15, the environment and the economy. The 2010 Strategy makes
41; 2010, 11). In regard to rescue operations, “the cooperation similar statements about the cause of environmental damage
carried out within the framework of the Council of the Baltic and stresses that, if this is left unchecked, there will be negative
Sea States does not address [these] operations.” Nevertheless, consequences for those living in the region. The need to balance
for the achievement of shared objectives, it is instrumental to the environment with the economy is also addressed in the 2010
“implement joint projects and assess the risks all the parties are Strategy because “the protection of Arctic land and sea areas
exposed to” (2013, 41). and ecologically sustainable economic and social development
are in Finland’s interests...Environmental issues are not just a
Finland further recognizes the importance of the United Na- separate sector of their own; instead, they are an important ele-
tions and its various bodies that “promote international coop- ment of a wider whole” (2010, 13–14).
eration in several areas important to the Arctic region” (2013,
19), including “maritime law, human rights, sustainable devel- While both strategies agree on the causes of environmental
opment, research, education, climate change and the status of damage, they propose somewhat different solutions for envi-
Indigenous peoples” (2013, 46). Among them is the UNCLOS, ronmental protection. For example, the 2013 Strategy stresses
which “regulates all the resources and uses of the seas, and seeks these sustainable economic practices must occur in all aspects of

44
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

extractive resource development, and that “an ecosystem-based cluding greenhouse gases, black carbon, methane, carbon diox-
approach makes it possible to assess the impact of the use of ide, oil, military waste, and nuclear or radioactive waste (2013,
natural resources and the effects of operations from a wider per- 13, 34, 39; 2010, 14, 15, 16, 28). In terms of nuclear waste, the
spective. By doing so, it is possible to consider the reciprocal 2010 Strategy suggests that it comes from Russia because “the
impacts of the economic activities and their combined effect on Kola Peninsula has the world’s greatest concentration of nuclear
the environment” as well as on Indigenous peoples (2013, 39). reactors” (2010, 16). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy mentions
The 2010 Strategy also mentions using an ecosystem approach mining waste and community waste, while the 2010 Strategy
and stresses that “the environmental perspective must be taken mentions nitrogen oxides, and “heavy metals and organic haz-
into account in all activities in the region” and includes efforts ardous substances” (2013, 39; 2010, 14, 15). It is not surprising,
such as working with international partners, “community and therefore, that the two strategies identify similar sources of pol-
regional planning, as well as land use planning,” nuclear safe- lution. Indeed, these include human activities, including those
ty, and maritime monitoring (2010, 16, 13, 27). Despite the associated with the military, the mining and resource industry,
differences, the overarching approach appears to be rooted in and the shipping industry (2013, 34, 39; 2010, 15, 16).
ecosystem-based management, meaning that environmental
protection is actually about ensuring environmental protection, To address this issue, the two strategies have identified different
regardless of how it is performed. approaches to solving these problems, although to varying de-
grees. The 2013 Strategy, for example, mentions the Agreement
Both documents also suggest that protected areas and bio- on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
diversity are an important part of Finland’s environmental sponse in the Arctic and notes that “increased attention should
program, while simultaneously linking them to economic ac- be paid to contingency planning and the prevention of oil spills”
tivities. In terms of protected areas, the 2010 Strategy makes (2013, 10). Along similar lines, the contribution of economic
the above-mentioned linkage between protection and “ecolog- activities to pollution must be considered, while “Arctic coun-
ically sustainable economic and social development” as being tries must shoulder their responsibility for reducing emissions
in the interest of Finland (2010, 13). This linkage is also ex- of greenhouse gases and short-lived climate pollutants” (2013,
pressed at least twice in the 2013 Strategy. For example, the 39). Pollution cannot be addressed by one state alone and “a tan-
document states that “further development of the network of gible example of cooperation in the Arctic region is provided
nature conservation areas in the Arctic region is a pragmat- by the nuclear safety projects implemented in the Arctic Water
ic way of improving the protection of the Arctic environment and wastewater projects [which] arecarried out under the part-
and clarifying the framework for economic activity” (2013, nership programmes in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Petroza-
31). Presumably, this balance would be achieved through eco- vodsk” (2013, 45).
system-based management.
Although the 2010 Strategy also refers to the nuclear safety
As for biodiversity, both documents recognize the importance and wastewater cooperation with Russia (2010, 49), the docu-
of the Arctic for difference species, but especially birds. In par- ment pays more attention to the issue of Russian nuclear waste
ticular, the Arctic is part of a migration route and “offers a nest- and safety, as mentioned earlier. Notably, these efforts include
ing place for the bulk of the world’s geese and for more than “preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and taking the envi-
half of the world’s waders and it contains unique species, such ronment into consideration [which] requires not only the dis-
as the polar bear” (2010, 17; 2013, 31). Both documents cau- mantlement of vessels but also the safe disposal and handling of
tion that economic activity can negatively affect biodiversity. radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.” They also include sup-
For example, the 2013 Strategy states that “biodiversity and the porting the work of the G8 Global Partnership program that,
preservation of the ecosystem services based on this diversity in part, seeks “nuclear safety in the area of the former Soviet
must be secured through the careful planning of the use of nat- Union” (2010, 16). The 2010 Strategy also mentions the Con-
ural resources and land areas,” while the 2010 Strategy mentions vention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (2010, 36)
that “the use of living natural resources entails risks endanger- and the EU’s potential contribution to this issue. For example,
ing biological diversity, such as overly intensive fishing. Besides “the Union’s strength in chemical policy must be utilised to re-
the fish species being caught, this may also have an effect on inforce the control and monitoring of chemicals in the Arctic
the functioning of the entire marine ecosystem” (2010, 17). The Region and to support international cooperation aiming at di-
2010 Strategy also recognizes the legal obligation to include In- minished long-range transportation and use of hazardous sub-
digenous peoples in the protection of biodiversity, as “Article 8 stances” (2010, 46). Additionally, new technologies can also be
(j) of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity obligates the used to limit pollution (2010, 15).
contracting parties to respect the traditional knowledge of In-
digenous peoples” (2010, 17). The Climate Change indicator accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 Strategy
The Pollution indicator accounts for 2 % of the total coded (see Figure 7, p. 42), and both documents discuss the negative
quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 Strategy (see consequences of climate change. Both documents stress that
Figure 7, p. 42). Both documents recognize that pollution comes climate change is having negative and increasing consequences
from within and outside the region (2013, 39; 2010, 13, 15). A for sea ice and that within five years, two record lows have been
broad range of pollutants are identified in both documents, in- reached. The 2010 Strategy notes that “the surface area of Arctic

45
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

sea ice reached its minimum in 2007” while the 2013 Strategy dialogue between governments and the scientific community
states that in 2012 sea ice again “reached an all-time low since regarding the numerous links to other global trends” (2013, 39).
the start of satellite monitoring” (2013, 8; 2010, 10). In addition
to ice, permafrost is also melting and contributing to warming The Security indicator accounts for 7 % of the total coded
temperatures at a global level (2013, 39; 2010, 14). The 2010 quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 2 % of the 2010 Strategy (see
Strategy also positions climate change as a safety issue. For in- Figure 7, p. 42). It is confirmed in both strategies that “stability
stance, in the context of adaptation, the Strategy states that “an- and security in the region” are the most important priorities
other priority is the use and management of water resources, in- for Finland as these are “in line with its foreign and securi-
cluding the risks arising from more frequent floods” (2010, 15). ty policies.” They are also “vital for any activities conducted
However, by the time the 2013 Strategy was released, Finland there” (2013, 14), including efforts to develop the Arctic econ-
had repositioned climate change as a problem for regional secu- omy. When responding to security challenges Finland’s poli-
rity. Indeed, the Strategy states that “combating climate change cy is to “keeping with its comprehensive concept of security.
and mitigating its impact are vital for the stability and security This means a high level of overall preparedness to be achieved
of the Arctic region and serve as the central point of departure through close collaboration between the authorities, industry
for the activities being carried out there” (2013, 7). Moreover, and NGOs as well as through international cooperation”. Here
human security can be affected because “the conditions in the “a safe and stable living environment is also instrumental to
Arctic have changed in a way that will have implications for improving the welfare of the local populations. Dialogue on
health, well-being and the living environment” (2013, 20). Arctic security policy is being conducted at different levels to
identify ways of guaranteeing stability and security in the re-
Mitigation and adaptation are addressed in both documents. gion that meet with general acceptance” (2013, 14, 40).
While “ecosystems in the region have poor adaptability” (2010,
14), the 2010 Strategy has one sentence that sums up the Finn- The 2010 Strategy comments that “in the future, the Arctic may
ish perspective on mitigation and adaptation, namely, that “the become a major energy reserve and transport channel for Eu-
Finnish policy for adapting to climate change must pay special rope” (2010, 9). As a result, “This has heightened the security
attention to measures that would support the adaptation of policy importance of the region. Increased shipping and human
livelihoods dependent on the Arctic environment” (2010, 15). activity increase the risk of serious environmental accidents in
The 2013 Strategy also addresses mitigation and adaptation in the Arctic Ocean” (2010, 9). The 2013 Strategy refers to “the
the context of economic development, and stresses that “eco- economic potential of the Arctic (extraction of natural resourc-
nomic activity and transport operations are increasing in the es) and the foreseen new transport routes which underline the
region... This makes it necessary to pay increased attention to strategic importance of the region in a way that will also have
actions to mitigate climate change; conserve and protect the implications for security policy” (2013, 19). “As the challenges
natural environment; promote the well-being of the local pop- are complex (increasingly multidimensional security threats)
ulation; and secure the viability of the traditional cultures of and closely linked with comprehensive security considerations,
the Indigenous people” (2013, 8). Interestingly, the 2013 Strat- it is vital to improve the situation awareness of the region and
egy also addresses the effects of climate change on freshwater, monitor developments.” Finland therefore, “must pay close at-
stating that “the necessary prerequisites for the use and man- tention to security developments in the Arctic” (2013, 40). In
agement of water resources must also be secured” (2013, 39). addition, “raising awareness of the Arctic Region and its po-
tential and making provision for changes promote safety in the
In terms of strategies to address climate change, the 2010 Strat- wide sense” (2010, 10).
egy recognizes different climate change agreements and forums.
In particular, it mentions the Copenhagen Accord, “the United According to the 2013 Strategy “a military conflict in the Arc-
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFC- tic is improbable – the Arctic States have declared that any
CC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), disputes will be settled peacefully and in accordance with in-
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer” ternational law” (2013, 40). Followed from this, “Finland ac-
(2010, 15, 36–37). The Strategy also argues that more research tively supports the peaceful resolution of pending issues and
is needed on climate change—“the estimates of the progress and potential disputes in the Arctic region in accordance with in-
impacts of climate change are based on climate models; their ternational law” (2013, 14). For the Arctic, “probably the most
regional accuracy needs to be developed so that they would be significant aspects” and recommendations concerning the Arc-
better suited for identifying Arctic changes as well” (2010, 14). In tic region of the Stoltenberg Report (on “closer cooperation in
contrast, the 2013 document does not provide too much infor- Nordic foreign and security policy”) “include air and maritime
mation on Finland’s commitment to the different frameworks. surveillance and closer cooperation for the utilisation of sat-
Instead of re-committing Finland to agreements and frame- ellite services and for improving the efficiency of rescue ser-
works of which they are a part, the document states that “in vice cooperation” (2010, 12). Here, Finland offers “its Arctic
global climate negotiations, Finland advocates ambitious emis- exercise and training to its international partners, which also
sion reduction targets by highlighting issues related to climate contributes to its own forces’ interoperability” (2013, 41). In
change in the region” (2013, 13). There is, however, support for addition, among “the priorities of Nordic Defence Coopera-
the scientific community and the role it should play in address- tion, Nordefco, … is the enhanced cooperation in defence ca-
ing climate change. For example, “it is imperative to intensify the pability development. It also covers cooperation and expertise

46
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

in Arctic conditions, prime examples of which are Nordic air especially in the context of maritime-based economic activity. For
forces’ cross-border exercises and the participation of Finland instance, the 2010 Strategy states that “increased shipping and
and Sweden in Iceland’s air-surveillance exercises, together human activity increase the risk of serious environmental acci-
with Norway” (2013, 41). dents in the Arctic Ocean,” while the 2013 Strategy explains that
“oil spills represent the greatest risks associated with Arctic ship-
Finland also emphasizes “the importance of its expertise on in- ping and oil drilling” (2013, 34; 2010, 9). The two documents also
ternational rescue operations and the management of such op- speak to different aspects of occupational safety. For example, the
erations that could be exported to other Arctic areas” (2013, 41). 2013 Strategy mentions the physical conditions that can impact
In the sphere of internal security Finland presents three main safety, such as “low temperatures, harsh weather and the seasonal
objectives in the 2013 Strategy: “i) Develop international rescue variations in the amount of daylight” (2013, 21). The 2010 Strate-
cooperation in the Arctic region and improve the efficiency of gy looks more towards IMO regulations that “concern the techni-
cross-border assistance; ii) Establish efficient cross-border co- cal and structural properties of vessels operating in the Arctic, as
operation between local, regional and national authorities and well as the training and competence of the crew serving on these
actors; iii) Develop cross-border cooperation in crime prevision vessels” (2010, 28). The 2010 Strategy also explains that maritime
in order to evaluate and ward off threats to Arctic shipping and safety issues are connected to flooding and growing maritime
security risks” (2013, 59). The 2010 Strategy emphasizes that traffic (2010, 15, 28). Additionally, NATO contributes to address-
“for Finland, it is positive that cross-border cooperation has ing other regional safety such as “in search and rescue operations,
gained new political weight in the EU. Creation of security, sta- in the containment of environmental and natural disasters, and in
bility and well-being on the EU’s external borders is considered raising situational awareness,” to which NATO surprisingly con-
to be a common interest for the Union” (2010, 51). Finland is tributes (2010, 11).
also “closely involved in preparing the EU’s integrated maritime
policy and developing the EU-wide system for the exchange of As mentioned in the pollution indicator, there is also a point of
maritime information”, as well as “the existing best practices de- difference between the two documents on the topic of nucle-
veloped in the course of sea surveillance cooperation”. Further- ar safety. Passing reference is made to “nuclear safety projects
more, in order to assess and prevent security threats it is vital to implemented in the Arctic” (2013, 45) as one area for regional
enhance “cooperation between the authorities in the region and cooperation in the 2013 Strategy. In contrast, the 2010 Strategy
internationally” (2013, 41). provides a more detailed discussion, and to this end “Finland
supports the development of the safety of nuclear power plants
The 2013 Strategy also addresses the interoperability of Finnish located in Finland’s neighbouring areas through bilateral coop-
armed forces. Behind is that “all service branches of Finland’s eration” (2010, 13).
Defence Forces have considerable cold climate expertise, capa-
bilities” and the “materiel suited for northern conditions.” More- Although neither of the strategies mention the development
over, Finland has several “Arctic training and exercise areas in of the Polar Code (2013, 37; 2010, 36), there is a progression
Rovajärvi, Sodankylä, Kajaani”, and that for sea operations there shown between the two documents regarding growth in Fin-
are “areas on the Quark, the Gulf of Bothnia and Gulf of Fin- land’s capabilities. The 2010 Strategy remarks that the 2009 Arc-
land” (2013, 14, 40, 41). Finnish Defence Forces play a crucial tic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) “includes a number
part “in supporting civilian safety and rescue authorities in such of important recommendations for improving logistics in the
duties as search and rescue operations and the mitigation of Arctic Ocean, such as the launching of measures to negotiate
the effects of potential natural catastrophes and environmental an Arctic search and rescue instrument” (2010, 28–29). Addi-
damage” (2013, 40). As a result, “Finland is well-placed to offer tionally, the strategy states that while “Finland also has solid
cold climate training and exercise to its international partners, expertise in the charting of seas” that “at present, the region’s
which in turn serves to improve Finnish forces’ own interoper- monitoring, surveillance and rescue systems and research infra-
ability” (2013, 14, 40, 41). structure are still underdeveloped” (2010, 28, 45). This means
that, overall, regional capabilities, need to be improved.
Finally, “Finland offers solid experience from inter-Nordic co-
operation. Finland, Sweden and Norway are engaged in close The 2013 Strategy suggests that the AMSA recommendation has
local cooperation in crime prevention in the Circumpolar Re- been completed; it mentions the Arctic Council’s SAR agree-
gion.” The “Nordic PTN crime prevention framework” could ment which “requires Finland to allocate funding to rescue re-
serve as an example of “readily employable mechanisms for pre- sources north of the Polar Circle and also to international res-
paring threat scenarios and cooperating in crime prevention”. cue cooperation,” and other agreements such as “the Nordred
Furthermore, “the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic and Barents Euro-Arctic agreements on rescue services, under
Sea Region (BSTF) has created a model for inter-disciplinary which the Barents Rescue exercises are held every two years”
crime prevention that could possibly be applied in the Arctic as (2013, 41). The Strategy also recognizes Finland’s capabilities
well” (2013, 41). with respect to maritime safety issues, from, interestingly, an
economic perspective. For example, Finland can offer satellite
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 6 % of the total coded monitoring services, “in addition to ship design, construction
quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the 2010 Strategy (see Fig- and operation capabilities, environmental and oil spill preven-
ure 7, p. 42). The two strategies address some similar safety issues, tion, and control technologies, Finland is in a position to offer a

47
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

range of off-the-shelf export products based on the best practic- a driver of the low-carbon bioeconomy in providing a basis for
es developed on the Baltic Sea” (2013, 30). Additionally, Finland new products, materials, services and forms of energy” (2013,
has developed solutions to occupational safety issues, although 12); it added an “estimated […] EUR 1.4 billion” to the econ-
this knowledge was gained through cooperation and does not omy in 2010 (2013, 31) and “employed directly a total of 3,200
appear to be commoditized (2013, 21). people in Lapland” in 2013 (2013, 12). Certainly, this industry is
important to the Finnish economy. Reindeer husbandry is also
Neither strategy advocates for integration of national safety important as “some one thousand families in Finland earn all
services, but when the two strategies are read together, they or part of their livelihood from reindeer husbandry” (2013, 30).
stress the importance of cooperation at different levels. At the
circumpolar level, and in addition to the Arctic Council’s SAR The 2010 Strategy also identifies a number of different econom-
agreement, “cooperation between national coast guards, in par- ic activities. The document at a more general level states that
ticular, could combine a number of security and law enforce- “the region plays a key role especially in terms of energy gener-
ment components while securing and promoting Arctic actions ation, fishery, other livelihoods based on natural resources, and
on a broad front” (2013, 42). However, circumpolar cooperation tourism” (2010, 20), but also focuses on areas of Finnish exper-
“takes place primarily through the International Maritime Or- tise. A footnote identifies the following sectors of expertise: for
ganization (IMO) and the agreements, recommendations and example, “offshore industries, shipping industries, forest exper-
standards drawn up under its auspices” (2010, 28). Cooperation tise, mining industry, metals industry, tourism, knowledge of
also takes place at the regional level, specifically in search and traditional trades, low-temperature expertise, winter testing,
rescue efforts within the Barents region (2013, 14, 41). Finland measurement technology, power and heat generation and dis-
also cooperates bilaterally with “the United States and Canada in tribution, energy conservation and energy efficiency, Arctic
enhancing the capabilities to perform under Arctic conditions wind power technology, Arctic building and infrastructure,
and securing fast response times in the event of impending acci- environmental engineering and management of environmental
dents” (2013, 30). Finland also cooperates bilaterally with Rus- impacts, sustainable social concepts, northern environmental
sia and Canada on different satellite projects, such as GLONASS expertise, northern health and well-being, waste management
and Radarsat-C, respectively (2010, 29). Finally, within Finland, technology, information technology and public e-services, in-
“preparedness is based on a comprehensive concept of security, novation-oriented development, cold climate research, bio and
which consists in securing the vital functions of society through nanosciences, risk analyses, oil spill prevention and response,
close cooperation between the authorities, industry, NGOs and materials engineering” (2010, 20).
citizens” (2013, 40). The two strategies demonstrate that safety
is a complex issue which cannot be handled by one entity alone. With this list in mind, the Strategy also addresses trade, stating
that “Finnish companies … must focus their export efforts on
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 20 % of the total the areas of competence they have selected” (2010, 21), such as
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 14 % in the 2010 Strat- “environmental technology” (2010, 21), and capabilities in the
egy (see Figure 7, p. 42), dedicates a fair amount of space to areas of forestry, mining, oil/gas, and shipbuilding (2010, 22),
economic development issues. The 2013 Strategy acknowledges for example.
the diversity of Finland’s northern economy, while also recog-
nizing national strengths. For example, “Finland is in a position Similar to the 2013 Strategy, the 2010 Strategy states that “the oil
to assume a key role, open up new opportunities and innovate and gas reserves in the Arctic Region play a key role for Euro-
in areas such as Arctic and cold climate expertise, construction, pean energy supply” (2010, 19), although access to “the Norwe-
technology, product development, business operations, research gian Snohvit gas field was restricted to a limited number of sub-
as well as in value-added products drawing upon the northern contracts” (2010, 22). Other important natural resource sectors
environment” (2013, 9), and also through services for the ship- are mining and reindeer husbandry (2010, 19, 20).
ping industry (2013, 9, 30). The cold climate creates opportuni-
ties in cloud services, which is already “valued at EUR 1 billion Sustainable development is similarly addressed in both strate-
annually and is expected to grow substantially” (2013, 37). Oth- gies. The 2013 Strategy summarizes the sentiment in both docu-
er activities include “small-scale, nature-based businesses, crafts ments, explaining that in the context of sustainable development
and local food production” (2013, 12), and tourism (2013, 30). and economic growth “these two goals are not mutually contra-
Additionally, Finland exports “maritime technology” (2013, 29) dictory or exclusive, as long as the economic development in
such as icebreakers (2013, 9), and other forms of “environmen- the vulnerable Arctic regions takes into account the limitations
tal expertise” (2013, 26). imposed by the natural environment and is sustainable in terms
of the local communities” (2013, 8), although the 2010 Strategy
The 2013 Strategy also discusses more ‘conventional’ Arctic includes cultural responsibility as well (2010, 9).
economic activities in the natural resources and energy sectors.
Indeed, “mining in the Arctic region is expanding in Finland as Generally speaking, economic activities that speak to Finland’s
well as in other Arctic countries” (2013, 9). Mining is important strengths will be prioritized; however, environmental protec-
for employment as “it is estimated that up to 5,000 new jobs will tion and sustainable development will also be adhered to, and
be created in the mining industry over the next few years” (2013, “the status and rights of Indigenous peoples [will be] respect-
32). Forestry is also important because it “plays a crucial role as ed” (2010, 18; see also: 2013, 26, 39). In more specific terms,

48
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

the 2013 Strategy seems to prioritize green resource extraction Correspondingly according to the 2013 Strategy, Finland’s ob-
as it is “Finland’s ambition is to become a global pioneer in an jective is to “increase and renew the tourist industry to bring
eco-efficient mineral industry by 2020, an objective supported well-being to the region in accordance with the principles of
by the 2011–2016 Green Mining Programme launched by Te- sustainability” (2013, 55). In particular, the Finnish forest “of-
kes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innova- fers opportunities for a range of activities from game hunt-
tion” (2013, 32). The 2010 Strategy also looks at logistical issues ing and picking berries and mushrooms to extensive tourism.
needed to help prioritize economic activities. The document Lapland’s annual berry harvest is estimated at 350 million ki-
states that Finland will also “improve business opportunities in lograms” (2013, 31). Furthermore, “the changing of seasons,
the Arctic by developing transport, communications and logis- untouched wilderness, cultural contrast and other unique fea-
tics networks and border crossings” (2010, 24). tures offer great potential for expanding tourism in northern
Finland.” Among other factors that contribute to growth is
To support this vast range of economic activities, both strate- “the uncertainty of snow in central Europe and the proxim-
gies refer to a variety of economic actors. For example, the 2013 ity of Russia” (2013, 34). In order to “succeed in developing
Strategy recognizes that “the public sector’s role may consist of and increasing tourism, it is necessary to cherish the natural
creating networks, launching and supporting reference proj- scenery, environment and the uniqueness of the local culture.”
ects or organising visits by corporate delegations” (2013, 27), Since “the infrastructure, level of service, research and train-
while the private sector can also build their own internation- ing related to tourism should be of the highest standard” Fin-
al networks (2013, 10, 26). Moreover, “partnerships are being land is also striving to “ensure access to sufficient data on the
established between research institutes, technology centres industry” (2013, 11, 31).
and private companies” and “it is necessary to make use of the
opportunities offered by international financing institutions” The 2013 Strategy emphasizes that the “growth of the mining,
(2013, 28). Other actors identified in the strategy include Nord- energy, tourist and adventure industries” and consequently the
Min to provide best practices for the mining industry, and even growing “number of people working in the Arctic” “will increase
other states, possibly including some from Asia (2013, 26, 31). the volume of traffic and the provision of ancillary services.”
In contrast, the 2010 Strategy does not identify the federal lev- Finnish Lapland offers the highest standart of “the infrastruc-
el public sector, but at a more local level “Northern Finland’s ture, level of service, international orientation as well as tourism
regions, central cities, universities and sub-regions for cooper- research and education” (2013, 21, 34). Additionally, in Finland
ation with the East, founded Barents Centre Finland Company “tourism ensures a wider range of better services for the local
to promote the communication of information to companies population and helps maintain the basic infrastructure which,
that are interested in business opportunities in the Barents Re- in turn, enables the development of other businesses.” Never-
gion” (2010, 41). The document also recognizes the importance theless, “tourism will remain a labour-intensive field of activ-
of other states, like Russia, to the maritime industry, and the ity in which jobs cannot be relocated.” Therefore, cooperation
role of Finnvera for financing and Finpro for trade consulting with Arctic neighbours, such as Norway, could be benefitial for
(2010, 21). tourism, especially for “seasonal work and career development”
(2013, 21, 34). All this makes “it possible for tourism to grow
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total cod- and transform in a responsible manner, steps must be taken to
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 1 % in the 2010 Strategy (see ensure the availability of labour, a high level of skills and com-
Figure 7, p. 42), is reflected in both documents. The 2010 Strategy petence, and a sufficient resource base” (2013, 34).
provides brief notes about tourism in general, while the newest
2013 Strategy looks into more details on the tourism industry. Finland offers “the unspoilt landscapes, peace and quiet,
well-managed game and wildlife stocks and unique cultural fea-
The 2010 Strategy recalls that “higher temperatures and changes tures.” However, “the interests of the various activities—mining,
in precipitation have resulted in alterations in snow cover and forestry and investments in tourism – are to a certain extent
vegetation and species, thus affecting the environment and live- contradictory”. Therefore, “a balanced evolution of regional live-
lihoods (e.g., reindeer husbandry and tourism)” (2010, 14). The lihoods calls for sustainable cooperation between the individual
Strategy further declares that “tourism is also expected to in- fields and a close control of the environmental and social reper-
crease in the Barents Region” as “tourist centres have become cussions. All livelihoods need to be perceived as a whole in re-
hubs for diverse activities; besides providing services for tour- lation to one another.” Additionally, “nature conservation areas
ists, they offer a wide range of private and public services for and the outdoor and recreation services organised by the state
both permanent residents and holiday home owners in their increase the appeal of nature tourism in the region.” It is not a
areas” (2010, 19). Since “most Finnish tourist centres are locat- surprising world trend that “nature-based tourism is generally
ed in Northern Finland, […] they play an important industrial regarded as the fastest growing sector in the tourist industry”
policy role, as concerns both the creation of jobs and the region- (2013, 31, 34).
al economy” (2010, 19). If the 2010 Strategy recognizes that “in
Lapland the strategic objectives are related to tourism” (2010, The 2013 Strategy further lists government actions that Fin-
10, 11, 12, 19), the 2013 document continues by stating that “the land should undertakes in the field of tourism: 1) “Recognise
growth in adventure and nature tourism is reflected in Lapland’s the importance of tourism as a major industry and an interna-
position as a leading Arctic tourist destination” (2013, 11). tional export growth sector in the Arctic region, and support it

49
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

through goal-oriented preparation, land use planning, invest- Bering Straits in the future. Similarly, the North-West Passage
ments and the allocation of sufficient development resources”; may be increasingly used for shipping in the long term” (2013,
Here 2) “Improve access to Finnish Lapland (air, rail and feeder 30). This optimism might stem from Finland’s economic aspira-
traffic services) in response to the needs of the tourism indus- tions, as “Finland’s ambition is to be a leading expert in Arctic
try”; As well as 3) “Develop a model for a sustainable concen- maritime industry and shipping – as it is, Finnish companies are
tration of tourist services to foster economically viable, custom- already actively involved in projects to develop Arctic sea areas”
er-oriented local communities and cultures as well as resorts of (2013, 9). Safety is also important as Arctic shipping increases.
international standard respectful of the Arctic environment”; At The Polar Code will contribute to safety (2013, 37; 2010, 36).
the same time, 4) “Make use of the tourist safety network model Meanwhile, “any transport fees that might be collected must not
developed in Finland to improve safety performance through- become obstacles to traffic; instead, they should be used to sup-
out the Arctic region”; Furthermore, 5) “Develop local planning port the safety of shipping” (2010, 27).
for use in the assessment, comparison and reconciliation of the
interests of the various business sectors and other values… so Icebreakers are also associated with transportation infrastruc-
as to maintain the attractiveness of sustainable tourism and ture, shipping, Finnish expertise, and are addressed in both
the operating environment of the sector”; Then, 6) “Support documents, although in different ways. The 2013 document
and encourage a responsible tourism business through projects mostly discusses icebreakers in an economic context and states
that take due account of the special features of the sector… and that “Finland also manufactures advanced, state-of-the-art
through efforts to develop the operating environment”; Further, Arctic ice-breakers” that are exported to other states such as
7) “Ensure the increased provision of tourism-related foresight- “Canada, Norway, Russia, the United States and China” (2013,
ing data, applied research and expertise pertaining to the specif- 9). These vessels can also be used for mining and research pur-
ic characteristics of the Arctic”; Finally, 8) “Promote culturally poses (2013, 30, 32). In contrast, the 2010 Strategy addresses
sustainable tourism through culture partnerships and coopera- icebreakers as a way to facilitate Arctic maritime transit. For
tion with creative industries” (2013, 55, 56). example, “according to estimates, thinning of the ice cover may
enable sailing across the North Pole in a few decades, or per-
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the haps already in the next decade by means of icebreaker-assisted
total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2010 convoys and double-acting ships” (2010, 26). Yet, despite these
Strategy (see Figure 7, p. 42), addresses different forms of in- capabilities, “year-round traffic in these sea routes is not profit-
frastructure. In terms of transportation, both documents link able because of icebreaking costs” (2010, 27).
this infrastructure to the economy. For example, the 2013 Strat-
egy explains that “the foreseen growth of the mining industry, Infrastructure for Telecommunications and ICT is also dis-
tourism, the growing energy industry in the Barents region and cussed in both documents. In the 2013 Strategy, the importance
the opening of the North-East Passage have highlighted issues is mentioned in three ways: First, in terms of economy, as “aside
such as the need to develop transports and logistics, and estab- from efficient transport services, reliable, high-capacity infor-
lish new transport routes in the Arctic” (2013, 9). According to mation networks and digital services are instrumental in boost-
the 2010 Strategy, this cannot be achieved alone, and regional ing economic activity in northern Finland as well as improving
cooperation is required. The report states that “investments in competitiveness in the country as a whole. The adoption and
cross-border infrastructure require that Russia, too, is prepared utilisation of smart solutions drawing upon advanced commu-
to develop its east-west transport networks” (2010, 25). Interest- nications technology need to be promoted in all sectors” (2013,
ingly, border infrastructure is mentioned in the 2013 Strategy 11). Second, in terms of safety, as “satellite-based communi-
as way to facilitate cross-border flows with Russia (2013, 36). cations systems are necessary for the Arctic seas, for example
The 2013 Strategy also explains that even though building new to transmit weather and maritime safety services to sea-going
transportation will be expensive, new infrastructure “creates fa- vessels” (2013, 37). Third, in terms of ICT, which is important
vourable conditions for securing a high quality of life for the for society, as “electronic communication networks and digital
people living in the northern environment” (2013, 11, 10). services are of key importance to the efficiency of society and
the welfare of the citizens” (2013, 11, 20). Similarly, the 2010
Shipping, particularly through the “northern sea routes” (2010, Strategy recognizes that “mobile communications networks and
26) is associated with transportation infrastructure in both broadband links improve the operating environment for busi-
strategies. The 2010 Strategy explains that safe shipping through ness and industry and promote the well-being of local residents”
these routes is rather challenging and that “at present, the (2010, 25).
Northeast Passage is open for navigation for 49 ± 18 days per
year. Owing to climate change, the navigation season is estimat- Energy infrastructure is discussed to different extents in both
ed to extend to 134 ± 38 days by the end of this century” (2010, documents. The 2013 Strategy focuses more on this issue, espe-
27). In contrast, the 2013 Strategy takes a more optimistic view cially in the context of transmission lines. More specifically, the
of the possibilities of shipping through the Arctic. In particular, document states that “the Arctic region needs new electricity
the document states that “some shipping lines have been operat- transmission lines and decentralised energy production” and
ing in the Arctic region for years, for example in Greenland and that “the existing power transmission lines in and between Nor-
Spitsbergen and along the North-East Passage” and that “open- way and Russia need to be upgraded, which offers interesting
ing the North-East Passage will increase the importance of the business opportunities for Finnish expertise” (2013, 10, 28). In

50
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

contrast, the 2010 Strategy does not focus on transmission lines geopolitical influence in the region because “Finland will be
but on energy security for the EU as “it is in the EU’s interest able to consolidate its position and increase its appeal as a
that energy reserves in the Arctic Region are linked with Euro- leading world-class expert in the Arctic” (2013, 24).
pean energy networks and serve the security of Europe’s energy
supply” (2010, 46). To facilitate its research, Finland has different types of science
infrastructure. First, there is physical infrastructure which in-
Much of the infrastructure requirements mentioned above cludes icebreakers and “infrastructure in Sodankylä and Pal-
will need innovative solutions. The 2013 Strategy comments las, among other places” (2013, 24; see also: 2010, 22). Second,
that “solutions conducive to a good quality of life and specifi- higher education institutions are also considered infrastruc-
cally tailored for northern conditions are called for. One such ture. Pages 24 through 26 of the 2013 Strategy list the different
solution is Arctic design, which refers to design that draws institutions in Finland and their areas of specialization, while
upon an understanding of the Arctic environment and cir- the 2010 Strategy specifically identifies “the University of Lap-
cumstances, while giving due consideration to the peoples’ land and the University of Oulu” because they “have been pro-
adaptation to Arctic conditions” (2013, 11). The 2010 Strategy filed as experts in Arctic and northern research and education”
makes vague statements, for example, “maintenance and fur- (2010, 23). Third, scientific networks also serve as infrastruc-
ther development of Arctic know-how, research and special ture, such as the National Committee of Arctic and Antarctic
expertise require strategic choices and decisions on the part of Research mentioned in the 2010 Strategy, while the 2013 Strat-
Finland” (2010, 9). egy notes the proposal “that the EU Arctic Information Centre
be established in the form of a network involving 19 European
Finally, housing infrastructure is mentioned in both docu- institutions engaged in Arctic research and communications”
ments, but only in passing. For example, the 2013 Strategy (2013, 47; see also: 2010, 23).
states in the section, Technological Applications, that “other
elements essential to housing, services and government ac- Finnish knowledge is discussed in both strategies, although
tions are to improve risk management, and to secure sufficient with more detail in the 2013 document. One aspect of knowl-
data communications capacity and performance in the sparse- edge is traditional and local knowledge. The 2013 Strategy
ly populated northern regions” (2013, 11). Similarly, in the states that “an important source of Finnish Arctic expertise is
2010 Strategy, the idea of housing infrastructure is suggested familiarity with the local conditions” (2013, 24). To this end,
in a sentence that mentions “housing construction” (2010, 9) both strategies stress that traditional knowledge is important,
as part of Finland’s Arctic expertise. Neither document pro- especially in the context of biodiversity (2013, 14; 2010, 17).
vides an assessment of the state of housing and of what, if any- Another aspect is ensuring that research takes a multi- or in-
thing, needs to be improved. terdisciplinary approach, especially in relation to the changing
nature of the region (2013, 23; 2010, 22–23). Innovation is re-
According to the two strategies, the Science and Education lated to knowledge; space technology in the larger context of
indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total coded quotes in the EU, is also mentioned in the 2013 Strategy because “in EU
the 2013 Strategy and 7% of the 2010 Strategy (see Figure 7, politics, it is important to be able to shape the priorities of the
p. 44), notes that regional change and the climate appear to EU’s R&D programmes related to the Arctic” (2013, 47).
drive much of Finland’s research. Both documents recognize
that regional change occurs, partly due to climate change, Neither document focuses on education as much as on science
while the 2013 Strategy also recognizes that change can also and research. Perhaps, this is because the 2013 Strategy com-
come from “the exploitation of natural resources and land use. mends the Finnish education system, stating that “Finland’s
As they affect both the environment and society, an inter-dis- extensive and in-depth Arctic expertise is a result of its high-
ciplinary approach is required” (2013, 23; 2010, 14). Climate ly advanced education system, where its position as an Arctic
is also discussed in relation to climate change, but also in the country is taken into account at all levels” (2013, 13). Certainly,
context of “cold climate expertise” (2013, 23, 24). the quality of education also seems to be linked to Finnish ex-
pertise. The 2010 Strategy also makes this connection, stating
In addition to making scientific contributions, the two strate- that “Finland possesses top-level Arctic know-how in many
gies outline other purposes, or uses, of Finnish research. For sectors. However, maintenance of this know-how requires
example, the two documents stress that research can also be relevant university-level education, correctly targeted invest-
used for decision making, and economic and social purpos- ments, and national and international cooperation” (2010, 20).
es. Indeed, the 2013 Strategy states that “the new knowledge
generated by research needs to be actively disseminated to Despite the limited focus on education, the two strategies do
support decision making, expand business opportunities and address access to education in three ways. First, both docu-
increase general awareness of the Arctic among the public at ments mention joint university programs, such as “the Nordic
large” (2013, 24; 2010, 13, 20), while the 2010 Strategy explains Mining School, jointly launched by the Universities of Oulu
that, in the case of social issues, “a study on the living condi- and Luleå” in the 2013 Strategy, and that the Universities of
tions, values and attitudes of young people helps outline the Lapland and Oulu “have a joint research programme and four
future of Northern Finland” (2010, 22). The 2013 Strategy also international Master’s programmes together with Universities
explains that research can be used for gaining and maintain in Northwest Russia” in the 2010 Strategy (2013, 21; 2010, 23).

51
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Second, both documents refer to the University of the Arctic. ment spending limits and budget” and “EU funding will be allo-
However, instead of discussing the range of programs offered cated to the projects subject to EU Programmes and the condi-
or whether this has increased access to higher education, the tions established for EU support” (2013, 7). Moreover, funding
strategies focus on the administration of the network by the may be sought from private sources (2013, 7). The Strategy also
University of Lapland and the University of Oulu (2010 only) discusses long-term funding and budgeting and states that “the
(2013, 25; 2010, 23). Finally, the 2010 Strategy mentions the actions to be taken over a longer period of time will be specifi-
“Saamelaisalueen koulutuskeskus (Training Centre for the cally prioritised in connection with future spending limits de-
Sámi Region), located in Inari, [which] provides vocational cisions and central government budgets, and revised to match
basic and further training for the needs of enterprise in the other developments” (2013, 49).
Sámi region” (2010, 23).
To sum up
For the Implementation, both documents provide extensive de-
tail on this process. The final section of both documents is ded- To begin the analysis of the Finnish strategies, Figure 7 at the
icated to strategy implementation. For the 2010 Strategy, this start of the Finland section shows that for the 2013 Strategy the
section is called “Conclusions: Objectives And Proposals For three most-coded indicators are Economy, followed by Gover-
Action” and presents “sector-specific objectives and concrete nance, and the Human Dimension. Similarly, for the 2010 Strat-
proposals for action” (2010, 52), while also identifying which egy, Governance and the Economy are in the top two, while the
ministries will take responsibility. There is not a great deal of in- third most-coded indicator is International Cooperation. This
formation on how these objectives will be achieved, nor is there difference is not surprising, given that the 2010 Strategy focuses
any discussion of follow-up. The implementation section in the on external issues.
2013 Strategy is called “Objectives And Actions For Attaining
Them” (2013, 49). The absence of details from the 2010 doc- The three-least coded indicators in the 2013 Strategy are Pollu-
ument is addressed in the 2013 Strategy, which acknowledges tion, Climate Change, and Environmental Protection. In con-
that the “current strategy gives a more comprehensive presenta- trast, the three least-coded indicators in the 2010 Strategy are
tion of the actions necessary for achieving these goals based on Tourism, Security, and Climate Change. This shows that tour-
revised objectives” (2013, 18). This final section of the strategy ism and security grew in importance for the Finnish govern-
thus identifies action items for the different objectives, and spe- ment following the release of the 2010 Strategy.
cific ministries are assigned for implementation. The ministries
will also be responsible for follow-up on their actions, while “the Now that each indicator has been analyzed, it is easier to deter-
monitoring and implementation of the strategy is overseen by mine if the priorities for the 2013 Strategy have been met. The
the Arctic Advisory Board” (2013, 49). While the action items document identifies “the creation of new business opportuni-
are brief and do not offer specifics of how they will be imple- ties” as a priority, and this would be correlated with the Econo-
mented, they do, however, seem to be realistic even if there are my indicator, which is the most-coded indicator for the docu-
no time frames attached to them. Another observation is that ment. This suggests that the priority has been met, especially as
the same ministries are mentioned repeatedly, raising questions the Strategy identifies a wide range of economic activities and
about their capacity to accomplish their goals. discusses different ways in which the government will prioritize
the regional economy. The priority of “environment and the re-
Implementation budgets are not strongly identified in the 2010 gion’s security and stability” is addressed in different indicators.
Strategy. For example, the document states that “up until now, As for the environment aspect, the Environmental Protection
the scale of operations has been slightly under 800,000 euros indicator was one of the least-coded indicators in 2013. How-
per year, most of which is provided by the Ministry for For- ever, when Environmental Protection, Pollution, and Climate
eign Affairs. The rest of the funding comes from the Ministry Change are added together, they become the second most-cod-
of the Environment and the Ministry of Education and Culture” ed topics (see Appendix), thus showing that environmental con-
(2010, 43). Additionally, funding for regional activities may cerns are prioritized, especially as the discussions takes envi-
come from regional bodies like the Northern Dimension (2010, ronmental concerns seriously. As for the security and stability
42). The government also considers other international sources aspect, the Security indicator is in the middle in terms of the
of funding. According to the Strategy, “Finland’s Arctic opera- percentage of coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy. However, the
tions can also be enhanced by creating a more well-defined na- percentage of coded security quotes grew from 2010 (see Figure
tional financing approach. It should be pondered whether the 7, p. 42), suggesting the government is placing more importance
neighbouring area cooperation funds can increasingly be used in this area, as evidenced by a more detailed discussion of it in
to finance Finland’s participation in regional cooperation, in- the 2013 Strategy.
cluding Arctic cooperation” (2010, 43). For the 2013 Strategy,
it does not seem as if new funding is provided either. Instead, The International Cooperation indicator falls in the middle with
“the Strategy for the Arctic Region will be implemented through respect to its level of coding. However, cooperation is also par-
sector-specific measures in accordance with the central govern- tially addressed in the Governance indicator, which is the sec-

52
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

ond most-coded indicator for the 2013 Strategy. This suggests Finland will prioritize areas in which they have expertise, such
that the priority of “international cooperation” is a priority, al- as cold climate services and goods. Sustainable development
though the 2013 Strategy does not speak to the issue as much is also important, especially in connecting the economic, en-
as the 2010 Strategy does (see Figure 7, p. 42). This, however, is vironmental, and social to sustainability. Both documents also
not surprising when one considers that the 2010 Strategy is de- highlight the important relationship between the private sector
signed to focus more on external concerns. The priority of “Arc- and academia for economic development, as well as the role of
tic expertise in the widest sense of the term” is connected to the financing companies.
Economy and Science and Education indicators. The Economy
has the highest percentage of coded quotes, showing an increase There are also three key differences between the documents
from the 2010 Strategy. The Science and Education indicator is that stand out. First, is the issue of nuclear safety and waste. As
in the middle in terms of the coded quotes. In view of this, it is mentioned above, both documents remark upon this; however,
inferred that the priority of [developing] Arctic expertise has the 2010 Strategy provides a more in-depth look at different ap-
been met. Finally, the priorities of “bolstering Finland’s position proaches to addressing the issue, including through structures
regarding the Arctic region” and “the position of the northern like the G8. The reason for this shift in focus away from nu-
parts of Finland” can also be accounted for with the Interna- clear waste is unclear and raises questions as to why this issue
tional Cooperation, Governance, Science and Education, and was dropped from the agenda. Second, both documents men-
Economy indicators, which also suggests these priorities are tion the importance of security and regional stability, especially
met. through international cooperation. However, the 2013 Strategy
pays more overall attention to security than the 2010 Strategy
There are also some connections between the different indica- does. For instance, the 2013 Strategy provides more informa-
tors and themes. For example, the Security indicator identifies tion on Finland’s security objectives, including soft security is-
the need for international cooperation, especially as new energy sues like safety, and stresses the importance of interoperability.
developments have the potential to create new security consid- Additionally, the 2013 Strategy also reflects on civilian security
erations. Additionally, security and stability also contribute to issues like crime, thus painting a broader picture of regional
the wellbeing of northerners, as noted in the Human dimension. security concerns. Moreover, the 2010 Strategy positions cli-
Another linkage exists between the Economy, Environment, mate change as a safety issue while the 2013 Strategy positions
and Pollution indicators as an increase in economy activity can it as a security issue. This difference can be subtle, as safety can
cause pollution and damage the environment. At the same time, sometimes be considered soft security. However, the sentiment
tourism growth, in part, depends on the existence of a healthy on climate change did shift between strategies from concerns
environment. Governance, too, is connected to the Science and about floods to maintaining regional stability. Third, there is a
education indicator, as research informs governance decisions, shift between the two documents in the way that the strategies
and also to the International cooperation indicator, as gover- address the EU. The 2010 Strategy dedicates an entire section
nance requires that cooperation takes place at different levels; it to the “THE EU AND THE ARCTIC REGION” with almost
is also connected to the Human dimension through discussions eight full pages of text (2010, 44). In contrast, the 2013 Strategy
on Indigenous governance. addresses the “EU’s role in the Arctic” as the final discussion of
the section on “International Cooperation in the Arctic” and
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant sim- dedicates only a little more than one page to this discussion.
ilarities and the three most relevant differences are discussed. Both strategies are clear that Finland wants to have influence in
the EU’s Arctic policy, but, there is one key difference between
There are many similarities between the two documents, al- the documents – the timing of the EU’s submission for Observ-
though two points stand out. First, international cooperation is er status in the Arctic Council. The 2010 Strategy explains that
an important aspect of Finland’s strategies, and there is continu- this is a goal for Finland (2010, 44); thus, it is not surprising
ity between the two documents in relation to the importance of there is much detail regarding the EU’s regional activities. The
international cooperation and the use of international law to re- 2013 Strategy, in contrast, was released in August 2013, two-
solve disputes. The two strategies further identify international and-a-half months after the Arctic Council decided to delay
organizations and structures such as BEAC, the UN, UNCLOS, their decision on the EU’s application at the Kiruna Ministerial
IMO, and the Arctic Council with respect to how they either Meeting in May 2013 (see Arctic Council 2015b).
promote cooperation and/ or create legal frameworks that can
foster cooperation. With regard to the Arctic Council, both Overall, the two documents show consistency between Fin-
strategies remark that it should move towards a treaty-based land’s approach to governing their Arctic, while also updating
system, which could give it more authority. Second, there are and adapting the country’s course of action to meet new re-
similarities with regard to economic goals. Both documents gional challenges.
mention a broad range of economic activities, from energy, to
natural resource development, forestry, and reindeer herding, to
name a few. At the same time, the two strategies also stress that

53
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Iceland “the Arctic region should therefore be regarded as a single vast

area in an ecological, political, economic and security-related
There are two main Arctic strategy documents for Iceland: the sense, but not in a narrow geographical sense with the Arctic
current A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy Circle, tree line or a temperature of 10 degrees centigrade in July
from 2011, and the 2009 document Iceland’s Position in the as a reference point” (2011, 7). Yet, the document also seems to
Arctic. The 2009 document, which is in Icelandic and consists justify Iceland’s status in the region based on one such defini-
of 67 pages including pictures, is analyzed here as an unofficial tion. It states that “Iceland is geographically located by the Arc-
2-page English translation. Prior to these documents, the Ice- tic Circle and is therefore within the Arctic” (2011, 6). Regard-
landic government produced two reports on Arctic maritime less of how the Arctic is defined in this strategy, it is a departure
transportation. The first, in 2006, was a “report of a working from the 2009 document. While we are generally not quoting
group of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs” called North Meets the unofficial translation, the document is clear in stating that
North: Navigation and the Future of the Arctic (Iceland MFA Iceland is “on the periphery of the Arctic in the centre of the
2006, 1). The second document was conference proceedings North Atlantic Ocean” (2009, 2). At the same time, the docu-
called Breaking the Ice. Arctic Development and Maritime Trans- ment also states that “Iceland is the only country located entirely
portation: Prospects of the Transarctic Route - Impact and Op- within the Arctic region and its prosperity relies heavily on the
portunity, “organized by the Icelandic Government” and also a sustainable utilization of its resources” (2009, 1).2
“contribution to the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment” (Iceland Government, 2007, cover page). For the The Arctic is described similarly in both documents. For ex-
purposes of this analysis, only the 2009 and 2011 documents ample, they both comment about the fragility of the ecosystem,
are analyzed. environment, and the region’s resources (2011, 2, 6; 2009, 1).
The 2011 Strategy also suggests the region has become geopolit-
The 2011 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy, ically important. According to the Strategy, “the importance of
with 13 pages of text, starts by clearly laying out, as a strategy, the Arctic region in international affairs has increased consider-
12 principles, or priority areas, before exploring them further. ably in recent years on account of debate about climate change,
Iceland’s priorities can be understood based on these 12 princi- natural resources, continental shelf claims, social changes and
ples which include: 1) “promoting and strengthening the Arctic new shipping routes” (2011, 3). The two strategies primarily re-
Council”; 2) “securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state”; 3) fer to the region as the “Arctic,” although the 2011 Strategy uses
defining the Arctic region’ 4) using UNCLOS for dispute res- the term “North” a couple of times (2011, 4, 6) and the 2009
olution; 5) “strengthening and increasing cooperation with the document refers to the “High North” in the context of resource
Faroe Islands and Greenland”; 6) “supporting the rights of In- development near Jan Mayen Ridge (2009, 2).
digenous peoples in the Arctic”; 7) “building on agreements and
promoting cooperation”; 8) “prevent human-induced climate Neither document provides much information on what min-
change”; 9) “safeguarding broadly defined security interests in istries are responsible for the Arctic. For example, the 2011
the Arctic”; 10) “developing further trade relations between Strategy states that “Althingi [Icelandic Parliament] entrusts the
States in the Arctic region”; 11) “advancing Icelanders’ knowl- Minister for Foreign Affairs with the implementation and de-
edge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland abroad”; 120 “in- velopment of the policy in cooperation with other relevant min-
creasing consultations and cooperation at the domestic level” istries, as well institutions and organisation working on Arctic
(Iceland Althingi 2011, 1–3). Affairs, and in consultation with the Foreign Affairs Committee
and the Environment Committee of Althingi on the policy de-
The priorities from the short 2009 document are not as clearly sign as necessary” (2011, 3). The 2009 document only mentions
laid out; however, they are implied based on the different sec- the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2009, 2).
tion headings including: international cooperation, security,
resource development and environmental protection, transpor- Figure 8 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
tation, people and culture, and science and monitoring (Iceland indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
MFA 2009, 1, 2). (rounded to the nearest whole number) for the 2011 Strategy.

Comparison by Indicator

The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-

vides a good understanding of how Iceland views its position in
the Arctic. The 2011 Strategy, for example, explains that Iceland
does not put strict boundary limits on the region. For example,

2 These two quotes are included because the unofficial translation makes clear Iceland’s views on their position in the region.

54
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Migration is mentioned in the 2011 Strategy, albeit in the con-

text of the Hoyvik Free Trade Agreement with the Faroe Islands.
More specifically, it allows for “movement of persons and right
of residence” (2011, 8), which is notable, as the Faroe Islands are
not a part of the EU.

The Governance indicator, which accounts for 26 % of the to-

tal coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8), focuses
on “increasing consultations and cooperation at the domestic
level on Arctic issues” (including the participation of all minis-
tries, local governments, the academic community, industries,
non-governmental organizations) “to ensure increased knowl-
edge of the importance of the Arctic region, democratic discus-
sion and solidarity on the implementation of the Government’s
Figure 8. Iceland’s 2011 Strategy
Arctic policy” (2011, 3, 11). Behind as an ultimate aim is that
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole num-
“Iceland’s legal position in the North needs to be further se-
ber and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each doc-
cured in order to put Iceland on equal footing with the other
ument. Only the 2011 Strategy is shown here as the 2009 Strategy is a short and
coastal States in the region, [and] the Government should take
unofficial translation and cannot be compared quantitatively.
the initiative of developing arguments in support of this objec-
tive in cooperation with the relevant institutions” (2011, 6).
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 7 % of the total
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8). Both docu- The 2009 document emphasizes the importance of cooperation
ments, and especially the 2011 Strategy, spend some time ad- in two ways. First, there is discussion about working with Gree-
dressing issues of Indigenous peoples, despite Iceland not hav- land and the Faroe Islands on shared issues. Second, it recog-
ing a native Indigenous population. The 2011 Strategy provides nizes that science cooperation contributes to decision making,
some demographic information and recognizes that “it is be- especially in light of changes occuring in the region.
lieved that Arctic Indigenous peoples are at least 375,000 and
divided into around 40 distinct peoples who speak different The 2011 Strategy further states that “emphasis should be placed
languages” (2011, 9). In terms of human rights, the 2011 Strat- on Iceland’s role in the intensified relationship between Arctic
egy argues that there needs to be more effort to protect Indig- communities and in increasing economic relations” (2011, 10).
enous rights, especially as they are not always taken seriously.
Therefore, “as a small nation and an advocate of human rights, The 2011 Strategy also recognizes the importance of the Com-
Iceland should support the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) which is
and promote their involvement in decision-making in all issues responsible “to consider submissions by coastal States concern-
affecting their communities, whether they entail political, so- ing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
cial, cultural, economic or environmental interests” (2011, 8). miles, and to make recommendations related to those limits”.
The 2009 document does not focus on these issues, and instead The strategy points out that “the outer limits of the continental
recognizes that culture should be preserved through technolo- shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of recommen-
gy. It also notes that Indigenous peoples participate in the Arctic dations by the CLCS shall be final and binding” (2011, 7). Fur-
Council (2009, 1, 2). thermore, the 2011 Strategy addresses IMO and its “established
guidelines for ship design and safety equipment for ships oper-
The 2011 Strategy addresses health and wellbeing in two differ- ating in ice-covered waters and there is a willingness to make
ent ways. First, it links health and wellbeing to environmental the guidelines legally binding” (2011, 9). Correspondingly, the
conditions. Efforts must thus be made to address “human-in- 2009 Strategy warns that there is a need for IMO to increase
duced climate change and its effects in order to improve the maritime safety in icy waters, especially as cruise ships are not
wellbeing of Arctic residents and their communities” (2011, 2). always prepared for these condition (2009, 1).
Second, there is a recognition that economic activities, espe-
cially in the extractive resource sector, will affect northerners The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
(2011, 3; 2009, 1). Thus, improving health and wellbeing re- dicator, which accounts for 16 % of the total coded quotes for
quires research on different issues such as “economic and social the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8), follows up on the governance
development, gender equality, health care issues” (2011, 11). indicator by emphasizing the importance of cooperation on the
Additionally, “contracting businesses from Iceland are working part of all eight Arctic states. The 2009 document stresses that
in Greenland and cooperation on health care issues has been regional cooperation is important to Iceland (2009, 1). Further-
successful” (2011, 8), suggesting an interest in health and well- more, Iceland argues that “increased cooperation between the
being outside of Iceland. West Nordic countries will strengthen their international and

55
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

economic position as well as their politico-security dimen- Union through participation in the so-called Northern Dimen-
sion” (2011, 8). The 2011 Strategy then highlights “increasing sion (a cooperative forum including Russia, the EU, Iceland and
cooperation with the Faroe Islands and Greenland with the Norway) and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council,
aim of promoting the interests and political position of the through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and within the North-
three countries” (2011, 2). ern Dimension” (2011, 7). The 2009 document further supports
the importance of international cooperation within the Barents
The 2011 Strategy also refers to the meetings of the five Arctic Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) (2009, 1).
States (the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway and Kingdom of Den-
mark) in Ilulissat in 2008 and in Chelsea in 2010, where the rest In addition, “all the Arctic States support the United Nations
of the Arctic Council member states (Iceland, Finland, Sweden) Convention on the Law of the Sea and have pledged to abide by
and Arctic Indigenous peoples were excluded. Followed from the Convention”. Therefore, “disputes in the field of the law of the
this, it remarks that “if consultation by the five States develops sea cannot be ruled out, however, for example over the delimita-
into a formal platform for regional issues, it can be asserted that tion of the continental shelf.” Both documents further emphasize
solidarity between the eight Arctic States will be dissolved and that “it must be ensured that the United Nations Convention on
the Arctic Council considerably weakened” (2011, 4, 5, 6). Fur- the Law of the Sea forms the basis for the settlement of possible
thermore, “the Icelandic Government has publicly, as well as in disputes over jurisdiction and rights in the Arctic region” (2011,
talks with the five States in question, protested their attempts 4, 7; 2009, 4).
to assume decision-making power in the region” which would
be carried out only by the Arctic Five. Therefore, “further ef- The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 3 % of the
forts that may undermine the Arctic Council and Iceland’s in- total coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55). Both
terests in the region must be prevented”. In addition to that, “it documents comment on the fragility of the Arctic’s environment,
is also necessary to ensure that Indigenous peoples are able to and the 2011 Strategy lays out a clear environmental priority. In
maintain and cultivate their cultural uniqueness, strengthen the particular, it states that “Iceland will concentrate its efforts fully
infrastructure of their own communities and work towards im- on ensuring that increased economic activity in the Arctic region
proving their living standards” (2011, 6, 9). will contribute to sustainable utilisation of resources and observe
responsible handling of the fragile ecosystem and the conserva-
The 2011 Strategy comments that “as an Arctic state and a tion of biota” (2011, 2). The connection between environmental
founding member of the Arctic Council” Iceland recognizes protection and economic activities is also made in the 2009 Strat-
“the Arctic Council as the most important consultative forum” egy, particularly in relation to shipping and resource development
for regional and international cooperation of all the Arctic (2009, 1). It is not surprising, therefore, that both documents
states with the participation of Indigenous organizations focus- comment on the need to monitor the ocean for pollution (2011,
ing on sustainable development in the region (2011, 1, 4, 5, 6). 10; 2009, 1). The 2011 Strategy suggests that environmental pro-
Indeed, “Iceland is among the countries that want to increase tection can, in part, be improved through security cooperation as
the Arctic Council’s weight and relevance in decisions on the well as through economic activity (2011, 2).
region, where necessary.” According to the 2011 Strategy, “the
role of the Arctic Council needs to be enhanced.” Therefore, it Wildlife protection, especially of fish, is addressed in both
is of “great importance that consensus is reached across the po- strategies. According to the 2011 Strategy, “the UN Fish Stocks
litical spectrum on an Arctic policy which aims at positioning Agreement established a framework for the cooperation between
Iceland among those countries that have the greatest influence coastal States and States fishing on the high seas within regional
on future development in the region; safeguarding economic, fisheries management organisations regarding conservation and
environmental and security-related interests in the North; and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
working towards closer cooperation with other nations, inter- stocks” (2011, 9). In contrast to this, the 2009 document seeks to
national organisations, autonomous regions and stakeholders.” protect fish from the damage caused by oil spills (2009, 1).
Importantly, the “individual Member States must be prevented
from joining forces to exclude other Member States from im- The Pollution indicator is addressed only in the 2011 Strategy
portant decisions, which would undermine the Arctic Council and accounts for 4 % of the total coded quotes in the document
and other Arctic States, including Iceland” (2011, 4, 5, 6; also: (see Figure 8). Only greenhouse gases are mentioned as a pol-
2009, 1). The Strategy also addresses the “increased interna- lutant, and the document suggests that the shipping industry is
tional interest in the region” demonstrated by high number of responsible for this pollution (2011, 9, 10). Although there is
countries and organizations that have “applied for permanent little mentioned on the sources and types of pollution, the Strat-
observer status in the Arctic Council” (2011, 5). egy does identify a number of ways to address the issue. First, it
recognizes that frameworks such as UNCLOS, the IMO, and the
In the sphere of international/regional cooperation, Iceland UNFCCC provide guidance on “pollution prevention” (2011, 2,
further emphasizes good relations with other states, “within 3, 9). Second, pollution is also positioned as a security concern.
the Nordic cooperation, defence cooperation with the United Interestingly, NATO is also recognized for pollution prevention
States, regional defence and security cooperation with Norway, as “a statement [on this] was released in connection with the
Denmark and Canada, cooperation with the other seven Arc- NATO Conference on Arctic issues in Iceland in January 2009”
tic States in the Arctic Council, relations with the European (2011, 10).

56
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

As previously mentioned, only the 2011 Strategy addresses the the framework of international law, not least the United Nations
Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Indeed, “all the Arctic States
coded quotes (see Figure 8). The Strategy puts forward differ- support the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
ent approaches related to climate action. This in part includes and have pledged to abide by the Convention.” The document
conducting climate change research and recognizing that “oth- states that “it must be ensured that the United Nations Con-
er States and alliances, such as China, Japan and the European vention on the Law of the Sea forms the basis for the settlement
Union, have also wanted to have influence on current develop- of possible disputes over jurisdiction and rights in the Arctic
ments, including various cross-national factors such as climate region. Although there are few indications that the Arctic will
change” (2011, 4, 11). Additionally, Iceland will work within be an area of conflict in the near future, it cannot be ruled out
the UNFCCC framework and follow the sustainable devel- that disputes arising from continental shelf claims will compro-
opment principles, while “cooperating on efforts to reduce mise relations between the Arctic States” (2011, 3,7). The Strat-
greenhouse gas emissions, including utilisation of renewable egy further mentions “several unresolved issues” in this context
energy sources” (2011, 9). connected to stability in the Arctic, including: “i) The United
States and Canada are involved in a dispute over the Northwest
The Security indicator is mainly discussed in the 2011 Strategy Passage and a part of the Beaufort Sea which is estimated to
(12 % of the total coded quotes) (see Figure 8). The document hold vast oil deposits. The United States considers the North-
refers to the peaceful cooperation among the Arctic States since west Passage as an international strait whereas Canada consid-
the end of the Cold War. At the same time, security relies on ers the route its internal waters; ii) Denmark and Canada, on
cooperation, respect for the law, and environmental protection the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, disagree on ju-
(2009, 1). The 2011 Strategy follows up on that by stating that risdiction over the Lomonosov Ridge in the Arctic Ocean; iii)
“general security must be strengthened in the Arctic region and Most nations reject Norway’s claim of a 200 nautical miles zone
the militarisation of the area prevented.” Furthermore, “coop- around Svalbard on the basis of conditional sovereignty over the
eration must be strengthened and bilateral agreements sought island and have refused to recognise their “fisheries protection
with individual Arctic countries, similar to agreements made zone” around it; iv) A dispute is ongoing between Canada and
with Denmark, Norway and Canada on specific security issues” Denmark over Hans Island, which is located in the strait that
(2011, 10). The 2011 Strategy further emphasizes “the impor- separates Ellesmere Island from Northern-Greenland and con-
tance of the Nordic cooperation, defence cooperation with the nects Baffin Bay with the Lincoln Sea” (2011, 4).
United States, regional defence and security cooperation with
Norway, Denmark and Canada, cooperation with the other sev- The Strategy also emphasizes the importance of “safeguarding
en Arctic States in the Arctic Council, relations with the Eu- broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region through
ropean Union through participation in the so-called Northern civilian means and working against any kind of militarisation
Dimension (a cooperative forum including Russia, the EU, Ice- of the Arctic.” At the same time, “Iceland’s cooperation with
land and Norway) and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic other states should be strengthened on the protection of biota,
Council, through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and with- research, observation capabilities, search and rescue, as well as
in the Northern Dimension” (2011, 7). According to the 2011 pollution prevention in the Arctic region, inter alia to protect
Strategy, “there is common willingness among the Arctic States Icelandic interests in the areas of environmental protection, so-
to increase cooperation of this kind”. Particularly, “common cial wellbeing and sustainable use of natural resources” (2011, 2).
security interests involve surveillance and the capacity for re- By increasing the “cooperation between the West Nordic coun-
sponse to danger, not least on account of environmental acci- tries” their “international and economic position as well as their
dents, accidents at sea and maritime activity in connection with politico-security dimension” will be strengthened (2011, 8).
oil extraction and other resource utilisation” (2011, 10).
Last, but not least, the 2011 document points to the role of
Further discussion about improvement of “preparedness and NATO in the Arctic. The Strategy recognizes that NATO is
monitoring of the region” is provided in the 2011 document “increasingly directing its attention towards the Arctic region
(2011, 10). The Strategy recognizes the “growing international again, even though the alliance has no plans for a military pres-
importance of the region which has led to an increasing pre- ence”. Nevertheless, “the interest in the region is not limited
paredness on behalf of the Arctic States to guard their sovereign to the Arctic States themselves, since other States and organ-
interests, without having led to militarisation.” Furthermore, the isations maintain that they have direct or indirect interests at
importance of investment in “developing the capacities of res- stake” (2011, 4). For example, in the conference on Arctic issues
cue services, the coast guard and the police” is mentioned (2011, in January 2009 in Iceland “the alliance expressed its willingness
10). The Strategy also refers to the Stoltenberg report, which to monitor and gather information and intelligence, as well as to
“addresses Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy, strengthen its capabilities for rescue and pollution prevention at
[and] includes numerous ideas related to the common interests sea… It was reiterated that the purpose was not to promote the
of the Nordic countries in the Arctic” (2011, 10). militarisation of the Arctic but to secure the stability that has
been maintained since the Cold War in successful cooperation
Iceland’s government also addresses potential conflicts in the with Russia and even other nations outside the alliance, such as
2011 Strategy arising from the Continental shelf claims, stating Finland and Sweden” (2011, 10).
that these claims by Arctic States “have yet to be settled within

57
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 5 % of the total cod- to the Arctic (2011, 10). However, economic activities are also
ed quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55) and identifies regulated, especially in the case of the oil and gas sector. The
regional safety issues. First, the two strategies identify the mar- fishing industry is also regulated, and in addition to the UN
itime and environmental safety in relation to economic activi- Fish Stocks Agreement, “an agreement between Iceland and
ty, while the 2011 Strategy securitizes these issues. Indeed, the the Faroe Islands on fisheries within their respective exclusive
document states that “common security interests involve sur- economic zones is also in effect” (2011, 8). The 2009 document
veillance and the capacity for response to danger, not least on does not specifically address economic regulation, but it too ex-
account of environmental accidents, accidents at sea and mar- presses the need to sustainable development and the protection
itime activity in connection with oil extraction and other re- of fish stocks (2009, 1, 2).
source utilisation” (2011, 10; 2009, 1). Second, the 2011 Strategy
addresses emergency preparedness by recognizing that “most of Only the 2011 Strategy refers to different economic actors,
the Arctic States have opted to improve civil preparedness and mostly in relation to trade. In particular, it mentions that the
monitoring of the region, inter alia by developing the capacities government creates the political context to facilitate economic
of rescue services, the coast guard and the police” (2011, 10). relations, especially with Greenland. The government has also
negotiated trade agreements, like the Hoyvik Free Trade Agree-
The 2011 Strategy also identifies three structures that contrib- ment with the Faroe Islands (2011, 8, 11). Moreover, “other
ute to Arctic security. First is the Arctic Council and its legal- States and alliances, such as China, Japan and the European
ly binding SAR agreement. Second, the strategy suggests that Union, have also wanted to have influence on current develop-
NATO could contribute to regional SAR efforts (2011, 5, 10). ments, including various cross-national factors such as climate
Third, safety is also addressed with regard to the IMO which change, possible utilisation of energy and the opening of new
“has established guidelines for ship design and safety equipment shipping routes” (2011, 4).
for ships operating in ice-covered waters and there is a willing-
ness to make the guidelines legally binding” (2011, 9). Based on The Tourism indicator is briefly discussed twice in the 2011
these comments, it seems that Iceland likes the idea of legally Strategy (1 % of the total coded quotes, see Figure 8, p. 55)
binding safety agreements and/or provisions. stating that “Icelanders, more than other nations, rely on the
fragile resources of the Arctic region, for example the indus-
Neither document suggests the integration of national safety tries of fishing, tourism and energy production” (2011, 6). The
measures. Instead, the focus is on cooperation, especially in the other time tourism is mentioned is in connection to coopera-
context of surveillance. For instance, the 2009 Strategy men- tion, with the Strategy emphasizing that “cooperation should
tions the possibility of Iceland creating an international capac- be strengthened with Greenland and the Faroe Islands on Arc-
ity to address safety (2009, 1). This idea is further discussed tic issues regarding trade, energy, resource utilisation, environ-
in the 2011 Strategy which states that “the Stoltenberg report, mental issues and tourism” (2011, 8).
which addresses Nordic cooperation on foreign and security
policy, includes numerous ideas related to the common inter- The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ests of the Nordic countries in the Arctic, such as a joint mar- ed quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55). Both docu-
itime monitoring and surveillance system that could be devel- ments discuss different types of transportation infrastructure.
oped further to increase preparedness and surveillance in the First, there is a brief mention of air transport to Greenland in
region” (2011, 10). the 2011 Strategy as “air services between the countries have
increased” (2011, 8), while the 2009 Strategy recognizes the
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 13 % of the total potential for Keflavik International Airport to be a transit hub
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55), iden- (2009, 2). Second, shipping is generally linked to transporta-
tifies a variety of economic activities. Both strategies note that tion and is also discussed in the two strategies. In particular,
Iceland is involved in renewable energy, extractive resource de- the 2011 Strategy recognizes that “world trade may be subject
velopment, fishing, and tourism (2011, 6, 8; 2009, 1, 2). With to changes as melting sea ice opens up new Arctic shipping
regard to extractive resources, the 2011 Strategy further ex- routes which connect the North Atlantic, the Arctic Ocean and
plains that “Iceland enjoys continental shelf rights in the joint the Pacific” (2011, 3) and that Iceland could become a hub for
exploitation area between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island” and this activity (2009, 2). Of course, this will require safety and
that “Iceland may for example be able to provide services in pollution measures, which have been discussed above in the
connection with future oil extraction areas in and off the coast respective indicators.
of Northeast Greenland” (2011, 6, 8).
The 2009 Strategy also mentions that ICT, and thus communi-
The 2011 Strategy identifies two ways to prioritize Iceland’s cations infrastructure, can play a role of cultural preservation
economy. First, Iceland wants to seeks an “intensified relation- (2009, 2), but does not state if these types of technologies exist
ship between Arctic communities and in increasing econom- or are still needed.
ic relations. The idea [of establishing] an Arctic Chamber of
Commerce to promote trade cooperation between business- The Science and Education indicator accounts for 6 % of the to-
es and industries in the region is an example” (2011, 10–11). tal coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55). The
Second, Iceland believes it has expertise that will be of benefit 2011 Strategy provides a long list of topics that research should

58
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

cover including “climate change, glacier research, marine biolo- There are also some connections between the different indi-
gy, international politics and law, security, oil and gas extraction, cators. For example, the Human Dimension is connected to
history and culture, economic and social development, gender the Climate Change indicator through discussions around the
equality, health care issues and Arctic shipping” (2011, 11). Ad- possibility of climate change affecting people’s health. The Gov-
ditionally, the 2009 Strategy suggests that research should help ernance indicator is connected to the Safety indicator through
inform policy (2009, 2). discussions about the IMO and shipping safety. The Environ-
mental Protection and Pollution indicators are also connected
In terms of facilitating research, both documents recognize to the Economy indicator, as economic activity affects the envi-
the University of the Arctic (2011, 11; 2009, 2), while the 2011 ronment and shipping can cause pollution.
Strategy recognizes Iceland’s different research networks and
the need to develop them. For example, “there is particular need Making comparisons between these two documents can be diffi-
to promote the involvement of Icelandic scholars and institu- cult, especially with regard to the percentage of coded quotes, as
tions in international cooperation on Arctic science, such as the the 2009 document is a translated and shortened version of the
International Arctic Science Committee and work carried out Icelandic original. Nonetheless, the key ideas are expressed and
by the Arctic Council working groups” (2011, 11). Both docu- do allow for comparison, revealing two relevant similarities and
ments also comment on the possibility of the University of Ak- three relevant differences between the two documents. In par-
ureyri housing an Arctic Centre (2011, 11; 2009, 2). ticular, two similarities are highly illustrative. First, both doc-
uments take similar approaches to environmental protection.
The Implementation indicator is addressed only by the 2011 As economic activities can negatively affect the environment,
Strategy. There are twelve related points suggestive of action items; there needs to be a sustainable economy which also guarantees
the opening sentence of the strategy is that “Althingi resolves to the protection of the fish stocks. Second, both documents ad-
entrust the Government, after consultations with Althingi, with dress transport infrastructure and shipping. The 2009 Strategy
carrying out the following overarching policy on Arctic issues comments that Iceland could be an air transit hub, while the
aimed at securing Icelandic interests with regard to the effects 2011 Strategy comments that air services between Iceland and
of climate change, environmental issues, natural resources, navi- Greenland have increased. Similarly, the 2009 Strategy suggests
gation and social development as well as strengthening relations the possibility of Iceland becoming a transit hub, while the
and cooperation with other States and stakeholders on the issues 2011 Strategy focuses on the possibility of new shipping routes
facing the region” (2011, 1). As previously mentioned in the (Re) and safety.
mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator, the Minister of
Foreign affairs has the ultimate responsibility for implementa- There are also some differences between the two documents,
tion (2011, 3). However, there is no information on what kind of three of which are discussed here. First, despite the fact that both
resources would be allocated to implementation activities, or if documents address governance through international coopera-
there will be any sort of evaluation process. tion, each focuses on different priorities. For example, the 2011
document addresses business cooperation and responsibility,
To sum up human rights, and delimiting the continental shelf through the
CLCS, while the 2009 document mentions research cooper-
Figure 8 and Appendix show that the top coded indicators for ation, and maritime safety through the IMO. In addition, the
Iceland’s 2011 Strategy are Governance, International Coopera- 2011 document stresses the importance of cooperation with all
tion, Economy, and Security. This suggests that the priorities of Arctic states and clearly denounces the fragmentation caused by
“promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council”; “strength- the Ilulissat Declaration. The document expresses a clear state-
ening and increasing cooperation with the Faroe Islands and ment of Iceland’s displeasure at the Ilulissat Declaration and the
Greenland”; “increasing consultations and cooperation at the harm it could cause to Arctic cooperation. Iceland is not the
domestic level”; “building on agreements and promoting coop- only state excluded from Ilulissat, but it is the only state to make
eration”; “securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state”; using its displeasure known in such a formal way—neither Finland
UNCLOS for dispute resolution; “safeguarding broadly de- or Sweden commented on their exclusion in their strategies.
fined security interests in the Arctic”; and “developing further Second, pollution and climate change are addressed only in the
trade relations between States in the Arctic region” have like- 2011 document. Few pollutants and/or sources of pollution are
ly been met (see: 2011, 1–3). As for the priority of “supporting identified; however, more attention is given to institutional ap-
the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic” and “advancing proaches to addressing pollution in general. The climate change
Icelanders’ knowledge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland discussion then generally focuses on climate collaboration
abroad” (2011, 1–3), these are accounted for with the Human through formal institutions like the UNFCCC or cooperation
Dimension and Science and Education indicators, respectively. with other states. Third, while both documents recognize that
The priority to “prevent human-induced climate change” is ac- security and stability are achieved through cooperation, securi-
counted for in the Climate Change indicator, which, however, is ty is addressed substantially only in the 2011 Strategy. The doc-
the second least-coded indicator. The final priority, defining the ument further develops these ideas by discussing the role of se-
Arctic region, is captured in the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining curity organizations like NATO, and also the Arctic Council as a
the Arctic indicator, with the Strategy seeking to locate Iceland place to build and maintain relations. In addition, the document
in the Arctic. refers to NATO as an actor being able to help with pollution.

59
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Overall, the key observation of the Icelandic documents high- Comparison by Indicator
lights that Iceland is making special efforts to be convincing
about its status as an Arctic State, as it definitely is, and even The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
redefining its location as an island state in the Arctic and in the vides information about how Denmark approaches the region.
North Atlantic. This is partly due to the fact that Iceland is not While neither strategy defines the Arctic outright, page 11 of the
among the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, which became an 2011 Strategy provides a regional map showing what seems to
important geographical and geopolitical factor due to, and after, be the 60th parallel, and suggests that this could be the Arctic’s
the above-discussed Ilulissat Ministerial meeting of 2008. boundaries (2011). If so, both Greenland and the Faroe Islands
are included in this definition.

The Kingdom of Denmark The 2011 Strategy also tends to describe the region in relation
to the environment. For example, it states that the Arctic’s “cli-
The Kingdom of Denmark has released two strategies for the mate, environment and nature” are both fragile and vulnerable,
Arctic. The most current, Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe and that the region has many “unique ecosystems” (2011, 31).
Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, At the same time, it also comments on the “extreme Arctic con-
was released in 2011 and has 58 pages including images and ditions” (2011, 13), which seems a little at odds with the other
maps. Previously, Denmark also released a draft strategy in descriptions. The Strategy also describes the region in relation
2008 called Arktis I en brydningstid. Forslag til strategi for akti- to its growing geopolitical importance which is due to “the cli-
viteter I det arktiske område, with 43 pages in Danish (Denmark mate effects in the Arctic” and “the economic potential of the
NOU 2008). The document used for this analysis is an unofficial region” (2011, 9). Similar sentiments are expressed in the 2008
translation from 2008, The Arctic in an Upheaval. Draft Strate- Strategy and both documents also acknowledge that the Arctic
gy for Activities in the Arctic (Denmark 2008), consisting of 42 is not heavily populated (2011, 16; 2008, 25). The 2011 Strategy
pages with no images and, as such, it will be referred to but not uses the term “Arctic” to describe the region, while “circum-
quoted directly. Additionally, the Faroe Islands, in 2013, pro- polar” and “North” are each used once in the document (see:
duced its own strategy called The Faroe Islands—A Nation in the 2011, 9, 36).
Arctic: Opportunities and Challenges (Faroe Islands PMO 2013).
However, as this is not a national strategy, it is not considered in Both documents identify different government ministries that
the analysis that follows. will be involved in regional affairs. In both cases, the Gov-
ernments of Greenland and of the Faroe Islands are involved,
The 2011 Strategy (Denmark MFA 2011) makes a clear state- demonstrating their self-governing status. Interestingly, there
ment about Danish priorities in the Arctic, mentioning that are only four ministries that appear in both documents, which
“in an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish are the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the
Realm, the Kingdom will work overall for: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the
• A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic Ministry of Transport. Additionally, the 2011 Strategy identifies
• with self-sustaining growth and development the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, the Ministry
• with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate, of Justice, the Faroe Island’s Ministry of Trade and Industry,
environment and nature and the Greenland’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The 2008
• in close cooperation with our international partners” document also mentions the Ministry of Environment and
(2011, 10–11). Food, the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, and the
Ministry of Education (2011, 14, 17, 20, 27, 35, 57; 2008, 12,
The purpose of the Strategy is “to focus attention on the King- 13, 30, 32, 39, 41).
dom’s strategic priorities for future development in the Arctic
towards 2020”, and the “aim is to strengthen the Kingdom’s sta- Figure 9 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
tus as global player in the Arctic” (2011, 11). signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
The priorities of the unofficial translation can be gleaned from ber) in the documents.
the section headings in the title page. These are: Home Rule ar-
rangement; Sovereignty; Arctic and Nordic cooperation; Orig-
inal people of the Arctic; Energy and minerals; Protection and
sustainable use of natural; Weather, climate, nature and the
environment; Research; Infrastructure; Commerce and indus-
tries; Joint Committee; Cultural cooperation in the Arctic; and
Greenlandic higher education (2008, 1–3).

60
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Climate change, according to the 2011 Strategy, can contribute to

rights violations in the Arctic; UNDRIP has a role to play here.
More specifically, the Strategy states: “The Kingdom will assist
in reinforcing the rights of Indigenous peoples in negotiations
towards a new international climate agreement by promoting the
visibility of Indigenous peoples’ situation and also ensuring that
the principles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples from 2007 are observed” (2011, 44, 50). In addition to
climate change, the 2008 document explains that hunting and
fishing are also rights issues, especially in relation to Inuit cul-
ture (2008, 19–20, 24). The 2011 Strategy further expands on
these issues, showing support for seal hunting. In particular, the
Strategy explains: “The Kingdom will work internationally for
the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ right to conduct hunting and to
Figure 9. Comparing the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2008 and 2011 Strategies
sell products from seal hunting, as long as it is based on sustain-
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
able principles” (2011, 32). This support is important because,
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
even though the UN seal ban has a special provision for the Inu-
it, Greenland’s Inuit still experience challenges selling their furs
The Human Dimension, which accounts for 8 % of the total (European Commission 2019; Raspotnik and Østhagen 2016).
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 docu-
ment (see Figure 9), recognizes that the Arctic has a small and The topic of health and wellbeing is discussed, and both strategies
sparse population, especially Greenland (2008, 41). Addition- recognize the different issues that can affect health, especially in
ally, the 2011 Strategy explains that “the Arctic region is pop- Greenland. The two documents mention that pollution is caus-
ulated by people, including more than 30 different Indigenous ing harm, while the 2008 document notes it affects breastfeeding
peoples such as the Inuit who originate from the Thule culture” mothers (2011, 45; 2008, 28). However, it is the 2011 Strategy
(2011, 9). Thus, both documents discuss issues concerning In- that goes into depth on the situation in Greenland. In particular,
digenous peoples. the Strategy emphasizes that “Greenland today is facing a dual
challenge from both old patterns of disease characterized by rel-
Both documents emphasize the Kingdom’s efforts to help pro- atively high infant mortality, accidents, and acute and chronic
tect the rights of Indigenous peoples, which seems to be a point infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, as well as a new Western
of pride for the country, especially considering that “The Act on pattern of disease dominated by chronic and lifestyle-related dis-
Greenland Self-Government was granted to Greenland on June eases” (2011, 40). Greenland has thus made substantial changes
21, 2009,” thus giving Greenland control over policies pertain- to its healthcare system that will result in improved access to care
ing to “education, health, fisheries, environment and climate” (2011, 40). Moreover, the 2011 Strategy recognizes that health-
(Government of Greenland n.d.). This development is apparent, care issues exist throughout the Arctic and can be addressed
as the 2008 document recognizes that Greenland’s self-rule sta- collectively. The document explains that “the cooperation be-
tus affords it rights and abilities that other Indigenous peoples tween Arctic partners on common challenges should be further
do not have, and that the Kingdom of Denmark and Green- developed, especially based on a Greenland context. Enhanced
land desire other Indigenous peoples to have the same rights Arctic cooperation could include, research, evaluation and also
(2008, 20). The 2011 Strategy builds on this, explaining that exchange of “good/best practices” regarding infectious diseases,
“Greenland’s self-government model, natural resource manage- public health, telemedicine, a culturally attuned health service
ment, climate policy, environmental policy and preservation of and environmental medicine” (2011, 40).
its cultural heritage is a model of inspiration for many of the
world’s Indigenous peoples” (2011, 10). Not surprisingly, there- The two strategies also comment on the Arctic Council’s con-
fore, both documents discuss and support other mechanisms tributions to health and wellbeing. For example, the 2008 doc-
to protect Indigenous rights. For example, there are different ument notes that the Council was associated with the Survey of
venues within the UN, such as the UN Special Rapporteur on Living Conditions in the Arctic and the Arctic Human Develop-
the rights of Indigenous peoples, the UN Expert Mechanism on ment Report (2008, 18, 19). However, the Arctic Council could
Indigenous Peoples Rights, and UN Declaration on the Rights play a strong role in this area. The Strategy, too, remarks that
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (2011, 51, 52; 2008, 17, 20). the Arctic Council could play a stronger role. Indeed, “the Arctic
Additionally, the 2008 document recognizes that the Arctic Council must be reinforced as the only relevant political orga-
Council is another venue that addresses issues concerning In- nization that has all Arctic states and peoples as members…The
digenous peoples and that there is an Indigenous Peoples Secre- Kingdom will emphasize that the human dimension, i.e. people’s
tariat (2008, 19, 20). living conditions and wellbeing, is given increasingly more space
in cooperation” (2011, 52).

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Equality is discussed in the 2011 Strategy in two ways. First, the research concerning the development of best practices, public
document focuses on self-government for Greenland and the health and health-related consequences of pollution”, and gives
Faroe Islands. In particular, the document explains that “today, high priority for Nordic, European and international coopera-
both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have extensive self-gov- tion on research and education. In addition to this “the King-
ernment” (2011, 10). Second, is gender equality in Greenland. dom will continue to develop cooperation in the health area,
Indeed, “Greenland is also sharing its experience on family including emergency and specialist treatments within the King-
matters and gender equality with, among others, the Nunavut dom – and in the case of Greenland also with Iceland – and
region of Canada Furthermore, the Nordic Council of Ministers training and recruitment within the Kingdom and through
has been focusing on changes in the Arctic from a gender per- Nordic and Arctic cooperation” (2011, 35, 40).
spective” (2011, 40).
The 2011 document also refers to the mineral resources in
Finally, both documents speak to migration issues, albeit with Greenland, highlighting that the sector “has significantly ma-
different foci. Labour migration is a factor in the 2011 Strategy tured over the last 10-15 years as a result of a long-term and
which comments that “it will also be a significant challenge for deliberate strategy” based on the “adoption by Parliament
Greenland to develop policies which, apart from the goal of so- Act No. 7 … on mineral resources and activities of relevance
cial and societal-related sustainability, deal with the prospect of hereto the mineral resources sector was fully taken over by the
significant foreign labour migration” (2011, 23), although there Greenland Self-Government on 1 January 2010 and is a key
is no explanation as to why this would be the case. In contrast, element to building growth industries and a self-sustaining
the 2008 document comments on the challenges of identifying economy” (2011, 24). Furthermore, “in 2008, Greenland had
illegal migration (2008, 10) but does not explain if this is an already adopted the Parliament Act No. 6 of 5 December 2008
issue that Greenland is facing. on Greenland’s Mineral Resources Fund, which is inspired by
the Norwegian model so that oil and gas revenues also benefit
The Governance indicator, which accounts for 18 % of the total future generations… In 2000 the first licenses for exploration
coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy and 18 % of the 2008 docu- of the Faroese shelf were issued… In total, 17 licenses have
ment (see Figure 9, p. 61), recognizes the importance of strength- been issued, of which 12 are currently active with a total of 11
ening cooperation between Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland licensees.” (2011, 24, 25).
in different areas of research, decision-making and governance.
Concerning the Faroe Islands, “one condition for acquiring a
The 2011 Strategy clearly states that “the Faroe Islands and license is that a commitment must be entered into to finance ac-
Greenland have had home rule since 1948 and 1979, respec- tivities that build up local competencies.” Therefore, in regard to
tively. Home rule arrangements have been continuously mod- “radioactive minerals, the Self Government follows a zero-tol-
ernised, most recently by the Takeover Act on Power of Mat- erance policy, which means that it does not permit the explora-
ters and Fields of Responsibility and the Act on Faroes Foreign tion and exploitation of deposits that contain [any] radioactive
Policy Powers of 2005 in the Faroe Islands and the Greenland elements… Terms and conditions for licenses to exploit must
Self-Government Act of 2009.” Apart from this, Greenland be reasonable for both larger and smaller companies, resilient
serves as an example and model for Indigenous peoples world- to fluctuating market conditions as well as simple and easy to
wide with its “self-government model, natural resource man- administrate for companies and authorities” (2011, 24, 25).
agement, climate policy, environmental policy and preserva-
tion of its cultural” (2011, 10). The document continues that On the national level, the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland
“today, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have extensive also pay attention to the protection of biodiversity in the Arctic.
self-government and the division of legislative and administra- “Effective management and control regimes must be pursued to
tive powers between the Kingdom’s three parts requires good counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishery and hunt-
cooperation and a joint strategy to meet the opportunities and ing, and also work for international agreements on potentially
challenges in the Arctic.” While Greenland is fully responsible attractive Arctic high seas not yet covered by the conservation
for “decisions on development, exploration and exploitation of and management systems” (2011, 32; 2008, 25). “The parts of
resources in Greenland… revenues from mineral activities will the Danish Realm will work to ensure that in general fishery
benefit both the Greenland and Danish people” (2011, 10; 2008, does not commence where a conservation and management
14, 29, 39). system is not available.” The 2011 Strategy also lists key orga-
nizations in the fisheries and hunting sector, which include the
Protection of the “rights of Indigenous peoples and their surviv- International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the North
al through respect for their culture, language and way of life” as Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, the Northwest Atlantic
well as the peoples’ right to self-determination under interna- Fisheries Organization, the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Com-
tional law is very important to the Kingdom of Denmark. Based mission, and the International Whaling Commission. Corre-
on “the initiative of Denmark and Greenland,” a “Permanent spondingly, on the international level, the 2011 Strategy states
Forum on Indigenous Issues” under the UN framework was es- that “there is very limited understanding for the catch of ma-
tablished in 2002 (2011, 50, 51; 2008, 10, 17, 20, 40). The 2011 rine mammals.” Additionally, this also applies to the “Greenland
Strategy also highlights the support of the Danish Realm “for catch of large whales, which is regulated by the International
cooperation among different institutions in the field of Arctic Whaling Commission in accordance with the exemption that

62
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

applies to Indigenous peoples.” The Kingdom of Denmark “will ing and implementation of EU policies, for example, in energy,
also work towards the introduction of a special regional form climate, fishing, hunting, exploitation of minerals and the rela-
of control for a prudent fishery in large ecosystems in sparsely tionship to the populations and Indigenous peoples in the Arc-
populated areas where there is no historical data and where it is tic.” Furthermore, the 2011 Strategy highlights the importance
particularly challenging to collect data and carry out control.” of Arctic populations and their say in the “EU’s involvement
The 2011 document emphasizes the importance of develop- in the Arctic.” The document also reminds, that the Kingdom
ment of methods “for sustainable management in situations “must seek to avoid further cases where the laws, traditions, cul-
of scientific uncertainty, whereby models are developed that tures and needs of Arctic societies are neglected, as for example
support a learning management system based on the precau- in the EU’s ban on the import of seal products.” The Strategy
tionary principle” (2011, 32). highlights that “for the parts of the Kingdom that are not in the
EU it will be of interest to participate in relevant EU programs
Concerning the sensitive whaling issue, the Strategy clarifies where desirable and possible.” From the regional perspective,
that “each part of the Danish Realm is empowered to regulate “it is of particular importance to promote good relations be-
the exploitation of whale resources in their own waters – though tween Greenland and the EU and expand the cooperative re-
some whale species are subject to decisions to which the King- lations which exist between the parties involved.” Particularly,
dom is bound under the framework of the International Whal- that “Greenland goods have duty-free access to the EU [and]
ing Commission (IWC).” The EU rules apply also to the waters the Faroe Islands has duty-free access to the EU for the majority
of Kingdom of Denmark, “i.e. a total ban on whaling”. Neverthe- of its goods.” In addition to this, “endeavours must be made to
less, “in Greenland, the hunting of small as well as large whales make the Faroe Islands more visible to the EU as part of the
is operated in connection to the society’s food supply. Large Arctic cooperation [and] the Kingdom will work to ensure that
whales are covered by the IWC’s regulatory powers. In case of the EU has a place in the Arctic, including in relevant institu-
the Faroe Islands, the commercial hunting of large whales was tions such as the Arctic Council where the Kingdom supports
“previously operated, but [it] has for many years only operated the EU’s wish for observer status” (2011, 33, 52, 53).
non-commercial hunting of small whales, mostly pilot whales,
which are not subject to the IWC” (2011, 33). In order to “optimize the safeguarding of interests, the King-
dom will upgrade bilateral cooperation and dialogue regarding
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in- the Arctic, both with established and new partners” – global-
dicator, which accounts for 13 % of the total coded quotes for ly, regionally and bilaterally” (2011, 49). The Arctic Five “is an
the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 document (see Figure 9, essential complementary regional forum for the coastal states
p. 61) emphasizes that “the Arctic has to be managed interna- of the Arctic Ocean” (2011, 49). Nevertheless, “Canada, USA,
tionally on the basis of international principles of law to ensure Norway and Iceland will remain key partners for close coop-
a peaceful, secure and collaborative Arctic.” Furthermore, “in- eration in areas such as the exploitation of resources, maritime
creased economic activity and renewed geopolitical interest in safety, climate and environment, Indigenous peoples, research,
the Arctic results in a number of key challenges to ensuring a education, health and defence.” Furthermore, “close contact
stable, peaceful and secure region characterized by dialogue, with Finland and Sweden on Arctic issues” will remain (2011,
negotiation and cooperation” (2011, 7, 9, 10, 55; 2008, 7). In 54). According to the 2011 strategy, the Kingdom emphasizes
future international Arctic cooperation, the Kingdom of Den- willingness “to further expand and develop cooperation with
mark wants to play a key role as “international law and estab- Russia. For example, under the auspices of the Danish-Russian
lished forums of cooperation provide a sound basis for conflict governing council, there is great mutual interest in closer co-
resolution and constructive cooperation in the development of operation on strengthening the safety of navigation in Arctic
the Arctic” (2011, 13; 2008, 5, 7). In addition to that, “within waters.” Additionally, “enhanced cooperation with Russia could
the entire spectrum of tasks, the Kingdom attaches great im- also incorporate scientific collaboration, for example, on the
portance to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic continental shelf.” Along with that, “it could also include the ex-
partner countries” (2011, 20; 2008, 6). change of findings on economically, socially and environmen-
tally sustainable development, as well as confidence building
According to the 2011 Strategy “the Kingdom will prioritize and studies on potential co-operation between the Danish and
global cooperation relevant to the Arctic, including, in partic- Russian defence, particularly in the maritime area” (2011, 54).
ular, an ambitious focus on climate change, the protection of
nature and the environment, strict global maritime rules, and The 2011 Strategy explains that “It is a central goal of the King-
continue giving high priority to Indigenous peoples’ rights.” dom to strengthen cooperation in the Arctic Council [and con-
Moreover, participation in relevant international fora, such as sider] the Arctic Council [as] the primary organ for concrete
the European Union, is given high priority, as “cooperation with cooperation in the Arctic” (2011, 52). The Kingdom also wishes
the EU is to be promoted and the Arctic to be given more weight to ensure that the “Council has an increasingly direct impact
in the Nordic context” (2011, 25, 49; 2008, 6, 12, 13, 15). The on the Arctic peoples…must evolve from a ‘decision-shaping’
relations between the EU and Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe to a ‘decision-making’ organisation.” The documents highlight
Islands and Greenland should also be expanded and strength- that “the Council’s function as an instrument exerting influ-
ened in order to contribute to the sustainable development. “It ence on nation states and international organizations should
will be in the Kingdom’s interest to leave its mark on the shap- be reinforced, and where feasible, the possibility of real deci-

63
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

sion-making ought to be developed.” Also, that the Council are mentioned in the 2011 Strategy. One of them is the “Joint
“must be reinforced as the only relevant political organization Committee cooperation between Greenland, Denmark and the
that has all Arctic states and peoples as members.” Importantly, U.S. arose from the Igaliku Agreement, signed in 2004.” T he
“the Kingdom will emphasize that the human dimension, i.e. Committee “is a tripartite forum…which aims to strengthen
people’s living conditions and well-being, is given increasingly and promote economic and technical cooperation…with spe-
more space in cooperation” (2011, 52, 54; 2008, 13). Within the cial focus on research, health, technology, education, culture
Arctic Council, the Kingdom further supports several stake- and tourism” (2011, 55). The 2011 Strategy further emphasiz-
holders, including the EU, and the Northeast Asian countries, es the importance of the May 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, which
China, Japan and South Korea in their efforts to obtain observer aims “to confirm the responsibility of the five coastal states for
status in the Arctic Council (2011, 54). managing the development of the Arctic” (2011, 13). The 2008
Strategy further refers to the cooperation within the Council of
The Kingdom is part of the UN Convention on the Law of the the Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (2008,
Sea (UNCLOS), “which contains detailed regulation of, for 13). The Northern Dimension cooperation from 1999 is also
example, navigational rights and management of resources.” recognized in the 2008 Strategy, particularly in the context of
Denmark ratified the Convention “on behalf of the Kingdom the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document (2008,
on 16 November 2004”. UNCLOS “is the global internation- 14). Last, but not least, cooperation within the United Nations
al legal instrument in relation to the sea around the Arctic, in International Maritime Organization (IMO) is mentioned. The
that the Convention defines states’ rights and responsibilities in Kingdom is “working to promote cooperation on maritime
relation to their use of the oceans”, and under the Convention safety in all key forums, particularly in the IMO, where binding
“coastal states have the right to create an exclusive economic rules for navigation in the Arctic are drawn up, but also through
zone” (2011, 13, 14; 2008, 7, 11). The 2011 Strategy emphasizes enhanced cooperation in the Arctic Council”. In addition, the
that “the Kingdom will seek to resolve outstanding unresolved 2011 Strategy refers to the importance of “the Polar Code which
boundary issues and actively work to reduce the processing will supplement the international maritime safety and environ-
time of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf mental conventions which already apply in the Arctic with ad-
and thereby ensure greater assurance of coastal states’ continen- ditional rules on rescue equipment, firefighting, ice navigation
tal shelf claims in the Arctic” (2011, 15). and navigation in uninhabited areas to allow for Arctic condi-
tions” (2011, 17, 18, 20, 25).
Both strategies highlight cooperation within the framework of
the Nordic Council of Ministers, where Denmark and Green- The Environmental Protection indicator, which accounts for
land develop different policy initiatives. The Nordic Council 7 % of the total coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of
of Ministers also contributes financially to the Arctic Coun- the 2008 document (see Figure 9, p. 61), shows that environ-
cil’s work. Additionally, “a number of collaborative projects of mental protection is a priority in the two strategies. Both doc-
Arctic relevance are being carried out in the Nordic Council of uments recognize that regional economic activities, including
Ministers’ various ministerial councils.” Moreover, “the King- the mining, energy, and living resources sectors, can negative-
dom wants the Arctic aspect of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ ly affect the environment. An ecosystem-based management
work both directly and through ministerial councils to be given structure will therefore be applied to the use of natural re-
greater weight, both politically and financially” (2011, 53; 2008, sources, and the 2011 Strategy explains that “decisions regard-
6, 13, 16). Importantly, “cooperation in and about the Arctic is ing management and utilisation of resources and protection of
being undertaken in a wide range of organizations other than the environment are taken in accordance with international
the above-mentioned, representing regional or sector-orga- obligations, and are based on the best scientific advice that
nized interests, for example through NORA [part of the Nordic supports healthy, productive and self-sustaining communi-
Council of Ministers], the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (Faroe ties” (2011, 10; see also: 2008, 22).
Islands, Greenland, Iceland and coastal Norway), West Nordic
Cooperation (Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland) and in Biodiversity and protected areas are a part of Kingdom of Den-
sector organizations, such as NAMMCO (North Atlantic Ma- mark’s environmental protection plan. Indeed, both documents
rine Mammal Commission – consisting of Iceland, Norway, discuss the importance of the Ramsar and Biodiversity Conven-
Greenland and the Faroe Islands).” In addition, the Kingdom tion, and the 2011 Strategy stresses that “the aim is to promote
also cooperates with “organizations that cover fishery, environ- the protection and sustainable harnessing of the Earth’s biologi-
mental or scientific interests” (2011, 53; 2008, 36). cal diversity and to ensure regeneration and preservation of the
ecosystem services that underpins communities and well-be-
“Many international agreements and cooperation fora are rele- ing” (2011, 50; see also: 2008, 25). The Strategy further explains
vant to the Arctic and whose interests require active safeguard- that the Arctic is part of migration routes for many animals and
ing by the Kingdom.” For example, “this concerns world trade that it is also home to a diversity of species that are “largely as-
within the WTO (where both Greenland and the Faeroe Islands sociated with the sea” (2011, 9). Shipping has the potential to
are part of it due to the Kingdom of Denmark’s membership), harm these areas and also introduce invasive species to the re-
environmental and nature conservation within UNEP, in re- gion (2011, 45).
search, health, and in security and defence matters in NATO
among others” (2011, 49). Also, other cooperation platforms

64
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

It is not surprising, therefore, that maritime pollution is an en- 47). Second, the Kingdom of Denmark seeks to match the EU’s
vironmental concern. Home Rule has meant that “the Faroe Is- targets of “reducing total global greenhouse gas emissions by
lands and Greenland have entirely or in part been responsible at least 50 % in 2050” while seeking to “become independent
for the monitoring of the marine environment and pollution of fossil fuels by 2050 and that Denmark’s binding renewable
control in territorial waters” (2011, 18), and there appears to be energy target under the EU in 2020 is 30 percent” (2011, 50).
support from the Kingdoms of Denmark’s ministries of Climate
and Energy, and the Environment (2008, 31). Bilaterally, the The 2008 document, in contrast to the 2011 Strategy, does not
Kingdom of Denmark is a party to the CANDEN agreement identify specific international treaties or agreements. While it
“which ensures information exchange in case of oil spills and does state that pollution should be addressed through formal
marine pollution, among other things” (2011, 55). Internation- organizations like the Arctic Council and the Nordic Council
ally, the IMO has also contributed to environmental protection of Ministers (2008, 26), the focus appears to be more on what
through shipping regulations that focus on oil spills and pollu- needs to be done. For example, more research is needed on how
tion (2011, 51). pollution affects Arctic residents, especially in relation to the
effects of POPs and heavy metals on Greenlanders. Pollution
The Pollution indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded quotes research could additionally be used to inform international pol-
for the 2011 Strategy and 5 % of the 2008 document (see Fig- lution agreements (2008, 28, 29). The document also recognizes
ure 9, p. 61). The documents explain that while some pollution the need to better understand the consequences for Greenland
comes from within the region, many pollutants come from out- if a maritime accident were to happen nearby and suggests the
side the Arctic and can have negative effects on the health and need for a stronger regulatory regime to prevent such incidents
the food chains. Both strategies identify greenhouse gases, heavy (2008, 28, 33).
metals, POPs, and oil; The 2011 Strategy also mentions mercury
and chemicals, while carbon is referred to in the 2008 document The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the
(2011, 30, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50; 2008, 26, 27, 28, 33). Both docu- total coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008
ments recognize that maritime traffic and mining activities con- document (see Figure 9, p. 61), identifies a number of conse-
tribute to regional pollution, while the 2008 document mentions quences associated with climate change. The 2011 Strategy con-
military activity, and the 2011 document states that “fishing and textualizes how climate change has affected the region by stating
tourism pose a risk of pollution and accidents” (2011, 45; see also: that “warming in the Arctic is occurring faster than anywhere
2008, 25, 28, 33). The 2008 document also makes an interesting else on the planet, and the average temperature in the Arctic
observation about the role climate change plays, in that additional has surpassed all previous measurements in the first decade of
greenhouse gases are produced from melting permafrost. Addi- the 21st century” (2011, 9). Both documents explain that this
tionally, the document makes a point of stating that Greenland change can have negative effects on biodiversity, and according
itself produces very little pollution (2008, 25). to the 2011 Strategy, on the ocean, too, “including rising sea lev-
els” and “potential changes in global ocean currents” (2011, 43;
The 2011 document identifies a number of international pol- see also: 2008, 6). At the same time, opening waters from sea
lution treaties, formal structures, and other problem-solving ice creates new economic potential within the region. These in-
methods to address regional pollution. Existing agreements clude, for instance, “the potential for mining and exploitation of
include “the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pol- hydrocarbon resources, and also navigational options for tour-
lutants and the LTRAP protocol” which the Kingdom of Den- ism and transport” (2011, 35).
mark would like to see improved (2011, 50). The Kingdom of
Denmark is also in the process of “implementing and ratifying To address these issues, both documents discuss the importance
the HNS Protocol … and also the Ballast Water Convention” of mitigation and adaptation. According to the 2011 Strategy,
(2011, 46), and at the time working towards the creation of two “the effects of climate change are already being felt, and the
new agreements: first “to support and promote the conclusion Kingdom underlines the importance that adaptation measures
of a global agreement on limiting emissions of greenhouse gas- are carried out in order to mitigate the already unavoidable cli-
ses” (2011, 44), which likely refers to the later Paris Agreement; mate impacts” (2011, 50). The two documents state that climate
second, “UNEP’s global mercury convention” (2011, 46), which research is essential to developing mitigation and adaptation
is likely the Minimata Convention. The Kingdom of Denmark measures (2011, 31; 2008, 31, 39). At a practical level, Green-
also contributes to pollution prevention through different struc- land has “initiated a project concerning the consequences of cli-
tures. For example, the IMO regulates the shipping industry to mate change on the fishing and hunting industry with a view to
help prevent pollution, and there is the CANDEN agreement identifying opportunities for adaptation that manage the chal-
between Greenland and Canada (2011, 25, 55), both previously lenges while exploiting new opportunities” (2011 31).
mentioned in the Environmental Protection indicator.
Both documents recognize the Arctic Council as a focus for
The 2011 Strategy further recognizes problem-solving that is climate work (2011, 50; 2008, 26), and also value the scientif-
more domestic in nature. First, research has gone into creat- ic community’s work on climate change. For example, the 2008
ing a maritime atlas that “contains information about the local document acknowledges the contributions to climate knowl-
wildlife, local fishing and hunting interests and archaeological edge from the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and suggests
sites that are especially sensitive to potential oil spills” (2011, that continued research and new facilities will especially help

65
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

inform policy development (2008, 26, 28, 32). The 2011 Strate- 10). The Danish Defence supports the “citizens of Greenland
gy provides information on how the state actively supports cli- [to] be increasingly involved in the tasks of the armed forces
mate research. Notably, “in 2009, the Ministry of Science and and participate in a wide range of training opportunities.” This
the Government of Greenland set up an interdisciplinary cli- would be of great “benefit from Greenland’s local knowledge”
mate research centre in Nuuk” which “focuses on basic research (2011, 20, 21; 2008, 11).
about the Arctic climate and the effects of climate change in-
cluding the need for mitigation and adaptation strategies, and Furthermore, the 2011 Strategy highlights that the armed forces
currently has approx. 80 Greenland, Danish and international “must be visibly present in and around Greenland and the Faroe
researchers affiliated on a permanent or flexible basis” (2011, Islands with regard to the enforcement of sovereignty and sur-
35, 36). Additionally, “the Kingdom will work to promote the veillance… Units from the army, navy and air force carry out
participation of Danish, Greenland and Faroese academic and tasks in the Arctic.” The armed forces undertake “surveillance
scientific institutions in international research and monitoring and enforcement of sovereignty of Greenland and Faroese ter-
activities” (2011, 36). ritorial waters and airspace, as well as the Greenland exclusive
economic zone and the fishing zones to ensure that no system-
In terms of major climate agreements and frameworks, the 2011 atic violations of territory can take place.” Furthermore, “the
Strategy mentions two main climate structures. First, it refer- armed forces adapts its deployment of vessels, aircraft and other
ences “an ambitious global climate agreement” that suggests capacities in accordance with the distinct difference in season-
the future Paris Agreement (2011, 50). Second, and perhaps al activity. Because of the enormous dimensions of the Arctic,
more importantly, it explains that “the Kingdom’s climate policy international cooperation is an important element in resolving
stems from the UN’s Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), the armed forces’ tasks in the Arctic” (2011, 21; 2008, 11). The
whose goal is to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases at a lev- 2011 Strategy further talks about “the establishment of joint ser-
el that prevents climate change that is dangerous to humanity” vice Arctic Command, which will be created by the amalgama-
(2011, 49). Certainly, addressing greenhouse gases appear to be tion of the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command.” The
Kingdom of Denmark’s primary climate focus in this Strategy. responsibilities of the Arctic Response Force vary depending on
In contrast, the 2008 document mentions COP15 (2008, 7). “defined periods and in defined areas anticipated to strengthen
the armed forces’ enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance,
The Security indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total cod- for instance through military exercises” (2011, 20, 21).
ed quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 3 % of the 2008 document
(see Figure 9, p. 61), stresses the importance of collaboration and The Kingdom of Denmark cooperates on bilateral and multi-
keeping the “Arctic as a region characterised by peace and coop- lateral bases in the field of defence and security. “In May 2010
eration” (2011, 13). The document states that “the Arctic has to Denmark and Canada signed a bilateral Memorandum of Un-
be managed internationally on the basis of international princi- derstanding (MoU) on enhanced operational defence coopera-
ples of law to ensure a peaceful, secure and collaborative Arctic.” tion in the Arctic, focusing on joint military exercises, staff ex-
Particularly, as “increased economic activity and renewed geo- changes and cooperation in rescue operations. The agreement
political interest in the Arctic result in a number of key challeng- serves as a catalyst for intensifying day-to-day collaboration
es to ensuring a stable, peaceful and secure region characterized between Greenland’s Command, Joint Task Force North in Yel-
by dialogue, negotiation and cooperation” (2011, 7, 9). Apart lowknife and MARLANT Maritime Forces Atlantic in Halifax.”
from this, “the rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic Moreover, “it is expected that close Danish – Canadian military
region necessitates a continued prioritising of a well-functioning cooperation will be further enhanced over the coming years
international legal framework for peaceful cooperation, a spe- partly via mutual exchange of findings in survival techniques in
cial need for enhanced maritime safety, and persistent focus on the Arctic, patrolling and surveillance and partly via continued
maintaining the Arctic as a region characterised by peace and participation in joint military exercises” (2011, 55). Geo-strate-
cooperation… [therefore] the Kingdom’s approach to security gically and militarily, more important is that the Danish armed
policy in the Arctic is based on an overall goal of preventing con- forces closely cooperate with the United States, in particular the
flicts and avoiding the militarization of the Arctic” (2011, 10). US military presence at the Thule Air Base (in North Green-
land), based on the bilateral US-Danish Defense Agreement of
The 2011 document states, that “even though the working rela- 1951, where the US Army has operated from its own facilities.
tionship of the Arctic Ocean’s coastal states is close, there will In 2002, the agreement was broadened to include Thule radar as
be a continuing need to enforce the Kingdom’s sovereignty, es- the early warning radar, part of the US missile defence system
pecially in light of the anticipated increase in activity in the (2008, 9). “Thule Air Base is, with its deep-water port, airport
region” (2011, 20). For this purpose, “the Danish Armed Forces and well-developed infrastructure (including tank and storage
undertake important tasks in the Arctic including the enforce- capacity, workshop, hospital, quarters, support and office facili-
ment of sovereignty, and attach in this respect great importance ties), a unique capability in the Arctic region north of the Arctic
to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic partner Circle” (2011, 54).
countries” (2011, 13). The defence of Greenland’s sovereignty
is provided by the Kingdom’s armed forces. Greenland Com- The 2011 Strategy underlines that “many international agree-
mand provides a wide range of sovereignty services, from pro- ments and cooperation fora are relevant to the Arctic and whose
tecting against foreign military to inspecting fisheries (2008, interests require active safeguarding by the Kingdom. For exam-

66
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

ple, this concerns world trade within the WTO, environmental information on safety structures, although it does suggest sup-
and nature conservation within UNEP, in research, health, and port for the development of the Arctic Council SAR agreement
in security and defence matters in NATO among others” (2011, (2008, 12). While these three structures legally bind the Arctic
49). Both strategies refer to the NATO and its important role in states to the same safety practices, neither document makes the
the region. While “the Kingdom’s area in the Arctic is covered by case for integrated safety efforts; they both support cooperation.
the NATO treaty Article 5 regarding collective defence, the en-
forcement of sovereignty is fundamentally a responsibility of the As much of the focus is on maritime safety, it is not surprising
Realm’s central authorities.” Importantly, “enforcement of sover- the strategies discuss the Kingdom’s capabilities in this domain.
eignty is exercised by the armed forces through a visible presence Satellite surveillance and monitoring systems, such as LRIT and
in the region where surveillance is central to the task. In addi- AIS for large vessels, are used to improve safety in the waters
tion, the armed forces play an important role in the provision of around the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Additionally, “ships
a range of more civilian-related duties” (2011, 20; 2008, 9). sailing to Greenland must report to the so-called GREENPOS
reporting system, which requires ships in Greenland waters to
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the to- continuously report their position to the Greenland Command”
tal coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 4 % of the 2008 docu- (2011, 17). While it seems that the Kingdom has addressed mar-
ment (see Figure 9, p. 61), identifies a key safety concern in both itime monitoring, one area marked for improvement is mari-
documents—maritime safety, which encompasses a range of time mapping and charting. In this regard, the 2011 Strategy
issues. The 2011 Strategy explains that “maritime safety is a fun- explains that “due to the vast sea areas, large areas of the Green-
damental priority. The extreme Arctic conditions require pre- land waters will be unsurveyed beyond 2018 while still greater
ventive measures including training and ship safety, as well as areas become accessible to shipping as the ice melts. For reasons
regional cooperation on search and rescue” (2011, 13; see also: of safety at sea the Kingdom will furthermore continue to pri-
2008, 33). Accidents and pollution should also be considered a oritize the work of the International Hydrographic Organiza-
part of maritime safety (2011, 46; 2008, 12). Safety concerns are tion (IHO), such as in the regional commission on the Arctic
also addressed in each of the two strategies. For instance, the which was established in 2010” (2011, 17). The 2008 document
2011 Strategy also prioritizes “public health preparedness con- also addresses mapping and monitoring, but focuses more on
cerning disaster situations and other urgent challenges to public efforts to map and monitor the Greenland’s shelf and landmass,
health” (2011, 40). While the 2008 document does not comment which includes using the Greenlandic names for different loca-
specifically on human health preparedness, it does note that tions (2008, 30). The 2011 Strategy also considers the role that
plant and fish health are important. Additionally, the document Thule Airbase in Greenland could play in maritime safety. For
does address the need to be prepared for disasters (2008, 12). instance, “collaboration on the logistical facilities in Thule could
thus eventually include assignments and emergency prepared-
To help make the Arctic safe, the 2011 Strategy identifies and ness in relation to the maritime environment, a base for exercis-
discusses three key structures that contribute to regional safety. es in connection to joint procedures such as search and rescue
First, the Strategy explains the significance of UNCLOS in terms services, and also be a platform for joint research in the Arctic”
of regional regulation and cooperation. However, it also recog- (2011, 54).
nizes that UNCLOS cannot remain static and that “there may
be a continuous need for more detailed regulating of certain The Economy indicator, which accounts for 12 % of the total
sectors. An example is the agreement on search and rescue ad- coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 18 % of the 2008 docu-
opted at the Arctic Council Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May ment (see Figure 9, p. 61), identifies a broad range of economic
2011 in Nuuk” (2011, 14). The second structure, therefore, is the activities. According to the 2011 Strategy, “today, tourism, sec-
Arctic Council and its SAR agreement which facilitates rescue ond only to fisheries, is the most important export industry in
cooperation in the Arctic as “a binding agreement between the Greenland, and the tourist industry has potential for growth in
8 members on search and rescue (SAR) with the Faroe Islands the future” (2011, 23; 2008, 5, 36). The 2011 Strategy also rec-
and Greenland as “co-signatories,” which is needed because of ognizes that trade can help economies in other ways, as “the
the increased access to areas that were previously covered by new trading opportunities can contribute to the diversification
ice” (2011, 52). Third is the IMO, which also regulates safety at of Greenland’s economy and create the basis for economic sus-
sea. The Kingdom of Denmark is keen on the creation of the tainability and prosperity. For the Faroe Islands in particular,
Polar Code as it will further enhance maritime safety in the the opening of the Northeast Passage will unfold new opportu-
Arctic. The Strategy explains: “The Polar Code will supplement nities as a result of increased navigation” (2011, 33). The 2008
the international maritime safety and environmental conven- Strategy also identifies veterinary services, crafts and cultural
tions which already apply in the Arctic with additional rules on products (2008, 35, 38). However, it is the natural resource sec-
rescue equipment, fire fighting, ice navigation and navigation tors that seem to hold greatest importance. Natural resources
in uninhabited areas to allow for Arctic conditions” (2011, 20). include living resources, such as fish, and non-living resourc-
Indeed, “the rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic es found in the mining and oil and gas industries. Certainly,
region necessitates a continued prioritising of a well-function- the fish industry does represent a substantial amount of trade
ing international legal framework for peaceful cooperation, a for the Kingdom. For the Faroe Islands, it “represents approx.
special need for enhanced maritime safety” (2011, 13). In con- 90 % of total exports and for Greenland, approx. 85 % of total
trast to the 2011 Strategy, the 2008 document does not provide exports” (2011, 31). However, Greenland provides the most ac-

67
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

cess to mining and oil and gas opportunities. A broad range of be an overriding political priority for the Kingdom” (2011, 23),
minerals are found in Greenland that can be used to support in- especially in relation to mineral resources. Because of this, ed-
novative technology and financial independence. For example, ucation and training in this area will be prioritized (2011, 36).
the 2011 Strategy explains that “Greenland is also rich in miner- The 2008 document also discusses the importance of the miner-
al deposits, including zinc, copper, nickel, gold, diamonds and al industry, but also includes oil and gas, and cultural products
platinum group metals, and has substantial deposits of so-called in its discussion (2011, 24; 2008, 23, 38). Another priority from
critical metals, including rare earth elements, several of which the 2011 Strategy is to increase trade opportunities for the Faroe
are important components of high-end technology, including Islands and Greenland, especially with the EU (2011, 35).
green energy technologies” (2011, 24; see also: 2008, 23). As for
oil and gas, these activities are not as developed as the mining Economic development does not happen without some form
industry. The two documents explain that while there has been of regulatory practices. The 2008 document does not focus as
some development, oil exploration is still taking place around much on this area, although the document does recognize that
Greenland. While exploration can be expensive, the payout will Greenland, under Home Rule, has the authority to regulate cer-
likely be worth it as “it is estimated that 31 billion barrels of oil tain economic activities (2008, 25). In contrast, the 2011 Strat-
and gas off the coast of Northeast Greenland and 17 billion bar- egy provides more information on some of the different ways
rels of oil and gas in areas west of Greenland and east of Canada that economic activities for living and non-living resources are
could be discovered, though the probability is greater for dis- regulated. For living resources, the strategy explains that fishing
coveries in Northeast Greenland,” according to the 2011 Strate- must be a sustainable practice to prevent overfishing. “Green-
gy (2011, 24; see also: 2008, 22). land’s fishery is based on a quota system whose aim is to en-
sure a sustainable exploitation of certain stocks. Therefore, an
While oil and gas resources are being explored, renewable ener- annual ‘Total Allowable Catch’ (TAC) of the principal species is
gies are also being exploited. For example, Greenland has been stipulated, based on biological advice and respecting socio-eco-
generating hydropower since at least 1993 (2008, 20–21). Re- nomic concerns, commercial interests and international obliga-
newable energy is important to the Kingdom in two ways, ac- tions” (2011, 31). As for the non-living resources in Greenland,
cording to the 2011 Strategy. First, the renewable energy gener- the Mineral Resources Act dictates corporate responsibility,
ated in Greenland can be used to power facilities in the mining especially when environmental protection is at stake. More
sector. For example, the 2011 Strategy states that “an example specifically, the Act explains that “responsibility for clean-up
is the designing, in collaboration with the American company, operations and compensation always lies with the party caus-
Alcoa, of an aluminium smelting plant in Maniitsoq which will ing damage, whereby a number of stringent requirements are
be operated solely by hydropower” (2011, 30). Additionally, re- imposed following international standards regarding financial
newable energy generated in both the Faroe Islands and Green- guarantees and insurance for oil and mineral activities” (2011,
land will help Denmark meet EU energy goals. The 2011 Strat- 26). Oil and gas licenses are also controlled by the Bureau of
egy explains that “Denmark’s commitment to renewable energy Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) and are issued under the strict-
targets under the EU is 30 % by 2020. Greenland will increase its est of conditions (2011, 26). The document also explains that
share of renewable energy to 60 % of total energy production by shipping safety is regulated through the IMO, and that trade
2020. The Faroe Islands will increase the use of renewable ener- activities follow regulations set out by the WTO (2011, 35, 51).
gy, including the target of 75 % of electricity production based
on renewable energy by 2020” (2011, 30). As for economic actors, the 2011 Strategy is very open about
who is investing in the region. For instance, the document
Sustainable development is important to many of the Kingdom’s states that “there is great interest from a number of different
economic activities. According to the 2011 Strategy, “it is a cen- companies and as of January 2011 the licensees are: NUNAOIL
tral goal of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark that de- (Greenland), DONG (Denmark), Maersk Oil (Denmark), Exx-
cisions regarding management and utilisation of resources and onMobil (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), Husky (CAN), Cairn Energy
protection of the environment are taken in accordance with in- (UK), PA Resources (SVE), ConocoPhillips (U.S.), Shell (NL),
ternational obligations, and are based on the best scientific ad- Statoil (NOR), GDF Suez (FRA) and Petronas (Malaysia)”
vice that supports healthy, productive and self-sustaining com- (2011, 26), and for the Faroes “oil companies active in the Faroe
munities” (2011, 10). Sustainable practices are applied to living Islands Atlantic Petroleum (FO), Cieco (Korea), Dana Petro-
resources through different mechanisms, such as fishing quotas, leum (UK), DONG (DK), ENI (ITA), Exxon Mobil (US), Faroe
conservation, and ecosystem-based management, for example Petroleum (FO), First Oil Expro (UK), OMV (Østrig), Sagex
(2011, 32; 2008, 6, 24, 25). Interestingly, the 2008 document Petroleum (NOR), Statoil (NOR)” (2011, 27). There is also state
suggests that the USA has not fully supported the work of the involvement, especially with the Government of Greenland, in
Arctic Council, apparently in the area of sustainable develop- the resources sector, and cooperation with the broader “busi-
ment (2008, 13). ness community” as well (see: 2011, 35, 33). The 2008 document
also names private companies, such as Acloa Inc. and Maniit-
The strategies sketch out different ways in which the Kingdom’s soq, both of which are in the aluminum industry. Other actors
northern economy will be prioritized. Both documents explain include governance bodies and other organizations such as the
that a great deal of focus will be on developing Greenland’s North Atlantic Hydrogen Association, the WTO (for Greenlan-
economy. In particular, the 2011 Strategy stresses that this “will dic compliance), the Greenland Innovation Centre, Piorsaavik,

68
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

the Nordic Region Cooperation (NORA) (2008, 21, 37), and, of Although there is not as much discussion about port develop-
course, the state. ment in the 2008 document, both strategies address shipping as
the melting sea ice and opening waterways provide new transit
The Tourism indicator is briefly discussed in both the 2011 and opportunities, although it will be expensive (MFA 2011, 16; 2008,
2008 strategies and accounts for 1 % of the total coded quotes in 33, 34). For example, the 2011 Strategy notes growing maritime
the 2011 Strategy and 2 % of the 2008 document (see Figure 9, traffic around the Faroe Islands and comments on the successful
p. 61). Tourism in Greenland has been on the rise (2008, 36). As journey through the first Northwest Passage by a Danish ship-
stated in the 2011 Strategy “today, tourism, second only to fish- ping company in 2010 (MFA 2011, 16, 19). In the light of these
eries, is the most important export industry in Greenland, and developments, it is not surprising that “the Kingdom will exam-
the tourist industry has potential for growth in the future. This ine the need for the establishment of new shipping routes, and
applies both to land-based tourism and the cruise-liner business. implement this to the extent it promotes maritime safety and
Among the benefits of the latter is that even small towns and marine protection.” Pollution is a concern and the 2011 Strategy
villages along the coast can be involved in tourism” (2011, 23, comments that IMO will play an important role in with regard
24). “The land-based tourism generates by far the greatest reve- to safety and pollution prevention (2011, 51; 2008, 28). Despite
nue but is currently dependent on only a few markets, primarily the discussion around expanding shipping and safety concerns,
the Danish. Therefore, Greenland’s Tourist Board is working on there is very little about the role and function of icebreakers.
the development of a new national brand that more clearly de- Indeed, only the 2011 Strategy mentions them, but only in the
fines Greenland as an adventure destination focusing on sustain- context of mapping the continental shelf and that some Asian
able tourism and which to a greater extent appeals to the global countries are developing them (2011, 15, 54).
market” (2011, 23, 24). Tourism should be further promoted in
Greenland as it brings in earnings from abroad. Furthermore, Energy infrastructure is addressed in both documents, particu-
tourism creates economic and job growth (2008, 36). The 2008 larly in the context of renewable energy sources. This is probably
Strategy further explains that tourism has resulted in more because “the energy policy objectives of Greenland, Denmark
flights to Greenland (2008, 36). and the Faroe Islands respectively are to create security of sup-
ply, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollution
The Kingdom of Denmark aims to “enhance economic develop- while creating a basis for commercial development” (2011, 30).
ment and diversification of the economy, including the develop- A goal, therefore, is for communities to use this type of energy
ment of the tourist industry and bolstering the overall develop- (2011, 30). The 2008 document also notes the need to improve
ment with adequate infrastructure” (2011, 23). The government transmission line infrastructure because of functionality prob-
is taking an active role in helping Greenland develop its tourism lems (2008, 21).
industry (2008, 36).
ICT and telecommunications are briefly mentioned in both
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total documents. The 2011 Strategy states that “the health reform is
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 document underpinned by the telemedicine network which was developed
(see Figure 9, p. 61), addresses different types of infrastructure. with the help of Alaskan and Norwegian inspiration” (2011,
Transportation infrastructure is discussed in both documents 40), which obviously needs digital services. The 2008 docu-
and seems to be a priority, especially for Greenland. The 2011 ment more broadly notes that digital services help communities
Strategy states that “infrastructure is a key element in the devel- (2008, 41).
opment of the Greenland society and to ensure long term sustain-
able development, the Government of Greenland set up a trans- Other kinds of innovation and technology are also mentioned
portation commission in 2009 for the socio-economic analysis in the strategies, such as that used for mapping and charting. In
of the entire infrastructure in Greenland” (2011, 24). In partic- particular, the NunaGIS system is mentioned as it is used for en-
ular, “ports and airports” are needed but they are expensive. The suring that Greenlandic names are used appropriately on maps
government will thus look for different sources of funding, in- (2008, 29, 30). This is considered “geographical infrastructure”
cluding the mining sector (2011, 24). The Strategy does not pro- in more technical terms, “the objective of NunaGIS is to gather
vide many particulars about what infrastructure would be devel- all essential information across Greenland in a digital atlas, and
oped and where, but it does seem as if ports are more important link this information to a data and organizational infrastruc-
because infrastructure is needed to support growing maritime ture, also called SDI (Spatial Data Infrastructure)” (2011, 37).
traffic and trade (2011, 17, 35). In contrast, the 2008 document is Mapping processes are also taking place in the Faroe Islands
more focused on airports than it was ports because Greenland is (2011, 37).
unlikely to benefit from shipping through the Northwest Passage
(2008, 33). Thus, the strategy focuses on air travel, commenting The Science and Education indicator accounts for 8 % of the
on the regular flights between Greenland and Iceland that have total coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 14 % of the 2008
been taking place for 50 years. At the same time, the Strategy also Strategy (see Figure 9, p. 61). The two documents identify the
acknowledges that there are very few flights between Greenland different drivers for science. The main driver in both docu-
and Canada Regardless, for Greenland to increase international ments appears to be climate change (2011, 35, 36, 43, 44; 2008,
flights, Denmark must provide the license although there will be 5, 27, 31, 32, 39). For example, the 2011 Strategy explains that
cooperation with Greenland (2008, 34). “in order to anticipate how global climate and environmental

69
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

conditions will evolve, it is crucial to understand how climate Danish Meteorological Institute, Commission for Scientific
change affects the Arctic, and in turn how changes in the Arctic Research in Greenland, Geological Survey of Denmark and
affect global climate trends” (2011, 43-44). Pollution is another Greenland, the Technical University of Denmark, the Universi-
research driver mentioned in both documents (2011, 45; 2008, ty of Greenland, University of Copenhagen, and Aarhus Univer-
28). Additionally, the 2011 Strategy notes that nature is also a sity (2011, 35, 36, 44, 47; 2008, 28, 32, 41). Third, several differ-
driver, as “the Arctic nature and environment must be managed ent research networks and collaborations are mentioned in the
based on the best possible scientific knowledge and standards documents. For instance, the 2008 document states that there
for protection” (2011, 43); the 2008 document notes the preser- is cooperation and collaboration with various researchers and
vation of living resources (2008, 19, 20). research institutions across borders (notably with the USA), and
different formalized networks like IASC, European Polar Board,
However, research also serves other purposes. First, research and the European Polar Consortium (2008, 32). The 2011 Strat-
will help the Kingdom with decision-making. For instance, egy, in the context of oceanic and ice research, states that “all
the documents explain that research can be used for decisions collections are conducted in cooperation with Danish, Green-
regarding the management of living resources, like fish (2011, land, Swedish and American research institutions and have led
32; 2008, 34); the 2008 document states that research can help to increased knowledge of the Arctic Ocean’s plate tectonics, pa-
inform climate agreements (2008, 28). Research can also be of laeoclimatology, physical oceanography and ecosystems” (2011,
benefit to economic development. The 2008 document explains 15), demonstrating the value of such collaborations.
that research can be of assistance to the mining and shipping
industries (2008, 23, 29, 32), while the 2011 Strategy explains As for funding, state support for research seems to be associated
that research can assist with workforce training. For instance, with specific endeavors. For instance, the 2008 Strategy com-
“the Kingdom’s Arctic research will be at the global forefront, ments on funding for the International Polar Year, whereas the
and research and training efforts must support the development 2011 Strategy states that funding is provided for the continental
of industry and society in the Arctic” (2011, 23). Additionally, shelf research (2011, 14; 2008, 32). The 2011 Strategy also ex-
both documents state that research will help with the Kingdom’s plains that “within the Kingdom, cooperation between research
continental shelf claim (2011, 14; 2008, 11, 12). Research should institutions must constantly be consolidated and developed,
also be of benefit to northerners themselves. Indeed, the 2011 and researchers have to be familiar with available options for
Strategy remarks that “it is also essential that research findings funding of Arctic research” (2011, 36), and that research fund-
are of practical use by Arctic peoples in supporting the rapid ing is also available “from among others the Nordic Council of
cultural, social, economic and industrial development that oth- Ministers and the EU” (2011, 35).
er peoples have had generations to adapt to,” including health
concerns (2011, 35, 40; see also: 2008, 39, 41). Finally, research In terms of education, both documents address the need to
can help position the Kingdom as an Arctic research actor as ensure Greenlanders attain education primarily for economic
“the Kingdom will work to promote the participation of Dan- reasons. Emphasis is placed on improving skills and training
ish, Greenland and Faroese academic and scientific institutions for the mineral resources industry to ensure Greenlanders can
in international research and monitoring activities” (2011, 36). access this job market (2011, 36; 2008, 23), and the state is facil-
itating this training. For example, the 2011 Strategy comments
Both documents also recognize the importance of traditional that “in January 2011, the Government of Greenland set up a
knowledge, especially with respect to environmental and cli- new mineral resources school by reorganising the Mining and
mate concerns (2011, 44; 2008, 18). The 2008 document, how- Construction School in Sisimut. The mineral resources school
ever, makes the interesting observation that the findings of tra- will function as a knowledge centre for the entire mining re-
ditional and scientific knowledge do not always match in the source sector and develop training within the oil industry”
case of determining the size of animal stocks. The document (2011, 36). The 2008 Strategy also contextualizes their training
suggests this can cause disagreement over decisions stemming efforts as a way for Greenland to gain further independence
from mismatched information (2008, 24). (2008, 37).

This research is facilitated through different types of research Outside of training for the mining industry, other kinds of
infrastructure. First, there are physical research stations which educational opportunities exist. First, the two strategies men-
include, for example, “the Zackenberg research station and a tion that learning opportunities are provided through the Joint
similar station in Kobbefjord near Nuuk” as noted in the 2011 Committee. For instance, the 2011 Strategy explains that the
Strategy (2011, 47). Second, there are different research insti- Kangerlussuaq summer school “is targeting two of the three
tutes, organizations, and universities, which include, but are not priority areas which the Joint Committee has agreed upon in
limited to, the Arctic Technology Centre, the Greenland Insti- 2010-2011, namely to improve access for Greenland’s students
tute of Natural Resources, the Climate Research Centre (Nuuk), to U.S. institutions of learning and to improve English skills

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

in secondary schools in Greenland” 3 (2011, 38; 2008, 37–38). end of some discussions. If the word ‘aims’ is the correct trans-
Second, distance learning is discussed in both documents. The lation, it does not suggest a strong commitment to implemen-
2011 Strategy addresses this by mentioning that “the Kingdom tation. Additionally, no new budget is identified. That said, the
also supports the running of the University of the Arctic” (2011, document does seem to suggest a working group will be created
36), whereas the 2008 Strategy acknowledges the importance of to generate a more comprehensive strategy that will also include
distance, or e-learning, to high school educational attainment the ministries responsible for the Strategy (2008, 42).
levels, while also recognizing the challenges to this type of
learning in Greenland (for example, the need for good and af- Figure 9 at the beginning of the Denmark discussion shows
fordable internet) (2008, 16, 41). Third, the 2008 Strategy notes that the top three coded indicators for the 2011 document are
that Greenlandic students can participate in EU education, in Governance, International Cooperation, and Economy. Simi-
the areas of technology and innovation for example, through larly, both the Governance and Economy indicators tie for the
the Overseas Countries and Territories program (2008, 16). most-coded in the 2008 Strategy, followed by Science and Ed-
ucation and the Human Dimension. The least-coded indicators
Implementation is addressed in both documents. For the 2011 in 2011 are Tourism and Pollution, with Infrastructure and
Strategy, a bullet-point list of action items is found at the end Safety and SAR tying for third least-coded indicators.
of each section. Although there is nothing written in the docu-
ment that makes clear that these are indeed items or plans that As mentioned earlier, the 2011 Strategy identifies four areas
should be implemented, the language used suggests just this. of importance (2011, 10–11). First is “a peaceful, secure, and
However, as responsibility for the different tasks is not assigned safe Arctic.” Generally, this is accounted for in the Security
to a government ministry or department, it is not clear who has indicator which falls in the mid-to-lower range in terms of
ultimate responsibility for implementation. The Strategy ac- the percentages of coded quotes (see Appendix). However,
knowledges that “the Kingdom consists of three societies, each the International Cooperation indicator, which is the second
with their own political priorities and social structures. There- most-coded indicator, also addresses these issues through dis-
fore, the strategy’s implementation in each individual area will cussions around international law and cooperation. It thus
be adjusted to each part of the Realm’s unique legislation, po- seems that this priority is met. Second, “self-sustaining growth
litical priorities and budget issues” (2011, 57). Yet, despite this and development” is associated with the Economy indicator,
mention of budget issues, there is very little information on which is the third most-quoted indicator and discusses Green-
how the strategy will be funded. However, the strategy does say land’s access to oil and gas. Third is “respect for the Arctic’s
that “the Foreign Ministry will allocate resources hereto” (2011, fragile climate, environment and nature.” While the Environ-
58) in regard to a few activities, including climate cooperation mental Protection, Pollution, and Climate Change indicators
and trade. Yet, it is not clear if this funding will be newly allo- are each in the mid-to-lower range in terms of percentages
cated or come out of existing budgets. coded, when combined they become the most discussed and
coded topic(s). It seems therefore that this priority is met. Fi-
The Strategy does, however, provide a great deal of informa- nally, there is “close cooperation with our international part-
tion about follow-up and evaluation. In terms of follow-up, “a ners” which is accounted for by the International Cooperation
cross-disciplinary Steering Committee is to be established for indicator, the second most-coded indicator (see Appendix).
the Arctic Strategy, consisting of representatives of the gov-
ernment (ministries with Arctic activities), the Government There are also connections between the indicators. For exam-
of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes at high level” ple, the Human Dimension in relation to Indigenous peoples
(2011, 57). As for evaluation, “the Foreign Ministry, on behalf is connected to the Governance indicator through discussions
of the Government and in cooperation with the Government around Home Rule and the Self-Government Act. The Gover-
of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes, will report nance indicator is also connected to the Economy indicator in
annually on developments in the Arctic and the status of the terms of how natural resources will be managed. The Infrastruc-
Strategy’s implementation. The aim is to carry out a mid-term ture indicator is also connected to the Economy indicator, but
evaluation of the Strategy in 2014–2015 and consider the in two ways. First, infrastructure is needed to support economic
preparation of a new strategy in 2018-2019” (2011, 58). activities, and second, the economy indicator focuses on oil and
gas development while the Infrastructure indictor notes the de-
To sum up sire for renewable energy for Greenlanders.

It is harder to tell from the 2008 document what implementa- Similar to the summary on the Icelandic strategies, a full com-
tion is addressed. The document reads as if it is explaining exist- parison is difficult between the 2011 Strategy and the 2008 docu-
ing regional practices and making some suggestions about what ment, which is an unofficial translation from which information
to do moving forward. There do appear to be some ‘aims’ at the may be missing. That being said, there are two relevant sim-

3 The Joint Committee allows for international cooperation between Greenland, Denmark, and the United States. Part of the initiative is the Science Group that
“advances and encourages cooperation across multiple policy areas, involving internationally-recognized experts contending with diverse, cutting-edge issues,
from deepening Arctic science cooperation to advancing science education” (U.S. Embassy in Denmark, n.d).

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

ilarities between the documents of which two are discussed GREENPOS and satellites. In contrast, the 2008 Strategy notes
here. First, the 2011 Strategy appears to be a continuation of that natural disasters and environmental safety must also be
the 2008 Strategy in terms of economic development. Indeed, considered, but only does so in the context of Greenland.
both documents state that tourism, fishing, trade, natural re-
sources, and energy are key economic activities, while the 2008 Overall, the 2011 Strategy aims to fulfil its purpose “to focus
document also mentions hunting, veterinary services, and attention on the Kingdom’s strategic priorities for future devel-
crafts. Both documents discuss the importance of sustainable opment in the Arctic towards 2020,” and its aim “to strengthen
development. The 2011 Strategy also comments on the need the Kingdom’s status as global player in the Arctic” (2011, 11).
for sustainable transportation and energy practices (develop- In addition, another important goal of the Strategy, drawn up
ment of renewable energy), as well as the development of ICT. two years after Greenland being accorded self-governing sta-
Interestingly, both documents appear to focus on economic tus, was to support that new status and strengthen Greenland’s
development in Greenland and disregard the Faroe Islands. development towards increased autonomy.
Second, both documents take a similar approach to addressing
security. For instance, they both state that growing interest in
the region must be managed. The documents also recognize Norway
the importance of international cooperation through efforts
with Canada and the United States, as well as through organi- To date, Norway has produced five Arctic strategies. The most
zations like NATO. The high relevance of security cooperation up-to-date is the 2017 document, Norway’s Arctic Strategy: Be-
with the USA is illustrated in both documents, where the ad- tween Geopolitics and Social Development. As the English short
vantage of having Thule early warning radar as part of the US version is analyzed here, it is difficult to determine what, if any-
missile defence system is described. thing, is missing from the original Norwegian text. Working
backwards, the other documents are the 2014 Norway’s Arctic
Three relevant differences and three examples are also dis- Policy: Creating Value, Managing Resources, Confronting Climate
cussed here. First, there are some differences in how the two Change and Fostering Knowledge, the 2011 document The High
documents address migration. While both documents com- North: Visions and Strategies, the 2009 New Building Blocks in
ment on this issue, the 2008 document is concerned with il- the North: The Next Steps in the Government’s High North Strate-
legal migration, whereas the 2011 Strategy focuses on (pre- gy, and 2006’s The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy.
sumably) legal migration and the challenges associated with For the purpose of this report, the 2017 and the 2014 strategies
potential increases in labor migration. This is very relevant will be analyzed.
especially in case of Greenland, where more than half of the
migrants come from Denmark, followed by the Faroe Islands The 2017 Strategy has 37 pages including pictures, maps, and
and Iceland, where there are also small numbers of migrants infographics and clearly outlines the following Arctic priorities,
from Thailand and the Philippines, mainly working in the fish- or “Priority areas:
ing industry. Second, both documents address environmen- • International cooperation
tal protection and mention the Ramsar and the Biodiversity • Business development
conventions. Although the 2008 Strategy makes a little more • Knowledge development
reference to the work of the Arctic Council than the 2011 doc- • Infrastructure
ument does, the latter document provides a more in-depth • Environmental protection and emergency preparedness”
understanding of the Kingdom of Denmark’s environmental (Norway MFA 2017, 6).
priorities as well as more information on specific pollutants.
As environmental protection transcends borders and requires These items are also the same priorities as those identified in
collaborative efforts, the 2008 document also notes that cir- the 2014 Strategy (see: Norway MFA 2014, 3), which consists
cumpolar environmental cooperation began in 1991 with the of 43 pages including pictures, maps, and infographics. Later in
start of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). the 2017 Strategy, the government builds on their priority list
This could be suggestive of a broadening understanding of en- and remarks that “the specific goals for each priority area are
vironmental protection by the Kingdom of Denmark. Third, presented in the respective chapters. Common to all of them
while both documents appear to prioritize maritime safety is that, in their different ways, they will help us realise our vi-
and express the importance of international cooperation for sion of peaceful, innovative and sustainable development in the
safety, there are some differences between the two documents, north” (2017, 15). Additionally, the document states that “the
with the 2011 Strategy providing more information on this Government’s Arctic policy builds on our long-term efforts. The
topic. For instance, the Strategy recognizes that health is a overarching goals, as set out in the last white paper on Arctic
safety issue, explains the role of international structures (ex. policy, remain unchanged:
UNCLOS, IMO, and Polar Code) and how they contribute to • Peace, stability and predictability
maritime safety, and discusses Danish safety mechanisms like • Integrated, ecosystem-based management

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

• International cooperation and the international legal order ident of Nordland County Government, Tomas Norvoll, Exec-
• A stronger basis for employment, value creation and welfare” utive Counselor for Planning and Finance Gerd Hetland Kris-
(2017, 15).4 tiansen, from Troms County Government, County Governor
of Finnmark County Runar Sjåstad, and Minister of Foreign
Having the same priorities in 2017 as in 2014, and also men- Affairs Børge Brende” (2017, 13). This suggests that it is not just
tioning the goals from 2011 (Norway MFA 2011), suggests that the federal government that has responsibilities for the region.
the Norwegian government is consistent in its policy and in its
long-term strategy for the Arctic region. In contrast, the 2014 Strategy identifies more federal-level min-
istries. These include the following ministries:
Comparison by Indicator • Foreign Affairs,
• Nordic Cooperation,
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro- • Trade, Industry and Fisheries,
vides insights in terms of how Norway defines and describes the • Climate and the Environment,
region. Both strategies recognize the importance of the region. • Education and Research, and
For instance, the 2017 Strategy opens by stating that “the Arctic • Petroleum and Energy (2014, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28).
is important for Norway and for the world as a whole,” especial-
ly as “people’s everyday lives are affected both by high politics The 2014 Strategy also recognizes other bodies that have re-
and by day-to-day issues” (2017, 2), showing the importance gional responsibilities. These include the “police, Customs, the
of the region domestically. In contrast, the opening remarks by Norwegian Armed Forces, the Directorate of Fisheries, the Nor-
the Prime Minister in the 2014 Strategy state that “the Arctic wegian Maritime Authority, the Norwegian Coastal Adminis-
is Norway’s most important foreign policy priority” (2014, 3), tration and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centres” (2014, 32)
thus taking a more international perspective. Both strategies in the context of BarentsWatch.
also describe the Arctic based on its physical characteristics,
such as the Arctic’s “vulnerable environment” (2017, 3; 2014, Figure 10 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
43). The 2014 Strategy also comments on the region’s “inhos- signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total
pitable wilderness” and explains that the “weather conditions number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
are harsh” (2014, 11, 3). At the same time, the Strategy remarks ber) in the document.
that “the High North has some of the most beautiful scenery
and wildlife that Norway has to offer” (2014, 36), thus painting
two different pictures of the region.

The 2017 Strategy calls the region the “Arctic” and use the term
“circumpolar” once in relation to the Arctic Council (see: 2017,
7). In contrast, the terms “Arctic,” “High North,” and “north”
are used seemingly interchangeably, while “circumpolar” is
used a few times when discussing the entire region in the 2014
Strategy (see: 2014, 16). Interestingly, the 2017 Strategy does
not define the Arctic, whereas the 2014 Strategy does, both de-
scriptively and geographically. Descriptively, the strategy states
that “the Arctic as a region is defined by its natural environ-
ment, its resources and its inhabitants” (2014, 3). Geograph-
ically, the Strategy notes that “1/3 of Norway’s land area lies
north of the Arctic Circle” and that “80 % of Norway’s sea areas Figure 10. Comparing Norway’s 2014 and 2017 Strategies
lie north of the Arctic Circle” (2014, 42), suggesting the Arctic Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
is located north of the Arctic Circle.5 and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.

Both documents also identify different ministries involved in

Arctic affairs, but to different degrees. For instance, the 2017 The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 8 % of the total
Strategy only mentions the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but coded quotes in the 2017 Strategy and 4 % in the 2014 Strategy
does take care to recognize different levels of government. For (see Figure 10). One of the focuses in both documents is on In-
example, a photo caption from the Regional Forum For Dia- digenous peoples. This is not surprising as “the Sami population
logue on Arctic Policy in February 2017 identifies the “Minis- totals approximately 80 000–100 000 people, living in Norway,
ter of Local Government and Modernisation, Jan Tore Sanner, Sweden, Finland and Russia” and “the largest Sami population
Senior Adviser from the Sami Parliament, Torvald Falch, Pres- is in Norway” (2014, 42) in the North (2017, 10). Both strate-

4 The white paper in reference is the document from 2011, The High North - Visions and Strategies (2017, 15).
5 This understanding is different than in previous strategies.

73
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

gies discuss the importance of the Saami Parliament, known as Norway are huge” (2017, 30) and that infrastructure solutions
the Sámediggi, which represents the interests of Norway’s Saa- are needed, especially for business. The 2014 Strategy also ad-
mi population. In relation to the 2017 Strategy, the Sámedig- dresses equality in the context of business and infrastructure.
gi’s participation in the policy development process allows for In particular, the need for improved infrastructure in the North
Indigenous voices to be heard (2017, 13–4). The 2014 Strategy is mentioned, and the Strategy states that “where agreements
also recognizes the government’s collaboration with the Saami have been signed concerning the public procurement of trans-
with regard to “ethical guidelines for resource extraction in In- port services, the additional costs to transport companies may
digenous areas” (2014, 24), although it is explicitly stated if this be transferred to the central government and county adminis-
is in conjunction with the Sámediggi. The 2017 Strategy also ex- tration...The three northernmost counties have the highest ex-
plains that international Saami cooperation is important (2017, penses, and have thus been reimbursed the most” (2014, 35).
19–20), although the 2014 Strategy provides more details on co-
operation. The 2014 Strategy explains that cooperation among Population and migration are also important in Northern Nor-
the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish Saami Parliaments takes way, especially as “nearly 10 % of Norway’s population lives north
place through the Sami Parliamentary Council which “[plays] of the Arctic Circle, a greater proportion than in any other coun-
a key role in efforts to promote cross-border cooperation and try in the world” (2014, 7). However, the 2017 Strategy explains
cultural exchange” (2014, 16). The preservation of the Saami that Norway’s northern population is ageing and will likely not
language is important, and the 2014 Strategy further explains see the same growth rate as in southern Norway (2017, 11, 27).
that “the Sami parliaments of Norway, Sweden and Finland have At the same time, the Strategy determines that “in contrast to
united in establishing a joint Nordic language centre – Sámi our neighbouring countries, the population trend in the Nor-
Giellagáldu. Developing and harmonising terminology in the wegian part of the Arctic is positive. This is due to immigration”
Sami languages across the Nordic borders is the key to the use of (2017, 10). This, in part, seems to be connected to the Freedom
the Sami languages in the broadest areas of society” (2014, 30). of Movement Council, which is mentioned in both documents.
In addition to these venues of cooperation, the 2017 Strategy The aim of the Council is to facilitate cross-border flows of peo-
also states that the Norwegian government will “promote co- ple “between the Nordic countries” (2017, 18; 2014, 19).
operation between Indigenous peoples in the Arctic under the
auspices of the Arctic Council, the Barents cooperation and the The Governance indicator, which accounts for 19 % of the total
Nordic cooperation” (2017, 21). coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 15 % for the 2014 Strat-
egy (see Figure 10, p. 73), highlights the relevance of existing
Health and wellbeing are addressed only in the 2014 Strategy, policy and the effective international cooperation mechanisms,
and the priority is to address health-related concerns. Indeed, as well as the existing governance structures, including the Arc-
efforts are under way to “strengthen health services in the north, tic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Norway also
in order to meet the needs that arise as a result of increased ac- recognizes “the importance of cooperation and reaching the
tivity” (2014, 32), and three key areas emerge in the Strategy. same goals at the national level, which enables to set the agen-
First, “there is a need for a new hospital in the north and a new da for the international debate on developments in the Arctic”
hospital is under construction in Kirkenes” (2014, 35). Second, (2017, 2, 3; 2014, 3, 12). “Both the Norwegian Government and
there is a focus on increasing access to Northerners in remote regional Norwegian stakeholders agree with the other Nordic
areas. One approach to addressing this challenge is that “the countries, Russia and the EU on the need to view regional poli-
National Centre for Integrated Care and Telemedicine (NST) cy programmes and cooperation arenas in the Arctic as parts of
at the University Hospital in North Norway (UNN) collects, a coherent whole” (2014, 18, 19, 22, 43). The 2014 Strategy high-
produces, and disseminates knowledge about telemedicine ser- lights that “the people who live in the north are the main drivers
vices, nationally and internationally, and works to ensure that of cross-border cooperation in the region.” Also, “the Barents
telemedicine and e-health are implemented” (2014, 35). Final- cooperation forum has formed the basis of much of the exten-
ly, the Strategy recognizes the need to address regional health sive cross-border contact in the north. Contact and cooperation
concerns that cross borders. For example, with the Cooperation across national borders strengthens business activity, enhances
Programme on Health and Related Social Issues in the Barents knowledge and provides a basis for a forward-looking and sus-
Euro-Arctic Region “priority is given to cooperation on com- tainable society” (2014, 16).
bating communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tubercu-
losis, preventing lifestyle-related health problems and develop- The work of County Councils, which have plenty of “tasks re-
ing more comprehensive healthcare services for children and lating to planning, coordination and regional development,” is
young people at risk” (2014, 19). “of great significance of the society in the North… Due to their
tasks and role as planning authorities, they have a responsibility
Different equality issues are raised in the two documents. For to take a coherent approach to land use management and social
instance, the 2017 document mentions the Svalbard Global and business development, and to give strategic direction to the
Seed Vault as a way of “safeguarding genetic diversity and con- efforts of the municipalities, regional government bodies, and
tributing to global food security” (2017, 37). While this is not other key actors in the north” (2017, 12). Furthermore, the 2017
specifically about food security in the Arctic, the intent is to Strategy notes that “the municipalities also have a key role to
ensure everyone has equal access to food. The document also play in the development of their local societies…The Govern-
recognizes the “distances between people and markets in North ment has presented a proposal to the Storting (Norwegian par-

74
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

liament) on regional reform aimed at creating larger and more increased activity in the sea and coastal areas in the north create
efficient regions. Among the objectives of the reform are closer new challenges for the management.” Therefore, “this makes it
coordination between sectors and a stronger role for the County necessary to further develop maritime administration to safe-
Councils in the development of the region” (2017, 13). guard good environmental standards and promote business
activities and food safety within sustainable limits” (2014, 38).
In the 2017 Strategy, “the Government has sought to give great- Norway “will therefore continue to have strict environmental
er consideration to the domestic aspects of Norway’s Arctic pol- requirements as a basis for new activities, and protect particu-
icy… In the development of North Norway, it is the region’s own larly valuable and vulnerable areas” (2014, 36).
citizens, companies and politicians that have the most import-
ant role to play” (2017, 3). Due to the fact that most of the ob- To strengthen cooperation on developments in the Arctic, “the
jectives of Norways’ Arctic policy are connected to the national Government has established a regional forum for systematic
regional policy, “the Government recently presented a white dialogue at political level between the national government,
paper on regional policy, which outlines the direction of urban the three regional governments counties of North Norway and
and regional development across the country. Sustainability is a the Sámediggi.” Additionally, “other key players in the Arctic,
key principle for all development. This is in line with the UN’s such as the business sector, academia, etc. will also be invited
Sustainable Development Goals” (2017, 15). to take part in the forum, when relevant.” The purpose of the
forum is “to discuss issues of importance for developments in
Both strategies emphasize the importance of the UN Conven- the north that require cooperation across different sectors and
tion on the Law of the Sea, and that “the Convention forms the administrative levels. These discussions will form the basis for
legal basis for the management of the Arctic sea areas” (2017, implementing policy in the three counties and nationally.” As
19–21; 2014, 11, 12, 16). The 2017 Strategy also refers to “the the strategy points out, “it is already clear that education, infra-
cooperation in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) structure and business development will be high on the agenda”
and in the Arctic Council on maritime safety and the sustain- (2017, 13; 2014, 16).
able development of shipping in the Arctic [as] vital for ensur-
ing a high level of maritime safety in Arctic sea areas.” Norway In order “to improve the quality of education and increase com-
is also “actively promoting the Polar Code, which entered into pletion rates,” the government works to “establish cooperation
force on 1 January 2017, and is playing a role in facilitating a between representatives of the counties, municipalities, the Sá-
harmonised and effective global implementation of the code” mediggi (Sami parliament) and the national authorities” (2017,
(2017, 36, 37; 2014, 36, 38, 39). 29). In fact, “the Sámediggi has a number of cooperation agree-
ments with both regional and governmental actors in the region,
Following from this, Norway’s Arctic policy “is also ocean pol- and with city municipalities such as Tromsø and Bodø.” The
icy”. The 2017 document highlights that Norway “have built up Government recognizes the important input of the Sámediggi
knowledge over generations that puts [them] in a good posi- “in connection with the development of the Arctic policy based
tion to take on a leading role in promoting sustainable use of on its insight into what the various Sami communities see as
the oceans.” Furthermore, “in 2015, the coastal states signed the the greatest challenges” (2017, 13, 14). In the 2017 Strategy, the
Oslo Declaration on research cooperation and on preventing” Government also promised to “work towards signing the Nordic
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing “in the internation- Sami Convention” (2017, 21).
al part of the central Arctic Ocean” (2017, 9, 20, 21; 2014, 19).
Additionally, “the blue economy holds great promise for new On the bilateral level, it is important to continue cooperation
investments, growth and employment. Sustainable ocean man- with Russia in different areas of interest. One of them is “regular
agement is essential to ensure economic growth and limit neg- Norwegian-Russian search and rescue exercises that are carried
ative environmental impacts in the Arctic” (2017, 22). Recently, out under the Barents cooperation”. As well, the two states will
“the Government presented an updated management plan for cooperate “on oil spill preparedness and response in the Barents
the Norwegian Sea, and work has begun on a complete revision Sea.” In fact, “targeted cooperation with Russia has also led to im-
of the management plan for the Barents Sea–Lofoten, which is proved maritime safety, higher cod quotas and action to reduce
due to be completed in 2020” (2017, 35). the risk of radioactive pollution.” Together with other states in
the region, Norway “aims to maintain international cooperation
In fact, “the Government attaches importance to safeguarding on the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, with a view to safeguarding
Sami interests. As an Indigenous people, the Sami have a right genetic diversity and contributing to global food security.” Last,
to be consulted in matters that could affect them directly. These but not least, Norway emphasizes the importance of “further im-
consultations are to take place in good faith with the aim of plementation of the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical
reaching agreement on any proposed measures” (2017, 23). and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, through the work
of the Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Behind is that “Norway is a maritime nation, and not least a Response Working Group (EPPR)” (2017, 37; 2014, 11, 16, 37).
nation of marine resources. Through work on the integrated The 2014 Strategy also refers to the “new Kirkenes Declaration,
ocean management plans for Norwegian sea areas, Norway is adopted at the Barents summit in 2013,” which “emphasizes the
also a pioneering country when it comes to comprehensive, eco- importance of business cooperation” (2014, 19).
system-based management.” In addition, “climate change and

75
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The International Treaties and International Cooperation “Respect for international law and international cooperation
indicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded quotes for the are crucial” values are at the core of Norway’s efforts (2014, 11).
2017 Strategy and 10 % for the 2014 Strategy (see Figure 10, This is also “crucial for promoting stability and predictability
p. 73) and has significant relevance for the Norwegian Arctic in the north” (2014, 11). Both Norwegian strategies reflect the
policy. “Norway recognizes the necessity of close cooperation importance of cooperation with Russia, despite Russia’s viola-
with other countries and organisations on how best to devel- tions of international law in Ukraine and Norway’s response to
op the region. These include also national, regional and local these: “It is vital that Norway and Russia work together to ad-
authorities, as well as various institutions and NGOs, that par- dress key challenges in the north.” Hence, “broad cooperation
ticipate actively in cooperation in the Arctic, which promotes with Russia over the course of many decades has been important
understanding in the region and opens up more channels for for building trust and promoting stability in the Arctic.” In fact,
dialogue” (2017, 17). International cooperation is “vital for “the bilateral cooperation has also produced concrete results in
maintaining the overarching framework, including peace and areas of common interest.” Indeed, “the government will pro-
security, but it also enhances national efforts in areas such as mote Norwegian–Russian political dialogue and cooperation in
infrastructure, knowledge development and business devel- areas of common interest, including fisheries management, the
opment.” Indeed, “the stable and predictable region where environment, search and rescue, nuclear safety, border control,
international cooperation and respect for the principles of in- and notification and response to incidents at sea, and maintain
ternational law are the norm” (2017, 10, 17). The 2014 Strate- the direct line of contact between the head of the Norwegian
gy highlights that “impacts of climate change are particularly Joint Headquarters and the head of the Northern Fleet.” All in
marked in the Arctic.” Moreover, the current major challenges all, Norway wants “to have good neighbourly relations with Rus-
“can only be tackled by means of knowledge, responsible man- sia, and the Government gives high priority to dialogue with the
agement and international cooperation” (2014, 3). Russian authorities. Relations with Russia will remain a constant
and important element of Norway’s Arctic policy” (2017, 18, 21).
The purpose of international cooperation in the north is “to
promote predictable, peaceful and sustainable development Together with the rest of Europe and other allies, “Norway is
through intergovernmental, regional and people-to-people standing firm in defence of international law and internation-
cooperation.” The 2017 Strategy further highlights the impor- al rules in the face of Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. Respect for
tance of “a good balance between conservation and sustainable the Law of the Sea, and international cooperation are crucial for
use” (2017, 19). “Close international cooperation has played a promoting stability and predictability in the north.” At the same
significant part in safeguarding Norwegian interests relating time, Norway intends “to continue cooperation with Russia in
to safety, environmental protection and resources in the Arc- areas where we have common interests.” As the 2014 Strategy
tic. Safety, the environment, resource management, health and emphasizes, “it is in everyone’s interests that the Arctic remains a
maritime safety are cross-border issues, and can only be ad- peaceful and stable region” (2014, 11, 16).
dressed in cooperation with other countries and actors in the
north” (2017, 2, 9, 17). Developments in the Arctic are also im- In the international cooperation indicator, both strategies also
portant beyond the region itself, and therefore Norway states highlight Norway’s approach towards the Exclusive Econom-
it is important to cooperate with the observer countries of the ic Zone (EEZ) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Arctic Council – “both for the sake of the valuable contribu- which “provides vital guidelines for continued peaceful coex-
tions they can make to the Council’s work, and to promote istence in the north.” Indeed, “there are very few unresolved
understanding of Norwegian policy… It is therefore important issues relating to jurisdiction in the Arctic, states comply with
to maintain all existing cooperation fora in Arctic” (2017, 17; the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Arctic coastal
2014, 16). states have committed themselves to the orderly settlement of
any overlapping claims.” As both strategies emphasize “the Law
Following from this, Norway’s Arctic Strategy states that “al- of the Sea must be respected in the Arctic as elsewhere” (2017,
though various actors may have legitimate but conflicting in- 19–21; 2014, 11, 12). Generally, “all coastal states have a conti-
terests in the north, there is no race for the Arctic or for the nental shelf extending 200 nautical miles from their baselines…
resources in the region… [and] Norway is intensifying its dip- Norway has already submitted documentation on the extent of
lomatic efforts in the Arctic vis-à-vis the other Arctic states, its continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit… The maritime
the EU, key European countries and the new Asian observ- delimitation line agreed between Norway and Russia in 2010
ers” (2014, 12, 18). Furthermore, Norway “wants to exploit stretches for 1750 kilometres. All the coastal states bordering the
the opportunities Nordic cooperation offers for growth and Arctic Ocean have undertaken to resolve maritime delimitation
development in the Arctic. Key areas for cooperation include issues in accordance with the law of the sea.” The 2014 Strategy
knowledge development, business development, infrastruc- summarizes that “it is essential for Norway to take a clear and
ture, climate change, the environment, security policy, and co- firm approach to upholding its rights and fulfilling its duties in
operation with the EU” (2014, 18). The “government attaches maritime areas under its jurisdiction in the north” (2014, 11, 12).
importance to maintaining its dialogue with the EU on the
Arctic.” Norwegian government “also supports the EU’s appli- As the 2014 document states “the Arctic is Norway’s most im-
cation for observer status in the Arctic Council, which is still portant foreign policy priority” (2014, 3). As well, “The Govern-
being processed” (2017, 19). ment’s Arctic policy builds on our long-term efforts” and here

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“the overarching goals” are: “peace, stability and predictability” in the Arctic, so as to protect the region’s vulnerable environ-
and “International cooperation and the international legal or- ment” (2017, 3). According to both documents, the main way
der” (2017, 2, 15). Norway aims to “play a leading role in inter- Norway will accomplish this appears to be through balancing
national diplomacy in the Arctic.” (2014, 3). The Government environmental protection and economic activities, as this will
will therefore “strengthen Norway’s position as a responsible be important to both the functioning and future of the region.
actor and partner in the north by focusing on knowledge de- For example, the 2017 Strategy states that “the natural environ-
velopment, business development and international coopera- ment and natural resources are the basis of all livelihoods in the
tion” (2014, 16). In common with other Arctic states, Norway north, and healthy ecosystems provide goods and services the
recognizes “the Arctic Council [as] the only circumpolar forum region depends on” (2017, 10; see also: 2014, 28). Both docu-
for political discussions at government level.” “Climate change ments accordingly note that oil spills can be environmentally
and environmental issues are key areas of the Council’s work, damaging and that response measures are needed (2017, 37;
and, in line with Norway’s wishes, greater attention is now being 2014, 39, 40). To find this balance, both documents identify dif-
paid to business development.” As both documents point out, ferent environmental practices. For example, the 2014 Strategy
“the Arctic Council should remain the most important inter- explains that environmental research is important for decision
governmental body for cooperation on Arctic issues” (2017, 17, making, and that “the goal is to acquire new knowledge about
21; 2014, 3, 7, 12, 16). oil and gas resources in the Arctic and develop knowledge and
methods for more environmentally friendly exploration activ-
Besides the Arctic Council, both strategies refer to the “Barents ities” (2014, 28). Research will also be used to make decisions
cooperation between the five Nordic countries, Russia and the with regard to climate change and environmental protection
EU which has been promoting peaceful and sustainable de- (2014, 36). Additionally, Norway will use an ecosystem-based
velopment in the Barents region” since 1993 (2014, 11). “The management structure for managing the ocean and its resources
Barents cooperation was initiated in response to changes in the (2014, 38). The 2017 Strategy also mentions the use of an eco-
political landscape, which made closer cooperation between the system-based management structure; however, this exact term
eight Arctic states possible.” Its “aim is to secure peace and stabil- is only used in the context of the strategy’s objectives (2017, 15).
ity in the Arctic.” Norway will “continue to play an active role in Other practices include sustainable business practices (2017, 21,
the Barents cooperation, and to further develop people-to-peo- 24) and finding ways to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
ple cooperation in the Barents region” (2017, 17, 18, 21; 2014, road transport” (2017, 33).
11, 12, 16, 19). The Northern Dimension also contributes to
regional cooperation. For example, “a number of partnerships Protected areas and biodiversity are also important to envi-
have been set up in the framework of the Northern Dimension, ronmental protection and mentioned in both documents, al-
including partnerships on the environment, health, culture, and though more detail is provided in the 2014 Strategy. The 2017
transport and logistics” (2017, 17; 2014, 19). Both strategies also Strategy makes a general statement that “the Government will
highlight the cooperation with the Baltic Sea Council and the seek to safeguard threatened species and habitats, achieve good
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The 2014 Strategy also refers to ecological status in ecosystems, and maintain a representative
the Kirkenes Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Eu- selection of Norwegian nature” (2017, 35). The 2014 Strategy
ro-Arctic Region from 1993 which aims “to secure peace and suggests that Svalbard is an important location for animal pro-
stability in the Arctic” (2017, 2, 17, 18, 21; 2014, 12, 19). tection. Indeed, the document notes that “65 per cent of Sval-
bard is protected” (2014, 38), and that “3000 polar bears live
The Arctic Economic Council (AEC) is also recognized in the around Svalbard and in the northern Barents Sea. The breed-
2014 Strategy. “The AEC will be an important platform for dia- ing population of seabirds in this area totals 15 million, and the
logue between the Arctic Council and the business sector. Nor- walrus population in the Svalbard area is about 4000” (2014, 7).
way considers it important that the Arctic Council gives greater Moreover, climate change can increase the presence of invasive
priority to business development cooperation” (2014, 18). The species, and ocean acidification can harm the region’s flora and
2014 Strategy also highlights the importance of more extensive fauna (2014, 36, 40). To address some of these issues, “Norway,
Finnish–Norwegian cooperation as “Norway and Finland have together with Canada, will develop a plan for the follow-up of
established a partnership to strengthen economic and scientific the Arctic Council’s report on the threats to natural diversity in
cooperation in the Arctic. Key areas include promoting student the Arctic” (2014, 40).
exchanges, research cooperation, dialogue on transport and
logistics, closer regional cooperation and flows of labour and The Pollution indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded
services” (2014,19). quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 5 % for the 2014 Strategy (see
Figure 10, p. 73). Both documents identify similar pollutants,
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 6 % of the including oil, greenhouse gases, radioactive material, and local
total coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 7 % for the 2014 and other waste material (2017, 6, 10, 31, 36; 2014, 6, 11, 14, 25).
Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73). As mentioned earlier, both docu- Additionally, the 2014 Strategy mentions short-lived climate
ments consider the Arctic’s environment to be vulnerable, mak- forces, soot, and sulphur dioxide (2014, 29, 40), while the 2017
ing environmental protection a priority. According to the 2017 Strategy also mentions “emissions of persistent, bioaccumula-
Strategy, “as one of the eight Arctic states, Norway has a great tive and toxic substances” and “marine litter and microplastics”
responsibility for ensuring sound management of all activities (2017, 35). As for the sources of pollution, both documents

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

mention the shipping industry, and the “transport sector” more the 2014 Strategy directly address adaptation with regard to re-
broadly in the 2017 document (2017, 6, 32; 2014, 40). The 2017 gional and national efforts. Regionally, “the parties in the Barents
Strategy also mentions that pollution comes from “infrastruc- Cooperation forum have prepared an action plan with measures
ture development” and the 2014 Strategy also names “the nickel that can contribute to reduced emissions and better adaptation
production facilities on the Kola Peninsula” (2017, 31; 2014, 29). to climate change” (2014, 40), while nationally “the Government
will strengthen work on climate adaptation in the north through
The strategies also discuss different approaches to pollution the measures that are announced in the white paper on climate
prevention. In particular, there is consistency, as they both ac- adaptation in Norway… to the Storting)” (2014, 40).
knowledge the Paris Agreement and the Arctic Council’s Agree-
ment on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness As for climate agreements and frameworks, both documents
and Response in the Arctic, as well as other mechanisms to ad- mention the significance of the Paris Agreement for addressing
dress oil pollution in the Barents, Lofoton, and Vesterålen (2017, climate change, and the 2014 Strategy also recognizes collabo-
32, 36, 37; 2014, 11, 36, 39). Some of the other problem-solving rative climate and emission reduction efforts through the work
tactics in the 2014 Strategy include documenting pollution, or of the Barents Cooperation (2017, 12, 32; 2014, 11, 40). While
the possibility of pollution. For example, the MAREANO pro- these agreements are important, both documents also address
gram maps pollution among other things (2014, 30), and in the the need for more climate research. For example, the 2017 Strat-
Kola Peninsula, “documenting the impact on the environment egy suggests that research underpins climate cooperation (2017,
and health is important for the dialogue with Russia on how 35), while the 2014 Strategy explains that “good climate models
to reducing the discharges” (2014, 30). Risk analysis is also im- are necessary in order to be able to say something about future
portant for preparing for potential pollution incidents. As an climate change, and better knowledge of sea ice is important to
example, the Strategy states that “in the course of 2014, the improving these models” (2014, 28).
Norwegian Coastal Administration completed an environmen-
tal risk and preparedness analysis for Svalbard and Jan Mayen. The Security indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total coded
The analysis will provide a better basis to measure national pre- quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 5 % for the 2014 Strategy (see
paredness against acute pollution in these areas” (2014, 39). The Figure 10, p. 73) illustrates the importance of international co-
2017 Strategy also speaks to plastics pollution and explains that operation and the international legal order in security matters.
“the Government will strengthen efforts at both national and The government’s Arctic policy builds on long-term efforts and
international level to prevent and combat marine litter and mi- foundations of the Norwegian foreign policy. As both strategies
croplastics” (2017, 35), but does not go into detail on what these emphasize, “international cooperation is vital for maintaining
measures will include. the overarching framework, including peace, security and sta-
bility, but it also enhances national efforts in areas such as infra-
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the structure, knowledge development and business development”
total coded quotes for the 2017 strategy and 3 % for the 2014 (2017, 9, 10, 15; 2014, 16). According to the Norwegian Arctic,
Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73) identifies some of the conse- as well as foreign, policy “it is in everyone’s interests that the
quences of climate change. The 2017 Strategy explains that cli- Arctic remains a peaceful and stable region… [due to] the im-
mate change is a global issue, and that “the impacts of climate portance of this approach to management in an area with such
change in the Arctic are affecting countries both in and outside abundant natural resources but at the same time a highly vul-
the region” (2017, 3). It also recognizes that “the impacts of cli- nerable natural environment”, as there are changes in Europe’s
mate change are particularly pronounced in the north, and this security environment. Therefore, Norway will “continue to take
may affect current business activities and communities in the a consistent and predictable approach to the exercise of its sov-
region” (2017, 3). Indeed, both documents recognize that sea ereignty” and “will play a leading role in promoting coopera-
ice is melting and that this may lead to new economic activity in tion with other countries based on trust and openness” (2014,
the region (2017, 3; 2014, 3, 7), which is one of the positive con- 11, 16). This entails “strategic projects with various cooperative
sequences of climate change. That being said, there are negative partners that can contribute to increased interaction across bor-
consequences for the flora and fauna, as “climate change is a ma- ders in the north, ambitious business initiatives, broad knowl-
jor and growing threat to species and ecosystems in the north edge initiatives, further development of infrastructure, and re-
and also makes them more vulnerable to other environmental inforced environmental protection, security and preparedness”
pressures” (2017, 35). Somewhat similarly, the 2014 Strategy (2014, 31).
notes that “higher temperatures in the sea and changes in ocean
currents may lead to fish stocks moving elsewhere” (2014, 26). As the 2017 and 2014 strategies are the most recent Arctic strat-
egies of any of the Arctic states, Norway reflects Russian for-
Despite the consequences of climate change, the 2017 Strategy eign policy and condemns its aggressive activities in Ukraine,
does not use the words mitigation and adaptation. Instead, it as mentioned in the International Cooperation indicator. “To-
makes statements that are suggestive of this. For example, the gether with the rest of Europe and our other allies, Norway is
Strategy explains that “more knowledge and new approaches are standing firm in defence of international law and international
needed to minimise the impacts of human activity and climate rules in the face of Russia’s conduct in Ukraine.” This approach
change on the Arctic environment” (2017, 35). Certainly, this is also important in the context of the Arctic. “On the subject
sounds like mitigating the effects of climate change. In contrast, of security policy and good neighbourly relations: there is no

78
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

hiding the fact that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are affecting re- stallations are suitable for polar waters, and that crew members
lations between Russia and the rest of Europe” (2014, 3, 11, 16). have received the necessary training.” Norway, moreover, will
Both strategies also refer to the increase of “Russian military ac- also be active in search and rescue (2014, 36). Rescue operations
tivities in the North… over the last ten years”. Although, “this will also take place on land, especially if there is an accident or
increase in activity is not considered to be targeted at Norway, other form of health emergency in Svalbard (2014, 39). Land
but it is nevertheless an important factor in Norway’s security safety is also addressed with regard to transportation safety on
and defence policy” (2017, 18; 2014, 3). The Norwegian Armed roads and highways. Indeed, the document stresses that “con-
Forces “will continue to exercise sovereignty and authority and gestion points, as well as landslide-prone and other vulnerable
[provide] situational awareness in the northern sea areas in a roads will be improved” (2014, 32).
predictable, consistent and unambiguous way. This is an im-
portant element of the Government’s overall Arctic policy.” The In light of these concerns, different approaches to safety are dis-
Norwegian Coastguard plays also an important role (2017, 18, cussed in the strategies. With regard to formalized agreements,
21; 2014, 11, 16). both documents identify the Arctic Council’s SAR and oil spill
agreements, which are collaborative efforts with the other Arc-
The 2014 Strategy highlights the importance of continued coop- tic states (2017, 17; 2014, 36, 38). Additionally, the strategies ac-
eration with Russia in areas where there are common interests, knowledge the important role of the IMO and the Polar Code
based on the “respect for the Law of the Sea and international to maritime safety. After participating in the development of the
cooperation are crucial for promoting stability and predictabil- Polar Code, the 2017 Strategy states, “Norway is actively pro-
ity in the north”. Behind is that being among the Arctic littoral moting the Polar Code, which entered into force on 1 January
states “Norway and Russia share many common interests, not 2017, and is playing a role in facilitating a harmonised and ef-
least the need to ensure sound management of the environment, fective global implementation of the code” (2017, 36; 14, 38).
the natural resources and the joint fish stocks of the Barents This suggests that binding safety rules are important for Nor-
Sea.” In addition to that, “the building of new military border way. There are also other collaborative safety initiatives in the
stations will strengthen Norway’s ability to monitor and con- Barents region. For instance, Norway and Russia bilaterally co-
trol the Norwegian–Russian border.” At the same time, “Norway operate on search and rescue (2017, 37), while the “the Norwe-
cooperates with the other Arctic coastal states on measures to gian-Russian ship reporting system, Barents SRS, and the mari-
combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Arctic time surveillance and information system BarentsWatch help to
Ocean” (2014, 16, 19). Hence, “targeted cooperation with Rus- provide an overview of high-risk traffic in these sea areas and a
sia has led to improved maritime safety, higher cod quotas and more effective response in the event of accidents” (2017, 36; see
action to reduce the risk of radioactive pollution” (2014, 11). also: 2014, 32, 34). There is also multilateral safety cooperation,
with the 2014 Strategy explaining that “in 2008, Norway signed
The 2017 Strategy also confirms that “membership of NATO an agreement with Sweden, Finland and Russia on prevention,
and the transatlantic security community is the cornerstone of preparedness, and crisis management in the Barents region”
Norway’s security policy.” Moreover, “the presence of our allies, (2014, 36–38). Safety collaboration also takes place within Nor-
such as for training and exercising in Norway, is an important way, such as through the SARiNOR project that ran from 2013
and natural result of our membership of NATO” (2017, 18). And to 2016. The 2014 Strategy explains the project “is led by the
the document continues with that “Norway is further develop- Maritime Forum Northern Norway” and that “the purpose of
ing its military cooperation and ability to cooperate with key the project is to create an arena for cooperation in search and
allies and Nordic partner countries in the north, for example by rescue among relevant private and public actors” (2014, 40).
participating in joint exercises.” In fact, “the Cold Response ex- Although the two strategies demonstrate close cooperation be-
ercise is carried out in North Norway every other year, most re- tween states, there does not seem to be a desire to integrate any
cently in March.” Importantly, “closer cooperation between the of these safety systems. This sentiment is clearly expressed in the
Norwegian Joint Headquarters in Bodø and NATO’s command 2014 Strategy as “the challenges in the Arctic transcend all bor-
structure strengthens the Alliance’s ability to manage potential ders, and must be managed through international cooperation
military crisis situations in the north” (2014, 16, 19). in agencies such as the UN Maritime Organisation IMO, and
regionally in the Arctic Council” (2014, 36).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 8 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 9 % for the 2014 Strategy In terms of capabilities, both strategies discuss the same four key
(see Figure 10, p. 73). The 2017 Strategy clearly states that “en- topics. First is the role of satellites for safety and surveillance.
vironmental protection, safety, emergency preparedness and The 2017 Strategy explains that “satellite navigation, communi-
response” (2017, 35) must be addressed. In part, this includes cations and surveillance systems are also important in the north
maritime safety (2017, 3, 36). The 2014 Strategy provides more for search and rescue efforts, climate and environmental mon-
information on Norway’s safety priorities, including maritime itoring, resource management and the exercise of sovereignty”
safety. For example, environmental protection is linked to oil (2017, 32). The 2014 Strategy identifies Norway’s satellite capa-
spills, as well as other forms of pollution, especially in the Sval- bilities as the AISSat-2 as part of the BarentsWatch program,
bard and Jan Mayen areas (2014, 36, 39). Safety and emergency and explains that capabilities are also acquired from the EU’s
preparedness at sea is also discussed. For example, the Strategy Galileo and EGNOS programs (2014, 32, 35). However, both
explains that maritime safety requires that “ships and other in- strategies recognize that a key challenge to satellite operation is

79
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

that “existing satellite communication systems have little or no technology and research is one area in which the region is already
coverage north of 75 degrees north” 6 (2014, 35; see also: 2017, a world leader” (2014, 14).
36) and that this flaw needs to be addressed. The 2017 Strategy
also explains Norway’s intention to “establish new land-based Minerals and energy, of course, are important aspects of Norway’s
AIS (Automatic Identification System) base stations along the economy. Both documents support developing the mining indus-
west coast of Svalbard, and will consider further developing the try (2017, 31; 2014, 22), especially as “33 % of turnover from the
AIS network in Svalbard” (2017, 36). Norwegian mining and mineral industry is generated in North
Norway and Svalbard” (2014, 6). Both documents also highlight
The second topic is improved SAR capabilities, particularly near the potential for increased oil and gas activity through similar
Svalbard. The strategies generally attribute this improvement to statements about untapped resources. The 2014 Strategy remarks
the purchase of two helicopters. The 2014 Strategy explains that that “43 % of undiscovered oil and gas resources on the Nor-
these “have a greater range, reduced response time and greater wegian continental shelf are expected to lie in the Barents Sea”
carrying capacity, as well as new and modern search, communi- (2014, 7; 2017, 2). In light of this potential, the 2014 Strategy fur-
cation and safety equipment” (2014, 38; see also: 2017, 37). The ther explains that the Government will promote exploration and
2017 Strategy further explains that, in addition to the helicopters, issue new licences (2014, 20). Oil and gas, however, are not the
safety around Svalbard has also been improved through new leg- only energy sources mentioned in the two strategies; renewable
islation “relating to ports and navigable waters” (2017, 37). The energy is also addressed, and there seems to be a slight shift in
third topic is oil and pollution prevention, especially near Lofo- tone between the two documents. For instance, the then Foreign
ten and Vesterålen. Both strategies show progression in address- Minister Brende expressed that “‘renewable energy use should,
ing this concern, with the 2014 Strategy explaining that Norway and will, increase considerably, but a large share of the global
wants to create a base for pollution response, and 2017 Strategy energy supply will still have to come from sources such as gas.
stating that Norway will “establish a centre with leading compe- Gas will be an important bridge between a fossil fuel based and
tence on oil spill preparedness and response and marine plastic a low-carbon economy…’” (2014, 14), suggesting that Norway is
litter, located in the Lofoten and Vesterålen archipelago” (2017, still focusing on oil and gas. The 2017 Strategy, however, appears
37; see also: 2014, 39). The final topic is mapping and charting to put more emphasis on the use of renewable energy. Indeed, the
around Svalbard. Again, the two documents show progress with Strategy states that “North Norway has abundant renewable ener-
this regard. The 2014 Strategy explains that little mapping has tak- gy resources, and the region as a whole has a power surplus. The
en place in this area, while the 2017 Strategy explains that “nauti- Government will promote the effective use of renewable energy
cal charts and ice data are an important part of the infrastructure resources as a basis for business development and value creation”
needed to save lives, and protect health, the environment and (2017, 32).
valuable assets and resources. The work that is already under way
to chart key areas around Svalbard will therefore be continued” Sustainability is also important for Norway’s economic activities.
(2017, 37). In addition, with responsibility for Arctic safety in For instance, the 2014 Strategy states that “Foreign Minister Bren-
mind, the Coast Guard performs a range of safety related duties, de considers it important that the Government promotes sustain-
“including fisheries inspections, customs inspections, environ- able business development in the north” (2014, 13–14). The 2017
mental protection and search and rescue operations” (2014, 15). Strategy further supports sustainable development, as one of its
main aims is to “ensure economically, socially and environmen-
The Economy indicator accounts for 18 % of the total coded tally sustainable business development in the Arctic” (2017, 23).
quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 17 % for the 2014 Strategy (see The Strategy does not, however, just stop at sustainable business-
Figure 10, p. 73). The two documents identify similar econom- es, but also seeks to create regional sustainability. It explains that
ic activities including tourism, reindeer husbandry, aquaculture, “a sustainable region is one that has a balanced population struc-
fisheries, seafood, and the blue economy (2017, 10, 22; 2014, 6, ture, and is one where human and natural resources are managed
20) According to the 2017 Strategy, the blue economy likely in- in a way that promotes development and growth, both now and
cludes “ocean-based industries such as marine biotechnology, in the future” (2017, 9).
energy, seabed mining, and maritime transport” (2017, 23–24;
see also: 2014, 14, 25). The blue economy, and fish in particular, Considering the breadth of economic activities, both documents
are important to Norway as “24,5 billion NOK was the value of comment on the importance of the regional economy to Nor-
fish exports from North Norway in 2016. This amounts to around way. For example, the 2017 Strategy expresses that “the business
60 % of the region’s total exports of goods” (2017, 6). The 2017 sector in North Norway is thriving, and the rate of growth in
Strategy additionally recognizes that “traditional Sami industries” the north of the country is currently higher than in the south”
also contribute to Norway’s economy, and also that there is “con- (2017, 3). The 2014 Strategy makes similar statements, explain-
siderable potential for green growth in North Norway” (2017, ing that “GDP growth forecasts for North Norway for 2014 and
23, 12). The 2014 Strategy also recognizes that space is another 2015 are better than for the rest of the country, and growth of
regional economic activity. Indeed, the report states that “space 3 % is forecast for both years. Expected growth for the rest of

6 When making the same point, the 2017 Strategy explains that coverage issues begin at 72°N (2017, 36). It was not clear why there was a 3° difference between
the two strategies.

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

the country in 2014 and 2015 is 2 %” (2014, 43). Moreover, “the The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 1 % of the total cod-
business sector in North Norway is more export-oriented than ed quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 2 % of the 2014 Strategy (see
the rest of the Norwegian economy and is responsible for some Figure 10, p. 73) recognizes the relevance of the tourist industry
8 % of the country’s exports other than oil and gas” (2014, 43). for the future. Tourism in the North is increasing, “with visitors
coming to the region from all over the world” (2017, 3). Indeed,
The two strategies recognize that the success of Northway’s “the High North has some of the most beautiful scenery and
northern economy is dependent upon people living in the re- wildlife that Norway has to offer” which are “major competitive
gion. The two documents thus propose different approaches to advantages for the travel and tourism industry” (2014, 20). Fur-
ensuring a viable workforce. The approach in the 2017 Strategy thermore, “there is rich natural diversity, both on land and in
is to build a sustainable region in order to attract or retain peo- the sea. This has been the basis of settlement, value creation and
ple. Indeed, the Strategy explains that “creating attractive local welfare for as long as people have lived here. Fisheries, aquacul-
communities that can offer secure and interesting jobs in both ture, agriculture, new marine industries and tourism make use
the private and public sectors is therefore an essential compo- of the natural environment and are dependent on sustainable
nent of the Government’s Arctic strategy” (2017, 10, 23). The management.” The 2014 Strategy further explains that “Tourism
2014 Strategy’s plan to increase the labour force was through is also important for local employment”, and “the Hurtigruten
the Freedom of Movement Council’s plan to ease cross-border ships are a symbol of authentic northern Norway to many peo-
employment (2014, 19) that was first mentioned here in the Hu- ple.” As well “The Government will contribute to good, predict-
man Dimension indicator. Another shared strategy is the legis- able framework conditions for the travel and tourism industry”
lation or policy changes to facilitate economic growth. The 2017 (2014, 20, 23, 36).
Strategy addresses “simplifying the Planning and Building Act”
as a way to stimulate growth (2017, 31). In contrast, Mr. Brende “The Norwegian economy is undergoing a process of restruc-
in the 2014 Strategy “emphasises the fact that the Government turing, and needs North Norway’s contribution more than ever”
will target its efforts towards industries with growth potential. (2017, 3). At the same time, the 2014 Strategy warns that “since
Priority areas will include the oil and gas industry and the re- the region is becoming more accessible as the sea ice melts and
lated supply industry, the maritime sector, the seafood industry, with the growing demand for energy and raw materials, the
the mineral industry, tourism and space technology” (2014, 14). region faces several other challenges, such as the expansion of
tourism, besides others like growing traffic along new sailing
To help facilitate some of these priorities, there will be both a routes or greater oil and gas activity” (2014, 12).
“white paper and draft legislation” put forward for the seafood
industry, and also a maritime strategy for maritime industries The 2014 Strategy also addresses the “growth in the travel and
(2014, 25). Regulations will also apply to the bioprospecting tourism industry in Svalbard”. In fact, “visit Svalbard AS is today
field; the oil and gas industry is also accountable to internation- the only travel and tourism company that receives annual sup-
al standards (2014, 25, 39). That said, the 2017 Strategy speaks port directly from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries.
to the issue of regulation and explains that “most sectors with This is because Svalbard has special safety and environmental
growth potential in the north are subject to considerable gov- challenges and the travel and tourism industry has a central po-
ernment regulation” (2017, 24) which will affect how economic sition in society in Svalbard and is important for settlement”
activities are performed. (2014, 25). The Government will further “develop the tourist
industry with a focus on profitability and sustainable manage-
Other actions will be taken outside of population building and ment of the natural environment and cultural heritage.” At the
economic regulation. According to the 2017 Strategy, the Gov- same time, it will “develop the transport system in the north
ernment will “provide risk capital through Innovation Norway’s so that it can handle the flow of goods, everyday transport and
Environmental Technology Scheme to companies seeking to travel and tourism” (2014, 23, 24, 32).
develop environmentally friendly products and technology”
and also “strengthen the supplier industry in North Norway by The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the
establishing a supply chain development programme for the re- total coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 9 % of the 2014
gion” (2017, 23, 24). The 2014 Strategy also looks towards inter- Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73) discusses different infrastructure
national cooperation as “the prime ministers of Norway, Swe- issues. Improving transportation infrastructure is addressed in
den and Finland have set up an expert group to identify ways both strategies. Both documents comment that the National
of strengthening business cooperation in the north” (2014, 18). Transport Plan guides their infrastructure developments (2017,
Combined, the two strategies identify a wide range of econom- 31–32; 2014, 32), and that transportation needs to facilitate the
ic actors. The state, the EU, the private sector, and Indigenous movement of goods (2017, 11; 2014, 32). Additionally, the need
peoples or the Saami are mentioned in both documents (2017, to develop sustainable, environmentally friendly, and safe trans-
18, 24; 2014, 16, 19, 20, 22). The 2017 Strategy further mentions portation is also discussed in both strategies, while the 2014
skilled labor, Innovation Norway, and The Expert Committee for Strategy also acknowledges the need for accessibility (2017, 31;
Green Competitiveness (2017, 9, 12, 23), while the 2014 Strategy 2014, 32). Both strategies, though recognizing the need to de-
names the Geological Survey of Norway, the Svalbard Director- velop different types of transportation infrastructure, provide
ate of Mining and the Commissioner of Mines, the Petroleum different amounts of detail. While the 2017 Strategy explains
Safety Authority, and Visit Svalbard AS (2014, 22, 25, 39). that “it is vital to ensure that infrastructure is well-maintained,

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

ferry capacity is sufficient, roads across the mountains are kept The Science and Education indicator accounts for 9 % of the
open year-round, and that there are reliable flight connections total coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 14 % for the 2014
in the region” (2017, 32), the 2014 Strategy goes into detail and Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73). Climate change is identified as a
provides concrete actions and proposals on highway, air, rail- driver behind Norway’s scientific activities in both documents,
way, and port infrastructure. For example, “National Trans- while the 2017 Strategy also explains that “the oceans, climate
port Plan 2014–2023 funds have been allocated to upgrading change and the environment are key topics in current Arctic
and constructing new harbour infrastructure in the port of research” (2017, 27; see also: 2014, 3). Research can also be
Longyearbyen” (2014, 35). used for other purposes. For example, both strategies suggest
that research and knowledge can help improve Norway’s econ-
Shipping is also connected to infrastructure and addressed in omy (2017, 27; 2014, 28), and the 2017 Strategy directly links
both documents, although to varying degrees. The 2017 Strat- climate and environmental research to business development.
egy does not address shipping as much as the 2014 Strategy The Strategy states that “more knowledge about interactions be-
does, but it does mention Norway’s plans to make local mar- tween oceans, ice, biodiversity, and ecosystems is necessary for
itime traffic more environmentally friendly. It also expresses overall management of the northern sea areas and business de-
the desire for increased safety by “[Norway participating] in velopment and value creation” (2017, 28). Additionally, research
efforts under the IMO and the Arctic Council to harmonise is used to help inform economic decisions, including on sus-
implementation of the Polar Code worldwide” (2017, 37). The tainable development (2017, 9). The 2014 Strategy also explains
2014 Strategy provides more detail, especially on safety, the that “it is important to have a research-based approach when
IMO, and the Polar Code. It explains that “80 % of maritime evaluating environmental consequences before making deci-
traffic in the Arctic passes through Norwegian waters” (2014, sions about new activity” (2014, 36). Both strategies also discuss
6), which contextualizes the focus on safety. It also explains the need for knowledge. The 2014 Strategy recognizes Saami
that “Norway is an active driving force in establishing glob- knowledge, whereas the 2017 Strategy states that “we must draw
al safety and environmental rules for ships operating in polar on the knowledge of the people, companies, institutions and lo-
waters. Norway has led the working group in the UN maritime cal politicians in the north” (2017, 10; see also: 2014, 30).
organisation (IMO) which is working to establish the so-called
Polar Code” (2014, 38). To facilitate this research, the two documents identify differ-
ent research infrastructure. First, in terms of physical infra-
Ensuring energy security is raised in both strategies, as is the structure, the 2017 Strategy explains the Government wants to
need for transmission lines (2017, 31; 2014, 35). In particu- “establish a centre of expertise on ocean and Arctic issues in
lar, the 2014 Strategy explains that “Statnett, the Norwegian Tromsø” and that “Norway is preparing for the future with a
state owned enterprise responsible for owning, operating and new ice-breaker research vessel, Kronprins Haakon” (2017, 29).
constructing the central power grid in Norway, is making sig- The 2014 Strategy also mentions that “the Institute of Marine
nificant investments in the main grid, which will result in in- Research has signed a contract for the construction of a new
creased security of supply in Northern Norway” (2014, 32). ice-going research vessel” (2014, 28), as well as “the Alomar Ob-
Energy security, seemingly, may also come from renewable servatory on Andøya” (2014, 8), and a “space research cluster
energy (2017, 32; 2014, 32). made up of research centres in Svalbard, Tromsø, Narvik and
on Andøya” (2014, 14). There are also plans to build “better in-
Telecommunications and ICT infrastructure are briefly men- frastructure for research in Svalbard” (2014, 29). The 2014 Strat-
tioned in both documents in a safety context. In particular, egy also mentions different research institutes and universities,
the two strategies recognize the challenges of operating satel- for example, the Fram Centre, the Institute of Marine Research,
lites in the far north (2017, 32; 2014, 35), which is discussed the Research Council of Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute
in detail in the Safety and SAR indicator. The 2017 Strategy (2014, 26, 28, 29, 30), Nofima which “is Europe’s largest busi-
also recognizes that as “long distances between communities ness-oriented research institute…and the head office is located
and businesses” is problematic, the Government will “facilitate in Tromsø” (2014, 25), as well as the “University of Tromsø, the
improvements in broadband coverage nationwide, including University Hospital of North Norway and the Northern Re-
in North Norway” (2017, 32, 33). search Institute (Norut)” (2014, 25). Finally, the two strategies
recognize that the research infrastructure also includes cooper-
To achieve these transportation and communications goals, ation through formal and informal networks and projects. For
innovation and technology are needed. Innovation and tech- example, the 2017 Strategy mentions “the Arctic Council and
nology in the 2017 Strategy cover transportation infrastruc- EU research programmes” (2017, 27), while the 2014 Strategy
ture with the aim of ensuring that “North Norway has effec- mentions the “Maritime Preparedness and International Part-
tive, well-connected infrastructure that facilitates sustainable nerships in the High North (2014-2016)” project, and collabo-
development, the transition to a green economy and the devel- ration with the USA (2014, 30, 39).
opment of an innovative and adaptable business sector in the
region” (2017, 31). As for communications, the 2014 Strategy The funding of research is addressed minimally in the docu-
states that “the Government will facilitate the development of ments. The 2017 Strategy explains that “750 million NOK was
space-based solutions for navigation, communication and earth spent on research relating to the Arctic through the Research
observation” (2014, 32). Council of Norway in 2016” (2017, 6), and that local County

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Councils also provide “regional research funds” (2017, 12). In of action items. While this shows intent, the document does
contrast, the 2014 Strategy suggests that research with commer- not provide details as to which ministries will be responsible
cial value receives funding. Specifically, the Strategy states that for the action items, nor are there time frames associated with
“through financing research and commercialisation, the public them. Strategy funding or budgets are not properly explained
authorities are contributing to the development of businesses in the document either, although one action item says to “allo-
based on marine biotechnology and bioprospecting” (2014, 25). cate approximately NOK 40 billion (under the National Trans-
port Plan 2018–2029) for investment projects in Norway’s three
Research, innovation and technology are also connected in both northernmost counties” (2017, 33). Finally, there is no mention
strategies. In particular, the 2014 Strategy stresses that “our aim of follow-up or evaluation, and the document ends without a
must be for North Norway to become one of the most inno- conclusion. However, as this is a short version, more details may
vative and knowledge-driven regions of growth in the world” be provided in the original Norwegian language document.
(2014, 14), while both strategies assert that knowledge and in-
novative technological developments help with the economy At the end of the priority sections in the 2014 Strategy, there
(2017, 27; 2014, 36). Technological innovations in space will are subsections called “Government measures for...” that main-
also be of importance for Norway (2014, 32). The 2017 Strategy ly provide details on what the Government is already doing
appears to build on this aim as the Government is stating that or some areas that they want to address. This does not read so
it will present “a national space strategy during the course of much like action items found in the 2017 document, perhaps
2017” (2017, 33). because of the inclusion of existing actions. The action items, at
times, do not necessarily align with what is written in the text.
In terms of education, the two strategies comment on levels For example, there is an item in the international cooperation
of educational attainment. The 2017 strategy states that in the section about increasing cross border health efforts, but this is
north there are “school results that are lower than the nation- not discussed as an issue in the section. While it is a good action
al average, low completion rates in upper secondary schools, item, it is not substantiated by the discussion. What is more,
and a shortage of qualified teachers are among the challenges the business section has less than one page of information but
facing the education system in North Norway” (2017, 28). To two pages of action items, and there seems to be a disconnect
address these gaps, “the Government is seeking to raise the lev- between them. Some aspects of the Strategy did have funding
el of education, improve the quality of education and training allocated to them. For example, an action item in the business
programmes, and reduce the dropout rate in upper secondary section notes that “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has allocat-
schools” (2017, 28). Indeed, the Strategy identifies the aim to ed NOK 150 million to business projects in the High North for
“improve the quality of education from primary school to uni- the period 2014-2019” (2014, 22). The document also states
versity, and increase completion rates” (2017, 27). Yet, the pro- that “through the establishment of a new grant scheme, Arc-
posed course of action appears to be to gear education towards tic 2030, we are expanding the perspective, both geographically
“regional labour market needs” (2017, 27), suggesting that ed- and in time. The new scheme will have a framework of NOK
ucation has, not only a knowledge-based purpose, but also an 150 million for 2015” (2014, 31). There is also an infographic on
economic one. The 2014 Strategy also recognizes the lower at- budgets which states that “the Norwegian Government’s budget
tainment levels, but is more direct in connecting education to allocations for activities relating to the Arctic have risen since
the economy. The Strategy explains that “the level of education 2010. The figures are not exhaustive, but give an indication of
in Northern Norway is lower than in the rest of the country. the trend over time” (2014, 43). The document does not men-
The development of strong, regional knowledge-based business tion follow-up or evaluation.
environments and skilled manpower for business and society
is critical to unleashing the value creation potential of the re- To sum up
gion” (2014, 26). The Strategy further solidifies the connection
between education and the economy, stating that “the Govern- Figure 10 at the beginning of this chapter shows that the same
ment is determined to cooperate with business to make it at- four indicators—Governance, Economy, International Coop-
tractive for young people to choose – and complete – courses eration, and Science and Education (2017 Strategy)—have the
of education that are important to the development of society highest percentage of quotes assigned to them in both strategies.
in the north” (2014, 26). The focus here seems to be in the field In the 2014 Strategy, the order is slightly different: Economy,
of engineering: “the Ministry of Education and Research has Governance, Science and Education, and International Coop-
therefore allocated 60 new places for technology students at the eration. In both cases, Tourism is the least-coded, followed by
University of Tromsø for the academic year 2013/2014” (2014, Climate Change.
28-29). Additionally, “142 doctorates were awarded at the Uni-
versities of Tromsø and Nordland in 2013, twice the number In terms of meeting Norway’s stated priorities identified at the
awarded in 2006” (2014, 43). start of the Norway discussion (2017, 6), “international cooper-
ation,” “business development,” and “knowledge development,”
The Implementation indicator identifies the different approach- these are supported by the corresponding indicators, which are
es to implementation in the two documents. In the 2017 Strat- in the top four coded indicators in the 2017 Strategy: Interna-
egy, there are text boxes at the end of each section containing tional Cooperation, Economy, and Science and Education (see
the wording “THE GOVERNMENT WILL” and listing a series Appendix). Infrastructure is the fifth most-quoted indicator,

83
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

suggesting that it is neither a priority nor an afterthought. As cusses actions they can take to help stimulate the economy, such
for “environmental protection and emergency preparedness,” at as making legislation and/or regulation more business-friendly.
first glance it may not seem as if this priority is supported. How-
ever, when the Environmental Protection, Pollution, Climate There are some differences between the two documents, three
Change, and Safety and SAR indicators are added together, they of which are discussed here. First, there is an interesting differ-
become the most coded issues (see Appendix) suggesting that ence in terms of safety, with the 2014 Strategy commenting on
the priority is met. road safety and the possibility of landslides. This appears to be
the only document that actually addresses this issue.7 Second,
The use of infographics for certain data stands out in these doc- there are some differences in how transportation infrastructure
uments and also draws the reader’s attention to important in- is addressed. While both documents comment that improve-
formation. There are some challenges when comparing the two ments are needed for economic reasons, the 2014 Strategy also
documents, as the 2017 Strategy is an English short version, so states that infrastructure improvements are also for residents
it is difficult to tell what, if any, pertinent information was not and that they must be safe.
included that was in the original Norwegian version. That said,
there are some connections between the different indicators and Additionally, more detailed information is also provided on
themes. For instance, the international cooperation and gover- specific road, air, and rail projects. Both documents also men-
nance indicators are connected, as cooperation takes place in tion the need to improve ICT infrastructure, but the 2017 Strat-
different governance structures (i.e., Arctic Council, Barents) egy speaks more about broadband for business while the 2014
and with different governance issues, such as safety (i.e., through Strategy focuses on satellites for safety. Third, there is one key
the Polar Code and the IMO). International cooperation is also difference when it comes to security. While both strategies state
connected to security, as cooperation is the foundation of re- that attention needs to be paid to Russian expansion in the Arc-
gional stability. tic, the 2014 Strategy clearly calls out the situation in Ukraine as
something to be condemned, while at the same time also sug-
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant sim- gesting cooperation can carry on in other, shared areas in a sec-
ilarities and the three most relevant differences are discussed. tion of the report titled ‘Peace and Law of the Sea.’ In contrast,
the 2017 Strategy mentions Ukraine and the need for continued
There are some similarities between the two documents and cooperation in a subsection on international cooperation that
two are discussed here. First, safety and SAR are addressed precedes a short security discussion that covers Russia’s actions
similarly in the two strategies. For instance, both mention the in the North, although not Ukraine. The 2014 Strategy also ad-
Arctic Council oil and SAR agreements, BarentsWatch, the dresses border management in the context of new border posts
IMO and Polar Code, and both support safety cooperation with that were opened.
Russia. As for capabilities, they also recognize the importance
of satellites for maritime surveillance and communication ca- Overall, the two documents show progression in the way the
pabilities but acknowledge the challenges of operating above Norwegian government approaches Arctic governance in that
72°N (75°N in the 2014 Strategy). The strategies also comment the 2017 Strategy keeps pace with environmental changes and
on the improved SAR capabilities in Svalbard with the addition changing international relations.
of two helicopters, and the need to improve maritime mapping
and charting. Indeed, both documents recognize the gains that
have been made for regional safety while also acknowledging
that more needs to be done. Second, there are similarities in the
way the economy is discussed. Indeed, both documents men-
tion economic activities, such as mining, oil and gas, and the
green economy. The discussion around green growth and re-
newables shows the progress made between the two documents,
from something to be developed in 2014 to something to be
promoted in 2017; the importance of sustainable development
is also reiterated in both documents. Other industries like tour-
ism, reindeer husbandry, and fishing are also mentioned in both
documents. Another key similarity in this indicator is the way
both documents stress that a successful northern economy is
dependent upon people living in the region. In this regard, the
2017 Strategy suggests creating sustainable communities to at-
tract people to the North, while the 2014 Strategy seeks to ease
labor migration. In both documents, the Government also dis-

7 Sweden mentions the need for “greater awareness of traffic at sea, in the air and on land helps to reduce the risks of accidents” (Sweden. GOS 2011a, 35), but
then goes on to discuss maritime traffic. This is not an adequate discussion of road safety in contrast to Norway’s.

84
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Russian Federation policy, Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the
Russian Federation up to 2035 (Korchunov 2019, 4-11).
The Russian Federation has two main strategy documents on
the Arctic that we analyze: the 2013 Strategy for the Devel- The 2013 Strategy identifies the following five main priorities:
opment of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Na- “a) integrated socio-economic development of the Arctic zone
tional Security Efforts for the Period up to 2020 [Стратегия of the Russian Federation;
развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и b) the development of science and technology;
обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до c) the establishment of a modern information and telecommu-
2020 года] (Russia TRG 2013). It is a follow-up to the 2008 nications infrastructure;
Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in d) environmental security;
the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond [Основы государственной e) international cooperation in the Arctic;
политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до f) provision of military security, protection, and protection of
2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу] (Russia TRG 2008). the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic”
In 2001 Russia presented for the first time Foundations of the (2013, 3).
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic [Основы
государственной политики Российской Федерации в The priorities of the 2008 Strategy can be summarized as mar-
Арктике], a draft of the Arctic policy for the 2008 document. itime delimitation, regional safety (SAR) standards, regional
For this analysis, the unofficial English translations are used cooperation, improved infrastructure, socio-economic devel-
and compared to the original Russian language documents; it opment, and improving regional wellbeing (2008, 3, 4). While
is thus important to understand that the quotes used here may there may be some overlap in priorities, the new 2013 document
not be the same in the original Russian version. provides a more comprehensive description of Russia’s objec-
tives, priorities, and means of implementation.
There are also other policy documents/resolutions released
by the Russian government. However, because they are not Comparison by Indicator
strategies, they are not considered in this analysis. Resolution
of the Government of the Russian Federation On approval of The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
the state program of the Russian Federation Socio-economic vides insights into how the Russian Federation (Russia) under-
development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for stands the Arctic. Both documents recognize that the regional
the period up to 2020 [Правительствo Российской Федера- climate is extreme and that there is poor ecological stability. Ad-
ции Постановление Об утверждении государствен- ditionally, Russia considers the region to be industrial despite
ной программы Российской Федерации Социально- its remoteness (2013, 2; 2008, 2,10). The strategies also refer to
экономическое развитие Арктической зоны Российской the region as the “Arctic” and do not use terms like circumpolar
Федерации на период до 2020 года] issued in April or North.
2014 (Russia TRG 2014); Resolution of the Government of the
Russian Federation On approval of the Provisions of the State Figure 11 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
Commission for the Development of the Arctic [Правительствo signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total
Российской Федерации Постановление Об утверждении number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
Положения о Государственной комиссии по вопросам ber) in the document.
развития Арктики] from March 2015 (Russia TRG 2015);
and Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation On
Amendments to the Resolution of the Government of the Rus-
sian Federation of April 21, 2014 [Правительствo Российской
Федерации Постановление О внесении изменений в
постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от
21 апреля 2014] from August 2017 (Russia TRG 2017). Addi-
tionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive
order on 26 February 2019 N78 On the improvement of state
governance in the sphere of development of the Arctic zone of the
Russian Federation [О совершенствовании госуправления
в сфере развития Арктической зоны Российской
Федерации] (Russia TRG 2019), according to which the Min-
istry for the Development of the Russian Far East is renamed
to the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East
and the Arctic. This Ministry has the authority, inter alia, to Figure 11. Comparing the Russian Federation’s 2008 and 2013 Strategies
develop and enforce government policy and legal regulations Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
concerning the Arctic’s socio-economic development. Final- and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
ly, the Russian Fedration is currently working on a new draft

85
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 12 % of the total As for demographics and migration, the 2013 Strategy also ac-
coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 3 % of the 2008 Strategy knowledges that skilled workers are problematically leaving the
(see Figure 11, p. 85). The 2008 Strategy addresses little to do Russian Arctic. For example, the Strategy identifies the “negative
with this indicator; there is one sentence stating that increased demographic trends in most of the Arctic regions of the Russian
access to social and economic activities would improve the Federation, the outflow of labor (especially skilled) in the south-
wellbeing of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the ern regions of Russia and abroad” (2013, 2). More skilled people
Russian Arctic. The strategy seeks the “improvement of quali- will thus be needed to migrate back into the region (2013, 4).
ty of life of the Indigenous population and social conditions of
economic activities in the Arctic” (2008, 4). The Governance indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85) is briefly
In contrast, the 2013 Strategy addresses a wider range of top- captured only in the newest 2013 Strategy, while the 2008 Strate-
ics. First, Indigenous peoples are discussed in relation to overall gy does not reflect on governance at all. The 2013 Strategy states
health and wellbeing corresponding to education, culture, and that for the “effective use and development of the resource base”
economic success. For instance, the Strategy links education to it is necessary to “ensure the preparation of materials submitted
future success. This means the improvement of “educational to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for
programs for Indigenous Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the validation of the outer limits of the continental shelf of the
especially as it relates to preparing children for life in a modern Russian Federation in the Arctic” (2013, 5).
society with a full mastery of skills policies for extreme envi-
ronments, including equipping of educational institutions and To “modernize the fishing industry” the Russian government
remote areas means of distance learning” (2013, 4). The Strategy promises “the effective use of key species of marine biological
also explains that there is a connection between Indigenous cul- resources and the involvement of non-traditional fishing sites.”
ture(s), way of life, and environmental protection (2013, 4). As At the same time, there is also a need for “preventing and com-
for Indigenous economic success, this is understood as new op- bating illicit production and trafficking of water biological re-
portunities rooted in “the traditional economy that strengthen sources.” Furthermore, the Strategy aims at “the preservation
employment and self-employment” (2013, 5) rather than larger and development of the resource potential of fisheries and
companies hiring Indigenous peoples as employees. To achieve implementation of technical upgrading and commissioning of
this, the Strategy explains that many actors will be involved new capacities for deep processing of aquatic biological resourc-
through the “mobilization of domestic resources of households es and the development of marine biotechnology” (2013, 6).
and communities, and their active support from the govern-
ment, business and non-profit organizations” (2013, 5). In terms of science and technology, the Russian government
aims to use “use of the opportunities for international scientif-
The Strategy also addresses culture outside the Indigenous con- ic and technological cooperation, ensuring the participation of
text. In particular, it provides a broad understanding of things Russian scientific and educational organizations in the global
and places that provide culture. Indeed, the strategy seeks “ac- and regional technology and research projects in the Arctic”
tive formation in cities, small villages and towns new affordable (2013, 6).
for all segments of the population, and mobile multi cultural
institutions (socio-cultural centers, cultural and sports facilities, The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
information intelligence centers, mobile library)” (2013, 4). dicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total coded quotes in the
2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p.
Health and wellbeing are also addressed outside the Indigenous 85), highlights the importance of joint cooperative efforts by all
context. For example, there is much emphasis on the need for Arctic states. The 2013 Strategy states that “in order to promote
improved access to health care for those living in the Russian international cooperation and preservation of the Arctic as a
Arctic. For example, the Strategy calls for “ensuring the avail- zone of peace” it is necessary “providing a mutually beneficial
ability and quality of medical care to the population, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Russian Fed-
through improved primary care and primary health care in plac- eration and the Arctic states on the basis of international trea-
es of traditional residence and traditional economic activities of ties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is increas-
the population of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the ing the efficiency of foreign economic activity” (2013, 7; 2008,
use of country vehicles and aircraft for sanitary -Air evacuation 3). Russia should also “ensure a mutually beneficial Russian
of patients, the development of technologies for remote panel of presence, economic, and scientific activities on the Norwegian
doctors” (2013, 4). The Strategy also links better telecommuni- archipelago of Svalbard keep” (2013, 8).
cations, water, housing, and energy infrastructure to improved
wellbeing (2013, 4). Improved health and wellbeing, in turn, are One of the strategic priorities of Russia is to “strengthening,
connected to increased “self-employment and entrepreneur- on a bilateral basis and within the framework of regional or-
ship” opportunities, “particularly in single-industry towns and ganizations, including the Arctic Council and the Barents-Eu-
villages” (2013, 4), as well as improved education, and access to ro Arctic region Council, good-neighborhood of Russia with
sports and cultural activities (2013, 4). the sub-Arctic states, atomization of economic, scientific and
technical, cultural interaction, and also frontier cooperation,

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

including in the field of effective natural resources management changes of climate” (2008, 3). Despite the small difference be-
and environment preservation in the Arctic” (2013, 8; 2008, 4). tween the two documents with regard to recognition of existing
environmental damage, both strategies do recognize the need to
The 2013 Strategy also refers to the importance of “combining protect the environment.
the efforts of the Arctic states to create a single regional sys-
tem for search and rescue, and to prevent man-made disasters Expanding protected areas and protection of the region’s bio-
and elimination of their consequences” (2013, 7). There is also a diversity are addressed in both documents in a similar man-
need for “the implementation of the regular exchange of infor- ner. For example, the 2013 Strategy makes clear that it is im-
mation on the environment, as well as data on the Arctic climate portant “to ensure the conservation of biological diversity of
and its dynamics, the development of international cooperation Arctic Flora and Fauna in the expansion of economic activities
in improving systems for meteorological observations in the and global climate change, including:” i) “development and ex-
Arctic climate, including from space” (2013, 8). pansion of the Arctic protected areas and federal waters”; ii)
“development and expansion of the Arctic protected areas of
The 2008 document also emphasizes the need for “carrying out regional significance;” iii) “monitoring of ecosystems and flora”
of an active interaction of the Russian Federation with the Arc- (2013, 7; see also: 2008, 7). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy ex-
tic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the plains that there will be “the development and expansion of the
basis of norms of international law, mutual arrangements taking network of protected areas and water areas of the federal and
into account national interests of the Russian Federation, [and regional level” (2013, 7), suggesting that this is a priority for the
also] for tackling issues of an international legal substantiation Russian government.
of the external border of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa-
tion” (2008, 3). The 2013 Strategy further highlights the organi- The Pollution indicator accounts for 3 % of the total coded
zation and “efficient use of transit and cross-polar air routes in quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 3 % in the 2008 Strategy (see
the Arctic, the use of the Northern Sea Route for international Figure 11, p. 85). Neither strategy clearly defines regional pol-
shipping under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and lutants, other than one statement about oil spills in the 2013
in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Feder- Strategy (2013, 6). There is one quote from the 2013 Strategy
ation” (2013, 8). that identifies different sources of pollution, explaining “envi-
ronmental damage caused by past economic, military and other
The 2008 Strategy also emphasizes enhancing “the participation activities in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2013, 7)
of Russian official agencies and public organizations in the work is problematic. One can thus can glean that military waste is a
of international forums devoted to the Arctic problematic, in- pollutant, while the economic pollution mentioned is likely oil.
cluding the inter-parliamentary interaction within the frame- The document does not state whether the mining industry has
work of the Russia - European Union partnership” (2008, 3, 4). also caused pollution. Similarly, the 2008 Strategy is also vague,
Furthermore, the 2013 Strategy refers to the necessity of “devel- naming “anthropogenous pollution” (2008, 7), but not saying
oping a dialogue between the regions and municipalities of the exactly what this is or where it comes from.
Nordic countries to exchange experience in the development of
climate and energy policies” (2013, 8). Despite the limited discussion around the types and sources
of pollution, both strategies identify different pollution prob-
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 5 % of the lem-solving measures. For instance, both documents suggest
total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the total cod- that technology can be of benefit for pollution management.
ed quotes for the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). The two The 2008 Strategy provides a little more information than the
documents take different approaches to discussing environmen- 2013 Strategy, explaining that Russia will “introduce new tech-
tal concerns. For instance, the 2013 Strategy acknowledges that nologies, including for clearing of the territories of islands,
the environment in the Russian Arctic has been damaged (2013, coastal zones and water areas of the Arctic seas of anthropog-
3), and expresses adesire to find a way to use technologies, es- enous pollution” (2008, 7). The 2013 Strategy identifies other
pecially those in the resource industry, to limit further harm. problem-solving methods that range from environmental as-
The Strategy calls for the “development and implementation of sessments, “environmental monitoring,” corporate responsibili-
new techniques and technologies in the field of environmental ty, and improved state oversight (2013, 7).
management, the development of offshore mineral resources
and water resources, as well as the prevention and elimination The Climate Change indicator accounts for 3 % of the total cod-
of oil spills in ice conditions” (2013, 6). In contrast, the 2008 ed quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 5 % of the total coded quotes
Strategy does not recognize that environmental damage has oc- for 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). Both documents state
curred, but expresses the wish to ensure that economic activities that climate change requires further study. Indeed, in both doc-
do not harm the environment. The Strategy thus states a “basic uments there are similar statements explain the need for bet-
objective…in the sphere of environmental security – preserva- ter understand of climate change. This means working towards
tion and maintenance of environment protection of the Arctic, “the prediction and assessment of the impact of global climate
liquidation of ecological consequences of economic activities changes in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation under the
in the conditions of increasing economic activity and global influence of natural and anthropogenic factors in the medium

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

and long term” (2013, 6; see also: 2008, 8). Additionally, similar the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the organization
statements were used with regards to using technology to pre- of a device technical control over the strait zones, rivers estu-
dict change. For instance, Russia will “promote comprehensive aries, firths on the itinerary of the Northern Sea Route” (2008,
research on the study of natural hazards, the development and 6). The 2008 Strategy also highlights that it is necessary to cre-
introduction of new technologies and methods to predict in a ate “groupings of general purpose armies (forces) of the Armed
changing climate” (2013, 6; see also: 2008, 8). Russia also recog- Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military forma-
nizes that climate change research requires international coop- tions and organs in this region” (2013, 8; 2008, 6).
eration. To this end, the 2013 Strategy states that there will be
“organization of complex international research expeditions to The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total
study the environment (ice, pollution of marine waters, marine) coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % in the 2008 Strategy
and the influence of observed and projected climate change” (see Figure 11, p. 85), identifies similar safety concerns in the
(2013, 8). two documents. For instance, safe transit through the Northern
Sea Route is important, as are search and rescue capabilities and
The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod- the ability to address “natural and man-made disasters” (2013,
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 15 % of the 2008 Strategy 4, 7; see also: 2008, 4, 5). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy also in-
(see Figure 11, p. 85), describes the need to protect the national cludes environmental safety (2013, 4). Neither document names
interests and national borders in the Arctic. According to the any formalized search and rescue or safety agreements, but they
2008 Strategy, the basic objective “in the sphere of military se- do address cooperation and collaboration on the issue of search
curity, defense and protection of the state border of the Russian and rescue. For example, the 2013 Strategy mentions coopera-
Federation [is] lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa- tion through “the coordination of rescue forces” in the context
tion, [and] maintenance of a favorable operative regime in the of search and rescue and “man-made disasters” (2013, 7), and
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintenance the 2008 Strategy also mentions the “building-up of efforts of
of a necessary fighting potential of groupings of general purpose the [Arctic] states for the creation of a uniform regional system
armies (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, of search and rescue” (2008, 4). The latter possibly suggests an
other armies, military formations and organs in this region” integration of national safety solutions, or perhaps it was allud-
(2008, 3). The 2013 document highlights that the Russian gov- ing to what would later become the Arctic Council’s SAR agree-
ernment aims at the “development of integrated security system ment, but neither is explicitly stated in the Strategy. In terms of
for the protection of territory, population and critical facilities facilitating safe maritime transit, the 2008 Strategy also prioritizes
[in] Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from the threats of “assistance in the organization and effective utilization of transit
natural and man-made disasters” (2013, 4). and cross Polar air routes in the Arctic, and also in the use of the
Northern Sea Route for international navigation under the juris-
Further the 2013 Strategy states that “in order to ensure military diction of the Russian Federation and according to international
security” it is necessary “to ensure comprehensive combat and treaties of the Russian Federation” (2008, 4).
mobilization readiness level required and sufficient for solving
non-military pressure and aggression against the Russian Fed- The 2013 Strategy identifies a few areas for improvements on the
eration and its allies, to ensure the sovereign rights of Russia’s safety front, especially in relation to maritime transit. This in-
Arctic and features the smooth implementation of all of its ac- cludes the need to develop adequate mapping of sea ice, reliable
tivities, including the exclusive economic zone and the conti- weather information, communications and satellite capabilities,
nental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic [and also] icebreaking services, and rescue services (2013, 5, 7). A challenge
to neutralize internal and external military dangers and mili- identified in the Strategy is the “lack of permanent complex space
tary threats in peacetime, providing strategic deterrence, and in monitoring of the Arctic territories and waters dependence on
the event of armed conflict – repel aggression and cessation of foreign sources of funds and information management of all ac-
hostilities on terms that meet the interests of the Russian Fed- tivities in the Arctic (including interaction with aircraft and ves-
eration” (2013, 8). Further, “there is a need for improvement of sels)” (2013, 2). The 2008 Strategy makes similar observations,
airspace and surface control and use of dual-use technologies recognizing the need “to create a reliable system of rendering of
for the benefit of a comprehensive approach to defense, security navigating, hydro meteorological and information services pro-
and sustainable socio-economic development of the Arctic zone viding an effective control of economic, military, environmen-
of the Russian Federation” (2013, 8). tal activity in the Arctic, and also forecasting and prevention of
emergency situations, minimization of damage in case of their
The 2008 Strategy states that one of Russia’s strategic priorities occurrence, including through the use of global navigating satel-
in the Arctic is the “delimitation of maritime spaces in the Arctic lite system GLONASS and multi-purpose space system” (2008, 7).
Ocean and maintenance of a mutually advantageous presence of
Russia on the Spitsbergen archipelago” (2008, 4). Furthermore, The Economy indicator accounts for 19 % of the total coded
according to the 2008 Strategy, it is necessary “to optimize the quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 21 % of the 2008 Strategy (see
system of a complex control over the situation in the Arctic, in- Figure 11, p. 85). The 2013 Strategy recognizes that traditional
cluding the boundary control at the check points across the state economies and the tech sector are among Russia’s economic ac-
border of the Russian Federation, [and] introduction of a bor- tivities. Indeed, there is a desire to “build a competitive scientific
der zones regime in the administrative-territorial formations of and technological sector in the development and implementa-

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

tion of advanced technologies, including the development of of new projects of economic development of the Arctic territo-
new or adapting existing in Arctic conditions on the basis of ries through their co-financing from the budgets of the various
relevant technology platforms” (2013, 6). However, much of the levels of the budget system of the Russian Federation and extra-
focus is on the natural resources and energy sectors in both the budgetary sources” (2013, 3; see also: 2008, 5).
2013 and 2008 strategies (note: the 2008 document does not
mention other forms of economic activity). Both documents The Tourism indicator is reflected only in the most recent strat-
discuss hydrocarbons and energy, mining, and living resourc- egy (2013) and accounts for 3 % of the total coded quotes in it
es. With regard to hydrocarbons and energy, both documents (see Figure 11, p. 85), with the document stating that the Rus-
explain that developing the hydrocarbon sector is important, sian Federation shall provide for “development of Arctic tourism
particularly “on the continental shelf of the Russian Federa- and expansion of environmentally friendly tourism activities in
tion” (2013, 5; see also: 2008, 3). Moreover, the 2013 Strategy the Arctic” (2013, 3). Furthermore, the 2013 Strategy empha-
explains the importance of energy security and the need for sizes that Russia aims at “improving the regulatory framework
“sustainable development of the energy sector in the long term” of tourism, establishment of its financial support on the basis
as sustainable energies become substituted in traditional areas of public-private partnerships, promotion of regional tourism
of development where production will be declining after 2020 clusters [and] Arctic tourism promotion at the national and in-
(2013, 5). Minerals will also be extracted from the continental ternational markets” (2013, 3). Last but not least, “in order to
shelf, alongside oil and gas (2008, 4). There are other miner- promote international cooperation,” Russia will focus on “the
al extraction locations in Russia, including the Kola Peninsula development of international tourism, including recreational,
and the Ural Mountains. Russia expects to extract “non-ferrous, scientific, cultural, educational, environmental” (2013, 7, 8).
precious metals and precious and scarce types of mineral raw
materials, effective mining of chrome, manganese, tin, bauxite, The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 24 % of the total cod-
uranium, titanium, zinc” (2013, 5). The biological resources ap- ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 15 % of the 2008 Strategy
pear to be ocean-based and include items such as fish, “water bi- (see Figure 11, p. 85), and different types of infrastructure are
ological resources,” and “marine biotechnology” (2013, 6; 2008, discussed. Both documents recognize that transportation infra-
3). At the same time, the government recognizes the need for structure needs to be improved due to the “underdevelopment
“preventing and combating illicit production and trafficking of of basic transport infrastructure, its marine and continental
water biological resources” (2013, 6). components, aging icebreaker fleet, lack of small aircraft” (2013,
2). There is also need for “modernization and development of
The government suggests different ways in which economic the infrastructure of the Arctic transport system” and “re-struc-
activities will be prioritized. For example, the 2013 Strategy turing of volumes of cargo transportation through the Northern
explains that the government will help with “development and Sea Route” (2008, 4, 5). The 2013 Strategy provides a great deal
implementation of a system of state support and stimulation of of information on Russia’s plans for transportation infrastruc-
economic entities operating in the Arctic zone of the Russian ture development. Russia intends to develop regional rail and
Federation, particularly in the development of hydrocarbon road networks. For the latter to be successful, the government
resources, other minerals and water resources, through the recognizes that “the development and introduction of new ve-
introduction of innovative technologies, the development of hicles adapted for use in arctic conditions” will also be required
transport and energy infrastructure, modern information and (2013, 6). Air transport will be addressed through “the devel-
telecommunication infrastructure, improvement of customs opment of small aircraft to meet the needs of air traffic and to
tariff and tax regulations” (2013, 3; see also: 2008, 5). The gov- ensure their availability in the Arctic zone of the Russian Feder-
ernment will also help Indigenous peoples with their econom- ation” (2013, 6). Maritime traffic will be improved through the
ic development (2013, 5). The goal appears to be “a balanced creation of new ports and ensuring an easy transition between
labor market, updating social guarantees and compensation maritime, rail, and air transport options (2013, 5). This indicates
for people working and living in the Arctic zone of the Russian that transport infrastructure should facilitate the movement of
Federation” (2013, 4). Supporting economic development also commercial goods.
means ensuring new regulatory frameworks are in place, and
to address this the government seeks “improving the regula- As mentioned, icebreakers also contribute to the transportation
tory framework that promotes the rationalization of property infrastructure and Russia needs to update its fleet. The 2008
relations in the sphere of culture and promotion of business Strategy recognizes that “state support” will be needed for new
through the development of a system of grants, sponsoring icebreakers, while the 2013 Strategy states that new icebreakers
institutions, copyright, sponsorship, insurance, tax, and oth- will need “modern technologies … including nuclear power
er specific sources of funding of social and cultural projects” plants” (2013, 5; see also: 2008, 5). In addition to state support,
(2013, 4). funds for development could be raised through “tariff regulation
services for icebreaking and other types of support” (2013, 5). In
Different economic actors are involved in Russia’s northern addition to icebreakers, other infrastructure is needed to support
economy. These include “state, business, science and educa- shipping in the Russian Arctic. While the 2008 Strategy does not
tion” institutions (2013, 6). The state, however, appears to be address shipping, the 2013 Strategy notes that shipping safety is a
the most involved, according to the strategies. Notably, the 2013 concern. As previously mentioned in the Safety & SAR indicator,
Strategy explains that the state shall facilitate the “promotion improved navigational aids are needed (2013, 2, 5).

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Both strategies recognize the importance of telecommunica- of materials adapted to the climatic conditions of the Arctic, as
tions and ICT infrastructure to the region. Both documents ex- well as introduction of means and equipment base, adapted for
plain that this would contribute to economic development. The the polar research” (2013, 6). Both strategies state that maritime
2013 Strategy recognizes the benefits of digital infrastructure to research vessels are important, and according to the 2013 Strat-
the wellbeing of northerners, while the 2008 Strategy also rec- egy, this could include “the use of deep-robotic systems” (2013,
ognizes that it will help with “military, environmental activity 6; see also: 2008, 7).
in the Arctic, and also forecasting and prevention of emergency
situations” (2008, 7; see also: 2013, 2, 5). Digital infrastructure, Education is addressed only in the 2013 Strategy and links
according to the 2013 Strategy, should include “the establish- education to the economy. In particular, it covers “the devel-
ment of a modern information and telecommunication infra- opment of education, provision of training, retraining and ad-
structure that enables the provision of services to the popula- vanced training in higher and secondary education to work in
tion and economic entities across the Arctic zone of the Russian the Arctic with the existing and projected need for specialists
Federation, including by laying underwater fiber-optic commu- in the field of marine geology, hydrocarbon production and
nication lines along the Northern Sea Route, and integration processing, marine biotechnology, information and communi-
with networks of other countries” (2013, 7; see also: 2008, 7). cation technology and other specialties” (2013, 4). Education,
including distance education, is also important for the health
Housing infrastructure is only briefly mentioned in the 2013 and wellbeing of northerners, and in particular for Indigenous
Strategy as being connected to regional wellbeing and quality peoples (2013, 4). This was also discussed under the Human
of life. The document notes the government recognition of the Dimension indicator.
need for “updating and upgrading of the housing stock,” and for
“fixed assets housing on the basis of energy saving technologies” Both documents address Implementation in great detail. The
(2013, 4). 2013 Strategy has a section on “Mechanisms for the implemen-
tation of the Strategy” (2013, 8) that lists nine action items. The
The need to improve energy infrastructure is also identified in 2008 Strategy lists five key action items and details on how to
both strategies, especially as the existing delivery system in in- achieve them (2008, 5–8). Both documents also provide infor-
efficient (2013, 2; 2008, 5). The documents make similar state- mation on how implementation follow-up will occur. For ex-
ments suggesting different approaches to improving this situ- ample, the 2013 Strategy divides the tasks into two stages; the
ation. For example, the 2013 Strategy expresses the benefits of first running until 2015 and the second until 2020 (2013, 9, 10).
“power differentiation schemes, including the construction of In contrast, the 2008 Strategy uses three phases: 2008–2010,
nuclear power plants, including floating” (2013, 3), and the “op- 2011–2015, and 2016–2020 (2008, 9–10). This makes sense,
timization of economic mechanisms of the “northern delivery” however, as both strategies run until 2020 and the first docu-
through the use of renewable and alternative, including local ment was written five years prior to the second, leaving more
energy sources, reconstruction and modernization of exhausted time for implementation when it was written. The 2013 Strategy
power plants, [and] the introduction of energy-saving materials also addresses evaluation in the section, “Monitoring the Imple-
and technologies” (2013, 3; see also: 2008, 5). mentation of the Strategy” (2013, 11). This section stresses that
the “Government of the Russian Federation, federal executive
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 9 % of the total authorities and executive authorities of the Russian Federation
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2008 Strategy shall provide system monitoring and analysis of the imple-
(see Figure 11, p. 85). The 2013 Strategy identifies that scientific mentation of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the
research is driven by natural “hazards”, climate change, and the Arctic” (2013, 12). There will also be “an annual report to the
environment (2013, 6). Research can also contribute to better un- President of the Russian Federation on the progress and results
derstanding of social and economic conditions. The 2013 Strat- of the Strategy” (2013, 12), which will support accountability.
egy explains that other research areas in which science can con- The budget is addressed only in the 2013 Strategy. In particular,
tribute include “the history, culture and economy of the region, the document states that “the scope of work and the volume of
as well as the legal regulation of economic and other activities in their funding from the federal budget is determined by the de-
the Arctic” (2013, 6) It can also help improve health and wellbe- velopment of state… federal and departmental target programs”
ing, and contribute to greater international cooperation (2013, 6). (2013, 9). Moreover, “extra-budgetary financial support of the
The 2008 Strategy also recognizes the importance of research for Strategy is a public-private partnership, with the resources of
social and economic issues, and states that research helps inform development institutions, international financial institutions
the “management of the Arctic territories” (2008, 3). and foreign investments into the future of infrastructure, social,
innovation, environmental and other projects” (2013, 9).
To carry out scientific activities, a proper research infrastructure
is needed. However, the 2013 Strategy states that “in the field of To sum up
science and technology are scarce technical resources and tech-
nological capabilities to the study, development and use of the Figure 11 at the beginning of this chapter shows that the
Arctic areas and resources, lack of readiness for the transition to most-coded indicators in 2013 are Infrastructure, followed by
innovative development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Fed- Economy and the Human Dimension. In 2008, the most coded
eration” (2013, 3). The strategy, thus, calls for the “development indicator is Economy, with Infrastructure and Security tying for

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

second place, and Safety and SAR, International Cooperation, To further compare the documents, the two most relevant simi-
and Science and Education tying for third. The three least-coded larities and the three most relevant differences are discussed.
indicators in 2013 are Tourism, Pollution, and Climate change,
tying for top place, followed by Environmental Protection and There are also some similarities between the two Russian doc-
Security tying for second, and Governance, International Coop- uments of which two are discussed here. First, both documents
eration, and Safety and SAR tying for third. Tying for least-cod- stress the importance of international cooperation with other
ed indicators in 2008 are Tourism and Governance, followed by states. This includes at different levels of government, within and
Human Dimension and Pollution tying for second, and Climate between organizations, and the need to abide by international
Change coming third. law and treaties, especially on maritime activities and rescue op-
erations. Regional safety issues are then are discussed similarly,
As mentioned above, there are six priorities in the 2013 Strategy as both documents mention maritime safety, man-made disas-
(2013, 3). First, “integrated socio-economic development of the ters, and SAR. However, the 2013 Strategy does a better job at
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” would be associated with identifying where Russia could improve its safety capabilities,
the Economy and Human Dimension indicators, which are the despite discussing safety substantially less (as a percentage of
second and third most-coded indicators in the document (see total quotes) than the 2008 document. Second, both documents
Appendix), suggesting that this priority is met. Second, “the recognize the importance of environmental protection, especial-
development of science and technology” is associated with the ly in relation to ongoing economic activities in the region. Both
Science and Education indicator, which is the fourth most-cod- documents call for protected areas to help maintain biodiversity,
ed indicator. Third, “the establishment of a modern information although the 2013 Strategy appears to take environmental pro-
and telecommunications infrastructure” is associated with the tection more seriously than the 2008 document does. Moreover,
Infrastructure indicator, which is the most-coded indicator, sug- in terms of pollution, the two documents identify different types
gesting this priority is met. Fourth, “environmental security” is of pollution (military and economic vs. anthropogenic), but nei-
associated with the Environmental Protection indicator, which ther provides much detail on what the actual pollutants are. De-
is the second least-coded indicator. When combined with the spite this vagueness, they do both suggest that technology can
Pollution and Climate Change indicator, environment becomes help address reduce environmental damage.
the fourth most-discussed topic (see Appendix). It seems that
these priorities are met. Fifth, “international cooperation in the There are also some interesting differences between the two
Arctic” is associated with the International Cooperation indica- strategies, and three are discussed here. First, the human dimen-
tor, which is in the middle in terms of coded quotes (see Ap- sion is discussed substantially more in the 2013 document than
pendix). Sixth, “provision of military security, protection, and it is in the 2008 document. The 2008 Strategy makes one com-
protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the ment about improving Indigenous wellbeing through econom-
Arctic” is associated with the Security indicator, which is the sec- ic activity, while the 2013 Strategy discusses Indigenous health
ond least-coded indicator. While international and cross-border and wellbeing, and economic growth. The 2013 Strategy also
cooperation and security are not the most coded, there is discus- speaks about maintaining a northern culture to ensure overall
sion dedicated to these indicators. health and wellbeing in the Russian north, and identifies an out-
flow of labor migration from the region. Second, both strategies
Comparison of the two documents is interesting, especially in state that security practices must protect the land, people, and
terms of the discussion on the Human Dimension and Infra- infrastructure; however, the two documents lay out different
structure, as the percentage of quotes for these indicators sub- priorities for these topics and they are discussed more in the
stantially increases from 2008 to 2013. For the Human Dimen- 2008 Strategy. The 2013 document shows more concern with
sion, the newer strategy spends a considerable amount of time preparing for military and non-military threats to the Russian
recognizing what needs to be done to improve the living con- Arctic (security and defense in general), which also includes
ditions of Indigenous peoples, as well as on regional health and internal threats. In contrast, the 2008 Strategy is more focused
wellbeing. In infrastructure terms, there is an increased focus on border management, including in the Arctic Ocean. Third,
on improving transportation to improve connectivity and tele- both documents explain that Russia’s economic priorities are
communications/ICT infrastructure for economic and safety resources and energy. Additionally, the 2013 Strategy paints a
reasons in 2013. broader picture of Russia’s other Northern economic activities
(e.g., fisheries and biotechnology) and provides more informa-
There are also some connections between the indicators. For tion on how the state will foster this growth, to include Indige-
example, the Human Dimension is connected to the Economy nous small businesses and self-employment.
indicator in the context of access to, and skills for, economic
opportunities. The Human Dimension is also connected to the
Infrastructure indicator, as wellbeing can be improved with in-
creased access to different types of infrastructure. The Science
and Education indicator is connected to both the Human Di-
mension and the Economy indicators through the need for re-
search in these areas. The Science and Education indicator is also
connected to the Economy indicator through skills training.

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Sweden Sweden’s Strategy does not provide much detail on which gov-
ernment ministries have responsibilities in areas covered by the
To date, the Swedish government has produced one Arctic strategy. The Strategy mentions that the “Barents region’s trade
strategy, Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, in May 2011. and industry ministers” (2011a, 32) are involved in business de-
However, in a recent speech the Swedish Minister of Foreign velopment, while other government agencies such as the Swed-
Affairs remarked that “during the year, Sweden will renew its ish Polar Research Secretariat and the Swedish Marine Admin-
Arctic Strategy” (Wallström 2019), indicating that a new strate- istration also have regional involvement (2011a, 29, 36). Both
gy is not far off. Additionally, in 2016, Sweden released a mem- the environmental ministers and the foreign affairs ministers
orandum entitled the New Swedish Environmental Policy for the from the Arctic countries are also mentioned in the appendices,
Arctic (Sweden MEA 2016), further demonstrating the state’s which provides further information on various regional gover-
continued interest in the region. That said, as the Environmental nance structures.
Policy is about the environment, it is not a national strategy for
the region and thus only the 2011 Arctic Strategy is considered Figure 12 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
in the following analysis. signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
The Swedish government provides a clear statement about the ber) in the document.
purpose of the Strategy: “the purpose of the Government’s Strat-
egy for the Arctic Region is to present Sweden’s relationship
with the Arctic, together with the current priorities and future
outlook for Sweden’s Arctic policy, proceeding from an inter-
national perspective” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 4). Moreover, the
release of Sweden’s strategy aligns with its first Chairmanship of
the Arctic Council from 2011 to 2013, and this has influenced
the strategic priorities. The document emphasizes: “Ever since
the Arctic Council was founded in 1996, there has been strong
consensus on the view that economic, environmental and social
development must be seen as a single concept to create long-
term sustainable development in the region. Continued Swed-
ish research and education initiatives are essential if progress is
to be made. The priorities below are to be seen in this context:
• Climate and the environment • Economic development • The
human dimension” (2011a, 23). Figure 12. Sweden’s 2011 Strategy
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
The following discussion about the indicators will show and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
whether the priorities stated by the government are reflected
in the document, or not. The following analysis on the written content of these codes will
give a better understanding of how the Strategy addresses these
Comparison by Indicator themes and issues.

The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator ad- The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 13 % of the total
dresses how the Arctic is defined within the context of the strat- coded quotes (see Figure 12) and comments on the remoteness
egy. In particular, it states that “there is no uniform definition of of the region: “most of the Arctic is characterised by widely scat-
what “the Arctic” actually is. The region is made up of an ocean tered, small population centres” (2011a, 43). The document also
(the Arctic Ocean) surrounded by sovereign states” (2011a, 11). that the Arctic is the homeland to Indigenous peoples, and that
Not only is there no one definition of the Arctic, but there are “the geographical area inhabited by the Sámi from time imme-
also multiple ways to describe the region within the Strategy as, morial is usually referred to as Sápmi or Sameland and stretches
for example, “the region concerned is sometimes referred to as over the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and
the Arctic region, sometimes as the Arctic and sometimes as the Russia” (2011a, 17).
Arctic area” (2011a, 4). Additionally, there are regional varia-
tions in the circumpolar Arctic as, for example, “in describing Based on the troubled history between the Sami and the state,
the Nordic countries’ part of the Arctic (including in the context the Strategy recognizes that “from the seventeenth century on-
of regional cooperation with Russia), the term High North is wards, more and more land was colonised as part of an active
sometimes used as well” (2011a, 4). The Strategy also refers to colonist policy, which gradually led to growing conflicts be-
the region as the “North” in a few instances (2011a, 40). Ref- tween colonists, forest farmers and the Sámi industries” (2011a,
erence is made, too, to the “unique Arctic environment” and 12). This acknowledgement, perhaps, is suggestive of the gov-
one of the “world’s most vulnerable areas” (2011a, 25, 27). Addi- ernment taking a more inclusive approach to addressing Indig-
tionally, it is mentioned that “widely scattered, small population enous, and particularly Sami issues.
centres” (2011a, 43) characterize the region.

92
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

One of the issues the Strategy recognizes in relation to Indig- gional cooperation. Sweden emphasizes in the document that
enous peoples are the negative effects of climate change and “the distances from traditional centres of power also provide
pollution on Indigenous communities. The Strategy states that greater scope for self-determination in everyday life, a form of
“climate change means that many traditional customs and liveli- practical Arctic empowerment” (2011a, 43). The Strategy also
hoods will be more difficult to maintain” (2011a, 41). Therefore, mentions the importance of the Sámi Parliamentary Council
as part of the Strategy, “Sweden will work for the conservation (SPC). The SPC was created from the “three Sámi Parliaments
and sustainable use of biodiversity in the Arctic, taking Indige- and the Russian Sámi as observers” and “The overarching aim
nous Arctic peoples into consideration” (2011a, 24). is to strengthen borderless cooperation between Sámi and
speak for them as one voice internationally” (2011a, 22). The
The relationship between Indigenous peoples and the econo- Strategy further explains that “a special form of cooperation
my is also addressed. In particular, there is mention that “the between Sweden, Norway and Finland, in which the Sámi Par-
tourism sector should be developed, albeit with consideration liament has a natural place. The ongoing negotiations on a Nor-
for the environment and the traditional lifestyles of Indigenous dic Sámi Convention are one of the most important current is-
peoples” (2011a, 6). At the same time, the document recogniz- sues with regard to this cooperation.” Additionally, “Within the
es the various economic activities of Indigenous peoples. For framework of the gender equality measures, the Sámi Parlia-
example, the document states that “for many reindeer-herding ment has also begun an exchange of experience with Finland,
Sámi, reindeer husbandry constitutes an important part of a Norway and Russia on gender equality, men’s violence against
“mixed economy” based on reindeer husbandry, hunting and women, sexual harassment and abuse.” Sweden is also “taking
fishing and a number of other secondary industries” (2011a, 38). a clear stance in favour of socially and culturally sustainable
development for Arctic Indigenous peoples with technological
Preserving and protecting Indigenous language and culture is development to ensure ethically and biologically sustainable
also important. The document recognizes the challenges of pre- resource use” (2011a, 6, 22, 45).
serving Saami culture and language, especially with the “migra-
tion of younger people away from traditional settlement areas According to the Swedish strategy the rapidly changing climate
in order to acquire an education or work elsewhere” (2011a, “requires greater political cooperation across territorial borders
46). To counter this, “Sweden will promote the preservation of to develop methods for managing species affected by hunting
the Sámi language and other Arctic Indigenous languages and and fishing”. Furthermore that “Ecosystem-based management
present Swedish experiences of revitalisation work,” as well as of marine resources based on the principle of conservation
recognizing the importance of “ratifying the UNESCO15 Con- and sustainable use and with special protection for threatened
vention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage” areas, species and stocks would be a way forward”. Therefore,
(2011a, 41, 45). “Sweden will work for international management plans to be
drawn up for species affected by hunting and fishing and by a
The Strategy also addresses different issues of rights and equal- changed climate… [and] contribute to ecosystem–based ma-
ity. For instance, gender is discussed, as “Sweden will work to rine management/spatial planning” (2011a, 24, 28).
bring the human dimension and the gender perspective to the
fore in Arctic-related cooperation bodies” (2011a, 6) and also The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
within domestic politics. “Between 2008 and 2010, the Swed- dicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded quotes (see Figure
ish Government has targeted special measures at increasing 12, p. 92) and focuses on Sweden’s commitment that “activities
the participation of Sámi women in political processes and and cooperation projects in the Arctic will be in accordance
the Sámi Parliament has been working actively on the issue” with international law, including UN conventions and other in-
(2011a, 45). The Strategy also acknowledges formal agreements ternational treaties” (2011a, 5, 18). Sweden promises to “bring
and treaties that affect rights. For instance, it identifies UN- the human dimension and the gender perspective to the fore in
DRIP and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as well Arctic-related cooperation bodies” (2011a, 6). It also emphasizes
as work on the Nordic Sámi Convention (2011a, 20, 22). that “despite significant challenges, Arctic cooperation is charac-
terised by a low level of conflict and broad consensus,” and at the
Sweden also identifies key elements of health and wellbeing. same time, declares that it will “ensure that the Arctic remains an
In particular, the Strategy states that “the basic prerequisites area of low political tension” (2011a, 18, 19). The Strategy further
for the people living in the Arctic are: a long-term optimism; clearly emphasizes that “efficient, multilateral cooperation on the
opportunities for them to earn a livelihood; good communi- Arctic is a main priority for Sweden” (2011a, 19).
cations and social care” (2011a, 30). As this, however, fails to
account for the some of the causes of illness, the Strategy ex- Sweden also declares that it “will highlight the importance of re-
plains that “measures will be needed to counteract the negative specting international law when extracting the energy resources
health and social impacts of climate change, pollutants and the of the Arctic.” Moreover, Sweden aims “to be a driving-force in
expected increase in the exploitation of Arctic natural resourc- international cooperation in order to protect the unique Arctic
es” (2011a, 6). environment and minimise the negative effects and risks of an
anticipated increase in extraction.” In this context, “the scope
The Governance indicator accounts for 13 % of the total coded for developing green and climate-neutral energy supply needs to
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and captures the importance of re- be taken into consideration” (2011a, 30, 37). The Strategy high-

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

lights the importance of “international research cooperation in On the global scale, Sweden respects the UNCLOS Convention,
areas of relevance for the Arctic, such as mineral research, envi- stating that “the Arctic coastal states, like coastal states in gen-
ronmental technology and sustainable natural resource use,” as eral, have rights to certain sea areas as defined in the UNCLOS
well as identifying that “cooperation among small and slightly Convention – both as regards the ocean and the seabed” and
larger institutions across national borders in the North is an ef- “the International Seabed Authority is responsible for the ad-
fective way of ensuring good resource use and increasing the ministration of extraction from the seabed outside the jurisdic-
quality of education and research” (2011a, 40). tion of the coastal states.” Sweden takes an active part in “the
UN and its various bodies [which] provide important arenas
Sweden recognizes that “the main multilateral arena for Arc- for promoting the Arctic region” (2011a, 11, 20). Additionally,
tic-specific issues is the Arctic Council” and aims to “strengthen Sweden recognizes the importance of the IMO and its efforts
the Arctic Council in its role as the central multilateral forum at “limiting emissions of greenhouse gases from ships,” as well
for Arctic-related issues.” As stated in the Strategy, “the Coun- as the importance of having the IMO’s Polar Code into force
cil should be more active in developing common policies and (2011a, 20, 30).
practical projects for the benefit of the region.” This would be
particularly so if its “mandate were broadened to include other In the Strategy, several international agreements, which directly
important strategic issues such as joint security, infrastructure affect the Arctic, are mentioned, such as the Commission on the
and social and economic development.” Sweden believes there- Limits of the Continental Shelf, the Universal Declaration on
fore the Arctic Council could be further energized “to strength- Human Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on
en [it] both institutionally and politically” (2011a, 4, 18, 19). Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention
Sweden further commits to “highlight the human dimension in on Biodiversity (CBD) and the United Nations Declaration on
the Arctic Council as a result of, among other things, its work the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Among UN bodies involved
on the Nordic Sámi Convention” and will consult with Sámi in the Arctic, the United Nations Development Programme
Parliament representatives prior to important Arctic Council (UNDP) and United Nations Environmental Programme
meetings (2011a, 41). (UNEP) are also among UN bodies involved in the Arctic, as are
the World Health Organization’s European Region (WHO Eu-
Sweden supports the EU’s ambition to become an observer to rope) and Region of the Americas (WHO PAHO) (2011a, 20).
the Arctic Council, while promising to “actively contribute to
the ongoing development of an EU policy on Arctic issues.” The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 8 % of
Moreover, “Sweden wishes to promote the EU as a relevant co- the total coded quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92). It notes that the
operation partner in the High North within relevant policy ar- Arctic environment is “unique,” and “sensitive,” and also calls
eas” (2011a, 5, 18, 19, 20). Sweden further emphasizes strength- the Arctic “one of the world’s most vulnerable areas” (2011a, 25,
ening “cooperation with the Barents Euro-Arctic Council on 27, 28, 38). Not surprisingly, therefore, “it is in Sweden’s inter-
measures to combat what are known as hotspots” (2011a, 27). est that new emerging activities are governed by common and
“In the Nordic Council of Ministers, Sweden will work to sharp- robust regulatory frameworks and above all that they focus on
en the focus of Arctic–related project activities that have a clear environmental sustainability” (2011a, 4). Thus, attention needs
supplementary value for the Arctic Council” and the Barents to be paid to “short-lived climate forcers” and pollution (2011a,
Euro-Arctic Council (2011a, 5, 18, 20). 5, 26, 27). To this end, the government recognizes that econom-
ic activities contribute to environmental problems and seeks to
In the Council of Ministers Sweden is working “to promote find a balance between the economy and the environment. For
the free movement of people, goods, services and capital”. For example, the Strategy states that “increased resource extraction
instance, “Cooperation in the Northern Dimension’s new part- in the Arctic involves considerable risks, however and especial-
nership for culture provides scope for helping to strengthen ly sensitive areas must be protected from exploitation” (2011a,
creative and cultural industries in the region” (2011a, 32, 39). 31). What is more, “Sweden will work to prevent and limit the
Additionally, “‘The Nordic Council for Reindeer Husbandry negative environmental impact potentially caused by the open-
Research,’ which is under the auspices of the Nordic Council ing–up of new shipping routes and sea areas in the Arctic”
of Ministers, is a good starting-point for continuing to develop (2011a, 24). The use of marine resources will also follow an eco-
cooperation even in an Arctic perspective” (2011a, 47). system-based management structure, and it is in the interest of
the government to monitor the Arctic environment (see: 2011a,
Furthermore, reference is made to the Ilulissat Declaration of 28 6, 28, 36).
May 2008, when “the five coastal states also agreed to solve out-
standing issues in accordance with current international law” Protecting flora and fauna, and maintaining biodiversity is
(2011a, 14). Sweden also underlines the importance of coopera- mentioned, even highlighted. The document states that “to
tion with “Russian regions within the framework of the EU Ko- strengthen the capacity for adaptation and resilience, networks
larctic ENPI CBC financing instrument”. Additionally, “Regions of protected areas that are important for flora and fauna should
in northern Scandinavia can also cooperate with Iceland and be created in the Barents region and elsewhere” (2011a, 28).
Greenland within the framework of the Northern Periphery There is also concern about non-native species entering the re-
Programme” (2011a, 31). gion and that “species composition is changing as a result of
southern species starting to outcompete high-arctic species”

94
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

and that “there is also a risk of negative environmental impact The Climate Change indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
from shipping as a result … the spread of non-native organ- ed quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92). Both positive and negative con-
isms” (2011a, 28, 35). To address this these concerns, “Sweden sequences are identified. Positive developments tend to be eco-
will contribute to the preservation and sustainable use of biodi- nomic as “new conditions are emerging for shipping, hunting,
versity in the Arctic” (2011a, 5). As well as, “the Arctic Council fishing, trade and energy extraction.” This is especially so for
should also contribute to continued global biodiversity-related shipping in the Northwest and Northeast Passages (2011a, 4, 7).
efforts” as well as the United Nations Convention on Biodiver-
sity (2011a, 22, 28). Most of the consequences, however, are problematic. In environ-
mental terms, climate change is “causing the world’s glaciers and
The Pollution indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded sea-ice to melt at an accelerated pace” and it has “changed ocean
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and identifies a broad range of pol- currents and [caused] more frequent extreme weather events”
lutants affecting the Arctic, including: (2011a, 16, 43). Indeed, “this rapid rise in temperature increases
• “emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases, the likelihood of dramatic effects on Arctic ecosystems and can
including carbon dioxide” reduce their resilience” (2011a, 25). There are social impacts, for
• “short-lived climate forcers such as soot, tropospheric example, “security may well become more of a question of pub-
ozone and methane” lic crisis management in extreme weather situations.” There is
• “persistent bioaccumulative organic pollutants” also “a greater risk of contaminated drinking water caused by
• “non-accident-related discharges of oil and chemicals, changes in the permafrost that affect water sources” (2011a, 14,
air pollution, waste and the spread of non-native 44). Additionally, the Strategy explains that climate change neg-
organisms” from ships atively affects traditional and Indigenous ways of life (2011a, 7).
• “organic pollutants, such as polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB) and other dioxins and certain heavy metals To address climate change, the government identifies some mit-
(mainly mercury)” and igation and adaptation strategies. For example, “in cooperation
• POPs (2011a, 5, 24, 26, 35, 44). with other Arctic countries, Sweden will contribute to propos-
als for knowledge–building and action to strengthen the capac-
The Strategy recognizes that “despite there being few local sourc- ity for adaptation to and recovery from the effects of climate
es of emissions in the Arctic, the spread of pollutants in and via change” (2011a, 24). Indeed, “adaptation to a changed climate
the Arctic is a major problem ... Most pollutants are transport- requires good knowledge about the effects not only on biolog-
ed there via air or water currents” (2011a, 27). These sources ical and technical systems but also on communities and hu-
of pollution include “carbon emissions from steelmaking,” the mans” (2011a, 28), emphasizing the importance of the scientific
shipping industry which “is responsible for 870 million tonnes community. The Strategy states that “Sweden will continue to be
of greenhouse gas emissions, or 2.7 percent of global emissions” a leading nation as regards climate and environmental research,
and “significant emissions of pollutants, both into the air and focusing also on the impact of climate change on humans.” As
water, occur in a large number of industrial areas in the Russian climate action requires broader frameworks, “Sweden will work
Arctic” (2011a, 29, 34–35, 44). to ensure that climate change in the Arctic and its global impact
is highlighted in international climate negotiations” (2011a, 24).
According to the Strategy, to combat pollution, “Sweden needs The Strategy acknowledges the UNFCCC and the Intergovern-
to actively pursue issues relating to reduced emissions and the mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2011a, 24, 26).
spread of oil, chemicals, waste, non-native organisms and oth-
er air pollutants” (2011a, 27). At a policy and political level, The Security indicator accounts for 4 % of the total coded quotes
this includes “making active efforts within the framework of (see Figure 12, p. 92); it emphasizes that “Sweden’s security pol-
the Stockholm Convention and the UN Convention on Long– icy position based on “security in cooperation” means that the
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)” and “[contrib- security policies of the EU Member States and Nordic countries
uting] to the international efforts in the IMO aimed at limiting will strongly influence Swedish security policy” (2011a, 14). The
emissions of greenhouse gases from ships.” This includes ad- Strategy further indicates that “the overall security policy climate
vancing the Polar Code (2011a, 30), and working with Arctic in the Arctic is very much dependent on the relationship between
neighbors to reduce “the risk of emissions of compounds that Russia and the United States” (2011a, 14). As well, “Dialogue,
could pose hazard to man and environment” (2011a, 44). Addi- transparency, confidence-building measures and cooperation in
tionally, “nuclear safety issues may also come to the fore from an line with international law form the starting-point for Sweden’s
environmental and security perspective” (2011a, 37). There is approach to security concerning the Arctic” (2011a, 19).
room for the private sector and researchers to contribute to pol-
lution reduction. For example, “Sweden and Norway, together In bilateral and multilateral contexts, Sweden wishes “the Arctic
with 48 businesses and organisations in the mining, steel, ener- remains a region where security policy tensions are low” (2011a,
gy and engineering industries as well as research institutes and 4) emphasizing “an approach based on security in its broadest
universities, take part in the priority research programme UL- sense and that the use of civil instruments is preferable to mil-
COS (Ultra-Low Carbon Dioxide Steelmaking) with the aim of itary means” (2011a, 19). The Nordic Declaration of Solidarity,
halving carbon emissions from steelmaking” (2011a, 29). adopted in 2009, has led to “Sweden’s security policy becoming
even more closely interwoven with the political priorities of the

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

other Nordic countries” (2011a, 15). In this context, the Strate- nomic activities that would be expected in the region. These in-
gy recognizes the influence of Arctic developments on Swedish clude natural resource extraction (addressed in more detail be-
security, while at the same time the Strategy points out that “the low) such as “hunting, fishing and reindeer herding… in Arctic
current security policy challenges in the Arctic are not of a mil- Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia” as well as tourism (2011a,
itary nature” and that “The Arctic is an area of low political ten- 15). There were also some unique industries such as “marine
sion in which the changed climate presents new opportunities bioprospecting after unique genes” and “ice-breaking, sea trans-
and challenges” (2011a, 19, 23). The Swedish Strategy, however, port and consultancy based on knowledge of business activities
mentions that as a “result of climate change, security may well in the Arctic climate.” Additionally, “the Swedish space industry
become more of a question of public crisis management in ex- has its base in the extreme north of Sweden” and that “Sweden is
treme weather situations; adaptation to changed climatic condi- currently a world-leading supplier of vehicle-tests in the Arctic
tions in order to protect human life, health and the economy” environment” (2011a, 15, 33, 37, 40).
(2011a, 14) are needed.
Sweden participates in the “ore and mineral extraction” indus-
Sweden proposes that “the Council could however be further try. This is important because “extraction is currently high on
energised if its mandate were broadened to include other im- the global economic agenda, which has led to significant lev-
portant strategic issues such as joint security” (2011a, 19). The els of investment in the Swedish mining industry” (2011a, 15).
Strategy also briefly mentions energy security, when pointing Sweden has interests in other natural resources like wood. “To-
out the “large volumes of fuel produced in the Arctic may there- gether with fish, the forest is the Arctic’s most important renew-
fore affect European security of supply and prices on several able source of raw materials” and “Sweden has a world-leading
markets” (2011a, 37). pulp, paper and wood engineering industry, which also utilises
forest materials from the Arctic region” (2011a, 15).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 4 % of the total coded
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92); it primarily identifies maritime safe- Trade is another important economic activity. “Sweden’s growth
ty issues associated with increased traffic. The Strategy states that and competitiveness stand to benefit from increased free trade
“increased shipping also brings issues related to safety require- and active efforts to counter technical barriers to trade in the
ments for sea transport to the fore. Poor safety routines or vessel Arctic region” (2011a, 6). To facilitate the movement of goods,
construction can have devastating consequences for seafarers, “the Nordic countries cooperate closely on trade issues within
marine flora and fauna and those who depend on the sea for their the EU/EEA and in the Nordic Council of Ministers, and Sweden
livelihoods” (2011a, 35). Issues around “sea and air rescue,” the is working in the Council of Ministers to promote the free move-
need for “more stringent safety requirements,” and surveillance ment of people, goods, services and capital” (2011a, 31–32).
(2011a, 6, 34, 35) are thus addressed. Indeed, prevention is a key
aspect of Sweden’s maritime safety agenda (2011a, 35). Sweden is not greatly involved in the Energy sector. The Strategy
states that “in contrast to the five coastal states, Sweden has no
The Strategy discusses two approaches to addressing these direct national energy interest in the Arctic and does not take
concerns. First, through the IMO and the Polar Code, “an as- part in energy policy cooperation initiatives in the area” (2011a,
sessment will be made of whether the existing international 37). Sweden does, however, have access to energy products—“in-
environmental regulatory frameworks offer a sufficient level creased trade and cooperation in energy – and rawmaterial-re-
of protection or whether further measures are needed” (2011a, lated sectors have been given high priority in Sweden and would
35). Second, the Arctic Council also plays a safety role: “the Co- help to achieve economic, energy and environmentally related
operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in objectives” (2011a, 32).
the Arctic agreement negotiated between the members of the
Arctic Council will enable more flexible use of existing resourc- Sustainable development is important to regional economic ac-
es and make it possible to find cost-effective solutions” (2011a, tivities. The Strategy recognizes that “in order not to undermine
36). Importantly, Sweden does not call for the integration of the the social or natural environment for people living in the region,
different national safety systems, but rather seeks “to continue its economic developments must be sustainable in the long term”
development of regional cross–border cooperation in the field (2011a, 30). For example, “Sweden is … striving for environmen-
of sea and air rescue and to tighten the safety requirements for tally sustainable use of the forest in the Arctic… the Sámi villages
sea transport in several sectors” (2011a, 30). The Strategy also affected [by forestry activities] will be consulted prior to forest
states that “better surveillance of shipping traffic, preventive being harvested in year-round reindeer-grazing grounds inside
measures and improved regional cross-border cooperation on the Arctic area” (2011a, 32–33). The Strategy also states that “it
air and sea rescue are all important components” of Sweden’s is in Sweden’s interest that new emerging activities are governed
Strategy (Sweden. GOS 2011, 36). That said, capabilities could by common and robust regulatory frameworks and above all that
be improved as “the Arctic is sparsely populated and there are they focus on environmental sustainability” (2011a, 4).
currently no widespread mechanisms in place for rescuing peo-
ple in distress at sea” (2011a, 35). The government prioritizes economic activity in a few different
ways. It first recognizes that “green growth can lay the founda-
The Economy indicator accounts for 13 % of the total coded tion for new jobs where the business sector can play a central role
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and reveals a wide range of eco- in the development of innovative solutions” (2011a, 31). Second,

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

“Sweden needs the right skills in order to utilise the potential development. For example, the Strategy states that “raw material
released by a developed Arctic region” and that “the recruitment extraction in the Arctic also generates the need for long-term
requirement for the mining and mineral industries will be con- sustainable land transport” (2011a, 33). Additionally, “the in-
siderable in the forthcoming five-year period” (2011a, 40). To creasing demand can also be expected to intensify calls for in-
this end, Luleå University of Technology offers Master’s level ed- vestment in infrastructure, such as new or upgraded harbours,
ucation in natural resources (2011a, 40). railways, roads and airports” (2011a, 33-34). Shipping is empha-
sized, especially as “the most energy – and cost-effective way
There are a variety of actors at different scales that help with Swe- of transporting goods” (2011a, 34). Shipping could increase, as
den’s Arctic economic activities. Internationally, Swedish Trade melting ice could open transit routes through the Northeast and
Council offices “should be instructed to build up skills to pro- Northwest Passage (Sweden. GOS 2011a, 7). There is recognition
mote Swedish commercial interests in the Arctic” (2011a, 6). At that “increased shipping also brings issues related to safety re-
a regional level “Sweden is cooperating on this with the countries quirements for sea transport to the fore” (2011a, 35). In addition
in the Barents region in for example the Baltic Sea Region Ener- to supporting commercial activities, “Swedish ice-breakers may
gy Cooperation (BASREC) and the Nordic Council of Ministers” be able to support increasing commercial shipping in the Arctic
(2011a, 32). Locally, “the involvement of Swedish businesses in as well as help with both the monitoring of the vulnerable ma-
local communities and their willingness to adhere to the prin- rine environment and Arctic research” (2011a, 36).
ciples of human rights, labour law, social responsibility, sound
environmental and sustainability efforts and anti-corruption will Telecommunications and ICT are also an important component
give them a competitive edge in future business deals and invest- of icebreaking. To this end, “the development of technology
ments in the Arctic” (2011a, 31). and communications that facilitate ice-breaking operations are
important from a Swedish perspective” (2011a, 36). Improved
The Tourism indicator accounts for 3 % of the total coded quotes digital infrastructure can also help in other areas like, for exam-
(see Figure 12, p. 92) and briefly summarizes the Swedish ap- ple, better “access to cost-effective and leading IT and telecom
proach towards this specific industry, which has growth poten- technology ... can present opportunities for Swedish businesses
tial in the Arctic. Sweden recognizes that “many visitors choose in this field” (2011a, 38–39).
the Arctic because of its clean air, water, mountains, forest and si-
lence – things that are in short supply in many other parts of the Improved energy infrastructure is also mentioned, with the
world.” Furthermore, “the tourism sector, including hunting and Strategy explaining that “energy efficiency is one area where
fishing, has considerable potential for creating jobs and boosting there is considerable need in some of the Arctic states and
economic growth” (2011a, 15, 38). At the same time, the Strategy within which Sweden has substantial expertise and a strong
emphasizes that “the tourism sector should be developed in a industry” (2011a, 32). Potential options include “hydro- and
sustainable manner and communications between tourist des- wind-power, solar and bioenergy and technology for improving
tinations should be improved”, although this means with “con- energy efficiency and reducing carbon emissions” (2011a, 37).
sideration for the environment and the traditional lifestyles of The Science and Education indicator accounts for 13 % of the
Indigenous peoples” (2011a, 6, 30, 38). Sweden also “welcomes total coded quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and identifies climate
the development of Arctic cooperation aimed at strengthening change and the environment as key drivers of science and re-
the conditions for tourism in the Arctic area” since “accessibility search. Notably, the Strategy states that “Sweden will continue
is a key success factor in the development of the Arctic as a tour- to be a leading nation as regards climate and environmental
ist destination” (2011a, 6, 38). research, focusing also on the impact of climate change on
humans” and that “Sweden should work to support Arctic re-
Besides highlighting the opportunities for development of the search and to monitor the vulnerable marine environment”
sector, the Strategy also notes the potential problematic areas - (2011a, 24, 30). In addition to the climate and environment, re-
the “increased seaborne tourism in Arctic waters heightens the search serves other purposes. For example, Sweden’s long his-
risk of accidents affecting both the environment and humans” tory of Arctic research can be used to ensure Sweden’s place as
and “poor infrastructure makes it very difficult to deal with an Arctic stakeholder (2011a, 12). Research also contributes to
emergency situations.” As well, “Better surveillance of shipping the functioning of the Arctic Council and “continued Swedish
traffic, preventive measures and improved regional cross-border research and education initiatives are essential if progress is to
cooperation on air and sea rescue are all important components” be made” (2011a, 23). Research “cooperation across national
of the Strategy (2011a, 35, 36). Finally, the Strategy also recog- borders in the North also helps to maintain good relations in
nizes the possible side effects of tourism, stating that “if we then the High North” (2011a, 40). Sweden is also interested in op-
add socioeconomic development, in terms of intensified forest- portunities in space; the Strategy states that “Sweden is striving
ry activities, expanded infrastructure and more tourism to the for cooperation in the Nordic region and the EU in order to
equation, the risk of conflicts of interest between reindeer herd- develop space technology to promote monitoring, exploration
ing and other land use becomes even greater” (2011a, 45). and communication in the Arctic” (2011a, 39).

The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod- To facilitate its research program(s), Sweden makes use of four
ed quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92). Transportation infrastructure different types of research infrastructure. First, icebreakers and
is discussed primarily in the context of economic and resource other vessels play a key role, with the Strategy boasting that

97
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

“few research vessels around the world can match the Swedish well as EU involvement in a strengthened infrastructure” (2011a,
ice-breaker Oden’s capacity in terms of combining the class of an 40). The Strategy recognizes the work of the University of the
Arctic ice-breaker with advanced research equipment for seabed Arctic which “focuses on postgraduate education, academic dis-
mapping and logistic platforms for climate studies” (2011a, 17). tance learning, Master’s programmes and the training of experts
Indeed, Oden and other “research vessels are an important part in a network comprising several institutes of higher education in
of the infrastructure and give researchers the same opportuni- the High North” (2011a, 40).
ties as onshore research stations” (2011a, 39). Second, with re-
gard to onshore research, “Northern Sweden is home to research As for Implementation, at the end of the sections on Internation-
stations in Abisko and Tarfala,” each of which serves different al Cooperation and Swedish Priorities, there are blue text boxes
purposes. “The Abisko Scientific Research Station administrates, with what appears to be a list of items the Swedish government
coordinates and performs experiments and tests for researchers will undertake in support of the Strategy. However, the text box-
from all over the world,” while “the Tarfala Research Station, es do not have headings that make clear these are actually items
located in the Kebnekaise mountains, conducts basic research, to be implemented. The document itself ends following the sec-
glacier monitoring, meteorological and hydrological analyses, tion on the Human Dimension, without a conclusion. There is
snow chemistry and permafrost studies” (2011a, 29). Third, are no discussion about time frames for following through on goals,
universities (2011a, 40), and fourth, Sweden draws on differ- nor are there any budget or plans for follow-up or evaluation.
ent research networks and opportunities for collaboration. The
Strategy recognizes the importance of informal cooperation and To sum up
“Sweden should encourage international research cooperation
in areas of relevance for the Arctic, such as mineral research, Figure 12 at the beginning of this chapter shows the percentage
environmental technology and sustainable natural resource of quotes within the document towards the different indicators.
use” (2011a, 40). More formal networks are also important be- It shows that the most-coded indicators are the Human Dimen-
cause “important knowledge is fostered within the framework sion, Governance, Economy, and Science and Education, all with
of forums such as the International Arctic Science Committee the same amount of quotes, followed by International Coopera-
(IASC) and the Arctic Council’s Sustaining Arctic Observing tion. The least-coded indicators were Tourism, Safety and SAR,
Networks (SAON),” and through the University of the Arctic and Security tied in second place, while Pollution was the third
(2011a, 26–27, 40). least-coded indicator.

There is much discussion about the importance of knowledge Unlike the other Arctic states, Sweden has produced only one
throughout the Strategy. For example, according to the Strate- Strategy to date. As previously mentioned, based on the percent-
gy, more knowledge is needed regarding the effects of industry, age of quotes assigned to the different indicators (see Appendix),
ecosystems and biodiversity, and climate change; dissemination the Strategy reflects the state’s focus on climate/environment,
is also important (2011a, 8, 26, 27). The way knowledge is gener- economic, and the human dimension, as the priorities of the
ated is important, too, with the Strategy recognizing the need for Arctic policy (2011a, 23). The Human Dimension indicator ad-
interdisciplinary research. To illustrate this, the document pro- dresses the different relationships between Indigenous peoples
claims that in the context of climate change, “current research and the state, the economy, and changing climate. It also includes
cooperation and network-building need to move towards more discussion on language and culture protection, and how Sweden
integrated research in which natural scientists, social scientists is working to protect Indigenous rights. Considering the size of
and humanists cooperate to improve understanding of the many Sápmi territory in the European Arctic, as well as in Sweden, it is
multi-dimensional problems” (2011a, 28). The role of traditional not surprising that Indigenous peoples are prioritized.
knowledge is also addressed, with the Strategy stating, for exam-
ple, that “Sweden will strive to ensure that Indigenous peoples The Environmental Protection, Pollution, and Climate Change
have greater scope for preserving and developing their identity, indicators, when read together, show that a variety of pollutants
culture and traditional industries and [will] facilitate their tra- are entering the Arctic environment, some of which contribute
ditional knowledge gathering and transfer” (2011a, 41). Much to climate change, which then has consequences for the envi-
of the focus is on transferring knowledge to Indigenous peoples ronment and local biodiversity. The Strategy discusses different
(2011a, 46–47) rather than including traditional knowledge into problem-solving strategies to both address pollution and miti-
scientific knowledge production. Perhaps the focus on this one- gate climate change. As for the economy, there is a decent over-
way transfer is in part related to the statement that “much of the view of Sweden’s different economic activities, which include re-
traditional knowledge has been either entirely or partly forgot- source development, but also activities like reindeer herding and
ten” (2011a, 46). innovation development, to name a few. The Strategy states that
economic activities, including tourism, are to be performed in
Very little is mentioned in the Strategy about education, although a sustainable manner. The Tourism indicator complements the
it does call for improved access to higher education through ex- Economy indicator by providing more information on Sweden’s
change programs. For example, “Sweden should urge the EU to approach to tourism, including issues of sustainability, Indige-
invest in Arctic research and higher education. This may include nous rights, and safety.
an improved Arctic window in Erasmus Mundus, the Bologna
Process, an Arctic research and student exchange programme as

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

There also interesting findings from the indicators that fall out- United States of America
side of Sweden’s strategic priorities. When read together, the
Governance and International Cooperation indicators provide The first Arctic strategy for the United States (USA) was re-
a comprehensive overview of how Sweden operates in the Arc- leased in 2009 with the National Security Presidential Direc-
tic, both domestically and internationally. Indeed, as coopera- tive/NSPD—66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
tion helps keep the region stable, it is not surprising that Sweden HSPD—25, with 14 pages and no pictures or maps. It was fol-
cooperates in a broad range of areas. For example, there is co- lowed up with a more formal strategy, the National Strategy
operation between the state and the Saami people within Swe- for the Arctic Region, in 2013, with 11 pages and no pictures or
den. Internationally, there is cooperation in the areas of safety, maps. In addition to these two documents, the government re-
resource management (energy and animals), and in the area of leased the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the
research. Cooperation also takes place in different governance Arctic Region (USA TWH 2014) in 2014, and in 2015 the Exec-
organizations like the Arctic Council, BEAC, the NCM, differ- utive Order 13689— Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts
ent UN programs, the WHO, and through structures like the in the Arctic (USA TWH 2015) was released. More recently, the
Ilulissat Declaration and the UNCLOS. United States Coast Guard released their own Arctic Strategic
Outlook (USA United States Coast Guard 2019), and the De-
The Security and Safety & SAR indicators are also connected partment of Defense released the Department of Defense Arctic
and should be read together. Both are underpinned by the need Strategy (USA Department of Defense 2019). In this study the
for international cooperation to address regional concerns. presidential and homeland security directives (2009) and the
Sweden’s position is that security should not necessarily focus 2013 Strategy will be analyzed.
solely on military threats, but rather look at other, softer secu-
rity issues like safety. The Arctic Council could play a greater In the introduction to the 2013 Strategy, the government clearly
role, and has already begun to do so through the Cooperation states its priorities, seeking “an Arctic region that is stable and
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust
agreement. The IMO has already taken on regional maritime and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are
safety through the creation of the Polar Code, which was in de- developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile
velopment at the time the report was written. Safety, however, environment and the interests and cultures of Indigenous peo-
will be improved when the regional infrastructure is improved, ples” (USA TWH 2013, 4). The Strategy outlines “three lines of
according to the Strategy. effort” that will help the USA achieve its goals. These are to “1.
Advance United States Security Interests”; “2. Pursue Responsi-
The Infrastructure indicator shows a connection between in- ble Arctic Region Stewardship”; and “3. Strengthen Internation-
frastructure development, and economic development. Trans- al Cooperation” (2013, 2). The Strategy explains that, as things
portation infrastructure, shipping, icebreakers, and even ICT change in the region, “we will be guided by our central interests
developments can help fuel economic growth. Advances in ICT in the Arctic region, which include providing for the security
can help icebreakers function more efficiently, which also serves of the United States; protecting the free flow of resources and
environmental and research purposes. New energy infrastruc- commerce; protecting the environment; addressing the needs
ture development can help create green and renewable energy, of Indigenous communities; and enabling scientific research”
thus helping the environment. (2013, 4). In contrast, the 2009 directives do not make clear pri-
ority statements. Instead, the documents’ section headings can
The Science and Education indicator connects back to many of be used to indicate the policy priorities. They are “B. National
the other indicators. For instance, science is driven by climate Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic”; “C. In-
change and the environment; research can help inform gover- ternational Governance”; “D. Extended Continental Shelf and
nance structures like the Arctic Council; icebreakers are used to Boundary Issues”; “E. Promoting International Scientific Co-
facilitate research; and research cooperation is important to ad- operation”; “F. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region”;
dress shared issues. The Strategy also stresses that there is more “G. Economic Issues, Including Energy”; and “H. Environmen-
than one type of knowledge and that interdisciplinary and tradi- tal Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources” (USA
tional knowledge are also important. However, the focus seems TWH 2009, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12).
to be on transferring knowledge to Indigenous communities
rather than incorporating Indigenous knowledge into scientific Comparison by Indicator
settings. As for education, there is mention of exchange pro-
grams, which is a form of cooperation with other institutions. The quotes in the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic in-
dicator provides further insights into how the region is under-
stood by the USA. While the 2009 directives do not define the
region, the opening remarks of the 2013 Strategy seem to define
the American Arctic as the state of Alaska; it specifies that an
“Arctic state is defined as one of the eight nations making up
the permanent membership of the Arctic Council and includes
the following nations: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland
and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Swe-

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

den, and the United States” (2013, 4). Describing the region,
the 2013 Strategy considers the Arctic to be “one of our planet’s
last great frontiers” (2013, 1); both documents use phrases like
“unique” and “changing,” while also recognizing the value of the
region’s resources (2013, 1; 2009, 2, 12). Both documents also
call the region the “Arctic,” although the directives use the term
“circumpolar” when discussing “the establishment of an Arctic
circumpolar observing network” (2009, 8), presumably because
it includes all Arctic states.

Only the government ministries or departments responsible for

the Arctic are addressed in the directives as the directives were
sent to 24 different officials, including, but not limited to, the
Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, the Interior, Com-
Figure 13. Comparing the United States of America’s 2009 Directives and
merce, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Energy,
2013 Strategy
and Homeland Security (2009, 1).
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
The departments with responsibilities for the 2013 Strategy
are actually identified in the 2014 implementation report, and
can take on the role of either lead or supporting agency for the The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 5 % of the total
different tasks. Throughout the document these include the coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 4 % of the directives (see
Departments of Agriculture (supporting), Defense (lead and Figure 13) and addresses improving the state’s relationship with
supporting), Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Indigenous peoples through consultations. For example, the
Administration (lead and supporting), Energy (lead and sup- 2013 Strategy gives importance to “[engaging] in a consultation
porting), Health and Human Services (lead), Homeland Secu- process with Alaska Natives, recognizing tribal governments’
rity (lead and supporting), Homeland Security, United States unique legal relationship with the United States and providing
Coast Guard (lead and supporting), Interior (lead and support- for meaningful and timely opportunity to inform Federal policy
ing), Interior, United States Geological Survey (supporting), affecting Alaskan Native communities” (2013, 3; see also: 2009,
State (lead and supporting), Transportation (lead and support- 3). The two documents also recognize that changes to the en-
ing), Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (lead vironment can be harmful for Indigenous peoples. In this re-
and supporting), Transportation, Maritime Administration gard, the 2013 Strategy explains the USA “will endeavor to do
(supporting). Other agencies and departments are also men- no harm to the sensitive environment or to Alaska native com-
tioned, including the Environmental Protection Agency (lead munities and other Indigenous populations that rely on Arctic
and supporting), Member Departments and Agencies of the resources” while the 2009 directives identify climate change as a
Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force and the National Inva- problem and recognize that energy development can also harm
sive Species Council (supporting), Member Departments and the environment (2013, 4; 2009, 10, 11). The 2009 directives also
Agencies of the Committee on the Marine Transportation Sys- recognize that the Arctic Council “provides a beneficial venue
tem (supporting), Member Departments and Agencies of the for interaction with Indigenous groups” (2009, 5).
United States National Response Team (supporting), National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (supporting), National Culture is addressed only in the 2013 Strategy. The document
Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (supporting), National identifies the incorporation of “cultural values” into the deci-
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (lead), National Sci- sion-making process, accounting for “cultural sensitivities”
ence Foundation (lead and supporting), Office of Science and (2013, 8) in the context of resource and development. Addition-
Technology Policy (lead), Smithsonian Institute (lead and sup- ally, culture must also be considered in the context of national
porting), and the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (support- security (2013, 6). The Strategy does not provide a definition of
ing). Although there are 24 different government entities listed; what constitutes cultural values, except in relation to the energy
some only play supporting roles, and more importantly, some sector and the “cultures of Indigenous peoples” (2013, 4).
are more involved than others.
The 2009 directives briefly mention health and wellbeing, and
Figure 13 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as- connect wellbeing to climate change in two different ways.
signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total First, climate change is argued to negatively affect Indigenous
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num- peoples, with the directives commenting that “climate change
ber) in the document. and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of Arctic
inhabitants, particularly Indigenous communities” (2009, 10).

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Second, climate change and the economy are also connected to environmental, and cultural values” and that “across all lines of
wellbeing (2009, 11). effort, decisions need to be based on the most current science
and traditional knowledge” (2013, 3, 8). At the same time, deci-
In the Governance indicator, which accounts for 18 % of the sions should be made by “using the best available information
total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 27 % of the direc- by promptly sharing – nationally and internationally – the most
tives (see Figure 13, p. 100), the emphasis is placed on, among current understanding and forecasts based on up-to-date sci-
other things, the “effects of climate change and increasing hu- ence and traditional knowledge” (2013, 10). Thereofore, “Just as
man activity in the Arctic region” (2009, 2). “New or enhanced a common spirit and shared vision of peaceful partnership led
international arrangements for the Arctic to address issues [are] to the development of an international space station, we believe
likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that much can be achieved in the Arctic region through collabora-
region, including shipping, local development and subsistence, tive international efforts, coordinated investments, and pub-
exploitation of living marine resources, development of energy lic-private partnerships” (2013, 6).
and other resources, and tourism” (2009, 6).
Last but not least, the role of Indigenous peoples is reflected in
The 2009 directives highlight that “the United States promotes both documents. The 2009 directives state that “it is the policy
the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries of the United States to… involve the Arctic’s Indigenous com-
in support of collaborative research that advances fundamen- munities in decisions that affect them” (2009, 2, 3). The 2013
tal understanding of the Arctic region in general and potential Strategy further confirms that the “Arctic nations have varied
Arctic change in particular. This could include collaboration commercial, cultural, environmental, safety, and security con-
with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Po- cerns in the Arctic region. Nevertheless, [the] common interests
lar Consortium, as well as with individual nations” (2009, 7). make these nations ideal partners in the region” (2013, 9). The
The directives further state that “given the need for decisions to Strategy explains that “we seek new opportunities to advance
be based on sound scientific and socioeconomic information, our interests by proactive engagement with other Arctic na-
Arctic environmental research, monitoring, and vulnerability tions through bilateral and multilateral efforts using of a wide
assessments are top priorities” (2009, 12). array of existing multilateral mechanisms that have responsi-
bilities relating to the Arctic region” (2013, 9). As the US Policy
Furthermore, the 2009 directives state that the USA will “con- “emphasizes trust, respect, and shared responsibility... [and] ar-
sult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to explo- ticulates that tribal governments have a unique legal relation-
ration, production, environmental and socioeconomic impacts, ship with the United States and requires Federal departments
including drilling conduct, facility sharing, the sharing of en- and agencies to provide for meaningful and timely input by
vironmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring tribal officials in development of regulatory policies that have
programs, and reservoir management in areas with potentially tribal implications” (2013, 11). The USA needs to “engage in
shared resources” (2009, 11). In addition, the USA will “con- a consultation and coordination process with Alaska Natives,
tinue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations op- recognizing tribal governments’ unique legal relationship with
erating in the region to address shared concerns, recognizing the United States and providing for meaningful and timely op-
that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are located outside portunity to inform Federal policy affecting Alaskan Native
of United States jurisdiction.” Also, “in cooperation with other communities” (2013, 3).
nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other
environmental challenges” (2009, 12, 13). The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator accounts for 15 % of the total coded quotes in the 2013
The 2009 directives recognize that “sustainable development in Strategy and 7 % of the directives (see Figure 13, p. 100); this
the Arctic region poses particular challenges.” Therefore, “stake- highlights the importance of international cooperation, which
holder input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks is emphasized in both documents. The 2009 directives state that
to promote economic and energy security.” At the same time, “it is the policy of the United States to… strengthen institutions
the USA will “pursue marine ecosystem-based management in for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations” (2009, 2). The
the Arctic” (2009, 10, 14). The 2013 Strategy also underlines that 2013 Strategy further confirms that the USA aims to strengthen
“the law recognizes these rights, freedoms, and uses for com- the international cooperation in the Arctic, stating that “what
mercial and military vessels and aircraft. Within this frame- happens in one part of the Arctic region can have significant
work, we shall further develop Arctic waterways management implications for the interests of other Arctic states and the in-
regimes, including traffic separation schemes, vessel tracking, ternational community as a whole” (2013, 8). The 2013 Strategy
and ship routing, in collaboration with partners” (2009, 7). further recognizes that “the United States will rely on existing
international law, which provides a comprehensive set of rules
The 2013 Strategy highlights that the USA “will emphasize sci- governing the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s oceans
ence-informed decisionmaking and integration of economic, and airspace, including the Arctic” (2013, 10).

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

The 2013 Strategy states that “the Arctic region is peaceful, sta- is nevertheless open to updating the structure of the Council,
ble, and free of conflict. The United States and its Arctic allies including consolidation of, or making operational changes to,
and partners seek to sustain this spirit of trust, cooperation and its subsidiary bodies, to the extent such changes can clearly im-
collaboration, both internationally and domestically” (2013, 1). prove the Council’s work and are consistent with the general
The 2013 Strategy also highlights that “the United States is an mandate of the Council” (2009, 5).
Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arc-
tic Region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, The 2009 directives ask the US Senate to act favorably and
protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account promptly on the US accession to UNCLOS “to protect and
for Indigenous communities, support scientific research, and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Arctic.
strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues” Joining will serve the national security interests of the United
(2013, 2). States, including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces
worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive
The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of ex- marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they
isting fora, international organizations, and bilateral contacts contain” (2009, 5). “The most effective way to achieve interna-
which promote the United States’ interests in the Arctic. The tional recognition and legal certainty for our extended conti-
USA participates in a variety of them: for instance, the Arctic nental shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties
Council, the International Regulators Forum, the International to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea” (2009, 6). The
Standards Organization, the International Maritime Organi- need to join UNCLOS is emphasized again in the 2013 Strategy,
zation (IMO), the “United Nations (U.N.) and its specialized since the USA being the only non-UNCLOS party of the Arctic
agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N. Frame- states: “Only by joining the Convention can we maximize legal
work Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on In- certainty and best secure international recognition of our sov-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and ereign rights with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf
Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pol- in the Arctic and elsewhere, which may hold vast oil, gas, and
lution and its protocols” (2009, 5–6), the Montreal Protocol on other resources. Our extended continental shelf claim in the
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, wildlife conservation Arctic region could extend more than 600 nautical miles from
and management agreements, and many other mechanisms. the north coast of Alaska” (2013, 9). As well, “instances where
“As many nations across the world aspire to expand their role in the maritime zones of coastal nations overlap, Arctic states
the Arctic, we encourage Arctic and non-Arctic states to work have already begun the process of negotiating and concluding
collaboratively through appropriate fora to address the emerg- maritime boundary agreements, consistent with the Law of the
ing challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, while we Sea Convention and other relevant international law” (2013,
remain vigilant to protect the security interests of the United 9–10). The Strategy continues to explain that “the United States
States and our allies” (2013, 6; see also: 2009, 3, 5, 6). The USA supports peaceful management and resolution of disputes, in a
“will seek to strengthen partnerships through existing multi- manner free from coercion. While the United States is not cur-
lateral fora and legal frameworks dedicated to common Arctic rently a party to the Convention, we will continue to support
issues.” Furthermore, the Strategy states that the USA “will also and observe principles of established customary international
pursue new arrangements for cooperating on issues of mutual law reflected in the Convention” (2013, 10).
interest or concern and addressing unique and unprecedented
challenges, as appropriate” (2013, 8, 9). The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 9 % of
the total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % in the di-
The 2013 Strategy further explains in detail how “U.S. efforts rectives (see Figure 13, p. 100); it notes that these documents
to strengthen international cooperation and partnerships will comment on the “fragile” and “unique” nature of the Arctic,
be pursued through four objectives”: i) “pursue arrangements as mentioned in the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arc-
that promote shared Arctic State prosperity, protect the Arctic tic indicator. The 2013 Strategy also comments that there is a
Environment, and Enhance Security”; ii) “work through the “harshness of the Arctic climate” (2013, 10), while also stating
Arctic Council to advance U.S. interests in the Arctic Region”; that the environment is “sensitive” (2013, 4). This suggests a
iii) “accede to the Law of the Sea Convention”; iv) “cooperate need to protect the environment, and both documents make
with other interested parties” (including “non-Arctic states and clear statements that environmental protection is a priority for
numerous non-state actors [that] have expressed increased in- the USA. Indeed, the 2013 Strategy states that “protecting the
terest in the Arctic region) (2013, 9). unique and changing environment of the Arctic is a central
goal of U.S. policy” (2013, 7), while the 2009 directives state
Behind is that the outcomes of the Arctic Council have “pro- that “it is the policy of the United States to … Protect the Arctic
duced positive results for the United States by working within environment and conserve its biological resources” (2009, 2).
its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustain- Additionally, the 2013 Strategy identifies different areas of en-
able development” and “it is the position of the United States vironmental concern, such as “land ice and its role in changing
that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum de- sea level; sea-ice and its role in global climate, fostering biodi-
voted to issues within its current mandate and not be trans- versity, and supporting Arctic peoples; and, the warming per-
formed into a formal international organization, particularly mafrost and its effects on infrastructure and climate” (2013, 8).
one with assessed contributions.” However, “the United States

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

According to the U.S. documents, environmental protection region, contaminants currently locked in the ice and soils will
must be balanced with regional economic activities, while also be released into the air, water, and land” (2009, 13). Moreover,
ensuring that Indigenous peoples are not negatively affect- the document comments that “increased human activity within
ed (2013, 2, 4; 2009, 11). The Arctic environment needs to be and below the Arctic, will result in increased introduction of
properly managed; the 2009 directives explain that the USA contaminants into the Arctic” (2009, 13).
will “pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arc-
tic,” while the 2013 Strategy more generally states that it will Each document discusses different strategies for addressing pol-
“establish and institutionalize an integrated Arctic management lution. For example, according to the 2013 Strategy, “it is imper-
framework” (2013, 2; 2009, 14). ative that the United States proactively establish national pri-
orities and objectives for the Arctic region” in relation to black
Environmental protection can make use of protected areas, al- carbon (2013, 5). The document also explains that the Arctic
though none of the documents is explicit in terms of the in- Council’s Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
tent of the USA to use or create such areas. The 2013 Strategy, sponse Agreement will help with regional cooperation and that
for example, focuses on ‘preservation’ and not protection. The “together, Arctic nations can responsibly meet new demands –
document states that “the remote and complex operating con- including ... developing capabilities to prevent, contain, and re-
ditions in the Arctic environment make the region well-suited spond to oil spills and accidents – by increasing knowledge and
for collaborative efforts by nations seeking to explore emerg- integrating Arctic management” (2013, 7). In contrast, the 2009
ing opportunities while emphasizing ecological awareness and directives pay more attention to international treaties, such as
preservation” (2013, 9). The 2009 directives also skirt around the “Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution
the topic, speaking more generally to the “effective conserva- and its protocols” (2009, 5-6) and the role of the IMO in relation
tion and management” of “living marine resources” (2009, 13) to “oil and other hazardous material pollution response agree-
and recognizing American participation in the Convention on ments” (2009, 9).
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (2009, 5). The Climate Change indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 5 % of the 2009 directives
Biodiversity is also an important aspect of environmental pro- (see Figure 13, p. 100) with the consequences of climate change
tection, even if the term “biodiversity” is not used8 in all doc- being discussed in those documents. The 2013 Strategy explains
uments. For example, the 2013 Strategy states that “the United that “while the Arctic region has experienced warming and
States in the Arctic will assess and monitor the status of eco- cooling cycles over millennia, the current warming trend is un-
systems and the risks of climate change and other stressors to like anything previously recorded” (2013, 5). Both documents
prepare for and respond effectively to environmental challeng- draw attention to melting ice and thawing permafrost. “Sea ice
es” (2013, 8). Similarly, the 2009 directives seek to “continue to and glaciers are in retreat. Permafrost is thawing and coasts are
identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arc- eroding,” with consequences for Indigenous peoples (2009, 12;
tic species and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safe- see also: 2013, 5). At the same time, the documents also recog-
guard living marine resources, taking account of the changing nize that climate change can be of economic benefit—“the melt-
ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic” (2009, 13). ing of Arctic ice has the potential to transform global climate
Both quotes are suggestive of biodiversity protection. and ecosystems as well as global shipping, energy markets, and
other commercial interests” (2013, 11). Climate change can also
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 4 % of the total cod- improve energy security (see: 2013, 7).
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the directives (see Fig-
ure 13, p. 100), identifies sources of pollution found in the Arc- To a limited extent, the documents mention mitigation and
tic. For example, the 2013 Strategy identifies methane, mercury, adaptation with respect to climate change, although the 2013
oil spills, and “emissions of black carbon or other substances Strategy does not explicitly use these words. The 2009 direc-
from fossil fuel combustion” (2013, 5, 7). The 2009 directives tives, in contrast, mention adaptation once, explaining that
mention “persistent pollutants (e.g., persistent organic pollut- “the United States affirms the importance to Arctic commu-
ants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot)” (2009, nities of adapting to climate change, given their particular
13). The directives also recognize that “pollutants from within vulnerabilities” (2009, 10). A possible reason for so little dis-
and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region” (2009, 12). cussion in the documents about mitigation and adaptation
While there is some overlap in terms of the types of pollution may be due to no connection being made in the documents
identified, the two documents identify different sources of the between climate change and scientific research, and the failure
pollution. The 2013 Strategy suggests that poorly planned eco- to recognize climate change agreements and frameworks. The
nomic activities, or “uncoordinated development” is to blame. 2009 directives do, however, refer to the UNFCCC (2009, 5),
In contrast, the 2009 directives remark that pollution is a result but they do not discuss what climate cooperation within this
of climate change as “with temperature increases in the Arctic framework might entail.

8 The 2013 Strategy only uses the term ‘biodiversity’ once in a list of issues that the government wants to learn more about, rather than in relation to the protection
of biodiversity.

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

In the Security indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total cod- The USA strives to “encourage the peaceful resolution of dis-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 7 % of the directives (see Fig- putes in the Arctic region” (2009, 3). Furthermore, the 2013
ure 13, p. 100), the documents highlight the importance of na- Strategy confirms that the USA will “safeguard peace and sta-
tional security in the Arctic. The 2009 directives confirm that “it bility by working to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as
is the policy of the United States to… meet national security and an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners,
homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region” (2009, 2). and other interested parties” (2013, 10). This will require ac-
The 2013 Strategy states that the United States “will be guided tion by the United States and “the actions of other interested
by our central interests in the Arctic region, which include pro- countries, in supporting and preserving international legal
viding for the security of the United States” (2013, 4). As such, principles of freedom of navigation and overflight and other
“the United States has broad and fundamental national security uses of the sea related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful
interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes” (2013, 10).
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard
these interests. These interests include such matters as missile “Working through the International Maritime Organization
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems (IMO), the United States promotes strengthening existing
for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to im-
maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of naviga- prove the safety and security of maritime transportation, as
tion and overflight” (2009, 3). The United States is “establishing well as to protect the marine environment in the Arctic region”
an overarching national approach to advance national security (2009, 9). Furthermore, the United States “exercises authority
interests, pursue responsible stewardship of this precious and in accordance with lawful claims of United States sovereign-
unique region, and serve as a basis for cooperation with other ty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, in-
Arctic states and the international community as a whole to ad- cluding sovereignty within the territorial sea, sovereign rights
vance common interests” (2013, 4). The Strategy further empha- and jurisdiction within the United States exclusive econom-
sizes that “we acknowledge that the protection of our national ic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control
security interests in the Arctic region must be undertaken with in the United States contiguous zone” (2009, 3). In addition,
attention to environmental, cultural, and international consider- “the United States will support the enhancement of national
ations outlined throughout this strategy” (2013, 6). defense, law enforcement, navigation safety, marine environ-
ment response, and search-and-rescue capabilities” (2013, 6).
According to the 2013 Strategy, “U.S. security in the Arctic en-
compasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those The 2009 directives also address prevention of terrorism:
supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national “the United States also has fundamental homeland security
defense” and the USA seeks “an Arctic region that is stable and interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those
free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States
and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region” (2009, 2). The
developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile 2013 Strategy further addresses energy security: “the Arctic
environment and the interests and cultures of Indigenous peo- region’s energy resources factor into a core component of our
ples” (2013, 2, 4). “The United States will identify, develop, and national security strategy: energy security. The region holds
maintain the capacity and capabilities necessary to promote safe- sizable proved and potential oil and natural gas resources that
ty, security, and stability in the region through a combination of will likely continue to provide valuable supplies to meet U.S.
independent action, bilateral initiatives, and multilateral coop- energy needs” (2013, 7).
eration” (2013, 6).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
The 2009 directives explain that “the Arctic region is primarily ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 4 % of the 2009 directives
a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and authorities (see Figure 13, p. 100). The documents address different safe-
relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those ty concerns. The 2013 Strategy recognizes a number of safety
relating to law enforcement” (2009, 2). Furthermore, the 2013 issues, including “search and rescue, and pollution prevention
Strategy states that “in protecting these interests, we draw from and response,” which can be connected to “safe, secure, and reli-
our long-standing policy and approach to the global maritime able Arctic shipping” (2013, 1, 10). The Strategy also recognizes
spaces in the 20th century, including freedom of navigation the possibility of “natural or man-made disasters” (2013, 6) and
and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea there is a need for general situational awareness (see: 2013, 6,
and airspace related to these freedoms; security on the oceans; 7). The 2009 directives primarily focus on shipping safety and
maintaining strong relationships with allies and partners; and also includes SAR, environmental protection, and situational
peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion” (2013, 4). Ad- awareness through, for example, “short- and long-range aids to
ditionally, “freedom of the seas is a top national priority for the navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg
USA” (2009, 3) and “preserving the rights and duties relating warnings and other sea ice information, [and] effective shipping
to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our standards” (2009, 9). Situational awareness could also include,
ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including but is not limited to, “ship routing and reporting systems, such as
through strategic straits” (2009, 4). traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arc-
tic chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice Covered Waters; underwater The Economy indicator accounts for 8 % of the total coded
noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 12 % in the 2009 directives
insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution (see Figure 13, p. 100) which provides only a narrow under-
response agreements; and environmental standards” (2009, 9). standing of regional economic activities. The 2013 Strategy
Although the directives focus on shipping, they demonstrate mentions oil and gas, shipping, and briefly mentions trade
that shipping safety is a complex issue. (2013, 7). The 2009 directives mention natural resources and
“maritime commerce” (2009, 9, 2). Much of the focus in both
As for safety agreements, the 2013 Strategy recognizes the role documents is on oil and gas and natural resources.
of the Arctic Council in regional safety. For example, it notes
that “recent successes of the Council include its advancement The documents recognize the importance of the continental
of public safety and environmental protection issues, as evi- shelf for access to natural resources, although the 2009 direc-
denced by the 2011 Arctic Search-and-Rescue Agreement and tives also note that the USA must “consider the conservation
by the 2013 Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re- and management of natural resources during the process of
sponse Agreement” (2013, 9). While the 2009 directives were delimiting the extended continental shelf ” (2009, 7; 2013, 9).
written before these agreements were put in place, the docu- The 2013 Strategy, more generally, also acknowledges that re-
ments address similar issues at a national level. In particular, source conservation and environmental protection must take
they mention that the USA will, “commensurate with the level place (2013, 7). The documents explain that “within the con-
of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based capa- text of this broader energy security strategy, including our
bility to address hazards in the Arctic environment. Such ef- economic, environmental and climate policy objectives, we
forts shall advance work on pollution prevention and response are committed to working with stakeholders, industry, and
standards; determine basing and logistics support require- other Arctic states to explore the energy resource base, de-
ments, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; velop and implement best practices, and share experiences to
and improve plans and cooperative agreements for search and enable environmentally responsible production of oil and nat-
rescue” (2009, 10). ural gas as well as renewable energy” (2013, 7). Similarly, the
2009 directives explain that “the United States seeks to ensure
With regard to safety capabilities, the documents identify ar- that energy development throughout the Arctic occurs in an
eas for improvement. For the 2009 directives, the only men- environmentally sound manner, taking into account the inter-
tion is of improvements in the area of SAR being required ests of Indigenous and local communities, as well as open and
(2009, 10). In contrast, the 2013 Strategy recognizes two key transparent market principles” (2009, 11). Energy security is
areas where improvements can be made. First, the strategy ex- also a priority of the two documents. The 2013 Strategy re-
plains that “the United States will endeavor to appropriately marks that the USA will increase “efficiency and conservation
enhance sea, air, and space capabilities as Arctic conditions efforts to reduce our reliance on imported oil and strengthen
change, and to promote maritime-related information shar- our nation’s energy security” (2013, 7) while the 2009 direc-
ing with international, public, and private sector partners, to tives explain that the USA will “work with other Arctic na-
support implementation of activities such as the search-and- tions to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in
rescue agreement signed by Arctic states” (2013, 6). Second, the Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted
improvements also need to be made with respect to mapping. best practices and internationally recognized standards and
“Given the vast expanse of territory and water to be charted the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy Security Prin-
and mapped, we will need to prioritize and synchronize chart- ciples” (2009, 11). The 2009 directives also discuss other types
ing efforts to make more effective use of resources and attain of natural resources, such as fishing. The directives state that
faster progress. In so doing, we will make navigation safer and the government will “seek to develop ways to address changing
contribute to the identification of ecologically sensitive areas and expanding commercial fisheries in the Arctic, including
and reserves of natural resources” (2013, 8). The 2013 Strategy through consideration of international agreements or organi-
would thus appear to be more reflective of America’s capabili- zations to govern future Arctic fisheries” (2009, 13).
ties than the documents.
Sustainable development is raised in both documents, al-
Despite their shortcomings, the documents demonstrate that though often in passing. For instance, the 2013 Strategy ex-
safety and SAR is truly a multilevel governance issue. For ex- plains that “we will seek opportunities to pursue efficient and
ample, the 2009 directives recognize that “effective search and effective joint ventures, based on shared values that leverage
rescue in the Arctic will require local, State, Federal, tribal, each Arctic state’s strengths. This collaboration will assist in
commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational cooper- guiding investments and regional activities, addressing dy-
ation” (2009, 9). Similarly, the 2013 Strategy states that the namic trends, and promoting sustainable development in the
USA, “working cooperatively with the State of Alaska, local, Arctic region” (2013, 9). This is clearer than the 2009 direc-
and tribal authorities, as well as public and private sector part- tives which make statements about actions that are “environ-
ners, we will develop, maintain, and exercise the capacity to mentally sustainable” or about carrying out such actions “in
execute Federal responsibilities in our Arctic waters, airspace, an environmentally sound manner” (2009, 2, 11). At the same
and coastal regions, including the capacity to respond to natu- time, the directives also state that “sustainable development
ral or man-made disasters” (2013, 6). in the Arctic region poses particular challenges. Stakeholder

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to 2013 Strategy states that “proper stewardship of the Arctic re-
promote economic and energy security” (2009, 10), without quires understanding of how the environment is changing, and
going into detail about what those difficulties are. None of the [that] such understanding will be based on a holistic earth sys-
documents depict what sustainable development looks like in tem approach” (2013, 8; see also: 2009, 2–3). The 2009 directives
an American context. also identify climate change and pollution as scientific driv-
ers. For example, the document states that “an understanding
None of the documents address tourism industry; thus, the of the probable consequences of global climate variability and
Tourism indicator is not discussed. change on Arctic ecosystems is essential to guide the effective
long-term management of Arctic natural resources and to ad-
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 7 % of the total coded dress socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in the use
quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the 2009 directives (see of natural resources” (2009, 12). The USA will “intensify efforts
Figure 13, p. 100) and addresses different types of infrastructure. to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pol-
With regard to transportation infrastructure, the 2013 Strategy lutants on human health and the environment and work with
mentions this slightly more the 2009 directives do. For instance, other nations to reduce the introduction of key pollutants into
the Strategy links infrastructure development and the resource the Arctic” (2009, 14).
industry because the potential of untapped resources has “in-
spired fresh ideas for commercial initiatives and infrastructure The mention of using climate science to help with the regional
development in the region” (2013, 5). A general increase in re- economy shows that science is directed at purposes other than
gional activity also calls for new infrastructure as “we will care- climate change. The 2013 Strategy notes that research helps in-
fully tailor this regional infrastructure, as well as our response form decision-making at all levels of governance (2013, 7, 10).
capacity, to the evolving human and commercial activity in the It also explains that traditional knowledge is important to deci-
Arctic region” (2013, 6). An increase in regional activity also sion-making because “across all lines of effort, decisions need
has implications for the shipping industry, and the Strategy ex- to be based on the most current science and traditional knowl-
plains that “Arctic nations can responsibly meet new demands – edge” (2013, 3). The 2009 directives also recognize the value of
including maintaining open sea lanes for global commerce” and science to decision-making. For example, they state that “given
that the IMO can help facilitate shipping and maritime safety the need for decisions to be based on sound scientific and so-
(2013, 7, 10). cioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research, mon-
itoring, and vulnerability assessments are top priorities” (2009,
In contrast, the 2009 directives do not pay as much attention to 12) and that “scientific research is vital for the promotion of
transportation infrastructure as they do to shipping. The direc- United States interests in the Arctic region” (2009, 7). There is
tives state that “the United States priorities for maritime trans- an economic aspect to research; the USA will “seek to increase
portation in the Arctic region are: a. To facilitate safe, secure, efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study chang-
and reliable navigation; b. To protect maritime commerce; and ing climate conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing
c. To protect the environment” (2009, 9). Shipping safety, and economic opportunity in the Arctic region” (2009, 11).
the importance of the IMO, are also discussed in the directives
(2009, 9), as, too, is the need to “develop additional measures, in The ability to support these efforts is important; however, only
cooperation with other nations, to address issues that are likely the 2009 directives note the USA’s research infrastructure. For
to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and example, the documents mention that “the United States has
through the Arctic region” (2009, 10). The directives, unlike the made significant investments in the infrastructure needed to
Strategy, also mention icebreaking, but again in the context of collect environmental data in the Arctic region, including the
maritime safety (2009, 10). establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing
network through a partnership among United States agencies,
Regarding other forms of infrastructure, the role of innova- academic collaborators, and Arctic residents” (2009, 7–8). This
tion and technology is mentioned only in the 2013 Strategy. quote recognizes both physical infrastructure and infrastructure
The document states that “the unique Arctic environment will in the form of networks by noting that “[strengthening] part-
require a commitment by the United States to make judicious, nerships with academic and research institutions and [building]
coordinated infrastructure investment decisions, informed by upon the relationships these institutions have with their coun-
science” (2013, 10). None of the documents address telecom- terparts in other nations” (2009, 9) will help facilitate research.
munication and ICT, housing, or energy infrastructure. The lack
of discussion on the energy infrastructure is surprising, consid- Obtaining new knowledge, both scientific and traditional, is
ering the focus on energy security. That said, energy security is also important. For example, the opening statement of the 2013
more about accessing and producing energy rather than build- Strategy comments that “working together, we will continue
ing the infrastructure needed to get it to the people. to increase our understanding of the region through scientific
research and traditional knowledge” (2013, 1). Moreover, “re-
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 11 % of the sponsible stewardship requires active conservation of resources,
total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 13 % in the 2009 balanced management, and the application of scientific and tra-
directives (see Figure 13, p. 100) and identifies the environment ditional knowledge of physical and living environments” (2013,
as a driver behind American Arctic science. For example, the 7). While the 2009 directives also recognize the need for knowl-

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

edge-based understanding of the region (2009, 12), there is no after 5 years to ensure that it still meets the intent and priori-
mention of the role of traditional knowledge in this process. ties of the Nation” (USA TWH 2014, 32), providing follow-up
and evaluation.
Research on Arctic conditions also requires a certain level of
innovation. To address this, the 2013 Strategy comments that To sum up
the USA will “Pursue Innovative Arrangements to support the
investments in scientific research, marine transportation infra- Figure 13 at the beginning of this section discussion shows that
structure requirements, and other support capability and ca- Governance, International Cooperation, and Science and Ed-
pacity needs in this region” (2013, 10). Innovation and technol- ucation are the three most-coded indicators in the 2013 Strat-
ogy are also important, including in the space domain (2013, egy and that Governance, Science and Education, and Econo-
6), mentioned in the discussion under Safety indicator. Inno- my are the three most-coded in the 2009 directives. The three
vation and technology are not overtly addressed in the 2009 least-coded in 2013 are Tourism, Pollution, and the Human
directives. Dimension, while the three least-coded in 2009 are Tourism,
Human Dimension and Safety and SAR (tying second) and Cli-
As for education, neither document addresses access to higher mate Change being the third least-coded indicator.
education, educational attainment, or the role of the Universi-
ty of the Arctic and distance learning. The focus, therefore, is As identified at the beginning of the discussion on the Ameri-
clearly on science. can strategies, the three lines of effort for the 2013 Strategy are
security, stewardship, and international cooperation. As the
The 2009 directives provided detailed Implementation plans. International Cooperation indicator is the second most-coded
Indeed, the directives state that “this directive establishes the indicator (see Appendix), it is fair to say this line of effort is met.
policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region As for the security line of effort, the security indicator is tied
and directs related implementation actions” (2009, 1). At the as the fourth most-coded indicator. Despite security not being
end of the policy priorities, there is also an implementation in the top three indicators, the Strategy does make clear and
section that lists action items that will be done. These sections concise statements about the USA’s broadening understanding
also include a list of departments that have responsibility for of regional security. As for stewardship, this is more difficult to
the items and that they ‘shall’ do them, suggesting there is assess because it cuts across different indicators and draws on
some importance behind doing them. Moreover, the document quotes from the environment indicator, governance (natural
states: “Implementing a number of the policy elements direct- resources, blue economy, licensing), safety (mapping), and sci-
ed above will require appropriate resources and assets. These ence and education.
elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law
and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, Moreover, the 2013 Strategy, also states that the USA will “seek
and subject to the availability of appropriations. The heads of an Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where na-
executive departments and agencies with responsibilities relat- tions act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and
ing to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget, where economic and energy resources are developed in a sus-
administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements tainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and
to implement the elements of this directive” (2009, 14). the interests and cultures of Indigenous peoples” (2013, 4). This
Certainly, the document provides an implementation strategy is a broad statement that is connected to the International Co-
for the various aspects of the directives. operation (second most-coded), Security and Environmental
Protection indicators (tied as fourth most-coded), the Economy
The 2013 Strategy also provides insights into how it will be im- indicator (fifth most-coded), and Human Dimension indicators
plemented. For example, it states that “when implementing this (seventh most-coded).
strategy, the United States will proceed in a thoughtful, respon-
sible manner that leverages expertise, resources, and coopera- Governance is the most-coded indicator and Science and Ed-
tion from the State of Alaska, Alaska Natives, and stakeholders ucation is the third most-coded (see Appendix) in the 2013
across the entire nation and throughout the international com- Strategy. The Governance indicator addresses topics around
munity” (2013, 4). Additionally, at the end of each of the three science-informed decision-making, international cooperation,
lines of effort, there are bullet point lists of different objectives. and respecting and consulting Indigenous governments. The
However, unlike in the directives, there are no details as to how Science and Education indicator identifies the environment
they will be implemented and who will be responsible. Instead, as a driver behind research and values the use of traditional
the 2014 implementation plan does this in great detail as each knowledge. While not all the indicators associated with the pri-
issue clearly lays out an objective, next steps, how progress will orities are highly coded, this priority does seem to be addressed
be measured, and who are the lead and supporting agencies. through connected discussions.
At the end of the document, it is explained that: “The Imple-
mentation Plan will be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure There are also some connections between the different indi-
that progress continues to be made in positioning the United cators and themes. For example, the Governance indicator is
States to best prepare and respond to changes, challenges, and connected to the Human dimension indicator through state-
opportunities in the Arctic region” and that it “will be revisited ments about ensuring consultations with Indigenous groups,

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

and it is also connected to the Science and education indicator, between the documents, there is one key difference. Notably,
as research will be used to inform governance decisions. Gov- the 2009 directives comment on the possibility of terrorism in
ernance structures are also used for safety, such as the Arctic the region, whereas the 2013 Strategy emphasizes the need for
Council’s SAR and oil agreements. Another linkage occurs with increased energy security. Again, this difference is indicative of
the Economy indicator. Indeed, economic activities can cause the change in government.
pollution and harm the environment, while climate change may
increase the regional economic activity. The Economy indica- The two documents address similar issues even though the
tor is also linked to the Security indicator through discussions Strategy and the presidential directives are different types of
around energy security, and to the Safety indicator, as shipping documents, but some issues are discussed with different foci.
can increase environmental safety risks. Nevertheless, the documents, overall, provide a comprehensive
understanding of the USA’s regional priorities.
To further compare the documents, the two most-relevant sim-
ilarities and the three most-relevant differences are discussed.
Comparing the Current Strategies
It is possible to compare the documents, and there are some
similarities between them. Two similarities stand out. First, the The last section provided an overview the contents of the strate-
documents address environmental protection, with the 2013 gies and policies on the Arctic of the eight Arctic states, and how
Strategy calling it “a central goal” (2013, 7), and the 2009 di- they have developed. To gain a better understanding of how the
rectives state that environmental protection is a policy. In the Arctic region is currently being governed, as well as how the
documents, there is thus a desire to balance environmental national strategies and policies complement each other, a com-
protection with economic development. While protected areas parison between the current strategies for each state is needed.
were discussed more in the 2013 Strategy, it and the directives
address biodiversity protection, even if the term is not explic- This section will go through the current national strategies and
itly used. Second, climate change is addressed by the Strategy policies of the eight Arctic states with an indicator-by-indicator
and the directives; however, the 2013 Strategy is more expres- comparison. It will identify both similarities and differences in
sive about the consequences, both positive and negative, than general, and discuss on some of relevant (biggest) differences
the 2009 directives which are more matter-of-fact. Regardless that could have implications for the state of Arctic governance
of how the consequences ware framed, neither the Strategy nor and development of the entire region. It is important to note
the directives places much emphasis on issues of mitigation/ ad- that, with the exception of Norway (2017), the current strategies
aptation or ways of addressing climate change through interna- were released between 2009 and 2013. While some countries
tional frameworks or scientific research. are working on new strategies as noted earlier, the majority of
documents that currently govern state action in the Arctic are
There are also some differences between the documents, three between six and ten years old.
of which are discussed here. First, the Governance indicator
is discussed more in the 2009 directives than it is in the 2013 To recognize where the similarities and differences are, to mea-
Strategy, and there is very little overlap in ideas. The directives sure their value, and whether they are general or rare, we have
mention cooperation and fisheries management, while the 2013 used simple criteria. If there are seven or more similarities be-
Strategy mentions the use of law for maritime governance. tween the national strategies and policies, the finding is striking.
There is some overlap as the documents discuss decision-mak- If there are five or more, the finding is relevant, and if there are
ing, but the directives speak to stakeholder engagement while three or fewer similarities, the finding suggests fragmentation.
the Strategy speaks to science as a way to inform decision mak-
ing. That being said, they both reference the need to include In- Table 6 shows where the different countries place the official
digenous peoples in the decision-making process. Second, the priorities of their Arctic strategies and policies. For example, all
documents take slightly different approaches to the issue of pol- countries, except the USA, clearly state that economy/economic
lution. While they mention similar, but slightly different types development is a priority (Canada and Russia use the term with
of pollution, their responsibility for addressing pollution differs. socio-economic development), which is striking. Similarly, all
Notably, the 2009 directives state that melting permafrost and countries, except Canada and Sweden, state that international
undefined human activity are the causes of pollution and that cooperation is a priority, which is relevant. All countries, except
international cooperation and adherence to international con- the United States, either have climate change or environmental
ventions are the solution. In contrast, the 2013 Strategy suggests protection as a priority, which is striking. Security and stability
economic and resource development are the primary source of are priorities for Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Rus-
pollution, and the USA must take responsibility for this. As the sia, and the United States, which is relevant, but not striking.
directives were released 11 days before former President Bush
stepped down and former President Obama was sworn in, this Overall, what this tells us as a conclusion is that the economy,
shift is telling of the change in government from Republican to international cooperation, and environmental protection are
Democrat. It could also be suggestive of greater self-reflection the overarching priorities of the national strategies and policies
and national accountability within the Arctic region. Third, of the Arctic states.
while there are similarities regarding how security is addressed

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA ditionally, the region is also described in geopolitical contexts
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 as strategic or important for Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of
Climate change X X X Denmark, and Norway.
Economic
X X X X X
development
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
Environmental
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
protection incl. X X X X X X
climate change Part of identify X
Expertise X X X Pure X

Human dimension Exceptional (env). X

Incl. Indigenous X X Strategic or im-
rights X X X X
portant
Improving and Fragile (env., cli-
devolving northern X X X X
mate, or ecosystem)
governance
Vulnerable (climate
Infrastructure X X X X X
or env.)
International Unique (ecosystem
X X X X X X X X X X
cooperation or env.)
Safety / Emergency Valuable (env) X
X
preparedness
Frontier X
Science and
X Extreme (climate) X
technology
Security / Stability X X X X X Unstable
X
ecologically
Socio-economic
X X Industrial X
development
Sovereignty / Remote / scattered /
X X X X X
position in the X X X sparsely populated
region
Table 7. Describing the Region
Stewardship X
(Strengthen) Arctic
X
Council
Table 8 shows the different terms used to name the region. All
Table 6. Comparing (Official) Priorities states but Canada prioritize the use of the term “Arctic” whereas
Canada uses “Arctic” and “North” fairly interchangeably. Fin-
land, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden also use
The table also shows some issues that are priorities for one or “North” but very minimally. Circumpolar is also used by Fin-
two states. Interestingly, Iceland is the only state to explicit- land, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Norway to describe larger
ly identify Indigenous rights as a priority, although Sweden regional affairs. The term “High North,” which was originally
does prioritize the Human Dimension which includes Indig- launched by Norway in its 2006 High North Strategy, is men-
enous peoples and rights. Either way, this shows fragmenta- tioned in Iceland and Sweden’s strategies, but not as a term Nor-
tion. Some of the other priorities are country-specific, such way uses itself to describe the region in its 2017 policy .
as Canada and devolving governance, Iceland and the Arctic
Council, and Russia and telecommunications (as part of in-
frastructure). These suggest a certain degree of fragmentation. CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013

Comparison by Indicator Arctic X X* X* X* X* X X* X

High North X X

The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro- North X X X X X

vides a good understanding of how each Arctic state views the Circumpolar X X X
region. Table 7 shows the which words are used to describe
the Arctic (region) and its features in the documents. Most of Table 8. Naming the Region
the strategies (Canada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark, Rus- *indicates most common term when multiple given
sia, and Sweden) comment on the region’s remote, scattered,
or sparse populations. As for the environment, ecosystem(s), Generally speaking, none of the strategies provide a set defini-
and climate, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden, and tion of the Arctic, although a few imply where a border might
the USA comment on its uniqueness, while the Kingdom of be. For instance, both Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden consider it vulnerable, and suggest that the southern border of the Arctic region might be
Canada, Iceland, and the Kingdom of Denmark comment on around the 60th parallel. For Canada, this is suggested based on
its fragility. Only Finland considers it to be pure or exception- their focus on the three northern territories, although the Cana-
al, which are more positive assessments than the others. Ad- dian Strategy notes that the territory of some of Canada’s north-

109
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

ern Indigenous peoples goes further south. For the Kingdom of though not surprising at all. The issues are discussed coun-
Denmark, there is a map with what appears to be the 60th par- try-by-country in different ways. A fragmented finding is that
allel on it. If so, this would mean that almost the whole territory the United Nations for the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples
of Finland would be included in this definition. Perhaps, then, (UNDRIP) is mentioned only by the Kingdom of Denmark
it is not surprising that the official Arctic policy of Finland con- and Sweden, even though five of the Arctic states voting in
siders the entire country to be within the Arctic. A little further favor of it on 13 September 2007 (Finland, Iceland, the King-
north, Iceland suggests the Arctic Circle might be the boundary, dom of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), while Canada and
as the Strategy comments on the country’s proximity to it. The the USA voted against, and Russia abstained (United Nations
U.S. Strategy recognizes the American Arctic as Alaska, and uses 2007). In 2010, Canada and the USA demonstrated for support
a political boundary for the Arctic by stating it consists of the for UNDRIP, with Canada adopting the Declaration in 2016
eight Arctic states. Sweden comments on a sub-region within the (CBC News 2010; Fontaine 2016; Richardson 2010). Consid-
Arctic—the High North which includes the Nordics and Russia. ering these events, it is not surprising that neither Canada nor
Russia mentioned UNDRIP in their strategies.
The documents also take different approaches in assigning re-
sponsibility to their strategies. For instance, Russia and the USA The recognition of Indigenous governments, however, was a
do not name any ministries, although the American implemen- more relevant finding. All but Iceland and Russia refer to it
tation plan identifies 24 different departments and agencies. (see Table 9), although from different perspectives. Canada
Iceland, Norway, Canada, and Sweden mention only between recognizes self-government in the context of land claim set-
one and three ministries. In contrast, the Kingdom of Denmark tlements, the United States mentions tribal government, and
names six ministries plus the Government of Greenland and Kingdom of Denmark champions the self-government system
their Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Government of the in Greenland. Finland, Norway, and Sweden all mention the
Faroe Islands and their Ministry of Trade and Industry, while Saami Parliament.
Finland lists the most at 11. This suggests is that Finland and
the Kingdom of Denmark (and the USA) have either a clearer
vision or a greater sense of accountability in terms of how their CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
respective strategies will be delivered, or the governments of
UNDRIP X X
these states want to involve as many ministries as possible in the
process. For example, if the Finnish Government states that the Indigenous Gov X X X X X X

whole country belongs to the Arctic, all ministries should be in- UN Declaration on
X
Human Rights
volved in designing policy there and for the region.
Gender Equality X X X

Concerning the comparison of the current national strategies

Table 9. Rights and Equality
and policies of the Arctic states, Figure 14 provides an overview
and detailed comparison of how the most current strategies pri-
oritize the different indicators as a percentage of the total quotes Table 9 also shows that the United Nations Declaration on Hu-
for each document. Governance, Economy, and International man Rights is mentioned only by Sweden. However, Canada,
Cooperation have the most quotes coded to them, although the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States
next one, Human Dimension is very close. Tourism, Pollution, all signed the Declaration in 1948, while the Soviet Union ab-
and Climate Change have the lowest percentage of coded quotes. stained (United Nations 1948). Finland, joined the UN in 1955
(see Figure 14. Comparing the Current Strategies, p. 111) (United Nations 2006) and has since signed the Declaration.
The table also shows that gender equality is mentioned only by
The table also shows some interesting differences. Canada dis- Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden. Both the human
cusses the Human Dimension indicator the most and the USA rights and gender equality findings are therefore fragmented.
the least. Iceland mentions the Governance indicator much
more than the other countries, and Russia the least. Finland is In addition to discussions about Indigenous peoples, the
the only country to provide a substantial discussion on Tour- documents speak more generally to topics that affect every-
ism. Finland, Russia, and Norway have the most quotes on the one living in the region. For example, Canada seeks to ensure
Economy indicator; whereas the other states did not devote as that “Northerners” have access to necessary services (2009, 5,
much space to this topic. Russia mentions the Infrastructure 22). Similarly, Finland addresses issues for the “local popu-
more than all the other states, and the most within its strategy. lation” and “local inhabitants” (2013, 11, 20), and Iceland is
concerned about the effects of climate change on “Arctic resi-
The Human Dimension indicator reveals similarities and dif- dents” (2011, 2). The Kingdom of Denmark addresses hunting
ferences in the approaches to Indigenous, human, and gender rights for the “Arctic community” (2011, 31), Norway com-
rights. For Indigenous peoples, all current strategies address ments on ensuring diversity in “local communities” and good
Indigenous peoples, including Iceland, though there are no “settlement patterns” for a “balanced population” (2017, 3, 10).
Indigenous peoples living in the country, a striking finding,

110
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Human Dimension Governance International Cooperation

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

CAN CAN

FIN FIN

ISL ISL

DNK DNK

NOR NOR

RUS RUS

SWE SWE

USA USA

Environmental Protection Pollution Climate Change

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

CAN CAN

FIN FIN

ISL ISL

DNK DNK

NOR NOR

RUS RUS

SWE SWE

USA USA

Security Safety & SAR Economy

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

CAN CAN

FIN FIN

ISL ISL

DNK DNK

NOR NOR

RUS RUS

SWE SWE

USA USA

Tourism Infrastructure Science & Education

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

CAN CAN

FIN FIN

ISL ISL

DNK DNK

NOR NOR

RUS RUS

SWE SWE

USA USA

CAN 2009 FIN 2013 ISL 2011 DNK 2011 NOR 2017 RUS 2013 SWE 2011 USA 2013

Figure 14. Comparing the Current Strategies

Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
and represent the % of the total number of quotes coded for each document.

111
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

Russia mentions issues affecting “people living and working in CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2013, 4), and Swe- 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
den shows its concerns about the life expectancy of “those living Role and
in the Arctic area” (2011, 43). Finally, the USA broadly men- importance X X X X X X X X
tions the “Arctic region” and the desire for stability (2013, 4). Of of int.coop.
course, Indigenous peoples would also be accounted for in these
broader descriptions. Major
agreements X X X X X X X
and forums
The Governance indicator illustrates the importance of gover-
nance to all eight states. From the perspectives of a quantitative Global
and qualitative content analysis, all eight countries of the Arctic perspective X X X X
and scales
devote a considerable part of their strategies to governance. The
only exception here is Russia, which according to both analy- UN SDGs (or
ses, dedicates the least space to Governance compared to other RIO 1992)
X

areas of interest in their strategy. For Iceland, on the contrary,

the Governance indicator, together with the international coop- Table 10. International Treaties and International Cooperation
eration, is the most significant, covering more than 25 percent
of its Strategy. The high relevance of Governance is shown by
Arctic states listing several key regional and international or- There are mainly similarities in how the Environmental Pro-
ganizations in their strategies and discussing their involvement tection indicator is addressed by the different strategies. Table
in particular organizations or cooperative platforms. Although, 11 shows that all strategies recognize the need to balance en-
governance is described differently by different states, there is vironmental protection with economic activities. Canada re-
a considerable overlap in their approaches. The high political fers only to sustainable development, while the USA alludes to
stability of the region enables the states to focus on cooperative this kind of balance but does not state it as explicitly as other
relationships and invest in support for these relationships. The documents do. Four strategies explicitly state they will use an
majority of the states emphasize the work of the Arctic Coun- ecosystem-based management system with regard to maritime
cil, and mention successful cooperation with the United Na- resources, although Norway uses this phrase only in the over-
tions, European Union, Nordic Council of Ministers, Barents all document’s strategic priorities and not in the discussion
Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, Barents Regional about the environment. The USA does not use the term eco-
Council, or Council of the Baltic Sea States. Interestingly, Swe- system-based management, but refers to an “integrated Arctic
den is the only country to highlight the potential stakeholder management framework” (2013, 2) which seems similar (see
conflict of interest. With increased socioeconomic development also: 2013, 8).
and other land use, there is a risk of conflicts of interest with
the more traditional way of life and culture of reindeer herders.
Therefore, Sweden focuses on socially and culturally sustainable CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
development of the Arctic.
Balance
environment
In the International Treaties and International Cooperation and economy
X X X X X X X X

indicator there is a clear difference between the quantitative (ex. Sustainable dev)
and the content analyses. In the quantitative analysis Finland Ecosystem based
X X X X X
and Russia address international cooperation the least of all the management

Arctic States. In the figure below, however, the comprehensive Protected areas vs
P C P P C P P P
Conservation
approach of the Finnish government can be seen with respect
Invasive species X X X
to all aspects of international cooperation. Moreover, Finland
is the only Arctic state to address the 1992 UN Rio+20 confer-
Table 11. Environmental Protection
ence in its 2013 Strategy. The USA and Iceland lead the quanti-
P=protected area C=conservation
tative analysis based on the frequency of quotes on this indica-
tor. Russia devotes the least space to international cooperation,
as illustrated both by the quantitative and the content analysis. Six of the eight countries address the concept of protected areas,
However, as very clearly stated by the recent declarations of the with four referring to them as protected areas and two mention-
Arctic Council Ministerial meetings, all the Arctic states con- ing them as being linked to conservation. In the U.S. Strategy,
sider international cooperation as a key instrument of the devel- the focus is on ‘preservation’ without specific geographical areas
opment of the Arctic to maintain the high geopolitical stability being stated. The Iceland document also generally speaks about
of the region and continue the constructive cooperation, and protecting or conserving biota, but does not recognize any spe-
thus keep the region free from potential conflicts. cific areas.

112
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

While there are many similarities, there is also fragmentation Table 13 shows different pollution problem-solving approaches.
when it comes to recognizing invasive species, with only three The strategies that identify greenhouse gases (e.g. black carbon)
documents raising this issue. as pollutants also address, to varying degrees, the need to reduce
those emissions. This is also the case for POPs and the Stock-
The Pollution indicator shows that each strategy, to varying ex- holm Convention, and pollution from economic activity. Note
tents, discusses the sources of pollution and different approach- that because a problem-solving approach is mentioned and cap-
es to problem-solving in this regard. Table 12 identifies which tured on Table 13, does not necessarily mean the solution is giv-
pollutants are mentioned in the different strategies. However, en much attention in the corresponding strategy.
there is not one pollutant that is addressed by all strategies. Oil
is mentioned in six strategies, while greenhouse gases and eco-
nomic activity are each identified in five (see Table 12). Thus, CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
these are relevant findings for the pollutants of greatest concern.
All other pollutants are mentioned in three or fewer strategies, Greenhouse
suggesting there is a fragmented approach to pollution. Inter- gas reduction
(UNFCCC –XX,
estingly, military waste is explicitly mentioned as a pollutant Paris Agreement -
X XX X XXX X
by the Russian strategy. Microplastics is mentioned only in the XXX)
Norwegian strategy, probably because that document, released
Stockholm
in 2017, is the latest one. While plastics have been in the oceans Convention X X
for decades, it was not until 2014 that a study identified the vast on POPs
amounts of plastics in the Oceans (Eriksen et al. 2014, 7).
Long-Range
Transboundary
X X
Air Pollution
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA (LRTAP)
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
Man-made Hazardous
X and Noxious
pollutants
X
Substances (HNS)
Greenhouse
X X X X X Protocol
Gases
Carbon dioixde X X Agreement on
Short lived Cooperation
X X on Marine Oil
climate poll.
Pollution X X X
Black carbon X X Preparedness
Methane X X X & Response in
the Arctic
Radioactive
X X
material Ballast Water
X
Heavy Metals X Convention

Mercury X X X UNCLOS X
POPs X X IMO
X X X
Requirements
PBTs X X
PCBs Polar Code X
X
Chemicals X X Nuclear Safety X X
Oil X X X X X X
Pathogens from Research on
X pollution
ballast water X X
(consequences,
Economic activity best practices)
(mining, ship- X X X X X
ping, etc) Pollution
X X X
Soot monitoring
X
International
Military waste X X X X X X X
cooperation
Microplastics X
Domestic legisla-
Marine litter X
tion, policies, X X X X
Local Pollution X X and practices

Table 12. Pollutants Changes to eco-

X X X X X
nomic activities

Table 13. Pollution Problem-Solving

113
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

It surprising that more strategies do not mention POPs/Stock-

CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
holm Convention and show more concern over the long-range 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
transmission of these pollutants, considering they have been
Mitigation/
present in the Arctic since the 1970s at least (see: AMAP 1997, Adaptation
X X X X X X
72). It is also surprising how few strategies opt to root their pol- Frameworks: X X X X X X
lution action in formalized institutions like UNCLOS and the
UNFCC X X X X
IMO. Instead, there is more emphasis in working collaboratively
IPCC X
with other Arctic states on certain issues.
Paris Agreement X X

The Climate Change indicator captures information from all Scientific

Community X X X X X X X
the strategies, although the issue is mentioned to different ex- Heard
tents. Table 14 shows some of the ways each state approaches
Climate Change
climate action. It is striking that all strategies, except that of as Security Factor
X X X X

the USA, recognize the role of the scientific community—ei- Environmental

ther existing scientific contributions, the need for continued Refugees
research, or greater interaction between researchers and gov- Asia
ernment. Mentioned
Access to
X X
Fresh Water
There are also three relevant findings: i) Canada, Finland, the
Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the USA all ad-
Table 14. Climate Action and Climate Concerns
dress issues around mitigation vis-a-vis adaptation. However,
although Norway does not explicitly use these terms, its Strat- Fragmentation also exists as only two strategies mention ac-
egy discusses activities that could be understood as such. ii) cess to fresh water. Sweden clearly states that there is “a greater
Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, and risk of contaminated drinking water caused by changes in the
Sweden all refer to climate change agreements. In particular, permafrost that affect water sources” (2011a, 44) and Finland
Canada, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden mention makes a vague reference to ensuring that changes are made to
the UNFCCC. Sweden is also the only country to mention the protect “water resources” (2013, 39).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.9 Norway is the
only country to mention the Paris Agreement, as this is the There is one more interesting finding that is neither relevant
only strategy written after the signing of the Agreement. The nor fragmented—climate change as a security issue. Finland,
Kingdom of Denmark, however, does allude to the Agreement, the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden, and the USA mention this
mentioning an “ambitious global climate agreement” (2011, in different ways. Finland suggests that climate change could
13). Finland, in contrast, makes a general comment about cause regional instability and that the security of Indigenous
reducing emissions in “global climate negotiations” (2013, 13). cultures could also be undermined. The Kingdom of Denmark
iii) Climate change causing environmental refugees, and Asia notes that climate change could lead to softer security issues
as a contributor to climate change, are not mentioned in any like illegal fishing. Sweden comments on the effects on health
document. as a security issue, while the USA suggests climate change
would improve energy security.

The Security indicator is relatively fragmented. While all the

Arctic states to some extent define security, none of them cov-
ers all aspects of the indicator. Interestingly, Canada and Fin-
land discuss security most comprehensively, covering a broad
range of sub-indicators. However, the perspective of frequency
of codes in the quantitative analysis illustrates that Canada,
the USA, and, surprisingly, Iceland, are the three countries
that put the most emphasis on security in their strategies (in
comparison to other indicators). The issues of sovereignty are
covered by Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, and Fin-
land. For Finland, a general notion related to “International
Cooperation” is that “while the sovereignty of the States must
be respected, it should not discourage genuine recognition of
mutual dependencies” (2013, 43). This matches well with the
results of an international public opinion survey Rethinking
the Top of the World on global perceptions of Arctic security

9 The Finnish strategy lists the IPCC in an appendix but does not address it in the body of the strategy (2013, 66).

114
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

which explains that “while most of the Nordic countries heavily CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
support negotiating a compromise to Arctic territorial disputes 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
(64 % of Danes, 50 % of Finns, and 49 % of Norwegians), in Can- Environmental
ada and Russia, there is more support for pursuing a firm line Safety (incl. pollu- X X X X X X X X
tion, oil spills, etc.)
in asserting their sovereignty in the Arctic (41 % of northern
Search and Rescue X X X X X X X X
Canadians, 43 % of southern Canadians, and 34 % of Russians)”
(Munk School/Gordon Foundation, 25 January 2011). Surveillance X X X X
Maritime Safety
X X X X X
(including shipping)
Interestingly, border issues are included only in the Russian
strategy, which refers to the delimitation of territorial waters, Tourism X X X X

the economic zone, and the continental shelf. NATO and its Civil preparedness X
role is mentioned only by three out of five Arctic—NATO Emergency
X
members Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, and Norway. The is- preparedness

sues connected to maritime security are included in the strat- Disaster

X X X
preparedness
egies of four states: Canada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark,
Health preparedness X
and Sweden.
Transport safety X X X X

CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA Occupational safety X X
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 Nuclear Safety X
How defined X X X X X X X X
Sovereignty X X* X X
Table 16. How Safety is Understood

Borders X
Stability and
There are also similarities and differences with regard to which
X X X X X international safety bodies are mentioned. Table 17 shows that
stability building
Interpretation six strategies mention the Arctic Council’s SAR agreement,
X X X X X
of security while five refer to either the IMO and/or the Polar Code. Only
Armed forces X X X X X two strategies comment on Barents-specific cooperation, while
Measures to only Finland mentions the Arctic Council’s EPPR working
X X X X
increase security group, and Iceland mentions NATO.
NATO and its role X X X
Military spending X X
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
Military capabilities X X 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
Maritime Security Arctic Council
(military and coast X X X X X X X X X X
SAR Agreement
guard)
IMO/Polar Code X X X X X
Table 15. Security UNCLOS X
* the 2013 Finnish strategy includes a general notion on sovereignty related to Barents
“International Cooperation” (see text) cooperation (ex. X X
SAR, surveillance)
Arctic Council
The Safety and SAR indicator reveals some similarities and EPPR
X

differences in terms of how the different strategies understand NATO X

safety, what formal structures are involved, and how the states
respond to these issues. Table 16 shows two striking similari- Table 17. Safety Institutions
ties in that all the strategies identify environmental safety, and
search and rescue (SAR) as being the most relevant safety top- Finally, there are also some similarities, but mostly differences,
ics. Another relevant similarity is that maritime safety is identi- when it comes to the safety capabilities or practices mentioned
fied in five of the strategies, and these are not necessarily the five in the strategies. Table 18 shows the most striking similarity,
littoral states of the Arctic. Transportation safety is mentioned namely, that six strategies state international cooperation to be
in four strategies. There is also some fragmentation, as disas- important for different safety practices. Additionally, four strat-
ter preparedness is mentioned in three strategies, occupational egies note that safety involves multilevel cooperation within the
safety in two, and civil preparedness, emergency preparedness, country, and only Finland and the Kingdom of Denmark rec-
and health preparedness are each only mentioned once. This ognize cooperation domestically and internationally, while the
tends to show that there is more focus perhaps on the commer- Kingdom of Denmark states that the Faroe Islands look after
cial aspect of the Arctic rather than the human side (although their own SAR. Another similarity is that four strategies state
there are clearly human implications for issues such as environ- the importance of surveillance and monitoring, including the
mental safety). use of satellites and communications, to safety practices. That

115
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

said, two of the strategies (Norway and Russia) comment on the Another striking similarity is that all strategies mention export
need to improve some of these capabilities. Four strategies also trade (although to varying degrees), while striking similarities
refer to mapping and charting, and three of them also comment include the general mention of energy in five strategies (Fin-
that there is a need for improvement in these areas. land, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the USA). As types of eco-
nomic energy production, Canada, Iceland, the Kingdom of
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the USA discuss oil and gas,
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 while Russia discusses hydrocarbons. Sweden and Finland both
Multilevel coopera-
X X X X
recognize the oil potential in Norway and Russia. Renewable
tion (in country)
energies are also mentioned by Iceland, the Kingdom of Den-
International
X X X X X X mark, Norway, and the USA.
Cooperation
Vessel reporting
X X CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
in national waters
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
Surveillance,
monitoring, and/ Energy X X X X X
X X X* X*
or communication Oil and Gas X X X X X X
(including satellites)
Renewables X X X X
Information sharing X*
Hydrocarbons X
Maritime mapping
X* X* X X* Mining X X X X X X X
and charting
SAR equipment X Forestry X X

Pollution solutions X Fisheries X X X X X X

Export of safety Aquaculture X

X
products Blue Economy X
Occupational safety Bioprospecting
X X X
knowledge
Reindeer
X X X
Husbandry
Table 18. Capabilities and Practices
*needs to be improved Tourism X X X X X X X
Cultural Products/
X X X
Crafts
There is also some fragmentation in the results. For example, Local food X
only the USA comments on information sharing and the need Shipping Services
X X X X
for it to be improved. Only Norway mentions SAR equipment and Transport
like helicopters, as well as problem-solving for pollution. Fin- Export Trade X X X X X X X X
land is the only state to mention having an ability to help others Technology X X
through its expertise in making safety products and its occupa- Maritime tech
tional knowledge. X X
(incl. icebreakers)
Biotechnology X X
The Economy indicator reveals some similarities and differenc- Cold Climate X X
es between the approaches to economic activities, economic
Space Industry X
prioritization, and economic actors. Table 19 shows the range of
Construction X
activities discussed in the different strategies. There is a striking
similarity between all the strategies, with the exception of the Table 19. Economic Activities
USA, in that they actively discuss the mining industry. Iceland
does so in the context of Greenland. The USA strategy does
make a generalized statement about new minerals being dis- Table 19 also shows some fragmentation as strategies become
covered, and that “these estimates have inspired fresh ideas for more specific in discussing their economic activities. For exam-
commercial initiatives and infrastructure development in the ple, cold climate expertise and forestry are discussed by Finland
region” (2013, 5), but this does not indicate what U.S. interests and Sweden, whereas Canada, Finland, and Norway mention
are in mining. Another striking finding is that all strategies, ex- cultural products or local crafts. Certainly, the fragmentation
cept the U.S. strategy, mention tourism. also illuminates industries that might be unique to certain
countries or sub-regions.
Six strategies explicitly discuss fisheries.

116
 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

In terms of how the different strategies prioritize their region- CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
al economic activities (see Table 20), there is nothing particu- 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
larly striking or relevant, but this is rather fragmented. Only Other states X X
four strategies mention government support programs, such as EU X
SINED in Canada, Tekes in Finland, and Innovation Norway, Government(s) /
X X X X X X
whereas the Russian strategy speaks more generally about the state
state supporting regional growth. Public Sector X X
Private sector X X X X X X X X
Oil companies X
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 Indigenous
businesses and X X
Gov’t legislation and
X communities
policy changes
Funding and
Economic actions X X
financing agencies
in line with regional X
priorities Academia and
X X X
research institutes
Gov’t Support
X X X X
Programs Industry networks X X
Indigenous business
and economic X Table 21. Economic Actors
development
Focus on national
expertise
X X There is also fragmentation with the economic actors. For
Focus on areas of
example, many of the strategies mention working with other
X Arctic states on economic issues. Only Finland and Iceland
growth
Cooperation with acknowledge the increasing presence of certain Asian coun-
X X
other states tries, like China and Japan, in the region. Another example
Encouraging people is with industry networks where Finland mentions NordMin
to move to the X mining network, and Sweden mentions the Baltic Sea Energy
North
Cooperation.
Compensating
people that live in X
the North In the Tourism indicator, the biggest similarity is that, for all the
A8, it is the least important of any of the indicators analyzed.
Table 20. How the Economy is Prioritized This may be partly due to the fact, as mentioned above, that the
strategies were published between six and ten years ago, when
There are also some differences as to how states approach simi- the tourism was not dramatically increasing. Another possible
lar priorities. For example, Canada discusses skills development explanation might be the approach to how this indicator is ana-
for Indigenous peoples to facilitate increased employment op- lyzed—it is done separately, but can be part of the economy in-
portunities in the resources sector, whereas the Russian strategy dicator. These two explanations are, however, not sufficient with
seeks to increase Indigenous capacity to gain employment and respect to Norway, which has the most recent strategy (2017)
to become self-employed. yet makes limited reference to tourism.

Table 21 shows what economic actors are identified in the differ- The general impression is that this indicator is very fragmented
ent strategies. There is a striking finding that all strategies men- and that it is referred to by individual states in different ways.
tion the private sector, although this is to varying degrees. Six of For Canada the tourism perspective is mostly connected to the
the eight strategies also interpret the government as an econom- development of the Northwest Passage and navigation safety. At
ic actor, as it helps facilitate economic opportunities. Finland the same time Canada supports the traditional knowledge and
also names the public sector, which is an extension of the state. Indigenous cultural programs. In the case of Finland, the aim is
The USA mentions public–private partnerships, which involves to increase tourism that is sustainable. Finland, of all eight Arc-
the state/public sector. Sweden also mentions public–private co- tic states, covers tourism the most, comprehensively explaining
operation, notably with the Swedish Trade Council. how it is defined, who are the actors, and what is the scale and
level of state support… “the growth in adventure and nature
tourism is reflected in Lapland” (2013, 11), which is a popular
location for visitors to Finland. Iceland approaches tourism as
one of the main economic activities of the country, besides fish-
eries and energy production.

117
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

For the Kingdom of Denmark, the tourism is mainly connected strategies except Iceland’s state or suggest that transportation
to Greenland and the Faroe Islands, while being “second only to infrastructure development is underpinned by economic rea-
fisheries, is the most important export industry in Greenland” sons, although Finland and the USA do also acknowledge
(2011, 23). The Kingdom of Denmark’s strategy is the only one the benefit residents will obtain. A relevant finding is that six
that mentions cruise activities. Norway focuses on state support strategies mention air travel (Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of
of the tourist industry with an emphasis “on profitability and Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Sweden). None of the strategies
sustainable management of the natural environment and cul- provide much detail on air infrastructure, but Finland and Ice-
tural heritage” (2017, 24). Similarly, Russia highlights state sup- land position it within international travel, Norway says it is for
port for environmentally friendly tourism. Interestingly, only regional travel, while Russia wants new planes to better service
Sweden addresses the impact of tourism (potential for “creating the Russian North.
jobs and boosting economic growth”) and possible side-effects
of the industry, such as “the risk of conflicts of interest between” CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
individual industries, especially between “reindeer herding and 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
other land use” (2011, 38, 45). The United States does not reflect Maritime X X
on tourism industry at all. Port X X X X
Air X X X X X X
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA Rail X X X
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
Roads X X X X
Safety and security
defined in this X X X - Border
X
context infrastructure

Tourism defined X X X X X - Economic X X X X X X X

Actors (who does For the people X X

X X -
tourism)
Scale of industry X X - Table 24. Transportation Infrastructure
Cruise activities X -
Impact of tourism X - As shipping is also discussed in every strategy, it is worth tak-
Level of state
X X X - ing a closer look at what the different strategies emphasize. For
support
example, Table 25 shows that all countries are concerned with
Possible side effects X - safety. As a relevant finding, five of the strategies comment on
increased navigability or possible new routes opening. Finland,
Table 22. Tourism
Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden mention both the North-
ern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Finland and Sweden
The Infrastructure indicator shows that, overall, a broad range comment on the possibilities of these new routes. The Kingdom
of infrastructure needs are discussed, although to varying de- of Denmark notes the possibilities of the Northwest Passage,
grees. For example, Table 23 shows that all strategies address and also provides information on the 2010 voyage of a Danish
transportation and shipping, while most mention icebreakers, ship through the Northeast Passage. Russia only mentions the
telecommunications and ICT, innovation and technology, and Northern Sea Route, and Canada the Northwest Passage. Inter-
energy. However, only three strategies touch on housing infra- estingly, only Finland makes reference to existing other routes
structure. Additionally, not all infrastructure types receive the “in Greenland and Spitsbergen” (2013, 30).
same amount of attention.
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 Northern Sea Route X X X X
Transportation X X X X X X X X Northwest Passage X X X X
Icebreakers X X X X X Increased navigabil-
X X X X X
Shipping ity/ new routes
X X X X X X X X
Other existing
Telecoms / ICT X X X X X X X
transit routes
Innovation and tech X X X X X X X
Safety X X X X X X X X
Energy X X X X X
Housing X X X Table 25. Shipping

Table 23. Infrastructure

In the Science and Education indicator there are some similar-
ities and differences in terms of both science and education. For
As all strategies discuss transportation infrastructure and ship- science, Table 26 shows that seven out of eight strategies state
ping, it is important to see if there are similarities and differ- climate change to be a major research driver, and six out of eight
ences in these discussions. Table 24 shows that, strikingly, all interpret the environment as a key driver. (Iceland is included

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

here as it mentions glacier research.) There is also some frag- CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
mentation, as some strategies identify other issues of concern, 2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
such as natural hazards, health and other social issues, as a driver Research Stations X X X X
for science and research. Icebreakers / vessels X X X
Universities /
X X X X X
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA research institutes
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 Informal networks X X X
Environment X X X X X X Formal networks X X X X
Climate Change X X X X X X X
Pollution X Table 28. Arctic Research Infrastructure

Natural Hazards X
Health X
Knowledge is an important factor in the eight strategies, as it
Social issues X
means more than just scientific knowledge. Six strategies (Can-
Table 26: Drivers behind Science and Research
ada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
the USA) mention the importance of traditional knowledge,
although the Norwegian strategy mentions “knowledge of the
Research can also be used to serve different purposes, although people” (2017, 10). It is not surprising that Iceland does not
there is not much consensus on what those purposes are, other mention traditional knowledge, as there are no recognized In-
than five strategies noting that research can be used to increase digenous groups in the country.
cooperation or build and strengthen relationships. That said,
Table 27 shows some similarities, as four states mention that re- As for education, there are no striking or relevant findings. There
search and knowledge will be used to inform decision-making is some consistency, however, as Table 29 shows four strategies
and four strategies state that research can also help with eco- suggesting that education be used to help with economic devel-
nomic activities. opment through programs and training geared towards certain
industries or other economic needs. In contrast to this, there is
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA also fragmentation, as only Norway mentions that attainment
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 levels need to be improved in the North.
Economy X X X X
Social Issues X X X CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013
Policy / decision
X X X X
making Attainment levels X
Governance X X Attainment for
X X X X
economic reasons
Cooperation and
X X X X X
relationship building UArctic X X X X
Regional influence Distance learning X
X X X
or positioning
Sovereignty X Table 29. Education in the Arctic

Table 27. Other Purposes of Research

There is also some consistency, as four strategies mention the
University of the Arctic. However, only Russia mentions dis-
Table 27 also shows that three countries consider that research tance learning in general. Interestingly, the U.S. strategy does
could help with social issues, and three consider that research not discuss education at all.
could also help assert their position within the Arctic. Only two
strategies consider research important to governance, while one The Implementation indicator shows that there are both strik-
mentions that it could help with sovereignty. ing similarities and some fragmentation in how each state ex-
presses its implementation plans. Table 30 shows that seven
There are also some similarities and differences in terms of re- out of eight strategies provide action items indicating how the
search infrastructure. For example, Table 27 shows that universi- strategy is to be implemented. As previously mentioned, the
ties and/or research institutes are the most mentioned infrastruc- U.S. strategy provides a list of items after each line of effort that
ture, appearing in five strategies. Four strategies mention research is suggestive of action items, but the real implementation plan
stations (in the case of Canada, the station was still in the devel- follows in a subsequent document. As for Canada, there are no
opment stage) and four strategies comment on the importance clearly outlined action items, but that is because the government
of formal research networks (i.e., organizations and structures) considers the document itself to be the implementation plan.
through the Arctic Council, the EU, or IASC. Informal networks,
such as cooperation between universities and researchers, is men-
tioned in three strategies. Three strategies also state that icebreak-
ers are used to help facilitate research and scientific activities.

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Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA Why then is Governance, with the most quotes, not among the
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013 official priorities? Is there a mismatch? This is not necessarily
Action items X X X X X X X the case. If Security and/or Stability, which are among the of-
Budget X X X X X ficial priorities, are interpreted as governance issues—as they
Follow-Up X X X
de facto are—and then included as part of Governance, we
have the fourth official priority. From the perspective of both
Evaluation X X
the quantitative and qualitative content analysis, therefore, the
Table 30. Implementation Details Arctic states devote a considerable part of their strategies to
governance and, moreover, explicitly mention their existing
governance structures. This can be interpreted as meaning that
In terms of budgets or funding for the strategies, Finland, the there is major political support for the current high geopoliti-
Kingdom of Denmark, and Russia’s strategies comment that cal stability and international cooperation in the Arctic region
funding will come out of existing budgets, while Russia also and also for the work of the Arctic Council, which is the main
comments that the private sector may also contribute to financ- international forum in the region and dealing with it.
ing aspects of the strategy through partnerships. Canada and
Norway both mention items that will receive funding, but it is This is supported by the strong and unanimous interpretation
not clear if this is new or existing and reallocated funding. by the Arctic states of international cooperation as a key in-
strument of the development of the Arctic, and the high value
As for follow-up, only the strategy of the Danish realm provides placed by those states on international agreements and organi-
detailed information on its plans for follow-up (e.g., steering zations, such as UNCLOS, and the legally binding agreements
committee), while Finland and Iceland remark that certain on the Arctic region under the auspices of the Arctic Council.
ministries will be responsible. As for the USA, this kind of in- Constructive cooperation in the Arctic, based on a common
formation is found in the subsequent implementation plan will, has materialized as human capital. This is the success
document. Only the Kingdom of Denmark and Russia address story and a resilient narrative, as mentioned earlier, that has
evaluation: the former comments on a “mid-term evaluation” maintained the high geopolitical stability in the region.
(2011, 58), while the latter seemingly envisages ongoing moni-
toring processes. It is a little surprising is that only half the strategies have a
global perspective and scale. The reason could be that the cur-
rent national strategies and policies are already 6–10 years old,
Conclusions except for that of Norway which, however, does not present a
global perspective. Are the states afraid of the growing inter-
All Arctic states use the term ‘Arctic,’ and all, except Canada, ests and activities of non-Arctic states if rapid climate change
prioritize it. In the national strategies, this ‘Arctic’ is described melts the rest of the sea ice, in particular, the major economies
to be remote, scattered, and with a spare population. Its eco- which have the status of Arctic Council observers? Or, are they
system is vulnerable, fragile, or unique. While there is no strict afraid of the global commons discourse, in particular, if sci-
definition of the (Arctic) region, there is rather broad agreement ence becomes a more dominant actor playing a more import-
that if there is a southern border to the region, it runs along the ant role in the Arctic, as it does in the Antarctic?
60th Northern parallel.
The Human Dimension indicator has a good number of quotes,
A comparison of the current national strategies and policies of but is not among the official priorities. Furthermore, all strat-
the Arctic states finds, as an overall conclusion, that the econ- egies explicitly mention Indigenous peoples. Six documents,
omy, international cooperation, and environmental protec- including that of Iceland, which has no Indigenous peoples,
tion are the overarching priorities of the Arctic states. On the also recognize Indigenous governments, and another six states,
other hand, according our coding of different indicators, the except Russia and the USA, explicitly mention self-gover-
most-coded quotes relate to the Governance, Economy, Inter- nance/self-determination. Why, then, does the Human dimen-
national Cooperation, and Human Dimension indicators (see sion seem not to be valued by the governments of the Arctic
Appendix). Thus, two of these – Economy and International states—not appearing among their official priorities? Perhaps
Cooperation - align with the priorities identified by the states the importance of issues affecting Indigenous peoples is taken
themselves. for granted, given that the Indigenous peoples are represented
on Arctic Council as Permanent Participants and that Indige-
If, however, the Environmental Protection, Pollution and Cli- nous rights and issues are considered by many Arctic states at
mate Change indicators are looked at as one indicator, all deal- the domestic level.
ing with environmental protection, then the percentage of
quotes coded to these indicators falls between the Governance The big issue of Arctic governance and geopolitics—either
and Economy indicators. This means that there is a fifth ma- challenge or ambivalence—is the environment (environmental
jor priority according to the most-quoted issues or themes, and protection and climate change) vis-à-vis economic activities in
then the three priorities identified by the strategies align with the Arctic. In the national strategies and policies of all the Arc-
the percentages of coded quotes. tic states, there is a balance between environment and economy,

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 Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States

including sustainable development. Most documents also dis- growing conscience about global warming, though pan-Arctic
cuss protected areas or conservation. However, the Economy flight routes would save time and energy, as well as pollute less.
indicator is quoted the most, and within this indicator, mining,
tourism, oil and gas, and fisheries are the top four, which ques- The areas of expertise, stewardship, as well as science & tech-
tions the states’ commitment to balancing the economy and the nology is a priority of five Arctic states, not all. It is weaker
environment. In terms of economic actors, the private sector than the Science and Education indicator in terms of being
is explicitly mentioned in the strategies and is thus a popular quoted in the policy documents. This indicator, however, is
actor. This is followed by the Government/State, although the the most even and has the highest similarity among the Arctic
public sector is depicted as the most important and most want- states, just as environment and climate change are the most
ed economic actor and investor in Arctic regions. important drivers behind Arctic research

It is not surprising that there a great deal of fragmentation The sovereignty of the eight Arctic states over their territo-
with pollutants, and that oil and greenhouse gases are the most ries in the Arctic (excluding international sea areas) is thus
frequently alluded to. While there is a general sense that inter- firmly supported by the official priorities of the Arctic states’
national cooperation can help address pollution, the use of re- strategies, the figures on their quoted interests, and their de
search in this area has been limited. In contrast, there is almost facto priorities —and also by those of the observer states of
a unanimous readiness to listen the scientific community on the Arctic Council, as will be discussed later. This allows us
climate change, which is why climate change is mentioned as to build a more holistic picture of the state of Arctic gover-
the most important driver behind science and research. There nance and geopolitics. Briefly, the main issue is that, although
is also strong common support for international frameworks, there is no international treaty on the Arctic and its environ-
in particular for UNFCCC. It is thus not surprising that envi- ment, the Arctic states have full legitimacy to protect the Arc-
ronmental safety, including pollution and oil spills, together tic ecosystem. Moreover, they have shown increasing concern
with search and rescue, is the most identified safety concerns over the state of the ecosystems, they prioritize economic or
in the Safety & SAR indicator, with maritime safety coming socio-economic development, including large-scale activities
second. A more fundamental question is why the Climate such as mining, oil and gas drilling and tourism, and they sup-
Change indicator is not among the most quoted indicators, port the private sector as the main economic actor. There is an
with the ACIA being launched in 2004 and climate change increasing need for more protection of the fragile ecosystem
having become the most referred-to trigger for the Arctic and and for more strict regulation of their use, for the Arctic states
global change. While the Paris Agreement was signed only in to be legitimized, and for civil society and NGOs to ask them
2016, and thus only the Norwegian current strategy was ad- do more to implement their concerns and principles.
opted after it, climate change is not much quoted even in the
latter. Is this an explanation, or at least an excuse? Or, could it All in all, concluding this section by a short summary: The
be that a real shock is needed, such as the 2018 IPCC Report Arctic states, except the United States of America, clearly state
together with the 2018 and 2019 summers being among the that economy/(socio)economic development is a priority, as
hottest summers on record. It will be interesting to see how well as either have climate change or environmental protection
climate change is addressed in forthcoming strategies of the as a priority, which is striking. All countries, except Canada
Arctic states. and Sweden, state that international cooperation is a priority,
which is relevant. Security and stability are priorities for Fin-
As infrastructure relates to economy and development, and land, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Russia, and the Unit-
includes transportation, it is not surprising that it is quoted ed States of America, which is also relevant, but not striking.
so often. And that it is, in fact, the most quoted indicator in As an overall conclusion, on the one hand, comparing the cur-
the Russian strategy—the Russian strategy focuses on the so- rent official national strategies and policies economy/econom-
cio-economic development of the Russian Arctic, which con- ic development, international cooperation, and environmental
sists of almost half of the entire Arctic region and the coast of protection are stated the overarching priorities by the Arctic
the Arctic Ocean. The topic of Arctic shipping has been hyped, states. On the other hand, according to our coding of different
much like the speed of thinning and melting of the sea ice of indicators, the most-coded quotes relate to the Governance,
the Arctic waters. Thus, the unanimous support of the Arc- Economy, International Cooperation, and Human Dimension
tic states for shipping and transportation in general is noth- indicators, as well as the Environmental Protection one (when
ing new. Likewise, the interest in telecommunication and ICT connected to Pollution and Climate Change), which falls be-
among these states is well known. What is not that well known tween Governance and Economy.
is the high interest in aviation of six states, excluding Canada
and the USA which both also have plenty flight connections
between the northernmost regions and the southern parts of
their respective states. It would be interesting to know more
about this issue and whether the states that focus on aviation
are more interested in increasing the volume of flights going
north–south or rather east–west within the Arctic. Or will avi-
ation services be decreased in the near future due to people’s

121
122
Part II:
Arctic Council Chairmanship
Programs and Declarations

The Arctic Council, as mentioned in the introduction, has a ro- local communities, and identifying the most vulnerable sectors of
tating chairmanship, with each member state serving as chair society” (Norway 2006, 5) within the context of climate change.
for two years. At the start of each chair, a program is produced The second Iceland program also focuses on pollution within its
by the government of the chairmanship country that outlines discussion on the “Arctic marine environment” (Iceland MFA
its agenda for the next two years. Each chairmanship then con- 2019, 3, 4). (see Table 31. Priorities in the Chairmanship Pro-
cludes with a ministerial meeting that provides guidance for the grams, p. 124)
following chair (Arctic Council 2015d) based on a consensus of
the eight member states. In addition to the priorities identified by headings, some of the
programs made clear statements about their intent during their
This section analyzes the declarations and the priorities of each chairmanships. For example, Iceland’s first program states that
state on taking the chair, in order to identify similarities and dif- “The Council’s environmental work has evolved continually
ferences in the collective decisions of the Arctic Council. Each and currently a number of important projects are being un-
set of documents will be compared indicator by indicator. Strik- dertaken under the auspices of the Council’s environmental
ing similarities will be deemed to occur when ten or more decla- working groups. Iceland, during the term of its chairman-
rations address an issue; relevant similarities with seven to nine ship, intends to emphasise successful continuation of the
declarations; and fragmentation with four or fewer declarations. environmental cooperation of the Council. Co-operation
on the social, economic and cultural aspects of sustainable
It is important to note that four declarations—in 1991 in development, on the other hand, has a shorter history with-
Rovaniemi, in 1993 in Nuuk, in 1996 in Inuvik, and in 1997 in the Council. Therefore, Iceland intends to emphasise this
in Alta—are not considered in this analysis, as they were is- part, especially as concerns well-being and quality of life of
sued under the auspices of ministerial meetings of the Arctic the inhabitants of the region” (Iceland MFA 2002, 2).
Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS), not in those of the
Arctic Council. Similarly, the Danish Program states that
“The chairmanship will focus on enhancing monitoring
and assessments to give a more complete picture of status
Chairmanship Programs and trends in the availability of both species that are essen-
tial to traditional lifestyles and new species that in the fu-
A program for a two-year rotating chairmanship of the Arctic ture could constitute important resources for a sustainable
Council is launched at the start of each chairmanship to out- Arctic” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 2).
line the Chair’s priorities and goals for the next two years. This
section analyzes and compares the chairmanship programs that Most of the programs follow a similar structure when it comes
were found on the Arctic Council’s website (note that there to program titles, “Program of, Chairmanship Program for …”.
was no official program in the first Canadian chairmanship in However, when the Chairmanship rotation began its second cy-
1996–1998), and the first one is a Memo on U.S. Chairmanship cle, the programs were given more descriptive titles that are also
Priorities, 1998-2000. As there have been, in 1996–2019, eleven indicative of programs’ priorities. These include:
programs this means that in our coding 10 or more similarities • Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council
are a striking finding, 7 or more similarities are relevant, and 4 Program During Canada’s Chairmanship (2013-15)
or fewer show fragmentation. • One Arctic. Arctic Council U.S. Chairmanship 2015–2017
• Exploring Common Solutions. Finland’s Chairmanship
Table 31 shows the different priorities as identified in the pro- Program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019
gram headings, with the exception of the second Iceland pro- • Together Towards a Sustainable Arctic. Iceland’s Arctic
gram which makes a clear statement about their priorities (see, Council Chairmanship 2019-2021
Iceland MFA 2019, 2). While there are no particularly striking
similarities, there is a general focus on issues of the environ- Comparison by Indicator
ment and the climate, and also on the human aspect of the Arc-
tic. As these priorities are, for the most part, main headings, this The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator does
does not mean that other issues are not addressed within them. not tell us much about how the region is understood or defined
For example, Norway talks about “Strengthening the adaptive in the different programs. Indeed, none of the programs pro-
capacities of Arctic residents, including Indigenous peoples and vide a definition of the Arctic, although that is probably because

123
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
Arctic Council functioning X X X X X
Sustainable Development X X X X X
Climate X X X X X
Science, research, and knowledge X X* X*
Environment X X X X X
Marine Environment X
Biodiversity X
Human dimension / development X X X X
Communities X X X
Indigenous peoples X X
Education X X
ICT X X
Economic Development X
Integrated resource management X X
EU X
Safety and emergencies X X
Operational cooperation X
Responsible resource development X
Green energy X
Arctic Ocean X
Seas X
Arctic awareness X
Meteorological awareness X

Table 31. Priorities in the Chairmanship Programs

*focus on IPY

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

they use the definition of the eight Arctic states from the Arctic

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Council. The programs do use different words to describe the

Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
region, with “Arctic” being the primary descriptor, as shown in
Table 32. For the USA, the term “Far North” is also used as more
of a location that a description: “the United States will continue
highlighting the need to ensure that humanitarian relief reaches Foreign X X X*
those living in the far North” (USA USC 1998, 1). Culture X*
Education X*
Denmark 009-11 Science X*
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06

Environment X* X*
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
Commerce (US) X
Interior (US) X
Minister for
Arctic X* X* X* X* X* X* X X* X X* X* X
Arctic Council
Far North X
Table 34. Ministries in the Chairmanship Programs
Circumpolar X X X X X X X X
*in context of all the ministers of these departments meeting at the Arctic
Polar X
Council.
North X X X

Table 32. Naming the Region in the Chairmanship Programs The Danish Program does not identify any ministries, but it
*Primary term if more than one is used does, however, state: “The Government of Denmark will be
coordinating the chairmanship in close cooperation with the
The Arctic is also described in different ways in the programs, Governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands” (Denmark
and Table 33 shows the descriptors that are used in most of DCAC 2009, 1).
the programs. Interestingly, neither the first American or sec-
ond Icelandic programs use descriptors to define the region, Figure 15 provides a comparison of indicators across the chair-
although the U.S. Program comments on “the unique circum- manship programs as a percentage of the total quotes coded
stances of living in the Arctic” (USA USC 1998, 1) and the Ice- for each indicator. The table shows that International Coop-
landic Program mentions “small and remote Arctic communi- eration, Governance, the Human Dimension, and Science and
ties” (Iceland MFA 2019, 5). Education are the most coded indicators over time, while Se-
curity and Tourism are the least, as they are not mentioned in
every program (see Figure 15. Priorities in the Chairmanship
Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21

Programs, p. 126).
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17

The Figure also shows that with the exception of the current
Finnish and Icelandic programs, at least one indicator is not
Unique X X X X present in the programs. Moreover, as more topics are ad-
Fragile X X dressed over time, this does not mean that they receive simi-
Remote X X
lar treatment in terms of attention being paid to them. Indeed,
some issues, like Governance, are discussed more than others.
Sparse X X
The Figure also shows that Environmental Protection, Pollu-
Vulnerable X X X
tion, and Climate Change gain momentum until about 2013,
Unpredictable X after which they are not mentioned as much.
Amplifier X
Spacious X The Human Dimension indicator shows that there is one strik-
Pristine / clean X X ing finding across the different programs. Indeed, all the pro-
grams address Indigenous peoples, although in different ways.
Table 33. Describing the Arctic in the Chairmanship Programs For example, the first American Program mentions “Saami fish-
eries” (USA USC 1998, 1), while the Danish and Swedish pro-
There is not much information on the different government grams discuss the importance of “traditional food” (Denmark
ministries that have Arctic responsibilities. That said, Table 34 DCAC 2009, 2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 5). In terms of Indigenous
does show what ministries are mentioned, and in many cases, relations with the Arctic Council, the Norwegian Program men-
the programs discuss activities that will bring all ministers from tions the success between the Council and Indigenous peoples
certain departments together. (Norway 2006, 1) and the second Finnish Program comments
on their support for “the strong participation of Indigenous
peoples in the work of the Arctic Council and the integration
of traditional and local knowledge into the programs and proj-

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Russian Kingdom of
USA Finland Iceland Federation Norway Denmark Sweden Canada USA Finland Iceland
1998-2000 2000-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006 2006-2009 2009-2011 2011-2013 2013-2015 2015-2017 2017-2019 2019-2021

Human
Dimension

Governance

International
Cooperation
Environmental
Protection

Pollution

Climate
Change

Security

Safety & SAR

Economy

Tourism

Infrastructure

Science &
Education

0% 1 -5 % 6 - 10 % 11 - 15 % 16 - 20 % 21 - 25 % 26 - 30 % 31 - 35 % 36 - 40 %

Legend

Figure 15. Priorities in the Chairmanship Programs

Note: The numbers represented in each indicator are a percent of the total
number of quotes coded for each document. The scale also ranges from
0 - 40% because none of the percentages went higher than this.

126
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

ects of the Council” (Finland FC 2017, 14). Some programs also “Gender equality can be supported by raising awareness of the
identify areas of improvement: the first Icelandic, Danish, and contribution of women and men to sustainable development.
Swedish, and the second Canadian programs mention the need Finland supports the ongoing work on gender equality in the
to better facilitate Indigenous participation (Canada CC 2013, Arctic Council” (Finland FC 2017, 15). The second Icelandic
2; Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Iceland MFA 2002, 4; Sweden GOS Program states that “Iceland will continue to lead a project that
2011b, 4). The first Finnish Program also mentions “improving aims to promote dialogue on gender equality in the Arctic and
the living conditions of Indigenous peoples” (Finland MFA 2001, strengthen a network of experts and stakeholders in the field”
7), the Russian Program states that Arctic activities “fully cor- (Iceland MFA 2019, 8), suggesting a continuation from the sec-
respond to the needs of the Arctic Indigenous peoples” (Russia ond Finnish Program. While there is still work to be done on
MFA 2004, 6), and the second U.S. Program mentions that the gender, this does suggest that Council has taken up the issue,
Permanent Participants would contribute to maritime environ- even if it is not mentioned in all programs.
mental protection (USA CAC 2015, 4). Considering the breadth
of discussion around Indigenous peoples, it is surprising that the Food security is also mentioned in the Swedish Program as being
second Icelandic Program mentions Indigenous peoples only in connected to traditional food sources (Sweden GOS 2011b, 5).
the context of cooperation within the Arctic Council as Perma-
nent Participants (see: Iceland MFA 2019, 2, 9). The Governance indicator addresses the existing structures
within the Arctic region. Mainly, it refers to the Arctic Council’s
“mandate concerning protection of the Arctic environment” and
Denmark 2009-11

the work of its working groups (AMAP, CAFF, EPPR, PAME),

Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17

which provide recommendations to the AC (USA USC 1998, 2;

Finland MFA 2001, 2; Iceland MFA 2002, 1; Russia MFA 2004,
1; Norway 2006, 1; Denmark DCAC 2009, 1, 2; Sweden GOS
Culture and lan- 2011b, 1; Canada CC 2013, 2; USA CAC 2015, 5; Finland FC
guage recognition X X X X X X 2017, 5; Iceland MFA 2019, 9). Finland, in its first chairmanship
and / or protection program, underlines the unique character and composition of
Gender equality X X X X X the Arctic Council, where “representatives of Indigenous peo-
Food security X ples convene around the same table with representatives of the
Sustainable Devel- governments of the member states.” At the same time, “several
opment for health X X X X observers, states, international organizations and non-govern-
and wellness
mental organizations bring their contributions to the activities
Human health X X X X X X of the Council”, as Finland proposes more active involvement of
Mental wellness X X X the Observers to the work of the AC (Finland MFA 2001, 2,4).
Wellbeing X Sweden, in its program, states that “the Arctic Council and its
working groups should link their scientifically based reports to
Table 35. The Human Dimension in the Chairmanship Programs practical decision-making and policies” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 2).
Iceland, in its first chairmanship program, reminds that “there
Culture is often associated with Indigenous peoples; however, is also need for stronger co-operation between the governments
that is not always the case. For example, the first Finnish Program and stakeholders at all levels” (Iceland MFA 2002, 2).
mentions “Arctic cultures” (Finland MFA 2001, 6), Iceland men-
tions the “Languages of small nations” (Iceland MFA 2002, 4), The majority of the chairmanship programs (see Table 36. Gov-
and Norway discusses “cultural monuments” (Norway 2006, 4). ernance in the Chairmanship Programs, p. 130) underline the
importance of strengthening cooperative relations and bet-
The issue of health is raised in six of the programs (see Table ter coordination with the European Union and other region-
35), while more recently the need to address “mental wellness” al bodies such as the Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council of
is mentioned (Canada CC 2013, 4; Finland FC 2017, 15; USA Ministers, Council of Baltic Sea States, and Parliamentarians
CAC 2015, 2). In contrast to this, the second Icelandic Program of the Arctic Region” (USA USC 1998, 3; Finland MFA 2001,
does not focus on particular health concerns and simply states: 4,7; Iceland MFA 2002, 5; Russia MFA 2004, 4; Denmark DCAC
“Initiatives that aim to promote the wellbeing of the roughly 2009, 2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 2). The most recent chairmanship
four million people living in the region will remain central to programs also address the need to strengthen the “cooperation
the Arctic Council’s work” (Iceland MFA 2019, 8). between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council”
and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (Finland FC 2017, 5, 17; Ice-
Table 35 shows that gender equality is raised in five programs, land MFA 2019, 9,10). In its first chairmanship program, the
and twice by Finland and Iceland The first Finnish Program USA also promises to “encourage region-to-region contact, of
states: “Issues of gender equality have not yet been addressed the sort which has developed between Alaska and the Russian
within the Arctic Council although equality has been promot- Far East under the auspices of the Northern Forum” (USA USC
ed, inter alia, in networks of women from Indigenous com- 1998, 3). Finland, in its first chairmanship program, highlights
munities” (Finland MFA 2001, 6), while the second states that the need for partnership between the AC and the European

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Commission, in order to “strengthen Arctic knowledge and The programs highlight Council’s relations with other regional
co-operation” (Finland MFA 2001, 4). In its second chairman- bodies, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Nordic
ship, Finland proposes to “participate in the continued work of Council of Ministers, Northern Forum, and the UN agencies,
the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, recognizing the including the International Maritime Organization. In addi-
need for implementing an ecosystem-based approach to man- tion, the USA promises to “expand Arctic international coop-
agement and taking into account the positive experiences of eration” in public health (USA USC 1998, 1–2). For the first
cooperation in other sea areas” (Finland FC 2017, 12). The En- time, Finland mentions in its chairmanship program the need
vironmental impact assessment (EIA) is also mentioned as “an to “promote co-operation between the Council and the EU”
important tool for sustainable and responsible development in and “making the EU an Arctic cooperation partner” “so that
the Arctic” and that Finland also “proposes to develop an Arc- the Commission becomes a permanent Observer in the Coun-
tic-specific EIA tool in which public participation is an integral cil.” The cooperation between the Council and the Northern
part of the process” (Finland FC 2017, 11). Forum should also be enhanced (Finland MFA 2001, 4, 7).
Other AC Observer states (and organizations) are also briefly
mentioned (Finland MFA 2001, 3; Iceland MFA 2002, 4 ,5, 6;
Denmark 2009-11

Finland 2017-19 Russia MFA 2004, 4,7; Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Canada CC
Norway 2006-09

Iceland 2019-21
Finland 2000-02

Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Russia 2004-06

2013, 3; USA CAC 2015, 5; Finland FC 2017, 17; Iceland MFA

USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17

2019, 9,11). It is in the second Canadian chairmanship, that

the first reference is made to “establishing a Circumpolar Busi-
ness Forum”, which “will foster circumpolar economic devel-
Eixsting structures X X X X X X X X X X X
opment and provide opportunities for business to engage with
the Arctic Council” (Canada CC 2013, 3). In addition, “Fin-
international and land proposes to deepen meteorological and oceanographic
transboundary X X X X X X X X X X X cooperation among the Arctic States in collaboration with the
cooperation
World Meteorological Organization” (Finland FC 2017, 5, 8).
natural resources, Finland also welcomes the establishment of the Arctic Coast
blue economy, and X X X X X X
licensing
Guard Forum.
public consultations
and env. impact X X X X The Arctic state chairmanship programs also refer to the cat-
assessments egory of Permanent Participants as a body for Indigenous
peoples’ representation in the Council. “Representatives of
Decision making X X X X Indigenous peoples sit at the same table with the member
states’ representatives, participating in the proceedings but
Table 36. Governance in the Chairmanship Programs without power of decision-making” (Finland MFA 2001, 3;
Iceland MFA 2002, 6; Russia MFA 2004, 1; Norway 2006, 1, 2;
Denmark DCAC 2009, 1,2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 1; USA CAC
The International Treaties and International Cooperation 2015, 5; Finland FC 2017, 5; Iceland MFA 2019, 11). Finland
indicator is well-defined and elaborated by all Arctic states in mentions in its first chairmanship program that “At the Rio +
their chairmanship programs, ranging from the first U.S. chair- 10 follow-up meeting of the UN in 2002, the Arctic Council
manship to the latest Icelandic chairmanship (see Table 37, should be able to present its activities to support sustainable
p. 129). The programs mainly refer to cooperation on the level development” (Finland MFA 2001, 5). The Russian Program
of the Arctic Council. The programs also mention the AC’s briefly follows up on this, stating that the Arctic Council “is
important role and activities with a focus on “environmental the main mechanism for implementing the principles of sus-
issues and sustainable development became key elements in tainable development set forth in the Program of Action on
the Council’s sphere of activities” (Finland MFA 2001, 3,5; the Implementation of the Agenda 21 adopted by the UN Con-
Iceland MFA 2002, 2; Russia MFA 2004, 1; Norway 2006, 1,6; ference on Environment and Development in 1992…and the
Denmark DCAC 2009, 1, 2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 1; Canada decisions taken by the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
CC 2013, 2; USA CAC 2015, 1,5; Finland FC 2017, 5; Iceland ment in 2002” (Russia MFA 2004, 1).
MFA 2019, 4). The Icelandic Program highlights the necessi-
ty “to strengthen scientific and technological co-operation for
sustainable development through increased networking be-
tween scientists and research institutions.” In this respect, the
document is the only one of all the documents to refer to the
important role of the International Arctic Science Committee
(Iceland MFA 2002, 3). Not surprisingly, Denmark is the only
one to mention in its program that “the Ilulissat Declaration
of 28 May 2008 underlines that co-operation on the sharing of
information is a prerequisite for addressing future challenges”
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 6).

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

There is also some fragmentation, as two programs mention an-

Denmark 2009-11

Finland 2017-19
imal conservation and invasive species. Moreover, only two pro-

Norway 2006-09

Iceland 2019-21
Finland 2000-02

Sweden 2011-13

Canada 2013-15
Iceland 2002-04

Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
grams mention international cooperation and sharing best prac-
tices. This fragmentation is surprising, as environmental issues
cross national boundaries.
Role and
importance of X X X X X X X X X The Pollution indicator reveals a somewhat fragmented approach
int. cooperation
to addressing pollution. Table 39 shows that starting with the Swed-
Major agreements ish Program, “short-lived climate forcers (SLCF), such as black
X X X X X X X X X X X
and forums
carbon,… and methane” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 2), are consistently
Global Perspective
and Scales
identified as problems for the Arctic, and the second Finland Pro-
gram recognizes that these pollutants can come from outside the
UN SDGs
(or Rio 1992)
X X X region (Finland FC 2017, 11). Oil (pollution) is also mentioned in
four of the last six programs, suggesting that this, along with the
Table 37. International Treaties and International Cooperation in the Chair- short-lived climate forcers, are the primary concern.
manship Programs

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00
The Environmental Protection indicator reveals one relevant

USA2015-17
finding. Specifically, Table 38 shows that seven programs also
address protection of the marine environment, either in gen-
eral or with specific reference to the Regional Programme of Man-made
Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment X
pollutants
from Land-based Activities. Seven programs also mention the
Greenhouse Gases X X
need to find a way to balance environmental protection with
economic activities; yet only three programs mention ecosys- Carbon dioxide X
tem-based management. There are also some similarities, with
six of the programs addressing the issue of biodiversity and five Short lived climate
X X X X X
poll.
programs addressing protected areas.
Black carbon X X X X X
Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06

Methane X X X X X
USA 1998-00

USA2015-17

Radioactive
X
material

Regional Pro- Heavy Metals X

gramme of Action
for the Protection
of the Arctic X X Mercury X X X
Marine Environ-
ment from Land-
POPs X
based Activities
Protect marine
X X X X X X PCBs X
environment
Protected areas X X X X X
Chemicals X
Biodiversity X X X X X X
Invasive species X X
Oil X X X X
Animal
X X
conservation
Mining waste X
Balance
environment and
X X X X X X X
economy (ex. Shipping Waste X
Sustainable dev)
Ecosystem-based Marine litter X
X X X
management
International
X X Plastics X
cooperation
Share best practices X X
Table 39. Pollutants in the Chairmanship Programs
Table 38. Environmental Protection in the Chairmanship Programs

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

It is surprising that the broad term of “greenhouse gases” is used tends to pursue the policy aimed at intensifying efforts taken by
in only two programs (Danish and Swedish), although black car- the Arctic Council Member States within the framework of the
bon and methane are explicitly named in every program since Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)” (Russia
Sweden’s in 2011. The second most-identified pollutant is oil MFA 2004, 4). Both the Swedish and second Finnish programs
(spills), which was mentioned in the Danish, Swedish, second express support for specific projects under AMAP. For Sweden,
Canadian, and second Finnish programs (Canada CC 2013, 3; that is “a report on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on
Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Finland FC 2017, 13; Sweden GOS the acidification of the Arctic Ocean, Arctic Ocean Acidification”
2011b, 2). Plastics is named for the first time in the second Ice- (Sweden GOS 2011b, 4), and the Finnish Program notes that “the
landic Program (Iceland MFA 2019, 4). Table 39 also shows fur- Arctic Council’s report “Chemicals of Emerging Arctic Concern”
ther fragmentation as POPs, PCBs, man-made pollutants, radio- (2017) will guide the work on pollution” (Finland FC 2017, 11).
active materials, chemicals, mining waste, and shipping waste
are each mentioned in only one strategy. There are also some time-specific findings. For example, the
Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arc-
There is also substantial fragmentation with regard to the dif- tic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities and the
ferent approaches to addressing pollution. Table 40 shows that Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic
none of the approaches to problem-solving are mentioned in Marine Environment from Land-based Activities are not men-
more than three programs. For example, only the first U.S., Finn- tioned after 2006. Moreover, the SAR Agreement was signed in
ish, and Russian programs recognize the Arctic Council’s Action 2013, and is thus mentioned in the second Canadian and sec-
Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP) (Finland MFA ond Finnish programs (Canada CC 2013, 3; Finland FC 2017,
2001, 4; Russia MFA 2004, 4; USA USC 1998, 2). Moreover, three 13), while the Polar Code is mentioned in the second Finnish
programs express support for the work of AMAP. For instance, Program (Finland FC 2017, 13). Additionally, it appears that
the Russian Program states that “the Russian Chairmanship in- the Arctic Council’s work with the Framework for Action on

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
Greenhouse gas reduction X X
Short lived climate forcers reduction X X
Global rules on mercury X
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) X
Recognize and support work of AMAP X X X
Recognize and support work of CAFF X
Recognize and support work of EPPR X
Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic
X X X
(ACAP)
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness
X X
& Response in the Arctic
Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane
X
Emissions Reduction
Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane X
Polar Code X
Research on pollution X
Pollution assessments X
Cooperation X
Share best practices X
Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine
X X
Environment from Land-based Activities
Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic
X
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities
Changes to economic activities X
Oil spill prevention or preparedness X X
Regional Action Plan for marine litter X

Table 40. International Treaties on Pollution and Problem Solving Measures

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
from the second Finnish Program (Finland FC 2017, 10) will be

Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
followed up during the second Icelandic chairmanship: “build-
ing on the work of the Expert Group on Black Carbon and
Methane, efforts to identify opportunities to reduce emissions
of short-lived climate pollutants will continue” (Iceland MFA Mitigation/
X X X X X X X
2019, 5). The second Icelandic chairmanship will also start to Adaptation
address marine litter: “The Arctic Council will work on the de- Frameworks:
velopment of a Regional Action Plan to reduce marine litter, in- UNFCC X X X X
cluding micro-plastics, along with other efforts to monitor and IPCC X X
limit its impacts” (Iceland MFA 2019, 4). Paris Agreement X
Kyoto Protocol X
Other approaches to problem-solving include less formal mech-
Scientific
anisms. Iceland mentions pollution assessments in the larger Community Heard
X X X X X X
context of environmental protection (Iceland MFA 2002, 4)
ACIA X X X X X
and Norway mentions increasing knowledge and sharing best
Access to
practices, as well as cooperation: “cooperation under the Arctic Fresh Water
X X
Council and integration of Indigenous peoples’ knowledge into
these efforts has yielded results far greater than could have been Table 41. Climate Action in the Chairmanship Programs
achieved by national efforts alone. This is particularly true in
the fields of long-range pollution and climate change” (Norway With respect to the climate framework, the Russian Program
2006, 1; see also: 3). recognizes that Russia is working with its international partners
on these issues—“a major evidence of this is the ratification by
The Climate Change indicator shows growth in the way that the Russian Federation of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Frame-
climate change is addressed in the chairmanship programs (see work Convention on Climate Change, which cleared the way to
Table 41). From the first U.S. Program, and with the exception the entry into force of that instrument” (Russia MFA 2004, 3–4).
of the Russian, and the second Canadian and U.S. programs, Although Kyoto is not mentioned again, the UNFCCC is men-
there is evidence that the scientific community has been, or is tioned by the Norwegian, Danish, and second Finnish programs
being, heard on this issue. Indeed, the ACIA Report was the first and the IPCC is mentioned by the Swedish and second Finnish
big climate project/study and is mentioned in the first Finnish, programs (Norway 2006, 5; Denmark DCAC 2009, 4; Sweden
Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, and second Finnish programs GOS 2011b, 2; Finland FC 2017, 11). The second Finnish Pro-
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 1; Finland FC 2017, 10; Finland MFA gram also mentions the Paris Agreement, stating that “putting
2001, 5; Iceland MFA 2009, 4; Norway 2006, 5). The Norwegian into practice the commitments of the Paris Climate Agreement
Program recognizes the report’s significance, especially with will be the most important contribution from the Member States
regard to mitigation and adaptation efforts. It states that “ac- in addressing climate change” (Finland FC 2017, 10). Interest-
cording to the ACIA report, the consequences of climate change ingly, the second Icelandic Program does not mention climate
in the Arctic will be dramatic for human life, ecosystems and frameworks and instead states that “Member States take action
many sectors of society. Further studies of impacts and means to address climate change in accordance with their respective in-
of adaptation are needed in order to address these issues” (Nor- ternational commitments and national policies” (Iceland MFA
way 2006, 5), and since then all programs have mentioned mit- 2019, 5).
igation and/ or adaptation. The significance of the ACIA is not
lost in the second Finnish Program which states that “the con- The issue of access to freshwater is brought up in the second
clusions of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004) have U.S. and the Finnish programs. While neither overtly makes
been largely confirmed by local environmental observations” the connection, they both show concerns. For instance, the U.S.
(Finland FC 2017, 10). Program states “the Arctic Council’s work on energy and water
security seeks to improve economic and living conditions in the
region by pursuing innovative technologies to mitigate the sig-
nificant challenges faced by remote Arctic communities” (USA
CAC 2015, 2) and the Finnish Program that “raising awareness
of the state of Arctic freshwater and its ecological, economic, so-
cial and cultural value is also important” (Finland FC 2017, 11).

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

The Security indicator is not captured in any of the first AC is essential to maintain close and effective cooperation among
chairmanship programs (Canada, US, Finland, Iceland, years the Arctic States on search and rescue, as well as emergency pre-
1996–2004). It only appears for the first time in the chairman- vention, preparedness and response. Circumpolar meteorologi-
ship program of Russia in 2004 in connection with environmen- cal and oceanographic cooperation also serves to improve safety
tal security. The Program states that the “main priorities of the at sea and should be developed further, in collaboration with the
Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council include implemen- World Meteorological Organization” (Iceland MFA 2019, 4).
tation of further coordinated measures to protect, preserve and The Safety and SAR indicator demonstrates that safety does not
restore the Arctic environment, enhance environmental security, receive much attention until the Russian chairmanship and then
including prevention of ecological emergencies, as well as to pro- becomes a regular topic starting with the Danish chairmanship.
vide for the rational Arctic resource management in order to en- Table 42 shows that maritime safety is the general regional
sure environmental, social and economic welfare of the present safety concern. Environmental security is also a concern and
and future generations in that region” (Russia MFA 2004, 4). In has been connected to pollution and the potential for oil spills
2006, Norway recognizes the importance of keeping the region (Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Finland FC 2017, 13; Russia MFA
out of conflict, stating that “while many of the other petroleum 2004, 4). Search and Rescue services are also mentioned in five
provinces of the world are characterised by conflicts and politi- programs, and Finland also recognizes that climate change can
cal unrest, the Arctic stands out as a stable and peaceful region” also affect safety (Finland FC 2017, 11).
(Norway 2006, 2). Denmark does not address any security issues
in its 2009 Program. Two years later in 2011, Sweden recognizes

Denmark 2009-11
that “the issue of food safety and access to good quality water

Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
in the Arctic is a matter of constant concern to the region’s in-
habitants and is closely linked to climate change and other envi-
ronmental disturbances” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 5). Canada in its
2013–2015 chairmanship program does not address any securi- Environmental
ty matters. The USA, at the beginning of its AC chairmanship, Safety
X X X
states that “with the increase in human and maritime activity (incl. pollution,
oil spills, etc.)
in the Arctic, Arctic Council members are working together to
Climate change X
promote Arctic Ocean safety, security and stewardship, includ-
ing by exercising Arctic State agreements on search and rescue Maritime Safety X X X X X X

cooperation and oil pollution preparedness and response” (USA Tourism safety X
CAC 2015, 1). Search and Rescue X X X X X
Emergencies
X X X
Finland in its second chairmanship program emphasizes that all (in general)
AC “Member States have pledged to maintain the Arctic as a re-
Table 42. Safety Concerns in the Chairmanship Programs
gion of peace, stability and constructive cooperation” (Finland
FC 2017, 5). Furthermore, Finland states that “the goal must be
to ensure the positive future perspectives of the inhabitants and Interestingly, the Danish Program comments on the challeng-
to improve the safety of communities in the Arctic” (Finland es associated with SAR in the Arctic. The Program states that
FC 2017, 14). In particular, “electronic communication services “due to low population and infrastructure density, emergency
improve safety and quality of life for those who live in or visit response resources are thinly spread over a large area, making
the Arctic. Access to broadband facilitates e-learning, enables for instance search and rescue operations difficult to stage and
the development of digital health and social services, and allows manage” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 6). The second U.S. Strate-
connectivity to media” (Finland FC 2017, 7). Finland also “high- gy comments on the importance of telecommunications for
lights the socioeconomic dimension of freshwater bodies in the rescue operations (USA CAC 2015, 2), suggesting that chal-
Arctic. These are used as sources of water supply, nutrition and lenges remain.
recreation by many Arctic communities and they form an im-
portant part of the food security of the communities” (Finland There are also varied responses to addressing safety issues. Table
FC 2017, 14). Moreover, “health security requires the ability to 43 shows that the most-mentioned response was in support of
prevent, detect and respond to health threats across borders” the work of the IMO (Denmark DCAC 2009, 7), and also the
(Finland FC 2017, 5, 7, 14, 15). In the sphere of security, Finland development of the Polar Code (Canada CC 2013, 3; Finland FC
further welcomes the “establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard 2017, 13). Moreover, the second U.S. and Finnish programs rec-
Forum” and “Under the auspices of the Arctic Coast Guard Fo- ognize the Arctic Council’s SAR agreement (Finland FC 2017,
rum, the Finnish Border Guard will strengthen the cooperation 13; USA CC 2015, 1), while the Russian and Danish programs
with search and rescue stakeholders to promote safety at sea. The mention safety cooperation, which seems to entail efforts lead-
aim is to exchange best practices, align standard operating proce- ing up to the SAR agreement. For instance, the Russian Pro-
dures and promote interoperability” (Finland FC 2017, 13). Ice- gram states that in the context of emergencies “in the longer
land in its second chairmanship program focuses on promoting term we could consider the signing of an intergovernmental
“safe and sustainable shipping in the Arctic” (Iceland MFA 2019, agreement on cooperation between rescue services of the Arctic
4). It continues: “With increasing marine traffic and activities, it Council Member States in this area” (Russia MFA 2004, 6). The

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Danish Program, also in the context of emergencies, states that Indeed, Table 44 shows that four or fewer programs identify a
“there is a growing understanding that the capacity to respond particular industry. Instead, what emerges is that different pro-
to emergency crises in the Arctic should be improved and that grams prioritize different types of activities. For example, the
the means to doing so is through the exchange of information, first Finnish Program focuses on living resources and associated
training and experience, technical development and support, activities (Finland MFA 2001, 7), while Norway tends to focus
and the co-ordination of response” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 6). more on a broad range of natural resources (Norway 2006, 1–3),
The second Icelandic Program also mentions cooperation, but and the second Finnish Program emphasizes more technologi-
does so in the context of shipping and not in relation to any cal or innovative activities (Finland FC 2017, 5).
particular agreement (see: Iceland MFA 2019, 4).

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
Denmark 2009-11

USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17

Natural resources X X X X
Arctic Council SAR Energy X
X X
Agreement
Renewables X X
Arctic Marine
Shipping X Green energy X
Assessment Fossil fuels X
Arctic Coast Guard Oil and gas X X X X
X
Forum
Mining /minerals /
IMO / Polar Code X X X X X X
metals
Satellites X Forestry X
International Hunting X
cooperation on
X X X Fisheries and
rescue services X X
and/ or supports fishing

International Reindeer
X X
cooperation husbandry
X
maritime safety Agriculture X
guidelines
Living marine
International X
resources
cooperation on
X X Bioeconomy X X
weather and
ocean research Shipping X X X X
Information Tourism X X X X X
X
sharing
Technology X
Oil spill
X
prevention Cold climate X
Communication X X
Table 43. Responses to Safety Concerns in the Chairmanship Programs
Construction X
Housing X
The Danish Program also supports international cooperation
Table 44. Economic Activities in the Chairmanship Programs
on creating safety guidelines and sharing information (Den-
mark DCAC 2009, 7). Sweden mentions the importance of the
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment and the need for better oil Sustainable development or sustainable economic activities are
spill prevention (Sweden GOS 2011b, 2). The second Finnish mentioned in all the programs, except the second U.S. Program.
Program mentions the value of satellites for safety purposes and However, the programs address the issue in different ways. For
the role the Arctic Coast Guard Forum can play in improving instance, the first Finnish Program states that “attention should
regional safety (Finland FC 2017, 13). Additionally, both the be paid on not only the ecological dimension but also the social,
second Finnish and second Icelandic Program state the need for cultural and economic dimensions of sustainable development”
“Circumpolar meteorological and oceanographic cooperation” (Finland MFA 2001, 2). The first Icelandic Program, however,
(Finland FC 2017, 8; Iceland MFA 2019, 4) as safety measures, comments on the complexity of sustainable development as it
mainly due to climate change and having WMO as an observer “requires, among other things, adaptation of international edu-
of the Arctic Council. cation and science to regional conditions through local research
and development projects” (Iceland MFA 2002, 1). The Norwe-
The Economy indicator shows that a broad range of economic gian Program diverges a little, however, by stating that “protec-
activities takes place in the Arctic. However, there is no striking tion of the environment combined with sustainable utilisation of
consistency with respect to what these activities are and involve. natural resources should be the core area of cooperation under

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

the auspices of the Arctic Council in the years ahead” (Norway ing, risk management, connectivity, cold-climate technologies
2006, 3), and further at the very beginning of the document that and services, maritime transport, energy, bioeconomy, tourism,
“Until now, the main emphasis has been on sustainable de- housing and mining.” Finland further “proposes to continue
velopment and environmental protection, and an extensive the Arctic Council’s work on telecommunications and explore
knowledge base has been established under the auspices of ways to enhance the connectivity and availability of broadband
the Council. However, it will not be possible to maintain services in the Arctic. This work would take into account the
settlement patterns and ensure growth and welfare without needs of Indigenous peoples, local communities and business-
economic activity. Therefore, the Council should also initiate es, tourism, and researchers” (Finland FC 2017, 5,7). Iceland in
broad political debate on all issues of importance to the Arc- its second chairmanship follows up on its first Program, stating
tic and the people living there” (Norway 2006, 1). that “new economic opportunities, including in shipping and
tourism, can contribute to growth and prosperity of Arctic com-
The Finnish second chairmanship also addresses “the coop- munities, if they are carried out sustainably. Environmental pro-
eration between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic tection and social inclusion must always go hand in hand with
Council to support the goal of facilitating business-to-busi- economic development” (Iceland MFA 2019, 8).
ness activities and responsible economic development” (Fin-
land FC 2017, 5). The Infrastructure indicator shows some similarities and dif-
ferences in the types of infrastructure that are discussed. Table
The first mention of the Tourism indicator is in the Finnish 45 shows that seven programs broach the topic of telecommu-
chairmanship program in 2000, when Finland recognizes the nications and ICT, which will be discussed in more detail later,
success of the Arctic Council’s “tourism project on eco-cul- and six programs address shipping. The Russian Program com-
ture” (Finland MFA 2001, 7). In addition, “Finland aims at ments on the Northern Sea Route (Russia MFA 2004, 2), while
strengthening co-operation on tourism that supports sustain- the Danish Program mentions the Arctic Marine Shipping
able development, by utilizing and co-ordinating the work Assessment (Denmark DCAC 2009, 6); the Swedish Program
done in this field by other bodies, such as the WWF and the mentions that surveillance could help the shipping industry
Northern Forum” (Finland MFA 2001, 7). In 2002 Iceland fol- (Sweden GOS 2011b, 6), and the Canadian and second Finnish
lows up on this, stating in its chairmanship program that the programs mention the Polar Code (Canada CC 2013, 3; Finland
Icelandic “aim is to build on existing international organiza- FC 2017, 13). The second Finnish Program also remarks that
tions and programmes working with issues such as sustainable climate and ocean research will “benefit international shipping
agriculture, communications, tourism, construction, and use and air traffic” (Finland FC 2017, 8), and the second Icelandic
of natural resources” (Iceland MFA 2002, 3). Russia does not Program states that “Iceland will continue to promote safe and
address tourism in its chairmanship of the AC in 2004–2006. sustainable shipping in the Arctic” (Iceland MFA 2019, 5).
Norway in 2006 states in its chairmanship program that “the
establishment of guidelines for responsible development of
Denmark 2009-11

petroleum and mineral resources in the Arctic should be giv-

Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

en priority. The need for guidelines for other activities such USA2015-17
as tourism, shipping, the establishment of infrastructure and
waste management should also be considered” (Norway 2006,
3). Denmark also briefly mentions tourism in its chairmanship Transport X X X
program from 2009, stating how in “responding to the general
Icebreakers X
increase in activities taking place in the Arctic,” it “would be
Shipping X X X X X X
useful to explore how co-operation could be enhanced to fur-
ther the development of guidelines in fields such as tourism, Telecoms / ICT X X X X X X X

shipping and maritime safety, etc.” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 7). Innovation
X
and tech

Sweden does not address tourism in its 2011 AC chairman- Energy X X X X

ship program. Two years later, Canada mentions tourism in Housing X

its 2013 Program, particularly recognizing that “opportunities
Table 45. Infrastructure in the Chairmanship Programs
for tourism are growing in the Arctic.” Canada believes that
“by establishing guidelines for sustainable tourism and cruise-
ship operations, the Arctic Council will encourage the benefits As mentioned, a relevant finding is that telecommunications
that tourism will bring to communities while reducing the risks and ICT are mentioned in seven programs that span a long time
associated with increased activity” (Canada CC 2013, 3). The frame. Table 46 shows that the most common issue was im-
USA does not mention tourism in its chairmanship 2015-2017, proving health services via telemedicine (Finland MFA 2001, 6;
while Finland in its second chairmanship 2017–2019 “strives to Russia MFA 2004, 3; USA USC 1998, 1) or other “digital health
increase the cooperation between the Arctic Council and the and social services” (Finland FC 2017, 7). Another ongoing dis-
Arctic Economic Council to support the goal of facilitating cussion is around the use of ICT to improve educational oppor-
business-to-business activities and responsible economic de- tunities. The first Finnish, first Icelandic, and second Finnish
velopment. Common areas of interest include capacity build- programs comment on distance or e-learning (Finland 2017, 7;

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Finland MFA 2001, 6; Iceland MFA 2002, 2). The two Icelan-

Denmark 2009-11
dic and second Finnish programs also comment on the use of

Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
telecommunications for economic reasons (Finland FC 2017, 8;
Iceland MFA 2019, 8; Iceland MFA 2002, 2).

Research institutes X

Denmark 2009-11
Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
Informal networks X X X X
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
Formal networks X X X X

Table 47. Science Infrastructure in the Chairmanship Programs

Communications
tech and - - - - X X
infrastructure Regarding the formal networks, the first Finnish and first Ice-
Internet X - - - - X landic programs mentions the International Arctic Science
ICT and Committee (IASC) (Finland MFA 2001, 5; Iceland MFA 2002,
X X - - - - X
Arctic Council 3). The Russian Program mentions the International Polar Year
Telehealth /
X X X - - - - X
(IPY) (Russia MFA 2004, 7), and the second Finnish Program
health services calls the Arctic Council a “recognized international forum”
Education X X - - - - X (Finland FC 2017, 5). The Finnish Program is also the only one
Economic
X - - - - X X
to recognize research institutes, and in this case “occupational
development
health research institutes” (Finland FC 2017, 15), as part of the
Safety - - - - X science infrastructure.
Need cost-effective
X - - - -
telecoms
In terms of the reasons for research, Table 48 shows that cli-
Table 46. Telecommunications and ICT in the Chairmanship Programs
mate change is the primary driver as it is mentioned in seven
programs. Pollution is mentioned by three programs, and the
environment in one.
The connection between ICT and the Arctic Council is inter-
esting. For instance, the first Icelandic Program comments that

Denmark 2009-11
“limited time and financial resources can restrain direct partici- Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA 2015-17
pation in the work of the Arctic Council, especially by the Indig-
enous peoples organizations. It is important to strengthen the
use of information technology in the work of the Arctic Council
in order to facilitate communications and consultations” (Ice- Environment X
land MFA 2002, 5). The Russian Program discusses work the Climate Change X X X X X X X
Council is doing on ICT, stating: “We believe it important that
Pollution X X X
the Arctic Council activities continue to be focused on enhanc-
ing cooperation in the field of information and communica- Table 48. Drivers of Research in the Chairmanship Programs
tion technology including further practical steps to develop the
Arctic Information and Communication Technology Network”
(Russia MFA 2004, 3). The second Finnish Program also states However, research does more than just generate new knowl-
that “Finland proposes to continue the Arctic Council’s work edge on these topics. Table 49 shows some of the other purpos-
on telecommunications and explore ways to enhance the con- es that research can be used for. Seven of the programs note
nectivity and availability of broadband services in the Arctic” that research will be used to inform policy or to help with de-
(Finland FC 2017, 7). cision-making. For example, the first Icelandic Program com-
ments on the need for clarity of research findings, remarking
In terms of the Science and Education indicator, Table 47 shows that “research results also need to be presented in a way that can
that the programs primarily identify informal and formal net- be used by policy makers in formulating policies and solving
works as part of their science infrastructure. For informal net- practical matter” (Iceland MFA 2002, 3). The Swedish Program
works, the first Icelandic Program mentions networking and asserts that “strong support for research in this part of the world
general cooperation (Iceland MFA 2002, 3), the Russian Pro- will give decision-makers data on which to base an effective re-
gram states that “further strengthening of the Arctic Council sponse to challenges arising in a rapidly changing region” (Swe-
interaction with other international and regional organizations” den GOS 2011b, 5).
(Russia MFA 2004, 7) which means strengthening networks,
while the Norwegian Program wants to “strengthen the interna-
tional monitoring networks” (Norway 2006, 4), and the Danish
Program to maintain connections developed during the IPY
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 3).

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

al attainment levels, the second Finnish Program remarks that

Denmark 2009-11
“fair educational opportunities in remote areas are key for cre-

Norway 2006-09
Finland 2000-02

Finland 2017-19
Canada 2013-15
Sweden 2011-13
Iceland 2002-04

Iceland 2019-21
Russia 2004-06
USA 1998-00

USA2015-17
ating sustainable development and building resilience in Arctic
communities” (Finland FC 2017, 9).

Social Issues X X
The Implementation indicator shows how the different pro-
grams address these matters. In terms of action items, the en-
Policy /
decision making
X X X X X X X tire program can be considered an action item list, as it out-
Inform AC lines chairmanship priorities and what is expected to take place
X
working groups during a chairmanship. Some items are new, while others ex-
Cooperation X X X X plain how previous work will be carried forward. For example,
Sustainable the first Finnish Strategy states that “during its chairmanship
X
development Finland will promote Arctic research and develop the Universi-
Increase knowledge ty of the Arctic” (Finland MFA 2001, 6) and also that “Finland
X X X
of Arctic aims at ensuring the progress of the Environmental Protection
Education X X Strategy by supporting various environmental programs” (Fin-
land MFA 2001, 5). The first U.S. document, which is a memo,
Table 49. Purpose of Research in the Chairmanship Programs states: “The purpose of this communication is to set out U.S.
thinking on Arctic Council priorities during the period of our
Although somewhat fragmented, both the first U.S. and Norwe- Chairmanship, and, for planning purposes, to provide an ini-
gian programs comment on the assistance of the Arctic Coun- tial calendar regarding proposed Council activities during this
cil in education. The first U.S. Program states that “we attach period” (USA USC 1998, 1), which suggests that the items that
high priority to the Council’s mandate to encourage education follow in the document will be actioned. The second Canadian
and public awareness of Arctic-related matters, and are begin- and U.S. programs are in brochure form and, while short on de-
ning to consider a public affairs strategy” (USA USC 1998, 3); tail, still provide information on what will be done during their
the Norwegian Program states its wish to “use of the work and chairmanships (see: Canada CC 2013; USA CAC 2015).
publications of Arctic Council working groups for educational
purposes” (Norway 2006, 4). This also contributes to increasing With regard to follow-up, the first U.S., Russian, Norwegian,
knowledge of the region (see also: Denmark DCAC 2009, 6). Swedish, and second Finnish programs discuss follow-up ac-
tivities to previously agreed-upon decisions. For example, the
The use and incorporation of traditional knowledge is men- Russian Program states: “Due attention will be given by the
tioned in both of the Finnish, the first Icelandic, and the Nor- Russian Chairmanship to enhanced collaboration in the field of
wegian, Swedish, and Canadian programs. However, the first education and science and to the implementation of the Decla-
Icelandic and Swedish programs mention local knowledge ration of the Meeting of Ministers of Education and Science of
(Finland MFA 2001, 2; Iceland MFA 2002, 3; Norway 2006, 1, the Arctic Council Member States in Reykjavik on June 9, 2004”
4; Sweden GOS 2011b, 5; Canada CC 2013, 4; Finland FC 2017, (Russia MFA 2004, 3).
14) rather than specifically naming Indigenous peoples. Tradi-
tional knowledge is not mentioned in any of the U.S., Russian, Evaluation is mentioned only in a couple of documents. In the
and second Icelandic programs. context of the SDWG, the Russian Program states: “Our suc-
cess will be measured primarily by the extent to which the Arc-
As for education, the UArctic is mentioned in the first U.S. and tic Council Member States manage to translate the SDAP into
discussed in the Finnish, Icelandic, Russian, and Norwegian practical activities, specific projects in each area of sustainable
programs in one capacity or another (USA USC 1998, 3; Fin- development, and to attract resources, first of all financial ones,
land MFA 2001, 5, 6; Iceland MFA 2009, 3; Russia MFA 2004, 6; needed for its realization” (Russia MFA 2004, 2). The Swed-
Norway 2006, 4). Distance learning outside the UArctic is men- ish Program states: “Before the start of the Norwegian Chair-
tioned in two programs. The first Icelandic Program specifically manship of the Arctic Council in 2006, Norway, Denmark and
mentions that “the Internet is increasingly being used in ele- Sweden informally adopted a joint ‘umbrella programme’ for
mentary and secondary schools and by the same token the res- their successive chairmanships. Sweden intends to highlight the
idents in remote communities may now take university courses jointly agreed objectives and the results achieved at the foreign
through distance learning” (Iceland MFA 2002, 2). While the ministers meeting in 2013” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 6).
second Finnish program also notes “access to broadband facil-
itates e-learning” (Finland FC 2017, 7), but does not comment To sum up
on the level of education covered by the distance learning. For
access to education, the first Icelandic Program comments on As a whole, the chairmanship programs tend to focus on issues
how the University of the Arctic has created an “international pertaining to the environment. In the past few years there has
and interdisciplinary Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies, which also been a focus on pollutants that contribute to climate change.
were initiated in the spring of 2002” (Iceland MFA 2002, 3), As for the social aspect, there is an overall focus on health and
which would create more access to education. For education- wellbeing, as well as culture and/or language protection. Gen-

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

der equality also shows up on the agenda every few years or so. Programs vis-à-vis
Maritime safety has also emerged as a safety concern over the
past few programs. Arctic States’ Strategies
Overall, it is surprising that the chairmanships do not have for- This section examines the Arctic Council chairmanship pro-
mal or public evaluation processes, especially as the ministerial grams in relation to the current Arctic state strategies. Before
declarations produced at the end of the Chairmanship are root- delving into this discussion, it is important to have a better un-
ed in consensus and provide a future vision for the Council and derstanding of the timeline in which the strategies and chair-
not a critical reflection of the previous two years. Instead, a SAO manships began. The bottom of Figure 16 shows the dates of the
report to ministers is issued at the end of the chairmanship to chairmanships, and the top shows when the different strategies
provide a summary of achievements for the working groups and were written. (see Figure 16. Arctic Council Chairmanships and
other initiatives during the chairmanship and their plans during Arctic State Strategies Timeline)
the next chairmanship (for example, see, Arctic Council 2019c).
While this is informal and useful for a better understanding of Figure 16 shows that it took 10 years after the start of the Arctic
the breadth of work of the Council, how effective the chairman- Council for the Arctic states to create their own national strate-
ship program has been is not mentioned. gies and policies. Norway was the first to do so with its strategy
of 2006, which was also the year it began its first chairmanship.
The Swedish Program remarks that “before the start of the Nor- Sweden also released its strategy in the same year, even on the
wegian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2006, Norway, same day, as its first chairmanship, and Denmark’s first strategy
Denmark and Sweden informally adopted a joint ‘umbrella was released in the year prior to its first chairmanship. For the
programme’ for their successive chairmanships” (Sweden, GOS other states, there was a flurry of activity, even a sort of national
2011b, 6). As this analysis shows, climate change and addressing competition by the Arctic states (see Heininen 2011), between
how the Arctic Council functions are the only priorities the three 2009 and 2013. In 2009 Canada, Iceland, Norway, the Russian
have in common (see the beginning of this section). However, Federation, and the USA released their own strategies. In 2010
there is some commonality shown when different indicators are Canada and Finland each released a strategy. The year 2011 saw
examined. For example, in the environmental protection indica- the release of four more strategies, including that of Sweden,
tor, all three programs address protected areas and biodiversity which was the last to create such a document. Three strategies
protection. With climate change, the three programs discuss miti- were then released in 2013, while Norway went on to release
gation and adaptation, and indicate that the scientific community updated strategies in 2014 and 2017. This shows that the release
is important for climate action, which aligns with the science and of national strategies for the Arctic is not necessarily aligned
education indicator where climate change is identified by all three with chairmanships.
as a driver of science. That said, there are also many instances
where there is no commonality between the three programs.

Figure 16. Arctic Council Chairmanships and 2011

Arctic State Strategies Timeline Iceland
Kingdom of
Denmark
2009
Norway
Canada
Sweden
Iceland
Norway
USA 2013
Finland
2006
Russian
Norway
Federation
2008
USA
Denmark & 2010 2019*
Greenland
Canada Canada
Russian Finland 2014 2017
Federation Norway Norway

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

1996-1998 1998-2000 2000-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006 2006-2009 2009-2011 2011-2013 2013-2015 2015-2017 2017-2019 2019-2021
Canada USA Finland Iceland Russian Norway Kingdom Sweden Canada USA Finland Iceland
Federation of
Denmark

* Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was published in September 2019.

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

As previously mentioned, there tends to be some fragmentation While in the 2009 Strategy, security is described extensively in
of priorities within both the strategies and the chairmanship the Security indicator, in the chairmanship program it is not re-
programs. For the current strategies, the priorities that appeared flected at all.
in five or more documents are environmental protection (6), in-
ternational cooperation (6), economic development (5), and se- For the Safety indicator, the two documents express a desire for
curity/stability (5). There is less consistency in the chairmanship maritime safety. As for ways to address safety issues, the Pro-
programs, as only issues concerning the main functions of the gram mentions the IMO and Polar Code, whereas the Strategy
Arctic Council: the environment (5), climate (4) and sustain- mentions domestic regulations, like NORDREG.
able development (4), as well as improving the Arctic Council’s
functioning (4) appeared in four or more documents. The only For the Economy indicator, resource development is mentioned
overlap between the two document sets is the environment, and in both documents. Yet, while natural resources are an import-
within the environment, only Finland, Russia, and Sweden ap- ant aspect of the economic discussion in the 2009 Strategy, the
peared on both lists. Program identifies “responsible Arctic resource development”
(Canada CC 2013, 2) as a priority, although it does not actually
Comparison by Country speak to what resources will be developed and how. Instead, it
focuses on how the Arctic Council can help and mentions the
Canada began its second Chairmanship in 2013, four years after need for sustainability.
the release of its 2009 Strategy. As the Program is a short bro-
chure, it does not have as much detail as Canada’s Strategy and The Tourism indicator is reflected in the 2009 Strategy mainly in
policy documents, but some comparisons can be made. These connection to the “increased number of ships undertaking des-
two documents will be compared. tination travel for tourism” (Canada INAC 2009, 5). The second
chairmanship program follows up on that with reference to the
For instance, with the Human Dimension, both the Program establishment of “guidelines for sustainable tourism and cruise-
and the 2009 Strategy address issues around health and well- ship operations” (Canada CC 2013, 3).
being, the Program also addresses the issue of mental wellness,
suggesting a deeper understanding of health concerns faced by The only similarity to the Infrastructure indicator is that both
northern communities. documents address shipping, particularly in relation to safety.

In both indicators—Governance and related International Co- The only similarity between the documents with regard to Sci-
operation—Canada highlights the importance of cooperation ence and Education is that the importance of traditional knowl-
in the region as well as recognizing the Arctic Council as the edge is recognized in both.
most relevant and key institution for “deepening global under-
standing of the Arctic” (Canada INAC 2009, 35). Canada also The first Finnish Chairmanship began in 2000 (until 2002),
emphasizes the need to strengthen the Arctic Council, improve eight years before the release of its first Arctic Strategy. The sec-
the “coordination and maximize efficiencies,” and “enhance the ond Strategy was released in 2013 and was in effect during Fin-
capacity of the Permanent Participant organizations” (Canada land’s second Chairmanship from 2017–2019. The current 2013
CC 2013, 2). Strategy and 2017–2019 Program will now be compared.

Regarding the Environmental Protection indicator, the two In the Human Dimension, both the current Strategy and lat-
documents express the need to protect the marine environment, est Program mention improving mental wellness. However, the
especially in the context of pollution, as well as the need to bal- Program takes the discussion further and address suicide pre-
ance environmental protection with economic activity. vention (Finland FC 2017, 15). A difference between the two
documents is that the Program explicitly addresses improving
For the Pollution indicator, there are differences between the “gender equality in the Arctic Council” (Finland FC 2017, 15),
Program and the 2009 Strategy. Notably, the Program recogniz- while the Strategy less so.
es pollutants that affect climate change, such as black carbon
and other short-lived climate pollutants, while the 2009 Strategy The Governance and International Cooperation indicators un-
mentions waste from economic activity and ballast water patho- derline the relevance of multilateral cooperation to solve com-
gens. As for problem-solving, the Program mentions the Arctic mon challenges. Interestingly, while the Strategy quite exten-
Council’s oil pollution agreement, while the Strategy seeks to sively supports the “EU’s policy towards the Arctic” and “the
reduce pathogens from ballast water and suggests changes to reinforcement of its role in the region” (Finland PMO 2013, 47),
economic activity may help. the chairmanship program does not talk about the EU at all.

With regard to the Climate Change indicator, the only com- For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents
monality between the Program and the Strategy is that miti- state that an ecosystem-based management structure is im-
gation and adaptation are mentioned in both documents. The portant to regional environmental protection. However, the
Program does not mention frameworks or the role of science in 2013 Strategy speaks more about finding a balance between the
climate action, while the Strategy does. environment and the economy, whereas the Program focuses

138
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

more on biodiversity. This suggests either that Finland’s envi- ness activities and responsible economic development” (Finland
ronmental focus changed over time, or that there were lessons FC 2017, 5). This approach is also supported in the 2013 Strategy
learned from the feedback of the 2010 Arctic Strategy. by focusing on increasing the level of sustainable tourism.

In terms of the Pollution indicator, only four pollutants are For the Infrastructure indicator, both documents refer to trans-
mentioned in both documents, including short-lived climate portation infrastructure, including icebreakers and shipping, as
forcers, black carbon, methane, and oil, while the 2013 Strategy well as telecommunications and ICT, housing, and energy in-
additionally mentions greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, ra- frastructure. There are some similarities and differences in how
dioactive material, economic waste, and local waste. As for pol- these issues are discussed. A similarity, for example, is that ac-
lution problem-solving, the Program identifies six approaches cess to energy and energy efficiency are mentioned in both docu-
and the Strategy four. Yet, the only overlap is with respect to ments. A difference is that, while the Strategy mentions that ice-
acknowledging the Arctic Council’s oil spill agreement and breakers serve a variety of functions (economic, research, etc.),
changes to economic activity. the Program only mentions them in relation to research.

For the Climate Change indicator, both documents recognize For the Science and Education indicator, climate change is
the importance of science and research for climate action and identified as the driver behind scientific activities in both doc-
that both mitigation and adaptation strategies are needed. In uments. Both documents indicate that research would be for
terms of understanding the contexts in which this kind of work decision-making purposes, while the Strategy also notes that re-
can be done, there are, however, differences between the two search can be used for economic, social, governance purposes,
documents. Notably, the Strategy makes a general reference to and regional influence. Traditional knowledge is also acknowl-
“global climate negotiations” (Finland PMO 2013, 13) while edged in both documents, although the use of this knowledge
the Program mentions the UNFCCC, IPCC, and the Paris is more explicit in the Program. In terms of education, only the
Agreement. A key difference is that the Strategy names climate UArctic is mentioned in both documents, but only in relation to
change as a security issue whereas the Program does not. the UArctic International Secretariat in the Strategy. In contrast,
the Program links the UArctic to teacher training.
In the case of the Security indicator, both documents illustrate
the importance of maintaining “the Arctic as a region of peace, Iceland’s two strategy documents (2009, 2011) were released be-
stability and constructive cooperation” (Finland FC 2017, 5). tween Iceland’s two chairmanships (2000–2002 and 2019–2021).
Security and stability in the Arctic region are considered as vital As such, the most current Strategy (2011) (Iceland Althingi.
for any activities and efforts to develop the economy. While the 2011) and Program (2019) will be compared.
Strategy refers to the rather traditional way of understanding of
security in connection to “foreign and security policies” (Fin- There are some similarities between the current Strategy and
land PMO 2013, 14) (including crime prevention), the Program current Program in the Human Dimension indicator. For exam-
reflects health and food security, as well as maritime security. ple, they both express the importance of wellbeing and of gender
equality. However, gender is only mentioned in passing in the
The Safety indicator shows some similarities in safety issues, Strategy, while the Program contextualizes gender equality in
such as SAR and transport/shipping safety. As for environmen- sustainable development. Both documents also mention Indig-
tal safety, the Strategy suggests that pollution is the priority, enous Peoples, although the Strategy speaks about Indigenous
whereas the Program suggests that climate and weather are en- rights, whereas the Program only discusses Indigenous Peoples
vironmental concerns. To address safety issues, both documents in relation to the Permanent Participants.
recognize the importance of satellite monitoring and communi-
cations, as well as the role of the IMO and Polar Code and the In the International Cooperation and Governance indicators,
Arctic Council’s SAR agreement as structural frameworks for the Icelandic Strategy expresses the need for inclusion of all
maritime safety. eight Arctic states in discussions or important decisions. Iceland
clearly states the disagreement with an approach in which “other
For the Economy indicator, the Program mentions only two eco- members of the Arctic Council, i.e. Iceland, Finland, Sweden and
nomic activities: fishing and reindeer husbandry, both of which representatives of Arctic Indigenous peoples, were excluded from
were identified among the twelve activities mentioned in the the meetings” (Iceland Althingi 2011, 6) of the five littoral Arc-
Strategy. The Strategy provides much more information about tic states (e.g., Ilulissat Declaration 2008). In the Program, Ice-
how the economy will be prioritized. One key issue is addressed land stresses the importance of “cooperation between the states
in both documents: that business development requires com- and peoples,” as well as to “strengthen cooperation between the
munications and information networks. As this is mentioned in Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council” (Iceland MFA
documents that were written four years apart, this suggests that 2019, 2, 10). In the Program there is no mention of the exclusion
more work is needed in this area. from discussions or decisions by the five Arctic states.

The Tourism indicator is briefly addressed in the Program in re- For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents
lation to the increase in cooperation between the Arctic Council indicate that environmental protection and economic activ-
and the Arctic Economic Council to support “business-to-busi- ities must be developed through sustainable practices, while

139
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

the Program focuses more on the marine environment than The Tourism indicator is briefly mentioned in both documents
the Strategy does. but in different contexts. While the Program talks about tour-
ism as one of the “new economic opportunities” (Iceland MFA
The Pollution indicator suggests more concern and awareness 2019, 9), the Strategy illustrates the connection of utilizing the
of regional pollution between the 2011 Strategy and the 2019 Arctic resources for different industries, including tourism.
Program. More specifically, the Strategy mentions only green-
house gases, whereas the Program identifies short-lived climate In terms of the Infrastructure indicator, the only similarity be-
pollutants, black carbon, methane, marine litter, and plastics as tween the Strategy and the Program are discussions around safe
pollution problems. The two documents also take different ap- shipping, although the Program also calls for shipping to be sus-
proaches to problem-solving. For instance, the Program focuses tainable. Moreover, the Program mentions telecoms and ICT,
on the work of the Arctic Council through the Expert Group on and energy infrastructure, while the Strategy mentions infra-
Black Carbon and Methane, and the Regional Action Plan for structure for air transportation.
marine litter, while the Strategy looks at other international fo-
rums, such as the UNCLOS, the UNFCCC, and the IMO, as well For the Science and Education indicator, both documents ex-
as through international cooperation, monitoring, and changes plain that climate change is a driver for research, while the Strat-
to economic activities. egy also mentions the environment and social issues. The two
documents diverge on the purposes of research, with the Pro-
For the Climate Change indicator, both documents acknowl- gram recognizing that it can help inform policy and the Strat-
edge that scientific research is important, although the Pro- egy arguing that research can help international cooperation.
gram is more explicit about the role that science plays in cli- Interestingly, traditional knowledge is not addressed in either
mate action. Mitigation and adaptation are mentioned in the document. Education is mentioned only in the context of the
Program but not in the Strategy. As for frameworks, the Strategy UArctic.
mentions the UNFCCC, while the Program does not mention
specific frameworks, but recognizes that frameworks are imple- The Kingdom of Denmark released its first Strategy one year
mented at the state level. prior (2008) to the commencement of its Chairmanship (2009-
2011), and its second one in 2011, the year its Chairmanship
Despite Iceland having no army, the Security indicator is dis- concluded. The Chairmanship Program will thus be compared
cussed quite broadly in the Strategy, especially in connection to the most recent policy (2011).
to strengthening security and prevention of militarization. The
Strategy also refers to NATO and its increasing role in the re- In terms of the Human Dimension indicator, both documents
gion. The Program specifically mentions only the promotion of address Indigenous peoples, although with some differences.
safety in regard to shipping and marine traffic. For example, the Program addresses the role of the Permanent
Participants in the Arctic Council and improving the wellbeing
There is some consistency in the Safety indicator with regard of Indigenous peoples, as well as ensuring traditional lifestyles
to understanding regional safety issues. For instance, both doc- are preserved, while the Strategy mentions hunting. The Strat-
uments acknowledge maritime safety, SAR, and emergencies/ egy differs in the sense that it provides considerable discussion
civil preparedness as concerns, while the Strategy also mentions on Indigenous rights in Greenland, through UNDRIP and other
environmental safety and surveillance. Both documents discuss UN mechanisms.
how international cooperation can improve safety, although in
different ways. For example, the Strategy recognizes more ‘tra- Concerning the Governance and International Cooperation
ditional’ forms of state-to-state cooperation with activities like indicators, the Program focuses on the importance of a strong
surveillance and SAR, whereas the Program recognizes that Arctic Council to “safeguard the inherent cultural, economic
safety cooperation also takes place through SAR cooperation, as and political rights of the Arctic states and of the Peoples of the
well as through weather and ocean research. The Strategy also Arctic” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 8). The Program also supports
mentions other governance organizations, such as the Arctic “international outreach, research and co-operation” (Den-
Council (SAR agreement), IMO, and NATO. mark DCAC 2009, 1) with neighboring countries in different
policy fields. The Strategy on the other hand, elaborates more
The Economy indicator shows some overlap and divergence in on international law in order “to ensure a peaceful, secure and
the economic activities mentioned in the Strategy and the Pro- collaborative Arctic” (Denmark MFA 2011, 7). It also reflects
gram. In terms of overlap, both documents mention tourism. on the self-government and the division of legislative and
The Program mentions green energy, while the Strategy men- administrative powers between Denmark, the Faroe Islands,
tions renewable energy; the Program mentions living marine and Greenland.
resources while the Strategy mentions fisheries (and that fish are
living marine resources). The divergence is interesting, as the There are similarities in the topics addressed in the Environ-
Strategy mentions oil and gas, and mining, while the Program mental Protection indicator, as both documents discuss bio-
mentions bioeconomy and shipping. While the differences are diversity and animal protection, as well as the need to balance
not major, it does indicate a possible shift toward more green or environmental protection with economic activities. However,
sustainable economic activities. the Strategy also discusses protected areas, which the Program

140
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

does not. The Strategy discusses, too, the use of ecosystem- Tourism is mentioned in the Program in relation to the develop-
based management, while the Program does not. These two ment of guidelines for the responsible management of resourc-
differences suggest that the Kingdom of Denmark’s under- es in the light of increased activities in the region. The Strategy
standing of environmental protection may have evolved talks about tourism as being the second “most important export
during its Chairmanship. industry” after fisheries in Greenland (Denmark MFA 2011, 23).
At the same time, the Strategy addresses both “land-based tour-
There are a number of similarities in the Pollution indicator ism and the cruise-liner business” (Denmark MFA 2011, 23).
with regard to the regional pollutants identified. Indeed, both
documents mention greenhouse gases, heavy metals, mercury, There are two similarities in the Infrastructure indicator: First
oil, and economic waste. Additionally, the Strategy mentions is that both documents discuss shipping, although the Program
man-made pollution, POPS, and chemicals. Correspondingly, does so in the context of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
the Program mentions only greenhouse gas reduction, where- ment, while the Strategy looks the possibility of new routes
as the strategy mentions this, five other international treaties opening and safety issues. The second similarity is in regard to
or governance regulations, and other practices like changes to energy, with the Program commenting that heating through the
economic activities. In both cases, the Strategy shows growth use of fossil fuels is expensive and the Strategy building on this
in Denmark’s understanding of the sources of pollution and idea and discussing options for the generation, supply, and de-
mechanisms to address it. livery of renewables.

For the Climate Change indicator, both documents address For the Science and Education indicator, both documents iden-
mitigation and adaptation, although with different empha- tify climate change and pollution as research drivers, while the
ses. For instance, half the quotes in the Program address Strategy additionally mentions the environment. Regarding the
mitigation, while the other half address adaptation. In con- purposes of research, there is only one common purpose men-
trast, the majority of quotes on this issue address adaptation tioned in both documents, namely, that research can help with
in the Strategy. Nevertheless, both documents recognize that social issues, particularly in the area of health. Additionally, both
research is important for climate action. The two documents documents make statements about using traditional knowledge
also acknowledge the UNFCCC, while the Strategy alludes to alongside scientific knowledge. Education is discussed only in
the creation of the Paris Agreement. One key difference is that the Strategy with reference to the UArctic and increasing educa-
the Strategy recognizes the impact climate change could have tional opportunities for economic reasons.
on illegal fishing.
Norway’s first Strategy was released the same year as it held its
The Program does not address the Security indicator at all. The first Arctic Council Chairmanship (2006–2009). Since then,
Kingdom’s approach to security policy is broadly described in Norway has released four strategies in 2009, 2011, 2014, and
the Strategy, emphasizing the prevention of conflicts, sover- 2017. The chairmanship program will thus be compared to the
eignty, confidence-building, and international relationships. most recent (2017) Strategy.
The Strategy also talks about the establishment of the Arctic
Response Force and NATO as a reference to the protection of For the Human Dimension indicator, both documents address
its territory under the Article 5 of collective defence. culture and languages, in two somewhat similar ways. First,
both documents speak about Indigenous culture. For instance,
There are also some similarities and differences in the Safe- the Program recognizes that “environmental change in the Arc-
ty indicator. For instance, both documents recognize that tic will affect … Indigenous cultures” (Norway 2006, 1), and
SAR and maritime safety are important, while the Strategy the Strategy remarks that Indigenous language and culture
also mentions environmental, disaster, health, and occupa- need to be protected. Second, both documents discuss culture
tional safety. There are some similarities in how safety is ad- as experiential. The Program, for example, talks about cultural
dressed. For instance, both documents identify the IMO as a monuments and world heritage sites, while the Strategy posi-
safety actor: the Program calls for cooperation on SAR while tions “cultural heritage” in the context of tourism (Norway MFA
the Strategy mentions the adoption of the Arctic Council’s 2017, 24).
SAR agreement. International cooperation is also addressed
in both documents, especially in terms of creating maritime Both documents address the Governance and International
safety guidelines, while the Program also mentions informa- Cooperation indicators in connection with close international
tion sharing. As for differences, the Strategy also recognizes cooperation at different levels and particularly within the envi-
UNCLOS as a safety actor and the importance of surveillance. ronmental field. The Arctic Council is considered the most rel-
evant body for cooperation in the region. The Strategy further
For the Economic indicator, both documents mention tour- describes other platforms where Norway cooperates—“the Bar-
ism, oil and gas, and renewables. The Strategy also mentions ents cooperation, the Baltic Sea cooperation, and the Northern
mining, fisheries, and exports. The Strategy provides sugges- Dimension” (Norway MFA 2017, 17). The Program also men-
tions on how to further prioritize economic development, tions the World Heritage Convention.
while the Program does not.

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents and gas, mining, fishing, reindeer husbandry, and shipping. This
remark that environmental protection and economic develop- overlap suggests that these are key economic activities. Addi-
ment must be balanced. It is thus not surprising that the Pro- tionally, the Program mentions fossil fuels, hunting, and tech-
gram and Strategy also mention the use of ecosystem-based nology, while the Strategy mentions renewables, aquaculture,
management10 to ensure this takes place. Additionally, the two blue economy, tourism, cultural products, and biotechnology.
documents state that biodiversity needs to be protected. Sustainable development is also mentioned in both documents,
although the Strategy provides a more nuanced discussion as to
There are some differences for the Pollution indicator. In par- what this entails.
ticular, the Program mentions only chemicals and radioactive
material as regional pollutants. In contrast, the Strategy, written The Tourism indicator is discussed in the Program, in accor-
11 years later, also identifies greenhouse gases, PBTs, oil, mil- dance to the Strategy, in relation to the establishment of guide-
itary waste, microplastics, marine litter, and local pollution in lines and infrastructure for responsible and sustainable devel-
addition to radioactive materials. This suggests that Norway is opment of the Arctic resources and activities.
keeping pace with pollution, especially as it refers microplastics
in its Strategy. As for approaches to pollution problem-solv- There is nothing in the Program under the Infrastructure indi-
ing, the only similarity between the documents is their call for cator, whereas the Strategy discusses transportation, icebreak-
international cooperation. Otherwise, the Program also men- ers, shipping, telecommunications and ICT, innovation and
tions pollution research and sharing best practices, while the technology, and energy infrastructure.
Strategy identifies formal structures like the Paris Agreement,
the Arctic Council’s oil spill agreement, and enforcement of do- For the Science and Education indicator, both documents
mestic legislation. identify climate change as a driver of science, while the Pro-
gram also mentions pollution and the Strategy mentions the
One key difference in the Climate Change indicator is that while environment. Both documents mention decision-making sup-
both documents discuss mitigation and adaptation, the Strategy port as a purpose of Science. Additionally, the Program notes
does not use these terms explicitly. Both documents also stress that science can also be used to help the economy, while the
that science is the basis for further knowledge about climate Strategy notes that it can help improve knowledge of the Arc-
change, while the Strategy mentions putting this knowledge tic, and for education. There are no similarities between the
into action. As for frameworks, the Program mentions the UN- documents with respect to education. Indeed, the Program
FCCC and the Strategy mentions the Paris Agreement, suggest- acknowledges only the UArctic, while the Strategy addresses
ing that Norway is part of a larger, international effort to address educational attainment levels and comments that education
climate change. can be used for economic reasons.

The Program reflects briefly on the Security indicator only once, The first formal strategy of the Russian Federation was released
mentioning that the Arctic is a “stable and peaceful region,” un- in 2008, two years after the conclusion of its chairmanship
like “many other petroleum provinces of the world which are (2004–2006). The second Strategy was released in 2013, and this
characterized by conflicts and political unrest” (Norway 2006, will be compared to the chairmanship Program.
2). The Strategy provides a broader understanding of the se-
curity in the region. The Strategy confirms that “foreign policy Regarding the Human Dimension indicator, both documents
should lay the foundation for peace and stability in the region” express a desire to protect traditional Indigenous ways of life
(Norway MFA 2017, 9). At the same time, it describes the “role and Indigenous culture. The Strategy explains that cultural in-
played by the Norwegian Armed Forces in exercising sovereign- frastructure and activities (Indigenous and not) will also be de-
ty and authority” (Norway MFA 2017, 18). For the first time, veloped. Both documents also address wellbeing, but in differ-
a Norwegian strategy comments on the increase of “Russian ent ways. The Program, for instance, speaks about health and at
military activity in the North” (Norway MFA 2017, 18) which times connects this back to the environment. The Strategy also
should be considered an important factor for Norway’s security mentions health concerns, but also more broadly speaks about
and defence policy. The Strategy also addresses the measures to conditions that affect wellbeing, such as access to telecommuni-
strengthen defence capabilities in the North. cations, employment, and access to social services.

The Program has nothing to say about the Safety indicator, For the Governance and International Cooperation indicators,
whereas the Strategy identifies different safety issues, interna- both Russian documents emphasize the need for “enhancing
tional safety and SAR agreements, speaks about safety coopera- international cooperation in the field of environmental protec-
tion, and discusses different capabilities. tion” (Russia MFA 2004, 3). The Arctic Council is considered to
be a “unique forum for interaction” (Russia MFA 2004, 1) of dif-
There is some overlap between economic activities in the Econ- ferent stakeholders. In the Program, Russia also calls for a more
omy indicator. Both the Program and the Strategy mention oil substantial and balanced contribution of the Arctic Council to

10 The Strategy mentions only ecosystem-based management as a strategic objective and does not provide much detail on the topic (Norway MFA 2017, 15).

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

resolve the challenges connected to “sustainable development of The Tourism indicator is reflected only in the Strategy and is
the Arctic” (Russia MFA 2004, 1). fully excluded from the Program. The Strategy addresses the
intention of the Russian Federation to develop and expand
For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents “environmentally friendly tourism activities in the Arctic.” The
discuss the need to balance environmental protection with eco- Strategy also emphasizes the need for improvement of “the reg-
nomic development and the protection of biodiversity. One dif- ulatory framework of tourism” (Russia TRG 2013, 3).
ference is that the Strategy discusses the creation of protected
areas while the Program does not. As for the Infrastructure indicator, both documents discuss
transportation, shipping, and telecommunications and ICT.
Regarding the Pollution indicator, the Program notes only that The discussion around telecoms and ICT is interesting as the
man-made pollution is a problem. The Strategy mentions oil, Program seeks cooperation on developing these networks and
economic activities, and military waste as pollutants—all of also using them for health services. The Strategy also recognizes
which are man-made. While the Strategy does not name all the the need to improve this infrastructure, especially as it can help
pollutants it could (compared to the other strategies), it is more with social and economic conditions, research, and safety. The
specific than the Program. The documents also differ somewhat fact that this is still being discussed nine years later suggests the
in how they address pollution problem-solving. The Program complexity of this type of infrastructure in the Arctic.
only makes reference to the work of the Arctic Council, in-
cluding the Russia-specific Russian Program of Action for the For the Science and Education indicator, both documents iden-
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based tify climate change as a driver of research, and both explain that
Activities. In contrast, the Strategy does not reference Arctic research is also used to help with international cooperation.
Council activities, but also mentions pollution monitoring, However, the Strategy provides more information and indi-
changing domestic practices, and changing economic practices. cates that science is also driven by the environment and natural
Considering the nine years between the Program and Strategy hazards, while research can also help with economic and so-
there has been progress in cleaning up the environment. cial issues. Neither document mentions the role of traditional
knowledge. As for education, the Strategy explains the need for
The Climate Change indicator is discussed differently in the two distance-learning opportunities, while the Program suggests
documents. For example, the Program refers to the UNFCCC that the UArctic can possibly help with education on a number
and the Kyoto Protocol, while the Strategy notes that climate of issues. Educational attainment levels are addressed only in
change needs to be studied. Neither document mentions miti- the Strategy, and within the context of improving people’s em-
gation and/or adaptation. ployment opportunities.

In the Program, the Security indicator is discussed in terms of Sweden’s Strategy was released in 2011, the year its Arctic
the need for measures “to protect, preserve and restore the Arc- Council chairmanship began. As Sweden only has one Strategy,
tic environment, [and] enhance environmental security, includ- this will be compared to the chairmanship Program.
ing prevention of ecological emergencies” (Russia MFA 2004,
4). The Strategy describes “the establishment of integrated secu- In the Human Dimension indicator, both documents brief-
rity system for the protection of territory, population and crit- ly identify gender as an issue. The Program calls generally for
ical facilities” of the Russian Arctic (Russia TRG 2013, 4). The gender equality, while the Strategy more clearly indicates that
Strategy also indicates the need for a “comprehensive combat increased gender issues are needed in international organiza-
and mobilization readiness level” of the armed forces required tions. A difference between the two documents is that the Strat-
for “aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, to egy addresses human rights by mentioning both UNDRIP and
ensure the sovereign rights of Russia’s Arctic,” to provide “strate- the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the Program
gic deterrence, and in the event of armed conflict - repel aggres- does not.
sion and cessation of hostilities” (Russia TRG 2013, 8).
Concerning the International Cooperation and Governance
For the Safety indicator, both documents recognize that en- indicators, both documents emphasize that despite substantial
vironmental safety and SAR are important: the Program and challenges, “cooperation in the Arctic is characterised by a low
Strategy mention the need to be prepared, for, respectively, gen- level of conflict and broad consensus” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 1).
eral emergencies and for disasters, and to improve transport The Arctic Council is considered as “the main multilateral arena
safety. Both documents state that international cooperation for for Arctic-specific issues” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 19). The Strate-
rescue operations is important, while the Strategy also discusses gy further mentions their desire to strengthen the Arctic Coun-
surveillance capabilities. cil “both institutionally and politically” (Sweden GOS 2011a,
19) (see also, Kiruna Vision (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013)).
The Economy indicator shows different ways in which regional It also describes the cooperation with other organizations in the
economic activities are understood. The Program mentions the region as well as the need to respect international law in devel-
use of natural resources, oil and gas, and renewable energy. The oping the Arctic.
Strategy mentions hydrocarbons, but also identifies hunting,
fishing, bioprospecting, biotechnology, and technology.

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents The only similarity between the two documents regarding In-
support the creation of protected areas and the protection of frastructure is that both mention shipping and address safety is-
biodiversity. Both also mention the need to balance environ- sues, while the Strategy also comments on the possibility of new
mental protection with economic activity and suggest that routes opening.
an ecosystem-based management may be the way to achieve
this balance. For the Science and education indicator, both documents identi-
fy the environment and climate change as drivers of science. De-
For the Pollution indicator, there are similarities in the pollut- spite these similarities, the two documents note that research can
ants identified. For instance, both documents mention short- be used for different purposes. For instance, the Program notes
lived climate forcers, greenhouse gases, methane, mercury, and that it can be used to help with social issues and decision-mak-
oil. The Program also mentions black carbon, and the Strategy ing, while the Strategy notes that research can help with gover-
identifies POPs, PTBs, PCBs, chemicals in general, soot, and nance, cooperation, and regional influence. Both documents also
waste from economic activity. Yet, despite these similarities, comment on preserving traditional knowledge, and the Strategy
the only comment on pollution problem-solving, mentioned in comments on the need to improve the sharing of traditional and
both documents, is the need to reduce greenhouse gases. scientific knowledge. Education is not addressed in the program;
however, the UArctic is mentioned in the Strategy.
For the Climate Change indicator, both documents address
mitigation and adaptation, support the use of science to better The USA’s first chairmanship was from 1998–2000, but the USA
understand climate change, and make reference to the IPCC. In did not publish its first strategy until 2009 with the release of
addition, the Strategy also mentions the UNFCCC. What really the presidential and homeland security directives. This was then
stands out, however, is that the Strategy names climate change followed by the 2013 Strategy, two years before the USA’s sec-
as a security factor, and the Program does not. Although securi- ond chairmanship (2015–2017). Thus, the 2013 Strategy and the
ty, and military security in particular, is not normally addressed 2015–2017 chairmanship Program will be compared. It should
in the Arctic Council, the Strategy frames this threat as an issue be noted that as the Program is short and in brochure form, com-
of “public crisis management” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 14), an is- parison may be limited.
sue that could have been addressed in the Program but is not.
Regarding the Human Dimension indicator, the two documents
The Security indicator is mentioned in the Program only in re- discuss Indigenous peoples in different ways. The Program, for
lation to food safety and access to good quality water as being example, mentions only that the Permanent Participants will
a matter of constant concern to the region’s inhabitants. The work with the Arctic Council on environmental issues, while the
Strategy elaborates a little more on security, underlining that Strategy recognizes the role of Indigenous governments, Indig-
the Arctic remains a region where security policy tensions are enous-state relations, and respecting Indigenous cultures. An-
low. Moreover, the Strategy emphasizes the “importance of an other difference is that the Program addresses mental wellness,
approach based on security in its broadest sense and that the while the Strategy does not address health and wellbeing at all.
use of civil instruments is preferable to military means” (Swe-
den GOS 2011a, 23). The International Cooperation and Governance indicators are
mentioned in both documents in connection to the important
For the Safety indicator, both documents mention environmen- role of the Arctic Council as the “preeminent international fo-
tal and maritime safety, while the Strategy also mentions SAR, rum for promoting cooperation” (USA CAC 2015, 5). The AC
surveillance, and transport safety. To address these safety issues, promotes “cooperation, coordination and interaction among
the Program mentions working toward oil spill prevention ca- the Arctic States, Indigenous communities and other interested
pabilities and the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping As- parties on common Arctic issues, with particular emphasis on
sessment, while the Strategy mentions the Arctic Council SAR sustainable development and environmental protection” (USA
agreement and the efforts toward creating the IMO’s Polar Code. CAC 2015, 5). The Strategy further reflects on the accession of
the USA to UNCLOS.
Regarding the Economy indicator, economic activities referred
to in both documents are mining, oil and gas, and shipping. The Regarding the Environmental Protection indicator, both docu-
Strategy identifies a broad range of activities, including but not ments recognize the need to balance environmental protection
limited to cold climate expertise, bioprospecting, and forestry. with economic activities. The Program also discusses marine
protected areas, while the Strategy speaks more generally about
The Tourism indicator is described only in the Strategy. A fur- preservation.
ther development of the tourism is mentioned, “albeit with con-
sideration for the environment and the traditional lifestyles of There are some similarities in the Pollution indicator, with both
Indigenous peoples.” Furthermore, “communications between documents identifying black carbon and methane as pollutants
tourist destinations should be improved in a sustainable man- found in the region. The Program also more generally mentions
ner” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 6). short-lived climate pollution, while the Strategy mentions mer-
cury and oil. Regarding pollution problem-solving strategies,
the two documents provide different options. The Program calls

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for the reduction of short-lived climate forcers, while the Strat- Declarations
egy mentions the Arctic Council’s oil pollution agreement, the
need for pollution research, international cooperation, and de- This section analyzes the Ottawa Declaration, which provides
velopment of national pollution strategies. the foundation for the work of the Arctic Council, as well as
the ten ministerial declarations that followed, from Iqaluit in
The only similarity in the Climate Change indicator is that both 1998 to Fairbanks in 2017 (see, List of declarations in appen-
documents mention adaptation. Interestingly, the Strategy links dix). The Kiruna ministerial meeting also adopted a special
climate change to increased energy security. Vision for the Arctic paper produced by the Arctic Council
Secretariat (Kiruna Vision 2013). The 2019 Rovaniemi Minis-
The Program briefly addresses the Security indicator in relation terial meeting failed to produce a signed declaration because
to the increased human and maritime activity in the Arctic. The consensus could not be reached on the issue of climate change.
Strategy illustrates that the US “security in the Arctic encom- Instead, the Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement 2019 was
passes a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those sup- signed by representatives of the eight Arctic states, while the
porting safe commercial and scientific operations to national Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Timo Soini, also made
defense” (USA TWH 2013, 2). For the first time, the Strategy a Statement by the Chair (Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair
also mentions energy security as a core component of the na- 2019). The Statement by the Chair resembles what would have
tional security. Furthermore, the USA supports “the enhance- been the declaration had all parties agreed to it, and provides
ment of national defense, law enforcement, navigation safety, guidance; that is why it is considered in this analysis.
marine environment response, and search-and-rescue capabili-
ties” (USA TWH 2013, 6). Unlike the Arctic state strategies, it is harder to determine
the priorities of the Arctic Council ministerial declarations,
Following from this, for the Safety indicator, both documents as they do not generally include priority statements. Priorities
comment on environmental safety and SAR as safety issues. can, however, be determined based on the different section
Regarding safety agreements and capabilities, each document headings of the document. Table 50 provides this overview
mentions the Arctic Council’s SAR agreement. and it groups similar issues together. Note that the first Iqa-
luit and Barrow declarations do not have headings, making it
For the Economy indicator, the Program does not mention any difficult to determine their priorities. The 1996 Ottawa Decla-
economic activities (or anything about the economy for that ration on the establishment of the Arctic Council also has no
matter), whereas the Strategy mentions energy, oil and gas, re- headings; it was decided to follow Arctic Council procedure
newables, shipping, and export trade. and to define “common Arctic issues, in particular issues of
sustainable development and environmental protection in the
None of the documents reflect on the Tourism indicator. Arctic” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 1) as the two main func-
tions or pillars of the Council. In this study, these were deemed
For the Infrastructure indicator, the only similarity is that both to be the priorities of the document.
documents address innovation and technology. For the Pro-
gram, this includes finding solutions for “energy and water se- In Table 50 below, Ministerial Declaration Priorities, there are
curity” (USA CAC 2015, 2), whereas the Strategy suggests that, no striking or relevant similarities per se and a great deal of
in general, technology can support regional infrastructure. fragmentation. However, when similar issues are looked at
together, four relevant similarities emerge. First, eight decla-
The two documents identify different research drivers in the rations address human and social issues when combining the
Science and Education indicator: the Program mentions pollu- human/social development, health, communities, and capaci-
tion, while the Strategy mentions the environment. As for other ty-building priorities. Similarly, eight declarations also priori-
research purposes, the Strategy states that research can inform tize the environment, when environmental protection, marine
decision-making, while the Program does not mention any environment, biodiversity, flora and fauna, pollution, and con-
other purposes. Another difference between the documents is taminants are taken together. Seven declarations prioritize cli-
the stated importance of traditional knowledge in the Program mate change. Seven declarations also address the functioning
while the Program does not mention it at all. Education is not of the Arctic Council, and every declaration since Kiruna in
mentioned in either document. 2013 has taken on this task. As the permanent Arctic Council
Secretariat was established in 2013, this suggests that it may
Finally, concluding this section by a short summary: The Arctic have identified areas of improvement.
Council chairmanship programs tend to focus on issues pertain-
ing to the environment. In the past few years, there has also been Taken together, the main priorities would thus seem to be: the
a focus on pollutants that contribute to climate change. As for the human dimension, environmental concerns, and ensuring a
social aspect, there is an overall focus on health and wellbeing, functioning Arctic Council.
as well as culture and/or language protection. Gender equality
shows up on the agenda every few years or so. Maritime safety
has also emerged as a safety concern over the past few programs.

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Comparison by Indicator

Rovaniemi 2019
Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator identi-

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
fies how the Arctic is defined in the context of the Arctic Coun-
cil. Specifically, the Ottawa Declaration’s opening statement
AC
X X X X X X X
defines the Arctic in a geopolitical context, stating: “THE REP-
Procedure RESENTATIVES of the Governments of Canada, Denmark,
International
X X* Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and
cooperation
the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Arc-
Human /
tic States) meeting in Ottawa” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 1).
social X X X X* X* X
development This definition is not disputed or expanded upon in subsequent
Health X
declarations.
Communities X
There is consistency in the terms used to describe the region (see
Capacity
building
X Table 51). All declarations primarily use the term “Arctic” while
Economy
also using, to a lesser extent, “circumpolar” with the exception
X* X*
of the Rovaniemi Chair Statement which only uses the term as
Energy X
part of a proper name.11 Additionally, the Tromsø Declaration
Sustainable
development
X X* X (2009, 3–4) uses the term “polar” in the context of the IPY.
Env.
protection
X X* X X X* Describing the Arctic was not really done until Salekhard in 2006
Marine Env. X X X X X
and it stopped with Fairbanks in 2017. There is also no consisten-
cy in the terms that are used, although “vulnerable” and “unique”
Climate
change
X X X X X* X X* are used most often, and in the context of the environment.
Biodiversity X X X

Rovaniemi 2019
Flora &

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004
X

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Fauna
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
Pollution X X
Contami-
X X
nants
Unique X X X
Monitoring &
X Remote X
Assessment
Science & Vulnerable X X X X
X
Monitoring Harsh X
Int’l Polar
X X
Year Table 51. Describing the Arctic in the Arctic Council Ministerial Declarations
Ocean Safety,
security, X X
stewardship Each declaration is signed by a representative of the eight Arctic
Emergencies
states. Table 52 (Arctic State Representation at the Arctic Coun-
X X
cil Ministerial Meetings, p. 147) shows which ministry, depart-
Table 50. Ministerial Declaration Priorities ment, or agency had a representative (either the minister or a
*two or more issues were linked in one declaration senior official) attending the ministerial meeting and signing
the declaration. In the case of the Ottawa Declaration, state rep-
The table also shows fragmentation. For example, energy is resentatives signed on behalf of their government and not as a
identified only once, and surprisingly emergency preparedness representative of a particular ministry.
only twice, like international cooperation. That said, the discus-
sion in each section reflects a broader range of issues, which is For each subsequent declaration, signatories were identified
why an indicator-by-indicator comparison is necessary. based on their ministry, department, or agency. Either the
Premier or the Deputy Premier for Greenland signed for the
Barrow, Reykjavík, and Nuuk declarations, while the Prime
Minister of the Faroe Islands was also signatory in Nuuk (Nuuk
Declaration 2011, 10; Reykjavik 2004, 8; Barrow 2000, 8). Table
52 also shows consistency from certain states in terms of who
signed the declarations. For example, Sergey Lavrov represent-

11 For example, the Circumpolar Resilience, Engagement and Action Through Story report and the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program’s State of the
Arctic Freshwater Biodiversity report are mentioned (Rovanimei Statement by the Chair 2019, 4, 8).

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Canada Finland Iceland Denmark Norway Rusia Sweden USA

Ottawa
1996

Iqaluit Lloyd Axworthy, Pekka Haavisto, Gudmundur Niels Helveg Knut Vollebaek, Vladimir Goman, Anders Bjurner, Wendy Sherman,
1998 Minister of Minister of Bjamasson, Petersen, Minister for Chairman of Deputy State Ambassador
Foreign Affairs Environment Minister of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the State Secretary
Environment Foreign Affairs Committee for
the Development
of the North

Barrow Mary Simon, Johannes Siv Fridleifsdottir, Jonathan Johan L. Løvald, Yuri Tsaturov, Eva Kettis, Frank E. Loy,
2000 Ambassador Koskinen, Minister for the Motzfeldt, Assistant First Deputy Ambassador Under Secretary
Minister of Environment Premier, Secretary Head Federal of State for
Justice Greenland General Service for Global Affairs
Home Rule Hydrometerology
and Environmen-
tal Monitoring

Inari William Graham, Erkki Tuomioja, Halldór Ásgríms- Ole Samsing, Kim Traavik, Roald F. Piskoppel, Anna Lindh, Paula Dobriansky,
2002 Minister of Minister for son, Minister for Senior Arctic State Secretary Deputy Minister Minister for Under Secretary
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Official of Economic Foreign Affairs of State
Development for Global
and Trade Affairs

Reykjavík Stéphane Dion, Erkki Tuomioja, Davíð Oddsson, Josef Motzfeldt, Jan Petersen, Sergei Lavrov, Laila Freivalds, Paula Dobriansky,
2004 Minister of the Minister for Minister for Greenland’s Minister of Minister of Minister for Under Secretary
Environment Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Deputy Premier Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs of State
for Global Affairs

Salekhard Robert Mills. Erkki Tuomioja, Valgerður Connie Jonas Gahr Støre, Sergei Lavrov, Carl Bildt, Paula Dobriansky,
2006 Member of Minister for Sverrisdóttir, Hedegaard, Minister of For- Minister of Minister for Under Secretary
Parliament Foreign Affairs Minister for Minister for the eign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs of State for
Foreign Affairs Environment Global Affairs

Tromsø Lawrence Cannon, Alexander Stubb, Ásta Ragnheiður Per Stig Møller, Jonas Gahr Støre, Sergey Lavrov, Carl Bildt, James Steinberg,
2009 Minister of Minister for Jóhannesdóttir, Minister of Minister of Minister of Minister for Deputy Secretary
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Minister of Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs of State
Social Affairs

Nuuk Leona Aglukkaq, Jakko Laajava, Össur Lene Espersen, Jonas Gahr Støre, Sergey Lavrov, Carl Bildt, Hillary Clinton,
2011 Minister of Health Under-Secretary Skarphéðinsson, Minister of Minister of Minister of Minister for Secretary of State
of State Minister for Foreign Affairs; Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs Kaj Leo Johannesen,
Prime Minister
Faroe Islands;
Kuupik Kleist,
Premier
Greenland

Kiruna Leona Aglukkaq, Erkki Tuomioja, Hermann Örn Villy Søvndal, Espen Barth Eide, Sergey Lavrov, Carl Bildt, John F. Kerry,
2013 Minister for the Minister for Ingólfsson, Minister of Minister of Minister of Minister for Secretary of State
Arctic Council Foreign Affairs Director General Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs

Iqaluit Rob Nicolson, Erkki Tuomioja, Gunnar Bragi Martin Lidegaard, Børge Brende, Sergei Donskol, Kristina Persson, John Kerry,
2015 Minister of Minister for Sveinsson, Minister of Minister of Minister of Minister Secretary of State
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Natural Resources for Nordic
Foreign Affairs and Environment Cooperation

Fairbanks Christina Timo Saini, Guðlaugur Þór Anders Samuelsen, Børge Brende, Sergey Lavrov, Margot Rex Tillerson,
2017 Alexandra Minister for Þórðarson, Minister of Minister of Minister of Wallstrbm, Secretary of State
Freeland, Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Minister for
Minister of Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs

Rovaniemi Chrustia Freeland, Timo Saini, Guðlaugur Þór Anders Ine Eriksen Sergey Lavrov Margot Michael R.
2019 Minister of Minister for Þórðarson, Samuelsen, Søreide, Minister Minister of For- Wallstrbm, Pompeo,
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Minister for Minister for of Foreign Affairs eign Affairs Minister for Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs State

Table 52. Arctic State Representation at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings

147
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

ed Russia at seven of the ministerial meetings, Erkki Tuomioja sures taken in relation to the International Year of Indigenous
represented Finland at five, and Carl Bildt represented Sweden Languages declared by the United Nations General Assembly
at four while others have attended only a couple of meetings. Of in 2019” (2019, 9).
course, who attends depends on the governments of the day of
the Arctic states; it is thus important to see what position was

Rovaniemi 2019
Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004
held by the signatories and from which ministry they came. In

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Nuuk 2011
the early years, signatories represented a broad range of minis-

Inari 2002
tries, but this began to change around 2002 when, for the most
part, the signatories were from the Ministry of/for Foreign Af-
fairs (or the State Department in the USA). However, it was not Permanent
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Participants
until 2017 in Fairbanks that, for the first time, all signatories
Culture and
were Minister of/for Foreign Affairs/Secretary of State, and this
language rec-
was replicated in the most recent meeting in Rovaniemi. This ognition and /
X X X X X X X
shift, starting in the early 2000s, is suggestive of the growing or protection
importance of the Arctic and the Arctic Council. Gender
X* X X
equality

Regarding the content of the declarations, Figure 17 (Compar- Food security X X X X X

ison of Arctic Council Ministerial Declarations, p. 149) shows Poverty X
that International Cooperation, Governance, Human Dimen- Sustainable
sion and Environmental Protection to be the most-quoted in- Development
X X X X X X X X
for health and
dicators across time. In contrast, Tourism and Security are the wellness
least-quoted indicators across time, and in some cases, are not
Human
mentioned at all. health
X X X X* X X X X X X X X

Mental health X X X X X
The Figure also shows that, over time, more topics are ad-
Recognize
dressed and in greater detail. This is suggestive of both the work of X X X X
expanding mandate of the Arctic Council and the growing im- SDWG
portance of new concerns, such as Climate Change (after the
launch of the ACIA Report in 2004) and Infrastructure. Table 53. The Human Dimension in the Ministerial Declarations
*strong connection.
The Human Dimension indicator reveals some similarities
and differences in priorities regarding the Human dimension Another striking similarity is that all declarations address is-
in the Arctic. Table 53 shows that Indigenous peoples, and sues of human health. Health discussions address telemedicine
especially the Permanent Participants, are addressed in ev- (Reykjavik 2004, 3; Inari 2002, 2; Iqaluit 1998, 2) in the earlier
ery declaration. Indeed, all declarations make statements that years, and mental health in more recent years (Rovaniemi 2019,
recognize and value the contributions of Indigenous peoples 8; Fairbanks 2017, 3; Iqaluit 2015, 13; Kiruna 2013, 2; Nuuk
to the Arctic Council. For example, the first Iqaluit Declara- 2011, 5), including for Indigenous peoples. Moreover, eight dec-
tion comments that “the category of Permanent Participation larations make the connection between sustainable development
is created to provide for active participation and full consul- and health and wellness.
tation with the Arctic Indigenous representatives within the
Arctic Council” (Iqaluit 1998, 1). There are also repeated re- However, there is also some fragmentation, especially around
quests for financial support for the Permanent Participants. certain issues of equality. For example, only the Salekhard Decla-
For example, the Nuuk Declaration reiterates “the need to ration (2006, 3) mentions Indigenous poverty. Food security, es-
finance circumpolar cooperation, as well as the importance pecially for Indigenous peoples, is mentioned in five declarations
of providing adequate funding to Permanent Participants to (Rovaniemi Statement 2019, 5; Fairbanks 2017, 3; Iqaluit 2015, 7;
support their preparations for, and participation in, the Arctic Nuuk 2011, 6; Barrow 2000, 4). Finally, gender inequality is men-
Council, the working groups, task forces and Arctic Council tioned in three declarations: in the Inari Declaration (2002, 2)
projects” (Nuuk 2011, 9). Seven declarations also address In- the ministers of the eight Arctic Council states: “Recognize the
digenous culture and languages. For instance, in the second crucial role of women in developing viable Arctic communities,”
Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6) the Ministers of the eight Arctic while also recognizing that gender equality can improve well-
states: “Recognize the importance of Arctic Indigenous lan- being and violence against women can harm it (Inari 2002, 2).
guages in empowering Arctic communities, and look forward In the second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 7) the ministers: “Note
to continuous efforts to assess and promote Arctic Indigenous the work done for the Arctic Council through the second Arctic
languages through the Arctic Council”, while the Rovaniemi Human Development Report, acknowledge that gender equality
Chair Statement notes that the Council “welcomed the con- is very important for economic, social and cultural development
clusions of the Teacher Education for Diversity and Equality and improves the prospects for future generations in the Arctic,
in the Arctic project, including the call to promote Indigenous and welcome[s] the report on current gender realities and future
languages in education, as well as national and regional mea- challenges.” Finally, the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 9)

148
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Ottawa Iqaluit Barrow Inari Reykjavík Salekhard Tromsø Nuuk Kiruna Iqaluit Fairbanks Rovaniemi
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Human
Dimension

Governance

International
Cooperation
Environmental
Protection

Pollution

Climate
Change

Security

Safety & SAR

Economy

Tourism

Infrastructure

Science &
Education

0% 1 -5 % 6 - 10 % 11 - 15 % 16 - 20 % 21 - 25 % 26 - 30 % 31 - 35 % 36 - 40 %

Legend

Figure 17. Comparison of Arctic Council Ministerial Declarations

Note: The numbers represented in each indicator are a percent of the total
number of quotes coded for each document. The scale also ranges from
0 - 40% because none of the percentages went higher than this.
Russian Kingdom of
USA Finland Iceland Federation Norway Denmark Sweden Canada USA Finland Iceland
1998-2000 2000-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006 2006-2009 2009-2011 2011-2013 2013-2015 2015-2017 2017-2019 2019-2021

Human
Dimension

Governance

International
Cooperation
Environmental
Protection

Pollution

Climate
Change

Security

Safety & SAR

Economy

Tourism

Infrastructure

Science &
Education 149
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

states that “it welcomed gender equality perspectives in the work United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention
of the Arctic Council and encouraged their mainstreaming”. on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.” The declaration
also “reaffirm our commitment from the Alta Declaration to take
In the Governance indicator, the AC declarations refers to the the findings and recommendations from the AMAP Report Arc-
Arctic Council as a key high-level forum for cooperation in the tic Pollution Issues : A State of the Arctic Environment Report,
Arctic. Beginning with the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998), the into consideration in our policies and programmes, to increase
majority of the following declarations also “emphasize the need our efforts to limit and reduce emissions of contaminants into the
for the Arctic Council and its programmes to cooperate close- environment” (1998, 3).
ly with existing organizations such as the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and other appropriate

Rovaniemi 2019
fora, including scientific bodies” (Ottawa 1996, 1,2; Iqaluit 1998,

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
6; Barrow 2000, 1,7; Inari 2002, 1,6; Reykjavik 2004, 7; Salekhard

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
2006, 9; Tromsø 2009, 1,9; Kiruna 2013, 1; Fairbanks 2017, 1;
Rovaniemi 2019, 1). The Inari Declaration (2002, 5) talks spe-
cifically about “closer cooperation between the Arctic Council Existing
X X X X X X X X X X X
and the European Commission.” The importance of the AC for structures

Arctic states, expressed in the ministerial declarations of 2000, international

and trans-
2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009, is further discussed in detail under boundary
X X X X X X X X X X X X
the International Cooperation indicator. Additionally, the Inari cooperation
declaration “take note of the recommendations issued by the 5th natural re-
Conference of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and wel- sources, blue
X X X X X X X X X
economy, and
come their continuous cooperation and support” (Inari 2002, 6).
licensing
public con-
The AC declarations stress the necessity of “full consultation with sultations and
X X X X X X
and the full involvement of Indigenous people and their commu- env. impact
nities and other inhabitants of the Arctic” (Ottawa Declaration assessments

1996, 1) on the “decision-making in relation to policy planning Decision

X X X X X X X
making
and implementation” (Salekhard 2006, 3). Therefore, “the cate-
gory of Permanent Participation is created to provide for active Table 54. Governance in the Ministerial Declarations
participation and full consultation with the Arctic Indigenous
representatives within the Arctic Council” (Iqaluit 1998, 1). At
the same time, the declarations of 1996, 2002, 2006, 2013, 2015, The International Treaties and International Cooperation indi-
2017, and Statement of 2019 acknowledge the need to pay “atten- cator illustrates how important collaboration is on the regional
tion to the impact of development and the use of natural resourc- and international level for all Arctic states (see, Table 55). The
es on the traditional sources of livelihood of Indigenous peoples first AC declarations already state that Arctic states are “Desiring
and their communities” (Inari 2002, 4). further to provide a means for promoting cooperative activities
to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation, and
The Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 5) refers for the first time to “pro- to ensure full consultation with and the full involvement of In-
mote the application of the Arctic Council Offshore Oil and digenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of
Gas Guidelines” and “an assessment of the adequacy of exist- the Arctic in such activities” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 1).
ing international agreements and arrangements related to the
protection of the Arctic marine environment.” The Guidelines The Arctic states emphasize “the importance of circumpolar
are mentioned once again in the Tromsø Declaration (2009, 5). and international cooperation as being fundamental to address-
The AC declarations of 1998, 2000 and 2002 further “acknowl- ing circumpolar challenges” and confirm that “in international
edge the successful integration of the Arctic Environmental Pro- relations the rule of law is a prerequisite for peaceful regional
tection Strategy (AEPS) and the four working groups” into the development” (Barrow 2000, 1; Inari 2002, 6; Reykjavik 2004, 1,
Arctic Council (Iqaluit 1998, 3). The Rovaniemi Chair Statement 2; Salekhard 2006, 2; Tromsø 2009, 1). Furthermore, the Arctic
(2019, 5) refers for the first time to “the Agreement to Prevent states “welcome the increased contributions to Arctic coopera-
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean” tion by non-arctic observer countries as well as scientific institu-
from 2018, “which provides for possible future fisheries regula- tions, international organizations and NGOs” (Inari Declaration
tion and strengthens future marine science cooperation” as well 2002, 5).
as ensuring “conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks in
Arctic waters.” The most discussed forum for cooperation in the AC declara-
tions is undoubtedly the Arctic Council. The high level forum
The Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 4) talks about the “ratification and “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and
implementation of the Protocols on the elimination or reduction interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the
of discharges, emissions and losses of Persistent Organic Pollut- Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on
ants (POPs) and of Heavy Metals under the framework of the common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable devel-

150
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

opment and environmental protection in the Arctic” (Declara- towards an effective, ambitious, durable international climate
tions of 1996, 1; 1998, 1; 2000, 1; 2002, 1; 2004, 1; 2006, 1; 2009, agreement in Paris in December 2015 that is applicable to all,
1; 2011, 3; 2013, 1,2; 2015, 4,12; Statement of 2017, 6,7). Besides and our determination to work within and beyond the United
that, the Arctic states ministers also “recognized the contribu- Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to limit the
tion of international science to the knowledge and understand- increase in global average temperature to below 2 degrees Cel-
ing of the Arctic region and noted the role that scientific cooper- sius above pre-industrial levels.” In 2017, the Fairbanks Decla-
ation, through the International Arctic Science Committee and ration (2017, 1) refers for first time to the UN SDGs, stating that
other organizations, is playing in developing a truly circumpolar the Arctic states are “reaffirming the United Nations Sustainable
cooperation” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 4). In the 2004 Reykja- Development Goals and the need for their realization by 2030.”
vik Declaration (2004, 2) the reference to the International Polar
Year (IPY) 2007–2008 is made for the first time, and states that

Rovaniemi 2019
the IPY represents “a unique opportunity to stimulate coopera-

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
tion and coordination on Arctic research and increase awareness

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
and visibility of the Arctic region and underline the role of the
Arctic Council.” Following up on that, this statement is further
confirmed in the declarations of 2006 (p. 3) and 2009 (p. 3). Role and
importance X X X X X X X X
of int.coop.
Besides the Arctic Council, the Arctic states recognize the im-
Major agree-
portance of, and the need to, “cooperate closely with existing or- ments and X X X X X X X X X X X
ganizations” (Iqaluit 1998, 6) and with cooperative frameworks forums
in the Arctic. The Iqaluit 1998 Declaration mentions for the first UN SDGs
X X X
time the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council of (or RIO 1992)
Ministers. The following declarations further reaffirm the need Mentions
to strengthen the cooperation. The Barrow Declaration also of other int. X X X X X X X X
orgs.
introduces the cooperation with the Council of the Baltic Sea
IMO/Polar
States, the Northern Forum, and the European Union’s Northern code
X X X X X X X X
Dimension, and the later declarations (Iqaluit 1998, 6; Barrow
2000, 7; Inari 2002, 6; Reykjavik 2004, 7; Salekhard 2006, 9; and Table 55. International Treaties and International Cooperation in the Minis-
Tromsø 2009, 9) confirm this. In the Nuuk Declaration (2011), terial Declarations
for the first time none of the other cooperation frameworks be-
sides the Arctic Council is mentioned at all. The Kiruna Declara-
tion (2013, 6) follows up on the Nuuk, where only the European The Environmental Protection indicator shows that there is a
Union’s application for AC observer status is briefly mentioned. considerable amount of consistency in how the declarations ad-
The Iqaluit 2015 Declaration (2015, 5) makes reference only to dress environmental protection. Indeed, Table 56 shows three
the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council. The Fair- striking similarities. First, all the declarations recognize the
banks Declaration (2017, 2) recognizes cooperation through the importance of environmental protection and the need to bal-
Arctic Coast Guard Forum. ance it with economic development, mostly through sustain-
able development. This is likely because these are the two main
Interestingly, on the global level, the AC declarations refer only functions of the Arctic Council based on the Ottawa Declara-
twice to the Rio/Rio+10 climate conference.12 The first time, tion (1996, 1), that is, “AFFIRMING concurrently our commit-
the Barrow Declaration states that the Arctic states “welcome ment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the
the opportunity presented by the Rio+10 process to review the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance or biodiversity in the
work of the Arctic Council with a view to bringing Arctic issues Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural
to the attention of the global community through the prepara- resources.” Second, all the declarations address the need to pro-
tory processes associated with the ten year review of Agenda tect biodiversity in one way or another. For example, the first
21” (Barrow Declaration 2000, 3). The second time, the Tromsø Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 4) mentions that Ministers of the
Declaration (2009, 6) “urge Member States to apply the pre- eight states of the Arctic Council “Welcome and endorse the
cautionary approach and polluter-pays principle as reflected in Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Strategic Plan
Principles 15 and 16 of the Rio Declaration, respectively, and for the Conservation of Arctic Biological Diversity as an overall
conduct risk and environmental impact assessments for the ex- framework for CAFF activities,” while in the Kiruna Declara-
ploration, development, transport and storage of oil, and enact tion (2013, 4), the Ministers, among other things: “Recognize
and/or enforce appropriate laws and controls.” Six years later, the value of sustaining Arctic ecosystems and biodiversity and
in 2015, the second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 5) reaffirms the that the Arctic environment needs to be protected as a basis for
“Arctic States’ commitment to work together and with partners sustainable development, prosperity, lifestyles and human well-

12 The original United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992; in 2002 the Rio+10 was held
as a follow up in Johannesburg.

151
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

being, and commit to pursue the conservation and sustainable ment approach underlies the AMSP and call upon Member
use of Arctic biological resources.” Third, with the exception of States, Arctic Council working groups and relevant regional and
the Ottawa Declaration, all subsequent declarations discuss and international bodies to further the application of this approach
support the work of both CAFF and PAME. The work of AMAP to the Arctic marine environment,” while in the Nuuk Declara-
in an environmental context is addressed in the Iqaluit (1998, tion (2011, 6) Arctic Council ministers “Decide to establish an
4), Barrow (2000, 4), and Salekhard (2006, 6) declarations, and expert group on Arctic ecosystem-based management (EBM)
the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 5). for the Arctic environment to recommend further activities
in this field for possible consideration by the SAOs before the
end of the Swedish chairmanship.” In the Kiruna Declaration

Rovaniemi 2019
Salekhard 2006

(2013, 5) the ministers, “Welcome the report on Ecosystem

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Based Management, approve the definition, principles and
Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002

recommendations, encourage Arctic States to implement rec-

ommendations both within and across boundaries, and ensure
Recognize
X X X X X X X X X X X
coordination of approaches in the work of the Arctic Council’s
work of CAFF
Working Groups”; the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 6)
Circumpolar notes that “the meeting welcomed the Guidelines for Imple-
Protected Ar-
eas Network*
X X X - - - - - menting an Ecosystem Approach to Management of Arctic Ma-
(CAFF) rine Ecosystems.” This shows progress and development of the
Recognize management system over time.
work of X X X X
AMAP
The Pollution indicator provides a great deal of information on
Recognize
what are considered to be the main Arctic pollutants and the
work of X X X X X X X X X X X
PAME different approaches to dealing with them. Table 57 shows some
Regional
relevant similarities, with ten declarations mentioning POPs,
Programme nine mentioning mercury and oil, and seven mentioning heavy
of Action for metals. Moreover, starting with Tromsø Declaration (2009), all
the Protection
of the Arctic X X X X X
subsequent declarations identify short-lived climate pollutants,
Marine Envi- including black carbon and methane, and greenhouse gases,
ronment from with four declarations specifically mentioning carbon dioxide.
Land-based
Activities
Biodiversity
This consistency suggests that POPs, mercury, oil, heavy metals,
X X X X X X X X X X X X
short-lived climate forcers (including black carbon and meth-
Balance
environment ane), and greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) are the
and economy X X X X X X X X X X X X primary pollutants in the Arctic, many of which come from
(eX. Sustain- outside the region (see: Rovaniemi Statement 2019 5; Fairbanks
able dev)
2017, 1; Iqaluit 2015d, 7; Nuuk 2011, 6; Tromsø 2009, 2, 5, 7;
Ecosys-
tem-based X X X X X X X
Salekhard 2006, 6; Reykjavik 2004, 4; Inari 2002, 1, 3; Barrow
management 2000, 5, 6). Of all these, POPs, oil and heavy metals, as well as
noise, radioactivity, and acidification were already mentioned
Table 56. Environmental Protection in the Ministerial Declarations in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1991, 20–24).
*Existed between 1996 and 2010 (CAFF n.d.).

Other Arctic Council activities are more fragmented. For exam-

ple, the Circumpolar Protected Areas Network existed between
1996 and 2010 (CAFF, n.d.), yet it was only mentioned in the
first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 4), Barrow Declaration (2000, 4),
and Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 6).

Table 56 also shows that the role of ecosystem-based manage-

ment started to emerge with the Reykjavík Declaration and
became consistent with the Tromsø Declaration. For example,
in the Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 4–5) Ministers of the eight
Arctic Council states “Note that an ecosystem-based manage-

152
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

documents after its signing in 2013 (Kiruna 2013, 5; Iqaluit

Rovaniemi 2019
2015, 9; Faibanks 2017, 4; Rovaniemi 2019, 5; see also: United

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Nations n.d.b.). The Fairbanks Declaration and the Rovaniemi

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
Chair Statement also mention the Paris Agreement which was
signed after the second Iqaluit Declaration in 2015 (Fairbanks
Man-made 2017, 1; Rovaniemi 2019, 1). This consistency suggests that
X X
pollutants these four—the Stockholm Convention, LRTAP, Minamata
Greenhouse Convention, and Paris Agreement—are the key international
X X X X X X
Gases agreements.
Carbon
X X X X
dioxide Table 58 also shows that with the exception of the Ottawa Decla-
Short-lived
X X X X X X
ration, all the remaining declarations recognize the work of one
climate poll. or more of the Arctic Council’s working groups AMAP, EPPR,
Black carbon X X X X X X PAME, or SDWG (see Glossary) including various reports and
Methane X X X X X X projects. The work of the SDWG is only mentioned in the Ro-
Acidifying vaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 8) with regard to the Best Waste
X X
substances Management Practices for Small and Remote Arctic Commu-
Radioactive
X X X
nities. Five declarations also comment on the Arctic Council’s
material
Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic; three mention
Heavy Metals X X X X X X X the Task Force and/ or Expert Group on Black Carbon and
Mercury X X X X X X X X X Methane; and two mention the Task Force on Short-Lived Cli-
POPs X X X X X X X X X X mate Forcers and the Task Force on Oil Pollution. Additionally,
PCBs X X X X X once the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution
PTS X
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic was signed, all subse-
quent documents mention it. This shows that the Arctic Coun-
Chemicals X X X X X
cil has an important role to play in addressing pollution. (see Ta-
Oil X X X X X X X X X
ble 58. Pollution Treaties and Problem Solving in the Ministerial
Shipping
X Declarations, p. 154)
Waste
Microplastics X X
There is also much fragmentation, as many problem-solving
Marine litter X X
tactics are mentioned in four or fewer declarations. For exam-
ple, the Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Table 57. Pollutants in the Ministerial Declarations
Arctic Marine Environment and Land-based Activities is men-
tioned only in the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 5) and the In-
There is also fragmentation in the sense that few pollutants are ari Declaration (2002, 3).
identified in four or fewer declarations. For instance, Table 57
shows that only two declarations mention man-made pollut- The Climate Change indicator reveals some similarities and dif-
ants. Interestingly, only the Barrow, Inari, and Tromsø declara- ferences in how the declarations address climate change. Table
tions comment on radioactive material (2009, 7; 2002, 3; 2000, 59 shows a striking similarity in that all declarations, with the
6). The Barrow Declaration (2000, 4) is also the only document exception of the Ottawa Declaration, recognize the contribu-
that mentions Persistent Toxic Substances (in Russia) and the tions of the scientific community in general or through specific
Reykjavík Declaration mentions shipping waste (2004, 5). The reports such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA
Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 3), and the Rovaniemi Chair 2004). For example, in the Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 6), the
Statement (2019, 6) are also the only documents to mention mi- ministers “Reiterate the importance of climate science to our
croplastics and marine litter. understanding of the changing Arctic region and our activities
in the Arctic environment,” and in the Inari Declaration (2002,
The declarations also mention specific international treaties 4) they “welcome with appreciation the good progress of the
and a broad range of pollution solutions, including the work Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the significant
of the Arctic Council. Table 58 shows that the Stockholm Con- progress in evaluating and synthesizing knowledge on climate
vention on POPs is mentioned in eight documents, while the variability and change and increased ultraviolet radiation.”
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and/or its
protocols is mentioned in seven of the declarations. Moreover,
the Minamata Convention on Mercury is mentioned by all four

153
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Rovaniemi 2019
Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
Greenhouse gas reduction
X XXX XXX
(Paris Agreement - XXX)

Stockholm Convention on POPs X X X X X X X X

Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)

X X X X X X X
and/ or its Protocols

Rio Declaration X

Minamata Convention on Mercury X X X X

Recognize and support work of AMAP X X X X X X X X X

Recognize and support work of EPPR X X X X X X X

Recognize and support work of PAME X X X X X X

Recognize and support work of SDWG X

Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic

X X X X X
(ACAP)

Task Force on Short Lived Climate Forcers X X

Task Force and Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane X X X X

Task force on oil pollution X X

Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil -Pollution -

X X X X
Preparedness & Response in the Arctic

IMO X X X

Polar Code X X

Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Technique X

UNEP X X X X X X

Nuclear Safety X X

Research on pollution X X

Pollution monitoring X X X X

International cooperation X X X X

Domestic action X X X X X

Sharing best practices X

Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the

X X
Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities
Integrated Hazardous Waste Mgmt Strategy in the
X
Northern Regions of the Russian Federation

Changes to economic activities X X

Table 58. Pollution Treaties and Problem Solving in the Ministerial Declarations

154
 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

into force of the Paris Agreement on climate change and its

Rovaniemi 2019
implementation”; while the Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
(2019, 1) “welcomed the outcomes of the UNFCCC COP24 in

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
Katowice, including the Paris agreement work programme.”

Mitigation/
X X X X X X X X X
There is also some fragmentation, with the Inari Declaration
Adaptation (2002, 5) being the only document to recognize that climate
UNFCC X X X X X X X change can create emergencies, and can thus be considered a
IPCC X X X X X security concern. The second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6) and
Paris Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 6) also comment on access to
X X
Agreement freshwater, but they do not explicitly make the connection to
Kyoto
X
climate change.
Protocol
COP15 X The first mention of the Security indicator appears in the Otta-
Montreal wa Declaration (1996, 1) in a footnote stating that “the Arctic
Protocol on
Council should not deal with matters related to military secu-
Substances
that Deplete
X rity.” Two years later, the Iqaluit 1998 does not mention secu-
the Ozone rity in any connection. In the 2000 Barrow Declaration (2000,
Layer
4), the Arctic states “acknowledge approval for funding by the
Arctic Resil- Global Environment Facility of the RAIPON/AMAP project
ience Action X X
Framework ‘Persistent Toxic Substances (PTS), Food Security and Indige-
Other
nous Peoples of the Russian North’”. The three AC ministerial
X X declarations that followed this (Inari, Reykjavik, and Salekhard)
frameworks
Scientific do not reflect on security at all.
Community X X X X X X X X X
Heard
The Security indicator appears again in the Tromsø Declaration
ACIA X X X X (2009, 1), where the Arctic states confirm “that in international
Climate relations the rule of law is a prerequisite for peaceful regional
Change as
X development.” Security of the region is for the first time con-
Security
Factor nected to the stability and peace in the Arctic. Two years later,
Environmen- in Nuuk (2011, 3, 6) governments of the Arctic states are “Rec-
tal Refugees ognizing the importance of maintaining peace, stability and
Asia constructive cooperation in the Arctic.” Since the Nuuk Min-
Mentioned isterial 2011, this sentence has been explicitly mentioned as the
Access to
X* X*
first preamble of the later ministerial declarations. At the same
Fresh Water
time, the governments “recognize that climate change and other
Table 59. Climate Action in the Ministerial Declarations
negative factors have impacted the traditional livelihoods and
*connection to climate change not clear
food safety and security of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other
Arctic residents and communities.” The following three minis-
terials—Kiruna 2013 (p. 1), Iqaluit 2015 (4, 7), and Fairbanks
There are also some trends. Every declaration, starting with 2017 (1, 2, 3,)—reaffirm “the commitment to maintain peace,
the Inari Declaration, addresses issues of mitigating climate stability, and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (Fairbanks
change vis-à-vis adapting to it. The declarations also address 2017, 1). They also acknowledge “the cultural and nutritional
key climate agreements at the time they are either decided or importance of traditional and local foods, including from ma-
in force. For example, in the Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 7) rine living resources in the Arctic”, and welcome reports, project
on the Kyoto Protocol, ministers “Note the ratification by the proposals, and policy recommendations to “assess and promote
Russian Federation of the Kyoto Protocol” the year before the food security” (Iqaluit 2015, 7), “access to safe water” (Fairbanks
Protocol came into force in 2005 (see: United Nations n.d.a.). 2017, 3), and mental wellness. The Rovaniemi Joint Ministeri-
The Tromsø Declaration (2009, 2) “confirm[s] the commitment al Statement (2019, 1) refers to the “commitment to maintain
of all Arctic States to actively contribute to reaching an adequate peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic.” The
agreed outcome at the UNFCCC 15th Conference of the Parties Rovaniemi Chair Statement also confirms this commitment but
(COP15) in Copenhagen in December 2009.” The second Iqa- goes further (2019, 1). The meeting “approved the assessment
luit Declaration (2015b, 5) makes a similar statement regarding on Biological Effects of Contaminants on Arctic Wildlife and
the Paris Agreement, with the Arctic Council ministers “Reaf- Fish highlighting the risk of pollutants and chemicals of emerg-
firming Arctic States’ commitment to work together and with ing concern to Arctic species, particularly those at the top of the
partners towards an effective, ambitious, durable international food chain, and food security” (2019, 4). It also welcomed the
climate agreement in Paris in December 2015 that is applicable “progress made to promote safe and sustainable Arctic marine
to all”; the Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 1) “Noting the entry shipping” (2019, 6).

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

The Safety and SAR indicator reveals different regional safety

Rovaniemi 2019
concerns. For example, Table 60 shows a striking similarity in

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
that there is a shared concern about environmental safety, es-

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002
pecially in the context of oil spills, in all but the Ottawa Dec-
laration. Other similarities include maritime safety, which is
addressed in seven declarations and search and rescue in five. Arctic Coun-
X X X X X
cil EPPR
Arctic

Rovaniemi 2019
Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Council SAR
Reykjavík 2004

X X X X X
Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Agreement*
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002

Arctic
Offshore
X X X
Oil and Gas
Environ- Guidelines*
mental Circumpo-
Safety (incl. X X X X X X X X X X X lar Map of
pollution, Resources at X X
oil spills, etc.) Risk from Oil
Climate Spills *
X
change Prevention of
Maritime Arctic Marine
X X X X X X X X
Safety Oil Pollution
Project*
Search and
X X X X X Arctic Marine
Rescue
Shipping
Natural
X Assessment X
disasters
Recommen-
Radiation dations*
and other X X
IMO /
chemicals X X X X X X X
Polar Code

Table 60. Safety Concerns in the Ministerial Declarations Shoreline

Cleanup
X
Assessment
Tool
The Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 5) mentions for the first time “the
Community
assessment of current and potential shipping activities to assist Radiation
in determining what, if any, additional Arctic shipping measures X
Information
are required, including work on an International Code of Safety Project
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) under the aus- International
X X X
Cooperation
pices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).”
Table 61. Addressing Safety Concerns in the Ministerial Declaration
Some fragmentation also exists. Only the Reykjavík (2004, 5) *Arctic Council activities
and Salekhard Declarations (2006, 7) mention concerns around
radiation. The Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 5) is also the one The IMO’s Polar Code is mentioned in every declaration start-
document to mention natural disasters. Climate change as a ing with the Nuuk Declaration (2011, 7) in which the ministers
safety issue is also addressed only in the Inari Declaration (2002, “Urge the completion as soon as possible of work at the Inter-
5) in which the states “Recognize the increasing importance of national Maritime Organization to develop a mandatory po-
prevention of and response to emergencies originating in cli- lar code for ships.” Interestingly, discussions around the Polar
mate variability and change.” Code began much earlier in the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998,
4); the idea was to “work on an International Code of Safety
In terms of addressing safety issues, the declarations do ac- for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) under the
knowledge the work of the Arctic Council, and this is marked auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).”
with an * in Table 61. Five declarations mention activities by In addition to the Polar Code, the Tromsø Declaration (2009,
the EPPR.13 While there are no particularly striking findings, 4) sought to “encourage active cooperation within the Interna-
there are some patterns. Table 61 shows that once the Arctic tional Maritime Organization (IMO) on development of rele-
Council’s SAR agreement is ready, it is mentioned in every sub- vant measures to reduce the environmental impacts of shipping
sequent declaration. in Arctic waters” and to “urge that the ongoing work in the
IMO to update the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic
Ice-Covered Waters be completed.”

13 Both the Inari and Tromsø declarations mention the EPPR, but not the work it is doing.

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

The Economy indicator reveals a striking similarity in that all For example, the Salekhard Declaration (2006, 4) states that the
declarations address sustainable development. In seven decla- Arctic Council will “welcome the increased co-operation in the
rations, sustainable development is explicitly linked to resource field of energy, reflected in various AC projects, and endorse en-
utilization (see Ottawa, both Iqaluit, Barrow, Inari, Tromsø, ergy, including renewable energy and environmentally friendly
Kiruna declarations, and Rovaniemi statement). This similarity technologies, as an important component of the AC coopera-
is not surprising, as the Ottawa Declaration (1996, 1) is clear tion, addressing energy issues and their impact on human life
about the Council’s position on sustainable development, name- and the environment, and request the SDWG to report on this
ly, “AFFIRMING our commitment to sustainable development activity to the AC Ministerial session in 2008, and to identify
in the Arctic region, including economic and social develop- activities that the Arctic Council could consider for future im-
ment, improved health conditions and cultural wellbeing.” Sim- plementation.”
ilar messages are present in the other declarations. For example,
the Inari Declaration (2002, 1) is “reaffirming the commitment The Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair (2019, 6, 8) also sees the
of the Governments of the Arctic States and Indigenous peoples introduction of new economic activities, such as marine bio-re-
to work together to promote sustainable development and envi- sources and Indigenous foods. Another point to note is the
ronmental protection in the Arctic region with increased focus change in the way economic discussions are approached after
on climate change, sustainable use of resources and human de- the creation of the Arctic Economic Council in 2015. While pre-
velopment in the Arctic.” vious discussions primarily focused on issues of sustainability,
the Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 4) also begins to “recognize
Specific economic activities are also mentioned in many of the the importance of collaborating with the private sector.” Sim-
Declarations, although sometimes in passing or within the con- ilarly, the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019b, 10) comments:
text of other economic discussions. This means that promoting “The meeting welcomed the Memorandum of Understanding
or highlighting certain economic activities is not the main fo- between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council
cus of economic discussions. Along these lines, Table 62 shows to further our shared goals, noted with appreciation the report
that there is general fragmentation in terms of what activities on Business Finance in the Arctic.”
are mentioned. That said, energy, including renewables, is men-
tioned in six documents. The Tourism indicator is mentioned only five times in Arctic
Council declarations—Iqaluit 1998, Barrow 2000, Inari 2002,
Iqaluit 2015, and Rovaniemi 2019. The 1998 Iqaluit Declaration
Rovaniemi 2019

mentions the need to “establish the Sustainable Development

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015

Program” which would include eco-tourism as well as other ar-

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002

eas (Arctic Council 1998, 2). The Barrow Declaration (2000, 3)

follows that up by acknowledging the “results achieved by the
Energy X X X X Sustainable Development Working Group established at the last
Renewables X X X X X Ministerial Meeting, including the Arctic Children and Youth
Oil and gas X X
initiative, the Arctic Telemedicine and cultural and eco-tourism
Mining /
projects.” The Inari Declaration (2002, 2) notes with apprecia-
minerals / X X tion “the Council’s successful efforts to expand ecological and
metals cultural tourism through circumpolar cooperation for the ben-
Fisheries X X efit of local communities.” The 2015 Iqaluit Declaration (2015,
Reindeer 6) recognizes “the growing importance of tourism to many Arc-
X
husbandry tic communities, and welcome[s] the report on Arctic marine
Marine
X
tourism.” The Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 8) refers in one
bioresources paragraph to tourism, addressing “the considerable growth in
Blue
X Arctic tourism and the economic opportunities for Arctic com-
economy
munities, and encouraged enhanced cooperation in developing
Tourism X X X X X
and sharing best practices to ensure sustainable Arctic tourism.”
Technology X
Diverse
X X
For the Infrastructure indicator, Table 63 shows that there is
economies
one relevant similarity and one other similarity. The relevant
Indigenous
X similarity is that 10 of the 11 declarations address shipping; the
food
other is that six declarations discuss telecommunications/ICT.
Table 62. Economic Activities in the Ministerial Declarations These two topics will be addressed in more detail below.

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Also connected to safety is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-

Rovaniemi 2019
ment (AMSA) finalized in 2009 and mentioned in the Reyk-

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
javík, Salekhard, Tromsø, second Iqaluit, and Fairbanks dec-

Nuuk 2011
Inari2002
larations. For example, in the Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 4)
ministers “request PAME to conduct a comprehensive Arctic
Transport X X X marine shipping assessment as outlined in the AMSP under
Icebreakers the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead
Shipping X X X X X X X X X X
countries and in collaboration with the EPPR working group
and other working groups of the Arctic Council and Permanent
Telecoms /
ICT
X X X X X X Participants as relevant,” while the Tromsø Declaration (2009,
Innovation
4) calls for approval of the Assessment, and the second Iqalu-
X it (2015, 10) and Fairbanks declarations (2017, 3) comment on
and tech
Energy X implementation. The Reykjavík (2004, 5), Tromsø (2009, 4),
Housing X X
second Iqaluit (2015, 10), and Fairbanks (2017, 3) declarations,
and also the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 7), recognize
Table 63. Infrastructure in the Ministerial Declarations the connection of pollution to shipping.

While six declarations discuss telecommunications and ICT,

Aside from these two similarities, there is fragmentation in the there is only one similarity that the Inari (2002, 2, 6), Salekhard
way that infrastructure is discussed. For transportation infra- (2006, 4), second Iqaluit (2015, 6), and Fairbanks (2017, 4) dec-
structure in the Inari Declaration (2002, 2) Ministers “Empha- larations, and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019b, 8) com-
size the significance of infrastructure, including aviation, marine ment on: either the need for better communications technology
and surface transport,” while the Kiruna Declaration (2013, 2) or for infrastructure, which accounts for five of the six declara-
they “Welcome the Arctic Maritime and Aviation Transportation tions that discuss this issue. There is fragmentation, as only the
Infrastructure Initiative and its comparative analysis of seaport Inari (2002, 2) and Reykjavík (2004, 3) declarations comment
and airport infrastructure in the Arctic States, and encourage on the importance of telehealth, and only the Reykjavík Decla-
continued efforts to identify opportunities for complementary ration (2004, 3) wishes to identify best practices.
infrastructure development and use.” The Salekhard Declaration
(2006, 4) mentions infrastructure in general, which would in- Certainly, this fragmentation is not helpful in establishing better
clude transportation infrastructure. Housing could be includ- communications in the Arctic, especially as there is an existing
ed in the “community infrastructure” mentioned in the second need for improved broadband services. The Arctic Economic
Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6), while in the Fairbanks Declaration Council (2016, 5) states that “reliable broadband is necessary to
(2017, 3) ministers “Recognize the vital importance of healthy promote and advance interconnectivity, which in turn facilitates
Arctic communities, homes and peoples.” This Declaration is improvements in national economies, education, health, and
the only to recognize energy infrastructure, and in particular re- many other sectors of society. Despite these benefits, broadband
newable energy infrastructure (2017, 4). Finally, the first Iqaluit deployment and adoption across the globe have not been uni-
Declaration (1998, 2) is the only one to recognize innovation and form. One region in danger of being left behind is the Arctic.”
tech, especially in the context of “technology transfer to improve
Arctic sanitation systems.” The Science and Education indicator reveals some similarities
and differences in the way that science and education are ad-
Taking a closer look at shipping, the Iqaluit, Barrow, Reykjavík, dressed. In terms of science, Table 64 shows that with the ex-
Tromsø, Nuuk, Kiruna, Fairbanks, and Rovaniemi declarations ception of the Ottawa Declaration and the Rovaniemi Chair
focus on safety, quite often in the context of the IMO. For exam- Statement, climate change is a key driver of scientific research.
ple, in the Tromsø Declaration (2009, 4) ministers “urge that the For example, the Salekhard Declaration (2006, 2) will “request
ongoing work in the IMO to update the Guidelines for Ships Op- the SAOs and the Arctic Council working groups to continue
erating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters be completed, application supporting, analyzing and synthesizing Arctic climate research.”
of its relevant parts be made mandatory, and global IMO ship Similarly, in the Nuuk Declaration (2011, 8) ministers “decide
safety and pollution prevention conventions be augmented with to task the Senior Arctic Officials to consider maximizing the
specific mandatory requirements or other provisions for ship legacy of the IPY by supporting a proposal to arrange an In-
construction, design, equipment, crewing, training, and opera- ternational Polar Decade in light of the rapid climate change of
tions, aimed at safety and protection of the Arctic environment.” the Arctic and the need for further coordinated research of the
The Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 7) also notes that “the Arctic environment and its human dimension.” Another trend
joint submission by all Arctic states to the International Mari- is the environment as driver, and this is noted in five of the dec-
time Organization on a proposal for regional arrangement for larations, with biodiversity/ecosystems and/or flora and fauna
Arctic port waste reception facilities was welcomed, the oper- being named as a concern in the Salekhard (2006, 7), Tromsø
ationalization of the Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information (2009, 4), Kiruna (2013, 4), and Iqaluit declarations (2015, 11).
Forum was noted with satisfaction, and further efforts for har-
monized implementation of the Polar Code were encouraged.”

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

Rovaniemi 2019

Rovaniemi 2019
Salekhard 2006

Salekhard 2006
Fairbanks 2017

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavík 2004

Reykjavík 2004
Tromsø 2009

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000

Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Ottawa 1996
Kiruna 2013

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015

Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015
Nuuk 2011

Nuuk 2011
Inari 2002

Inari 2002
Environment X X X X X Social Issues X X X X
Climate Policy / deci-
X X X X X X X X X X* X X X X X X X
Change sion making
Pollution X X X X X Inform AC
working X
Health X
groups
Social Issues X
Cooperation X X X X X X
Economy X
Safety X
Increase
Table 64. Drivers of Science in the Ministerial Declarations
interest in X X
Arctic

Pollution, health, and social issues are fragmented drivers here. Table 65. Purpose of Science in the Ministerial Declarations
It is interesting that as pollution dropped off after 2006 (except
for its mention in the Rovaniemi Chair Statement), environ-
ment picked up. The Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair (2019, There is also fragmentation, as only four declarations link re-
6) also addresses research for economic reasons, although there search to social issues; two suggest it can promote an interest in
is a connection to the environment; it states that “the meeting the region, and one each that research will inform the working
noted the importance of conservation and sustainable use of groups and be used for safety purposes.
marine bioresources for Arctic communities, and encouraged
studies and sharing of best practices on the blue bioeconomy in In terms of science infrastructure, there is one relevant simi-
the Arctic.” larity and two types of fragmentation. Table 66 shows that nine
declarations make reference to formal networks. For example,
Regarding the purpose of science, there is nothing particular- the Barrow, Inari, and Reykjavík declarations mention only
ly striking or relevant in terms of similarities. However, Table the University of the Arctic (UArctic), while the first Iqaluit,
65 does show some commonalities. For instance, the Barrow, Salekhard, Tromsø, and Nuuk Declarations, and the Rovaniemi
Reykjavík, Salekhard, Nuuk, Kiruna, and second Iqaluit decla- Chair Statement also mention other international academic net-
rations, and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement all note that science works. For example, the Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 3) comments
will help inform decision-making. For instance, in the Nuuk on AMAP’s Human Health Thematic Data Centre; Salekhard
Declaration (2011, 8) Arctic Council ministers “recognize that (2006, 3) mentions the Global Earth Observing System of Sys-
the International Polar Year (IPY) was the largest circumpolar tems, the International Polar Year, and the Northern Research
program on scientific research to date, and welcome in 2012 the Forum, and Tromsø (2009, 3,4) mentions the Sustaining Arc-
‘Knowledge to Action Conference’ in Montreal as the conclud- tic Observing Networks and IASC and the International Polar
ing event of IPY and the opportunity it presents to transform Year. Nuuk (2011, 7) mentions the Sustaining Arctic Observing
knowledge and scientific results into policies that will guide our Networks and the International Polar Year; and the Rovaniemi
future actions related to the environment and well-being of Arc- Chair Statement (2019, 3) mentions the Sustaining Arctic Ob-
tic communities.” Similarly, the Ottawa, Reykjavík, Salekhard, servation Network.
Kiruna, second Iqaluit, and Fairbanks declarations note that
science is about cooperation. For example, in the Kiruna Dec-
Rovaniemi 2019

laration (2013, 5) ministers “agree that cooperation in scientific

Salekhard 2006

Fairbanks 2017
Reykjavik 2004

Tromsø 2009
Barrow 2000
Ottawa 1996

Kiruna 2013
Iqaluit 1998

Iqaluit 2015

research across the circumpolar Arctic is of great importance

Nuuk2011
Inari 2002

to the work of the Arctic Council, and establish a Task Force to

work towards an arrangement on improved scientific research
cooperation among the eight Arctic States.” Research
X
Stations
Informal
X X
networks
Formal
X X X X X X X X X
networks

Table 66. Science Infrastructure in the Ministerial Declaration

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Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

There is also fragmentation as only the Salekhard Declaration ample, the Inari Declaration (2002, 3) states the Arctic Coun-
(2006, 3) addresses monitoring stations, while the Tromsø Dec- cil will “welcome multilateral and bilateral financial support of
laration (2009, 4) and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019b, 2) Russian NPA-Arctic and the projects derived from it as well as
mention research cooperation which tends to be informal. That projects aimed to eliminate pollution in the Russian Federation.”
said, the Rovaniemi Chair Statement comments on the formal- Moreover, in kind funding is recognized through the hosting
ization of cooperation as the Agreement on Enhancing Interna- of working groups and secretariats. For example, the second
tional Arctic Scientific Cooperation is now in force (2019b, 2). Iqaluit 2015 Declaration (2015, 12) expresses “appreciation to
the Kingdom of Denmark for hosting the Indigenous Peoples’
Traditional knowledge is also addressed. There is a striking sim- Secretariat for more than two decades, reaffirm[s] the decision
ilarity, as all except the Barrow Declaration mention the need to taken by Permanent Participants to relocate it to Tromsø, Nor-
use traditional knowledge. For example, in the Reykjavík Decla- way, and note[s] the decision to host it with the Arctic Council
ration (2004) ministers “Welcome the continuing contribution of Secretariat.” The Council also approves the budget for the Arctic
Indigenous and traditional knowledge to research in the Arctic,” Council Secretariat. For example, the Rovaniemi Chair State-
and in the second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6) they “Welcome ment (2019,10) states that the Ministerial “meeting approved
the recommendations on traditional and local knowledge and the Arctic Council Secretariat budget for 2020 and 2021.”
recognize the importance of using this knowledge in the work of
the Council, instruct the Arctic Council to take relevant actions With the exception of the Ottawa Declaration, all declarations
to implement these recommendations, and note with appreci- address follow-up measures to a certain degree. For example,
ation the work done by the Permanent Participants to develop declarations can follow up on the work done during the chair,
their own principles for the use of traditional knowledge.” such as in the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 2) in which minis-
ters “Welcome the SAOs’ Report to the First Ministerial Meet-
In contrast to science, little attention is paid to education. As ing of the Arctic Council and adopt the recommendations
mentioned in the science infrastructure discussion above, the contained within the Report.” Similarly, in the second Iqaluit
UArctic is a scientific network, but it is first of all an educational Declaration (2015, 10) they “Welcome the Guide to Oil Spill Re-
network and mentioned in all but the Ottawa, Kiruna, and sec- sponse in Snow and Ice Conditions in the Arctic and the further
ond Iqaluit declarations, making this a relevant finding. There efforts to implement the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
is also substantial fragmentation, as only the Ottawa and Fair- Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, request
banks declarations and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement broach continuous efforts to further cooperation on oil spill prepared-
the topic of educational attainment. The Ottawa Declaration ness and response.” Finally, the Rovaniemi Statement by the
makes reference to education in passing, and it is also unclear Chair (2019, 6) notes that “the meeting welcomed the Guide-
if the education being discussed is about education for north- lines for Implementing an Ecosystem Approach to Management
erners or rather about educating the public on the Arctic. The of Arctic Marine Ecosystems.” This shows progress and develop-
Declaration states that “the Arctic Council is established as a ment of the management system over time, even if it appears to
high level forum to: [1](d) disseminate information, encourage have evolved slowly.
education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues” (Otta-
wa Declaration 1996, 1–2). In contrast, the Fairbanks Declara- In terms of evaluation, the Barrow Declaration comments on
tion (2017, 4) states that it will “encourage the advancement of the achievements of the SDWG. In particular, in the Declara-
equal access to good education at all levels” and that ministers tion, Arctic states’ ministers “Note with satisfaction the results
“Welcome the initiative concerning preschool education prac- achieved by the Sustainable Development Working Group es-
tices aiming to raise the living standards of Arctic Indigenous tablished at the last Ministerial Meeting, including the Arctic
peoples while maintaining their cultures and languages” (2017, Children and Youth initiative, the Arctic Telemedicine and cul-
4). In the context of Indigenous peoples, the Rovaniemi Chair tural and eco-tourism projects and the coastal fisheries project
Statement (2019b, 9) continues with education with “the call to under the Council’s Sustainable Development Program” (Arctic
promote Indigenous languages in education.” Council 2000, 3). This reads as a successful evaluation of that
work. However, there is not much by way of structures to eval-
For the Implementation indicator, each declaration addresses uate the work of the Council or its working groups through the
implementation in similar ways. Although the declarations do declarations themselves. Instead, evaluation appears to take
not have a specific “recommendation” list, the different points in place two years later with the SAO Report to Ministers follow-
declarations uses action-oriented language like, but not limited ing the conclusion of the subsequent chair. That report outlines
to, “encourage,” “commit,” or “request.” For example, the Reyk- the achievements of the working groups for the previous two
javík Declaration (2004, 1) states the Arctic Council ministerial years and often the work of the groups is linked back to previous
meeting will “Recognize the need for raising the profile of the declarations. For example, the 2019 SAO Report to Ministers
Arctic internationally.” states that “In follow-up to the Fairbanks declaration 2017 (e.g.,
see paragraphs 11, 14-17, 20, 23–26 of the declaration), ACAP
In terms of budgets, the Arctic Council itself does not pro- has, inter alia, undertaken the following work over the course of
vide an operating budget. Instead, “all projects or initiatives 2017-–2019” (Arctic Council 2019c, 17).
are sponsored by one or more Arctic States” (Arctic Council,
2015c), as well as through funding from other sources. For ex-

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 Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations

As a conclusion, this section shows, not surprisingly, that re-

garding the content of the declarations they tend to prioritize
issues around International Cooperation, Governance, Human
Dimension and Environmental Protection, to be the most-quot-
ed indicators across time. They all mainly deal with – directly or
indirectly - the two main functions of the Arctic Council: envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable development. Under the
Human Dimension indicator there is also a focus on ensuring
issues of the health and wellbeing of Northerners. The economy
and infrastructure are also discussed, although not to the same
extent as the other issues.

161
162
Part III:
Permanent Participants’ Documents

When the Arctic Council (AC) was established in 1996, the (AAC), connecting Athabaskan from Canada and the USA; the
eight Arctic State ‘Members’ unanimously agreed to recognize Gwich’in Council International (GCI), connecting Gwich’in
six Indigenous Peoples Organizations as ‘Permanent Partici- from Canada and the USA; the Inuit Circumpolar Council
pants’ (PPs) in the Council. According to The Ottawa Declara- (ICC), connecting Inuit from Canada, Greenland/DNK, the
tion (1996), the position of PPs “equally is open to other Arctic Russian Federation and the USA; the Russian Association of
organizations of Indigenous peoples14* with a majority Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), connecting all In-
Indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a single Indigenous digenous peoples in the Russian Arctic; and the Saami Council
people resident in more than one Arctic State; or (b) more than (SC), connecting Saami in Finland, Norway, the Russian Feder-
one Arctic Indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state”. ation, and Sweden.

The eight Arctic states first recognized the Indigenous peoples of Of these organizations, only the Arctic Athabaskan Council and
the Arctic in 1991, with the signing of the Arctic Environment the Inuit Circumpolar Council have written and adopted a spe-
Protection Strategy (AEPS). According to the AEPS, the eight cific Arctic policy into their portfolio of governance documents;
Arctic states agreed “to continue to promote cooperation with the Gwich’in Council International has produced a report on
the Arctic Indigenous peoples and to invite their organizations environmental impact assessments; and the Saami Council has
to future meetings as observers” (Declaration on the Protection published declarations on the Arctic. Thus, a proper intercom-
of the Arctic Environment, 1991, 2). Inuit and Saami represent- parison of the documents cannot be performed in this section,
atives had, in fact, participated in the preparatory meetings for as each document type serves different purposes, and, unlike
the AEPS in 1989–1990 (e.g., Heininen 1992). In contrast, the the national policies, are not coded in the study. The documents
Ilulissat Declaration (2008), based on the ministerial meeting of these four Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council
of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states in May 2008, does not (Athabaskan, Inuit, Gwich’in, and Saami) are, however, analyz-
recognize the six Permanent Participants or other Arctic Indig- ed below—they provide valuable insights into their different ap-
enous peoples. proaches to Arctic governance and geopolitics, with Indigenous
rights and self-determination being frequently highlighted in
The Arctic Council has aimed, since its establishment, to ena- them. They also provide politically diverse and academically in-
ble the Arctic Indigenous peoples—as permanent residents of teresting approaches to Arctic security issues, for example, food
the region—to contribute to the circumpolar debate in terms safety, and the connections between human rights and peace,
of their traditional knowledge, policy and political perspectives, security, and development.
and insights into environmental protection and sustainable de-
velopment—the latter being the Council’s two main focuses.
This has been evidenced in ministerial and plenary meetings of
the AC, where the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) representing
the six Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs) sit down at the
same table with the representatives of the member states. These
Indigenous peoples’ representatives also have the right to take
the floor and express their opinions and proposals, a right that is
not afforded to the representatives of the AC observer countries
and to other permanent observers, whose mandate is only to be
present and to observe.

The six Indigenous Peoples Organizations with the status of a

Permanent Participant of the Arctic Council are: the Aleut In-
ternational Association (AIA), connecting Aleut from the USA
and the Russian Federation; the Arctic Athabaskan Council

14 Footnote (*2), one of two in the Declaration, states: “the use of the term ‘peoples’ in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard
the rights which may attach to the term under international law” (1996, 3).

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Arctic Athabaskan Council between Europe and the Arctic, wider international coopera-
tion, and international treaties and organizations relevant to
The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) has produced three the Arctic.
short Arctic governance documents,15 as follows:
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator is dis-
1. Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council: cussed in both the 2008 and 2017 documents. The 2008 paper
A Discussion Paper (AAC 2007), a short discussion paper on states that the Athabaskan people have traditionally “used and
the Arctic Council and its development from its March 2007 occupied up to 3 million kms2 of territory in North America”
meeting; and that “[AAC] represents internationally Athabaskan peo-
2. A special paper, Europe and the Arctic: A View from the Arc- ples and communities” (2008, 2) in this territory as well as
tic Athabaskan Council (AAC 2008) based on the September within the Arctic Council. There is, additionally, an internal
2008 Arctic Conference, “Common Concern for the Arctic,” definition of the Arctic as a ‘home’ to the Athabaskan and other
supported by and organized in cooperation with the Nordic aboriginal peoples of the region, as AAC International Chair
Council of Ministers and held in Ilulissat, Greenland. Bill Erasmus (2008) wrote to the European Union. Moreover,
3. The most recent, the 2017 AAC’s Arctic Policy (AAC 2017). the AAC recognizes that “it has been clear for many years that
decisions made outside the Arctic have a significant bearing
Here we analyze and compare two of these documents: the 2017 on what takes place within the region, for both good and ill”
AAC’s Arctic Policy and the 2008 Europe and the Arctic: A View (2008, 2). It further states that in 2003 the United Nations En-
from the Arctic Athabaskan Council. The AAC’s Arctic Policy, vironment Programme (UNEP) “effectively characterized the
adopted in 2017 by the Arctic Athabaskan Council, has ten Arctic as the world’s barometer of environmental change and
pages (excluding maps and pictures) and covers the following: urged states worldwide to heed the reading on the barometer”
(2008, 3) and also “to amend the UNFCCC [United Nations
i) It explains (a) the expected outcomes of international pol- Framework Convention on Climate Change] to embed the
icy initiatives regarding the Arctic, and (b) the thematic Arctic-as-global-barometer principle” (2008, 7). This so-called
areas and current process of Canada’s 2017 Arctic Policy barometer refers to the rapid decline of multi-year sea ice in
Framework development which is aimed at replacing Can- the Arctic Ocean, which could mean, as the 2008 document
ada’s Northern Strategy (2009) and the Statement on Cana- speculates, that the Arctic Ocean is soon destined to become
da’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010). like North America’s Great Lakes—frozen over in winter and
completely thawed in summer.
ii) It refers to a joint Statement on Climate, Energy and Arc-
tic Leadership by the USA and Canada (President Obama The 2017 Arctic Policy, on the other hand, states that the AAC
and Prime Minister Trudeau) in March 2016, and a USA– is “an international treaty organization established to defend
Canada Joint Arctic Leaders Statement in December 2016 the rights and further the interests internationally of American
to launch actions ensuring a strong, sustainable and viable and Canadian Athabaskan members First Nation governments
Arctic economy and ecosystem. in the eight-nation Arctic Council and other international fora”
(2017, 4–5). It further states that the AAC also “seeks to foster
iii) It sets out the nine principles of partnership of a new Shared a greater understanding of the shared heritage of Athabaskan
Arctic Leadership Model (by Mary Simon Indigenous and peoples of the Arctic North America” (2017, 5). They have lived
Northern Affairs Canada INAC 2017) to provide advice in Arctic and sub-Arctic Alaska (USA) and Yukon and North-
on two important topics: 1) “New ambitious conservation west Territories of Canada for at least 10,000 years and occupy
goals for the Arctic in the context of sustainable develop- about 3 million square kilometers of this territory (2017, 5).
ment”; and 2) “The social and economic priorities of Arc-
tic leaders and Indigenous peoples living in remote Arctic Concerning the Human Dimension indicator, the 2008 paper
communities” (2017, 3). notes briefly that the AAC “represents internationally Athabas-
kan peoples and communities in sub-Arctic Alaska and north-
iv) The document covers the following thematic areas of Can- ern Canada” (2008, 2). While the 2007 discussion paper states
ada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Economy and Trade; Defence, clearly that the AAC is “one of six ‘permanent participants’ to
Safety and Security; Environmental and Scientific Cooper- the Arctic Council” (AAC 2007), the 2017 Arctic Policy states
ation; and Social and Cultural Cooperation. that “The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) is an international
treaty organization established to defend the rights and further
The 2008 document Europe and the Arctic: A View from the the interests internationally of American and Canadian Ath-
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC 2008) (eight pages, excluding abaskan members… [and] authorized ’Permanent Participant’
maps or pictures), relates to the AAC’s view on the relations in the Arctic Council.” (2017, 4–5).

15 There are also two more recent documents which we will mention in the report: AAC and Arctic EIA: Good Practice Recommendations for Environmental Impact
Assessment and Public Participation in the Arctic; and AAC - Arctic Resilience Action Framework.

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The 2017 document also includes a special section on social the application of global agreements in our region, be evaluated
and cultural cooperation emphasizing “a number of factors that from this perspective” (2008, 7). The views of the AAC “are sim-
put stress on Northern Indigenous people’s health, languages, ilar to those of Canadian Inuit… that the Northwest Passage is
and social well-being.... [including] struggles with building ‘internal waters’ to Canada” (2008, 6).
new housing,… food availability”. The section also stresses that
climate change is “increasing hazards for those… harvesting Although, the 2017 AAC Arctic Policy is, first of all, meant as
on the land” and “can bring new disease vectors… as well as a policy paper on the “harvesting rights and interests of Ath-
contaminants”. Recommendations for Canada’s Arctic foreign abaskan peoples” (2017, 5), it also deals with the International
policy include to support, among other things, “human health Treaties and International Cooperation indicator. For exam-
and mental wellness”, to “encourage and enable conferences and ple, it includes recommendations that “Canada’s Arctic Foreign
exchanges at both the academic and community level”, and to Policy communicate fundamental information about Canada’s
“provide seed funding to allow Indigenous organizations and modern treaties, land claims and self-government agreements
communities to develop programming designed to work in as a fundamental element of our Arctic Foreign Policy” and also
their specific circumstances” (2017, 6). “embed the need for input from and consultation with Canadi-
an Arctic Indigenous peoples when negotiating trade treaties in
The Governance indicator is well represented in both docu- its Arctic Foreign Policy” (2017, 9). The 2008 paper defines the
ments and addresses different governance topics. According to Arctic Council as “the key intergovernmental forum for co-op-
the 2017 policy, “Forms of political and cultural organization erative action in the circumpolar Arctic and in conveying Arctic
vary, depending upon the place of residence of a particular Ath- perspectives to international and global bodies. A ‘high level’
abaskan people.” Also, “in Alaska, Athabaskan peoples have or- forum but rarely a political decision-making body, the council
ganized themselves in accordance with federal and State statutes does excellent technical work and informs and enables states to
which provide funding for government operations including the adopt progressive and environmentally and socially responsi-
Indian Reorganization Act for tribal governments” (2017, 5). ble policies, if they wish.” Furthermore, the fact that six IPOs,
including AAC, “are ‘permanent participants’ to the council…
The negotiated agreements referred to are based on the Arctic enables the region’s permanent residents to contribute tradi-
Athabaskan Council’s strategic objectives “to defend the har- tional knowledge as well as policy and political perspectives to
vesting rights and interests of Athabaskan peoples, communi- circumpolar debate” (2008, 3). Among the recommendations to
cate Arctic Council activities… and promote the evolution and Global Affairs of Canada for the international dimension of a
strengthening of the Arctic Council to address and balance the new Arctic Policy framework is to “explore opportunities for ex-
competing issues of environmental protection and sustainable panded Canadian diplomacy and leadership in multilateral and
development” (2017, 5). bilateral forums and ways in which AAC leaders can effectively
engage” (2017, 5) in several fields from the economy and trade
The 2008 paper addresses issues of self-governance and self-de- to cultural cooperation.
termination, stating that “land-claim agreements… provide a
basis for Athabaskan peoples to own land and natural resources The 2008 paper, which has a greater focus on international coop-
and to chart their own paths in the two nation states in which eration than the 2017 paper, first defines that the AAC “partic-
they reside” (2008, 2). Furthermore, the document comments ipates in the Arctic Council… the UN Framework Convention
on regional governance structures, such as the Arctic Council on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Stockholm Convention
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN- on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)” (2008, 2); it then rec-
CLOS) in a pan-Arctic context. Regarding the Arctic Council, ognizes the success of a few international agreements involving
the 2008 document states that, “importantly, strengthening the the AAC, such as the Convention on Long-range Atmospheric
Arctic Council may require giving it a more formal, authorita- Pollution (1998) of the United Nations Economic Commission
tive, and legally-binding foundation. Of interest may be the draft for Europe (UNECE) and the Stockholm Convention on Persis-
Arctic convention prepared by Donald Pharand and published tent Organic Pollutants (POPs) of UNEP (2001). It also refers
by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) in 1991” to UNEP’s effective characterization of “the Arctic as the world’s
(2008, 5). As for UNCLOS, in a bigger picture, “all five Arctic barometer of environmental change” (2008, 3). With respect to
Ocean rim states need to apply the science-based UNCLOS pro- the growing interests of the European Union (EU) towards the
cess to determine the geographical extent of national rights to Arctic and its development of an Arctic policy, the 2008 paper
the offshore seaward of exclusive economic zones (EEZ),… this stresses that “that [the term] ‘common concern’ is not confused
is exactly what the five rim states agreed in Ilulissat [in 2008]. with ‘common property’. As Athabaskan peoples acquired legal-
At the end of this process… only a small zone around the North ly recognized property rights in 1971… AAC is well aware of the
Pole will remain ‘common property” (2008, 6). difference” (2008, 7). The AAC believes “strongly that member
and observer states use the Arctic Council as a forum in which
Concerning governance of natural resources, the 2008 paper to engage China and we welcome ideas from European states
states that the AAC states are “committed to the principle that and the EU about how best to do so” (2008, 5). Here, the hope
development in the Arctic be environmentally, socially and cul- is expressed that the European AC observer states, as well as the
turally sustainable no matter how the UNCLOS process unfolds. European Union, will support the AAC’s goal “that the Arctic
It is our view that the need for additional legal instruments, and Council be strengthened to take a ‘hands on’ role in conveying

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Arctic perspectives, concerns and interests on climate change, considerable importance to the Arctic… we strike a real note of
contaminants, biodiversity conservation and other issues to in- caution about who is best positioned to be the ‘main interpret-
ternational and global bodies” (2008, 4). er of Arctic concerns’ to the broader international community”.
The paper continues: “This is not to defend the undeniably weak
The Environmental Protection indicator shows that the AAC positions on climate change mitigation taken, in particular, by
takes environmental protection seriously, even if the issue is the governments of Canada and the United States. Rather than
only briefly mentioned in the two documents; for example, assuming the burden of interpreting Arctic concerns we suggest
the 2017 document comments on the Tlicho Aquatic Ecosys- that Europe continue to… engage with those who live in the
tem Monitoring Program. The 2008 document also recognizes region, particularly its Indigenous peoples, and help them inter-
the role of UNCLOS in environmental protection, but takes a pret and convey Arctic concerns to the world” (2008, 4).
cautious approach as the AAC “is committed to the principle
that development in the Arctic be environmentally, socially The Security indicator is explicitly mentioned in the 2017 policy
and culturally sustainable no matter how the UNCLOS process by the following statement: “Where Canada’s defence, securi-
unfolds” (2008, 7). The 2008 document also explains that en- ty, and boundary issues will be impacting its Indigenous and
vironmental protection requires management of the Northwest Northern residents well-being… it is of utmost importance that
Passage as Canadian internal waters, which “makes sense from a the residents are consulted and informed of any actions Cana-
practical, environmental management and regulatory perspec- da proposes to undertake” (2017, 9). Based on that, the AAC
tive… [and] is the best means to protect the area’s fragile natural aims to include “defence, safety and security” by providing
environment” (2008, 6). Additionally, with regard to environ- recommendations on them to the Global Affairs of Canada for
mental protection and pollution, the document states the hope the international dimension of a new Arctic Policy framework
that the European observer states and the EU will support the “to explore opportunities for expanded Canadian diplomacy
AAC’s goal of strengthening the Arctic Council “to take a ‘hands and leadership in multilateral and bilateral forums and ways in
on’ role in conveying Arctic perspectives, concerns and interests which AAC leaders can effectively engage” (2017, 5) in them.
on climate change, contaminants, biodiversity conservation and
other issues to international and global bodies” (2008, 4). Without explicitly mentioning sovereignty, the 2008 paper states
that “the legal status of the Northwest Passage is an issue of the
The Pollution indicator is briefly mentioned in both documents, first political importance, particularly in Canada” (2008, 6), be-
although each identifies different pollutants. For instance, the ing ‘internal waters’ to Canada. It is thus important for the mar-
2017 policy comments on the presence of POPs and atmos- itime boundary disputes between Canada and the USA in the
pheric mercury, while the 2008 paper mentions contaminants Beaufort Sea to be resolved. Furthermore, “all five Arctic Ocean
linked to the biodiversity convention. Approaches to pollution rim states need to apply the science-based UNCLOS process to
problem-solving are addressed only in the 2017 policy, which determine the geographical extent of national rights to the off-
mentions the Stockholm Convention on POPs. shore seaward of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)” (2008, 6).
The document notes that flag planting on the Arctic Ocean floor
The Climate Change indicator comes straight to the forefront in by the 2007 Russian Expedition “has been interpreted—misin-
the 2017 policy, which states that “the Indigenous peoples of the terpreted in our view—as a sign of coming conflict” (2008, 6),
North are dealing with the effects of climate change on a daily while noting that outside pressures from this kind of discourse
basis. Work by the Arctic Council on the Arctic Climate Impact are nothing new.
Assessment (ACIA) 2004 provided a broad brush examination
of climate change in the Arctic” (2017, 7). The AAC has observ- The Safety and SAR indicator is not covered in either document.
er status at the UNFCCC.
The Economy indicator is briefly noted by the 2017 policy,
The starting point of the 2008 paper, which places more atten- stating that “the trade treaties which the Canadian Govern-
tion on climate change than the 2017 policy, is: “the rapid de- ment negotiates at the International level… can have impacts
cline in recent years of multi-year sea ice in the Arctic Ocean on treaty rights… [and] intellectual property” (2017, 6). There
has attracted considerable attention worldwide” (2008, 6) with is thus a “need for input from and consultation with Canadian
UNEP having characterized the Arctic as “the world’s barometer Arctic Indigenous peoples when negotiating trade treaties in its
of environmental change” (2008, 3). The document also men- [Canadian] Arctic Foreign Policy.… [to] recognize the cultural
tions that the 2004 ACIA report “has significantly influenced and food security barriers.… [and provide] resources to Arctic
the climate change mitigation and adaptation positions of some universities and institutions” (2017, 7) so as to develop innova-
non-Arctic as well as Arctic states” (2008, 4). The AAC thus tive ways of addressing housing in the Arctic North, including
“suggests that a formal adaptation protocol to the UNFCCC be energy-efficiency.
considered which references the Arctic as well as other vulnera-
ble regions of the globe” (2008, 7). Furthermore, the document The 2008 paper briefly recognizes that there is a strong connec-
recognizes the EU’s leading role in climate change negotiations tion between the aspirations of the EU to be/become a “more
and that “the EU may even become the main interpreter of Arc- visible and important player in the Arctic and Europe’s attitude
tic concerns” (2008, 4). The paper, therefore, notably states that to the wildlife-based renewable resource economy which re-
although “the EU’s efforts on climate change mitigation… are of mains important in many northern communities and to Arctic

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Indigenous Peoples” (2008, 5). The document, however, states (2017, 9); and third, Canada will “provide multiyear funding to
bluntly that “exempting Indigenous peoples from broader re- the three Canadian Permanent Participants” (2017, 10) in the
strictions in trade on wildlife products has not [worked] and Arctic Council.
will not work [in the future]” (2008, 5).
Correspondigly, as a follow-up, the 2008 paper discusses “seven
The Tourism indicator is not covered by the two documents. ideas/initiatives for consideration as policy priorities” (2008, 7).
Finally, to note that the document was sent to the [then] Presi-
Concerning the Infrastructure indicator, the 2008 paper firmly dent of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso (on 29
states that “transcontinental shipping through the [Northwest] September 2008), and the first of the six points of the letter from
passage will… inevitably lead to additional development with the AAC, is that “the Arctic is considered the sovereign terri-
impacts further South” (2008, 6). It also shows the AAC’s con- tory of eight states, not common property to which interested
cerns that, due to the rapid warming of the Arctic Ocean, it is non-Arctic parties have property rights” (Erasmus 2008).
destined, as mentioned earlier, to soon become “frozen over
in winter and completely thawed in summer – [thus] further To sum up
‘opening’ the region to oil, gas and mineral development and
intercontinental shipping” (2008, 6). Among the recommenda- The two AAC documents are strong statements on behalf of
tions for Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, the 2017 AAC policy Athabaskans and the Arctic Athabaskan Council. They also
asks for “resources to Arctic universities and institutions to de- send strong messages to ‘outsiders’ from one Arctic nation,
velop Arctic innovations that considers and addresses northern which is a minority but proud to live there, regarding the
housing and energy-efficient infrastructure, renewable energy, staunch sovereignty of the Arctic states. The 2017 Arctic Policy,
food security, community based monitoring, resource develop- in particular, is meant, first of all, as a policy paper on strategic
ment and technology” (2017, 7). objectives with respect to the “harvesting rights and interests
of the Athabaskan peoples” (2017, 5). It shows how strong-
For the Science and Education indicator, the 2008 paper brief- ly protective the AAC is of the sovereignty and rights of the
ly notes that having six Indigenous Peoples Organizations as Athabaskan peoples, and it can be interpreted as challenging,
‘Permanent Participants’ to the Arctic Council enables “the re- if not questioning, the second footnote (see (*2) above) of the
gion’s permanent residents to contribute traditional knowledge Ottawa Declaration (1996), namely, that “the use of the term
as well as policy and political perspectives to circumpolar de- ‘peoples’… shall not be construed as having any implications as
bate” (2008, 3). Further, the AAC is well aware “of the significant regard the rights which may attach to the term under interna-
contribution of Germany, France and the UK to polar science” tional law” (1996, 3).
(2008, 5). The 2017 policy paper, concerning the Canadian High
Arctic Research Station (CHARS) and Polar Knowledge Cana- It is encouraging to read in the 2008 paper and in the ACIA
da, recommends that Canada’s Arctic foreign policy should en- Report (2004) on mitigation and adaptation of UNEP’s char-
sure “to the maximum extent possible, [that] research be co-de- acterization of the Arctic as “the world’s barometer of environ-
veloped, produced and communicated in full partnership with mental change” (2008, 3). The basis of this characterization is
Arctic Indigenous people” including “Indigenous participation the 2007 discussion paper on improving the efficiency and ef-
on Canadian delegations” (2017, 8). The aim is to strength- fectiveness of the Arctic Council (AAC 2007), which was the
en Arctic [research] links, engaging broadly in dialogue with first to recognize that “global interest in the Arctic is growing.
First Nations, Yukon and Northwest Territories governments, Energy and mineral development, pollution, climate change,
co-management bodies, individuals, and organizations with re- transportation and other issues in the Arctic are attracting in-
spect to research plans, instead of the current situation, namely, creased attention internationally, and this process continues”
where all communication is directed via CHARS and providing (2007, 3). The 2007 paper goes on to state that “decisions made
input or exploring research synergies is impossible. in non-Arctic states and by global institutions have a growing
influence on the well-being of Athabaskans who continue to
The Implementation indicator is an element in both docu- adjust to a rapidly changing world” (2007, 3).
ments. The 2017 AAC Arctic Policy has several recommen-
dations on each theme and includes three additional recom- As the nature and purpose of the 2017 and 2008 documents
mendations as follow-up to the Arctic Athabaskan Council’s differ greatly, comparing the papers makes little sense. Briefly,
policy formulation process regarding how Indigenous northern among the most striking similarities are, i) the dominant areas
think-tanks could be used to advise governments on Arctic is- of the documents are those related to indicators of Governance
sues: first, “a co-creation Policy-making group comprised of In- and International Cooperation; ii) security is explicitly, and
digenous and Northern experts alongside federal and industry evenly, discussed in the both documents; and iii) the Arctic
experts [should] be created to advance economic development Council itself is highlighted in the documents. The 2008 policy
in a sustainable manner within the Territorial North” (2017, 9); paper defines the Arctic Council as “the key intergovernmen-
second, Canada will establish “an Indigenous Northern based tal forum for co-operative action in the circumpolar Arctic”
‘think-tank’ for research and social science advisors to ensure (2008, 3), stating its wish to strengthen the Council in its goals
that Canada’s Arctic people have an informed voice and mean- (of environmental protection and sustainable development).
ingful participation on Arctic decision-making at all levels”

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The biggest difference between the two documents lies in their is, in particular, due to the fact that “historically, Canadian Indig-
purposes. The 2017 one is a general policy document by the enous groups have often not had a meaningful voice in impact
AAC, which concentrates on the rights, interests and self-deter- assessment” (2018, 10), because, according to Gibson (2017),
mination of Athabaskan peoples as part of the human dimen- “Indigenous culture, traditional activities, rights, and title have
sion, and of science and education. The 2008 paper is all about by and large not been taken into comprehensive… account in
the AAC’s view on “Europe and the Arctic,” and thus the docu- the Crown-led and proponent-driven Canadian environmental
ment very much concentrates on International cooperation, as assessment processes” (2018, 10). Here human capacity critically
well as climate change. consists of “three elements related to capacity: funding, human
resources, and relationship building” (2018, 38).

Gwich’in Council International The Governance indicator reveals that the document is about
“Indigenous-led impact assessment,” which is mentioned mul-
The only Gwich’in Council International (GCI) document tiple times (e.g., five times in one paragraph on p. 7). Within
which we found for the project was the April 2018 Impact As- this context, the study illustrates how Indigenous governments
sessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indigenous-Led Re- can and have led their own impact assessment processes, how
view submitted to Gwich’in Council International. This report they established their own Indigenous-led impact assessment
is a study on environmental assessment, in particular, an In- processes over resource development in their homelands, and
digenous-led impact assessment with two research questions. how legislation and land claims set clear processes for impact
First, the document asks what the key features of this impact assessment review. The document furthermore states that
assessment are; and second, what the outcomes are there, and “where this powerful enabling factor is absent, the nation can
how they have worked. To answer these questions, the docu- seek such clarity through the establishment of a contract (IBA)
ment uses specific case studies on environmental impact as- [Impact Benefit Agreement] to define requirements for consent
sessment, referring to ‘community based assessment.’ and impact assessment review” (2018, 42).

The key findings of the Gwich’in study report, consisting of 54 Interestingly, the document, which is based on a study com-
pages, including maps and pictures, are: “Indigenous parties missioned by Gwich’in Council International to inform its
are creatively using legislation and negotiated agreements to participants about “Good Practice Recommendations for En-
give force to Indigenous-led reviews. Indigenous-led impact vironmental Impact Assessment and Public Participation in
assessments can be effective with a wide range of primary re- the Arctic project” (under the auspices of the Sustainable De-
lationships.... All processes require a clear set of steps defining velopment Working Group, SDWG of the Arctic Council) de-
how the review will be conducted.... Creation of Indigenous-led scribes in detail the “common characteristics that distinguish
approach does not negate participation and use of findings Indigenous-led impact assessment.” Those characteristics in-
from state-led processes.... There are a variety of specific en- clude, among others, “a process derived from and steeped in
abling factors that will improve the chances of success of an the culture, traditional knowledge, and stewardship approach
Indigenous-led impact assessment.... There are distinguishing of the nation.... legitimate elements of an Indigenous group’s
elements that make Indigenous-led impact assessment attrac- overall governance/stewardship rights and responsibilities
tive, such as the ability to ensure culture, language, and way of within its territory.... Indigenous laws and norms.... Indigenous
life” (Gwich’in Council International 2018, 4–5). knowledge… brought in systematically through every phase
of decision-making.... Cultural values tend to be more broadly
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining indicator briefly defines defined in Indigenous-led assessment.... [with] more focus on
the Gwich’in territory, with the 2018 document noting that oral discussion of issues.... [and there is] a greater willingness
the Gwich’in Council International represents “9,000 Gwich’in to consider a future without the project if costs are deemed to
in the Northwest Territories (NWT), Yukon, and Alaska as a outweigh benefits” (2018, 13).
Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council, the only inter-
national organization to give Indigenous peoples a seat at the This method is about ‘self-governance’ and ‘self-determination’,
decision-making table alongside national governments” (2018, as the document’s working definition for ‘Indigenous-led im-
2). However, there is no detailed discussion or definition of the pact assessment’ indicates: “a process that is completed prior
Arctic, only a consideration of “how to establish their own In- to any approvals or consent being provided for a proposed pro-
digenous-led impact assessment processes over resource devel- ject, which is designed and conducted with meaningful input
opment in their homelands” (2018, 7). and an adequate degree of control by Indigenous parties— on
their own terms and with their approval. The Indigenous par-
The Human Dimension indicator explains that “Indigenous ties are involved in the scoping, data collection, assessment,
parties are creatively using legislation and negotiated agree- management planning, and decision-making about a project”
ments to conduct reviews” (2018, 4). “However, even absent (2018, 10). As a result, and based on the definition of ‘Indige-
these powers, Indigenous-led assessments can successfully oc- nous-led impact assessment,’ decision-making is carried out by
cur, especially in high leverage situations” (2018, 42). Further- the Indigenous parties.
more, the document seeks to identify ‘enabling factors’ contrib-
uting to the success of Indigenous-led impact assessment. This

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The document also mentions the “willingness to support and pact assessment. Thus, it is also a study on self-governance and
engage the Indigenous-led review…[and the] pre-existing re- self-determination, how governance is interpreted, and how this
quirements for Indigenous engagement in both the NWT and plays a more important role in the globalized Arctic region, and
Quebec There was also a willing and engaged proponent, which possibly in world politics, too. Therefore, the document does
at least partially funded the effort” (2018, 40). Finally, central not cover, nor is it intended to cover, most of the indicators of
governments [for example,] “also play a role in supporting In- this overall analysis. The content of the report is, however, rich
digenous-led impact assessment… governments and industry and includes both theoretical approaches and case studies. Its
may be assets, not opposition… to encourage and support In- value is to examine, discuss and define environmental impact
digenous-led impact assessment” (2018, 40). assessment, in particular Indigenous-led, through three case
studies with different relationship models: co-managing, co-de-
Finally, the report identifies three different ‘lessons learned’ velopment, and independently run. Indeed, this report is more
which are listed in the document. First, “effective Indigenous-led than a study of environmental impact assessment in a changing
impact assessment includes a clear process for defining how Arctic influenced by grand environmental challenges and big
consent will be given.” Second, “creation of an Indigenous-led international/global actors from outside of the region. It is also
approach should not negate participation [in] and use of find- an important contribution and presentation from Indigenous
ings from the state-led process. In fact, there are high benefits peoples’ perspectives to discuss, brainstorm, and (re)define
to at least ‘shadowing’ the state-led processes.” Finally, govern- self-governance/self-determination in general, and good prac-
ments and industry may be “assets, not opposition” (2018, 42). tices on impact assessment in the global Arctic, in particular.

The International Treaties and International Cooperation

indicator is briefly discussed, first, through the mention that Inuit Circumpolar Council
Gwich’in Council International is a “Permanent Participant in
the Arctic Council, the only international organization to give The Inuit Arctic Policy of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)
Indigenous peoples a seat at the decision-making table along- was adopted in 2010 (ICC 2010) and is currently in its third
side national governments” (2018, 2) and second by identifying edition. The 121-page information-rich policy document (in-
and proposing a potential “for international comparative work, cluding pictures) was edited and revised by Aqqaluk Lynge and
including and especially significant to the Arctic, that focuses Marianne Stenbaek. It has eight sections: I. Goals and Objec-
on Indigenous impact assessment processes, particularly those tives; II. Inuit Rights, Peace and Security Issues; III. Environ-
that are being led by Indigenous groups in other jurisdictions” mental Issues; IV. Social Issues; V. Cultural Issues; VI. Economic
(2018, 43). Issues; VII. Educational and Scientific Issues; VIII. Implementa-
tion and Appendixes.
The following indicators are not explicitly discussed in the doc-
ument: Environmental Protection, Pollution, Climate Change, Another important ICC document is the Utqiagvik Declaration
Security, Safety and SAR, Tourism and Infrastructure. 2018 (ICC 2018), consisting of 13 pages (with no pictures) by the
Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka, presented at
The Economy indicator is discussed substantially via three case the 13th General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council on
studies of the Indigenous-led impact assessment, that include 16–19 July 2018 in Utqiagvik, Alaska. The main themes/sub-ti-
the Tlicho of the Nico Project (North-West Territories), The tles are: International Indigenous Human Rights and Interna-
Sivumut Project (Quebec), Squamish Nation Woodfibre LNG tional Partnerships; Food Security; Families and Youth; Health
Project (British Columbia). These all address governance and and Wellness; Education and Language; Indigenous Knowledge;
co-management of resources, but have different relationship Sustainable Wildlife Management; Environment; Sustainable
models: the Tlicho of the Nico Project is co-managed, the Sivu- Development’ and Communication and Capacity Building.
mut Project co-developed, and Squamish Nation Woodfibre
LNG Project is independent. As they all are about utilization A General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)
of natural resources (mining and natural gas), and sustainable is held every fourth year. There are thus several Inuit declara-
development, they are included in the economy indicator here. tions available, such as the Kitigaaryuit Declaration of July 2014
(ICC 2014), the Nuuk Declaration of July 2010, and the Utqiag-
The Science and Education indicator is not explicitly discussed vik Declaration of 2006 (ICC 2006). Better known, however, is
in the Gwich’in Impact Assessment, but is implicit, given that A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic,
the document is a study with methods and an ambitious re- adopted by the ICC in April 2019 (ICC 2009), and inspired, per-
search approach. haps even provoked, by the Illulissat Ministerial meeting and
Declaration of May 2008.
To sum up
In the 2018 Utqiagvik Declaration, the (Re)mapping and (Re)
The Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indig- defining the Arctic indicator clearly defines, or redefines, the
enous-Led Review report by the Gwich’in Council International Arctic region by explaining the Inuit as “one Arctic people liv-
is first of all a study—and an interesting one—on environmen- ing in four nations across Inuit Nunaat, our shared homeland,
tal impact assessments, and in particular on Indigenous-led im- that today encompasses northern Alaska, Chukotka, Canada,

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and Greenland” (ICC 2018, 1). The Declaration continues that Correspondingly, the 2018 Declaration reaffirms that “Inuit are
the Arctic region “poses extreme challenges to connectivity and one Arctic people living in four nations across Inuit Nunaat, our
[that] overcoming these challenges requires political will and in- shared homeland” (2018, 1).
frastructure” (2018, 10); “Inuit are more connected today than
ever before due to the advent of the internet and social media” The 2010 Policy includes requests to both the Inuit Circum-
(2018, 11). Finally, “ICC will pursue novel initiatives that foster polar Council (ICC) and to Arctic states regarding subsistence
greater social, cultural, and political exchange between Inuit re- rights. “An Inuit Arctic Policy must recognize that Indigenous
gions in order to enrich Inuit cooperation and unity” (2018, 12). ‘subsistence’ is a highly complex notion” (2010, 29) [and the]
ICC shall be greatly encouraged to undertake a comprehensive
The 2010 Inuit Arctic Policy (ICC 2010) makes a more politi- study on how best to address global forces, such as the ‘animal
cal definition of the region arguing that “the Arctic is the Inu- rights’ and other destructive movements that aim to destroy In-
it Homeland and has been inhabited by Inuit for thousands of uit sustainable use of living resources” (2010, 82). This matter
years” (Inuit Arctic Policy 2010, 26). Hence “Inuit and other Arc- is seen as consistent with the “principles of self-government,
tic Indigenous peoples are ancient societies using and occupying [given that] Inuit and other Arctic peoples should have direct
vast traditional territories which pre-date the creation of modern input in the formulation and implementation of Arctic co-oper-
states” (2010, 21). The “Inuit own or have jurisdiction over half ation agreements” (2010, 22). On the other hand, Arctic States
the entire Arctic… [and] we are, in fact, the largest landholders “should recognize that Inuit have the right to engage in tradi-
in the world [and] The Arctic has been our home and our suste- tional contacts and in all forms of cooperation, including eco-
nance for centuries” (2010, 9). “The Arctic is first and foremost nomic and social exchanges, and travel and trade across state
the ancestral homeland of Inuit and other northern peoples” and other boundaries” (2010, 88), and “trade among themselves
(2010, 22). Overall, the Arctic region and sub-Arctic areas, as regardless of national jurisdictions or boundaries” (2010, 81).
well as the entire northern circumpolar world, is said by the Pol-
icy to “form a single region in which many states and peoples are The issue of ‘Inuit rights’ is an important part of the 2010 Poli-
found. This region includes the Inuit homeland (Inuit Nunaat), cy, both in general and at the national level (see the chapter on
which transcends the geographical boundaries [of the region] ‘Inuit Rights, Peace and Security Issues’). Nationally, the Inuit
(2010, 21) and given that a “large part of the Arctic Ocean is as “distinct Indigenous peoples… have both fundamental col-
contiguous to Inuit Nunaat, Inuit should therefore be consulted” lective and individual [basic] rights”… [that] “must be guar-
[on all relevant issues] (2010, 45). anteed in the national legal system of their respective states”
(2010, 13) “across the circumpolar regions, including marine
The 2010 Inuit Policy also discusses changes in the Arctic. “The areas, and [that] transcend the national boundaries of Arctic
Inuit world has changed profoundly… [and] Inuit Nunaat, our states” (2010, 13). In general, the 2010 Policy strongly states
homeland, has become a major force in international and na- that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment,
tional politics, in climate change research and science, in culture as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fun-
and arts, in minority human rights and models of Indigenous damental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United
self-government. Arctic Sovereignty is one of our main concerns Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and inter-
and is now also an international concern” (2010, 9). Finally, that national human rights law[s]” (2010, 21). The 2018 Declaration
“The Inuit Circumpolar Council and its Arctic Policy principles correspondingly reaffirms “that the rights to lands, resources
have played an important role in this development” (2010, 9). and territories and the right of self-determination [recognized
and] affirmed by the United Nation Declaration on the Rights
Concerning the Human Dimension indicator the 2010 Policy of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) [as an international human
clearly states how critical it is that “Inuit be recognized and re- rights instrument], applies to our entire homeland, including
ferred to both nationally and internationally as a distinct ‘peo- lands, waters, ice, air space and resources” (2018, 1). Indeed, the
ple.’ Inuit are not mere ‘populations’ or ‘minorities’” (2010, 13). 2018 Declaration goes back to the very roots of the ICC—“con-
In recognition of their distinctness, the seventh of November cern for the security and integrity of the Arctic environment
each year has been proclaimed ‘Inuit Day’ (2010, 11). The 2010 prompted the establishment of ICC” as “the first non-govern-
Policy further clarifies: “The Inuit are an integral part of Arctic mental organization to call for the precautionary principle and
ecosystems in harmony with… the dynamic processes of Arc- vocalize the human rights dimension of the implications and
tic ecosystems” (2010, 34). In terms of Inuit history, “Inuit and impacts of a rapidly changing Arctic environment” (2018, 9).
other Arctic Indigenous peoples are ancient societies using and
occupying vast traditional territories which pre-date the creation The 2010 Policy states that some of these human rights exist to
of modern states. These first inhabitants of the Arctic have their “protect and promote Inuit rights and status within each state”
own laws, customs, institutions, cultures and rights which also (2010, 13). In pursuit of these rights, “Inuit must seek to obtain
pre-date those of Arctic states” (2010, 21). “The archaeological full participation in all national and governmental discussions
record of the Arctic is the history of Inuit and other northern and major issues affecting Inuit interests” (2010, 13) which “not
Indigenous peoples” (2010, 73), but “people have underestimat- only ensures recognition and respect for Inuit rights and inter-
ed our adaptability and resilience. We were a rag-tag and young ests, but also protects the human and other fundamental rights
group of Inuit… but we were determined” (2010, 9). and freedoms” (2010, 11). The 2018 Declaration echoes this
opinion in terms of supporting Inuit “rights and self-determina-

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tion on wildlife management issues” (2018, 8) and of directing dren in the Arctic” (2010, 59). Additionally, other international
the ICC “to participate collectively and strategically to ensure agreements and instruments should be consulted regarding the
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) action plans sup- rights of children, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
port and enhance monitoring and sustainable use of Arctic bio- Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, In-
diversity” (2018, 8). Furthermore, Inuit aim to “exchange infor- ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
mation amongst ourselves to build capacity regarding human the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
rights instruments and apply them to co-management regimes crimination Against Women, and ILO Conventions.
and other governance bodies to advance our food sovereignty
and self-governance of land, wildlife and ecosystems” (2018, 8). A fundamental part, even the foundation, of human rights, ac-
cording to the 2010 Policy, is to “integrate Inuit cultural values
It should be recognized that “there is a profound relationship and concerns in all aspects” (2010, 11) including creative aspects,
between human rights, peace and development” (2010, 20) in given that “the diverse cultures of Inuit… are part of the cultural
“formulating a comprehensive Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 9). heritage of all humankind” (2010, 65). Here the ICC can play
This is because, on the one hand, these rights “are considered as an important role in circumpolar relations, providing “an ideal
individual and collective rights [including both] rights and du- forum for Inuit from the various Arctic states to engage in social
ties” (2010, 20), and on the other, “severe economic disparities and cultural relations” (2010, 22). The 2010 Policy emphasizes
and human rights violations can pose a threat to world peace” that “language is central to the continuity of culture and to cul-
while “peaceful relationships and peace are generally vital fac- tural identity.... the universe… [is] manifested through the Inuit
tors in striving towards social progress and development” (2010, language” (2010, 65), and “the Inuit language should [thus] be
20). Regarding Inuit subsistence rights, these include “hunting, a working language in Inuit schools.... [as well as used] at home
fishing, trapping, and gathering” (2010, 29), being “both col- with [our] children” (2010, 92). The 2018 Declaration echoes
lective and individual in nature. Inuit rights to harvest flora this viewpoint, stating that “our languages are the foundation
and fauna… are not limited to traditionally harvested species” of our culture and identity. Legally protecting and revitalizing
(2010, 29). The feasibility of creating an “Arctic Environmental those languages is urgent and paramount” (2018, 6). In order for
Bill of Rights” should be studied in this context (2010, 28). the Inuit language to remain strong, “Inuit language schools and
learning institutions need to be established by the appropriate
The 2010 Policy also states that “The harvesting practices authorities” (2018, 6).
of Inuit are a crucial part of their ancestral rights and tradi-
tions” (2010, 30). And this economic self-sufficiency also in- Interestingly, the 2010 Policy argues that, on the one hand,
cludes a reference to the problems Inuit encounter regarding “most of Inuit material culture is derived from the land and
“animal rights groups” (2010, 33). The ICC is asked to “rep- sea mammals” (2010, 66) and this”‘cultural property’ includes
resent Inuit by promoting their rights and protecting their property of archaeological, ethnological, artistic, literary, scien-
interests” in relevant international organizations, such as tific, or historical interest and importance” (2010, 71). On the
WIPO, the EU, NAFTA, IWC, IUCN, WTO (2010, 82). Ac- other hand, “non-material cultures are [also] part of the cultural
cording to the 2018 Declaration “elements of an overall strat- heritage of Inuit. The collective rights of Inuit to those non-ma-
egy to counter international anti-harvest and animal rights terial cultures are to be respected and Inuit credited with the full
groups would include [for example].... securing of expanded benefits” (2010, 66). For example, “the spiritual expression of a
markets for products of Indigenous harvesting” (2010, 33). traditional Inuit culture is part of its greatest treasures” (2010,
74) and must be respected and protected (2010, 66). Religious
According to the 2010 Policy, rights are also connected to access beliefs are not limited to organized religions” (2010, 76), as ‘cul-
to resources. For example, the document explains that “Inuit tural property’ also “merits adequate protection, foremost be-
have the right to manage Arctic renewable resources including cause of its cultural, spiritual, and educational value and use”
hydro-power” (2010, 29) and have “extensive rights in inland (2010, 71). This means that “cultural sites of particular signif-
water areas within their traditional territories, as outlined in icance to Inuit should be protected through regional, national,
agreements with their respective nation states” (2010, 39). They and international measures” such as the UNESCO Convention
should also “be involved in all aspects of economic development on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the
in order to enjoy such fundamental human rights as the right to UN Convention on Cultural Diversity (2010, 74). One of the
work and the right to an adequate standard of living” (2010, 79). goals of the 2018 Declaration is to “support communities who
are working to reclaim formal recognition of their original place
The 2010 Policy also speaks to issues of children’s rights. In par- names” (2018, 12). Overall, the 2010 Policy stresses that “Inuit
ticular, “in ensuring that the rights of Inuit children are clearly have a right to the protection of their intellectual property. In
recognized, it is beneficial to determine what children’s rights particular, special attention is required to substantially reduce
already exist at the international level and within the Arctic or eliminate the trade of counterfeit Inuit art or other objects
states concerned” (2010, 58). Here the “right to education is a and products” (2010, 88).
fundamental right” (2010, 89), which is recognized in the 2007
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Final- Inuit rights also includes supporting families and youth. The
ly, the ICC promises to “work to have the UN Convention on 2018 Declaration considers equality as “the unique needs and
the Rights of the Child fully implemented in regard to all chil- challenges based on gender in Inuit communities” (2018, 5).

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Correspondingly, the 2010 Policy argues that with respect to that Inuit values and traditions with respect to family planning
“threats of violence in the home, special measures must be im- and treatment of children be given full recognition by the Arc-
plemented both in regard to women and men… [and] when tic states concerned” (2010, 54). “Inuit health and social service
possible, safe houses should be located in each community” organizations must ensure the creation or improvement of ser-
(2010, 55). Health and well-being are also considered impor- vices in Inuit communities” (2010, 64).
tant: the chapter on “Sexual Equality and the Changing Roles
of Women and Men in the Arctic“ argues on behalf of greater Finally, the 2010 Policy briefly mentions migration, stating that
equality for the Inuit, including education about AIDS and oth- “mobility rights are generally recognized throughout Inuit re-
er sexually transmitted diseases. To open the doors to equality gions” (2010, 81).
of opportunity, the Inuit and other distinct peoples may need
to be treated differently, with the obstacles which they alone The core of the Governance indicator here is undoubtedly
face for no justifiable reason needing to be eliminated” (2010, ‘self-governance’/‘self-determination.’ The 2010 Policy (in its
54–55). Moreover, “dissemination of hate literature, incitement chapter on self-government) states that Inuit “as Indigenous
to violence, and other forms of promoting racial, religious, or peoples… have the right to exercise sufficient control over mat-
other prejudices must be effectively prohibited throughout the ters affecting their traditional territories, communities, and in-
Arctic” (2010, 77). terests. An integral part of this right of self-determination within
states is the right to self-government”, consistent with “recog-
Health is also addressed in the 2018 Declaration. “Healthy Inu- nized rights and principles applicable to Indigenous peoples
it families are central to the sustainability of our communities” under international law” [so that they can exercise] “adequate
(2018, 4). While food security will be discussed under the Se- powers of self-government within their traditional territories”
curity indicator, this means more broadly that “Inuit health and (2010, 15). Finally, “the rights to lands, resources and territories
wellness must be approached in a holistic way that recognizes that and the right of self-determination, affirmed by the UN Decla-
physical and mental health cannot be addressed separately and ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), applies
solutions should build upon the knowledge and strengths found to our entire homeland, including lands, waters, ice, air space
within our communities” (2018, 5). The 2018 Declaration com- and resources” (2018, 1).
mits to taking “full and effective action to prevent suicide among
Inuit” (2018, 1) and to “advocate for infrastructure and Inuit-spe- The 2010 Policy claims that “there is insufficient recognition
cific interventions that will address family violence” (2018, 5). and respect for Indigenous societies and rights in some coun-
tries, inadequate protection of the Arctic environment, and of-
One of the priorities of the 2010 Policy is “improving the qual- ten, the imposition of centralized state policies unsuited to Arc-
ity of life in Inuit communities” (2010, 11) and to “improve the tic conditions and needs” (2010, 22) and that “state government
quality of life in Arctic communities” (2010, 19), namely “issues policies that continue to deny Indigenous peoples their full
of food security, unemployment, housing shortages and many rights to non-renewable resources and that treat such peoples
chronic health issues” (2010, 25), and “a right to safe drinking as obstacles to development are colonial and out-dated” (2010,
water” (2010, 39. Moreover, “if the right to health as a funda- 36). Instead, states should actively “promote Inuit self-reliance
mental human right is to have real meaning in the Arctic, a com- [and] the Inuit Arctic Policy must elaborate a comprehensive
prehensive strategy must be devised and carried out” (2010, 51). Arctic economic strategy” (2010, 79). For example, “a vital step
“Health is more than the absence of disease. It refers to the state towards achieving full and meaningful employment… must be
of the whole person and has a direct bearing on the develop- the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive train-
ment of the individual and her or his quality of life” (2010, 51). ing and education strategy designed especially for the Arctic”
“An approach which addresses a wide range of basic needs, such (2010, 83). “Where lacking, direct political representation by
as nutrition, education, housing, water and sanitation, medical Inuit in national and regional political institutions should be
care and social services, must be developed if health goals are to actively sought, in order to obtain a more adequate government
be achieved” (2010, 51–52). “The well-being of children is vital response to Inuit concerns” (2010, 13).
to all Inuit. Children represent the future of the Arctic” (2010,
55). For example, as Inuit youths are facing chronic unemploy- “Consistent with principles of self-government, Inuit and other
ment, childhood abuse and violence, and a high suicide rate, Arctic peoples should have direct input in the formulation and
“the education system and its ability to prepare them for the la- implementation of Arctic co-operation agreements” (2010, 22)
bour market” is important (2010, 59). Moreover, Inuit Elders and be involved “when devising policies and implementing in-
are mentioned “as traditional leaders [who] must be encouraged ternational conventions or other agreements” (2010, 40). The
and permitted to re-establish a leadership role and participate term ‘self-government’ is mentioned several times and the es-
in decision-making” (2010, 64). “Traditional knowledge, be it tablishment a “committee to examine the state of Inuit rights for
cultural, environmental or ecological, should be part of the cur- self-determination as recognized in international law” is pro-
riculum in schools” (2010, 64). posed (2010, 16). The committee should also ascertain how to
secure these rights within Inuit Nunaat (2010, 16). Finally, it is
All in all, the 2010 Policy fully supports “traditional Inuit adop- proposed “to establish a comprehensive Inuit Arctic Policy… in
tion and encourage states to legally recognize Inuit traditional regard to matters of economic, social, cultural, environmental
adoption” (2010, 53). Moreover, it is “of primary importance as well as political concerns”, “to achieve a broad consensus on

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the priorities, policies, and principles to be advanced in Inuit… particular, the siting, construction, and operation of military
regions”, and “to encourage co-ordination of policy-making and bases, installations, and facilities” (2010, 18). “National security
decision-making in the international community” (2010, 11). restrictions… must not be used as a means of avoiding a full
and open process of impact assessment” (2010, 19). Overall,
According to the 2010 Policy, “self-regulation is a key element in “Inuit and other Arctic peoples must be assured timely access
the relationship between Inuit and harvested resources” (2010, to relevant information and full participation in the impact as-
30) and “an integral part of the cultural relationship between Inuit sessment process” (2010, 19), for example, through an Arctic
and the subsistence harvest” (2010, 34) “if fundamental principles Environmental Bill of Rights, as mentioned above.
of self-government are to be respected” (2010, 34). Furthermore,
“Inuit traditions, customs, and rules relating to harvesting and According to the 2018 Declaration, [Inuit] “self-determination
resource management should be an integral part of any Arctic and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge” (2018, 7) are cru-
renewable resource management regime” (2010, 34). cial. The ICC should also be directed “to advocate its positions
on contaminants through the implementation and effectiveness
Correspondingly, the 2018 Declaration states that “Inuit have a monitoring regimes” of for example, UN Stockholm Conven-
right to self-determination in all facets of life, including in the tions on POPs and UN Minamata Convention on Mercury
promotion of Indigenous Knowledge and research” (2018, 7). (2018, 9). The Declaration (2018, 10) refers to the 2017 Report
To achieve this, it is necessary “to advance self-determination of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, ‘People of the Ice Bridge:
and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge… [and to] instruct The Future of Pikialasorsuaq’ should be adopted. The main ob-
ICC to engage with appropriate international fora” (e.g., AC, jective here should be “improving the self-sufficiency of Inuit
UNFCCC, CBD, IPCC) (2018, 7). Furthermore, “sustainable over time with the overall objective of aligning economic devel-
wildlife management is an important element for achieving In- opment and [the Inuit] cultural way of life” (2018, 10).
uit food security. Inuit have rights in national and international
agreements that protect Indigenous hunting and fishing activi- The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
ties…. [which] affirm Inuit rights to self-determination” (2018, dicator plays an important role here—both Inuit documents
7). As far as sustainable development is concerned, the Inuit greatly appreciate and emphasize international cooperation,
know that “economic development and social and cultural de- and note, for example, that “multilateral and transnational co-
velopment must go hand-in-hand, resulting in self-sufficiency, operation among Arctic and other states is a prerequisite to the
which is an essential part of greater political self-determination” development of a circumpolar system of marine management”
(2018, 10). The 2018 Declaration recommends continued shar- (2010, 43).
ing of “our unique knowledge and experiences with each other
to advocate for the utilization and equity of Indigenous Knowl- The 2010 Policy is clearly committed both to international co-
edge within wildlife management practices… and support our operation and to international organizations and treaties which
rights and self-determination on wildlife management issues” promote “international understanding and co-operation in
(2018, 8). Arctic matters through collaborative, co-operative research;
informational, cultural, and educational exchanges; and inter-
The 2010 Policy recognizes that “multilateral and transnational national agreements” (2010, 11). It states that “cooperation, in-
cooperation among Arctic and other states is a prerequisite to formation sharing, and solidarity among northern peoples are
the development of a circumpolar system of marine manage- increasingly vital” and that “multilateral forums, such as the
ment” (2010, 43), and insists that Arctic states’ “policies regard- Arctic Council, are required in the Arctic” (2010, 22). It is im-
ing the management and development of the seabed and its re- portant for Inuit and other northern peoples to “work together
sources must be established in collaboration with Inuit” (2010, to ensure that… key Arctic issues and concerns are made the
43). In addition, “ship-owners and oil drilling rig owners should focus of the international community. This is particularly im-
be subject to strict liability for ocean pollution (2010, 48) as “in- portant in this age of climate change” (2010, 22). Young people
creased exercise of Inuit offshore rights in the Arctic is crucial should also be encouraged to pursue activities “that emphasize
for the survival, development and future of Inuit” (2010, 40). the need for international peace, co-operation, and understand-
Also, “comprehensive Arctic marine management and devel- ing” (2010, 61). Inuit have a right to be involved in international
opment policies… must meet the social, cultural, political, and agreements and treaties as they are often “concluded between
economic needs and priorities of Inuit” (2010, 42). states on matters that directly affect Inuit rights and interests”
(2010, 14). Such “treaties and other agreements for cultural and
Concerning public consultations and environmental impact other forms of Arctic cooperation between states should involve
assessments, the 2010 Policy states that “proposed projects Inuit in the policy formulation, negotiation, and implementa-
subject to environmental and social impact assessment must tion stages” (2010, 68). It is also vital that Inuit “have formal
include potential economic impacts as an integral part of the and direct representation in international policy and law-mak-
overall assessment” (2010, 80) and, for example “study the so- ing forums relating to Indigenous peoples’ interests or Arctic
cio-economic, environmental and cultural impacts of the open- concerns” (2010, 14).
ing of the north polar sea routes on our communities” (2010,
82). “Environmental and social impact assessment procedures According to the 2018 Declaration, “self-determination and rec-
must be mandatory for proposed defence related projects… in ognition of Indigenous Knowledge” need to be advanced and,

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in this context, the ICC should be instructed to engage in the Arctic Council and be adequately funded to participate fully”
“appropriate international fora” (e.g., the AC, UNFCCC, CBD, (2010, 15). Finally, the Policy recognizes “the NGO… status of
IPCC) (2018, 7). The Declaration calls for participation in “Arc- the ICC within the United Nations… ICC participation in the
tic science and research,” namely, “contributing to activities that Arctic Council and in the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous
achieve partnerships and reflects the utilization of both Inuit Issues” (2010, 14) which significantly advances Inuit interests
Knowledge and science” and thereby advancing Inuit self-de- and provides increased opportunities. For example, “the com-
termination, for example, in the framework of the “Inuit review mon heritage of humankind principle… must not be applied
of the consultation process of the Arctic Council Arctic Science in a manner that may in effect deny or diminish Inuit offshore
Cooperation Agreement” (2018, 7). The Declaration further rights” (2010, 35), while “in addressing navigational, economic
urges the ICC “to promote the interconnectedness of drivers and environmental concerns, reference should be made to the
of change and the interrelated impacts and implications on our 1982 UNCLOS]” (2010, 47–48).
health, economy and environment in high level political discus-
sions and decision-making at fora” (2018, 9). The ICC should Correspondingly, the 2018 Declaration first, acknowledges “the
be mandated to “participate actively in the operationalization value of each ICC General Assembly Declaration as instrumen-
of the United Nations ‘Local Communities and Indigenous Peo- tal for guiding action on our shared priorities and for moni-
ples Platform’… and build capacity for Indigenous peoples to toring ongoing issues” (2018, 2) and also the importance of the
engage in the [UNFCCC]” (2018, 9). To achieve these goals, the ICC’s “advocacy work and participation in decision-making
ICC is urged “to promote sustainable economic and business processes and… [in strengthening] Inuit rights throughout In-
development” through the AC and its working groups, the UN uit Nunaat and globally” (2018, 2). Second, it encourages the
agencies and its collaborations with economic development fora “ICC to enhance Inuit participation and capacity within the
and networks, including the Arctic Economic Council” (2018, United Nations General Assembly” (2018, 3), and to implement
11). One of the actions needed is to “improve capacity to fully the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals in Inuit Nunaat—for
engage in the work of the Arctic Council at [SAO] and Working example, to “support the mandate of the Expert Mechanism on
Group [WG] levels” (2018, 2)—an important forum for achiev- the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) and to defend the
ing the aims of “Inuit—The Arctic We Want” (2018, 1–2). rights of the Inuit at the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC) and expand its mandate to engage with states” (2018,
Both the 2010 Policy and the 2018 Declaration broadly discuss 3). The UN agencies and organizations referred to are: UNEP,
the indicator of international cooperation in the context of, for UNESCO, WHO, IMO, FAO, as well as the UN 2030 SDGs.
example, human rights, Inuit youth and children, peace and se-
curity, environment and climate change, wildlife management, The 2010 Policy also notes international agreements and organ-
science and research, and Inuit rights. Both also include (long) izations relevant to health and social well-being: the UN Dec-
lists of major and minor international agreements and treaties, laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007), and
important and relevant for Inuit, and also forums, where Inuit the rights of Inuit children under the 1989 Convention on the
act or are asked to act. Rights of the Child.

The 2010 Policy ties together Inuit rights and international co- The 2010 Policy chapter on “Peaceful and safe uses of the Arc-
operation, beginning with the UN Declaration on the Rights tic” (2010, 19–20) emphasizes that “when formulating the Inuit
of Indigenous Peoples, which is frequently referred to, as are Arctic Policy, the various meanings of ‘peaceful purposes’ un-
other UN declarations. “It is of utmost importance that Inuit, der international law, should be carefully examined” (2010, 20),
together with the ICC, work towards having all countries en- and refers to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
dorse the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Peoples. It further states that the Arctic Council and other in-
(2010, 15) and for the ICC to “work for the implementation of ternational forums “have already taken important steps on spe-
Article 31” (2010, 33). The ICC having NGO status within the cific issues, for example, in regard to safety navigation, search
United Nations “provides Inuit with increased opportunities” and rescue, environmental monitoring and disaster response
and ICC “participation in the Arctic Council and in the UN and scientific cooperation, which are relevant also to the Arctic
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues significantly advanc- Ocean” (2010, 45). “In addressing navigational, economic and
es Inuit interests” (2010, 14). As a result, (i) “Inuit and other environmental concerns, reference should be made to the 1982
northern peoples have a responsibility to respond to the call of [UNCLOS]” (2010, 47–48). For its part, the 2018 Declaration
the United Nations for concerted and comprehensive action on states that “to support food security in Inuit Nunaat” (2018, 4),
the part of the world community. In this regard, the Inuit Arc- the ICC must be directed to “advocate for the enforcement of
tic Policy should clearly support the overall goal established by the International Marine Organization Polar Code… and phase
the UN General Assembly [GA] of general and complete disar- out heavy fuel oil (HFO) in order to minimize impacts on ma-
mament under effective international control” (2010, 16); and rine mammals and fish and to prevent disruption of seasonal
(ii) the ICC “should use its Permanent Participant status in the hunting, and for safety and environmental protection” (2018, 4).
Arctic Council to promote legal and administrative reforms to
strengthen the Council and increase the ability of Inuit to par- In the context of environmental protection and climate change,
ticipate fully in the Council internationally” (2010, 14). “Inuit the following list of international bodies and agreements is in-
and other Indigenous peoples must have a stronger voice at the cluded in the 2010 policy: CITES, IUCN, IWC, NAMMCO;

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and WHO, NAFTA and EU; and UNCLOS and ILO; and the 38). Environmental protection also includes protecting wildlife
AC UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; the and recognizing the “continuing significance of whales, polar
1998 POPs Protocol to the UN/ECE Convention on Long-range bears, seals, and other marine mammals” (2010, 31) given that
Transboundary Atmospheric Pollution, Stockholm Convention “most of Inuit material culture is derived from the land and sea
2001 on POPs, and the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UNFCCC. mammals” (2010, 66). The document also recognizes that the
need for environmental protection and development should be
The 2010 Policy also takes a more global scale and perspective balanced in order to “protect the delicate environment, includ-
by proposing that the “ICC should establish a committee to ex- ing the marine and other resources” (2010, 11) and to provide
amine the state of Inuit rights for self-determination as recog- “adequate laws and enforcement procedures… to protect the
nized in international law, including the right to self-govern- many facets of the Arctic environment” (2010, 28). To reach
ment, and recommend options to the ICC General Assemblies, these environmental objectives, the Inuit Arctic Policy “should
to secure these rights everywhere in Inuit Nunaat” (2010, 16). support the punishment of crimes against the environment…
This is prompted by the fact that “Indigenous peoples and their [and] encourage studies on the feasibility of creating an Arc-
vital economic issues are often excluded from the structural ar- tic Environmental Bill of Rights” (2010, 28) as well as to ensure
rangements and institutionalized practices and policies of states the protection of sea ice “as a habitat and platform for marine
at the bi-national and international level [particularly with re- mammals and other biological resources” (2010, 42). “In cases
spect to the GATT and the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement]. where fresh waters, plants, wildlife and their habitats… [are de-
Such exclusions of Indigenous peoples may in effect be contrary graded], Inuit have a right to full and fair compensation” (2010,
to the 1985 International Convention on the Elimination of All 39). “Conventions concerning migratory birds, sea mammals,
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1978 UNESCO Decla- polar bears, fish and other animals should be regularly exam-
ration on Race and Racial Prejudice” (2010, 86). ined from an Inuit perspective” (2010, 31), and “wildlife, in par-
ticular, requires an ecologically based system of management…
Referring to International Covenant on Economic, Social and [where] habitat management should be a key part of species
Cultural Rights and the UN Declaration on the Rights of In- management” (2010, 34) with respect to “[implementing] the
digenous Peoples, the 2010 Policy also notes that “Inuit should Convention on Biological Diversity” (2010, 28).
co-operate with the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO)” (2010, 73); “the UNESCO Convention on the Safe- The 2010 Policy particularly emphasizes the Arctic marine
guarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the UN Conven- environment. While “the conservation of marine resourc-
tion on Cultural Diversity should be respected” (2010, 74), and es [is] fundamental to the maintenance of global ecological
“cultural sites of particular significance to Inuit should be pro- health and stability”, the Inuit should also be recognized as “a
tected through regional, national, and international measures… primary user of marine life” (2010, 42). This means that the
[as] some sites have already been protected as UNESCO Her- prevention of pollution is important, especially oil spills. The
itage Sites or national parks” (2010, 74). The 2018 Declaration Inuit policy should also “support an express ban of any burial
mostly refers to the traditional international level by reaffirming of radioactive wastes in the sea bed” (2010, 44) and “in light
that “the interrelated, interdependent and indivisible rights of of all the above risks, the construction or use of nuclear reac-
Inuit” (2018, 2) “to lands, resources and territories and the right tors anywhere in the Arctic must be prohibited” (2010, 20).
of self-determination” (2018, 1) “are recognized and affirmed in
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN- The 2010 Policy also notes that as “Inuit Traditional Knowledge
DRIP) as an international human rights instrument” (2018, 2), has provided critical information about climate change in Arc-
and mandates the “ICC to strengthen its role within other inter- tic ecosystems, completing scientific knowledge … [it] should
national, multinational and bilateral fora including the Europe- be incorporated… into… the UN system or by the IPCC” (2010,
an Union (EU)” (2018, 3). 23). Further, the ICC, in cooperation with national Inuit leaders,
“should call on the international community, particularly the
With respect to the Environmental Protection indicator, the G20 countries, to use an International Climate Change Adapta-
2010 Policy recommends that “the circumpolar Arctic should tion Fund to aid Arctic regions in developed countries” (2010,
be the world’s barometer of environmental health and Inuit 23) and also “work to have the following human rights con-
should support resolution 22/11 Sustainable Development of ventions respected due to their relevance for Climate Change”
the Arctic” adopted by UNEP in 2003 (2010, 27). Further, the (including UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICE-
ICC should commit to participating in future COP conferences SCR, ICCPR, ILO Convention 169, UNDRIPs) (2010, 26). The
“to ensure that any international agreements on climate change ICC also “recognizes the on-going need for Inuit to be actively
recognize the unique... issues faced by Inuit” (2010, 26). The engaged with the circumpolar and international processes [in-
2010 policy emphasizes the protection of “the delicate Arctic cluding UNFCCC, CBD, UNPFII, AC] and international sci-
environment, including marine and other resources upon which ence bodies (e.g., ICSU, IASC, IASSA)” (2010, 25).
Inuit depend” (2010, 11), as well as the need to, to “identify the
mounting and diverse threats to ecological processes, biological The 2018 Declaration requires support for “Sustainable Wild-
diversity, and the future of Inuit harvesting” (2010, 34). “The life Management [and urges the] ICC to support the [CIWN]
integrity and abundance of fresh water resources in the Arctic to link activities on various bi-lateral and international wildlife
must be protected as one of its most important resources” (2010, activities including [CAFF, IUCN, CBD]”. The ICC should be

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directed to “participate collectively and strategically to ensure [PCBs], [POPs], radionuclides, and other toxic and persistent
the [CBD] post-2020 action plans support and enhance our substances” (2010, 38) are in many instances “from trans-
monitoring and sustainable use of Arctic biodiversity and for boundary sources” (2010, 40) “outside the Arctic” (2010, 38).
the Convention on Biological Diversity”. The ICC should also On ocean contamination in general, “of particular concern to
“collaboratively identify opportunities for our collective engage- Inuit are vessel noise, ship tracks, and oil spills and their conse-
ment in the United Nations Convention on the International quences on marine mammal migration” (2010, 45). A particu-
Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) Rural Communities to lar concern is that “transboundary nuclear pollution could [be]
safeguard the distinct rights of Inuit as an Indigenous Peoples” devastating” and “even if nuclear technology is excluded from
(2018, 8). the Arctic, circumpolar regions may still be adversely affected
by nuclear accidents arising from outside the Arctic” (2010, 48).
Correspondingly, the 2010 Policy requires that the “ICC should Considering these pollutants, it is “important to identify and
participate in international bodies, in particular the Convention effectively address the principal sources of oil pollution in ma-
on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), the rine environments” (2010, 44)…. [and] to recognize that by far
[IUCN], the [IWC], and the [NAMMCO] to defend the right of the principle source of oil pollution in the world’s oceans are
Inuit to harvest marine mammals and to trade their products on not accidents… but intentional ‘operational’ discharges” (2010,
a sustainable basis”. ICC should also be directed to use and, where 45) “from ships (e.g., deballasting), ocean dumping of wastes
appropriate, “lobby international and regional bodies such as the or major spills from offshore drilling rigs” (2010, 44). Also, “it
[WTO], the [NAFTA] and the [EU] to help promote trade of In- must be recognized that military activities in circumpolar seas
uit goods and services world-wide in ways that do not adversely can pose unacceptable environmental and other security risks
affect Inuit hunting, fishing and gathering rights” (2010, 30). to Inuit and the Arctic” (2010, 44). The Policy includes interna-
tional and local, pan-Arctic perspectives on pollution: “the in-
The 2018 Declaration has an even more comprehensive ap- ternational trade and development policies of Arctic and other
proach, stating: “Our environment continues to undergo pro- developed countries require closer scrutiny. Toxic products…
found, rapid and unpredictable change. Our communities are being supplied to less developed countries that are not in
witness and suffer the effects of these changes and respond by a position to properly store and dispose of toxic substances”
sharing our knowledge, adapting our communities, working (2010, 88) and “mining activities can be a major source of water
with researchers and negotiating national, bilateral and inter- pollution within circumpolar regions” (2010, 40).
national agreements to reduce or eliminate the causes of these
changes where possible. We know that the Arctic environment In terms of approaches to problem solving, the 2010 Inuit Arctic
is unique and plays a fundamental role in global climate change Policy first states its concerns about transnational pollution. A
regulation. Our culture is dependent on the land and sea. There- “clean and safe Arctic environment cannot be assured without
fore, the sustainability of the Arctic environment and its living effectively controlling pollution hazards both in and outside the
resources is crucial to our communities and a focus on support- Arctic” (2010, 48) for example] by strongly promoting “the need
ing families and Inuit society” (2018, 8–9). to keep the Arctic environment safe from [POPs] and heavy
metals” (2010, 39). Second, international co-operation and man-
The 2018 Declaration also makes clear that the issue of sustaina- agement, such as international agreements on acid rain, impact
bility and living resources is crucial to Inuit communities. “Sus- assessment procedures, participate in the mitigation of GHGs
tainable wildlife management” (2018, 7–8) is needed to achieve including SLCFs, such as Black Carbon, and are all necessary
food security for the Inuit to support families and Inuit socie- measures. The following international bodies are mentioned as
ty. “Inuit have rights in national and international agreements being relevant to this issue: AC, CITES, EU, ILO, IUCN, IWC,
that protect Indigenous hunting and fishing activities” (2018, 7) NAFTA, NAMMCO, UNCLOS, WHO, as well as the following
and “ICC was the first non-governmental organization to call international treaties: UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
for the precautionary principle and vocalized the human rights nous Peoples, 1998 POPs Protocol to the UN/ECE Convention
dimension of the implications and impacts of a rapidly chang- on Long-range Transboundary Atmospheric Pollution, Stock-
ing Arctic environment” (2018, 9). According to the Declara- holm Convention 2001 on POPs, Kyoto Protocol to the 1992
tion, the following are Inuit goals: “to advance self-determina- FCCC. The 2010 Policy on nuclear pollution holds that the
tion and recognition of Indigenous knowledge” (2018, 7); “[to] ICC “should support an express ban of any burial of radioac-
instruct ICC to share research and actions that build climate tive wastes in the seabed and insist that nuclear states assume
change resilience and to share and showcase the adaptation and the full responsibility and costs of dealing with the wastes they
innovative mitigation responses, including… monitoring the generate” (2010, 44). “As long as nuclear power continues to be
movement of animals due to climate change” (2018, 9); and [to] used by some countries, the international community has a duty
“direct ICC to participate collectively and strategically to ensure to protect peoples and the global environment from accidental
the [CBD] post-2020 action plans support and enhance our transboundary harm” (2010, 48). “Special measures must be de-
monitoring and sustainable use of Arctic biodiversity” (2018, 8). vised to deal with any possible consequences of accidental trans-
boundary pollution by radioactive material in the Arctic, as well
Both documents include brief notions on the Pollution indica- as with international terrorist activities” “involving radioactive
tor. According to the 2010 Policy the following pollutants are materials, transport of plutonium and other radioactive sub-
recognized: “acid rain and snow, mercury pollution, pesticides, stances in or over the Arctic should be prohibited” (2010, 49).

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The 2018 Declaration proposes actions needed “to advance “immediate financial assistance should be provided to assist
self-determination and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge” Arctic communities already significantly affected by climate
(2018, 7). The ICC should be directed “to advocate its positions change” (2010, 25).
on contaminants through the implementation and effective-
ness monitoring regimes [e.g., POPs, UNs Minamata Conven- Similarly, the 2018 Declaration states the need to instruct the
tion on Mercury]… recognize the importance of short-lived ICC “to share research and actions that build climate [change]
climate forcers such as black carbon” (2018, 9) and “support resilience and to share and showcase the adaptation and inno-
national and global programs that safeguard our marine eco- vative mitigation responses, including… monitoring and move-
systems and wildlife from marine litter and micro-plastics” ment of animals due to climate change, erosion and community
(2018, 10). It is also necessary to “advance self-determination relocation” (2018, 9). The “Inuit and other northern peoples
and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge” (2018, 7) and “di- should work together to ensure that… key Arctic issues and
rect ICC to advocate for Inuit-led environmental monitoring concerns are made the focus of the international community”
and management of Inuit Nunaat (marine and terrestrial) and (2010, 22). “Traditional knowledge should be recognized as
adopt in principle, the report, People of the Ice Bridge: The Fu- having validity and the Inuit should make representation to
ture of Pikialasorsuaq, and establish a committee to advance the IPCC to develop a complementary assessment on climate
the implementation of the recommendations” (2018, 10). Fi- change and Indigenous peoples” (2010, 23).
nally, the declaration states that “these initiatives should be
undertaken with an objective of improving the self-sufficiency The 2010 Policy ties together climate change and human rights,
of Inuit over time with the overall objective of aligning eco- and brings them onto the international / global stage, stating
nomic development and [the] cultural way of life” (2018, 10). that ICC should “work to have… human rights conventions re-
spected due to their relevance for Climate Change [e.g., the UN
According to the 2010 Policy, “climate change is a major dan- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Convention 169]”
ger” (2010, 38) and “the ICC believes in preventing danger- (2010, 26). “The ICC, in cooperation with national Inuit lead-
ous climate change that will adversely affect Inuit livelihoods” ers, should call on the international community, particularly the
(2010, 23). It thus recognizes the Climate Change indicator, G20 countries, to use an International Climate Change Adapta-
though this is not among the major themes in these Inuit doc- tion Fund to aid Arctic regions in developed countries [and to
uments. “The overriding concern is the increased melting of commit themselves to participate in future COPs]” (2010, 23).
ice and other potentially detrimental effects of climate change
on the oceans and waterways” (2010, 47). There are “potential The Security indicator is explicitly discussed in both the 2010
impacts of climate change on the culture, health, spirituality Policy and the 2018 Declaration. The 2010 Policy has a substan-
and economy of Inuit throughout the Arctic” (2010, 23). “Inuit tial sub-chapter on Arctic and Global Security (2010, 16–19)
should work towards making international organizations rec- “promoting peace, and global security (2010, 18)… [and fos-
ognize the impact of climate change on Inuit and put resourc- tering] peaceful diplomacy and the use of appropriate and safe
es in place to help Inuit adapt” (2010, 23) by “[minimizing] technologies in circumpolar regions” (2010, 11). The document
climate change impacts”, “[stabilizing] greenhouse gas (GHG) says bluntly that although national defence and foreign policy
concentrations” (2010, 23), “[devising] an overall policy on issues are “traditionally the domain of state governments”, but
sea ice in circumpolar regions” (2010, 42), and “the effects of “policy-making concerning Arctic and global security is too
climate change on sea ice [have] to be taken into considera- crucial to exclude northern communities and should not be left
tion” (2010, 42). solely to experts within the military and government” (2010,
16). Furthermore, “For true Arctic security to be achieved, there
The 2018 Declaration starts with a notion about the Arctic must be greater global security. New concepts of common secu-
environment being ‘unique’ and playing “a fundamental role rity are urgently needed that incorporate environmental, health,
in global climate change regulation. Our culture is depend- social, cultural, and economic aspects” (2010, 16).The goal of
ent on the land and sea” (2018, 9). It goes on to say that “loss this must be the attainment by “general and complete disarma-
of multi-year sea-ice and thawing permafrost are leading to ment under effective international control… [here] is essential
enhanced cycling of contaminants that may have adverse im- that the concept of an Arctic zone of peace be formally accepted
pacts throughout the food web” (2018, 4). For example, there by Arctic states and others as an explicit and political objective”
are changes in temperatures, sea ice coverage and movement, (2010, 18). For example, “it must be recognized that military ac-
thawing permafrost. Moreover, the “arrival of new species is tivities in circumpolar seas can pose unacceptable environmen-
resulting in a need to adjust hunting strategies and ways of tal and other security risks to Inuit and the Arctic“ (2010, 44).
storing food” (2018, 4). It is not surprising, therefore, that mit-
igation and adaptation are mentioned in both documents. The The 2010 Policy thus proposes that “environmental and social
2010 Policy explains that “adaptation processes should deal impact assessment procedures must be mandatory for proposed
with issues of food security, unemployment, housing shortag- defence related projects… In particular, the siting, construction,
es and many chronic health issues” (2010, 25) and “partici- and operation of military bases, installations, and facilities must
pate in the mitigation of [GHG emissions], including [SLCFs], be subject to impact assessment” (2010, 18). Moreover, “secu-
such as Black Carbon, in order to limit global temperature rity shall not only be defined in military terms. In this context,
rise” (2010, 25). As a result of these impacts on the population, respect for the rights, values, and perspectives of the Arctic’s

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Indigenous peoples in vital” (2010, 16) and “national security peoples should encourage the development of new notions of
restrictions should only apply where strictly necessary and must common security” (2010, 22) and “encourage activities of youth
not be used as a means of avoiding a full and open process of that emphasize the need for international peace, co-operation,
impact assessment” (2010, 19). and understanding” (2010, 61). Suitable means “should be de-
vised to promote awareness and informed discussion in north-
The 2010 Policy also states that, for the Inuit, “Arctic Sovereign- ern communities of the dangers of nuclear weapons” “to teach
ty is one of our main concerns and is now also an internation- students… the values of disarmament, non-violent resolution
al concern” (2010, 9). Of fundamental importance is that the of conflicts, and world peace” (2010, 16). The 2010 Policy urges
Inuit Arctic Policy should recognize “a profound relationship that “the concept of an Arctic zone of peace be formally accept-
between human rights, peace and development”. “The human ed by Arctic states and others as an explicit and political objec-
rights of peace and development are considered as individual tive” (2010, 16). Such a “zone of peace must foster international
and collective rights: they include both rights and duties” (2010, cooperation for solely peaceful purposes and must be free of
20). It is important to take them into account when formulating nuclear weapons; testing of nuclear and other weapons of mass
a comprehensive Inuit Arctic Policy, and ensuring that there is destruction must not be permissible; as a general rule, the safe-
“a uniform, consistent meaning of ‘peaceful purposes’ under the guarding of the Arctic environment must take precedence over
Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 20). Within the Arctic region is “the military exercises and activities; peacetime military activities
Inuit Homeland [Nunaat]… inhabited by Inuit for thousands [including low-level and supersonic flight testing and training]
of years. Therefore, its inhabitants should be involved in and that disrupt or undermine the territories, communities, rights,
can contribute significantly to the issues of Arctic Sovereignty” and security of peoples must not be allowed… and internation-
(2010, 26). “The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of al, circumpolar, and national systems of verification pertaining
November 19, 1794 (the Jay Treaty) between the [USA] and the to arms control must be encouraged” (2010, 18). Furthermore,
[UK] promised to allow Indigenous peoples free passage and for these purposes “it would be beneficial to devise an Arctic
trade across the U.S.–Canada border”. “Similar steps must be foreign policy as an integral part of the overall Inuit Arctic Poli-
taken in relation to borders in other Arctic states within Inuit cy” which is not “limited to defence-related issues but should be
Nunaat” (2010, 88). made consistent with environmental, social, and other aspects
of the overall Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 18). The fundamen-
The 2018 Declaration also has a special perspective on food se- tal issue here is that “the Inuit circumpolar homeland… must
curity which “is central to Inuit identity and way of life” and only be used for purposes that are peaceful and safe” (2010,
“will be promoted and endorsed in all aspects of ICC’s work” 19). “Testing, use, manufacture, production, installation, or ac-
(2018, 1). “Inuit food security is multi-faceted and reflective quisition of any nuclear weapons within the Inuit circumpolar
of interconnecting elements, such as language, child develop- homeland must be prohibited” (2010, 20). Finally, on this issue,
ment, mental and physical health, high cost of transportation, the 2010 Policy states: “Severe economic disparities and human
economic development and management. The Arctic’s living rights violations can pose a threat to world peace… peaceful
resources and the ability of our hunters to harvest and process relationships and peace are generally vital factors in striving to-
these resources are fundamental to food security and is core to wards social progress and development” (2010, 20).
Inuit identity” (2018, 3). “Recognizing the health of our people
are connected to the health of the animals and overall environ- The 2010 Policy outlines a few interests and concerns with re-
ment, climate-related changes provide both opportunities and spect to the Safety and SAR indicator First, the Inuit have a
challenges that contribute to food security or insecurity” (2018, “right to safe drinking water” (2010, 39). “The integrity and
4). Both ‘food security’ and ‘food sovereignty’ are defined. To abundance of fresh water resources in the Arctic must be pro-
achieve “food security will require holistic approaches, Inuit tected as one of its most important resources” (2010, 38). Sec-
innovation, and depends on the capacity to mobilize govern- ond, “an Arctic waters management regime [should] address
ments, regional stakeholders and community residents” (2018, conflicting uses [shipping, hydroelectric power, inter-basin
4). To support food security in Inuit Nunaat and achieve food transfers, mining, oil and gas developments]” (2010, 39), “Tank-
sovereignty the following actions, inter alia, are needed: “Urge er traffic, in the Arctic, is highly risky and should be prohibited”
ICC to continue its work to enhance food security through re- (2010, 47). Third, due to domestic violence and vulnerability
search and advocacy… Direct ICC to address components of of Inuit children “the right to protection against external risks
food security that will aid in enhancing self-governance across likely to endanger health. Special attention should be devoted
Inuit Nunaat… Direct ICC to advocate for the enforcement of to occupational health and safety” and “domestic violence must
the International Marine Organization Polar Code… and phase be eliminated” (2010, 52). Finally, as mentioned earlier, trans-
out heavy fuel oil (HFO) in order to minimize impacts on ma- boundary nuclear pollution “could have devastating environ-
rine mammals and fish and to prevent disruption of seasonal mental, health, economic, and cultural impacts in the Arctic”
hunting, and for safety and environmental protection” (2018, 4). (2010, 68). Special measures for dealing with such occurrences
and with “the dangers of terrorist attacks using radioactive ma-
As measures to “achieve real and lasting security in the Arctic” terials” should be put in place (2010, 49).
(2010, 22) and solve problems across the jurisdictional bound-
aries of the Arctic states, the 2010 Policy recognizes first, “in- The 2010 Policy acknowledges that international forums, like
ternational cooperation” (2010, 18); and second, that “northern the Arctic Council, “have already taken important steps on spe-

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cific issues, for example, in regard to safety navigation, search The 2010 Policy also requires renewable resources to be man-
and rescue, environmental monitoring and disaster response aged and “protected in a manner that maintains ecological bal-
and scientific cooperation” (2010, 45). It concludes, however, ance, respects Inuit resource rights, and sustains the renewable
that “a clean and safe Arctic environment cannot be assured resource needs of Inuit, both now and in the future” (2010, 33).
without effectively controlling pollution hazards both in and Only development that is “culturally-appropriate” should be
outside the Arctic” (2010, 48), and proposes infrastructure and promoted (2010, 27). “Inuit and other Indigenous peoples must
capabilities to increase safety. For example, “a system of regis- have clear priority in terms of access to and use of Arctic renew-
tration should be implemented for all tankers and ships sail- able resources for subsistence purposes, including inter-com-
ing in the Arctic waters in order to track them in case of ac- munity trade” (2010, 31). “An Inuit Arctic Policy on renewable
cident” (2010, 47), also “an urgent need to develop upgraded resources and Inuit subsistence practices must take into ac-
navigational or hydrographic charts for Arctic marine areas, count the devastating effects that international anti-harvest and
according to the highest standards”, and “critical… to devel- animal rights groups continue to have on Inuit communities,
op a proven capacity for immediate and effective response to culture, and economies. A comprehensive strategy must be de-
any oil spill” (2010, 47). For nuclear safety “the internation- veloped and implemented to effectively counter these opposing
al community has a duty to protect peoples and the global forces” (2010, 33).
environment from accidental transboundary harm” (2010,
48). “Special measures must be devised to deal with any pos- Regarding non-renewable resources, “Inuit rights include the
sible consequences of accidental transboundary pollution right to manage Arctic non-renewable resources and to fully
by radioactive material in the Arctic” “involving radioactive participate in, and benefit from, policies and projects associated
materials, transport of plutonium and other radioactive sub- with resource development” (2010, 36). This involves a few es-
stances in or over the Arctic should be prohibited” (2010, 49). sential principles: (i) “The overall prosperity of each state is af-
fected by the economic growth of its various parts. [Thus] if the
While the 2018 Declaration is brief and focuses on ‘food security’ Arctic regions are to contribute to strengthening the economies
as “central to Inuit identity and way of life” (2018, 1). It also seeks, of their respective states, Inuit have to be included as full and
as mentioned earlier, to “advance emergency response, and phase active partners in northern development matters” (2010, 79);
out heavy fuel oil (HFO) in order to minimize impacts on marine (ii) “Inuit and the circumpolar regions must substantially ben-
mammals and fish, and to prevent disruption of seasonal hunting, efit from Arctic offshore resource development [with] revenues
and for safety and environmental protection” (2018, 4). generated from approved offshore projects [being] directed
towards [safeguarding] the marine environment [and directly
The 2010 Policy includes a substantial chapter concerning the benefiting] Inuit communities” (2010, 43); (iii) “multinational
Economy indicator, Economic Issues (2010, 79–88) which em- corporations and others involved in Arctic economic devel-
phasizes “the importance of an economic base in the North, opment must respect all applicable aspects of the overall Inu-
and the continuing [human] right of Inuit to participate in the it Arctic Policy” (2010, 81); (iv) the ICC should “promote the
management and development of the Arctic and its resources” redefinition of hunting and harvesting activities by Indigenous
(2010, 11). The Policy also states that “It is of utmost importance peoples as a profession” (2010, 31) and “subsistence hunting,
to emphasize that the lack of economic opportunities and devel- fishing, and trapping rights must be assured for both economic
opments have critical implications for the future of Inuit society and cultural reasons” (2010, 80).
and culture. Inuit should be involved in all aspects of economic
development in order to enjoy such fundamental human rights Establishment of full and meaningful employment is a prima-
as the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of ry goal in the Inuit regions under the 2010 Inuit Policy. “An
living” (2010, 79). employment-intensive economic growth, which includes both
subsistence and wage-earning activities, must be a clear prior-
Therefore, active promotion is needed of “Inuit self-reliance… ity” (2010, 82–83). The Policy recognizes that “the adequacy
Inuit Arctic Policy must elaborate a comprehensive Arctic eco- and costs of air transportation in the circumpolar region have
nomic strategy” (2010, 79) including “an overall strategy to a direct effect on economic development.... air transportation
counter international anti-harvest and animal rights groups” problems are… economic development problems [and have to
(2010, 33). “At the regional level, action must be taken in every be] dealt with in a coordinated and comprehensive manner”
Arctic community towards establishing a viable base for com- (2010, 84).
munity development.... including key elements [such as] ade-
quate infrastructures… and business and management train- According to the 2018 Declaration “employment and wealth
ing” (2010, 80). For enterprises doing business in Arctic regions, creation are building blocks for autonomy and… equitable, sus-
“consideration should be given to establishing principles or tainable economic development and employment must be a pri-
norms to guide [their] conduct…. promotion of innovation and ority” (2018, 10). Under the heading, Sustainable Development,
transfer of technologies appropriate to the Arctic; and reinvest- the Declaration argues: “Our economy is changing rapidly with
ment of profits in local regions” (2010, 81). Furthermore, “mul- growing international interest in marine shipping, commer-
tinational corporations and others involved in Arctic economic cial fisheries, tourism and natural [resources] development.
development must respect all applicable aspects of the overall Economic development is central to the sustainability of Inuit
Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 81). communities….” The Declaration acknowledges that “economic

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development and social and cultural development must go national interest in marine shipping, commercial fisheries,
hand-in-hand,” which results in self-sufficiency— “an essen- tourism and natural resources development” (2018, 10). The
tial part of greater political self-determination” (2018, 10). To Declaration urges the “ICC to compile Arctic tourism best
achieve these goals, the ICC is urged to first “promote sustain- practices, and develop an ICC Statement on Tourism to help
able economic and business development” through the Arctic guide tourism initiatives,” (2018, 11) as part of overall actions
Council and its Working Groups, the UN agencies, and the Arc- to achieve the goals of sustainable development.
tic Economic Council (2018, 11). Second, the ICC is directed to
“advocate for our rights to fresh water,” and “utilize Indigenous The main focus of the Infrastructure indicator in the two doc-
Knowledge to advise all future processes of the Central Arctic uments, is telecommunications. The sub-chapter Communica-
Ocean Moratorium on Commercial Fisheries” (2010, 11). tions, News Media, Information Technologies of the 2010 Policy
(2010, 68–71) notes that the “communications media are a
A major question here is how economic activities are or fundamental dimension of life in every society” (2010, 68) and
should be regulated. The 2018 Declaration concludes that “satellites make communications possible in the Arctic” (2010,
the Inuit “have experienced international trade bans and 70). Particularly, “the relationship and significance of commu-
treaties that prevent us from exercising our rights to use nications, mass media, and other information technologies to
Arctic living resources with serious impacts on our cul- Inuit language and cultural development must be recognized”
ture, health and economies” (2018, 7). It directs the “ICC (2010, 68). The Policy suggests the “ICC should work to ensure
to advocate for policies that facilitate cross-boundary In- that broadcast and telecommunications regulatory agencies
uit trade, employment, and travel, across our circumpolar governing circumpolar regions recognize the special needs
homeland,…. [and] urge ICC to support the formation of an and challenges of the Arctic with respect to geographic iso-
International Association for Inuit Businesses” (2018, 11). lation, language and culture” (2010, 71). It also proposes that
“Arctic education systems should provide both Inuit youth and
The international level is also important here, in particular, be- adults with concrete opportunities to familiarize themselves
cause “Indigenous peoples and their vital economic issues are with new and existing forms of communications, mass media,
often excluded from the structural arrangements and institu- and information technologies in the Arctic” (2010, 69–70).
tionalized practices and policies of states at the bi-national and This should be facilitated by the “establishment of a pan-Arc-
international level… particularly evident in regard to… [the tic news agency and Arctic radio and television network… or
GATT] and the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)” by [use] of the Internet” (2010, 70). To support telecommuni-
(2010, 86). The 2010 Policy states that “ICC should participate cation and ICT, and infrastructure in general, the 2010 Policy
in international bodies, in particular the Convention on the In- urges adaptation to the inevitable changes and “to accelerate
ternational Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), the [IUCN], technology transfer” (2010, 25) for instance, “remote sensing
the [IWC], and the [NAMMCO] to defend the right of Inuit to and data gathering by satellites [which] already serve as a new
harvest marine mammals and to trade their product on a sus- global information system within the international commu-
tainable basis….” (2010, 81–82). Moreover, where appropriate nity” (2010, 70). As part of adaptation assistance, the “ICC
the ICC should lobby “international and regional bodies [e.g., should work towards…incorporating support for small-scale,
WTO, NAFTA, EU] to help promote trade of Inuit goods and green energy technology” (2010, 25) and “action must be tak-
services world-wide in ways that do not adversely affect Inu- en in every Arctic community towards establishing a viable
it hunting, fishing and gathering rights” (2010, 30). Promoting base for community development, [including] adequate infra-
“the removal of international and national trade barriers that structures” (2010, 80).
affect all forms of Inuit livelihood, in consultation with affect-
ed Inuit” (2010, 82) is another main objective with the aim of The 2018 Declaration states that in an interconnected world,
facilitating “transnational trade and travel by Inuit throughout “connectivity or broadband, is crucial to provide societal ben-
Inuit Nunaat” (2010, 86). “Elements that should be considered efits” (2018, 10) and “Inuit are more connected today than
in formulating the international dimensions of an Inuit/Arctic ever before due to the advent of the internet and social media.
economic strategy include: … organize multilateral talks on in- However, practical measures should be taken that enhance
ternational trade and development issues affecting the world’s communications with and between Inuit” (2018, 11). The ICC
Indigenous peoples [through GATT]”… request relevant UN should thus “pursue novel initiatives that foster greater social,
organs to carry out a “special study and consideration of the cultural, and political exchange between Inuit… to enrich In-
economic rights and concerns of Indigenous peoples in Arctic uit cooperation and unity…. [and] develop a comprehensive
regions”… make continued representations in the EU and Euro- four year communications strategy and action plan” (2018,
pean countries “in regards to the seal hunt and… seal products, 12). The 2018 Declaration lists the activities needed to achieve
possibly through consultation with WTO “ (2010, 87). these goals. The ICC should “advocate for high capacity
broadband internet, share best practices and engage in inter-
The Tourism indicator is very briefly noted by the documents: national discussions on broadband development in Inuit Nu-
the 2010 Policy states that “resource management and eco- naat” (2018, 11) in order “to support knowledge sharing and
nomic development must be based on a common approach” communication of Inuit innovation and best practices around
as must eco-tourism (2010, 35). The 2018 Declaration briefly mental health and wellness” (2018, 5) and “urge the use of the
notes the rapid changes in the economy “with growing inter- internet to increase availability of Inuit language program-

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ming through television, radio, and other platforms, as well as The 2010 Policy recognizes “that Arctic scientific research can
the connectivity of residents in Inuit communities” (2018, 11). potentially provide vital information pertaining to a rapidly
growing number of activities and subject matters of interest
The 2010 Policy document recognizes “that aviation is not a and concern in Inuit Circumpolar regions” (2010, 93). There-
privilege but a necessity in the circumpolar region [as]…the fore, “the number of cultural, educational, scientific, and ath-
only means of year-round transport between Inuit communi- letic exchanges among Inuit from the various Arctic regions
ties, regionally, nationally, and internationally” (2010, 84). “Ade- and states” (2010, 68) should be increased and “the Inuit Arc-
quate and safe systems of transportation, including air transport tic Policy should ensure that a key aspect of research involves
infrastructures, must be developed and upgraded throughout community-based research (CBR)” (2010, 95). “As traditional
the circumpolar region” (2010, 86). leaders, elders must be encouraged and permitted to re-es-
tablish a leadership role and participate in decision-making”
The 2018 Declaration explicitly mentions the need for adequate (2010, 64). “Traditional knowledge, be it cultural, environmen-
housing in the list of “the most important needs of families” tal or ecological, should be part of the curriculum in schools
(2018, 4), while the 2010 Policy mentions a “wide range basic ” (2010, 64), “include both traditional ecological knowledge,
needs… [which] must be developed if health goals are to be environmental and cultural knowledge” (2010, 94) and “be
achieved” (2010, 51–52). recognized as having validity” (2010, 23). As “Inuit Tradition-
al Knowledge has provided critical information about climate
The 2010 Policy has a substantial chapter on Educational and change impacts in Arctic ecosystems, completing scientific
Scientific Issues (2010, 89–96). Scientific research for the pur- knowledge… [it] should be incorporated into and made the
poses of the Inuit Arctic Policy, “refers to all basic and applied focus of complimentary assessments through the UN system
research in respect to the Arctic” (2010, 93). The chapter pro- or by the IPCC” (2010, 23).
vides an interesting contribution to the Science and Educa-
tion indicator by recognizing “that the physical, biological The 2018 Declaration is more straightforward stating that “Inuit
and health sciences, as well as social, behavioral and human have a right to self-determination in all facets of life, includ-
sciences, can all potentially contribute in significant ways to ing in the promotion of Indigenous Knowledge and research”
information and knowledge about the Arctic… both ‘western (2018, 7). Here ‘Indigenous Knowledge’— “a systematic way of
scientific’ opinion and Inuit knowledge and experience have va- thinking applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cul-
lidity and, therefore, should be utilized” (2010, 93). Significant tural and spiritual systems”—is recognized as a way of life, that
efforts should be made by Arctic states, according to the Policy “goes beyond observations, ecological knowledge, and research,
“to involve Inuit when determining the content of international offering a unique ‘way of knowing’…. [Therefore,] recognizing
agreements in regard to cooperative northern research” (2010, the work that ICC has done to advance the understanding and
96) and “of scientific research affecting the Arctic, particularly utilization of Indigenous Knowledge, it is important to contin-
when it affects their communities or Inuit rights and interests” ue this work” (2018, 7). The Declaration suggests focusing on
(2010, 93). In terms of cooperative research involving different advocating for Inuit driven research and monitoring. In order,
organizations, the ICC is asked to “develop a clearinghouse that however, “to protect Inuit Nunaat and guide academic institu-
will help record and protect the traditional knowledge of Inuit tions, governments and researchers” (2018, 9) the ICC needs
and facilitate information exchange between all Inuit in Inuit to be instructed “ to support knowledge sharing and commu-
Nunaat” (2010, 94). Also, Inuit need to be actively engaged on nication of Inuit innovation and best practices around mental
an ongoing basis with the circumpolar and international pro- health and wellness.… and link Indigenous Knowledge and ac-
cesses including international science bodies (e.g. ICSU, IASC, tion with scientific research” (2018, 5), “call for an Inuit review
IASSA) (2010, 25, 96). “Collaboration with institutions such as of the consultation process of the Arctic Council Arctic Science
the Inuit Center for International Understanding and the Uni- Cooperation Agreement” (2018, 7), and “utilize Indigenous
versity of the Arctic should be encouraged” (2010, 92). “Large Knowledge to advice all future processes of the Central Arctic
international Arctic research undertakings such as the… IPY Ocean Moratorium on Commercial Fisheries” (2018, 11).
should be urged to more fully include Inuit and other Arctic
inhabitants” (2010, 96). The 2010 Policy calls for Inuit research priorities to be identi-
fied and considered and for Arctic objectives to be fully taken
The 2018 Declaration requires actions “to protect Inuit Nunaat into account along with national and international considera-
and guide academic institutions, governments, and researchers tions. Moreover, it is seen important “to ensure that research
in the conduct of the Inuit Nunaat research… enhance ICC’s and data on fresh water management issues are generated on an
work with Arctic research efforts” for example, via AMAP, ongoing basis” (2010, 40), and that “research priorities should
SAON, IASC, EU (2018, 9). Interestingly, the Declaration re- be determined in conjunction with Arctic Inuit and other Arc-
quires that “during high-level ministerial processes,” Inuit views tic peoples” (2010, 45). The Policy also makes it clear that “in-
and concerns should be addressed regarding how research in ternational cooperation in health and social research programs
the Arctic should be conducted and also that “ethical approach- concerning the Arctic should be encouraged…. [and] deter-
es for research in the Arctic advance Inuit self-determination in mined in collaboration with the local people and communities
research” should be highlighted (2018, 9). involved” (2010, 53). Furthermore, “environmental education
processes should be devised and implemented” (2010, 27) and

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“governments and relevant private institutions should be urged Finally, the 2010 policy calls for “the best strategies for allowing
to support Inuit research centers for the coordination and prac- the greatest amount of choice in education and research among
tice of Arctic research” (2010, 95). inhabitants of generally small and isolated Arctic communities
[to] be explored and implemented [either by] tele-education and/
The 2010 Policy further states that “large international Arctic or courses over the Internet, or through such institutions as the
research undertakings such as the [IPY] should be urged to University of the Arctic” (2010, 90). The Arctic states are also
more fully include Inuit and other Arctic inhabitants” and “close asked to “establish a university in its Arctic regions; at the mo-
cooperation should also be developed with national research ment only Canada does not have an Arctic university” (2010, 92).
funding agencies” (2010, 96). Among others, the ICC is asked to
“develop a close liaison with bodies within the [UN] and other The 2010 policy also demands the establishment of “prin-
international organizations interested in Arctic research,” such ciples or norms to guide the conduct of enterprises doing
as ICSU, IASC, AMAP, IIASA (2010, 96). business in Arctic regions [that] should relate [among oth-
er things] to: Inuit training and management development
The 2018 Declaration requires that the Inuit Nunaat be protect- programs [and] use of the local language” (2010, 81). Em-
ed and that “academic institutions, governments, and research- ployment and training programs and strategies “should
ers [be guided] in the conduct of the Inuit Nunaat research take into account the Inuit way of life, and generally support
[through the enhancement of] ICC’s work with Arctic research ongoing Inuit cultural development through the introduc-
efforts, such as [AMAP, SAON, IASC, EU]”. Moreover, Inuit tion of culturally appropriate programs…. [while receiving]
views and concerns on how research in the Arctic should be adequate community and financial support” (2010, 83–84).
conducted should be addressed during high-level ministerial
processes and ethical approaches for research in the Arctic to The 2018 Declaration states that “the model of education intro-
“advance Inuit self-determination in research” should be high- duced and utilized to this day has had limited success… [and
lighted (2018, 9). therefore] effective education requires new pedagogies that re-
flect our values, culture and languages.” For example, “for our
As previously mentioned, the 2010 Policy explains that “educa- language to remain strong the Inuit language must be the pri-
tion and training have a vital and on-going role to play in teach- mary language of instruction in our schools….—language and
ing Inuit youth” (2010, 35), and “to meet the specific needs of education supports our culture, and Inuit hunting, gathering
Inuit and other aboriginal women must be made accessible on a and food practices are a way [in] which our culture is taught”. To
regional or local basis” (2010, 55). “Culturally appropriate edu- strengthen education the ICC is called on to “support an Inuit
cation is the key to healthier and more prosperous Inuit commu- Education Committee with membership from all Inuit regions,”
nities and to a better future for all Inuit” (2010, 89). Based on the for example, the ICC 2018 Education Summit in Greenland sup-
UN Expert Mechanism in the Implementation of Rights of In- ported “the development and implementation of Inuit-focused
digenous Peoples to Education “educational institutions should educational initiatives, pedagogies, assessment and evaluation
[thus] be established in the Arctic and encouraged to provide practices, curricula, teaching materials and resources” (2018, 6).
educational and scientific opportunities over a broad spectrum
of potentials. In addition, the practical questions of funding for The Implementation indicator is mentioned explicitly in both
ambitious programs… should be addressed” (2010, 90). documents. According to the 2010 Policy the “ICC should work
towards having the Inuit Arctic Policy taken into account by
As “children are the most valuable Inuit resource and repre- all levels of government throughout the circumpolar world, as
sent future leaders of Inuit... a comprehensive education policy well as by Arctic residents and other users of Arctic resourc-
should be formulated and implemented in collaboration with In- es…. [Moreover,] public policies and programs of government,
uit communities (2010, 89). “The knowledge and experience of and international agreements, should be aware of the ICC Inuit
Inuit elders and other traditional knowledge should be utilized in Arctic Policy” (2010, 99). To follow up, there should be “discus-
informing Inuit students and developing their skills” (2010, 36). sions of the Inuit Arctic Policy by Inuit from the various Arctic
“Eligibility for training programs should be based on aptitude states; at the ICC general assemblies, a multi-year work plan
for the particular skills rather than on educational requirements” should be prepared, major areas of priority and concern should
(2010, 91). Education is also mentioned in the context of Social be identified for further work…. Inuit organizations at all lev-
Issues as a “crucial component of a major youth strategy” (2010, els should ideally be involved” (2010, 100). Finally, “it should
61) in which “education programs and other means should be always be remembered that the Inuit Arctic Policy is a ‘living
used to promote acceptance of the principle of non-discrimina- and resilient document,’ adaptable to ongoing changes in Inuit
tion, as well as understanding, tolerance, and respect for differ- Nunaat” (2010, 100). “To ensure that the ICC Inuit Arctic Policy
ent religions and for religious freedoms” (2010, 77). is achieving the desired effect, its implementation must be mon-
itored by the ICC” (2010, 99).
In general, therefore, “educational, scientific and other termi-
nology should be standardized within the Inuit language and The 2018 Declaration includes a list of implementation items for
further developed on a regular basis… to meet the present and each main theme, prefaced by words such as ‘Mandate,’ ‘Direct,’
future needs of Inuit society” (2010, 66) and they should also ‘Urge,’ ‘Support,’ ‘Develop,’ ‘Instruct,’ ‘Engage,’ ‘Facilitate.’ ‘En-
be “made fully accessible for handicapped persons” (2010, 92). courage.’ Neither a budget nor follow-up mechanism are men-

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tioned. Finally, with respect to the creation of an Arctic zone of • the health and well-being of the Inuit people and, in
peace mentioned under the 2010 Policy, the 2018 Declaration particular, their children;
gives a mandate to the ICC “to initiate diplomatic talks for the • the governance of their homeland, Inuit Nunaat,
purpose of laying the groundwork for negotiations to declare meaning the rights of Inuit to their self-government;
the Arctic as a Peaceful Zone” (2018, 3). • being active in international cooperation, and being
supported by international agreements and organizations.
To sum up
When taking into consideration this and the emphasis on inter-
The two Inuit ICC documents are rich and substantial, with the national agreements and organizations, which are noted several
2010 Inuit Arctic Policy being particularly full and rounded. The times in the documents, it is rather clear that ‘self-government’
documents are strong statements by Inuit themselves, on the In- does not mean here only Inuit interests or Inuit nationalism.
uit as a nation or distinct people, as well as on the Arctic region It should be interpreted more widely to mean and emphasize
of the Inuit, that is, “The Arctic We Want” (ICC 2018, 1). The the importance of international cooperation, including inter-
table of contents of the 2010 Policy (ICC 2010a), is impressive, national organizations, in particular the UN and the AC, for
covering many relevant themes: Inuit Rights, Peace and Secu- protecting and supporting small (Indigenous) nations, and in-
rity, Environment, Social Issues, Culture, Economy, Education ternational agreements, such as UN Declaration of the Rights of
and Science. Reading these substantial thematic chapters gives Indigenous Peoples (referred to many times), as international
the impression of a nation that is proud, knows what it wants, legal regimes to be relied upon.
and knows how to accomplish that. Take, for example, the 2010
Inuit Policy (i) to “achieve real and lasting security in the Arctic”
(2010, 22) and to solve problems across the jurisdictional bound- Saami Council
aries of the Arctic states through international cooperation and
having greater global security; and (ii) that “northern peoples The Saami Council did not have an official Arctic policy or strate-
should encourage the development of new notions of common gy for the Arctic, although, according to Asa Larsson-Blind, pres-
security” (2010, 22) and “activities of youth that emphasize the ident of the Saami Council, this has been discussed among Saami
need for international peace, co-operation, and understanding” politicians, until early autumn 2019. The Sami Arctic Strategy was
(2010, 61). This honest and holistic approach is not usually part adopted in September 2019 by the Saami Council as to “serve tool
of national conversations and hardly exists in state policies. for implementing long-term and sustainable programs that im-
prove access for the Sami people to the same opportunities that
The Utqiagvik Declaration (ICC 2018) has a very precise lists of are afforded to other Arctic inhabitants. The strategy also shines
issues required, making frequent use of words such as ‘Direct,’ the path towards decolonizing Sami society and aims at securing
‘Urge,’ ‘Support,’ and ‘Instruct’. At the same time, it covers all the Sami people’s right to self-determination now and for future
relevant issues from food security, families and health to envi- generations” (The Sámi Arctic Strategy 2019, 3).
ronment and communication.
The Sami Arctic Strategy / Sami Arktalas Aigumusat / Samisk
As was the case with the two Athabaskan Arctic Council docu- Strategi for Arktiske saker. Securiting enduring influence for the
ments, the nature and purpose of the two ICC documents differ Sami people in the Arctic through partnerships, education and ad-
greatly, and are thus not really intercomparable. That being said, vocacy (10 pages, attachment of 13 pages, no pictures) is with
the most striking similarity is the domination of the Human Di- the five substantial chapters, which can be interpreted to indi-
mension indicator, which is clearly the major indicator in these cate the priority areas: Acting as a robust and reliable partner
documents. The Governance and International cooperation on Arctic Sami issues, Ensuring the right to choose, Addressing
indicators, which are the second-most dominant indicators, climate change and environmental protection, Deploying Sami
are also almost even between Athabaskan and Inuit indicators. Indigenous knowledge and science as a catalyst for Sa’pmi part
This clearly shows how much the ICC, like other small nations, forward, and The Saami Council as a partner in policy-making
depend on international cooperation and international agree- and decision-making on Arctic issues. Each of them includes a
ments to protect the people and enhance their rights. All in all, separate list of measures.
the two documents are in balance, as most of the indicators are
fairly even, when the texts are measured quantitatively. Another recent Saami policy paper on the Arctic, or actually on
the Saami land, Sápmi (in Finland, Norway, Russian Federation,
The main difference comes from the status of the two docu- and Sweden), is the Tråante Declaration (2017) adopted at the
ments. The 2010 Policy is a comprehensive policy paper and the 21st Saami Conference, by representatives of the Saami Coun-
2018 Utqiagvik Declaration is the declaration of an assembly cil member organizations. The conference took place on 9–11
held every fourth year. February 2017 in Tråante (Trondheim), Norway on the occasion
of the centennial jubilee of the first national Saami Conference.
Based on the latest (2010) Inuit Arctic Policy and the Prior to the Tråante Declaration official policy statements on the
declaration of the latest (2018) ICC general assembly, it is clear Saami territory have been adopted by the Saami Council every
that the policy priorities of the ICC, representing Inuit across fourth year at the Saami conferences (e.g., in 2013 in Murmansk,
the circumpolar Arctic, are as follows: Russia, and in 2008 in Rovaniemi, Finland).

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The 2017 Tråante Declaration (7 pages, no pictures) states: “The and highlight the Saami traditional names of mountains, lakes,
Saami people have the rights described below [i.e., in the decla- rivers and other places, as well as communities” (2017, 6). Fi-
ration]. All requirements and positions presented below are in nally, according to the 2019 Arctic Strategy the traditional Sami
line with current or… rapidly developing rules of international land is defined as Arctic region, and “All Sápmi is included,
law. [The Saami people] commits to work for these rights to be when the Saami Council address Arctic questions… The Arctic
realized, and requires that States inside Sápmi to do the same” strategy will support the Saami Council’s relations to the global
(2017, 2). This statement is short and clear and permeates the discussion” (2019, 3).
entire declaration which has strong, substantial and concentrat-
ed messages. The Human Dimension indicator is already focused on by the
cover of the 2017 Declaration, which addresses Saami rights
This document is interpreted and analyzed here as an offi- clearly by stating that “the Sami are an independent people;
cial policy document of the Saami people based on two facts like other people, we have the right to our lives and to decide
(downloaded from internet, pages not marked when quoted): on matters concerning us”16 (2017, 1). Furthermore, “a central
(i) the Saami Council member organizations come from the element of the Saami people’s right to self-determination is the
four countries of Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and right to define which individuals are included in the Saami
Sweden, where the Saami live, and thus the Council is eligible people, Saemiedigkie and the nation” (2017, 3). Under the Con-
to represent all the Saami people; (ii) at the 20th Saami Coun- stitution and Common Saami Parliament, as well as historically,
cil Conference in 2013 the representatives of the Saami Coun- the Saami themselves have decided on their destiny and lives;
cil’s member organizations confirmed their membership of the the Saami right to self-determination is “rooted in the Saami
Council “by ratifying the Declaration by their highest repre- people, who make up a nation…. The Saami have always had
sentative bodies” as mentioned in the Murmansk Declaration these rights and others cannot define or deprive the Saami of
(2013), which is also included the analysis. them” (2017, 6).

The 2013 Murmansk Declaration (4 pages, no pictures) says Echoing this, the ultimate goal of the 2019 Strategy is stated
a great deal about ‘responsibility’— both state and corporate that “Sápmi is recognized and that Saami people are treated as
responsibility—which ties into human and Saami rights. The equals by the greater society… [as] rights Indigenous peoples
document also, unlike the 2017 Declaration, discusses the have under international law, shall guide the work of the Saami
changing climate and the environment. These two declarations Council in the Arctic” (2019, 3, 5). Furthermore, the measures
are interpreted and analyzed here as official policy documents of the Strategy include that the Council “should advocate the
of the Saami people based on two facts: (i) the Saami Council right of Indigenous peoples to give or withhold their free, pri-
member organizations come from the four countries of Fin- or, and informed consent in non-coercive negotiations prior to
land, Norway, the Russian Federation and Sweden, where the activities being established and developed on their customary
Saami live, and thus the Council is eligible to represent all the lands” (2019, 6).
Saami people; (ii) at the 20th Saami Council Conference in 2013
the representatives of the Saami Council’s member organiza- The Strategy highlights an importance of the Human Dimen-
tions confirmed their membership of the Council “by ratifying sion, when dealing with resources stating that resource devel-
the Declaration by their highest representative bodies,” (2013, opment proposals for the Saami area “must serve the needs of
1) as mentioned in the 2013 Declaration. the Sami people today without compromising the ability of the
Sami people to meet their needs in the future. And the pro-
For the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator, jects must meet the legal international standards that protect
the 2013 Declaration emphasizes that “the Saami people has Indigenous peoples…. [and] promote the physical and mental
inhabited its traditional homeland— Sápmi —since time im- health of communities and individuals within Sápmi” (2019,
memorial and long before national borders were drawn” (2013, 8). As well as, when dealing with culture and language, as “Cul-
1). Thus, for the Saami the Arctic is their traditional homeland. turally and linguistically appropriate services are respectful of
Correspondingly, the 2017 Declaration goes deeper: on the and responsive to the beliefs, practices and needs of the Sami
cover of the document it is clearly stated that the basis for the People. Cultural competency is crucial as a resource for health
life “Sápmi the legacy of our mother, the Sun and our father, care providers and educational institutions (and others) to im-
the Earth. Lands and waters where we have lived in all times, prove their knowledge and understading of culture, kanguage,
before national boundaries divided our country” (2017, 1). The and helath literacy.” (2019, 10).
states inside Sápmi “shall [thus] support and under no circum-
stances counteract the Saami people and the Saami nation’s ef- The 2017 Declaration also states that the Saami people “have a
forts to establish a common Saemiedigkie [Saami Parliament]” right to the best attainable standard of health, including men-
(2017, 2). The Declaration also deals with geographical Saami tal health” (2017, 6) and states are therefore asked to “provide
place names, with States officially being asked to “recognize health care that is linguistically and culturally appropriate to the

16 The 2017 Declaration uses both ‘Sami’ on the cover and ‘Saami’ in the rest of the text, and the 2019 Strategy uses ‘Sami’. We use here ‘Saami’, as it has been used
in general (e.g., the name of the Saami Council).

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Saami,” and, even more, they “should implement this right… Interestingly, the work for self-determination is said to begin
[avoiding] discrimination and marginalization of the Saami by establishing “a Saemiedigkie representing all Saami who be-
people” (2017, 6). Correspondingly, the 2013 Declaration also long to the Saami nation. The States shall respect Saemiedigkie
reiterates that “as people, the Saami have the right to self-de- as the institution though which the Saami Peoples’ rights to
termination, including the right to determine our economic self-determination mainly is exercised.… Meanwhile States
and social development” (2013, 1). It contains an ultimate aim shall respect that the Saami people—like other Nordic peoples
and demand that “Saami traditional livelihoods should be safe- —exercise their rights to self-determination [which] means
guarded, and their rights recognized and implemented in all that in issues of local and regional nature Saami decisions will
levels of national legislation efficiently” (2013, 4). Interestingly, be made on local or regional level” (2017, 2).
this declaration is very specific in that it demands that states
should acknowledge that Saami rights to fish rivers, in particu- The International Treaties and International Cooperation
lar “fishing in border-rivers has since time immemorial been indicator plays a growing role in the documents. While the
carried out jointly between Sami communities irrespective of 2017 Declaration states that Saami traditional knowledge and
citizenship and borders” (2013, 4). traditional cultural expressions in those states should be im-
plemented “through legislation… as well as by international
Concerning the Governance indicator, the 2019 Strategy states agreements and international cooperation… [in particular] in
that “The Sami people have the right to self-determination”, relation to the tourism industry” (2017, 6). The 2019 Strategy
and as mentioned earlier, “shines the path towards decoloniz- in general emphasizes an importance of international coopera-
ing Sami society and aims at securing the Sami people’s right tion, when defining the Saami Council as an active partner for
to self-determination now and for future generations” (2019, 5, several actors (the Saami society, governments, NGOs, IGOs)
3). The whole section Acting as a robust and reliable partner on “though international cooperation”, and in particular, that as a
Arctic Sami issues much indicates, even demonstrates, the main Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council, the Council “also
aim of the Strategy “to establish the Saami Council as an active sits at the decision-making table on Arctic issues” (2019, 3–4).
partner for the civil Sami society, governments, NGOs, IGOs,
and others that, though international cooperation, will build a Though, the 2013 Declaration briefly responds to the Environ-
strong and sustainable Sapmi in the Arctic” (2019, 3). This is, mental Protection indicator, there is nothing explicit in the
first of all, meant to strengthen the self-determination of Sápmi, 2017 Declaration about this topic. Unlike, the 2019 Strategy
and self-governance by the Saami. includes a short section on climate change and environmen-
tal protection for example stating that the Saami people “have
Similarly, the 2017 Declaration straightforwardly states that the for millennia depended on, and adapted to, the environment”
Sami have acquired the right to manage their territory through (2019, 6). One of the measures under Resource development on
long-term use. The Saami “have the knowledge and cognizance Sami land is to “Promote the recommendations in the ‘Arctic
of the conditions of life in these areas…. To enable the Sami Environmenatal Impact Assessment and Meaninful Engage-
people to live in a responsible way… mercenary states in Sáp- ment in the Arctic’ report (2019) and call for holistic approach
mi must cease to impede our right to self-determination” (2017, and meaningful engagement in Environmental Impact As-
1). This quotation, as well as the first statement that “the Saami sessment and similar strategic planning processes in Sápmi”
people[s] have the rights described below” (2017, 2) show very (2019, 9).
well, under this indicator, the emphasis on self-determination
on the part of the Saami people. This is not surprising, given the There is nothing explicit on the Pollution indicator in the
Saami’s current situation and main trends affecting the Arctic 2017 Declaration. Also the Strategy is brief here including the
Indigenous peoples. measures to “enhance the Saami Council’s efforts in the Arctic
Council Indigenous Peoples Contaminat Action Program (IP-
The States in which the Saami live, are asked—even demanded— CAP) Expert Group under ACAP” (2019, 6).
by the 2017 Declaration to “accept that the right to self-
determination… is a right to exercise effective influence on the Likewise, there is nothing explicit on the Climate Change in-
outcome of those things that are essential to the Saami people” dicator in the 2017 Declaration. Correspondingly, the 2019
(2017, 3). Under the title Self-determination: Constitution and Strategy includes a short section on climate change and envi-
common Saami Parliament, the Declaration continues by stating ronmental protection, as mentioned earlier. Among the meas-
that “the right to self-determination is a right other than the ures of this section is to “develop a climate and socio-econom-
right to consultation… the Saami people will [and] should not ic model for Sápmi focusing on the impacts of climate change,
be subordinate to the will of the Nordic and the Russian people” the economic and societal costs of climate change damages,
(2017, 3). This right is extended to (traditional) knowledge and risk mitigation, and adaptation” (2019, 6).
(traditional) cultural expressions, and therefore the 2017 Decla-
ration states: “The Saami have the right to decide about Saami Nothing is explicitly mentioned about the Security indicator
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions…. in either of the documents.
[and] States should implement these rights through legislation”
(2017, 6).

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The Safety and SAR indicator is noted by the Strategy, as first, serve the needs of the sami people today without compromising
the above-mentioned measure mentions “the impacts of cli- the ability of the Sami people to meet their needs in the future...
mate change, the economic and societal costs of climate change [and] promote the physical and mental health of communities
damages, risk mitigation”; and second, one of the Saami Indige- and individuals within Sápmi” (2019, 8). Among the measures is
nous knowledge section measures is to “understand the impacts to “Develop a toolkit for Sami communities for natural resource
– both ecological aand societal – of extreme weather events” projects on Indigenous land… combined with training cpurses
(2019, 7). Furthermore, one of the measures of the Deploying to empower communities” (2019, 9). Correspondingly, the “Eco-
Sami Indigenous knowledge and science as a catalyst for Sápmi nomic growth on Sami premises” notes that “Sami traditional
part forward section mentions food security among the issues subsistence living is an old form of entrepreneurship. Sami prod-
to “perform integrative analyses of sustainability and actiona- ucts were, and still are, important commodities on both national
ble adaptation policies and challenges for Sami communities” and international markets… Reindeer husbandry plays a crucial
(2019, 7). role in Sami societies, but other ways of life are also important to
protect, such as traditional gathering culture and te use of marine
Interestingly, the 2013 Declaration identifies economic activi- products.” It also proposes to organize a Sami Business Summit
ty as a safety issue for the Saami. “Resource extraction in the “at which Sami entrepreneurs and potential investors can meet
Saami territories today carries huge risks and little advantag- and share ideas, innovations, and new technologies” (2019, 9).
es…. [and] pollution constitutes serious possible pressures to
the Saami livelihoods and its food security” (2013, 3). The Dec- Interestingly, the 2013 Declaration, with regard to industrial ac-
laration calls “for a moratorium on further resource extraction tivities on Saami land, includes a special section under the ti-
in Sápmi until the states with Saami populations have…. a regu- tle Corporate responsibility with the starting point that although
latory framework in place… and installed effective remedies for “states are primarily responsible for ensuring respect for Saami
violations of Saami rights” (2013, 2). rights, the private sector too has a responsibility to respect, pro-
tect and fulfill human rights. Business must not use inadequate
The Economy indicator is a substantial topic in the both dec- state regulation as an excuse for not respecting Saami human
larations and it is bound, rather tightly, to the Saami rights to rights” (2013, 2). The 2017 Declaration continues this under the
land, water and natural resources. The 2017 Declaration, en- title, The Green colonialism and states that “the foregoing con-
titled Saami rights to land, water and natural resources, builds siderations apply correspondingly in relation to the ‘Green Nor-
on the Conference’s first statement “The Saami people have the dic industry,’ including wind power, hydro power, wave power,
rights described below” (2017, 2) by explaining, or stating, that etc.… Saami livelihoods— including reindeer herding— are
“Saami use of land, water and natural resources constitute the among the ‘greenest’” (2017, 4–5).
foundation of the Saami culture, identity and society. Sápmi is
the land and water that the Saami have owned and possessed by The Tourism indicator is explicitly noted by the 2017 Declara-
traditional use” (2017, 3). This is followed by an interpretation tion, which places special emphasis on tourism, namely, that
that “intrusion, such as mines, hydropower, wind power and “states must coordinate with the Saami people around the devel-
other ‘green energy’ and infrastructure, steals land from Sápmi opment of tourism related to the Saami culture, including within
and thus causes the Saami living space to decrease” (2017, 3). Sápmi… [and] ensure that the tourism industry operates in a
cultural, social, and economically sustainable manner” (2017, 5).
Under the title Saami holders of rights to land, water and natural Furthermore, states should implement the rights to Tradition-
resources, the 2017 Declaration continues that “the Saami peo- al knowledge and traditional cultural expressions through legis-
ple have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, lation, as well as by international agreements and international
territories and resources in the areas they possess and have pos- cooperation, in general and in particular “in relation to the tour-
sessed due to traditional ownership, use, disposal or otherwise ism industry” (2017, 6). Finally, the Sami Parliaments with the
obtained…. [in particular] Saami reindeer herding is a central tourism industry are asked “to compile guidelines on appropri-
part of the Saami culture and is in big parts of Sápmi the basis for ate conduct, to ensure that the Saami culture, the Saami society,
maintaining and developing the Saami language, Saami culture way of life and nature is respected” (2017, 5).
and the Saami way of life” (2017, 4). Clearly, the Saami appear to
have their own economies that are in conflict with other forms Correspondingly, the Deploying Sami Indigenous knowledge and
of economic development. Finally, the document state that this science as a catalyst for Sápmi part forward section of the Strate-
Saami right “to land, water and natural resources is not limited to gy very briefly mentions tourism among the fields to have more
the areas that the Saami traditionally have used and continually research “to understand the consequences of continued resource
[use],” (2017, 4) meaning that the Saami have a vested interest in development, including risk-based assessments” (2019, 7).
what happens outside of their traditional territory.
There is nothing explicitly mentioned about the Infrastructure
The section The Saami Council as a partner in policy-making indicator in the 2017 document. Unlike, the Strategy briefly
and decision-making on Arctic issues of the Strategy includes two mentions hydro- and wind-energy projects, forestry and railway
sub-sections which directly deal with the Economy indicator. tourism among the fields to have more research “to understand
The “Resource development on Sami Land” sub-section states the consequences of continued resource development, including
that resource development proposals for the Saami area “must risk-based assessments” (2019, 7).

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The Science and Education indicator is largely discussed in the This attachment (to identify knowledge gaps and ideas for fur-
2017 Declaration and the 2019 Strategy. The 2017 Declaration ther research) clearly indicates an explicite Implementation of
concentrates on Traditional knowledge and traditional cultural the strategy. The objectives of this kind of list is said to be two-
expressions, as this traditional approach “will constitute the ba- fold: “i) To provide guidance for Sami institutions, students and
sis for the management of the area’s resources” (2017, 1). “The politicians to make priorities for their knowledge production
Saami have the right to decide about Saami traditional knowl- and identify research topics. ii) To provide guidance for Sami
edge and traditional cultural expressions…. States should im- institutions to identify topics when seeking collaborfators in
plement these rights through legislation... as well as by inter- Arctic research” (2019, 7). Unlike, the 2017 Declaration does
national agreements and international cooperation” (2017, 6). not explicitly mention implementation or evaluation, although
This is extended to include the Saami language, as “all Saami it does include de facto follow-up by stating that the rights of the
children have the right to education, including early childhood Saami people include commitments “to work for these rights to
education, in and on Saami and otherwise adapted to the Saami be realized, and requires that State inside Sápmi do the same.”
culture…. Within the traditional Saami areas, the right to ed-
ucation in and on Saami is absolute…. States are required to To sum up
effectively implement this right” even outside traditional Saami
areas so that “children have rights to receive education in and on The nature and status of these two Saami documents—a decla-
Saami and Saami culture” (2017, 5). ration of a Saami conference and the first Saami strategy on the
Arctic—is different, although they both are official policy doc-
Correspondingly, the 2019 Strategy emphasizes knowledge and uments of the Saami Council in the 2010s. It thus makes sense
science, as well as ties them together with climate change and slightly to compare them.
other Arctic changes, and clearly states that “there is a need for
new knowledge about how these changes affect the Arctic… The The most striking similarity is the dominance of the Human
Saami Council believes that the best way of producing these tools Dimension indicator. This conclusion has been reached not just
is through respectful use and acknowledgement of Sami Indige- due to the quantitative measuring (of indicators), but more due
nous knowledge” (2019, 6–7). The measures include for example, to the strong wording of the declarations on behalf of human
“Build constructive relationship between procucers and users of and Saami rights. This is already clear from the cover of the
knowledge, including Sami Indigenous knowledge, in order to Tråante Declaration – the message of this short text is very pow-
improve undwerstandiing of the vulnerability and resilience of erful. In addition of the explicit text, the focus on Indigenous
Arctic environment and Sami socities… Assess the diverse im- (human) and other Saami rights is expressed by connecting
pacts of climate chage and human activities on Arctic biodiver- ‘responsibility’ —both state and corporate responsibility—with
sity… Examine the role of institutions, resources, and traditional (Saami) human rights. The Strategy continues by stating that the
and emerging economies as factors and instruments of sustaina- Saami Council “should advocate the right of Indigenous peoples
ble development” (2019, 7). to give or withhold their free, prior, and informed consent in
non-coercive negotiations” (2019, 6).
Concerning the Science and Education indicators there is a con-
tinuity, since the 2013 conference calls to “seek strengthen and The second similarity is that the Economy indicator, and also
support the establishment of knowledge of Indigenous issues… the Science and Education indicator, is not only explicitly noted,
for traditional knowledge and research in Sápmi… [and] expand but also discussed in detail in both documents. Third, the Secu-
already existing institutions of higher education in such a manner rity and Infrastructure indicators are not explicitly mentioned.
that a Saami or Indigenous university can be established,” (2013, Finally, it is surprising how little the environment, climate
4) is echoed in the following statement from the 2017 Declaration change and pollution are explicitly noted by the declarations.
(entitled Academia and research): “Research that is relevant for
the Saami is useful for both the Saami and the majority society The first difference in the content of these two Saami documents
[therefore] Saami self-determination in research relevant for the is that the 2017 Declaration concentrates on self-determination,
Saami [should] be strengthened” (2017, 7). Finally, all research under the Governance indicator. The second difference is that
institutions are recommended to “cooperate with the Saami com- the Environmental protection, Pollution, Climate change, and
munity regarding ethical rules applicable for Saami research” Safety & SAR indicators are explicitly noted only in the Strategy.
(2017, 7). The third one is the strong emphasis on implementation by the
2019 Strategy, which also expands the Saami Council’s relations
Furthermore, the Strategy also includes an attachment, Building to global.
Knowledge in Sapmi – A List of Knowledge Gaps and Research
Needs with lists of identified knowledge gaps and ideas for further All in all, the two Saami documents are strong statements (i) on
research on the following topics: Data and demography, Cultur- human rights, which also belong, and are actually required to
al heritage and history, Indigenous Peoples Rights connected to belong, to Saami people, and (ii) on the right to self-determi-
land amd territories, Environment, climate change and ecosystem nation, including solid argumentation, concrete proposals and
services, Animal health and ethics, Indigenoius knowledge, Sami demands to the states (where the Saami live). The 2017 Dec-
languages, Health and well-being, Entrepreneurship, business laration argues for strengthening Saami self-determination in
and industry in Sapmi, and Duodji: Art and cultural expressions. research: “Research that is relevant for the Saami is useful for

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both the Saami and the majority society,” (2017, 7) and the 2019 Arctic: A View from the Arctic Athabaskan Council refers to the
Strategy continues this a substantial lists of knowledge gaps UNEP’s characterization of the Arctic as “the world’s barometer
and research needs. All this shows mature thinking, and aims of environmental change” (AAC 2008, 3).
to create a win–win situation. Interestingly, the term ‘self-de-
termination’ is used instead of ‘self-government,’ and is a term The Gwich’in report notes that the Gwich’in live in the North-
frequently used in ICC policy, as discussed earlier. west Territories, Yukon, and Alaska, and that the GCI is a Per-
manent Participant of the Arctic Council. Although it gives no
Finally, it is interesting and refreshing to read how the 2017 detailed definition of the Arctic, it does discuss how to establish
Declaration discusses the greening of Nordic industry, calling an “Indigenous-led impact assessment processes over resource
it the Green colonialism (including wind power, hydro power, development in their homelands” (Gwich’in Council Interna-
wave power, etc.), while Saami livelihoods (including reindeer tional 2018, 7).
herding) are noted to be among the “‘greenest” ones. To define
these so-called alternative energy sources as ‘green energy’ “is a The Inuit Arctic Policy 2010 clearly defines that the Inuit, as one
paradox” (2017, 5) according to the document. Arctic people living in four nations across Inuit Nunaat, are a
part of a connected world. Even more relevant that the Arctic is
the Inuit Homeland—a “shared homeland” (ICC 2010).
Comparing and Discussing
Based on the narrative on the cover of the Saami Tråante Dec-
the Documents laration (2017, 1) the basis for the life is ’Sápmi’, the tradition-
al homeland of Saami, “the legacy of our mother the Sun and
The previous sections provide an overview of the contents of the our father the Earth”, where the Saami have lived long before
policy documents of the four Indigenous peoples’ organizations national boundaries divided these areas. The Declaration also
(IPOs) and Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council—the demands that states officially recognize and use the Saami tra-
AAC, the Gwich’in Council International, the ICC and the ditional names of mountains, lakes, rivers and places. And ac-
Saami Council—and how they have recently developed. To gain cording to The Saami Arctic Strategy the traditional Sami land
a more holistic picture of the state of Arctic governance of the is defined as Arctic region, and “All Sápmi is included, when the
21st century, and better understanding of how the region is cur- Saami Council address Arctic questions” (2019, 3).
rently being governed, there needs to be a comparison of these
papers to see how they combine and contrast with each other. It is thus fair to conclude that there is a relevant key similarity
in this indicator, in how the different Indigenous groups define
Although some of the national policy documents, which are the Arctic region. The documents all make clear that their terri-
still current, were released between 2009 and 2013, most of the tory, ‘homeland’ is where their respective populations live, and
documents studied here are much more up to date. With the that this spans traditional state boundaries, although in differ-
exception of the 2010 Inuit Arctic policy, the three others were ent ways.
released between 2017 and 2019.
The Human Dimension indicator also emphasizes self-identi-
A real comparative study, where policy papers are compared fication, which is explicitly discussed in all the documents. The
indicator by indicator does not make much sense in this case, AAC policy (i) emphasizes social and cultural cooperation due
however. The policy papers highlighted here are rather frag- to growing stress on Northern Indigenous people’s health, lan-
mented, and do not cover the indicator fields in full detail. They guages and social well-being, including housing, food availabil-
also come from different directions, being Arctic strategies, or ity, and climate change; and (ii), includes recommendations for
declarations, and a study. They are thus neither coded and with Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy to support, among others, hu-
figures, nor quantitative comperation included. Instead, we can man health and mental wellness.
make a slight comparison, by way of a discussion, to identify a
few of the similarities and differences between the most cur- The Gwich’in 2018 report emphasizes that identifying ‘enabling
rent policy papers of the four PPs. We also discuss here some factors’ will contribute to the success of Indigenous-led im-
of relevant findings with possible have implications for Arctic pact assessment, and that human capacity critically consists of
governance and development of the entire region. “three elements related to capacity: funding, human resources,
and relationship building”Gwich’in Council International 2018,
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator is ex- 38. The report also emphasizes the Arctic Council is “the only
plicitly discussed in all the documents. The AAC Arctic Policy international organization to give Indigenous peoples a seat
2017 has a traditional definition of the Arctic region inhabited at the decision-making table alongside national governments”
by the Athabaskan peoples for centuries on both the Canadi- (Gwich’in Council International 2018, 2).
an and US sides, “occupying” about three million square kilo-
metres of territories. However, the AAC is defined as “an inter- The ICC policy is precise in stating that Inuit should “be rec-
national treaty organization”, (AAC 2017, 4) which defends the ognized and referred to both nationally and internationally as
rights and interests of Athabaskan First Nation members inter- a distinct ‘people’” (ICC 2010, 13) and that they are an integral
nationally. It should also be noted that the 2008 Europe and the part of Arctic ecosystems. Furthermore, the Arctic states are re-

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quired to recognize the Indigenous right to ‘subsistence’ that In- the NGO status of the ICC within the UN, for example, the UN
uit rights to manage resources of the Inuit homeland are much Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, as well as its participa-
emphasized, as well as strong relationships “be recognized and tion in the Arctic Council.
referred to both nationally and internationally” and “are consid-
ered as individual and collective rights” (ICC 2010, 13, 28). Last Likewise, the Saami policy documents are precise in stating that
but not least, human health and well-being (of Inuit children), the Saami people have always had “the right to manage their
and non-material cultures are part the Inuit cultural heritage. territory” (Tråante Declaration 2017, 1), and “have the right to
self-determination” (The Sámi Arctic Strategy 2019, 5). And, in
The Saami Tråante Declaration (2017) defines the Saami as “an order to be able to live in a responsible way “mercenary states in
independent people”, who like other people have “the right to Sápmi must cease to impede [the Saami] right to self-determi-
our lives and to decide on matters concerning us”, (2017, 1) in- nation” (2017, 1).
cluding “the best attainable standard of health” (2017, 6). Cor-
respondingly, The Sámi Arctic Strategy states that “Sápmi is Again, all the policy documents explicitly discuss govern-
recognized and that Saami people are treated as equals by the ance, both broadly and in detail. There are some differences:
greater society… [as] rights Indigenous peoples have under in- the Gwich’in report is clearly about aiming for ‘Indigenous-led
ternational law, shall guide the work of the Saami Council in impact assessment’ and mentions the process and methods
the Arctic” (2019, 3, 5). A central element of the Saami right of achieving this; the Saami documents use the term ‘self-de-
to self-determination is “the right to define which individuals termination’; and the ICC policy documents use the term
are included in the Saami people, Saemiedigkie and the nation” ‘self-government’.
(2017, 3).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
There is a striking similarity between these documents in that, dicator is explicitly discussed in all the documents. The AAC
in general, they all address issues broadly surrounding Indig- Arctic Policy, as a policy paper on the “harvesting rights and
enous individual and collective rights, although in different interests of Athabaskan peoples” (AAC 2017, 5) includes rec-
contexts. Some of them also address issues around health, and ommendations that treaties, land claims and self-government
relations between Indigenous people and states. There are also agreements be a fundamental element of Canada’s Arctic for-
a few differences; for example, the ICC aim to build a strong eign policy. The Arctic Council is defined as a key internation-
relationship between human rights, peace and security, and de- al forum for Indigenous Peoples Organizations, including the
velopment is highlighted. AAC, and on how best to engage with non-Arctic states, such as
China and European states, including the EU. Only a few inter-
The Governance indicator is explicitly discussed in all the doc- national agreements and organizations are mentioned.
uments. The AAC policy (AAC 2017) recognizes differences in
political and cultural organizations, depending on the location The Gwich’in report 2018 mentions the status of Gwich’in
of residence of Athabaskan People. Among AAC’s strategic Council International as a Permanent Participant of the Arctic
objectives, as mentioned, the document defines defense of the Council and only deals with international cooperation by pro-
harvesting rights and interests, and strengthening of the Arctic posing an international comparative work on Indigenous im-
Council “to address and balance the competing issues of envi- pact assessment processes.
ronmental protection and sustainable development” (2017, 5).
The ICC 2010 policy begins by promoting international under-
The Gwich’in report, being about ‘Indigenous-led impact assess- standing, and ties Inuit rights with international cooperation,
ment’ places the emphasis on governance, with ‘self-governance’ emphasizing the importance of the UN Declaration on the
and ‘self-determination’ being the main pathways. The report Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The ICC policy pro-
looks at how Gwich’in can “establish their own Indigenous-led motes cooperation, information sharing, and solidarity among
impact assessment processes over resource development in northern peoples, as well as multilateral forums, such as the
their homelands”, (Gwich’in Council International 2018, 7) and AC. According to the ACC, these are greatly needed in the Arc-
links this to legislation and land claims. tic, particularly in this age of climate change. In addition, the
document includes long lists of international agreements and
The ICC policy is very precise in its view that an integral part international organizations, on which the ICC preferentially de-
of the right of self-determination within states is “the right to pends to protect Inuit peoples and their rights.
self-government… recognized rights and principles [are] appli-
cable to Indigenous peoples under international law…. [Indig- The Saami Strategy 2019 clearly emphasizes an importance of
enous peoples should have the right to exercise] adequate pow- international cooperation, when defining the Saami Council
ers of self-government within their traditional territories” (ICC as an active partner “though international cooperation”, and in
2010, 15). Supported and affirmed by the UN Declaration on particular, its status as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, these rights to lands, resourc- Council, “the decision-making table” on Arctic issues.
es and territories, as well as to self-determination, applies to the
Inuit Homeland, “our shared homeland” with jurisdiction “over The main similarity here is that all the Indigenous documents
half the entire Arctic” (ICC 2010, 9). The policy also recognizes explicitly, though briefly, note the importance of international

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cooperation. Most of them look to international agreements The Security indicator is explicitly discussed only in the AAC
and international organizations, such as the United Nnations and ICC documents: The AAC 2017 policy recognizes that se-
and the Arctic Council (instead of the gatherings of the five lit- curity issues impact Indigenous peoples’ and other residents’
toral Arctuc states, when searching for support for Indigenous well-being, and therefore includes recommendations on ‘De-
peoples and their rights. fence, Safety and Security’ for a new Arctic Policy framework
for Canada.
The Environmental Protection indicator is explicitly noted
in the AAC, ICC and Saami documents, although to a limited The ICC Policy has a special sub-chapter promoting the impor-
extent. For example, environmental protection is briefly men- tance of peace, and global security, and peaceful diplomacy for
tioned in the AAC policy with respect to research projects on the Arctic region. This illustrates that peace and security are un-
ecosystem monitoring. derstood in a comprehensive way, including military and food
security, and that specific features, such as (environmental) im-
Similarly, The Saami Strategy briefly states that the Saami peo- pacts of traditional security and the military, are recognized.
ple “have for millennia depended on, and adapted to, the en-
vironment”, (2019, 6) as well as calls for holistic approach and The Security indicator is not covered by the Gwich’in report and
meaningful engagement in Environmenatal Impact Assessment the Saami documents, showing the striking difference between
in Sápmi. these Indigenous policy documents—two of them explicitly dis-
cussing security including defence— ICC even in detail —and
Unlike, the ICC documents include substantial discussion on the rest not.
the issue. The ICC 2010 policy even emphasizes the protection
of the fragile Arctic environment, in particular marine and The Safety and SAR indicator is explicitly, though briefly, men-
other resources, on which Inuit and the future of Inuit har- tioned in the ICC and Saami documents. The former one de-
vesting depend. Conservation of marine resources for Inuit is mands a right to safe drinking water, as well as nuclear safety,
seen as a fundamental factor in maintaining global ecological and underlkines that important steps are taken by international
health and stability. organizations and forums with regard to safety navigation. The
latter document includes economic and societal costs of climate
Environmental protection is not explicitly covered by the change damages and risks related to climate change, and risks
Gwich’in report, though it is all about Indigenous-led impact of extreme weather events, as well as food security among the
assessment. issues when analyzing sustainability and actionable adaptation
policies and challenges for Sami communities.
The Pollution indicator is explicitly, though briefly, mentioned
in the AAC, ICC and Saami documents. For instance, the AAC The Economy indicator is explicitly discussed and mentioned
Arctic Policy notes some of the pollutants affecting the region, in all the documents, although in different ways. The AAC pol-
such as POPs, and that the Stockholm Convention on POPs is icy, for example, explicitly mentions the economy in regard to
a problem-solving tactic. The ICC policy also identifies a range trade in the context of treaty rights and intellectual property. It
of pollutants and argues that pollution outside the region must also recognizes the need for input from Canadian Indigenous
be addressed. The Saami Strategy briefly mentions the Saami peoples when the Canadian Government is negotiating trade
Council’s efforts in the Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Con- agreements at international level. The Gwich’in report exten-
taminat Action Program (IPCAP) Expert Group under ACAP. sively discusses the economy via the Indigenous-led impact as-
sessment case studies (Tlicho of the Nico Project, The Sivumut
In contrast, pollution is not explicitly discussed in the Gwich’in Project, and Squamish Nation Woodfibre LNG Project, which
document. deal with resource governance and sustainable development).

Similarly, the Climate Change indicator is explicitly discussed The ICC policy considers the protection and management of
in the AAC, ICC and Saami documents. The first two docu- renewable resources through the maintenance of ecological
ments explain that climate change poses a significant challenge balance to be very important; it therefore emphasizes right of
and major danger to their respective populations and ecosys- Inuit to participate in the management and development of the
tems, and express that climate action is required at an interna- Arctic and its resources. It also calls for the promotion of “In-
tional level through processes, like the Arctic Climate Impact uit self-reliance”— explicitly mentioned in the document is the
Assessment, or the UNFCCC (AAC), or through human rights need for Inuit Arctic Policy to elaborate a comprehensive Arctic
conventions (ICC). economic strategy to potentially include “full and meaningful
employment” (ICC 2010, 82), and air transportation.
Correspondingly, the Saami Strategy proposes a measure to “de-
velop a climate and socio-economic model for Sápmi focusing Based on the Saami right to own, use, and develop its own lands
on the impacts of climate change, the economic and societal and resources, resulting from their traditional ownership, the
costs of climate change damages, risk mitigation, and adapta- economy plays an important role in the 2017 Declaration. In
tion.” (2019, 6). Unlike, the Gwich’in document is not explicit particular, Saami reindeer herding is interpreted as a central
about this topic. part of the Saami culture, as are maintaining and develop the

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languages, culture and the entire Saami way of life, as well as by large extent, that research will be co-developed, produced
among the ‘greenest’, unlike the Green colonialism. Correspond- and communicated in full partnership with Arctic Indigenous
ingly, two sub-sections of the Saami Strategy directly deal with people. The ICC policy recognizes Arctic research as providing
the Economy indicator by stating that resource development vital information for a growing number of activities, subjects,
proposals for the Saami area should consider “the needs of the and interests in Inuit communities, in particular communi-
Sami people today without compromising the ability of the ty-based research; it also requires ‘traditional knowledge’ to be
Sami people to meet their needs in the future”, (2019, 8) and included in school curricula as it has provided critical informa-
considering Saami traditional subsistence living as “an old form tion about climate change.
of entrepreneurship” (2019, 9). In this context, finally, the pro-
posal of a Sami Business Summit is interesting. Correspondingly, The Saami Strategy emphasizes knowledge
and science, as well as ties them together with climate change
All the documents unsurprisingly recognize and emphasize the and other Arctic changes, and clearly states that “there is a
rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples to use and utilize, and to need for new knowledge about how these changes affect the
manage, the resources of their homelands. An interesting differ- Arctic” (2019, 6). The document includes several measures
ence is that the Gwich’in report has detailed case studies. directly concerning Indigenous knowledge, as well as science
and education.
The Tourism indicator is explicitly mentioned only by the ICC
and Saami documents. The ICC 2010 policy briefly states that The first similarity of this indicator is, not surprisingly, an em-
common approach to resource management and economic de- phasis on ‘Traditional knowledge’, and the second one, that sci-
velopment “also applies to eco-tourism” (2010, 35). Tourism is entific findings should be produced and developed further in
a special concern of the Saami 2017 Declaration, which states partnership with Indigenous peoples.
that the development of tourism related to the Saami culture
and within the Saami areas should be coordinated by states in The final similarity between the four Indigenous policy docu-
order to “ensure that the tourism industry operates in a cultural, ments is that the Implementation indicator is explicitly includ-
social, and economically sustainable manner” (Tråante Decla- ed, at least de facto, by all the documents. For instance, as a fol-
ration 2017, 5). The Sami Parliaments are also asked to compile low-up of the Arctic Athabaskan Council’s policy formulation
guidelines on tourism to respect the Saami culture and way of process, the AAC Policy includes three additional recommen-
life, and nature. dations on how Indigenous northern think-tanks could be used
to advise governments on Arctic issues. For the Gwich’in report,
Neither the AAC document nor Gwich’in one explicitly discuss in addition to the short list of recommendations, the report pro-
this topic. poses further work on monitoring and Indigenous impact as-
sessment, and stresses that “this costs money” (2018, 43).
The Infrastructure indicator is explicitly discussed in the AAC
and ICC documents, although with different foci. For instance, The Inuit Arctic Policy (ICC 2010, 99) is defined as a ‘living and
the AAC policy stresses that innovative solutions are needed to resilient document’; to achieve its desired effect “its implemen-
address northern housing and energy-efficient infrastructure, tation must be monitored by the ICC”. Finally, while the Saami
renewable energy, and food security. The policy recommends Declaration includes de facto follow-up by emphasizing rights
that Canada’s forthcoming Arctic foreign policy provides re- of the Saami to include commitments to realize these rights,
sources for Arctic universities and institutions to develop these and requires that “the States inside Sápmi do the same”, the 2019
innovations. In contrast, the ICC 2010 Arctic Policy stresses Strategy includes an explicit attachment Building Knowledge in
that communications and media, including satellites, are of fun- Sapmi – A List of Knowledge Gaps and Research Needs with iden-
damental importance, as they make communications possible tified knowledge gaps and ideas for further research.
in the Arctic; it is particularly important that the relationship
of these, together with information technologies, with the Inuit As a conclusion, this section shows that the policy documents
language and cultural development be recognized. The docu- of these four Indigenous peoples’ organizations, as Permanent
ment also explicitly mentions, unlike the others, that air trans- Participants of the Arctic Council, are rather fragmented. They
portation a necessity in the large Arctic regions, as “the only do not cover all the indicator fields in full detail, as they come
mean of year-round transport between Inuit communities, re- from different directions. There is a striking similarity that all
gionally, nationally, and internationally” (ICC 2010, 84). policy documents explicitly address issues broadly surround-
ing Indigenous (individual and collective) rights, although in
Correspondigly, the Gwich’in 2018 and Saami 2019 documents different contexts, and governance both broadly and in detail,
briefly mention issues (directly or indirectly) dealing with in- as well as the importance of international cooperation. Unlike,
frastructure. environmental protection, pollution and/or climate change are
not explicitly covered by all documents. Unsurprisingly, all the
The Science and Education indicator is explicitly discussed documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples
in all documents, in particular in the Gwich’in report, which to use / utilize the resources of their homelands, as well as the
should be defined as a scientific paper. The AAC policy makes importance of ‘Traditional knowledge’.
recommendations for Canada’s Arctic foreign policy to ensure,

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Part III: Permanent Participants’ Documents

Finally, at the end of the full scientific report, as conclusions and

synthesis of the different parts of this study, this analysis of these
Indigenous peoples’ policy documents - as well as those of the
national strategies and policies of the Arctic states and the AC
observer countries, and the Arctic Council Ministerial declara-
tions - will be used as a foundation for new and emerging trends
of Arctic governance and geopolitics from the points of view of
all these categories of Arctic actors or stakeholders.

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Part IV:
Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

When the Arctic Council (AC) was established in 1996, eight ed to the meetings of the Arctic Council (once observer status
Arctic States became ‘Members’ of the Council, and six In- has been granted) to observe its work, which is their primary
digenous Peoples Organizations became ‘Permanent Partic- role. Observers are further expected to “make relevant con-
ipants’ (PPs). No more categories were created. However, in tributions through their engagement in the Arctic Council
the Joint Communique on the Establishment of the Arctic primarily at the level of Working Groups,” and they are also
Council (1996), the governments of the Arctic countries also informed that they “may propose projects through an Arctic
recognized the need to provide an opportunity for “non-Arc- State or a Permanent Participant,” although financial contri-
tic countries, governmental and non-governmental organiza- butions from observers to any given project may not exceed
tions with Arctic interests to participate actively, as Observers, the financing from Arctic States. Finally, in Council meetings
in the work of the Council, and to draw on their experiences.” “observers may, at the discretion of the Chair, make statements
Following on from this, the Declaration of the First Minis- after Arctic states and Permanent Participants, present written
terial Meeting of the Arctic Council in September 1998 (the statements, submit relevant documents and provide views on
Iqaluit Declaration) approved observer status for i) several the issues under discussion.”
intergovernmental organizations, such as the IASC, UNEP,
and the Nordic Council; ii) international non-governmen- Thus in the AC meetings—the Ministerial and SAO Plenary
tal organizations, such as the WWF; and iii) four non-Arctic meetings—observers, unlike the Permanent Participants, do
states—the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, not per se have a right to take the floor and give statements or
Poland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- provide views, but they may be allowed to do so. They have,
ern Ireland (UK). first of all, a mandate to be present and to observe, and to at-
tend the meetings of the Working Groups. The observer sta-
Germany, Poland, and the UK were already observers at the tus only allows to participate in the Arctic Council SAO and
very first ministerial meeting of the Arctic states in June 1991 Ministerial meetings, not necessary in other meetings by the
in Rovaniemi, Finland, when the 1991 Arctic Environmental Arctic states, such as the Ilulissat Ministerial by the five littoral
Protection Strategy (AEPS) was signed. Other AC observers states of the Arctic Ocean in 2008.
were the ICC, the Saami Council, and the USSR Association
of Small Peoples of the North (later accorded PP status and In spite of these restrictions and the narrow mandate, the
named the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, position of (permanent) observership at the Arctic Council
Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation (RAI- has become attractive, and several non-Arctic states, IGOs,
PON)), as well as the UN-ECE, UNEP, and IASC. Germany, and international NGOs have applied for this status. By the
Poland, and the UK, together with Japan and the Netherlands, 11th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2019
were also present at the establishing ceremony of the Arctic a total of 39 states and organizations—13 non-Arctic states,
Council in Ottawa in September 1996. 14 intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations
(e.g., NCM, SCPAR, UN-ECE, UNEP), and 12 international
Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic non-governmental organizations (e.g., IASC, Northern Fo-
states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary, global and rum, UArctic, WWF)—had been approved as Arctic Council
regional, and international non-governmental organizations. observers. The non-Arctic state observers are (with the year
There are certain criteria for admitting observers, namely, of approval) France (2000), Germany (1998), Italian Republic
they should i) “accept and support the objectives of the Arc- (2013), Japan (2013), Netherlands (1998), People’s Republic
tic Council; ii) recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign of China (2013), Poland (1998), Republic of India (2013),
rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic; iii) recognize that an ex- Republic of Korea (2013), Republic of Singapore (2013),
tensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, Spain (2006), Switzerland (2017), and the United King-
notably, the Law of the Sea; and iv) respect the values, inter- dom (1998).
ests, culture and traditions of Arctic Indigenous peoples and
other Arctic inhabitants” (Arctic Council 2015b). Of the observer countries, the following have approved an Arc-
tic policy or strategy (with the year it was announced): France
Observers are reminded that “decisions at all levels in the (2016), Germany (2013), Italy (2015), Japan (2015), Nether-
Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of lands (2014), People’s Republic of China (2018), Republic of
the eight Arctic States with the involvement of the Permanent Korea (2013), Spain (2016), and United Kingdom (2013 and
Participants.” (Ottawa Declaration 1996). They are then invit- 2018). Each state has one document relating to the Arctic,

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

apart from the UK, which has two. The Netherlands document, in international forums on the Arctic; The European Union
Strategy for the Netherlands Polar Programme 2016–2020, and and the Arctic region; and National interests and the common
the Spanish document, A Spanish Polar Strategy, focus on the interest in the Arctic region. The work has four main areas,
Arctic and Antarctic. As Germany released its newest, up-dat- which are seen as the French priorities: i) identifying France’s
ed strategy in August 2019, it is not analyzed here. interests in the Arctic; ii) enhancing the legitimacy of France
in Arctic affairs; iii) working to balance national and gener-
Of the remaining non-Arctic observer states, Poland is in the al interests of Arctic Ocean governance; and iv) promoting
process of finalizing a report. India does not have a strategy protection of the fragile Arctic marine ecosystem (2016, 12).
per se, but sets out the main objectives of the Indian research
in a short paper India and the Arctic on the Arctic region and The Roadmap explicitly notes that “France already has politi-
the Arctic Council (see Indian Ministry of External Affairs cal and economic interests in the Arctic (Total, Engie, Technip,
website for public diplomacy (India MEA 2013). Switzerland Thales, etc.) which are bound to grow” (p. 11). France has a long-
also has an Arctic science document, which is not a strategy as standing relationship with the Arctic, with its famous French po-
such (Switzerland. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af- lar explorers and scientists and the country having a permanent
fairs 2015). scientific base in Svalbard since the 1960s (e.g., Plouffe 2012).
Furthermore, the title of the concluding chapter reveals France’s
Other observers of the Arctic Council have also released doc- national interest there, “France, an Arctic player” (2016, 3).
uments. For example, the Northern Forum (2019) released its
new Development Strategy 2030 in April 2019. As these docu- France received the status of permanent observership at the
ments do not have the status of a national strategy or policy, Arctic Council in 2000 (Arctic Council 2015b).
they are neither coded nor analyzed here.
The substantial (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic in-
Also the European Union (EU) has an official policy / strategy dicator provides a fairly good understanding of how France de-
on the Arctic since 2008, when the first EU Communication fines and would like to map the Arctic. France defines the Arctic
on the Arctic has adopted. Building on this communication “as an ocean surrounded by continents” (2016, 6). A document
and other initiatives the 2016 Joint Communication “sets out subchapter has a list of different definitions of political and ad-
the case for an EU policy that focuses on advancing interna- ministrative boundaries in the Arctic (2016, 21–22), The docu-
tional cooperation in responding to the impacts of climate ment also explains that “the Arctic Ocean, a unique and fragile
change on the Arctic’s fragile environment, and on promoting marine environment,” (2016, 39) “has been severely affected by
and contributing to sustainable development, in particularly climate change [which] is a key component in the regulation of
in the European part of the Arctic” (European Commission the planet’s climate” (2016, 10). The Arctic is also described as
2016, 2). Behind is that the Union “has a strategic interest in being “a region with very few inhabitants” (2016, 29), but also
playing a key role in the Arctic Region” (ibid). As the EU does a “home to some forty ethnic communities” (p. 22). The Arctic
neither have, yet the status of a (permanent) observership of is “also defined as one of the seven ‘socio-cultural regions’ of
the Arctic Council, nor it is state, these documents are neither the world recognized by the UN Permanent Forum on Indige-
coded nor analyzed here. nous Issues” (2016, 22). Finally, in the Roadmap, the Arctic is
defined as “an ecologically sensitive area,” which find itself in
a situation, “where economic opportunities and environmen-
France tal and climate challenges are inextricably linked” (2016, 60).

The document The Great Challenge of the Arctic —The National The French Roadmap also notes that “the Arctic is both far from
Roadmap for the Arctic, was approved and launched in 2016 by France and near to it” (2016, 4). This means that “from France,
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International De- the Arctic Ocean… seems like a natural extension of the North
velopment (France MAEDI 2016). Atlantic, which laps at the western shores of our country….
Until recently, however, the Arctic seemed far away because it
The 60-page document, including several maps and pictures, remained, if not untouched, at least largely preserved from the
is a collaboration between the French ministries of Defence, changes caused by people. But the Arctic is [now] feeling the
Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, Education full force of climate change” (2016, 4), and “is the canary in the
and Research, and Finance, working “under the aegis of the coal mine for the climate change occurring all over the world”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development” (2016, 9). The Arctic is “a worldwide concern” (2016, 11), the
(2016, 12). Their goal was “to draft a ‘National Roadmap for Roadmap states, and France is “an Arctic player” (2016, 3).
the Arctic’ identifying, ranking, and coordinating France’s pri-
orities with regard to the Arctic” (2016, 12). The seven chap- Figure 18 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
ters are entitled: Scientific research and cooperation; Economic indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
opportunities and cooperation; Defence and security issues; (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
Protecting the Arctic marine environment; France’s presence

194
 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

that potentially concern the international community… [due

to] the current process in which coastal states are consolidating
their sovereignty in their northern regions (maritime border
disputes, extension of the continental shelf, legal status of po-
lar straits, national security issues, etc.)” (2016, 10). One of the
main areas of this work are efforts “to balance national and gen-
eral interests of Arctic Ocean governance” (2016, 12). This focus
is on the five Arctic coastal States (Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia, United States) of the Arctic Ocean which “by virtue of
their sovereignty and their jurisdiction over large areas of the
Arctic Ocean… are on the front line in the face of these chal-
lenges” (2016, 4). Here the Roadmap notes that:

Figure 18. France 2016 1) These five states solemnly stated in the 2008 Ilulissat Decla-
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the nearest whole num- ration that under the terms of the United Nations Conven-
ber and represent the percentage of the total number of quotes coded for each tion on the Law of the Sea, “governance issues in the Arctic
document. Ocean require balancing the interests of the coastal states
with those of other states” (2016, 10);

The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 5 % of the to- 2) “Maritime boundaries between neighbouring coastal coun-
tal coded quotes of the French National Roadmap for the Arctic tries are defined through an advanced bilateral or trilateral
(see Figure 18). The indicator is a dual one. On the one hand, negotiation process… including a historic treaty between
“the Indigenous populations of the North” (2016, 17) are men- Russia and Norway in 2011” (2016, 33);
tioned several times, and their ways of life, rights, and Indige-
nous languages, are discussed, although their health and well- 3) “The coastal states’ claims to the continental shelf extending
being are less mentioned. For example, the Arctic Indigenous more than 200 nautical miles offshore are addressed as part of
peoples “claim specific rights that are more than human rights a UN process under the terms of the Convention” (2016, 33);
or minority rights…. These rights have been set out in the Inter-
national Labour Organization Convention No. 169 and in the 4) “The central Arctic Ocean… is a maritime space where
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo- each state has control and jurisdiction over its own vessels.
ples, which is not legally binding” (2016, 30). The document France, working alongside the European Commission, in-
also explains that some of the Indigenous communities cross tends to assert its obligations and rights in discussions on the
international borders: for example “the Sami people… the only regulation of future activities in the central Arctic Ocean….
Indigenous population in the ‘European Arctic’... [who] inhabit As a maritime power, France… is committed to preserving
the northern territories of Finland, Norway, Northwest Russia freedom of navigation in the Arctic seas” (2016, 57);
(Murmansk Oblast) and Sweden; the Inuit people live in the
northern territories of the United States, Canada, Greenland 5) “France will [thus] work with other directly and indirectly
and the Russian Federation (Kola Peninsula)” (2016, 29)17. concerned states to promote a balance between national in-
terests and the common interest in the Arctic Ocean, which,
On the other hand, the document notes that “the Arctic can be year after year, reveals a new inter-oceanic connection be-
described as the juxtaposition of northern territories with very tween the North Atlantic and the North Pacific” (2016, 60);
small populations (approximately 4 million individuals) that
have a wealth of natural resources in countries where the main 6) The five Arctic coastal states [thus] signed in 2015 a “Dec-
economic, political and population centres are, with the excep- laration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High
tion of Iceland, located much further south” (2016, 22). Only Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean,” and “the Euro-
“10 % of the Arctic population… consists of Indigenous popula- pean Commission was invited… to participate in the five
tions who have been living in… the Arctic for more than a thou- Arctic coastal states’ negotiation of a draft legally binding
sand years in some cases…. [This is] in contrast to the average agreement on preventing illegal fishing in the central Arctic
figures for the whole Arctic region, in Nunavut (Canada), and Ocean” (2016, 40). This agreement was signed by nine states
in Greenland (Denmark), [where] Indigenous inhabitants are and the EU in October 2018.
in the majority and Westerners are in the minority” (2016, 29).
These points made regarding Arctic Ocean governance under-
The Governance indicator accounts for 10 % of the total coded line that “France promotes the principle of the empowerment
quotes of the National Roadmap of France (see Figure 18). The of the non-Arctic states that are potential users of the Arctic
Roadmap identifies an increase in “collective governance issues through greater involvement of these states in the planning and

17 This is, in fact, mistake, as the Inuit live in the Russian Far East, not on the Kola Peninsula, which is the European part of the Russian Federation.

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

decision-making processes relating to sustainable and respon- and ii) “France’s presence in international forums on the Arc-
sible governance of the Arctic Ocean” (2016, 58). The Roadmap, tic” (2016, 43). Among these international and inter-regional
however, notes that “the nature and scale of the issue calls, now forums, the Arctic Council is identified as “the key political
more than ever, for greater international cooperation” (2016, forum for regional cooperation on Arctic issues… [adopting]
4). International cooperation in the Arctic, including cooper- texts that are not legally binding, but… carry[ing] enough
ation between the Arctic states, is identified as “a recent ini- political weight that countries comply with them” (2016, 45).
tiative stemming from a shared political commitment to over- Other international forums identified as dealing with Arctic
come the strategic past of the former cold war theatre” (2016, issues are “the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, on which the Eu-
10). It quotes the famous 1987 Murmansk Speech by President ropean Union sits as a member and France as an observer, and
Mikhail Gorbachev: “Let the North Pole be a pole of peace” the European Union’s Nordic Dimension” (2016, 45). The lat-
and “a genuine zone of [...] fruitful cooperation” (2016, 10). It ter’s relation with the European Union are noted (2016, 52–53).
is emphasized that “Russia’s participation in regional coopera-
tion bodies and bilateral cooperation programmes means that Among the Arctic-related international organizations and
the Arctic has progressively become a region of cooperation agreements identified by the Roadmap are the Internation-
between the eight countries directly concerned” (2016, 33). al Maritime Organisation (IMO) which “drew up a ’Polar
For example, by the Ilulissat Declaration, the five Arctic littoral Code’”… and a collection of amendments to the SOLAS and
states “made a commitment to peaceful settlement of maritime MARPOL Conventions on the safety of vessels operating in
disputes based on the United Nations Convention on the Law polar waters.” The Roadmap explicitly mentions that “France
of the Sea” (2016, 33). has played an active role on the Marine Environment Protec-
tion Committee (MEPC), the Marine Safety Committee (MSC)
Although the French Roadmap emphasizes cooperation be- and the ad hoc working group that drafted the texts,” as well
tween the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic as in the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission (ARHC)
Council is identified as a young organization “which explains of the International Hydrographic Organization (2016, 45–46).
why it does not deal with governance issues... [but] plans to France has also conducted international scientific cooperation,
adopt a more comprehensive approach, encompassing issues namely, the International Polar Years, the International Arctic
relating to the role of potential non-Arctic users of the region Science Committee, and the European Polar Board, are iden-
or to economic issues in the Arctic” (2016, 45) ). Concerning tified (2016, 17, 20). UNCLOS is also noted. Otherwise, there
France’s observership within the Arctic Council, “scientific ac- is no clear global perspective, apart from a mention of mostly
tivities relating to the Arctic strengthen its [France’s] legitima- Asian observer countries of the Arctic Council.
cy in dealing with Arctic affairs and are an essential condition
for the renewal of its observer status” (2016, 19). Concerning France’s diplomatic action in, and relating to, the
Arctic, the Roadmap focuses on maintaining “a presence in
‘Self-governance’ or ‘self-determination’ are not explicitly dis- all the relevant forums in order to promote France’s interests,
cussed in the document, though, as mentioned earlier, the maintain the positions of French players and promote a com-
“right to self-determination” is briefly noted as an example of mon interest vision” (e.g., on conservation of the environment
“human rights or minority rights” (2016, 30). (2016, 46). The Roadmap includes eight special recommenda-
tions on diplomacy, primarily that “France’s diplomatic action
Echoing the previous indicator, international cooperation in is based primarily on steady and sustained participation in the
the Arctic is largely identified as the International Treaties and Arctic Council… Our action must also aim to enhance France’s
International Cooperation indicator, accounting for 13 % of scientific cooperation through bilateral initiatives and involve-
the total coded quotes of the National Roadmap (see Figure 18, ment in other technical forums,” and, further, “strengthen our
p. 195). This provides a good understanding of how highly val- links and plan cooperation projects with the Permanent Partic-
ued international Arctic cooperation is in several fields, such as ipants… identify opportunities for synergy with the observers;
science and research, economy, and environmental protection [and] take an active part in the dialogue between the observers
(e.g., as “adopting processes that ensure an ecological expert as- and the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at ‘Warsaw For-
sessment” (2016, 41). The same applies when combining differ- mat’ meetings” (2016, 47).
ent fields, for example, the “regulation of extractive industries’
activities [must be] commensurate with environmental risks in Finally, the Roadmap includes a special chapter on “the Euro-
the Arctic [or there could be a] complete ban in cases where the pean Union and the Arctic” (2016, 49–54) first, emphasizing
risks appear to be too great” (2016, 41). There is also a need for the EU as “the world’s largest maritime economic power (trans-
“French companies’ compliance with best practices… to miti- port, insurance, shipbuilding techniques, tourism, offshore
gate the environmental impact of these industries by prevent- energy production, research) and a key player in the trade of
ing and fighting air and sea pollution” (2016, 41). fishery products in the European sub-Arctic and Arctic” ; and
second, supporting “EU policy on the Arctic and [adding that
The two highly focused values of international cooperation it ]coordinates its action with this policy… the view [is] that
which the Roadmap addresses are: i) international cooperation the EU is significantly involved in the Arctic and a key actor in
with respect to the Arctic Ocean and the maritime environ- this region” (2016, 51). To implement the coordination with the
ment and (regional) cooperation between the five littoral states; EU, several objectives are listed in the Roadmap with respect to

196
 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

supporting EU action in the Arctic, such as the establishment fied as challenges and potential risks, but polluters are named.
of “a regional fishery management organization and a regional For problem solving, the document mentions the Polar Code
sea convention for the Arctic ocean”; upholding “the princi- of the IMO, the SOLAS Convention on safety at sea, and the
ples of international law, particularly in terms of freedom of MARPOL Convention on pollution from ships (2016, 39), as
navigation and the right of innocent passage”; strengthening well as the Arctic Council’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guide-
“the Arctic dimension within the Northern Dimension and the lines which act “to mitigate the environmental impact of these
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, especially for environmental and industries by preventing and fighting air and sea pollution,”
transport issues”; and integrating “the Arctic into long-term and are applied by French companies, and a “non-binding
planning for the European Energy Security Strategy” (2016, agreement on preventing and fighting oil spills,” adopted by the
54). In addition, with reference to the EU’s strategic priorities Arctic coastal states (2016, 41).
in the Arctic, “combating the effects of climate change; [under-
taking ]sustainable development; [and ]international cooper- The Climate Change indicator accounts for 6 % of the total
ation” (2016, 52): here, the Roadmap explicitly notes the EU’s coded quotes of the National Roadmap for the Arctic of France
Northern Dimension. (see Figure 18, p. 195). The Roadmap explicitly notes both mit-
igation and adaptation: “France will promote or support adap-
As mentioned earlier, the Arctic is described in the Roadmap as tation by the competent international bodies of international
a “particularly fragile marine environment”, and although the regulations to the new uses of the Arctic Ocean made possible
region is thought to remain “at least largely preserved from the through increased accessibility” (2016, 11). Moreover, “an envi-
changes caused by people… [it] is feeling the full force of cli- ronmental transformation such as this [climate change] would
mate change” (2016, 4). The Environmental Protection indica- certainly bring major economic opportunities for the Arctic re-
tor, accounting for 13 % of the total coded quotes of the French gion, in terms of both shipping and fisheries, but it would also
National Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195), states that “France pose immense challenges, such as the need to mitigate the in-
will do everything that it can, here in the Far North of the plan- evitable loss of biodiversity, the increased risk of sea pollution
et, to take action, mobilise its researchers and its businesses, to and the impact on the ways of life of Indigenous populations”
enable us to preserve this part of the world, which is undoubt- (2016, 4). Well-known consequences, and “the full force of cli-
edly one of the most beautiful” (2016, 60). In particular, the mate change” (2016, 4), are also identified, among which are
country is “committed to protecting the Arctic marine environ- “the large decrease in the extent of Arctic sea ice at the end of
ment” (2016, 39). The mission here is twofold: first, “Protection the summer… [which is] one of the most spectacular manifesta-
of Biodiversity and Conserving the Environment” including, tions of current climate change” (2016, 9). The decrease in Arc-
among others, support of “the process of defining marine pro- tic ice has “strategic consequences” [with] the prospect of regu-
tected areas in the Arctic,” encouraging “measures to mitigate lar use of new Arctic shipping routes… growing nearer” (2016,
the impact of shipping on sea mammals; work with the Euro- 12). Finally, the region is re-identified as “an important natural
pean Union to monitor the sustainable management plan for laboratory for studying climate change at the global level, mak-
Arctic fisheries; [promotion of] policy decision-making based ing it an area of scientific interest for all of humanity” (2016, 60).
on the best scientific knowledge available”; and second, France
will “support, within the context of the Common Fisheries Pol- The Security indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total
icy, any initiative aimed at establishing a framework for the sus- coded quotes of the Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195) shows
tainable management of Arctic fisheries” (2016, 41). skepticism or caution by reason of its concern that “even
though the military role of the Arctic has faded into the back-
It is also explicitly noted in the Roadmap that “each economic ground… it offers room for manoeuvre… [and once again has]
prospect comes with several challenges that are largely related become a theatre for contradictory ambitions, especially as
to the key issues in the marine Arctic, which are maritime safe- Russia’s strategic stance changes” (2016, 33). These are again
ty and the environment (search and rescue, fighting pollution)” shown in the notion that “Russia’s participation in region-
(2016, 9). This is echoed in the identification of France’s multi- al cooperation bodies and bilateral cooperation programmes
dimensional interests in the Arctic: economic, defence, scien- means that the Arctic has progressively become a region of
tific, influence, etc. At the same time, the document includes cooperation between the eight countries directly concerned.
a substantial chapter on economic opportunities and France’s Under the terms of the Ilulissat Declaration of 28 May 2008,
economic interests in the Arctic, and the foreword remarks that these countries [the five littoral states] made a commitment to
there are new economic opportunities due to climate change. peaceful settlement of maritime disputes based on UNCLOS”
(2016, 33). As mentioned, the Roadmap makes reference to
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total the maxim “Let the North Pole be a pole of peace” spoken
coded quotes of the Roadmap of France (see Figure 18, p. 195), by President Gorbachev in his Murmansk Speech in 1987.
does not recognize any specific pollutants other than oil in the
Arctic region. Instead, it notes that “each economic prospect As a NATO member state, “France is concerned by the issues of
comes with several challenges that are largely related to the key stability and security that could concern the Arctic states that
issues in the marine Arctic, which are maritime safety and the are members and partners of the [NATO] Alliance” (2016, 58).
environment (search and rescue, fighting pollution)” (2016, 9). Furthermore, “France’s main interests in the Arctic primarily
Further, commercial shipping, oil spills, and mining are identi- concern its economy, security and the environment, rather than

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

military and defence issues” (2016, 34). The Roadmap remarks: covered by the SOLAS Convention… [and] ensure that ship-
“the Arctic made its first appearance in the French Defence owners comply scrupulously with the provisions of the Polar
and National Security White Paper in the section on ‘threats Code... [as] pleasure cruises, run by specialised French compa-
and risks amplified by globalization’ [because] “the decrease in nies, are booming” (2016, 40).
the extent of sea ice in the Arctic has strategic consequences,
and the prospect of regular use of new Arctic shipping routes The Economy indicator accounts for 17 % of the total coded
is growing nearer” (2016, 12). The Roadmap also includes a quotes of the French Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195). The doc-
chapter on defence and security issues (2016, 31–35) with sev- ument’s foreword notes that “an environmental transformation
eral recommendations on activities in the field, inter alia, to such as this [due to climate change] would certainly bring major
“monitor regional political and military developments and de- economic opportunities for the Arctic region in terms of both
velop in-depth understanding of the area [e.g.,] step up the ex- shipping and fisheries” (2016, 4). Later the document notes
change of oceanographic information between the French navy that “France already has political and economic interests in the
and its foreign counterparts, possibly by offering information Arctic (Total, Engie, Technip, Thales, etc.) which are bound to
in our possession about other regions of the world”; in order grow” (2016, 11).
to “support our economic and industrial interests [e.g.,] main-
tain the technological understanding and know-how needed to Among the main natural resources of the Arctic region the
design Arctic equipment with due consideration of the opera- Roadmap includes “gas, oil, wood, nickel, cold-water fish, di-
tional needs of the armed forces”; to “enhance the legitimacy amonds, rare earth elements, etc.” (2016, 7). In particular, it
of France’s participation in regional governance through its explains that “in terms of energy security, Europe relies on im-
contribution to the stability and security of the region”; and to ports for more than 50 % of its energy, and over two-thirds of
“promote outside of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable a its imports are from Russia and Norway, which have large off-
bilateral approach focusing on practical objectives with coun- shore oil fields in the Arctic that are in production or under de-
tries having proven capabilities in the Far North” (2016, 35). velopment” (2016, 51). On the other hand, the Roadmap notes
that an environmental transformation, such as melting of sea
Finally, the Roadmap greatly reflects “France’s scientific, eco- ice in Arctic waters “would also pose immense challenges, such
nomic, ecological ethics, political and defence interests in the as the need to mitigate the inevitable loss of biodiversity, the in-
Arctic [which] are bound to grow stronger” (2016, 57). creased risk of sea pollution and the impact on the ways of life
of Indigenous populations” (2016, 4). Following on from this,
‘Sovereignty’ is explicitly identified in the Roadmap, as is the “France has also expressed ecological ethics concerns about the
“jurisdiction over large areas of the Arctic Ocean” of the five region in its ‘Grenelle’ environment project… ’with the aim of
Arctic littoral states (2016, 4). The document is clear in stating protecting the Arctic environment’’’ (2016, 11), while “the Blue
that “by virtue of their sovereignty, their sovereign rights and Book explained [in 2009] that ‘appointing a polar ambassador
their jurisdiction over vast portions of the Arctic Ocean, the five will underline France’s commitment to contributing to an inte-
coastal states are in a special position to respond to the chal- grated sustainable development plan for this region, where the
lenges and issues in the Arctic.” As an observer country of the ecosystem is particularly fragile’ and that the Arctic is ‘a world-
Arctic Council, “France recognises the Arctic states’ sovereign- wide concern’” (2016, 11).
ty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic” (2016, 57).
The Roadmap does, however, note that “France does not cur-
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod- rently have any major interests in commercial shipping in the
ed quotes of the Roadmap of France (see Figure 18, p. 195). The Arctic. If this sector should develop we must ensure that ship-
Roadmap does not explicitly mention the SAR Agreement, but owners comply scrupulously with the provisions of the Polar
instead focuses on the Polar Code of the International Mar- Code” (2016, 40). It also lists several “French companies in the
itime Organization, which is “a collection of amendments to Canadian, Norwegian and Russian Arctic,” such as:
the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions on the safety of vessels • Areya: uranium exploration project in Nunavut, Bouygues,
operating in polar waters” (2016, 45), and plays “an active role and Colas
in the process of harmonising national regulations and the new • PPP for the renovation of Iqaluit airport
international regulations on shipping in polar waters” (2016, • Canada Rail (Systra) rail infrastructures related to mining
59). As the Roadmap identifies, “the existing shipping monitor- • Ponant: polar cruise company (in Canada)
ing systems are insufficient in number and do not yet operate • GDF Suez (oil and gas)
as a network…. There is a lack of satellite surveillance [and of] • COFELY Fabricom (platform maintenance)
search and rescue capabilities” (2016, 39). Here the document • Technip (underwater engineering)
reflects that France “supported the drafting of a Polar Code in • Nexans (cables)
the form of amendments to the SOLAS Convention on safety • CGG Veritas (underground exploration and
at sea and the MARPOL Convention” (2016, 39). Further, it oil-related services)
recognizes a need to “implement the regulatory framework for • Seabed Geophysics (collection of seismic data,
vessels operating in the Arctic (‘Polar Code’)”, as well as “main- sale of cables and surveillance)
tain our involvement in the IMO’s work to broaden the scope of • Bourbon Offshore Norway (shipping services for
the binding Polar Code (Phase II) to include vessels that are not offshore oil drilling)

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

• FROM Nord and Euronor (fishing) policy, namely, “scientific research and academic cooperation in
• MA-CGM (commercial transportation) the Arctic” (2016, 15–20). Linked to this are the long-standing
• Ponant, GNGL polar exploration and research tradition of France: “France was
• 66° Nord (Specialised travel companies) (in Norway) the first country to set up, in 1963, a scientific research base in…
• Total & Technip (oil and gas) Svalbard, where it shares a permanent base with Germany in the
• Ponant (polar cruise company) (in Russia) (2016, 27). international scientific village Ny-Ålesund” (2016, 17). The doc-
ument also argues: i) that “in historical terms, the polar regions
As for economic actors, the Roadmap identifies the EU, the Arc- have had a special place in international scientific cooperation”
tic Council and its new observer countries, and particularly, the (2016, 17) for example, “the International Polar Year 2007–2008,
Arctic Economic Council. There are also comments about busi- which involved several thousand researchers from 63 countries”
ness events, such as the Arctic Business Forum, Arctic Business (2016, 9); ii) that “non-Arctic states must engage in research in
Council, and Arctic Oil and Gas Symposium, in which French the Arctic to obtain official observer status in the Arctic Council”
companies are encouraged to participate (2016, 28). (2016, 18); and iii) that “France’s scientific activities relating to
the Arctic strengthen its legitimacy in dealing with Arctic affairs
The Tourism indicator, accounting for 3 % of the total coded and are an essential condition for the renewal of its observer sta-
quotes of the National Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195), reflects tus in the Arctic Council” (2016, 19).
concerns that “the gradual opening of Arctic shipping routes,
the increase in commercial shipping traffic (pleasure cruis- Based on its long-standing polar tradition, France “ranks 9th
ing and, to a lesser extent, cargo)… raises new challenges for among scientific countries for publications on the Arctic, where-
France in its capacity as a leading naval power. [Among these as it ranks 5th in the world for scientific publications on Antarc-
challenges are] protection and rescue of ships and passengers, tica” (2016, 17) France “was the first country to establish in 1963
fighting pollution, critical legal issues concerning freedom of a scientific research base in Svalbard” (2016, 17). The Roadmap
navigation, etc.” (2016, 34). It states, too, that “pleasure cruises, includes a list of ten main scientific interests of France in the
run by specialised French companies, are booming” (2016, 40). Arctic, as well as recommendations on research. Among the ten
Among the recommendations on economic opportunities and main scientific interests, which mostly relate to natural sciences
cooperation of the document is to “promote the development of are: “Arctic and global atmospheric variability,” “water cycle and
fair trade tourism that respects local populations and encourage land ice,” the “changing ocean,” “Arctic terrestrial ecosystem dy-
French companies operating in the Arctic to hire and train local namics,” “Indigenous societies and global change,” and “sustain-
residents” (2016, 28). able development in the Arctic” (2016, 19). Correspondingly,
recommendations (2016, 19, 20) include raising “France’s profile
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded by building up the community of French scientists working on
quotes of the Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195). This indicator the Arctic and, more specifically, by ensuring that the develop-
specifies France’s interest in (technical) innovations in the Arctic ment of the Arctic project that involves France’s research bod-
region “where climate change opens up prospects for economic ies… [especially] the Paul-Emile Victor Polar Institute (IPEV),
and commercial development, green growth is a crucial issue… the national agency that provides resources for French scientific
and renewable energy sources, green technology and investment activities in the polar regions.”
in innovation” (p. 27). Here the Arctic is named “a laboratory for
new technologies in information and communication, robotics, There are also recommendations to “build up France’s scientific
automation, airborne systems and sensors” (2016, 27), which re- role in the Arctic Council working groups and task forces, by
quires promotion of “French expertise in environmental tech- bringing in French human and social science specialists in partic-
nology” (2016, 28). ular… [and] ensure that France participates fully in international
scientific organisations, such as the International Arctic Science
Concerning transportation, however, France does not have ma- Committee”; to “develop the European aspects… of French sci-
jor interests in commercial Arctic shipping. As mentioned ear- entific research on the Arctic, as part of the European Union re-
lier, the Roadmap explicitly discusses i) that “the waters of the search and innovation programme (Horizon 2020), and at the
Arctic Ocean are key components for climate regulation in the institutional level, through the European Polar Board (EPB)
northern hemisphere. Their ecosystems are undergoing major and its initiatives (e.g., the EU-PolarNet project)”; [to] “promote
changes as a result of [environmental] changes… global warm- France’s scientific expertise in human and social sciences and
ing and increasing pressure from human activity,” and therefore, the teaching of Arctic languages in France to the Arctic states”;
“shipping traffic is increasing… pleasure cruising is developing” and [to] “develop research contracts with businesses that may be
(2016, 39); and ii) how “the Northeast Passage reduces the dis- interested by economic opportunities in the Arctic.” Finally, the
tance from Rotterdam to Yokohama by 40 % compared to the document notes that “all of these initiatives require development
route through the Suez Canal,” although, to date, there has been of French Arctic research with strong institutional and scientific
little traffic on the sea route (2016, 25). support” (2016, 20) (see Implementation indicator).

The Science and Education indicator, which accounts for 10 % of The Roadmap mentions that “with regard to human and social
the total coded quotes of the Roadmap for the Arctic (see Figure sciences… France is one of the few countries in the world that
18, p. 195), reflects the second-highest priority of France’s Arctic teaches Inuktitut (the language of the Inuit in Canada) at the Na-

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

tional Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INAL- To sum up

CO)” (2016, 19), and asks for the promotion of “France’s scien-
tific expertise in human and social sciences and the teaching of Based on the quantitative measuring of our 12 indicators, Econ-
Arctic languages in France to the Arctic states” (p. 20). Although omy is the highest major priority of the Arctic policy of France
the Roadmap comments that “France has a long-standing tra- according to the French National Roadmap for the Arctic. This
dition of internationally recognised scientific work in human interpretation is supported, too, by its substantial chapter on the
and social sciences (anthropology, ethnography, etc.) related to economy, which explicitly identifies new economic opportuni-
the Indigenous populations of the North” (2016, 17), traditional ties in the Arctic and notes that French companies are already
knowledge is not explicitly mentioned. present there, such as Total in the Yamal LNG Project. However,
as mentioned earlier, the Roadmap has two sides to it, as it also
Concerning research funding the EU is mentioned “as both a key places an emphasis on the immense environmental challenges
player and a major donor, in the field of Arctic research” through present in the Arctic, such as the inevitable loss of biodiversity,
the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technologi- the increased risk of sea pollution, and societal impacts on Indig-
cal Development, the Creative Europe, Horizon 2020. and other enous and local populations. This poses a classic question about
research, development. and innovation programmes (2016, 51). national policies and strategies, namely, which of the two is the
priority in an Arctic heavily impacted by climate change: the en-
Finally, the Roadmap directs attention to a growing need for vironment or the economy? The main conclusion here might be
satellites, as “new activities and rapid change in the Arctic ‘both–and’ rather than ‘either–or’, an approach that reflects the
stemming from global warming mean that satellites and space realities of life rather than environmental politics, especially in
programmes are bound to become helpful tools in the follow- the case of the Arctic.
ing areas: telecommunications; maritime safety and navigation
aids… environmental surveillance… sustainable management of It is noteworthy that both ‘sovereignty’ and ‘defence’ are explicit-
marine resources” (2016, 26). ly discussed. The Roadmap comes down firmly on the side of the
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the five Arctic coastal states,
The Implementation indicator is explicitly noted by the French and it is clear that France recognizes the Arctic states’ sovereignty.
Roadmap for the Arctic, as it is interpreted as providing “a work- The Roadmap also discusses defence and security issues, which
ing framework and [setting] guidelines and priorities, which are excluded from the Arctic Council agenda; it notes that the
should make it possible in the coming years to align and priori- security of the Arctic states is of concern to NATO and promises
tise action on Arctic issues and challenges that concern France, that France will contribute to Arctic stability remaining strong.
with a broader focus on sustainability and the common interest”
(2016, 12). This is related to “France’s growing interest in the new France’s national Arctic policy is also a strong statement on be-
scientific, environmental and economic issues in the Arctic, and half of the EU and its Arctic policy and the latter’s legitimate in-
that of the international community [which has given rise to] volvement in and presence there. A little surprisingly, the EU’s
a national initiative to coordinate Arctic research” (2016, 17). Northern Dimension is identified as playing a role in the Arctic,
Indeed, each of the substantial, thematic chapters—on science, and the EU’s membership of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council is
economy, defence, environmental protection, international co- explicitly noted.
operation and diplomacy— has a (longer or shorter) list of rec-
ommendations (several being referred to earlier). For example, It can be concluded that the French Roadmap emphasizes the
the last recommendation on Diplomacy states that “France’s dip- interests of both France and the EU in the Arctic. The national
lomatic network in the Arctic states and in the Arctic Council and general interests of Arctic Ocean governance are clearly ex-
observer states must play its full role in implementing the Na- pressed, but it is not clear if they are in balance. Environmental
tional Roadmap for the Arctic” (2016, 47). protection is, however, high on the agenda. Regarding the legit-
imacy of France’s involvement in Arctic affairs, this is impossi-
Although the document does not include any figures for bud- ble to measure; it is thus unclear as to whether actual legitimacy
geting, the recommendations on research are finalized by the exists, especially legitimacy that is in any way enhanced. Finally,
firm statement that “all of these initiatives require development according to the Economy and Security indicatorss, there is, in
of French Arctic research with strong institutional and scientific fact, a greater focus on economy than the official priorities re-
support: allocating operating grants for the coordination struc- veal, therefore better reflecting, perhaps, France’s focus on na-
ture based on the Arctic project and the Paul-Emile Victor Polar tional interests in the Arctic and Arctic affairs.
Institute; placing greater priority on the main scientific issues
relating to the Arctic defined by the Arctic project in the other
research funding agencies” (2016, 20).

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

Germany The 2013 German Guidelines primarily call the region the “Arc-
tic,” although they do once use the term “High North” (2013, 5).
Germany released its strategy, Guidelines of the Germany Arc-
tic Policy: Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities, in 2013 Figure 19 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
with 19 pages of text, published by the Federal Foreign Office. indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
While the 2013 strategy does not explicitly state priorities, the (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
document opens with a list of 11 issues that the federal govern-
ment seems to be interested in. Broadly, these include economic
development, environmental protection, research, technology,
maritime governance, peace and stability, Indigenous rights,
international cooperation, and EU involvement in the region
(German Federal Foreign Office 2013, 1–2).

In August 2019, Germany released a new adopted Arctic Policy

Guidelines in its Cabinet with the aims to “work towards world-
wide climate and environmental protection” and “environmen-
tally-friendly technology”, and for the rights of the Arctic Indig-
enous population, free and responsible research, and finally, for
“the future of the Arctic” (German Government, August 2019).
However, due to its late release the up-dated Arctic policy doc-
ument is not included this analysis.
Figure 19. Germany 2013
Germany was accepted into the Arctic Council as an Observer Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
at the 1998 Iqaluit Ministerial meeting (Arctic Council 2015b). and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.

The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro- Not too much has been captured in the Human Dimension
vides insights into how Germany understands the region. There indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total code quotes (see
is a focus on the Arctic waters. The document explains that “the Figure 19), perhaps because Germany is geographically outside
heart of the Arctic—that is, the area within the Arctic Circle—is the region. That being said, the Guidelines recognize that “ap-
the Arctic Ocean” (2013, 4) and that “the Arctic comprises not proximately ten percent of the four million people in the Arctic
only the Arctic Ocean, which is bordered by the continents of belong to the more than 30 groups of Indigenous peoples who
Europe, North America, and Asia, but also the northernmost inhabit the Arctic region” (2013, 4). As such, the Guidelines rec-
areas of the Atlantic Ocean (i.e., the Norwegian Sea and the ognize “the special situation of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic
Greenland Sea), to which the Arctic is connected via the Fram and campaigns for the protection of their right to a free and
Strait, as well as Baffin Bay, the Nares Strait and, finally, the Ber- self-determined life in their homeland” (2013, 2). This seems to
ing Strait, which connects the Arctic with the Pacific Ocean” (p. mean that “attention must be paid to respecting the Indigenous
4). Within the context of the Arctic waters, the document also peoples’ territorial claims, ensuring that they share in the profits
recognizes that “climate change is bringing about a fundamen- of Arctic economic development, and that they can adapt to the
tally new geographic constellation” (2013, 4). As for the Arctic significantly changed living conditions” (2013, 11) and to recog-
states, the strategy remarks that “the Arctic also includes parts nize that “conflicts may arise, for example when countries bor-
of the landmass of Russia, the United States (Alaska), Cana- dering the Arctic Ocean assert claims to territorial sovereignty
da, Denmark (the autonomous Danish-dependent territory in this region” (2013, 11).
of Greenland), Norway (including Spitsbergen) and Iceland”
(2013, 4), thus leaving out Sweden and Finland. The Governance indicator, which accounts for 15 % of the to-
tal coded quotes for the Guidelines (See Figure 19), confirms
Considering the comments about the potential changes to the Germany’s commitments to “existing international agreements
region, the federal government “views the Arctic as a region in and treaties that are of relevance for the Arctic” (2013, 19). The
transition” (2013, 1). Moreover, the strategy asserts that “due to Guidelines further explain that Germany also advocates for the
global warming and the rapid increase in the melting rate of the creation of an “agreed international political and legal frame-
polar ice sheets, the Arctic is of steadily growing geopolitical, work” in the Arctic (2013, 4) and that “The Federal Government
geoeconomic and geo-ecological importance for the interna- backs preventive action that aims to avoid conflicts through
tional community” (2013, 1). At the same time, the strategy also confidence-building measures, cooperation and coordination,
describes the region in terms of the environment. For example, and works to settle disagreements through consensual solutions
with climate change, the Arctic is “the earth’s ‘early warning sys- based on existing legislation” (2013, 10). Furthermore, Germa-
tem’” (2013,5), and it remarks that the Arctic is “an ecologically ny believes that “increased use should be made of existing struc-
significant and sensitive region” (2013, 7). tures in regional and multilateral institutions [in the Arctic], to
promote scientific collaboration and international cooperation
with a view to tackling challenges and seizing economic oppor-

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

tunities in the Arctic region” (2013, 11). At the same time, Ger- Germany recognizes the relevance of important international
many argues that “legally-binding regulations are required for conventions that are connected to the Arctic and “In Germany’s
the exploration and development of mineral resources”, as well view, the most central body for Arctic policy is the Arctic Coun-
as “sustainable development of living marine resources” (2013, cil, which was established in 1996 and is the only regional forum
11, 6). The Guidelines explains that “This includes, among oth- dealing with Arctic issues” (2013, 12). According to the Ger-
er things, setting high environmental standards, developing man Arctic Guidelines, “the significance of the Arctic Council
multinational strategies for protecting the environment in the as a forum for international cooperation is steadily increasing—
event of accidents, and establishing a binding regime concern- to the same extent that interest in the region is growing.With
ing environmental damage and liability” (2013, 11). Moreover, its increased workload and importance, the Arctic Council is
“high safety and environmental standards are an absolute pre- becoming more and more institutionalised, and the issues it
requisite for shipping and maritime transport in the Arctic re- deals with are gaining in scope” (2013, 12-13). However, “the
gion” (2013, 8). For these purposes, “the Federal Government body still does not address any questions related to security”
is ready to embark on maritime-sector cooperation (e.g. in the (2013, 13). Still, the Arctic Council “represents a unique oppor-
area of polar technology) with countries bordering the Arctic tunity for balancing regional and international interests in the
Ocean” (2013, 1). With regard to “issues concerning shipping Arctic through multilateral cooperation” (2013, 13). Germany
in the Arctic, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) also addresses the SAR Agreement as “the first binding interna-
is the foremost body for multilateral cooperation” (2013, 13). tional agreement drawn up exclusively for the Arctic… [which]
Furthermore, “Germany supports efforts to ensure that existing represents progress towards setting up a specially-tailored le-
shipping regulations, as well as the environmental and safety gal regime for the region. For the same reason, Germany wel-
standards of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), comes the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution,
are equally implemented for all vessels, regardless of their flag Preparedness and Response in the Arctic” (2013, 13). Germa-
state” (2013, 8). ny aims to further strengthen its observer status in the Arctic
Council and is “interested in increasing Germany’s ad hoc par-
The Guidelines also address the situation of Indigenous popu- ticipation in Arctic Council working groups” (2013, 1, 2).
lations and protection of their “right to a self-determined and
free life in their homeland.” In this connection, “attention must Furthermore, Germany considers UNCLOS as particularly
be paid to respecting the Indigenous peoples’ territorial claims, important, as it “contains obligations for the protection of the
ensuring that they share in the profits of Arctic economic de- marine environment. All states parties are bound to prevent,
velopment, and that they can adapt to the significantly changed reduce and control pollution of the marine environment…
living conditions” (2013, 11). The UNCLOS is a valuable instrument for delimiting maritime
boundaries and clarifying the resulting development rights.
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in- However, the regulations set out therein are limited in scope,
dicator, which accounts for 21 % of the total coded quotes (see and they do not resolve all issues related to the Arctic” (2013,
Figure 19, p. 201), reflects the fact that the German Federal 12). The Federal Government also mentions in the strategy the
Government “support international cooperation in all areas of support of “the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) as a suit-
Arctic research through the International Arctic Science Com- able framework for addressing in detail Arctic issues specific to
mittee (IASC), which is based in Potsdam… It is the leading the Barents Sea” (2013, 16). On the international level, Germany
forum for cooperation among all states and scientific bodies in- “favours and supports an active role by the European Union in
volved in Arctic research” (2013, 10). The Federal Government Arctic policy, as set out in the European Union strategy for the
also “remains committed to international and regional conven- Arctic” (2013, 15). Specifically, “a close coordination must be
tions—in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law ensured between the Northern Dimension policy (ND) and the
of the Sea, the MARPOL Convention, the conventions for the continually developing Arctic policy of the European Union”
protection of the marine environment and on biological diver- (2013, 15). The Federal Government is “working to ensure stra-
sity, and the Spitsbergen Treaty—which form the legally binding tegic integration of, and horizontal coherence on, Arctic issues
framework for states’ rights and obligations with respect to the with respect to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy,
Arctic.” Furthermore, the Government “supports an active EU as well as to the domains of environmental protection, research,
Arctic policy and is working to ensure horizontal coherence on industry and technology, energy and raw materials, transport,
Arctic issues within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and fisheries” (2013, 19).
as well as in the domains of research, environmental protection,
energy and raw materials, industry and technology, transport, The Environmental Protection indicator, which accounts for
and fisheries” (2013, 1, 2). 7 % of the total coded quotes for the document (see Figure 19,
p. 201) identifies Germany’s environmental actions. As men-
Germany favors multilateral cooperation on Arctic issues, first tioned earlier, the Arctic is considered an “ecologically signif-
and foremost in the Arctic Council. The Federal Government is icant and sensitive region” (2013, 7). Therefore, “safeguarding
also “aware of the global consequences of developments in the the Arctic’s unique environment, living conditions and biologi-
Arctic region, including their political, economic and environ- cal diversity, also through establishing protected areas, is a high
mental significance, and Germany is therefore prepared to do its priority for the Federal Government. It stresses the importance,
share as an observer country” in the Arctic Council (2013, 13). from a global point of view, of protecting the Arctic environ-

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

ment through circumspect and precautionary action” (2013,18). increased shipping can endanger the environment and health of
The Guidelines further asserts that “particularly in the Arctic, the Indigenous peoples” (2013, 7), and “global warming is chang-
precautionary action must be taken to protect the environment. ing the local ecosystems in a major way, and thus significantly
The lack of absolute scientific certainty is no reason to delay ac- impacting the environment, livelihood and culture of the Indig-
tion, if there is a danger of severe or lasting damage being done” enous peoples” (2013, 11). There are also consequences for Ger-
(2013, 4-5). This includes finding a balance between economic many, for instance: “not only the shrinking sea ice in the Arctic
activities and environmental protection (see: 2013, 1, 4, 6, 14). Ocean, but also the increased melting of the Greenland ice sheet
and the thawing of the permafrost that covers a considerable area
As mentioned, protected areas and biodiversity are import- of the Arctic, have a global effect. This will also directly impact
ant. Indeed, “the Federal Government … supports efforts to Germany” (2013, 5).
pinpoint ecologically and biologically unique areas, and to es-
tablish a representative and coherent network of marine pro- In terms of addressing climate change and global warming, the
tected areas, with a view to safeguarding biological diversity in Guidelines states that “efforts to slow the rapid further increase
the Arctic” (2013, 7). This means respecting the Convention on in greenhouse gas emissions have been unsuccessful so far”
Biological Diversity, the Convention for the Protection of the (2013, 5), which is rather pessimistic. The Guidelines does not
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (2013, 7), and provide a more detailed discussion around mitigation and ad-
recognizing that “other problems are created by the introduc- aptation efforts.
tion of invasive species or by increased soot deposits stemming
from the burning of heavy fuel by ships” (2013, 7). The German government does appear to listen to the scientific
community, with the document stating that “in recent years, the
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the total cod- Arctic summer ice cap has shrunk by an area equivalent to four
ed quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) identifies different pollutants times the size of Germany. According to model calculations, in
that are affecting the Arctic. The policy identifies the following 20 to 30 years the Arctic Ocean will be mostly free of ice during
pollutants throughout the document: greenhouse gases, meth- the summer months, and therefore increasingly navigable”
ane, soot, black carbon, sulphur, nitrogen oxide, and shipping (2013, 5).
waste (2013, 5, 7, 14, 18). Some of the causes of pollution, there-
fore, are “the exhaust generated by the burning of fossil fuels The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
[and ]the burning of heavy fuel by ships (2013, 7). ed quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) highlights the fact that the Fed-
eral Government “backs preventive action that aims to avoid
The Guidelines addresses pollution prevention through dis- conflicts through confidence-building measures, cooperation
cussions on formal structures. This includes the IMO’s Polar and coordination, and works to settle disagreements through
Code that “sets out technical requirements for ships and crews. consensual solutions based on existing legislation” (2013, 10).
It also contains a chapter dedicated to the environment, with While the Federal Government “is convinced that the Arctic
binding regulations regarding waste and wastewater that go be- must be used for peaceful purposes only, it recognises that se-
yond those introduced by the International Convention for the curity issues do arise in conjunction with developments in the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention)” Arctic, and that possible security risks need to be addressed”
(2013, 14), by UNCLOS where “all states parties are bound to (2013, 17. The Guidelines warns about the “overlapping interests
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environ- of Arctic countries” which might “trigger a geopolitical race for
ment” (2013, 12), and by “the Agreement on Cooperation on sovereignty, or for rights to develop the seabed and its natural
Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arc- resources, which would pose an economic, environmental and
tic, which was signed by Arctic Council members in May 2013” security policy threat to stability in the region and would also
(2013, 13). affect Europe’s security interests” (2013, 10, 17). Furthermore,
“political attention must also focus on the Indigenous popula-
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the to- tion in the Arctic region. Here, conflicts may arise, for example,
tal coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) identifies issues associated when countries bordering the Arctic Ocean assert claims to ter-
with climate change. The Guidelines remarks that “already today, ritorial sovereignty in this region” (2013, 11).
the consequences of climate change in the Arctic are dramatic.
The Arctic region is currently warming at twice the rate of other Germany also recognizes the key role that the “UNCLOS plays
areas on the planet, compared to the global average” (2013, 5). a key role in clarifying usage rights and regulatory powers,
The Guidelines thus outlines a number of consequences associat- by introducing regulations that delimit the coastal areas and
ed with climate change. For example, “the consequences are many maritime zones of the states parties. This can prevent conflict
and diverse: these developments generate both opportunities and between states over maritime boundaries” (2013, 10-11). The
risks, and their effect is felt far beyond the Arctic region as such. Guidelines also mentions potential consequences, as “these de-
They touch upon environmental, economic, research and safety velopments generate both opportunities and risks, and their ef-
issues, and are becoming a focus of foreign and European policy” fect is felt far beyond the Arctic region as such. They touch upon
(2013, 4). Moreover, “the positive economic prospects that are environmental, economic, research and safety issues, and are
being created by the warming of the Arctic region may also carry becoming a focus of foreign and European policy” (2013, 4). In
considerable risks. Development of Arctic mineral resources and the Guidelines, Germany also mentions the role of NATO. From

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

the Federal Government’s perspective, “NATO’s wide-ranging (2013, 9). The Guidelines also asserts that “in 2002, IMO drafted
partnership formats, which are open to all countries bordering guidelines for ships operating in areas of the Arctic Ocean cov-
the Arctic Ocean, provide suitable forums for dealing with Arc- ered by ice. The Federal Government is campaigning for making
tic security policy issues. If necessary, this can be supplemented these guidelines binding and for further adapting them to the
with discussions in other groups, such as the Arctic Security special conditions in the Arctic” (2013, 13-14). Additionally, the
Forces Roundtable, a forum that brings together the security Guidelines states that “sea marks, nautical charts, lines of com-
forces of Arctic countries, and in which Germany and other Eu- munication, and outposts need to be established as widely and
ropean partners have an observer role” (2013, 17). The Federal extensively as possible” (2013, 9).
Government is further “campaigning for freedom of navigation
in the Arctic Ocean (Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar Pas- The Economy indicator, which accounts for 12 % of the total
sages) in accordance with high safety and environmental stan- coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) reveals a few different types
dards” and also “working hard to ensure free, safe and peaceful of economic activity. For instance, as a result of climate change,
passage through Arctic waters in compliance with strict environ- “new opportunities are arising in this connection, for example
mental guidelines” (2013, 1,9). for fisheries, maritime routes and tourism” (2013, 4) more gen-
erally in the region. As for Germany, there are also opportuni-
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the to- ties to participate in the Arctic economy. For instance, “thanks
tal coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201), shows that safety was to the increasing navigability of the Arctic Ocean, there is great
addressed primarily in the context of maritime transit as there potential in the market for innovative shipbuilding that meets
are concerns about the impact of shipping on the environment. high environmental standards. Germany, especially through its
The Guidelines states that “the Federal Government is working shipyards and maritime contractors, is a global leader in this
hard to ensure that environmental protection and sustainability domain. German companies have specialised in building inno-
aspects are respected by all economic activity in the Arctic, which vative and environmentally-friendly ship propulsion systems,
includes shipping” (2013, 7). Part of the concern is about oil spills special vessels, including ice class ships, as well as cutting-edge,
“which may be caused by the operation of vessels, or by the very environmentally-friendly maritime technology” (2013, 9). Ad-
real risk of maritime accidents” (2013, 7). There are also concerns ditionally, “as one of the world’s largest importing and exporting
about existing rescue capabilities. For instance, the Guidelines nations, Germany has a strong interest in new passageways to
comments that “a Northeast Passage that is ice-free year round East Asian trading centres. Germany has the third-largest mer-
would be the shortest shipping route between the ports of Eu- chant marine in the world and the world’s largest fleet of con-
rope’s Northern Range and East Asia. Here, the advantages of tainer ships” (2013, 8).
shorter shipping routes must be weighed against several factors:
the sea ice’s unpredictability, the fact that, as of yet, there is insuf- The resource industry is also important to the regional econo-
ficient emergency rescue capacity, and the lack of Arctic-capable my, especially considering “some 20 to 30 percent of the world’s
cargo ships” (2013, 8). There is also concern about cruise ships as undiscovered fossil fuels, such as oil and natural gas, are sus-
“already today, cruise companies are looking towards the Arctic, pected to lie north of the Arctic Circle. The region is also be-
both as a destination and a future sea route. Yet there still is a very lieved to be rich in metals such as copper, nickel, zinc and rare
large risk of collision with sea ice or icebergs” (2013, 8). earths” (2013, 6). However,“harsh climatic conditions and the
technical challenges that need to be mastered to access Arctic
To help address these concerns, the Guidelines discusses different raw materials, as well as the particularly sensitive Arctic envi-
safety agreements. The primary focus is on the IMO because of ronment, are leading to an increased need for specialised tech-
its “environmental and safety standards” (2013, 8); it also notes nology and know-how. New opportunities are opening up for
that Germany would like “to have the Arctic either wholly or German companies. There is great potential for German mari-
in part dedicated a special area” (2013, 14). The Guidelines fur- time technologies, due to the increasing importance of the sea
ther recognizes that not all maritime areas are the same and that in the development of raw materials” (2013, 6).
“IMO environmental and safety standards must be re-examined
on a regular basis and adapted to the polar regions (also through Energy is also of importance to Germany. Indeed, “development
development of the Polar Code), to meet the special challeng- of Arctic raw materials, which is already under way, can con-
es posed by the Arctic environment” (2013, 8). Aside from the tribute to energy and raw material security in Germany and the
IMO, the Guidelines also recognizes that “the Agreement on Co- EU” (2013, 18).
operation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in
the Arctic, which was signed by Arctic Council members in Feb- As much of Germany’s economic opportunity in the Arctic is
ruary 2011, is the first binding international agreement drawn connected to maritime technology, the government has creat-
up exclusively for the Arctic” (2013, 13). ed a plan to help facilitate these activities. In fact, “the Nation-
al Master Plan for Maritime Technologies (NMMT) agreed in
In terms of capabilities, the focus remains on Germany’s work 2011 aims to help unlock the full potential of these technologies.
with the IMO, which makes sense as Germany is not on the Arc- By driving forward this cutting-edge maritime technology that
tic Ocean. To this end, “the Federal Government is campaign- meets high environmental standards, high-quality jobs are be-
ing within IMO to achieve better maritime surveillance, infra- ing created and secured in a key future market that is of great
structure expansion, and Arctic search and rescue capabilities” strategic importance” (2013, 6).

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

The Guidelines also recognizes the importance of sustainable The Science and Education indicator, which accounts for 7 % of
development. For instance, “Germany’s Arctic policy, which is the total coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) primarily focuses
strongly committed to global environmental protection, stress- on science. The Guidelines suggests that drivers of research tend
es the importance of developing Arctic resources in a peaceful to be related to the environment and climate change (see: 2013,
and sustainable way, by ensuring that the highest environmental 4, 9, 10), although this research serves different purposes. For ex-
standards are met and the principle of precautionary action is ample, there are economic reasons why the Federal Government
adhered to, and by respecting the concerns of the Indigenous “is convinced that, as a partner with vast expert knowledge in
population” (2013, 7). The Guidelines also explores how Germa- the areas of research, technology and environmental standards,
ny can help with this process. For example, “with its know-how Germany can contribute to sustainable economic development
in cutting-edge research, sophisticated technology, and high in this region” (2013, 1). The Federal Government also sees re-
environmental standards, Germany is in a position to support search as a way to make policy and “is working to guarantee the
sustainable economic development in the Arctic” (2013, 18). In freedom of Arctic research, based on the conviction that scien-
addition to the principles of sustainable development, econom- tific findings are of fundamental importance for Arctic policy”
ic activities are also regulated through formal structures. The (2013, 1; see also: 18). Research can also inform decision making
Guidelines, in particular, recognizes that the OSPAR Conven- as “the AWI has significant and broad expertise, also through
tion for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North- its collection of long-term data. This knowledge base is made
East Atlantic fails to protect fisheries. However, “this domain available to inform future discussions on all issues related to the
is addressed by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission Arctic” (2013, 9).
(NEAFC), which covers almost exactly the same geographic
area as the OSPAR Commission” (2013, 15). The Guidelines mentions different types of research infrastruc-
ture. First, it mentions research institutes such as the Alfred
In terms of economic actors, the Guidelines does not name many. Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine
It comments only on “Germany and its companies” (2013, 7) and Research (AWI), and that “together with France, it operates
that “the Federal Government encourages the promotion of in- its own Arctic research base on Spitsbergen” (2013, 9), and the
vestments in parts of the Arctic through the European Invest- Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR)
ment Bank (EIB)” (2013, 16). (2013, 9–10). Second, there are formal networks such as the
IASC (2013, 10) and also the fact that “German institutes par-
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 1 % of the total cod- ticipate in research programmes of the EU, the Nordic Council
ed quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) reflects on new opportunities and the Arctic Council. The European Polar Board (EPB) con-
in connection to increased shrinkage of the Arctic sea ice, “for sists of a group of experts of the European Science Foundation
example for fisheries, maritime routes and tourism.” However, which is headquartered in Strasbourg and provides advice on
“all economic activities in the sensitive Arctic ecosystem must research in polar regions. Similar advisory bodies exist for the
go hand in hand with high economic and safety standards.” Fur- Nordic and Pacific countries” (2013, 10). Finally, there are infor-
thermore, the policy reflects on the new transit routes. “Cruise mal networking opportunities like conferences. “Germany has
companies also stand to profit from such routes. To provide sus- hosted three international Arctic conferences in Berlin: a first in
tainable tourism, however, they must meet the most stringent cooperation with Norway and Denmark in 2009, a second with
safety and environmental standards. Already today, cruise com- Finland in 2011, and a third with Norway in 2013” (2013, 10).
panies are looking towards the Arctic, both as a destination and a
future sea route. Yet there still is a very large risk of collision with There is no discussion of traditional knowledge or education.
sea ice or icebergs” (2013, 4, 8).
The Implementation indicator reveals that there is no list of rec-
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the ommendations or actionable items. Instead, the summary (at
total coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) focuses on issues of the end of the document) recaps German priorities and makes
shipping. In particular, “the Federal Government actively backs statements about what the Federal Government is currently
the opening of new shipping routes in the Arctic” (2013, 8) and doing or where it thinks action should be taken. For example,
“is campaigning for freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean “the Federal Government is campaigning to ensure free pas-
(Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar Passages) in accordance sage by international vessels through Arctic maritime routes,
with high safety and environmental standards” (2013, 1). This and it fully backs high safety and environmental standards for
is likely because “as one of the world’s largest importing and shipping” (2013, 18) and that “effective action must be taken to
exporting nations, Germany has a strong interest in new pas- close existing loopholes with respect to the Arctic, for example,
sageways to East Asian trading centres” (2013, 8). Germany also through the development of the Polar Code by the International
recognizes that “high safety and environmental standards are an Maritime Organization” (2013, 19). There is no mention of a
absolute prerequisite for shipping and maritime transport in the budget for Germany’s Arctic work, no follow-up plan, and no
Arctic region. Germany supports efforts to ensure that existing evaluation processes.
shipping regulations, as well as the environmental and safety
standards of the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
are equally implemented for all vessels, regardless of their flag
state” (2013, 8).

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

To sum up The Infrastructure indicator prioritizes shipping and, in part,

speaks to safety issues. The Safety and SAR indicator is concerned
Based on our quantitative analysis, International Cooperation with environmental safety, especially from shipping. As such, the
is the most discussed indicator, followed by Governance. This indicator notes that the IMO is the key international structure for
reflects the Germany’s interest in being involved in key issues, safety as it sets shipping guidelines and contributes to environ-
such as peace and stability, maritime governance, international mental safety. The policy also recognizes that the Arctic Council’s
cooperation, and the EU involvement in the Arctic. Germany SAR Agreement can help with rescue efforts, but also recognizes
highly supports the existence of international agreements which that more needs to be done.
are relevant for the Arctic. At the same time, the Government also
advocates for legally binding regulations for sustainable explora- Considering the above and the quantitative analysis, it seems,
tion of mineral resources and living marine resources. In Germa- according to the 2013 Arctic Policy, that Germany’s main pri-
ny’s view, it is crucial to maintain high-level cooperation within orities are environmental protection (when accounting for
the Arctic Council as the most prominent body with intergov- the three indicators on the environment, pollution, and cli-
ernmental decision-making process for Arctic policy. Germany mate change), international cooperation, maritime governance
recognizes the importance of keeping the Arctic outside potential (through the governance and safety indicators), and economy.
conflicts and supports preventive efforts to avoid conflicts, for ex-
ample, in the case of overlapping territorial claims.
Italy
Economic development is one of the main issues the German
policy seeks to address, and , the Economy indicator is the third Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic—National Guidelines
most-coded indicator. The indicator recognizes that climate was adopted in 2015 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Af-
change is opening up new economic opportunities and that Ger- fairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC). It has 21 pages
many has a place in these through shipbuilding and providing including maps and pictures. The headings of the chapters of
technology for the extractive resources industries. These activ- the version analyzed (updated in May 2016) are: 1. Italy in the
ities, together with tourism, will adhere to sustainable develop- Arctic: A Centenary History, 2. Italy in the Arctic: The Political
ment processes and goals. Tourism is also reflected in the Guide- Dimension, 3. Environmental and Human Dimension, 4. The
lines in connection to the new transit routes, and to the safety and Scientific Dimension, and 5. Economic Dimension (Italy MFA-
environmental standards that must be met. IC 2015, 2, 3, 7, 10, 15)

While environmental protection is a major issue for Germany, in As there are no explicit priorities, four headings of these head-
our quantitative analysis it ranks somewhere in the middle, along ings can be interpreted as priorities: 1) Political Dimension; 2)
with pollution and climate change. However, when these three Environmental and Human Dimension; 3) Scientific Dimen-
indicators are looked at together, they are discussed just as much sion; and 4) Economic Dimension.
as International Cooperation. The three indicators addressing
environmental issues all recognize the negative effects of eco- Italy was accepted as a permanent observer of the Arctic Council
nomic activity on the region. As such, the Environmental pro- at the Kiruna Ministerial in May 2013 (Arctic Council 2015b).
tection indicator speaks to the importance of protected areas and
biodiversity. The Pollution indicator looks toward international The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator reflects
agreements (i.e., the MARPOL Convention and the Marine Oil on Italy’s Arctic expeditions, and in particular the successful
Pollution Agreement) as mechanisms to address pollution. The 1926 airship expedition to the North Pole by Umberto Nobile,
climate change indicator does not suggest how mitigation or ad- Roald Amundsen, and Lincoln Ellsworth. The Guidelines also
aptation efforts could be used. mentions the establishment of an Italian scientific base, Dirigi-
bile Italia, in Svalbard (2015, 2, 11).
Indigenous rights, as part of the Human Dimension indicator, is
one of the issues Germany’s strategy seeks to address, although The Arctic is described, inter alia, as a “complicated” and “vul-
it is the second least coded indicator. Nevertheless, in the space nerable” region with a “peculiar and sensitive ecosystem,” which
allotted to this topic, it is argued that rights should be protected “each Arctic stakeholder has an interest in respecting” (2015,
through land claim settlements and self-determination. 16). Moreover, “many Arctic territories are highly fragile due to
their natural isolation and vulnerability” (2015,10).
Research is one of the issues of the German Guidelines, although
the Science and Education indicator is in a middle of our quan- Figure 20 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
titative analysis. The indicator focuses solely on research, recog- indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
nizing the environment and climate change as important areas of (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
research and linking research to environmental protection and
economy. To conduct research, Germany uses different types of
infrastructure, such as its own Arctic research base on Spitsber-
gen, run together with France, and through formal research net-
works, like IASC, and more informally through conferences.

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

Pollution (CLRTAP), the International Convention for the Pre-

vention of Pollution from Ships (Marpol 73/78), and UNCLOS.
However, as changes in the Arctic region are global and mainly
result from impacts from lower latitudes, the Guidelines calls for
“a global approach, implying new responsibilities not only for
the Arctic States but for the whole international community…
[dealing] with the new challenges arising, from global warming
to the opening of Polar navigation routes” (p.4). In this context,
the Italian Guidelines also notes “the principles and goals of the
European Union environmental policy…[and] all relevant inter-
national obligations, with special reference to sustainable devel-
opment” (2015, 19).

Figure 20. Italy 2015 As indicated by the previous indicator, the Italian Arctic Guide-
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number lines reflect international cooperation and agreements. Further-
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. more, the International Treaties and International Coopera-
tion indicator, which accounts for 14 % of the total coded quotes
of the strategy (see Figure 20), highlights first, the role of the
The Italian national Guidelines explicitly refer to the Human Arctic Council, where Italy “provides an active contribution in
Dimension indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the total coded different fields of research thanks to the considerable expertise of
quotes of the Italian Arctic Strategy (see Figure 20) as follows: its scientific community” (2015, 5); and second, UNCLOS as the
by making the human dimension of primary relevance, Italy most important body for “responsible management of the Arctic
“considers it to be extremely important to raise awareness on Ocean” (2015, 4).
such issues... through a growing, internationally coordinated ef-
fort, working in concert with the Arctic States” (2015, 4). This Among the international agreements and relevant operational
indicator includes two main aspects: “urban areas” and “Indig- tools for problem solving in environmental protection, the Ital-
enous peoples.” Given the extreme features and vulnerability of ian Guidelines notes the Marpol Convention “on the prevention
the Arctic “urban development has a role of remarkable impor- of pollution from ships… as the key international instrument
tance” (2015, 10). Among the Arctic states, Sweden is said in for its parties, including Italy,” and the EU Directive 2013/30 on
the Guidelines to promote “a holistic approach to sustainable offshore safety for establishing “strict rules for the construction
urban development, involving not only architectural and urban and management of extraction facilities as well as technical and
design, but also the careful planning of interactions among all financial requirements for the granting of licenses to oil and gas
relevant subsystems… planning [which] ensures cities’ effec- operators” (2015, 8). A short list of other “main international in-
tiveness and sustainability, thus improving the quality of life of struments dealing directly or indirectly with atmospheric pol-
citizens” (2015, 10). Correspondingly, Indigenous people are lution and climate change” (2015, 8) follows, such as the United
said to be “the real experts in the Arctic environment, with their Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Vienna
unique, millennial heritage of traditions and culture, which Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Montreal
should be protected and treasured by all companies operating Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Conven-
in the region” (2015, 16). tion on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). In
addition to the above-mentioned international agreements, the
The Governance indicator accounts for 6 % of the total coded Guidelines also mentions the International Convention for the
quotes (see Figure 20). According to this indicator “the recog- Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Urban Development (HABITAT
nized national jurisdictions of the Arctic States are completed III), and the global negotiation process in the framework of the
and integrated by customary international sea law and by a num- Paris Climate Agreement.
ber of Treaties…. [of which] the most important is the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” (2015, The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 12 % of
4). Italy’s firm confidence in the existing Arctic and international the total coded quotes of the Italian Guidelines (see Figure 20).
governing structures is also shown. The Arctic Council, with its Italian institutions are “ready to put their expertise at Arctic
wide structure of members, permanent participants, observers, States’ disposal, by cooperating in the framework of the Arctic
and working groups, is considered to be “the main debate forum Council to ensure that the highest standards of safety and envi-
for the Arctic, where the different features and issues of this com- ronmental protection are applied to exploration and extraction
plicated region and all viable forms of cooperation are discussed” of oil and gas in the Arctic” (2015, 6). Here the focus is “on cru-
(2015, 3). Concerning governing structures for the Arctic, the cial Arctic environmental issues,” including, among other things,
Guidelines mention that Italy is one of the original signatories protection of biodiversity, prevention of air pollution, reversal of
to the Svalbard Treaty. Nothing explicit about self-determination climate change, marine conservation, environmental risks posed
of Indigenous peoples is noted. International legal instruments by transport by sea, tourism, mining (2015, 7). Of special con-
are mentioned, such as the Convention on Biological Diversi- cern is the protection of the region’s biodiversity, which is de-
ty (CBD), the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air fined as “one of the most vulnerable of our planet” (2015, 9).

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In the context of economic activity and the environment, the The Security indicator, accounting for 1 % of the total coded
Arctic is also said to represent “a huge technology and man- quotes of the strategy (see Figure 20, p. 207), is brief. It notes,
agement challenge for all companies…. [offering] oppor- first, that large areas in the Arctic “are subject to national sover-
tunities to explore new mineral resources… [however] its eignty. Italy fully respects these sovereign rights” (2015, 4); and,
environmentally sensitive and remote areas require excep- second, that “the Arctic Council today goes beyond its original
tional safety measures” (2015, 18). Moreover, “cooperation concept of an inter-Arctic consultation forum. It has become
and exchange of experiences with Arctic States can and must a vehicle for regional stability, whose increasing relevance is
also offer development opportunities for Italy in some fields, proved not least by the growing number of its Observer coun-
such as sustainable urban environment, which is one of the tries—including some European Union Member States and var-
priorities of the Italian Ministry of Environment” (2015, 7). ious Asian countries” (2015, 3–4).

Under the subtitle “Air pollution and climate change” the Ital- The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 6 % of the total cod-
ian Guidelines refers to the Pollution indicator, which accounts ed quotes of the Guidelines (see Figure 20, p. 207). Although this
for 9 % of the total coded quotes of the strategy (see Figure 20, indicator does not explicitly note SAR, it recognizes growing
p. 207). The Guidelines recognizes [the challenges of] Short sea trade in Northern waters as a “major challenge as it entails a
Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs), such as methane, tropospheric growing risk of accidents and environmental damage connected
ozone, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and black carbon, as well as, to possible oil spills.” In this connection, Italy relies the 2013
at international level, ship emissions, and “environmental risks EU Directive no. 30/2013/EU “on safety of offshore oil and gas
posed by transport by sea, tourism, mining and harbour opera- operations” with “proposals aimed at consolidating safety stan-
tions” (2015, 7) which are also polluting the Arctic. dards” (2015, 5). The EU Directive states that “the serious envi-
ronmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters require special
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 10 % of the attention to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic
total coded quotes of the Italian Arctic Strategy (see Figure 20, in relation to any offshore oil and gas operation, including ex-
p. 207), reflects that “Italian presence in the Arctic is motivated ploration, taking into account the risk of major accidents and
also by global warming, which has severe repercussions on the the need for effective response” (2015, 6), especially given the
region, and the new, urgent challenges it poses” (2015, 3). The ex- growing volumes of trade through Northern sea routes. More-
plicitly mentioned reason for this is that “Italy bears a number of over, the company Eni has “remarkable projects aimed at im-
similarities with the Arctic… especially the Alps” (2015, 7) given proving safety conditions of transport by sea (against oil spills),
that “the Italian mountain areas and the Arctic region both suffer mitigating its environmental impact and safeguarding Indige-
from geographical, social and technological isolation” (2015, 7). nous communities in a rapidly changing ecosystem” (2015, 3).

The Guidelines states that “Italy is deeply committed to studying The Economy indicator, accounting for 12 % of the total coded
climate change through the work of its research agencies” (2015, quotes of the Guidelines (see Figure 20, p. 207) shows Italian
16), and lists “the priorities and actions set out by the scientific interests in energy and sustainable use of resources. For exam-
community and by international scientific (ICSU, IASC, EPB) ple, “urban sustainable development is one of Italian national
and political (Arctic Council, European Commission) coordi- priorities” (2015, 10) as, too, is support for “an eco-sustainable
nating bodies to deal with climate change” (2015, 12). One of management of Arctic fisheries stocks,” which should be taken
Italy’s aims is to increase “the spatial and temporal extent of the into account and applied by commercial fishing” (2015, 16).
Arctic observation system” and promote “the study and knowl-
edge” of the complexities “of the Arctic system” (2015, 12). The Among the explicitly noted economic actors are “companies
Guidelines states that the main international agreements and with offshore activities in the Arctic (Canada, Greenland, Ice-
mechanisms, mentioned above, such as the United Nations land, Norway, Faroe Islands)” (2015, 11), and in particular the
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergov- Italian company Eni (covering two pages). “Eni’s approach to
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), also deal with cli- Arctic activities” is said to be based on key principles, such as
mate change. “activities… to be performed in ice-free offshore areas only and
assisted by satellite iceberg control and remote monitoring of all
Interestingly, an Italian company, Eni is explicitly noted, even drilling activity,” and “operations… to be conducted only during
highlighted, in the Guidelines as having “extraction programs periods of the year when repercussions on the marine environ-
in Norway and Russia and implementing some remarkable ment (in particular, on mammals) are minimal”… “local inhab-
projects aimed at improving safety conditions of transport by itants have to be involved and informed” (2015, 18).
sea (against oil spills), mitigating its environmental impact and
safeguarding Indigenous communities in a rapidly changing The Tourism indicator only accounts for 2 % of the total cod-
ecosystem hit by climate change” (2015, 3). Further, the Guide- ed quotes of the Guidelines (see Figure 20, p. 207) being noted
lines states that “Eni acknowledges the scientific evidence on twice: first, with respect to activities which pose environmen-
climate change as exposed in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report tal risks for the Arctic ecosystem; and second, the comparison
(AR5), which defines [as]‘extremely likely’ the link between cli- between the Arctic and the Alps as having particularly fragile
mate change and human activities” (2015, 17). ecosystems (2015, 7).

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The Infrastructure indicator is also brief and accounts for 3 % G) Promoting activities of technological innovation and exper-
of the Guidelines’ total coded quotes (see Figure 20, p. 207). imentation (2015, 13–15).
Investments in renewable energy and development of “green”
products are noted, although the Guidelines mainly focuses Finally, the Guidelines provides a concrete example of imple-
on innovations, such as promoting “innovative organizational menting the interplay between science, politics and business,
structures in scarcely populated areas” (p. 10). Furthermore, it the recently reactivated Tavolo Artico (Arctic Table), as “an in-
mentions Italy’s capacity “to combine advanced technology and formal, open-ended consultation group on the Arctic,” includ-
the preservation of its environmental and cultural heritage [as] ing “members from academic, scientific and business commu-
its added value to economic growth and sustainable develop- nities” (2015, 6).
ment in the Arctic” (2015, 16).
The Implementation indicator is not explicitly mentioned in
The Science and Education indicator is clearly priority num- the strategy document.
ber one of the Italian Arctic Guidelines, accounting for 19 % of
the total coded quotes (see Figure 20, p. 207). Expeditions to the To sum up
North Pole are noted as “the first Italian scientific missions in the
Arctic region” (2015, 2), and it is easy to understand why this The Science and Education indicator is the most substantial
indicator is the most extensive of the whole Arctic strategy of in the Italian Arctic Guidelines. In particular, the Guidelines
Italy. Under “Environmental and Human Dimension” the Guide- strongly addresses how the Italian scientific community, “sup-
lines highlight that “a major role is to be played by scientific and ported by the national research agencies… and in line with…
technological research, in which Italy excels” (2015, 7). Indeed, international efforts,” is committed to the overall national goal
Italy’s contribution to Arctic research is rich and includes sever- “to reinforce Italian presence in the Arctic” (2015, 13). The list
al elements and activities, such as the Svalbard scientific station is long and impressive.
(Dirigibile Italia), opened in 1997 in Ny-Ålesund, for multidisci-
plinary research; and also OGS Explora as an “Ocean-going Mul- Related to and supporting this, the International Cooperation
tipurpose Research Vessel classified as ice class IB” (2015, 12) indicator takes up a big share of the Guidelines, emphasizing the
for collecting data in the Arctic waters. Here Ny-Ålesund, as an importance of both international cooperation in general and in-
international hub for Arctic research, is identified as playing an ternational agreements. It also highlights the role of the Arctic
important role by enabling and enhancing “the study of the com- Council and of UNCLOS, as the most important bodies for the
plex interconnections between biological phenomena and physi- management of the Arctic Ocean.
cal, chemical, dynamical and radiation processes” (2015, 11).
Further, closely related the two above-mentioned indicators, the
The Guidelines includes two pages of information about how the Guidelines focuses on Arctic environmental issues, including
Italian scientific community, supported by the national research protection of biodiversity, prevention of air pollution, reversal
agencies (CNR, ENEA, INGV, OGS) and in line with interna- of climate change, marine conservation, environmental risks
tional efforts, will reinforce Italian presence in the Arctic by: posed by transport by sea, tourism, and mining. Of special con-
cern is biodiversity of the Arctic ecosystem. If taken together,
A) Promoting Italian participation in Arctic research giving the three indicators, Environmental protection, Pollution, and
prominence to national scientific and technological excellence Climate change, could easily be interpreted as another priority,
a dominant one, of the strategy.
B) Expanding the Italian presence in the pan-Arctic observa-
tion system, mainly through bilateral agreements Based on our quantitative measuring the Economy indicator is
almost equal to that of Environmental protection (for example,
C) Reinforcing internationalization the ‘Eni and the Arctic’ subchapter alone covers two pages). In-
terestingly enough, the Economy indicator would become even
D) Participating in the action to strengthen European Arctic in- more substantial, if some of Eni’s remarkable projects “aimed
frastructures promoted by the European Commission, Arc- at improving safety conditions of transport by sea (against oil
tic countries and also Mediterranean countries like France spills), mitigating its environmental impact and safeguarding
Indigenous communities in a rapidly changing ecosystem hit by
E) Creating synergies between the activities of Italian research climate change” (2015, 3), were to be included as part of eco-
agencies in the Arctic and PNRA (National Antarctic Re- nomic and commercial activities in the Arctic. Here we face the
search Programme) activities same difficulty in measuring, as in the case of France.

F) Promoting and strengthening the collaboration among na- The explicit mention of the Tavolo Artico as an informal group
tional actors (Agencies, Universities), including the first on Arctic issues is interesting, given the important role of the
Italian Master’s course dedicated to Arctic issues offered by science–politics–business interplay in Arctic research and
MFAIC and Ministry of the Environment and Protection of geopolitics, and as an important precondition for high geopo-
Land and Sea (2015, 6) litical stability.

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

Finally, when comparing the de facto priorities to our coding The substantial subchapters are interpreted as the priorities,
and analysis, it can be concluded that Italy does, indeed, have though there are quite a few of them: 1) Global Environmen-
a presence in the Arctic first of all by having the scientific and tal Issues; 2) Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic; 3) Science and
economic dimensions as the focus, andincluding the political Technology; 4) Ensuring the Rule of Law and Promoting In-
dimension via international cooperation, and also on the envi- ternational Cooperation; 5) Arctic Sea Route; 6) Natural Re-
ronmental dimension. The human dimension is, however, less sources Development; and 7) National Security (2015, i).
of a focus, though Italy does give this dimension more atten-
tion than most of the observers. Japan gained Observer status of the Arctic Council Japan at
the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in Sweden in May 2013 (Arctic
Council 2015b).
Japan
The (Re)mapping and (re)defining the Arctic indicator is brief,
Japan’s Arctic Policy was adopted and announced by the Head- defining the Arctic as a “home to about four million people, in-
quarters for Ocean Policy of the Government of Japan in Octo- cluding Indigenous peoples” (2015, 3).
ber 2015. It was launched at the same time at the Arctic Circle
Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland. Figure 21 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
Japan’s brief (11-page) policy document is structured around (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
three main chapters: I) Background and Purpose of Basic Pol-
icy; II) Need to Address Arctic Issues, and III) Specific Initia-
tives. The “Need to Address Arctic Issues” chapter includes the
following major subchapters as the main themes, if not prior-
ities of the policy: i) Global Environmental Issues, ii) Indig-
enous Peoples of the Arctic, iii) Science and Technology, iv)
Ensuring the Rule of Law and Promoting International Coop-
eration, v) Arctic Sea Route, Natural Resources Development,
and National Security (Japan The Headquarters for Ocean Pol-
icy 2015, i).

As discussed in its Policy, Japan has previously shown interest

in the Arctic region, and in particular the Arctic Ocean and
Northern sea routes (e.g., the International Northern Sea Route
Project, INSROP), scientific research (the first non-Arctic state
to join the IASC), and Russian Far East. The strategic and com- Figure 21. Japan 2015
prehensive focus areas of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, ad- Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
opted by the Japanese Cabinet in 2013 are: and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.

1) observation of, and research on, the Arctic from a global The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 4 % of the total
perspective coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21). It states that
2) international cooperation on the Arctic “Indigenous peoples are easily affected by environmental change
3) examination of the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Route” (2015, 2) and expanded economic activity in the Arctic” (2015, 3) and that
there is thus a need to “respect the right of Indigenous peoples
The aim of Japan’s Arctic Policy “is… to define policy for more to continuity in their traditional economic and social founda-
specific measures (2015, 2) from the standpoint of a ‘Proactive tions” (2015, 2). Here the Policy requires Japan to “examine how
Contribution to Peace.’” It is based on principles such as inter- [it] can contribute to achieve sustainable development of which
national cooperation, national security, environment, trans- Indigenous peoples can see benefits while protecting the founda-
portation, science and technology, and “a multidisciplinary tions of traditional cultures and lifestyles” (2015, 3).
perspective with contributions from industry, academia, and
the government... [with the aim of making] Japan an important
player that contributes to the international community through
its action to Arctic issues” (2015, 2).18

18 Based on this background, the Policy notes that “Japan will: Make full use of Japan’s strength in science and technology from a global viewpoint; Give full consid-
eration to the Arctic environment and ecosystem, which is fragile, with a lower ability to recover; Ensure the rule of law, and promote international cooperation
in a peaceful and orderly manner; Respect the right of Indigenous peoples to continuity in their traditional economic and social foundations; Pay full attention
to security developments in the Arctic; Aim for economic and social compatibility with climate and environmental changes; and Seek possible economic chances
for the use of the Arctic Sea Route and for the development of resource by implementing the following initiatives” (2015, 2).

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

The Governance indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the total Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), International Convention on
coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210), re- Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Sea-
flects Japan’s promise to “ensure the rule of law, and promote farers (STCW) (2015, 8), and the United Nations Convention
international cooperation in a peaceful and orderly manner,” on the Law of the Sea.
and to respect the rights of Indigenous peoples, as mentioned
earlier (2015, 2). Discussions on this indicator are twofold. First, The Japanese Arctic Policy has a global approach. It correctly
the Arctic Ocean, which, like other oceans, is “subject to inter- reminds us that “Japan has played a leading role in formulating
national laws, including the United Nations Convention on the the Kyoto Protocol, the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and other
Law of the Sea.… Freedom of navigation and other principles agreements through which the international community has
of international law [in the Arctic Ocean] must be respected” responded to global environmental problems such as global
(2015, 5). Concerning living marine resources, the Policy states warming and the loss of biodiversity” (2015, 3). In the Arctic,
that Japan will “participate actively in discussions with coastal Japan is thus required to “make the best use of its strengths,
and other states toward the formulation of rules for preserva- engage in active international cooperation, and enhance col-
tion and management of fishery resources in high seas of the laboration between stakeholders in comprehensive, cross-disci-
Arctic Ocean toward sustainable use on a scientific foundation” plinary research” (2015, 4).
(2015, 8). Second, regarding the Arctic Council: “Japan will
further strengthen its contributions to the work of the coun- The Environmental Protection indicator, accounting for 7 % of
cil… [and] also examine further contributions that can be made the total coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p.
through policy dialogues with the AC chair, member states, and 210), seems not to have the same priority in the Policy as climate
others” (2015, 8). The Policy also notes that it is “important for change. The Arctic is recognized as being a vulnerable environ-
Japan [also] to participate actively in international forums other ment with fragile ecosystems and low resilience, and sensitive to
than the AC, and to initiate constructive discussions based on global warming. Indigenous peoples are recognized as being “eas-
its scientific knowledge when necessary” (2015, 5). ily affected by environmental change and expanded economic ac-
tivity in the Arctic” (2015, 3). Linking the Environmental Protec-
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in- tion indicator with global environmental issues, the Policy notes
dicator accounts for 22 % of the total coded quotes of Japan’s that “changes in the Arctic and their influence on the Earth as a
Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). One of the three strategic whole must be understood with a comprehensive and wide-rang-
and comprehensive focuses of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy of ing perspective, considering the climate, material cycles, biodi-
the Japanese Government is international cooperation, and this versity, and the effects of human activities” (2015, 4).
is also one of the three specific initiatives of the Arctic policy.
It is thus no wonder that this indicator is one of the most dom- The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total cod-
inant overall of the Policy. The Policy notes that Japan’s Arctic ed quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210), identi-
policy has been established “from the standpoint of a ‘Proactive fies greenhouse gases as pollutants. It also briefly pinpoints that
Contribution to Peace’ based, among other things, on principles “development and expanded economic activity will result in
of international cooperation” (2015, 2). Indeed, the term ‘inter- pollution of the air and water, such as leaking and discharge of
national community’ is explicitly mentioned a few times, as is pollutants from ships into the Arctic Ocean” (2015, 3) and that
the fact that “Japan is an important player [contributing] to the this is problematic.
international community through its action [on] Arctic issues”
(2015, 2). It is also noted that Japan should participate active- The Climate Change indicator accounts for 10 % of the total
ly “in the international debates regarding the drafting of new coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). The
rules” (2015, 6) and respond “to global issues regarding the Arc- Policy opens with the statement that “the Arctic environment is
tic and formulation process of international rules for the Arctic” responding very sensitively to global warming… Over the past
(2015, 8); moreover, it should become involved “in discussions 35 years, the Arctic sea ice extent in the summer has declined
with coastal and other states toward the formulation of rules by nearly two-thirds” (2015, 1). It goes on to express concerns
for preservation and management of fishery resources in high that “environmental changes in the Arctic will accelerate global
seas of the Arctic Ocean toward sustainable use on a scientific warming, lead to global sea-level rise, increase the frequency
foundation” (2015, 8). Concerning research and development, of extreme weather events, and adversely affect ecosystems,” re-
the Policy proposes to “establish research and observation sta- calling the “risk that rapid change in the Arctic environment
tions in the United States, Russia, and other Arctic states, and will have a drastic and irreversible impact on the foundations
promote closer international cooperation through observations of the lives of Indigenous peoples and others who live in such
in the Arctic and joint research projects” (2015, 7). harsh environment” (2015, 1). Furthermore, the Policy seems to
focus more on consequences than solutions, warning that, “if ef-
Other international agreements and forums identified in the fective mitigation measures are not taken, and if global warming
Policy, in addition to the Arctic Council and the Arctic Eco- continues to accelerate at the maximum pace, a nearly ice-free
nomic Council, are the International Maritime Organization Arctic Ocean in the summer by the mid-century is likely” (2015,
(IMO), which has developed the ‘Polar Code,’ as well as treaties 1). Furthermore, “the mechanisms of environmental change in
such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at the Arctic are still not sufficiently understood… the impact of
Sea (SOLAS), International Convention for the Prevention of global warming is amplified to a greater extent in the Arctic

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

than in any other regions on the Earth” (2015, 1). Finally, Japan, With respect to natural resource development, the Policy ex-
having played a leading role in the Kyoto Protocol and other plicitly identifies mineral resources, which in the extreme cold
agreements dealing with global warming has already proposed and sea ice of the Arctic region “should be addressed steadily
“advanced efforts in both mitigation and adaptation” (2015, 3). over the mid and long term [bearing in mind] continued di-
versification of resources supplies…progress in resources devel-
The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod- opment technology in sea ice regions, cooperative relationships
ed quotes of the Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210), notes that one with coastal states, and factors such as …private sector [needs]”
of the aims of Japanese Arctic policy is to “pay full attention (2015, 6) It also identifies marine living resources, in particu-
to security developments in the Arctic” (2015, 2). The Policy lar, unexploited marine living resources, the development of
points out that “some Arctic states, with a view toward secur- which needs to be promoted “through due cooperation with
ing their national interests and protecting their territories, have the coastal states and [in order to]secure the need for food se-
become active in the area of national defense. Moves toward ex- curity in balanced manner while ensuring the sustainability of
panding military presence may have an impact on the interna- the resources based on scientific evidences” (2015, 6). Finally,
tional security environment.” (2015,1). The Policy further warns the Policy promises to “continue financial support for Green-
that “factors such as opening of new shipping routes and the land Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. which is participating in
development of natural resources may become a cause for new an exploration project in an ocean area northeast of Greenland,
friction among states.” These factors may thus become factors via the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOG-
that “change the international security environment, not only in MEC)” (2015, 9).
the Arctic but for the surrounding states including Japan.” The
Policy further advises that close attention be paid “to moves by The Tourism indicator is not explicitly mentioned in Japan’s
the states concerned and also to promote cooperation with the Arctic Policy.
Arctic and other states” (2015, 6).
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded
The Policy document also explicitly identifies that “land areas quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). Not sur-
in the Arctic are under the sovereign authority of the states in prisingly, this indicator explicitly discusses the Arctic Sea Route,
the region… [and that a] large part of the Arctic Ocean con- which, if sea ice on the Arctic Ocean decreases will “be estab-
sists of the territorial waters of the coastal states… with sov- lished along the coasts of Russia and neighboring states… a voy-
ereignty or sovereign rights to exclusive economic zones age between Asia and Europe will [then ]become about 40 %
(EEZ) and continental shelves” (2015, 1). It is thus important shorter than a voyage via the Suez Canal” (2015, 6). The feasi-
“to prevent moves to strengthen military presence in the re- bility of the Arctic Sea Route is identified as attracting mount-
gion from leading to tension and confrontations” (2015, 6). ing interest from the international community. The Arctic Sea
Route, in terms of sustainable use, is also related to a specific
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 5 % of the total cod- Japanese initiative to identify its different (natural, technical,
ed quotes of the policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). Regarding “the systemic, economic) challenges, and to promote the “prepara-
use of ports and other infrastructure along the [sea] route, and tion of an environment for its utilization by Japanese shipping
the status of services and regulations of coastal states,” the Jap- companies and others, by constructing systems to support mar-
anese Policy warns that the Arctic Sea Route is not ready yet itime navigation such as a system to predict sea ice distribution
for safe and reliable use” (2015, 6). It recommends that “Japan and one to forecast weather” (2015, 9).
should participate actively in the international debates regard-
ing the drafting of new rules… [on] the effect of [increasing] The Science and Education indicator accounts for 23 % of the
shipping on the marine environment and on securing the safety total coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210).
of navigation” (2015, 6). SAR is not explicitly mentioned. The This is another dominant indicator of the Japanese Arctic poli-
‘Polar Code,’ developed by the IMO, is emphasized as “a bind- cy, parallel to International Treaties and Cooperation. The Poli-
ing international framework to specify standards for maritime cy notes clearly that in 1991 “Japan became the first non-Arctic
safety in polar seas, protection of the marine environment, and state to establish an observation station in the Arctic… [and]
the manning, certification, and training of sea farers” (2015, 8). the first non-Arctic state to join the International Arctic Sci-
ence Committee (IASC)” (2015, 3–4). In 2015 “the Arctic Sci-
The Economy indicator accounts for 10 % of the total coded ence Summit Week (ASSW), the most important international
quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). Given conference on Arctic research, was held in Japan” (for the first
the Arctic’s “vulnerability to environmental changes” (2015, 2) time in Asia) (2015, 4). Outcomes from these activities are also
Japan needs to examine how to contribute to the achievement noted, for example, “observation data and scientific knowledge
of sustainable development that will benefit Indigenous peoples from Japan have made major contributions to understanding
“while protecting the foundations of traditional cultures and the environmental changes in the Arctic… Japan has conducted
lifestyles” (2015, 3). Japan has an advantage in the field of sus- satellite, ocean, and land observations and simulations at a high
tainable development through its foresight and through policy level, and has received a high evaluation from the international
which is… “based on science and technology” (2015, 2). Japan’s scientific community” (2015, 4). The Policy does, however, state
aim is “to play a leading role for sustainable development in the that “scientific understanding of the Arctic is still inadequate”
Arctic in the international community (2015, 2). (2015, 4). Another aim of Japanese activities in the Arctic, and

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

scientific cooperation with other Arctic actors, is that “the Arc- Finally, comparing the results of the coding and analysis to
tic environment is responding very sensitively to global warm- the de facto priorities, it can be concluded that Science and
ing, and Arctic Ocean sea-ice is decreasing at a pace exceeding Technology, Promoting International Cooperation, Nat-
scientific predictions” (2015, 1). ural Resources Development, and the Arctic Sea Route
(economy), and Global Environmental Issues, including cli-
The list of specific initiatives, under the Research and Devel- mate change, are much in focus. There is less of a focus on
opment title, is long: from “promotion of Arctic research to Indigenous Peoples, Governance, and National security.
contribute to policy-making and problem-solving” to the “es-
tablishment of research a network” (2015, 7). Of major note
is the Japanese Arctic research vessel being used as a “new in- The Netherlands
ternational Arctic research platform, with functions to enable
participation in international Arctic observation projects using The Netherlands released its first strategy on the Arctic, in
equipment such as autonomous underwater vehicles” (2015, 7). Dutch, in 2009 with the release of the Poolpositie-NL: Nieuw
Among other interesting initiatives are: i) to “conduct work to Nederlands Polair Programma (NNPP) 2010–2014 by the Neth-
strengthen observations using advanced satellites, observatory erlands Organisation for Scientific Research (The Netherlands
stations, and research vessels,” which are one of the country’s NWO 2009). This strategy was evaluated through the Evalu-
strengths, in order to “acquire and analyze scientific data to fur- ation of the (New) Netherlands Polar Programme 2009–2014
ther clarify the mechanisms of changes in the Arctic environ- (NWO 2014b). During this time frame, The Netherlands and
ment”; and ii) to establish research and observation stations in the Polar Regions, 2011–2015 policy framework was released,
the United States, Russia, and other Arctic states, and promote including a five-page English summary (see: The Netherlands
closer international cooperation through observations in the NWO 2011). The current Dutch strategy was released in 2014
Arctic” (2015, 7). and is entitled Pole Position - NL 2.0: Strategy for the Netherlands
Polar Programme 2016-2020, consisting of 33 pages including
Except for three lists of specific initiatives, there is nothing ex- appendices, tables, and photos, and addressing both the Arctic
plicitly mentioned about Implementation. and Antarctic. Many of the quotes in the analysis are thus ap-
plicable to both poles, and Arctic specific issues are identified
To sum up where possible.

The Japanese Arctic Policy document includes two domi- The new strategy is “an updated continuation of the Master
nant indicators: i) science and education and ii) international Plan,” and while focusing on research “as one of the building
cooperation. blocks, this Strategy Plan will contribute to the total polar policy
of the Dutch government” (The Netherlands NWO 2014a, 5).
Science and technology relates particularly to research and de- The current 2.0 Strategy Plan is analyzed here and outlines some
velopment within the international science community. The clear priorities.
theme is well represented among specific initiatives, including
promotion of Arctic research, the contribution to policymaking “The Strategy Plan creates a framework for Dutch research in
and problem-solving, and concrete proposals, such as the new two important and rapidly changing areas on earth. It presents
Arctic research vessel. Supporting this, international, world- new lines for future polar research and continues on points that
wide cooperation is one of the strategic and comprehensive fo- merit continuation. Continuously amassing knowledge about
cuses of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. The Policy identifies the polar regions and the changes occurring there is necessary
and highlights the Polar Code as the most important interna- in order to deal properly with the changing conditions and to
tional means to increase maritime safety. The Environmental ensure that the Netherlands continues to play a role in interna-
protection indicator explicitly notes sustainable use of resources tional (polar) issues” (2014a, 5).
and growing concerns due to global warming. The list of specif-
ic initiatives under sustainable use mainly concerns economic “In addition to the national economic priority areas policy, the
activities, the Arctic Sea Route, and (mineral and marine living) NWO also strives for similar alignment of Dutch polar research
resources. Correspondingly, whaling is not explicitly noted with with international polar research agendas of the European Polar
respect to marine living resources, although it is relevant, prob- Board (EPB), the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
ably because it is too sensitive an issue for Japan, which resigned (SCAR), the Arctic Council (AC) and the International Arctic
from the IWC in 2019. Science Committee (IASC)” (2014a, 7). Finally, “the ambition
of this strategy plan is the continuation of a long-term basis of
Interestingly, although the Arctic is identified as being a home financing for the Netherlands Polar Programme” (2014a, 7).
to Indigenous peoples, the Ainu people, a Japanese northern Clearly, this strategy is focused on the Netherland’s contribu-
Indigenous people, living in the northernmost part of Japan, tions to polar research.
are not explicitly noted. Discussion by the Japanese of their
own experiences in working with Indigenous peoples could The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
have contributed substantively to the Human dimension and vides insights into how the region is discussed by the Nether-
Indigenous peoples. lands. The Strategy Plan is different from others in that it fo-

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

cuses on both polar regions, the Arctic and Antarctic. Thus, the The Governance indicator is rather brief in the Strategy Plan
document often uses the term “polar” when speaking more gen- and accounts for 13 % of the total coded quotes (see Figure 22).
erally and then differentiates between the Arctic and Antarctic, First and foremost, it addresses the need for the Netherlands
as needed. to “be able to influence international management regimes for
both polar regions. In order to acquire that influence, to main-
In terms of defining the Arctic, the Strategy Plan primarily does tain it and, especially, to elaborate it properly, the Dutch govern-
so in the context of where the Netherlands has research inter- ment must be adequately informed about the state of affairs in
ests. For example, the document states that “the precondition the polar regions, the imminent changes, and solutions to pos-
that the NPP’s activities were preferably to be concentrated in sible problems. For this, conducting clearly visible and valued
the geographic areas of the Antarctic Peninsula in the south and scientific research under the Dutch flag and being able to make
on Spitsbergen and Greenland in the north was formulated in results available that are relevant to policy has turned out to be
the NPP. This does not exclude research in other areas” (2014a, essential” (2014a, 7).
13). The Strategy Plan further explains that “the choice of Spits-
bergen, and Ny-Ålesund in particular, is based on the presence According to the Strategy Plan “the policy-driven framework
of the Dutch polar station there. The choice of Greenland is pri- is geared toward application and policy relevance. In the poli-
marily based on the importance for the Netherlands of research cy-driven framework, research must be relevant for policy es-
into the melting of the Greenland ice cap” (2014a, 13). At the tablished by the participating ministries. The challenge here is
same time, the Strategy Plan also remarks that “this geographic to fit the research extensions of the various ministries’ working
focus can be expanded depending on the size of the NPP bud- areas into a collective, future-oriented approach to the policy”
get. For example, one could consider the Russian Arctic region (2014a, 11). The Strategy Plan further states that “the increasing
as a focus area, considering existing efforts by Dutch scientists human activities in the polar regions will require further inter-
there and the Dutch business community’s interest in that part national consultation, governance and regulation. Knowledge
of the North polar region” (2014a, 13). of the changes that the various local communities in the Arc-
tic region are undergoing (have undergone) and knowledge of
As for the government ministries’ participation in polar affairs, the local political, social and legal situation is also particularly
the Strategy Plan states that “the Netherlands Polar Programme important for Dutch organisations and companies that wish to
(NPP) is a financing programme that invests in scientific re- operate in the Arctic region” (2014a, 16).
search into the polar regions. It is supported financially by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Culture and Science, The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
Infrastructure and the Environment, Economic Affairs and by dicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total coded quotes (see
the NWO” (2014a, 7). Figure 22) reflects throughout the document that the Neth-
erlands supports relevant “international regulations and the
Figure 22 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different maintainability of existing treaties and/or the need for new
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes treaties,” in order to “manage the polar regions” (2014a, 9). The
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. Netherlands further highlights the relevance of international
collaboration as a prerequisite for the Dutch polar research. The
Strategy Plan especially emphasizes scientific cooperation in the
Arctic with Russian, Norwegian and Belgian institutions and
scientists (2014a, 19, 24). It also refers mainly to the importance
of “science-driven research, which should include the effective-
ness of existing law—e.g., by a study of the way in which existing
international treaties are implemented and enforced in practice
in national law and enforcement” (2014a, 16). The government
also supports the scientific research as it “can be important to
the Dutch business community and to the Dutch government”
(2014a, 7). The Strategy Plan also highlights the relevance of the
European Polar Board (EPB), which “is an advisory body of the
European Science Foundation and is part of the European Polar
Consortium.” Since 2015, the EPB has been an independent en-
tity, with its Secretariat hosted by the Netherlands Organisation
Figure 22. The Netherlands 2014 for Scientific Research (NWO) in The Hague (2014a, 20).
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. The Environmental Protection indicator does not capture
much information, accounting for 4 % of the total coded quotes
The Human Dimension indicator is not addressed in the (see Figure 22), but it does recognize the importance of the
strategy. polar environments. Indeed, the Strategy Plan states that “the
poles are extremely sensitive to changes in climate: they form
the heartbeat of our climatic system” (2014a, 9). It is not there-

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fore surprising that elements of the Dutch research agenda ad- “the data arising from this is an important source of information
dress environmental issues. For example, the research topic on for climate models” (2014a, 14,). Furthermore, science-driven
sustainable exploitation notes that “the development of clear pre- research from the “social, legal and economic landscape” theme
conditions for sustainable exploitation and conservation of biodi- will address “global economic consequences from thawing in
versity and environmental quality are important in this” (2014a, the polar regions” and “the effect of (climate) change on local
15). Additionally, the research topic on polar ecosystems “the inhabitants in the Arctic region” (2014a, 16). Perhaps more im-
focus of policy-driven research includes the impact of changes portantly, the strategy also explains that “the results of Dutch re-
in polar regions on migratory birds” and “protecting biodiver- search into the polar climate system are increasingly finding an
sity” (2014a, 15). There will also be policy-driven research in audience with (inter)national policymakers. See, for example,
the research theme on the social, legal, and economic landscape the Summary for Policymakers in the most recent IPCC report,
addressing “the implementation of protection of biodiversity the AMAP report about Greenland, the recommendation by the
and wilderness values in the polar regions in treaties and permit Terlouw Commission and the most recent report from the Ad-
systems” (2014a, 16). visory Council on International Affairs (AIV). In “The Future of
the Arctic Region” (September 2014)” (2014a, 14).
The Pollution indicator also does not capture too much infor-
mation on pollution, accounting for 2 % of the total coded quotes The Security indicator is not reflected in the strategy at all.
(see Figure 22, p. 214). It does, however, note that in the “ice,
climate and rising sea level” research topic “important topics for There is not much in the strategy regarding the Safety and SAR
science-driven research within this theme include... “studies of indicator, which accounts for 1 % of the total coded quotes (see
greenhouse gases, atmospheric tracers collectively referred to as Figure 22, p. 214). However, the Strategy Plan does recognize
‘air pollution ‘and ‘aerosols’” (2014a, 14,). Moreover, under the that increased economic activities could pose safety risks, and
research topic for ‘polar ecosystems’ in this theme, the focus of that risk management is needed for ecosystems and species; risk
policy-driven research includes: research into the provenance management, safety and social impact for local communities;
and behaviour of contaminating substances such as persistent and risk management and safety for the companies and their
organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals that end up in the employees themselves” (2014a, 16). The Strategy Plan states that
polar region via air and sea flows” (NWO 2014a, 15). These two “these activities must be structured and performed within the
quotes identify regional pollutants and also the Netherlands’ ap- preconditions of safety and sustainability.” (REF?)The expect-
proach to problem solving through research. ed increase in maritime operations in the Arctic (coastal) areas
and in tourist activities in both polar regions will necessitate re-
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 10 % of the search into methods and technologies for managing the risk and
total coded quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214), identifies a number of safety of such operations.
consequences of climate change. The Strategy Plan recognizes,
for example, that “climate change in the polar regions has huge The Economy indicator, which accounts for 13 % of the total cod-
physical, ecological, social and economic consequences far be- ed quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214), identifies polar/polar-related
yond those regions” and that “what is now becoming visible in economic activities. The Strategy Plan notes that “changes in the
the polar regions in an accelerated manner is generally seen to polar regions, primarily in the North Pole region, increase the
be a precursor to what the Netherlands is facing in a deriva- economic importance for the Netherlands because of the new op-
tive form” (2014a, 9). Indeed, “potential effects include changes portunities that these changes create for the Netherlands. The de-
in storm tracks, shifts in precipitation patterns, changes in the sire to take advantage of natural resources, as well as the northern
frequency and intensity of cold polar air flowing to lower lat- transport routes that will open up, make this area extremely in-
itudes, a rise in sea level, loss of biodiversity and the resulting teresting to the Dutch business community” (2014a, 20). Indeed,
degradation of fish populations, shifting vegetation boundaries “the Netherlands has a strong maritime and offshore services
and diminishment of the existing agricultural acreage” (2014a, sector specialised in complex, specific systems and operations”
9). At the same time, the strategy also recognizes the econom- (The Netherlands NWO 2014a, 16), and, of course, there are new
ic opportunities that climate change may bring. For example, opportunities foreseen for tourism (2014a, 9).
“the continuous retreat of Arctic sea ice gives room for shipping
lanes from the Netherlands that may be 40 % shorter than the In terms of resource utilization and energy, the climate change
routes now in use” and “the tourist sector can expand” (2014a, indicator notes that access to natural resources, such as oil and
9). Additionally, “exploration into raw materials that are present gas, will likely improve (2014a, 9). To that end, the Strategy Plan
in the North Pole region such as oil, gas and minerals will be- quotes the Shell website and notes that “developing the Arctic
come technically and economically feasible. This also goes for could be essential to securing energy supplies for the future,
new and shifting fishing grounds” (2014a, 9). but it will mean balancing economic, environmental and social
challenges” (Shell 2014a, 16). It is not surprising, therefore, that
The Strategy Plan does not mention plans for mitigation or sustainable development or rather ‘sustainable exploitation’ is
adaptation efforts. It does, however, briefly mention the IPCC one of the Netherlands’ research themes, although the Strategy
and AMAP (NWO 2014a, 14) and indicates that the scientific Plan does comment on “increasing global demand for natural
community would be heard. In particular, there is a research resources, interest in mining activities and fisheries is increasing
topic on “ice, climate and rising sea levels” which specifies that in the polar regions. New transportation routes and new op-

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

portunities for polar tourism are also opening up” (2014a, 15). for natural resources, interest in mining activities and fisheries
However, there is no specific mentioning oil and gas (unlike is increasing in the polar regions. New transportation routes
minerals). Regardless of industry, the northern economy will be and new opportunities for polar tourism are also opening up”
of benefit to the Netherlands. Certainly, the “business commu- (2014a, 9, 15, 16).
nity forecasts for the coming 10 years indicate an expected gen-
eral increase in economic activity in various forms. With that, There is not much in the Strategy Plan about the Infrastructure
there is talk of rapidly developing business (on a scale of billions indicator which accounts for 2 % of the total coded quotes (see
of euros) with the growing need for ‘polar expertise’ and influ- Figure 22, p. 214), all of which are connected to climate change.
ence in the region” (2014a, 7). Based on this, it seems that even For example, the strategy notes that shipping times will likely be
though the Netherlands is not located in the Arctic, the country shorter (2014a, 9), and “as a consequence, the number of mari-
has much to offer. time operations will increase strongly through the years, along
with the pressure to implement more permanent facilities (such
In terms of how northern economic activities are being priori- as harbours, tourist facilities, etc.) in the polar regions” (2014a,
tized, the strategy demonstrates synergies between the business 9). The focus appears to be on maritime infrastructure.
and scientific communities. In the context of polar expertise
and the strategy’s research areas, “scientific research can be For the Science and Education indicator, which accounts for
important to the Dutch business community and to the Dutch 46 % of the total coded quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214), the em-
government that (usually together with other countries) shoul- phasis is on science and not education. Regarding the Neth-
ders responsibility concerning the permissibility and concrete erlands science agenda, “with regard to research, this strategy
substantiation of these developments within the frameworks plan combines ‘space for science’ and ‘space for policy’” (2014a,
of applicable international treaties. The topics within the NPP 11). Within this context, there are four key drivers of the Neth-
have many overlaps with a number of the economic priority erlands’ scientific agenda that address both science and poli-
areas” (2014a, 7): these have been identified as “Water, Energy cy. These are reflected in the Strategy Plan’s research themes,
and Transport” (2014a, 7). For example, under the sustainable which are: “4.1. Ice, climate and rising sea levels; 4.2. Polar eco-
exploitation research topic, “Policy-driven research within this systems; 4.3. Sustainable exploitation; 4.4. Social, legal and eco-
theme should provide information about the capacity of and nomic landscape” (2014a, 14–16). These themes cover drivers
environmental effects on the polar regions when using natural such as climate change, ecosystems, environmental protection,
resources, conducting maritime operations and using the area economic development, and the effect of these on people and
for transport.” Important topics within this theme include: communities. It is important to note that the Netherlands does
• “Research that contributes to proper management of fish not necessarily determine these areas by itself; “when formu-
and marine krill populations; lating the themes, the Grand Challenges as identified by the
• Mining in cold regions and the associated environmental European Commission were included” and “the objectives of
problems; the European Polar Board, Europe’s strategic advisory body for
• Research that contributes to knowledge of the local scientific policy in the polar regions (EPB), the Arctic Council,
(territorial), social, legal, economic and political frame- the Antarctic Treaty and the International Arctic Science Com-
works under which companies operate (this topic mittee (IASC) were included in the formulation of the research
overlaps with theme 4)” (2014a, 15). themes in this strategy plan” (2014a, 13).

The Strategy Plan also comments that “polar research is a mo- One of the main functions of this research agenda is the cre-
tor for technological development. In the near future, research ation of knowledge. The strategy states that “the NPP helps gen-
into specific equipment and technologies and knowledge about erate knowledge about the polar regions – knowledge that pro-
safe and environmentally friendly ways of working in low tem- vides us insight into how our planet works and how it will react
peratures will be essential. Collecting data in extreme weather to the imminent changes, and knowledge that contributes to safe,
conditions and at extremely remote locations makes the design responsible decisions with respect to the conduction of activities
of specific equipment and methods necessary” (2014a, 20). in the polar regions” (2014a, 5). There is a fifth research theme
in addition to those mentioned above that seeks to generate
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total interdisciplinary knowledge: ‘4.5. Transcending the themes’
coded quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214) recognizes that the tourist whereby “connections between fields of research occur in var-
sector can expand. As a consequence, “the number of maritime ious areas. These so-called cross-cutting issues connect the
operations will increase strongly through the years, along with four themes... This interdisciplinarity within the Dutch polar
the pressure to implement more permanent facilities (such as research community can be strengthened by formulating re-
harbours, tourist facilities, etc.) in the polar regions.” At the search questions that either fall within various themes or that
same time, “the expected increase in maritime operations in connect the themes” (2014a, 17).
the Arctic (coastal) areas and of tourist activities in both polar
regions demands research into methods and technologies for In addition to creating knowledge, there appear to be four oth-
managing the risk and safety of such operations.” Furthermore, er purposes served by the research. i) Research provides a bet-
“due to the current and predicted decrease in sea ice in po- ter understanding of the poles and their implications for the
lar regions, in combination with the increasing global demand Netherlands. For instance, “knowledge about changes in the

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polar regions and the consequences of these for the Nether- In addition to physical infrastructure, the Strategy Plan also
lands remains strategically important” (2014a, 7); ii) Research recognizes scientific networks and international cooperation. In
can help with economic development. Along these lines, the particular, “Dutch polar research is conducted from areas of its
Strategy Plan states that “the topics within the NPP have many own strength and uses international collaborative partnerships
overlaps with a number of the economic priority areas” (NWO that have been carefully built up” (2014a, 13). To this end, “polar
2014a, 7) and “in the near future, research into specific equip- research in the Netherlands has long-term collaborative part-
ment and technologies and knowledge about safe and environ- nerships in place with the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and
mentally friendly ways of working in low temperatures will be the German Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeresfor-
essential” (2014a, 20); iii) It helps support policy, as “the results schung (AWI)” (2014a, 19). The Netherlands also participated
of Dutch research into the polar climate system are increas- in a PolarNet proposal and “the University of Groningen co-
ingly finding an audience with (inter)national policymakers” ordinates the Dutch involvement in this consortium” (2014a,
(2014a, 14). However, there can be a disconnect between re- 20). The Strategy Plan also notes that in the case of the research
search and policy as “the questions that the ministries wish agenda in the Dutch topic of transcending themes, “the Europe-
to see answered for purposes of policy support are not always an Polar Board has also designated these two basic threads [ac-
the same questions that science itself generates: after a poli- quiring fundamental knowledge of the polar regions, and mon-
cy-driven call for proposals, the most important and urgent itoring and/or long-term research] as being hugely important
policy questions do not always generate the most excellent re- for the European research agenda Horizon 2020” (2014a, 17),
search proposals. Conversely, the most excellent research pro- which could potentially expand the Dutch scientific network.
posals do not always address the most important and urgent
policy questions” (NWO 2014a, 11); iv) “this knowledge can There are also other research networks of importance to the
also provide solutions. Changes in the polar regions —and, Netherlands. In particular, the strategy notes that “the import-
particularly, in the area around the North Pole—also provide ant activities and organisations for the polar region are
opportunities for the Netherlands. Which opportunities and • Contract with the University of Groningen’s Arctic Centre
which threats arise in and due to a world of ice that is rapidly concerning management of the Dutch Polar Station on
changing?” (NWO 2014a, 7). Spitsbergen
• European Polar Board
The Strategy Plan mentions different types of science infra- • International Arctic Scientific Council (IASC)
structure. There are research stations in the Arctic. In particu- • Workgroups in the Arctic Council (AC)
lar, the document notes that “since 1995, the Netherlands has • European Framework programmes” (2014a, 21)
rented a modest research facility in Ny-Ålesund. This research
facility enables Dutch scientists to participate in international As mentioned, the Netherlands collaborates with Norway (see:
research activities and to use other research facilities present 2014a, 19), but there is also potential for other collaborations.
at Ny-Ålesund” (2014a, 24). The facility is, however, in need For example, the Strategy Plan mentions Russia as a potential
of renovation, and the Kings Bay Marine Laboratory cannot collaborator and “its large territorial presence in the North Po-
provide all the services needed. This means, however, that lar region…Dutch research efforts already present in Northern
“there is now an excellent opportunity for building a new ac- Russia… further collaboration with Belgian scientists might be
commodation in Ny-Ålesund in collaboration with AWI and important for the Netherlands” (2014a, 19). Partnering with
IPEV (AWIPEV)” (2014a, 24). The Strategy Plan also recog- Belgium would make sense considering their research station
nizes other infrastructure in the Arctic, such as the Svalbard mentioned above.
Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System (SIOS) where “the
Dutch research station in Ny-Ålesund can make an import- Research funding is also important. The “NPP’s financing
ant contribution to this initiative” (2014a, 20). Additionally, is subdivided into three Clusters. Curiosity-driven—or sci-
the German Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeres- ence-driven—acquisition of knowledge about the consequences
forschung (AWI) “has also made research facilities available of changes in the polar regions is included in the NPP’s Cluster
at the Koldewey Station on Spitsbergen” (2014a, 23) and “the I. Cluster II is structured in order to generate policy-driven and
Belgian Princess Elizabeth Base may be an interesting terres- application-oriented knowledge. The intended collaboration
trial fieldwork location for Dutch scientists” (2014a, 19). The with private partners is also included in this” (NWO 2014a, 11).
Strategy Plan acknowledges the importance of these other fa- The third cluster is a little different as it “is intended primarily
cilities and states that “the Netherlands will have to contribute for financing work for and contributions to international organ-
proportionally to the maintenance/construction/rental of our isations” (2014a, 11).
international partners’ Arctic and Antarctic logistical and in-
frastructural facilities, if we want to be able to maintain our There are two main ways funds will be awarded. First, “open
privileged collaboration with them” (2014a, 19). Moreover, rounds of competition will be held for the entire area of polar
the “polar research requires facilities such as research vessels, research, with a call amount of approximately €2 million, for
weather stations, satellites, drilling rigs, data and knowledge which interested polar scientists may submit proposals. This
centres and the Netherlands will have to contribute to this in concerns a programme for promising, but relatively small-
its collaboration with other countries” (2014a, 27). scale, top research (one Ph.D. or postdoc scientist)” (2014a,
25). Second, “there is a provision to award a number of new

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core programmes (each a total of €1–3 million for 5 years). The lar research; encouraging, initiating and coordinating national
research proposals must fit within the four indicated themes” and international scientific activities in the polar regions; or-
and can seemingly be for research and policy driven research ganising an annual polar symposium; functioning as a nation-
(2014a, 25). There is also “the possibility of coordinating with al point of contact for issues related to the NPP” (2014a, 29).
international calls [which] will be reviewed each time an op- While this is not follow-up to specific tasks, it ensures the tasks
portunity presents itself ” (The Netherlands NWO 2014a, 26). are completed and that the program functions.

The Implementation indicator does not identify a particular Two forms of evaluation are also discussed in the strategy: the
list of recommendations or action items, but it does provide first is evaluation of the polar program overall. For example,
much information on the Netherlands’ research funding and the Strategy Plan references the evaluation document identi-
made suggestions for improvement. The Strategy Plan is clear fied at the start of this discussion on the Netherlands. In par-
that “the Netherlands Polar Programme (NPP) is a financing ticular, it notes that “the 2014 NPP evaluation showed that the
programme that invests in scientific research into the polar various stakeholders considered NPP’s execution in the period
regions” (2014a, 7). The NWO considers the amount of mon- from 2009-2014 to be very much professionalised. This pro-
ey allocated in the past and suggests that more is needed. The vides encouragement for continuing the existing way of work-
strategy states that “the ambition of this strategy plan is the con- ing, in which the necessary adjustments will be made to certain
tinuation of a long-term basis of financing for the Netherlands components” (2014a, 25).
Polar Programme. In 2009, the Terlouw Commission evaluated
the NPP and recommended financing on a scale of €6.5 mil- The second is the way in which research proposals are evaluated
lion per year. That level of financing was not achieved in the for funding. Both the science (cluster I) and policy (cluster II)
time period 2011–2015. Considering the high costs, mainly for streams have their own evaluation process. The strategy states
the logistical and infrastructural facets within polar research, that “research proposals are submitted and evaluated within
and the need to be able to make multiple-year financial com- one of the two assessment frameworks. In this manner, finan-
mitments to our international partners, NWO is calling for an ciers have influence on the direction of the NPP’s movements”
effective and ambitious growing polar research programme… (2014a, 11). Moreover, “for both frameworks, NWO, the exec-
to achieve a proper first alignment with the economic priority utive party and co-financier of the programme, ensures that all
areas, NWO considers budget growth to €10 million per year of the research to be financed is of high scientific quality. For
necessary” (2014a, 7–8). both Cluster I and Cluster II, only those proposals whose final
evaluations of scientific quality are in the category ‘very good
The Strategy Plan also provides a comparison with the UK, an- to excellent’ make the grade” (2014a, 11). Furthermore, “the
other Observer country, to suggest that not enough funding is ranking of proposals within this framework is based on two
currently being provided. In particular, the Strategy Plan states sets of criteria (scientific versus policy) with a 50–50 weighting
that “the Netherlands Polar Programme invested €3.7 million formula for scientific excellence versus importance for policy.
per year in polar research and policy support in the 2011–2015 If a decision must be made about awarding policy-driven re-
period. NWO contributes €0.75 million per year to this. By way search proposals, then the members of the IPO issue a proposal
of comparison: the UK maintains an expensive logistical in- for a decision, after which the NWO-ALW’s divisional board
frastructure and invests approximately €60 million annually in makes the formal decision” (2014a, 30).
polar research” (2014a, 27).
To Sum Up
The Preface to the strategy notes that the current Strategy Plan
is a follow-up to the previous one. In particular, the Preface As mentioned at the start of the discussion on the Netherlands’
states that “in 2010, at the request of Ronald Plasterk, the Min- Strategy Plan, there are three priorities: 1) increase research
ister of Education, Culture and Science at that time, the Master and polar knowledge; 2) align research priorities with interna-
Plan for Pole Position - NL was published, in which plans were tional polar research agendas; and 3) provide “long-term basis
elaborated for the New Netherlands Polar Programme (NNPP) of financing” for research (2014, 7). It is not surprising, there-
for the period 2010–2014. The 2016–2020 Scientific Strategy fore, that the Science and Education indicator is the most cod-
Plan… is an updated continuation of the Master Plan” 2014a, ed indicator, followed by the Economy and Governance ones.
5). This contributes to strategic implementation, as well as International cooperation is then discussed in connection with
demonstrating policy continuity. the polar research, and the document highlights collaboration
with other Arctic states’ research institutions.
There is also follow-up in the sense that the Netherlands Polar
Committee carries out a number of duties in relation to admin- The Science and Education indicator provides a detailed over-
istering the program. For example,“the NPC’s primary tasks view of the Netherlands’ approach to polar research. Impor-
are: writing the calls for proposals necessary for the NPP; rep- tantly, it notes that research is about both science and policy.
resenting and promoting the interests of Dutch polar research Two of the research priorities are “Ice, climate and rising sea
in national and international committees and organisations; levels” and “Polar ecosystems” (2014, 14, 15), which largely
monitoring the progress of NPP research; making recommen- focus on environmental and climate change issues. It is thus
dations about national and international developments in po- not surprising that both the Environmental Protection and

218
 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

Climate Change indicators discuss research, as does the Pol- ful and Rational Manner, iv) Participating Actively in Arctic
lution indicator. governance and international cooperation, and v)Promoting
peace and stability in the Arctic; and Conclusion (2018, 1).
Other research priorities are “Sustainable exploitation” and the
“Social, legal, and economic landscape.” There is little in the The policy goals of the Chinese Arctic Policy are thus interpret-
Strategy Plan about people, as evidenced by the lack of quotes ed as the main priorities 1) “to understand, protect, develop
coded to the Human Dimension. In contrast, both of these and participate in the governance of the Arctic”; 2) internation-
priorities are concerned with economic activities, which is evi- al, global cooperation and the international community in the
denced by the Economy indicator being one of the second most Arctic; and 3) sustainable development of the Arctic (2018, 4).
discussed indicators. Tourism, as part of the economy sector, These are well supported by the four basic principles.
is briefly mentioned in connection to the increased maritime The People’s Republic of China was accepted as a permanent
operations and the need to research technologies for risk and Observer of the Arctic Council at the Kiruna (Sweden) Minis-
safety of such operations. This indicator also discusses new op- terial in May 2013 (Arctic Council 2015b).
portunities in the Arctic for the Netherlands, especially in re-
lation to extractive resources and shipping. Considering these The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator re-
connections, it is understandable that the Strategy Plan states veals that the Chinese Arctic Policy is substantial and exact
that “scientific research can be important to the Dutch business when defining and mapping the Arctic region, which is “situat-
community” (2014, 7). ed at a special geographical location [and refers] to the area of
land and sea north of the Arctic Circle totaling about 21 million
The Safety and SAR indicator is connected to both the Science square kilometres [including] the northernmost landmasses of
and Education, and Economy indicators as a range of region- Europe, Asia and North America adjacent to the Arctic Ocean
al economic activities demands research for managing the risk and the relevant islands, and a combination of sea areas with-
and safety of such operations. The Infrastructure indicator is in national jurisdiction, high seas, and the Area in the Arctic
connected to the Economy indicator as there will be a need for Ocean” (2018, 2). Furthermore, “the continental and insular
more maritime infrastructure. land territories… cover an area of about 8 million square kilo-
metres,” and “the Arctic Ocean covers an area of more than 12
As for financing, the Implementation indicator concerns fund- million square kilometres.” (2018, 2). The indicator also identi-
ing sources. fies that the region has “a unique natural environment and rich
resources, with most of its sea area covered under thick ice for
most of the year” (2018, 2), as well as “abundant resources, but
People’s Republic of China a fragile ecosystem” (2018, 7).

China’s Arctic Policy was published in January 2018 by the State Finally, the Arctic Policy clearly states that “China is an im-
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. portant stakeholder in Arctic affairs,”, followed, first by a sim-
The Chinese Government’s white paper was issued for, among ple explanation that, “geographically, China is a ‘Near-Arc-
other reasons, “to elaborate on its policy goals, basic principles tic State,’ one of the continental States that are closest to the
and major policies and positions regarding its engagement in Arctic Circle”; and second, that “China is also closely in-
Arctic affairs” and the Arctic (People’s Republic of China. The volved in the trans-regional and global issues in the Arc-
State Council 2018, 2). tic [and] has long been involved in Arctic affairs” (2018, 3).

Those policy goals, according to the Chinese Arctic Policy, are: Figure 23 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
“to understand, protect, develop and participate in the gover- indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
nance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
all countries and the international community in the Arctic,
and promote sustainable development of the Arctic” (2018, 4).
Correspondingly, the basic principles of how “China will par-
ticipate in Arctic affairs” and implement the policy goals are
stated to be: ‘Respect’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Win–win result’, and ‘Sus-
tainability’ (2018, 4–5).

The contents for the policy document (10 pages, no pictures,

in PDF from website) is as follows: Foreword; I. The Arctic Sit-
uation and Recent Changes, II. China and the Arctic; III. Chi-
na’s Policy Goals and Basic Principles on the Arctic; IV. Chi-
na’s Policies and Positions on Participating in Arctic Affairs:
i) Deepening the exploration and understanding of the Arctic,
ii) Protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic and address-
ing climate change, iii) Utilizing Arctic Resources in a Law-

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

(UNCLOS), the Spitsbergen Treaty and other treaties and gen-

eral international law govern Arctic affairs at present” (2018, 2).
It notes, too, that “in 1925, China joined the Spitsbergen Treaty
and started to participate in addressing Arctic affairs” (2018, 3).
It later states that “China is committed to improving and com-
plementing the Arctic governance regime… China takes an ac-
tive part in the international governance of the Arctic... upholds
the current Arctic governance system with the UN Charter and
the UNCLOS as its core, plays a constructive part in the making,
interpretation, application and development of international
rules regarding the Arctic, and safeguards the common inter-
ests of all nations and the international community” (2018, 8).

Furthermore, “China supports efforts to formulate a legally

Figure 23. People’s Republic of China 2018
binding international agreement on the management of fisher-
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
ies in the high seas portion of the Arctic Ocean… supports the
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
establishment of an Arctic fisheries management organization
or making other institutional arrangements based on the UN-
The Human Dimension indicator, accounting for 4 % of the to- CLOS” (2018, 8).
tal coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23) explicit-
ly discusses residents of the Arctic region, and in particular, the The Policy does not explicitly note ‘self-governance’ or ‘self-de-
Indigenous peoples. “China will… contribute to the economic termination,’ but clearly states that “China respects the sover-
and social development of the Arctic, improve the living condi- eign rights of Arctic States over oil, gas and mineral resourc-
tions of the local people and strive for common development” es in the areas subject to their jurisdiction in accordance with
(2018, 4). It is especially noted that “to protect the Arctic, China international law, and respects the interests and concerns of
will actively respond to climate change in the Arctic, protect its residents in the region” (2018, 7). The document also discusses
unique natural environment and ecological system… and re- Chinese involvement “in the trans-regional and global issues in
spect its diverse social culture and the historical traditions of the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, environ-
the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 4). ment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource
exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance”
Following on from the above-mentioned principles, the policy (2018, 3). Final, it states that “China enjoys the freedom or
identifies: i) “the key basis for China’s participation in Arctic rights of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, lay-
affairs, [namely] …that respect should be reciprocal. [This] ing of submarine cables and pipelines, and resource exploration
means all States should… [also] respect the tradition and cul- and exploitation in the high seas, the Area and other relevant
ture of the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 4). It next identifies ii) sea areas, and certain special areas in the Arctic Ocean, as stipu-
“‘cooperation’ as an effective means for China’s participation lated in treaties such as the UNCLOS and the Spitsbergen Trea-
in Arctic affairs. [This] means establishing a relationship of ty, and general international law” (2018, 3).
multi-level, omni-dimensional and wide- ranging cooper-
ation… [in which] all stakeholders are encouraged to take Following on from this, the International Treaties and Inter-
part in cooperation on… cultural activities” (2018, 4). Cor- national Cooperation indicator, which accounts for 16 % of the
respondingly, the third principle iii) a “’win–win result’ is the total coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23), em-
value pursuit of China’s participation in Arctic affairs. Itmeans phasizes that China “stands for steadily advancing international
all stakeholders in this area should pursue mutual benefit and cooperation on the Arctic” (2018, 8), and works “with the inter-
common progress in all fields of activities. Such cooperation national community to safeguard and promote peace and sta-
should… [also] accommodate the interests of local residents bility in, and the sustainable development of, the Arctic” (2018,
including the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 5). Finally, the fourth 2). Furthermore, “as an important member of the international
principle, iv)‘Sustainability’ is “the fundamental goal of Chi- community, China has played a constructive role in the formu-
na’s participation in Arctic affairs… promoting the sustainable lation of Arctic-related international rules and the development
development of the Arctic by ensuring the sustainability of en- of its governance system” (2018, 3). Final, the document explic-
vironmental protection, resource utilization and human activ- itly mentions an aim “to strengthen such [international] coop-
ities in the area… realizing harmonious coexistence between eration under the Belt and Road Initiative according to the prin-
man and nature…and intergenerational equity” (2018, 5). ciple of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared
benefits and emphasized policy coordination, infrastructure
The Governance indicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer
quotes of the Arctic Policy (see Figure 23). This indicator first people-to-people ties” (2018, 8).
notes that “there is no single comprehensive treaty for all Arctic
affairs”; and second, identifies that “the Charter of the United At a global level, “China actively participates in the formulation
Nations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of rules concerning the global environment, climate change,

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international maritime issues, and high seas fisheries manage- China is thus “closely involved in the trans-regional and global
ment, and fulfills all its international obligations in accordance issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change,
with the law… promotes global cooperation in tackling climate environment, scientific research” (2018, 3). China “follows in-
change, and upholds the principles of equity, common but dif- ternational law in the protection of the natural environment
ferentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities… advo- and ecosystem of the Arctic and conservation of its biological
cates stronger international cooperation in maritime technolo- resources, and takes an active part in addressing the challenges
gy and a globally coordinated solution to reducing greenhouse of environmental and climate change in the Arctic (2018, 6)…
gas emissions from maritime transport” (2018, 9). At a regional China always gives top priority to resolving global environmen-
level, China “takes part in Arctic intergovernmental mecha- tal issues, earnestly fulfills its obligations under relevant treaties,
nisms… as an accredited observer of the Arctic Council, highly and discharges its responsibility of environmental protection…
values the Council’s positive role in Arctic affairs, and recogniz- [for example] China’s emission reduction measures have a pos-
es it as the main intergovernmental forum on issues regarding itive impact on the climatic and ecological environment of the
the environment and sustainable development of the Arctic” Arctic” (2018, 6). Finally, the Arctic Policy notes that China “is
(2018, 9). Correspondingly, at bilateral and multilateral levels, committed to properly protecting Arctic biodiversity and advo-
“China promotes practical cooperation in all fields,” such as cli- cates transparent and reasonable exploration and utilization of
mate change, scientific expeditions, environmental protection, Arctic genetic resources… [and] hopes to strengthen coopera-
shipping routes, resource development, submarine fiber-optic tion with the Arctic coastal States on the research, conservation,
cables, cultural exchanges” (2018, 9). and utilization of fishery resources” (2018, 8).

Cooperative partnerships are proposed with the Arctic states In terms of international law in general, UNCLOS and the Arctic
and non-Arctic States. Of the Arctic states, it is first proposed, Council are identified as the international bodies regarding en-
with the United States, to “set up an annual dialogue mechanism vironmental protection and sustainable development. The Arctic
for bilateral dialogues on the law of the sea and polar issues”; Policy does not explicitly reflect on monitoring, except for noting
secondly, with Russia, China has “been conducting dialogues that China “requires its enterprises to observe the laws of the rel-
on Arctic issues”; thirdly, with Iceland, China has “signed the evant States and conduct risk assessments for resource explora-
Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation… [as] the first tion, and encourages them to participate in the exploitation of
intergovernmental agreement on Arctic issues between China oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic, through cooperation
and an Arctic State” (2018, 9). Of the non-Arctic States, “bilater- in various forms and on the condition of properly protecting the
al dialogues on the law of the sea and polar issues [are identified] eco-environment of the Arctic” (2018, 7).
with the United Kingdom and France,” and “high-level trilateral
dialogues on Arctic issues [with Japan and the Republic of Ko- The Pollution indicator, accounting for 2 % of the total coded
rea] to promote exchanges on policies, practices, and experience quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220), is brief-
regarding Arctic international cooperation, scientific research, ly noted and mentions greenhouse gases and carbon (2018, 9),
and commercial cooperation” (2018, 9). China has also partic- “ship discharge, offshore dumping, and air pollution” (2018, 6),
ipated in platforms on Arctic governance and international co- and, in general, polluting of the marine Arctic environment, are
operation, such as The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue, The Arctic also identified. The Policy also states that respects all the legally
Circle, Arctic Frontiers, and in particular, the China–Nordic binding agreements adopted by the Arctic Council (2018, 9).
Arctic Research Center (CNARC) “promoting exchanges and China promises support to “the Arctic coastal States in their ef-
cooperation among the stakeholders” (2018, 9). forts to reduce pollutants in the Arctic waters from land-based
sources… [and] commits itself to raising the environmental re-
Among major international agreement and organizations, as sponsibility, awareness of its citizens and enterprises” (2018, 6).
mentioned earlier, are identified first of all, the UN Charter
and UNCLOs, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) The Climate Change indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
at global level, and at regional level, Spitsbergen Treaty, Arctic ed quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220, p. 222).
Council and University of the Arctic. This indicator is not one of the most substantial, although the
Policy clearly states that “to protect the Arctic, China will ac-
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 12 % of the tively respond to climate change in the Arctic, protect its unique
total coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220). natural environment and ecological system” (2018, 4). Further,
This indicator notes that the Arctic “has abundant resources, but although mitigation is not explicitly noted, the Policy states that
a fragile ecosystem” (2018, 7), and “is home to several endangered “China’s emission reduction measures have a positive impact on
species of wild fauna and flora from around the globe” (2018, 6). the climatic and ecological environment of the Arctic” (2018, 6).
At the same time, commercial activities “may also pose a poten- Due to the existing and potential climate change consequences,
tial threat to the ecological environment of the Arctic… [which] it is obvious that “the Arctic natural environment is now under-
is now undergoing rapid changes” (2018, 2). Furthermore, “the going rapid changes” (2018, 2). The policy identifies first of all,
natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct that “global warming in recent years has accelerated the melt-
impact on China’s climate system and ecological environment, ing of ice and snow in the Arctic region” (2018, 1); second, that
and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, “fish stocks have shown a tendency to move northwards due to
fishery, marine industry and other sectors” (2018, 3). climate change and other factors… the Arctic has the potential

221
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

to become a new fishing ground in the future” (2018, 7–8); and respects the sovereign rights of Arctic States over oil, gas and
finally that, “the Arctic shipping routes are likely to become im- mineral resources in the areas subject to their jurisdiction in ac-
portant transport routes for international trade” (2018, 7). cordance with international law, and respects the interests and
concerns of residents in the region” (2018, 7). At the same time,
Again, in addition to international cooperation on climate and limited to the previous quotations, the document identifies
change and international law in general, such the UN Charter, that “the Arctic Ocean covers an area of more than 12 million
the Policy notes that China “also promotes global cooperation square kilometers, in which coastal States and other States share
in tackling climate change, and upholds the principles of eq- maritime rights and interests in accordance with internation-
uity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective al law… [and] certain areas of the Arctic Ocean form part of
capabilities [and] urges developed countries to fulfill their com- the high seas and the Area” (2018, 2) (meaning the above-men-
mitments under the UN Framework Convention on Climate tioned that of the Arctic Ocean). It also states that “China en-
Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, and joys the freedom or rights of scientific research, navigation,
provides support to fellow developing countries in addressing overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
climate change” (2018, 9). and resource exploration and exploitation in the high seas, the
Area and other relevant sea areas, and certain special areas in
The Security indicator accounts for 6 % of the total coded the Arctic Ocean, as stipulated in… international law” (2018, 3).
quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220). As “pro-
moting peace and stability in the Arctic” is one of the priorities The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total
of China’s Arctic Policy, and peace is a core of security/security coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 23, p. 220), briefly notes that
studies, it is natural that this indicator is greatly focused upon “China attaches great importance to navigation security along
in the Policy. The document notes, first, that “peace and stability the Arctic shipping routes. It has actively conducted studies on
in the Arctic provides a significant guarantee for all activities in these routes and continuously strengthened hydrographic sur-
the region, and serves the fundamental interest of all countries veys with the aim of improving the navigation, security and logis-
including China” (2018, 10); second, it promises “to work with tical capacities in the Arctic” (2018, 7). In addition, China prom-
the international community to safeguard and promote peace ises to abide by the Polar Code and support the IMO “in playing
and stability in, and the sustainable development of, the Arctic” an active role in formulating navigational rules for the Arctic.”
(2018, 2); and finally, it appeals to others, calling “for the peace- It calls “for stronger international cooperation on infrastruc-
ful utilization of the Arctic and commits itself to maintaining ture construction and operation of the Arctic routes” (2018, 7).
peace and stability, protecting lives and property, and ensuring
the security of maritime trade, operations and transport in the The Economy indicator accounts for 22 % of the total coded
region” (2018, 10). quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220). This in-
dicator clearly shows the general ambivalence of Arctic devel-
Clearly, China is considering reinforcing cooperation with the opment in the 21st century. This is shown in the short sentence,
Arctic States in many fields, such as maritime and air search “the Arctic has abundant resources, but a fragile ecosystem,”
and rescue, and information sharing so that it can handle secu- and the close-following statement that “China advocates pro-
rity challenges properly, for instance, maritime accidents; it is tection and rational use of the region and encourages its enter-
also considering involvement “in the trans-regional and global prises to engage in international cooperation on the exploration
issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, for and utilization of Arctic resources by making the best use
environment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, of their advantages in capital, technology and domestic mar-
resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global gov- ket” (2018, 7). This approach is supported by the two policy
ernance” (2018, 3). Moreover, “as a permanent member of the priorities: “deepening the exploration and understanding of the
UN Security Council, China shoulders the important mission Arctic”, and “utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational
of jointly promoting peace and security in the Arctic” (2018, 3), manner” (2018, 1).
and “supports the peaceful settlement of disputes over territory
and maritime rights and interests by all parties concerned in ac- Among commercial activities in the Arctic explicitly identified
cordance with such treaties as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS in the Policy are “global shipping, international trade and en-
and general international law” as well as supporting efforts “to ergy supply,” which “bring about major social and economic
safeguard security and stability in the region” (2018, 10). changes, and exert important influence on the way of work and
life of Arctic residents including the Indigenous peoples” (2018,
As already mentioned in the Governance indicator, sovereignty 2). Other activities are “the exploitation of oil, gas, and mineral
is explicitly noted, as the Policy first identifies that sovereignty resources” as well as other non-living resources (2018, 7), and
over the land territories and waters of the Arctic region (cov- tourism. In general, “the utilization of sea routes and explora-
ering about 8 million square kilometres) belongs to “Canada, tion and development of the resources in the Arctic may have a
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the huge impact on the energy strategy and economic development
United States, respectively… [and that the] coastal States have of China, which is a major trading nation and energy consumer
within their jurisdiction internal waters, territorial seas, contig- in the world.” (2018, 3). Finally, the “Polar Silk Road” initiative is
uous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves identified as the Chinese tool for conducting economic activities
in the Arctic Ocean” (2018,2). Second, it identifies that “China in the Arctic, in particular in transportation and shipping. The

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

Policy notes that China encourages “its enterprises to participate opment in the Arctic” (2018, 10). Finally, by standing for steadi-
in the infrastructure construction for these routes and conduct ly advancing international cooperation in the Arctic, the policy
commercial trial voyages in accordance with the law to pave the notes that China “has worked to strengthen such cooperation
way for their commercial and regularized operation” (2018, 7). under the Belt and Road Initiative according to the principle of
extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits and
This results, on the one hand, from China’s involvement “in the emphasized policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, un-
trans-regional and global issues in the Arctic, especially in such impeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people
areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, utili- ties” (2018, 8).
zation of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation,
security, and global governance” (2018, 3), and, on the other The Policy also notes that “the availability of technical equip-
hand, “the freedom or rights of scientific research, navigation, ment is essential to understanding, utilizing and protecting the
overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and Arctic,” and therefore that “China encourages the development
resource exploration and exploitation in the high seas,” which of environment-friendly polar technical equipment, actively
China is also said to enjoy (2018, 3). All this is happening un- participates in the building of infrastructure for Arctic devel-
der, and integrated into, the basic principles. For instance, under opment,… [and, for example] promotes technology innovation
‘Cooperation,’ resource utilization is put together with cultural in Arctic oil and gas drilling and exploitation, renewable energy
activities (2018, 4), and while ‘Sustainability,’ which is “the fun- development, navigation and monitoring in ice zones, and con-
damental goal of China’s participation in Arctic affairs… means struction of new-type icebreakers” (2018, 6). It is a long list of
promoting the sustainable development of the Arctic by ensur- aims of technical innovation.
ing the sustainability of environmental protection, resource uti-
lization and human activities in the area” (2018, 4). Finally, the The Science and Education indicator, accounting for 10 % of
Policy vows that China “attaches importance to the sustainable the total coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23,
development and biodiversity protection of the Arctic” (2018, 6). p. 220), identifies that the Policy interprets the Arctic as hold-
ing “great value for scientific research” and that therefore “to
Following on from the previous indicator, the Tourism indica- explore and understand the Arctic serves as the priority and
tor, accounting for 2 % of the total coded quotes of the policy focus for China in its Arctic activities” (2018, 5). Following on
(see Figure 23, p. 220), identifies ‘Arctic tourism’ as “an emerging from this, and in order to understand the Arctic, “China will
industry [with China being] a source of tourists to the Arctic” improve the capacity and capability in scientific research on the
(2018, 8). Indeed, “participating in developing tourism resourc- Arctic, pursue a deeper understanding and knowledge of the
es” is one of the sub-themes of utilizing Arctic resources, where Arctic science, and explore the natural laws behind its changes
China: i) “supports and encourages its enterprises to cooperate and development, so as to create favorable conditions for man-
with Arctic States in developing tourism in the region, and calls kind to better protect, develop, and govern the Arctic” (2018, 4).
for continuous efforts to enhance security, insurance, and res- Finally, international cooperation on Arctic research is noted as
cue systems to ensure the safety of tourists in the Arctic”; ii) being actively promoted; the document pushes “for an open and
“conducts training for and regulates Chinese tourism agencies inclusive international monitoring network of the Arctic envi-
and professionals involved in Arctic tourism, and endeavors to ronment, supports pragmatic cooperation through platforms
raise the environmental awareness of Chinese tourists”; and iii) such as the International Arctic Science Committee, [and] en-
“advocates low-carbon tourism, ecotourism, and responsible courages Chinese scientists to carry out international academic
tourism, and hopes to contribute to the sustainable develop- exchanges and cooperation on the Arctic” (2018, 5–6).
ment of Arctic tourism” (2018, 8).
China began to conduct research in the Arctic in 1999, and
Concerning the Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 4 % since then “has organized a number of scientific expeditions in
of the total coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 23, p. 220), the the Arctic, with its research vessel Xue Long (Snow Dragon) as
focus is on shipping and technical innovation and on the Belt and the platform… In 2004, China built the Arctic Yellow River Sta-
Road Initiative (BRI). The two first as activities are connected tion in Ny Alesund in the Spitsbergen Archipelago. By the end
to the BRI. The Policy further notes that China “hopes to work of 2017, China has carried out eight scientific expeditions in the
with all parties to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ through developing Arctic Ocean” (2018, 3). By using its research vessel and stations
the Arctic shipping routes” (2018, 7), and furthermore, “advo- as platforms, “China has gradually established a multi-disci-
cates stronger international cooperation in maritime technology pline observation system covering the sea, ice and snow, atmo-
and a globally coordinated solution to reducing greenhouse gas sphere, biological, and geological system of the Arctic” (2018,
emissions from maritime transport” (2018, 9). The Policy ends by 3). Among multi-disciplinary research topics identified are
stating that “on the basis of the principles of ‘respect, cooperation, “Arctic geology, geography, ice and snow, hydrology, meteorolo-
win–win results and sustainability,’ China, as a responsible ma- gy, sea ice, biology, ecology, geophysics and marine chemistry”
jor country, is ready to cooperate with all relevant parties to seize (2018, 5). An aim is to make “a greater effort to advance research
the historic opportunity in the development of the Arctic… [and in the fields of natural science, climate change and ecological
to] advance Arctic-related cooperation under the Belt and Road environment, accelerate the development of basic subjects such
Initiative, so as to build a community with a shared future for as physics, chemistry, life science and earth science.” (REF?)
mankind and contribute to peace, stability and sustainable devel- Furthermore, the Policy undertakes that China will “strengthen

223
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

social science research including Arctic politics, economy, law, In the long run very relevant, even fundamental, is that the Gov-
society, history, culture and management of Arctic activities, ernance indicator notes that the sovereignty of the land territo-
and promote innovation in both natural and social sciences” ries and waters of the Arctic region belong to the Arctic states,
(2018, 5). and these coastal states “have within their jurisdiction internal
waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic
The Policy also states China’s aim “to strengthen person- zones, and continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean” (2018, 2)
nel training and public awareness of the Arctic, support which China respects, while at the same time, identifying that
higher learning and research institutions to train profes- China enjoys “the freedom or rights of scientific research, navi-
sionals specialized in natural and social sciences on the gation, overflight, fishing” (2018, 3) and other activities and re-
Arctic… and publish cultural products on the Arctic to im- source exploitation in the high seas in general, including certain
prove public knowledge” (2018, 5). Finally, as part of inter- special areas in the Arctic Ocean. It is a little surprising that
national cooperation on Arctic research the Policy “encour- Science and Education, although the first field under the title
ages Chinese higher learning and research institutions to “Deepening the exploitation and understanding of the Arctic,”
join the network of the University of the Arctic” (2018, 6). (2018, 5) is addressed in greater detail.

The Implementation indicator is not explicitly noted in the The Human dimension is explicitly noted as meaning the inter-
policy document. ests of local residents, including the Indigenous peoples, who
are mentioned a few times, and also “the safety of tourists in the
To sum up Arctic” (2018, 8). All in all, based on the official Arctic policy,
China is explicitly committed to maintaining peace and stability
Of all the Arctic policies of non-Arctic states and AC observer in the Arctic, as well as environmental protection there.
countries, the Chinese Arctic interests and policy has been in-
ternationally the most discussed and speculated upon, already Finally, comparing the results of the coding and analysis to the
before the Policy was launched, as well as studied, examined de facto priorities it can be concluded from the two first policy
and discussed after the launch (e.g., Jakobson and Peng 2012; goals, that the focus is on governance of the Arctic, and inter-
Kopra 2013; Lanteigne 2016; QIN and LI 2017; Heininen 2017; national, global cooperation, including the international com-
Lim 2018). munity in the Arctic. The third goal, sustainable development
of the Arctic, is less of a focus, as economy is the most quoted
The Policy does not have a very plentiful amount of text but is indicator. Again, it is important to take into consideration that
densely worded and takes a holistic approach. Based on our this indicator includes sustainable development.
quantitative measuring, the Economy indicator is the highest
priority of China in the Arctic and among Arctic activities. It
is not surprising that the Belt and Road Initiative plays, as in Republic of Korea
general in China’s foreign (economic) policy, an important role
in China’s Arctic policy. The Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea was adopted in De-
cember 2013 based on the Government’s decision on a plan
The second most-coded indicator is International Cooperation, to implement “a comprehensive Arctic policy and follow-up
although it could be interpreted as being more a means than a measures” (Republic of Korea Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries
priority per se. Therefore, and taking into consideration quali- 2013, 4). The vision of the Policy, also called “the Master Plan”
ty, it is fair to identify the Environmental protection indicator (15 pages including pictures), is to “contribute to sustainable
and/or that of Governance as the second priority. In particular, future of the Arctic by enhancing cooperation with the Arctic
as mitigation is not explicitly mentioned in the climate change states and relevant international organizations in the areas of
indicator, the document notes that “China’s emission reduction science, technology and economy” (2013, 5). The Policy “aims
measures have a positive impact on the climatic and ecological for the ROK to: a) strengthen international cooperation; b)
environment of the Arctic” (2018, 6). Here the Arctic Policy build a foundation for polar scientific research; and c) create
of China reveals the general ambivalence about how states, in new business areas (by participating in the Arctic Council and
particular non-Arctic states but also some Arctic states, consid- its Working Groups)” (2013, 5).
er Arctic development in the 21st century of globalization: “the
Arctic has abundant resources, but a fragile ecosystem” (2018, These three aims are also included the Policy as the following
7), and at the same time commercial activities “may also pose a policy goals: “1. Build a cooperative Arctic partnership, 2. En-
potential threat to the ecological environment of the Arctic… hance scientific research activities for the Arctic, 3. Explore new
[which] is now undergoing rapid changes” (2018, 2). Therefore business opportunities in the Arctic” (2013, 6). Finally, based
“China advocates protection and rational use of the region and on these goals, “from 2013 to 2017, thirty-one key plans will be
encourages its enterprises to engage in international coopera- established to meet the following four major strategic goals: a)
tion on the exploration for and utilization of Arctic resources strengthening international cooperation with the Arctic region;
by making the best use of their advantages in capital, technolo- b) encouraging scientific and technological research capacity; c)
gy and domestic market” (2018, 7). pursuing sustainable Arctic businesses; and d) securing institu-
tional foundation” (2013, 5).

224
 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

The three policy goals: 1) Build a cooperative Arctic partner- The Governance indicators, which account for 10 % of the total
ship; 2) Enhance scientific research activities for the Arctic; and coded quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (see Fig-
3) Explore new business opportunities in the Arctic (2013, 6), ure 24), provides one of the major strategic goals of the Policy
are interpreted as the priorities. aimed at “securing [an]institutional foundation” (2013, 15). To
implement that goal, the Policy promises to “Establish [an] in-
The Republic of Korea was accepted as a permanent observer of stitutional base to develop a national polar policy” and “build
the Arctic Council at the Kiruna Ministerial in May 2013 (Arc- [a] polar information service center” (2013, 15). The Arctic
tic Council 2015b). Council is described as a “great opportunity to promote shared
interests and cooperation in the Arctic” (2013,3). Among the
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator does ROK’s major goals here is an of expansion of “activities in the
not exist in the Korean Arctic Policy, as there is no definition Arctic Council and its bodies” (2013, 6), and establishment of
either of the Arctic (region) or its (special) features. “a plan to increase the participation of Korean experts in the six
Among stakeholders mentioned as being involved in the prepa- Working Groups” of the AC (2013, 8).
ration of the policy are six ministries: “Ministry of Oceans and
Fisheries (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Minis- It is thus not surprising to find that the International Treaties
try of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP), Ministry of and International Cooperation indicator, which accounts for
Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), Ministry of Environ- 17 % of the total coded quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic
ment (MOE), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of Korea (see Figure 24), is highlighted in the document. This is
(MOLIT) - Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA),” as because “enhancing cooperation with the Arctic states and rel-
well as “national research institutes, such as the Korea Maritime evant international organizations in the areas of science, tech-
Institute (KMI)” and “Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI)” nology and economy” (2013, 5) is making a contribution to the
(2013, 4). sustainable future of the Arctic: so, too, is strengthening “coop-
eration with the region’s major fisheries organizations that are
Figure 24 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different associated with the Arctic and its adjacent seas” (2013, 13), and
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes cooperating in “Ship Safety and Marine Environmental Protec-
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. tion” (2013, 8).

Cooperation, both internationally and with bodies of the Arctic

Council, is explicitly identified, in the Policy, particularly after
ROK gained observer status in the Council, for example, ROK
cooperation in the Arctic Hydrographic Commission (ARHC)
which ensures provision of “safe nautical charts on the unchart-
ed waters of the Arctic” (2013, 10). Finally, the Policy notes that
ROK joined the Svalbard Treaty in 2012. Other explicit refer-
ences in the document are the ROK’s intention to: i) “pursue co-
operation with Arctic coastal states and nearby nations to carry
out Arctic spatial information development projects” (2013,
10), for example, hosting international seminars with, and in-
viting experts from, the Arctic coastal states; ii) “cooperate with
Observer States”; iii) in particular, “increase cooperation activ-
ities that contribute to achieving a sustainable Arctic with ob-
Figure 24. Republic of Korea 2013 server states such as China and Japan”; and iv) “encourage par-
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number ticipation in international forums and consultative society such
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. as the Arctic Frontier and Arctic Circle, etc.” (2013, 8), as a part
of the goal of participating in “the cooperation programmes of
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 5 % of the total the Arctic-related organizations.”
coded quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (see Fig-
ure 24). The Policy identifies the melting of the Arctic ice as pos- Concerning the Environmental Protection indicator, which ac-
ing “serious challenges to the livelihoods of residents in the Arc- counts for 3 % of the total coded quotes of the document (see
tic. It also states that “the increase in human activities may also Figure 24), the ROK Policy is brief and a little ambivalent, point-
affect the marine ecosystem… and threaten the livelihoods of ing out that “the melting of the Arctic ice will provide new op-
residents, including the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic” (2013, portunities for growth,” while also posing “serious challenges to
3). There is a special focus on cooperation with Indigenous the livelihoods of residents in the Arctic and its biodiversity….
peoples through cooperation projects “to preserve the Arctic’s However, the increase in human activities may also affect the
unique history, culture and traditional knowledge” (2013, 8). marine ecosystem, a vulnerable part of the environment, and
threaten the livelihoods of residents, including the Indigenous
peoples of the Arctic” (2013, 3). Finally, marine environmen-
tal protection and ship safety are explicitly mentioned, together

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with “the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Routes” (2013, 6), and “re- Sea transportation and navigation is one of the main economic
search on ways to improve the monitoring of the surrounding fields identified. For example, the Policy seeks to “establish and
environment of the NSRs (Northern Sea Routes)” (2013, 9). implement follow-up measures to the pilot navigations along
the Arctic Sea routes…provide consulting services and market
The Pollution indicator is not explicitly noted in the Arctic Pol- research support to make it easier for Korean maritime logistics
icy of the Republic of Korea. companies to enter the Arctic Sea market [and] provide possible
incentives for the vessels that use the Arctic Sea routes (2013,
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 2 % of the 12). This is because “decreasing sea ice creates new business
total coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 24, p. 225), is briefly opportunities in the Artic in such areas as resources develop-
noted. The Policy promises first, to “carry out more researches ment and commercialization of the Northern Sea Route” (2013,
on climate change in the Arctic” (2013, 6); second, to “devel- 3). These new economic opportunities also include energy and
op a model to identify the causes of Arctic climate change by cargo transport between Asia and Europe by Korean ship and
conducting high-definition atmospheric and marine modelling cargo owners and bulk cargo between Asia and Europe. Anoth-
of the Arctic Sea and reproducing a circulation model of the er noted field is fisheries where the aim is to “strengthen coop-
ocean and sea ice” (2013, 10); and third, to “Conduct Research eration with the region’s major fisheries organizations that are
on Climate Change Forecast Using Arctic Science Infrastruc- associated with the Arctic and its adjacent seas,” and second, to
ture” (2013, 11). “establish a project group led by the NFRDI (National Fisheries
Research and Development Institute), KOFA (Korea Overseas
The Security indicator is not explicitly noted in the Arctic Poli- Fisheries Association), PICES, KMI, and KOPRI, and develop a
cy of the Republic of Korea. basic plan to strengthen cooperation” (2013, 13).

The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the The Tourism indicator is not explicitly noted in the Arctic Poli-
total coded quotes of the Arctic Policy (see Figure 24, p. 225), cy of the Republic of Korea.
shows the interest of the ROK in “Ship Safety and Marine En-
vironmental Protection.” This includes the development of The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for a small share
“shipbuilding technologies for the Arctic and for different ves- (3 %) of the total coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 24, p.
sel types… and materials technologies” and the setting up of 225), links the development of cargo shipping infrastructure
“national safety standards for polar ships, in preparation for the and transshipment ports as part of pursuing joint research with
Polar Code” (2013, 8). The discussion in the section, ‘Pursue Arctic states. The Policy aims to establish “a basic plan for ports
sustainable Arctic businesses,’ includes the goal of developing to prepare for the commercialization of the Arctic Sea routes”
“shipbuilding and safety technology for polar-class vessels [in- (2013, 12), and conduct a “feasibility study and establish plan
cluding] core technology for safe navigation in the polar region” for building a second research icebreaker” (2013, 11).
and “for safe navigation of ice class ships along polar routes and
relevant testing technology” (2013, 14). There is also a promise The Science and Education indicator accounts for 32 % of the
in the Policy to develop “a safety training course that teaches the total coded quotes of the Arctic Policy of the Republic of Ko-
basics of glaciers, emergency responses, and survival methods rea (see Figure 24, p. 225). This indicator reflects that scientific
for crews that board polar operating vessels” (2013, 12). research is, without a doubt, the major priority of ROK in the
Arctic region and Arctic affairs. The Policy’s main goal, namely,
The Economy indicator accounts for 21 % of the total coded to “encourage scientific and technological research capacity” is
quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (see Figure substantial, providing more concrete goals to be implemented,
24, p. 225). The Policy explicitly seeks to “explore new busi- such as to “support the scientific researches of Arctic stations;
ness opportunities in the Arctic” (2013, 6) as a policy goal of build science infrastructure… [and] carry out more researches
the ROK. With respect to resource utilization, the Policy pro- on climate change in the Arctic” (2013, 6), and finally, to “con-
poses among other things, to “pursue joint research with Arc- duct comprehensive arctic sea research by utilizing ARAON”
tic states in the fields of resources development, cargo shipping (2013, 9).19
infrastructure, transshipment ports, and the commercial use
of NSRs (2013, 12)… lay the foundation for sustainable arctic The Policy also explicitly identifies the Dasan Arctic Science
resource exploration cooperation” by launching “joint explo- Station in Svalbard, established in 2002 (in the same year as
ration of minerals and geological survey with resource-related ROK joined the IASC), as well as support “to start research on
public entities and institutes” (2013, 13); and “develop offshore geological, atmospheric, and ecological changes” there (2013,
plant technology for deepwater resources development” (2013, 9). Education is explicitly noted, such as training courses on ice
14). Under scientific and technological research, it is proposed navigation and on safety on glaciers, emergency responses, and
to introduce capacity to “conduct gas hydrate exploration and survival methods for crews that board polar operating vessels.
deep drilling in the Arctic Sea with Arctic States” (2013, 9). Finally, the Policy aims to “strengthen cooperation with educa-

19 For more detailed information on this, see the presentation “Korea’s Scientifc Activities in the Arctic” by Jihoon Jeong, Korea Polar Research Institute at NPARC
2016 meeting in 5 July 2016 at Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan.

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

tional institutions such as the University of the Arctic” (2013, 8). the Labrador Peninsula and Newfoundland,” but “in the waters
The Implementation indicator is de facto included in the pol- of the Svalbard archipelago” (2016, 8). According to the Strat-
icy, as it was adopted based on the Government’s decision on egy, “we should not forget that Spain’s pioneering presence in
a plan to implement “a comprehensive Arctic policy and fol- the polar regions is an asset that is still insufficiently known in
low-up measures” (2013, 4). Many points in the document be- international forums” (2016, 7). Moreover, “a large number of
gin with words like ‘establish’, ‘develop’, ‘pursue’, etc. and could Spanish researchers increased their involvement in internation-
therefore be interpreted as action items. Finally, the Policy states al polar science programmes in the early 1980s” (2016, 4). The
that it serves “as a framework for developing consistent policies, Strategy concludes that “Spain has a considerable presence in
and Korea will have a committee that would put into action the the polar regions” (2016, 17).
above-mentioned three policy goals and review their imple-
mentation” (2013, 5). According to the Strategy, the Spanish Polar Committee, creat-
ed in 1998, is “in charge of coordinating activities in the polar
To sum up regions” (2016, 6). The Directorate for Technological and Scien-
tific Research of the Ministry of the Economy and Competitive-
The Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea has a clear vision ness is in charge of managing activities in Spain. The National
and is rich in major goals, policy goals, and action items. It is, Antarctic Region Research Programme (PNIA) was established
however, quite minimalistic and rather technical in nature. Ac- in 1988, as a part of the 1988–1991 National Plan for Scientific
cording to the policy goals, the three dominating indicators are, and Technological Development, in the same year as Spain at-
not surprisingly, Science and Education, Economy, and Interna- tained the status of Consultative Party of the Antarctic Treaty
tional Cooperation. It makes sense that these appear in combi- (2016, 5).
nation leading to a policy document that is more credible and
easier to implement. Except for the mention that polar research, including education,
is defined as a “strategic priority for the Spanish scientific sys-
In contrast, the Environmental protection, Pollution, and Cli- tem” and, further, that “because Spain has a considerable pres-
mate Change indicators are not explicitly reflected, but only ence in the polar regions, it should also have a high profile in
briefly and partly ambivalently described, under the twofold no- the forums, initiatives and actions” (2016, 17), there is nothing
tion of i) creating “new opportunities for growth”, and ii) posing major in the Strategy that could be interpreted as priorities.
“serious challenges to the livelihoods of residents in the Arctic
and its biodiversity” (2013, 3). Spain has been an Observer country of the Arctic Council since
2006 (Arctic Council 2015b).
Finally, comparing the coding and analysis results to the policy
goals, as priorities, it is concluded that the goals of the Policy are Concerning the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic in-
among the most focused indicators in what is a short, straight- dicator, the Spanish Polar Strategy defines that “the polar re-
forward, and precise document. gions are acquiring an ever greater geostrategic and economic
interest due, among other factors, to their location, improved
potential of access to their natural resources, tourism, fishing,
Spain and maritime traffic” (2016,12). Further, these regions “are…
extraordinarily fragile, at least until there is sufficient scientific
The Guidelines for A Spanish Polar Strategy (in Spanish and En- knowledge to ensure their proper management in a sustainable
glish) was released in 2016. The 35-page document includes and environmentally-friendly manner” (2016,13); they are also
four chapters: two introductory ones, one about geostrategic as- “among the most sensitive to climate change”(2016,10). Finally,
pects and two more substantial chapters on scientific research, the Arctic Ocean is specially identified as being “surrounded by
logistics and sectoral issues as action proposals (Spain 2016). inhabited continents, where the sovereignty of the coastal states
can be clearly felt” (2016, 7).
The Spanish Arctic Strategy focuses on Spitsbergen and Green-
land. It notes that there are historical reasons for Spain having Figure 25 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
developed and adopted a polar strategy. The continuing histor- indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
ical presence of Spain in the polar regions started in the 16th (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
century, when “Spanish mariners sailed the coasts of North
America, reaching the high northern latitudes of the Pacific…
seeking the Northwest Passage and the possibility of establish-
ing new settlements” (2016, 7–8), and when “Spanish whalers
from Galicia, Cantabria and the Basque Country was first doc-
umented” sailing not only “in northern latitudes higher than

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

a member of the NEAFC, whose remit includes Arctic waters”

(p. 29). Here, as a general principle guiding Spain’s actions re-
garding fisheries, it is noted that to “ensure the sector’s sustain-
ability, which includes respecting the environment and combat-
ing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing… Spain only
carries out fishing activities when permitted by international
or national regulations, considering, among other reasons, that
protecting the environment is important in order to prevent the
pollution” (2016, 29).

The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-

dicator accounts for 15 % of the total coded quotes of the Span-
ish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25). The indicator notes that, in
Figure 25. Spain 2016 addition to the lifestyles and cultures of the Indigenous Arctic
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number populations, the Strategy supports, “Spain’s involvement in all
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. the major polar organizations [in order] to ensure its partic-
ipation in such fields of special interest as scientific research,
environmental protection, natural reserves, energy, industry,
The Human Dimension indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the resources, polar technologies, bioprospecting, tourism, trans-
total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25), port, fisheries” (2016,14). As it has a considerable presence in
briefly identifies the Arctic regions (North of 60ºN latitude)as the polar regions, Spain “should also have a high profile in the
“inhabited by Indigenous populations, who are currently facing forums, initiatives, and actions carried out in the areas of scien-
fast changes in their habitats and their ways of life” (2016, 7). tific research, technology, sustainable use of natural resources,
The Strategy maintains that the Indigenous populations “must and freedom of navigation, respecting international and region-
be taken into account and are entitled to benefit from the ac- al regulations and carrying out all of its actions in accordance
tivities carried out in their habitat, including respect for their with the strictest environmental standards” (2016, 17).
environments and their lifestyles” (2016, 14).
The Strategy identifies the major international organizations,
The Governance indicators, accounting for 10 % of the total where Spain has a member- or observership: i) an Observer
coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25), country in the Arctic Council, which includes all the Arctic
capture the fact that “the geostrategic situation is subject to the coastal countries as member states and is “gradually gaining in
Arctic countries’ sovereignty and jurisdiction, and there is no substance and influence at the regional and global levels” (2016,
specific multilateral instrument regulating international spaces, 12). Here the strategy considers that it is in “Spain’s geopoliti-
such as the Antarctic Treaty” (2016, 12). Furthermore, the influ- cal interest [to have] an Arctic presence and [to maintain] its
ence of the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean “is compounded by status as observer country in the Arctic Council” (2016, 14);
the intervention of organizations, such as the OSPAR Regional ii) as a member of the International Arctic Science Commit-
Convention and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission tee (IASC) since 2009 ; iii) as a member of the OSPAR Con-
(NEAFC), and other global organizations like the Internation- vention; iv) as a member of the European Polar Board (EPB),
al Maritime Organization (IMO), with its Polar Code and its which promotes coordination among European countries’ polar
MARPOL Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, programs, as well as supporting “the expansion to the Arctic of
and, above all, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the the Convention on Biological Diversity by being involved “in
Sea (UNCLOS), which the Arctic coastal countries have agreed developing the EU’s Northern Dimension, in the same way that
to apply without exception… when they approved the Ilulissat it promotes an EU Mediterranean policy” (2016, 31). More-
Declaration in 2008” (2016, 12). Here UNCLOS and the IMO’s over, Spain is considering becoming a full member of the Bar-
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters are ents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) to “align with the strategies
identified as “the natural multilateral framework for managing drawn up by the EU regarding the Arctic” (2016, 14), and to
navigation issues, including polar navigation… [and promot- foster the creation, within the framework of the EU Council,
ing] the necessary measures for free, safe and environmental- of a “specialized commission devoted to polar issues (CPO-
ly-friendly trans-Arctic maritime transit” (2016, 14). LAR) as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP); this would serve as a forum for agreement, coopera-
Inter alia, Spain considers it necessary to “foster peacekeeping, tion and discussion among the EU Member States and for fi-
environmental protection and security in the polar regions,” as nancing all kinds of activities related to the poles” (2016, 14).
well as maintain a presence there “as an affair of State, and as the
basis for its participation in polar activities with all its resources The Environmental Protection indicator, which accounts for
(both civilian and military)” (2016, 13). One important reason 5 % of the total coded quotes of the Strategy (see Figure 25),
is that “any strategic Spanish approach to the fishing industry clearly identifies the polar regions as being among the most
must consider… that the management of fishery resources is an sensitive to climate change and its impacts and consequences,
EU mandate,” and that “Spain, as an EU Member State, is now which are “having a far-reaching impact on the region’s envi-

228
 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

ronment and resident populations, and access to its natural re- both the extension and the thickness of the ice, of increasing the
serves” (2016, 10). There is thus a need to protect “the polar envi- seasonal contraction of sea ice, and the melting of permafrost”
ronment on the basis of the precautionary principle” (2016, 13). (2016, 9).
Furthermore, the Strategy alludes to fostering “environmental
protection and security in the polar regions” (2016, 13); it also Among other explicitly noted impacts are: i) “the gradual melt-
promotes “the implementation of environmental protection and ing of the ice caps,” as shown by scientific research, and the
sustainable exploitation policies in the Arctic” (2016, 15) for ex- effects this will have on “environmental, social, political, geo-
ample, by “promoting the conservation of polar environments strategic and economic issues” (2016, 8); ii) “significant envi-
and the sustainable use of their natural resources” (2016, 11). ronmental changes, which have a direct impact on global cli-
Finally, the Strategy states that “exploitation of resources in the mate processes” (2016, 12); iii) “on our planet, polar regions are
polar regions and their transport must be carried out in a stable, among the most sensitive to climate change with consequenc-
sustainable and environmentally friendly manner [and that] a es that... are having a far-reaching impact on the region’s en-
higher priority must be given to maintaining biodiversity and vironment and resident populations, and access to its natural
the living conditions of the local populations” (2016, 27). reserves” (2016, 10); and iv) “ intercontinental trade [through
the Arctic passages] going to or from ports beyond the Arctic it-
The Strategy thus reflects the importance of protecting the po- self will occur in the medium term, possibly after approximately
lar environment by “making use of the best available scientific 20 years, if the international scientific community’s forecasting
knowledge at any given moment, including the adoption of the models regarding sea ice decline in this polar maritime region
necessary measures to reduce emissions…. [and] using the best are correct” (2016, 32).
scientific knowledge available at any given time” (2016, 13, 15).
For example, support for “the creation of protected marine or ter- These impacts need to take into consideration “the impact of
restrial areas [must be] underpinned by the best scientific basis climate change on human populations in the Arctic, including
available at any given time” (2016, 15). Support for the protected the necessary development of the social and human sciences in
areas used for the protection of fishing resources must continue, an inhabited area with extreme climate conditions and popula-
“as long as their definition is based on the best available scientific tion subjected to fast-moving, radical changes in their environ-
knowledge and their management is agreed with the major fish- ment” (2016, 20). Furthermore, “exploitation of resources in the
ery organizations in the region” (2016, 31). polar regions and their transport must be carried out in a stable,
sustainable and environmentally-friendly manner… a higher
The Pollution indicator, accounting for 3 % of the total cod- priority must be given to maintaining biodiversity and the living
ed quotes of the Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 228), notes that the conditions of the local populations in these biologically unique
changes occurring in the polar regions are interpreted by Spain as areas with such extreme weather conditions” (2016, 27).
“an accepted scientific fact [and that they] are induced, primarily,
by greenhouse gas emissions.” These reach the polar regions due The Security indicator, which accounts for 2 % of the total
to “atmospheric and oceanic circulation and river runoff, all of coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p.
which are generated, essentially, outside the polar regions in areas 228), identifies the geostrategic situation of the Arctic region as
with high-intensity urbanization, industrialization and farming” “subject to the Arctic countries’ sovereignty and jurisdiction”
(2016,9). As there is no “system for preventing and/or addressing and remarks that there is “no specific multilateral instrument
the damage produced by marine pollution” (2016, 32), Arctic ma- regulating international spaces, such as the Antarctic Treaty”
rine environments must be protected. As a solution, the Strategy (2016, 12). Therefore, “scientific research, productive activities
offers “the opening of new routes cutting the transit distance… and even environmental protection are, in the Artic, under the
[which will favor] “the proportional reduction of greenhouse gas influence of the coastal countries” (2016, 12). Thereafter, the
emissions, although this could be offset by an increase in transac- Strategy, as mentioned earlier, somewhat surprisingly, considers
tion intensity due to lower logistical costs” (2016, 34). the fostering of; “peacekeeping, environmental protection and
security” in the polar regions as a necessity… and that Spain’s
According to the Climate Change indicator, which accounts presence in the polar regions is “an affair of State” (2016, 13).
for 9 % of the total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy
(see Figure 25, p. 228), the Strategy refers to the United Nations The Safety and SAR indicator, accounting for 2 % of the total
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) propos- coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p.
al of “a set of measures to address both climate change mitigation 228), notes that “different Arctic routes do not currently have a
and the adaptation to these changes” (p.10), as well as to “the Paris complete, reliable, accessible system for cartographic informa-
Climate Summit (COP21)” (2016, 10). It also identifies the Arc- tion or navigational assistance” and that there is no “a high-seas
tic as being among the most sensitive regions to climate change, search and rescue system covering all of the interior seas and
where the effects of climate change “are self-reinforcing,” for ex- straits, nor a system for preventing and/or addressing the dam-
ample, “the heightened thawing of permafrost could trigger sub- age produced by marine pollution” (2016, 32). It is thus vital to
stantial emissions of methane and other short-life hydrocarbons, “promote the necessary measures for free, safe and environmen-
with a greenhouse gas effect that is far more potent than that of tally-friendly trans-Arctic maritime transit, in strict compliance
carbon dioxide” (2016, 10). These effects are equal to twice “the with the 1982 UNCLOS and the IMO’s International Code for
average recorded worldwide”; they have the effect of “reducing Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), the natural mul-

229
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

tilateral framework for managing navigation issues, including of Gibraltar and the North-South maritime axis. Spain has an
polar navigation” (2016, 14). overcapacity of turnkey transport and logistical infrastructure”
(2016, 32). Furthermore, it identifies that “perhaps the greatest
The Strategy considers that different areas of activity are behind difficulty” will be the inability to duly meet the requirement of
“Spain’s sectoral interests in the polar regions.” These are related regularity demanded by shipping agents regarding interconti-
“both to extractive activities and the available natural reserves, nental transport services” (2016, 32) if the Arctic passages can-
new navigable routes, commercial activity in the polar regions, not stay completely open year-round.
and other fields related to the development of new technolo-
gies” (2016, 28), as identified by the Economy indicator. This The Strategy remarks that trans-Arctic navigation is a reality,
accounts for 10 % of the total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar as “cabotage traffic between Arctic countries has been going
Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 228). This indicator notes that geo- on for decades, mainly through the Siberian passage, encom-
strategic and economic interests in the polar regions are caused, passing two major classes of commercial navigation” (2016, 31).
inter alia, by “improved potential of access to their natural re- Originally, destination or transit ships carried mineral and fish-
sources, tourism, fishing, and maritime traffic” (2016, 12). Fur- ing resources for international distribution. “This flow of com-
thermore, “exploitation of resources in the polar regions and mercial traffic is related,” according to the Strategy “not only to
their transport must be carried out in a stable, sustainable and raw materials, but above all to the intercontinental exchange of
environmentally-friendly manner [and] a higher priority must semifinished and finished goods (general merchandise), result-
be given to maintaining biodiversity and the living conditions ing from the consolidation of a global economy” ( 2016, 32). As
of the local populations in these biologically unique areas with a result, the Strategy concludes, or predicts, that “the real impact
such extreme weather conditions” (2016, 27). of the Arctic passages on intercontinental trade going to or from
ports beyond the Arctic itself will occur in the medium term,
Concerning fisheries, the Spanish Strategy is twofold: first, it possibly after approximately 20 years, if the international scien-
notes that “Spain only carries out fishing activities when permit- tific community’s forecasting models regarding sea ice decline
ted by international or national regulations [because] protecting in this polar maritime region are correct” (2016, 32).
the environment is important in order to prevent the pollution
or deterioration of the fishing grounds from negatively impact- As a permanent opening, the “Northeastern Siberian passage…
ing the resources [and] ensure the sector’s sustainability, which would lead to a commercial route competitive with the classic
includes respecting the environment and combating illegal, un- southerly routes. Routes crossing the Siberian Arctic connect-
reported, and unregulated fishing” (p. 29). Second, it notes that ing ports in the north of China, Japan, and South Korea with the
the “fishing industry must consider the fact that the management Atlantic coast of northern Europe would offer savings in terms
of fishery resources is an EU mandate, falling under the aegis of of distance and time with regard to the Malacca/Suez/Gibraltar
its Common Fisheries Policy. It must be taken into account that route” (2016, 33). Here, the Strategy also speculates about pos-
Spain, as an EU Member State, is now a member of the NEAFC, sible competition between northern and southern seas routes:
whose remit includes Arctic waters” (2016, 29). “the impact of a fully operational Siberian passage on Spain’s
logistical positioning in the container market is, unlike that of
Finally, the Strategy notes that the status of the Arctic Economic the Canadian passage, one of facilitating, in the long term, that
Council (AEC), established in 2014, “has yet to be defined, but… Spain’s Atlantic/Straits of Gibraltar ports could opt to connect
aims to be a forum for cooperation among companies interested with the new transport chains polarized within the North Atlan-
in carrying out activities in the Arctic that maintain the high- tic arc” (2016, 34). Further, if the western Mediterranean will be
est environmental protection standards…. [and that the AEC] competing with the North Atlantic carry goods from Asia, “the
is promoting the development of joint projects with other coun- key for the southern ports is to improve their land accessibility,
tries having experience and investment potential regarding Arc- an issue addressed in the latest revision… of the Trans-Euro-
tic projects, with strict respect for the environment” (2016, 28). pean Transport Network” (2016, 34). All in all, “the opening of
new routes cutting the transit distance is going to favour the
The Tourism indicator, accounting for 1 % of the total coded proportional reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, although
quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 228), is this could be offset by an increase in transaction intensity due to
limited and identifies tourism as a field of “special interest,” to- lower logistical costs. In any case, it would affect emissions [that
gether with other fields and interests, such as scientific research, are] not within the scope of the EU’s current targets, but rather
environmental protection, energy, industry, resources, polar [emissions from] international bunkering, which are being ne-
technologies, transport, and support for the lifestyles and cul- gotiated for inclusion in the mitigation obligations under the
tures of the Indigenous Arctic populations (2016, 14). UNFCCC” (2016, 34).

The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total The Science and Education indicator accounts for 29 % of the
coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p. total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25,
228), is all about marine transportation and shipping. The strat- p. 228). This indicator is the most substantial part of the strategy
egy highlights the “two factors favouring the intensification of and greatly reflective of the main interests of Spain in the polar
commercial relations between areas of the Arctic and Spanish regions. It identifies the Spanish promotion of “polar scientific
ports: Spain straddles major world navigation routes: the Straits research that respects regional legislation and fosters interna-

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

tional cooperation, out of the conviction that these extreme re- and atmospheric processes occurring in both the Arctic and the
gions of the Earth, the Arctic and the Antarctic, must be used Antarctic are critical to the advancement of our knowledge of
for peaceful ends and for the sustainable development of the the Earth’s land and ocean system processes” (p. 18). Finally, due
region and of the world” (2016, 10). Spain has had installations to the isolation of Arctic regions, there is a “need for specific
in the Antarctic for over three decades, and annually sends ex- infrastructures and complex logistics…scientific research in the
peditions there “representing high levels of development, expe- polar regions requires a sufficient level of long-term financing,
rience, and findings” (2016, 18). One example is the Oceano- organization, stability and continuity” (2016, 19).
graphic Research Vessel Hespérides with a “Lloyd Ice Class 1C
hull equipped for physical oceanography, hydrography, marine Due to “the gradual melting of the ice caps as a consequence of
geology and biology and a classification for young ice… to oper- climate change” interest in the Arctic and the Antarctic is grow-
ate in the Antarctic and the Arctic” (2016, 26). Spain’s Institute ing with respect to scientific research and environmental, social,
of Geology and Mining (IGME) “is responsible for the National political, geostrategic and economic issues (2016, 8–9). “Scien-
Polar Data Centre” (2016, 26). tific research findings are of vital importance to our knowledge
of the environmental processes and risks that climate change can
As Spain’s scientific activity in the Arctic is thus quite recent and bring to our planet,” increasing our ability “to foresee the possi-
the country does not have its own land infrastructure in the re- ble effects of these changes in our own latitudes” (2016, 11). The
gion, there is a “need for specific infrastructures and complex Strategy notes, even emphasizes, that such changes make it im-
logistics, [as] scientific research in the polar regions requires a portant to redefine these extraordinarily fragile regions so that
sufficient level of long-term financing, organization, stability they treated and managed “in a sustainable and environmental-
and continuity” (p. 18). Furthermore, “it is necessary to for- ly-friendly manner… at least until there is sufficient scientific
malize relations with other countries to order to gain access to knowledge” available on how best to manage them (2016, 13).
installations in different geographic areas and to promote re- Spain thus wishes to promote “polar scientific research that re-
search in Arctic waters through oceanographic campaigns us- spects regional legislation and fosters international cooperation,
ing Spanish resources or taking into account the possibility of out of the conviction that these extreme regions of the Earth, the
integrating our oceanographic vessels into Eurofleet” (2016, 21). Arctic and the Antarctic, must be used for peaceful ends and
for the sustainable development of the region and of the world”
The document acknowledges that “scientific cooperation is one (2016, 10). The Strategy also considers “polar research to be a
of the most effective forms of international cooperation… it can strategic priority for the Spanish scientific system, due both to
be transformed into essential political capital enabling effective its scientific importance and its high internationalization and
action and supporting the presence of Spain in polar institu- repercussions in areas of interest to Spain, both strategically and
tions and bodies, enabling it to defend both its own interests socio-economically” (2016, 20).
and global interests” (2016, 10). Therefore, Spain will advance,
among other things, “the development of scientific and techni- The Strategy identifies many action proposals on scientific re-
cal polar research in the framework of international coopera- search and scientific cooperation in the Arctic…so that Spain
tion” (2016, 13). Moreover, as “participation in international can achieve “a high profile in the forums, initiatives, and actions
forums is essential to polar research… there must be a strategy carried out in the areas of scientific research [and] technology”
for promoting ongoing involvement in international forums including sustainable use of natural resources, and freedom of
based on results assessment and a cost-benefit analysis of the navigation (2016, 17). These proposals include, for example,
participation” (2016, 24–25), for example, the European Polar strengthening the Polar Data Centre “to guarantee future access
Board drafting its Strategic Plan (2016, 19). An example of the to the data obtained in polar campaigns” (2016, 23); and to es-
best available scientific knowledge and its management could be tablish “a long-term programme to monitor and research rele-
that “the data collected encompasses not only fishing statistics vant aspects of polar science, with the participation of scientists
but also scientific information relevant to studies on biodiversi- from Spain and other countries… [and also] long-term promo-
ty and biomass evolution” (2016, 30). tion of research and development programmes” (2016, 23). With
respect to fishing resources, the Strategy proposes that Spain
The Strategy emphasizes that polar research as a whole is “es- should “continue providing the information [it] collects for sci-
sential for many branches of science, including environmental entific monitoring of its fisheries, for use within the framework
earth science and the role of the processes occurring in the en- of the different scientific bodies competent in each polar region”
vironment.” For example, due to “our ability to predict the im- (2016, 31), creating “the best possible interaction between the
pact of these variations on the local Arctic populations… [we scientific monitoring of Spanish fisheries with the National Polar
can] foresee the possible effects of these changes in our own Data Centre and Spanish polar research circles” (2016, 31)
latitudes” (2016,10). “The creation of protected marine or ter-
restrial areas” is also a possibility and would be “underpinned Finally, this indicator also includes several requests which Spain
by the best scientific basis available at any given time” (2016, wishes to promote and facilitate, such as “the involvement of
15). Furthermore, “scientific research in the polar regions is es- Spanish researchers in the Arctic Council’s different working
pecially important due to the global impact of the processes and groups (2016, 15) … [as well as] stable financing, the avail-
discoveries taking place there… the understanding, knowledge ability of scientific infrastructure in Antarctica, and the use of
and observation of the geological, biological, oceanographic facilities belonging to other countries as part of international

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

cooperation agreements, both in the Arctic and the Antarc- and Sectoral Issues, which mainly consists of fishing resources
tic—[are all] enabling Spain to develop an internationally re- and navigation. The duality discussed above presents a holistic
nowned scientific programme” (2016,6). The Strategy also grand challenge and is a wicked problem. However, in general,
requires Spain’s scientific effort in the polar regions should be a strategy does not have clear priorities, if it does not make a
promoted among policymakers and at educational centres, for strategic choice between issues, even contradictory ones.
example, by the “hiring of young researchers by the scientif-
ic teams having the highest training capacity, complementing It can be concluded the results of the coding and analysis are
contract calls with specific training programmes” (2016, 25, 26). convergent with the priorities, as the main focus of the strategy
is on international cooperation and polar research.
The Implementation indicator is de facto included in the strat-
egy as the action proposals appear to provide a series of items
linked to Spain’s aims in polar regions, for example, “the pro- United Kingdom
gramme should be proactive and invite potentially interested
Spanish groups to participate in polar activities and to be sub- Adapting To Change–UK policy towards the Arctic was adopted
ject to the usual evaluation and selection procedures” (2016, 24). and signed in 2013 (United Kingdom Foreign and Common-
wealth Office 2013), while the updated version, Beyond the Ice–
To sum up UK policy towards the Arctic was adopted and signed in 2018
(United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2018).
The Guidelines for A Spanish Polar Strategy starts with the as- The 2013 UK Arctic Policy (31 pages, including several pic-
surance of Spain’s “considerable presence in the polar regions” tures) “is intended to be a clear exposition of Government pol-
(2016, 17), a statement reinforced not only by the presence of icies towards the Arctic and will be reviewed regularly… it is
Spanish mariners and whalers in northern and Arctic waters in designed to set the overall direction for further policies towards
the 16th and 17th centuries, but also by the fact that Spain today is the Arctic as well as a way of presenting existing policies” (2013,
a Consultative Party of the Antarctic Treaty. Spain is also a Medi- 9). The UK vision on “an Arctic that is safe and secure; well gov-
terranean country—almost a metaphor for the ‘South’ in the Eu- erned in conjunction with Indigenous peoples and in line with
ropean context. Spain’s aim is to “foster peacekeeping, environ- international law,” will be supported by, among other things, the
mental protection and security in the polar regions” (2016, 13). following principles: i) “respect for the sovereign rights of the
Arctic states… for the views and interests of people who live and
The Strategy places emphasis on polar research, including edu- work in the Arctic… for the environment, its fragility and its
cation, as a “strategic priority for the Spanish scientific system,” central importance to the global climate”; ii) leadership, accord-
with polar research highlighted as being a “global geostrategic ing to the UK “leadership for Arctic stewardship rests with the
instrument.” Based on the coding and qualitative measuring of eight Arctic states and the peoples within those States… How-
the 12 indicators, the Science and education indicator is identi- ever, it would be wrong to say that the UK should not show any
fied as the main priority of the Polar Strategy of Spain. leadership on issues affecting the Arctic”; and iii) cooperation,
as “the mix of actors, interests and expertise at play in the Arctic
Other priorities identified are, on the one hand, maritime trans- means dialogue and cooperation should be at heart of Arctic
portation along northern sea routes, dealing with the Arctic policy making” (2013, 7).
(a part of the Infrastructure indicator), and with fisheries and
the fishing industry (Governance and Economy indicatorss). Further, the 2013 Policy sets out “for the first time the detail of
A combination of these two indicators would suggest that an- the United Kingdom’s interests in the Arctic, how we will work
other main priority of Spain’s Arctic policy is free navigation in with Arctic States and the wider international community, and
northern waters with better trade access, and involvement in the what expertise the United Kingdom can offer to help meet some
management of fishery resources, as an EU mandate, in ice-free of the long-term challenges facing the region”; it also “outlines
Arctic waters. the United Kingdom’s legitimate interests in the region, our pri-
orities for practical action and our willingness to show leader-
The Strategy has a twofold approach towards climate change ship in appropriate areas. It recognises that what happens in the
vis-à-vis economic activities. It identifies, on the one hand, that Arctic has a global impact and can be a legitimate concern of
“polar regions are among the most sensitive to climate change” people far beyond the Arctic Circle. It commits the United King-
and that there are “significant environmental changes, which dom to working with international partners to balance the needs
have a direct impact on global climate processes” (2016, 12), and of human development with environmental protection. ”It does
on the other hand, that the multi-dimensional and far-reaching this by setting out “three tenets—covering the human, environ-
impacts of climate change include (better) “access to its natural mental and commercial dimensions—that between them con-
reserves” (2016, 10). This is, of course, true, and the Strategy is tribute to the UK’s overall vision for the Arctic” (2013, 9).
not the only Arctic policy document to have this two-dimen-
sional approach, or ambivalence. The two other indicators, Cli- The updated 2018 UK Arctic Policy, is a review of achievement
mate change and Economy are rather even in terms of quanti- since the 2013 publication and purports to be based on the same
tative measuring (see Figure 25, p. 228), while within Action three core principles (2018, 3). The 2018 Policy (33 pages, in-
Proposals, scientific research is almost on a par with Logistics cluding pictures and maps) states that the UK “holds fast to

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

a vision of a Global Britain that is engaged in the world and being only 400 km south of the Arctic Circle…combined with
working with our international partners to advance prosper- a long tradition of exploration, has given the UK a historic in-
ity and security in the Arctic” and that “UK science and in- terest in the Arctic that dates back to the voyages of discovery”
novation helps advance global understanding of how changes (2013, 7).
in the Arctic have global consequences and helps to find new
solutions to the challenges” (2018 7). The UK has “always been Echoing this, the 2018 Arctic Policy briefly notes, using a map
a world leader in Polar affairs,” according to the 2018 Policy with “Arctic Definitions,” that “there is no single Arctic and no
and “British views have long held sway in the fields of polar universally agreed definition of the Arctic” (2018, 5), and that
science, exploration, diplomacy, business and environmental “the Arctic is not one homogenous landscape” (2018,17). “Differ-
protection. Even in spite of UK’s intended withdrawal from the ent descriptions result in a variation in the number of people…
European Union, the 2018 Framework “reaffirms our intention estimates range from four to ten million people. Regardless of
to remain a significant player in Arctic affairs” (2018, 2). technical definitions, the Arctic is a vibrant mix of communities
and cultures, languages and traditions; a place where people live,
In addition, the Policy refers to the speech of the First Minis- trade and visit.” (2018, 5). Furthermore, it is “an area of fascina-
ter of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, in 2016 at the Arctic Circle tion for many people who first learned about the region from the
Assembly where she speaks of tackling climate change and to stories of the early explorers. For others, their passion develops
promote climate justice, noting the Scottish Government’s an- from a desire to protect the landscape and its wildlife” (2018, 5).
nouncement “that it would develop its own Arctic Strategy on Finally, the 2018 Policy echoes the 2013 Policy by noting that
devolved matters at the Arctic Circle Forum in Edinburgh in “although the UK is not an Arctic State, we are its nearest neigh-
November 2017” (2018, 9). Indeed, the Scottish Government bour, with Lerwick in the Shetland Islands closer to the Arctic
released its first Arctic Policy Framework in September 2019, Circle than it is to London” (2018, 2).
which understandably is not included this analysis.
Figure 26 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different
According to the 2018 Arctic Policy, UK actions and priori- indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes
ties in the Arctic cover the following three areas: 1) Protecting (rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document.
global influence; 2) Protecting people and the environment;
and 3) Promoting prosperity (2018, 4).

The 2013 UK Arctic Policy reflects to the (Re)mapping and (re)

defining the Arctic indicator by defining that “the area with-
in the Arctic Circle is home to 4 million people. On a slightly
wider definition of the Arctic, its population is around 10 mil-
lion” (2013, 1). There is “no universally agreed definition of the
Arctic, but a number of common definitions are in use” (2013,
1: see also “Common definitions of the Arctic” map on p. 2).
The Policy also notes that as “one of the most pristine areas
of the world” the Arctic is “diverse in terms of its geographic,
climatic and human dimensions.” Therefore, to understand the
region and its ecosystem “it is not particularly useful to see it as
a homogenous section of the world entirely covered by ice and
snow” (2013, 1). Figure 26. United Kingdom Strategy Comparison
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
Furthermore, the region has “a unique environment of glob- and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
al significance. It is an environment that is changing rapidly
and will continue to change; [although] that is still not fully The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 6 % of the total
understood” (2013, 17). For example, there is “no doubt that coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 7 % of those
the Arctic is on the frontier of global climate change impacts… of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26). This indicator is
[and also] seeing more commercial activity… non-Arctic States explicitly noted in the chapter “protecting people and the envi-
have long had an impact on the Arctic, for example, as sources ronment” of the 2018 Policy, as it refers to “the importance of
of Arctic pollutants” (2013, 4). The 2013 document also identi- taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”
fies that “the Arctic has been connected to the wider world for based on the UN Global Goals for Sustainable Development.
[a long time] through trade and with pollution” (2013, 1). It Here the Policy recognizes that “the Arctic is not one homoge-
therefore has a history of non-traditional activities, such as oil nous landscape, neither are the people who live there. The tradi-
and gas exploitation since the 1960s, as well as being a region tions and cultures of the Indigenous people differ between each
is “inextricably linked to global processes, whether they are group, as much as they do between the Indigenous people and
climatic, environmental, social, legal or economic” (2013, 4). those who live in the cities” (2018, 17).
The closeness of UK, as “the northernmost country outside of
the eight Arctic States; the northern tip of the Shetland Islands

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

This diversity is supported by the statement that “the UK Gov- many of the Council’s Working Groups… [and] will support
ernment will respect the views, interests, culture and traditions of the Arctic Council as the pre-eminent regional forum for dis-
the Arctic Indigenous people” and “the inclusion of Indigenous cussing Arctic issues and the stability it provides for discussion
peoples in the Arctic Council” is welcomed (2018, 17). Finally, amongst Arctic States” (2013, 13)
among other things, the UK “supports safe, responsible and sus-
tainable tourism in the Arctic that enables visitors to experience Concerning exploitation of living natural resources, the UK’s
the uniqueness of the region, which respects the preserve of local overriding principles regarding the management of fishing
communities while supporting their economy and protects the activity in the Arctic are explicitly discussed in the 2013 Pol-
fragile environment for future generations” (2018, 22). icy, in which the UK “supports the work of Regional Fisheries
Management Organisations (RFMOs) in managing fish stocks
Correspondingly, the 2013 Policy states in the chapter on the and marine ecosystems, including in the waters of the Arctic”
human dimension that the UK will “work towards an Arctic (2013, 27). Finally, as an active member of the International
that is safe and secure; well governed in conjunction with In- Whaling Commission, the UK “strongly supports the morato-
digenous peoples and in line with international law” (2013 13). rium on commercial whaling” (2013, 20).
Furthermore, it “will respect the views, interests, culture and
traditions of Arctic Indigenous peoples and promote the partic- Based on the 2018 Policy, “the UK’s primary foreign policy
ipation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making” (2013, 14). objective continues to be the maintenance of the Arctic as a
This links to one of the UK’s major approaches to the Arctic peaceful and stable region. Integral to this is the recognition
in terms of “respect for the views and interests of people who that the vast majority of the Arctic region falls within the sov-
live and work in the Arctic and call it home” (2013, 7). Among ereign jurisdiction of the eight Arctic States. “Their leadership
other things, the Policy also promises that the UK “fully imple- is vital to sustain a safe, secure and peaceful region” (2018, 7).
ments the EU-wide policy on trade in seal products,” including Regarding UNCLOS, it is explicitly noted that: “the rights and
recognizing a “clear exemption to allow the free trade of seal responsibilities of Arctic coastal states [provide] an overarch-
products from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other ing agreement that regulates the various uses of Arctic waters.
Indigenous communities that contribute to their subsistence” Continuous decline in Arctic sea-ice will necessitate negotiat-
(2013, 20). ed agreement to ensure that claims to Continental Shelf under
the Arctic Ocean are conducted within international norms
Non-Indigenous people(s) are only briefly identified as “peo- and that there is continued cooperation in areas of the Arctic
ple who are defined as living in the Arctic estimates range Ocean that are beyond national jurisdiction” (2018, 8). Follow-
from four to ten million” (2013, 5) and “those who live in the ing on from this, the 2018 Policy concludes that “while there
cities” (2013, 17). were areas where rules and collaborative mechanisms could be
further developed, no major governance gaps exist at present”
The Governance indicators, accounting for 10 % of the total (2018, 10).
coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and 3 % of those
of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), are sub- Finally, the Arctic Council, “with its vision for peace, stability
stantial in the 2013 Policy. The latter notes that the “UK will and constructive cooperation in the Arctic,” is explicitly iden-
work towards an Arctic that is safe and secure; well governed in tified and heralded “for its role in promoting cooperation and
conjunction with Indigenous peoples and in line with interna- coordination between the Arctic states and for ensuring that the
tional law; where policies are developed on the basis of sound Indigenous peoples are central to their discussions” (2018, 7).
science with full regard to the environment; and where only
responsible development takes place” (2013, 7). The phrase The International Treaties and International Cooperation
“Promoting good governance of the Arctic through existing fora indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total coded quotes of
and legal mechanisms” (2013, 13) means: i) “ that governance of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 15 % of those of the 2018
the Arctic rests with the sovereign Arctic States, supplemented UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), reveals that the 2018
and complemented by international agreements and treaties, policy builds on a global approach, noting that UK “holds fast
in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN- to a vision of a Global Britain that is respected abroad, engaged
CLOS)”; ii) that through the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration the five in the world and working with our international partners to
littoral states of the Arctic Ocean “committed themselves to the advance prosperity and security around the world” (2018, 4).
existing legal framework and to the orderly settlement of over- Based on its close proximity to the Arctic and connections with
lapping territorial claims. The UK will strongly support moves the global systems, the UK reaffirms “our commitment to sup-
by the Arctic States that promote governance in conjunction port and work in partnership with the eight Arctic States and
with international law… [and] considers [that] moving towards the region’s Indigenous peoples, to uphold this position” (2018,
a specific Arctic Treaty at this time [is] neither necessary nor 7). The bilateral relations with the Arctic States bring “greater
beneficial” (2013, 13); and iii) that the Arctic Council “has been depth to our Arctic engagement”; they are “strong and mul-
successful in helping promote practical co-operation and en- tidimensional... [we work] with them bilaterally and within a
gagement between them, particularly regarding environmental multitude of international fora” (2018, 8): they include the 2011
and sustainable development issues” and that UK—as an active High Level Agreement on the Strengthening of UK and Nor-
observer of the Council—contributes “scientific expertise to wegian cooperation on polar research and cultural heritage,

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

and also scientific cooperation between the UK Science and others on the issues facing the Arctic therefore remains central
Innovation Network (SIN) team and Russian research institu- to the Government’s approach” (2013, 8).
tions, together with the project run by the “British Embassy
Helsinki to strengthen its policy relationships with Finland on Concerning international agreements and rules-based systems,
Arctic affairs” (2018, 24). the 2013 Policy briefly identifies IMO, UNCLOS, SOLAS and
MARPOL, noting the UK “does not believe that it will be nec-
Diplomatic relationships with the Arctic Council with their essary or appropriate to make fundamental changes to existing
“vision for peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the international regimes for regulating Arctic, or other, shipping”
Arctic” and with most of the other multilateral organisations (2013, 25)
are also discussed in the 2018 Policy, in particular, the UK’s par-
ticipation in the 1st Arctic Science Ministerial meeting in 2016 The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 12 % of the
in Washington, and preparations for the second one in 2018, total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 10 % of
which explicitly aim “to increase capacity to respond to major those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233). The
societal challenges in the Arctic and encourage further scientific 2018 Policy states that conservation is “of high importance but
cooperation among [the states]” (2018, 13). that this will be maintained alongside the utilisation of Arctic re-
sources” (2018, 10). Based on more than 300 treaties and agree-
Concerning international agreements and rules-based sys- ments, “each with an important role in protecting and improving
tems, the 2018 Policy identifies “the importance of negotiated the natural world… [and] playing “an active role in securing a
and consensus driven agreements through multilateral organ- new international agreement for the conservation and sustainable
isations [and] treaties,” such as UNCLOS, IMO and the Con- use of marine areas beyond national jurisdiction,” the UK’s aim
vention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the is to be “at the forefront of global efforts to protect and improve
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) (2018, 18). These “arrangements the natural world, driving the international community to adopt
continue to provide an additional platform for cooperation higher standards” (2018, 16). Following on from this, “conserving
and collaboration between the Arctic States and with the wider the Arctic’s biodiversity remains a UK priority, for example, the
international community” (2018, 8). The UN Minamata Con- nutrient-rich waters of the Arctic are critically important for as
vention on Mercury is defined as “an important global treaty many as 17 different species of whale” (2018, 18).
to protect human health and the environment from the adverse
effects of mercury” (2018, 20). Moreover, the Paris Climate The links between the UK and the Arctic are not limited to cli-
Agreement and the United Nations Global Goals for Sustain- mate and marine systems and marine... [as] “our shared bio-
able Development recognize “the importance of taking urgent diversity includes many migratory birds” (2018, 21). Protected
action to combat climate change and its impacts; to conserving areas are also explicitly identified, although it is noted that the
and sustainably using marine resources; and of life on land.” The Arctic region “is not about to become a national park, but will
UK “is firmly committed to delivering the goals at home and continue as a lived in, and managed, environment” (2018, 10).
around the world” (2018, 4). From a number of international Here “the UK Government considers that the best way to deliv-
conferences focused on the Arctic, aimed at sharing expertise er universally accepted marine protected areas in areas beyond
and experience, the Policy identifies the Arctic Circle Assembly national jurisdiction would be through the new Implementing
and Arctic Frontiers as “the prominent” ones; these have be- Agreement under UNCLOS. In support of this, the UK will
come significant annual events that bring together academics, continue to work with other Contracting Parties and the Arctic
civil society, scientists, businesses and governments” (2018, 9). States through OSPAR to improve and extend the protection of-
fered by marine protected areas in the Arctic region” (2018, 18).
Correspondingly, the 2013 Policy has an explicit global ap- Finally, assessment is briefly noted, in particular “monitoring
proach, stating that the inextricable links “to global processes, and further research into marine litter is underway” (2018, 19)
whether they are climatic, environmental, social, legal or eco-
nomic” (2013, 4) mean that non-Arctic states, such as the UK, Correspondingly, the 2013 Policy includes a chapter on the
“have legitimate interests and roles to play in finding solutions environmental dimension, and affirms “respect for the envi-
to many of the most pressing issues facing the Arctic” (2013, ronment, its fragility and its central importance to the global
7). Furthermore, “global Arctic policy needs to keep up with climate” (2013, 7); this, in particular, means respect for biodi-
the rapid changes being seen in the Arctic and use the scientif- versity, as the Arctic region is described as “one of the world’s
ic evidence available”; here, the UK “will encourage the timely most pristine and biologically rich environments” (2013, 19).
feedback of robust evidence into decision making mechanisms” Based on its geographic location, the UK “shares a common
(2013, 17). The UK also “believes that those aspects of Arctic marine and avian biodiversity with much of the Arctic and is
policy that are either affected by or contribute to wider global thus intrinsically linked to the region with a significant stake in
impacts are best discussed by open dialogue with a broad range protecting the area’s ecosystem,” for example, protecting Arc-
of actors,” and that, therefore, the UK “will actively encourage tic migratory species (2013, 19). Likewise, the 2013 Policy also
the Arctic Council and other regional fora to further engage explicitly protects certain areas, and the UK is “a strong sup-
non-Arctic countries in Arctic matters of global importance” porter of the efforts of Parties to the Convention on Biologi-
(2013, 13). The UK’s “long-standing aim of working closely and cal Diversity to strive for marine protected areas… [and] will
co-operatively with the Arctic States, Indigenous peoples and support the principle of designating Marine Protected Areas in

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

international waters, including in the Arctic, where the science “considers that the Arctic should receive… protection from
supports it” (2013, 20). Finally, ecosystems-based management ship-source pollution… [and] that the expansion of shipping
is said to provide “a flexible approach to managing ecosystems in the Arctic should not have a damaging effect on the envi-
subject to… the rapid changes taking place in the Arctic,” where ronment” (2013, 21). Furthermore, the UK “will build under-
the UK “will encourage experts to engage with the Arctic States standing of the climate impacts of black carbon in the Arctic;
and Arctic Council… to help underpin the resilience of Arctic reduce its domestic emissions of methane,” and work with the
ecosystems and communities” (2013, 19). IMO to reduce emissions of black carbon from Arctic and other
shipping and through the UN Economic Commission for Eu-
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total cod- rope’s Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
ed quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 8 % of those of to address black carbon emissions (2013, 18). Here, UNCLOS
the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is identified “remains paramount in the prevention of pollution from ships
within the 2018 Policy: “the Arctic is becoming increasingly [with MARPOL]… All environmental regulations contained in
polluted and increasingly visited, while a growing number of MARPOL apply to ships and fixed or floating platforms in Arc-
non-Arctic nations are looking toward the Arctic as a place for tic waters” (2013, 21).
commerce” (2018, 2), and as “the vast majority of litter and pol-
lutants impacting the Arctic originate outside of the region it is The Climate Change indicator accounts for 11 % of the total
essential for us all to take action” (2018, 18). Among pollutants coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 8 % of those
listed are: i) “marine litter, particularly marine plastic pollution of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233). The 2018
[as] a serious and growing threat to our environment” (2018, Policy records that “for the last fifty years, Arctic temperatures
19); ii), “a range of chemicals and pollutants that are having a have risen more than twice as fast as the global average” (2018,
harmful effect on the Arctic environment… for example, the 15). Possible and potential consequences of the situation are,
contamination of the environment from mercury is not new” among others, that “the Arctic may become effectively ice-free
(2018, 20); iii) “noise in our seas and its impact on vulnerable in the summer sooner than predicted, perhaps as soon as the
species” (2018, 19), and iv), emissions of black carbon from in- late 2030s” (2018, 3); “less sea-ice results in more of the sun’s ra-
ternational shipping, and other “greenhouse gas emissions…the diation being absorbed by the sea… Similarly, thawing perma-
effects of climate change in the Arctic are accentuated by the frost leads to more warming… emissions of methane and CO2
impact of black carbon” (2018, 26). The 2018 Policy does not increase as soil microbial activity increases” [and there is] “po-
explicitly identify who are the polluters. tential damage to infrastructure built on it” (2018, 15). Because
of this, the number of voyages between the Northern Sea Route
As for pollution problem solving, the 2018 Policy notes that the ports and transits have increased rapidly as people’s appetite for
UK “has committed to improve the situation [marine plastic the unique travel experiences the region has to offer increases,
pollution] through domestic and international action” (2018, so does the number of visitors” (2018, 22). All this, “known as
19), and “will continue to display the same strong leadership ‘Arctic amplification,’ may have profound implications for the
shown when we became the 1st country in the world to set legal- regional and global climate, as well as for the people who live in
ly binding emission reduction targets through the 2008 Climate and around the Arctic” (2018, 15).
Change Act” (2018, 4). Moreover, international agreements are
identified as important, among them the Intersessional Corre- As far as problem-solving is concerned, although the word ‘ad-
spondence Group on Marine Litter, and OSPAR through which aptation’ occurs, the main term used is ‘mitigation’; the UK has
the UK and other contracting parties “have developed and are “a strong record of implementing policies that mitigate the re-
implementing a Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter” (2018, lease of harmful emissions into the atmosphere” (2018, 16). The
19); the UN Minamata Convention on Mercury is identified as Clean Growth Strategy is noted as one of the mechanisms that
“an important global treaty to protect human health and the en- will set out “how we will meet our climate targets while securing
vironment from the adverse effects of mercury” (2018, 20); the the economic benefits of clean growth for the UK… [and] legis-
Polar Code, through the IMO and PAME reduce “risks of use lation and action plans developed by the devolved administra-
and carriage of heavy fuel oil as fuel by ships in Arctic waters” tion [of the UK] complement the UK’s emission reduction am-
(2018, 20). Finally, as far as assessment is concerned, the G7 bitions. [For example] the Scottish Government has announced
and the UN Environment Programme will “review and propose plans to encourage an uptake of electric vehicles by phasing out
monitoring methods, share best practice and recommend fur- new petrol and diesel cars by 2032” (2018, 16). Concerning in-
ther research or action” (2018, 19). ternational cooperation the 2018 policy refers the UN Global
Goals for Sustainable Development and the Paris climate agree-
The 2013 Policy is brief, noting that “non-Arctic States have ment. The UK is “fully committed to it… [but] would have pre-
long had an impact on the Arctic, for example as sources of ferred the USA to remain in the Paris Agreement” (2018, 16).
Arctic pollutants such as mercury… [and as] contributors to
climate change. Conversely, changes in the Arctic also impact The 2013 Policy states that “climate change is the greatest threat
on non-Arctic States” (2013, 4). Thus, “actions to reduce Short facing the Arctic” (2013, 17), and the UK works with other
Lived Climate Forcers, including methane and black carbon countries “to build an understanding of the threats posed by
(soot), are a crucial complement to reducing emissions of car- climate change and the opportunities for action,” for example,
bon dioxide in tackling climate change” (2013, 18). The UK also by helping to build “mitigation capacity in countries around the

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

world” (2013, 17). Therefore, there is “no doubt that the Arctic The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the
is on the frontier of global climate change impacts [and] inextri- total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 4 % of
cably linked to global processes, whether they are climatic, envi- those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), links
ronmental, social, legal or economic” (2013, 4). These processes tourism and maritime transport with safety in the 2018 Poli-
include “decreasing sea-ice or increasing freshwater entering cy , as both have increased in recent years in the Arctic region.
the Arctic Ocean [that] may have the potential to affect the UK’s Although, “the majority of visits to the region are trouble-free”
weather and climate” (2013, 4). Finally, the document proposes visitors are putting a strain “on modest search and rescue capa-
that the UK “will play a leading role in diplomatic efforts to avoid bility, and increase the potential for harm to the fragile environ-
dangerous climate change, including through the negotiation of ment” (2018, 22). The Policy thus notes that “when visiting the
a legally binding global climate change agreement to be agreed Arctic, we want British nationals to be safe and to ensure that
in 2015” (2013, 17). As mechanisms, the 2013 Policy identifies all international travellers and operators refrain from harming
the Climate Change Act 2008 for reducing Short Lived Climate the Arctic environment” (2018, 22). This will be done, for exam-
Forcers, and working “through the UN Economic Commission ple, by supporting “the work of the Association of Arctic Cruise
for Europe’s Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Operators and its goal of managing responsible, environmen-
Pollution to address black carbon emissions” (2013, 18). tally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and strive to set the
highest possible operating standards” (2018, 22). Among inter-
Concerning the Security indicator, which accounts for 3 % of national mechanisms for maritime safety are noted the manda-
the total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 5 % tory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, the SAR agree-
of those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), the ment by the Arctic states, and the Arctic Regional Hydrographic
premise and objective of the 2018 Policy is to maintain “the Arc- Commission, where UK will continue to seek Associate Mem-
tic as a peaceful and stable region” (2018, 7). Hence, “the vast bership status at “to maintain close links with other nations in
majority of the Arctic region falls within the sovereign jurisdic- the region and to share the UK’s knowledge and expertise of
tion of the eight Arctic States. Their leadership is vital to sustain Arctic hydrography” (2018, 25).
a safe, secure and peaceful region” (2018, 7). The cooperative
and collaborative approach of the Arctic Council is also not- The 2013 Policy clearly states that the UK works with the Arctic
ed to promote confidence between the Arctic States and their States and the Arctic Council to promote safety in Arctic ship-
international partners, as well as “the various coastguard agen- ping. As means and mechanisms, the Policy notes i) that the
cies of the Arctic States and through the Arctic Coast Guard mandatory Polar Code produces “a clear direction on the de-
Forum, which provides a useful arena for cooperation” (2018, sign, equipment and, where appropriate, operational methods
21). Under the sub-chapter “Defence” the policy first speculates of shipping”; ii) that the UK welcomes the steps by “the Arctic
whether “increased interest and commercial activity in the re- Council regarding Arctic shipping, particularly the 2011 SAR
gion provides potential for heightened tension… [as] Arctic Agreement; and iii) the UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) has
nations may want to enhance their security presence in the re- “considerable experience and expertise in surveying in the Arc-
gion to protect their own territorial and commercial interests” tic” (2013, 26). Concerning monitoring, the Policy first men-
(2018, 21); Second, it states that the UK “remains committed tions, “the significant contributions to the Arctic Monitoring
to preserving” this stability and security, and “will work with and Assessment Programme’s ‘Snow, Water, Ice and Perma-
our international partners and allies through defence engage- frost’ (SWIPA) report” by UK researchers; the “NERC funded
ment, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation,” including Arctic Research Programme (2011–2016) [providing] detailed
essential cold weather training exercises and participation in understanding of how ocean, sea-ice and atmosphere interact
the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable; and finally, “NATO also and respond under climate change” (2013, 22); and finally, that
remains a central plank for cooperation among its Arctic State “the Arctic and Antarctic are experiencing increased levels of
members” (2018, 21). shipping resulting in more vessels transiting through hazard-
ous ice-infested waters.... Timely information also reduces costs
The 2013 Policy notes the UK’s “respect for the sovereign rights for ships operating in sea-ice by allowing more efficient routing
of the Arctic States to exercise jurisdiction over their territo- decisions and reducing the impact of hull damage from sea-ice”
ry” (2013 7), and that it “remains committed to preserving the (2013, 29).
stability and security of the Arctic region” (2013, 13). This lat-
ter objective “will be pursued through a wide range of defence The Economy indicator, accounting for 20 % of the total coded
engagement and bilateral security co-operation with a number quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 18 % of those of the
of close allies and partners in the region” (2013, 13) in which 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is noted equally in
NATO will play a central role; also central is “the UK’s partici- both policy documents. Moreover, it is the most substantial field
pation in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable forum, which of the UK Arctic Policy.
promotes security co-operation on issues such as situational
awareness and search and rescue missions” (2013, 13). The 2018 Policy is searching for a balance with the environment
by “promoting the Arctic as a place where economic and com-
Energy security is explicitly noted by the 2013 Policy to ensure mercial development occurs in a sustainable and responsible
“security of supply through a diverse set of sources” (2013, 24). manner. The 2018 Policy expresses the hope that people of the
region benefit from the prosperity that a changing Arctic may

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

bring [while also] supporting UK companies investing in the nies” (2013, 23). The UK believes that fundamentally”: i) Arctic
Arctic; [the goals are] making them aware of, and connecting stewardship rests with the eight Arctic States and the peoples
them to, the opportunities available” (2018, 4, also 23). At the within those States” (2013, 8); ii) there must be “responsible de-
same time, conservation is defined “of high importance but… velopment” (2013, 23); and iii) that “the scale of the challenges
will be maintained alongside the utilisation of Arctic resourc- facing the Arctic is immense and compounded by the speed of
es” (2018, 10). Furthermore, “successful mining operations that the changes.” Furthermore, responding “to these changes, while
meet the needs of customers, investors and local communities supporting rigorous protection of the environment, is one of the
require strong governance frameworks and clear human rights many challenges facing the region and wider world… in turn,
policies” (2018, 27). The Arctic is also defined i) as “an area for the region is seeing more commercial activity,” as, due to reduc-
maritime transport” (2018, 22) and “shipping originating from tions in sea-ice cover, “large reserves of oil, gas, metals and rare
a destination within the Arctic itself ” (2018, 25); ii) as being earths… are becoming more accessible with improvements in
able to provide transport links through the Barents Sea Trans- technology.” For example, “interest in exploration and develop-
port Plan in cooperation between Sweden, Finland and Russia, ment of the region’s offshore oil and gas fields is steadily increas-
where ”UK companies will be encouraged to explore opportu- ing. There is also the growing possibility of increased mining for
nities…as these projects develop” (2018, 29); as a provider of mineral and rare earth deposits” (2013, 21).
energy, with the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) in
Orkney being defined as “the world’s first and only centre pro- The 2013 Policy lists the following types of economic activity,
viding developers of both wave and tidal energy converters… in addition to tourism (the next indicator): i) energy, with UK
with purpose-built, grid-connected open-sea testing facilities” energy security, global markets and the Arctic being tied togeth-
(2018, 26); and iii) as providing fisheries, with Iceland’s “world- er (a case study in a box), and the UK’s import of natural gas
class fisheries industry using efficient, integrated high-tech from Norway; ii) “maritime transport, and shipping in partic-
solutions to ensure the sustainability of its fish stocks, enhance ular, is an international, global industry in which the UK has a
the productivity of its fisheries and maximise the value of its prominent role” (2013, 25); and iii) concerning global trade “the
catches” (2018, 27). Based on experience, “the UK Government UK ports and shipping industry, together with the wider UK
will continue to adopt a science-led, precautionary and ecosys- maritime cluster, are generally well placed to take advantage of
tem-based approach to the establishment and management of any commercial opportunities that expansion of Arctic shipping
any new and emerging fisheries in the Arctic region” (2018, 27). may present in the short term” (2013, 25).

The regulation of economic activities will be worked on “with Among the regulations and regulators of economic activities
the devolved administrations and regulators as part of UK-wide (in the Arctic) the Policy identifies the International Whaling
implementation mechanisms that ensure regulatory consisten- Commission and the UK “strongly supports the moratorium on
cy across the UK for business and industry” (2018, 16). Relevant commercial whaling” (2013, 20); the EU-wide policy on trade in
international mechanisms are identified as i) the Polar Code, seal products, which UK “fully implements” (p. 20); UNCLOS;
an Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Central Arctic Ocean; ii) the Arctic Economic Council; and iii) and MARPOL (2013, 25); Regional Fisheries Management Or-
participation in initiatives, such as “the Voluntary Principles on ganisations (RFMOs) which are “managing fish stocks and ma-
Security and Human Rights in the Extractive Industries [and] rine ecosystems, including in the waters of the Arctic” (2013,
the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative, which ap- 27); and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing
ply to mines in the Arctic and elsewhere” (2018, 27). Finally, “which allows fair access to genetic resources in return for a
concerning global trade it is explicitly noted that to transport share of the benefits for their use, potentially paving the way
goods between Asia and Northern Europe through the North- for exciting new medicinal and genetic innovations” (2013, 27).
ern Sea Route “could significantly reduce travel time… thereby
reducing costs… The amount of fuel utilised and consequently The Tourism indicator, accounting for 3 % of the total coded
pollutants emitted into the environment currently, half of the quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 2 % of those of the
world’s volume of trade travels through the South China Sea” 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is briefly noted by
(2018, 23). both documents. As already mentioned, in the 2018 Policy the
hope is expressed that “British nationals [should] be safe and…
The 2013 Policy is even more substantial, as its chapter on the that all international travellers and operators [should] refrain
commercial dimension explicitly discusses energy security, from harming the Arctic environment” (2018, 22), in particular
shipping, tourism, fisheries and bioprospecting, as well as UK as all forms of tourism to the Arctic, “from small expedition
commercial expertise. The policy states that “the decision to in- ships to large conventional cruise liners… [have] increased in
vest in commercial projects in the Arctic is a matter for the indi- recent years” (2018, 22). Therefore, the UK supports, as men-
vidual companies concerned and the relevant national author- tioned earlier, “safe, responsible and sustainable tourism in the
ities of the Arctic States in whose jurisdiction they take place” Arctic that enables visitors to experience the uniqueness of the
(2013, 23). Therefore, the UK “will encourage UK business to region” (2018, 22). The UK also supports the goals of the As-
engage directly with the Arctic Council, Arctic States, Indige- sociation of Arctic Cruise Operators of “managing responsible,
nous peoples and other actors, as appropriate… [and] will facil- environmentally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and
itate responsible business activity in the region by UK compa- strive to set the highest possible operating standards” (2018,

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

22). Finally, despite SAR and the legal regimes, “extra caution the coming decades” (2013, 4). Finally, the 2013 Policy notes
is required when planning all tourism activities and maritime that UK “supports investment in new infrastructure that would
operations in the Arctic” (2018, 22). connect Norway’s new Arctic gas finds with the existing North
Sea pipeline network” to satisfy projected long-term demand
In a subchapter on tourism the 2013 Policy notes that “the Arc- for imported gas and our transition to a low-carbon economy
tic is an increasingly popular destination for British travellers, in the UK (2013, 24).
primarily as passengers on cruise ships but also for those un-
dertaking on-shore activities such as adventure tourism” (2013 The Science and Education indicator, accounting for 16 % of
26). The Arctic coast of Norway and Svalbard are identified as the total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 16 %
popular destinations within the region. The challenges to safe of those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is
tourism posed by “the isolation of certain parts of the Arctic explicitly and evenly discussed in the both policy documents.
combined with the harsh environment and modest capacity of
search and rescue infrastructure… are likely to rise as the op- The 2018 Policy states that “the UK research community has
portunities for Arctic tourism continue to increase” (2013 26). a strong record of collaborating internationally and delivering
high impact Arctic research; nearly two-thirds of UK Arctic
As well as the Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 2 % papers have international co-authors, while only three other
of the total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for countries—the US, Russia and Canada—produce more Arctic
4 % of that of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), science papers than UK. High-level agreements, with Arctic
is briefly noted by the two documents. The 2018 Policy identi- States… provide strong frameworks for collaborative research”
fies the Arctic as “an area of increasing importance for maritime (2018, 11). The vision of a Global Britain in the Arctic com-
transport”, as the number of voyages have rapidly increased, as prises “the UK’s world leading science and innovation [and will
mentioned earlier. “Although there were only 19 transits across help] advance global understanding of how changes in the Arc-
the entire NSR in 2016, there were more than 1700 voyages,” tic have global consequences and helps to find new solutions
which has implications for navigational safety (2018, 22). The to the challenges” (2018, 4). Further, “as an original observer
European Arctic states prioritize improved transport links via state, the UK has continued to influence Arctic Council policies
the Barents Sea Transport Plan (2018 29). The policy also notes by providing scientific analysis and evidence in its working and
possible side-effects: first, that “declining Arctic sea-ice could in expert groups” (2018, 7). This is supported on the one hand,
future open new shipping routes [and that] hostile conditions by the strong UK science infrastructure, including a summer
and a lack of infrastructure will make commercial operations research station in Svalbard since 1972, the ‘blue-water’ ships
difficult for some considerable time” (2018, 23); and second, (the RRS James Cook and RRS Discovery), as well as a new
that the Polar Silk Road, comprising road, rail and port infra- ice-strengthened research vessel, the RRS Sir David Attenbor-
structure built in partnership with the Arctic states means “po- ough for “year-round access to state-of-the art facilities on this
tential implementation risks that could be involved in delivering floating, multidisciplinary, research platform” (2018, 28); and
the Belt and Road Initiative” by China (2018, 25). finally, the UK Science and Innovation Network (SIN), “oper-
ates across the eight Arctic States in support of both UK Gov-
The 2018 Policy also notes that the European Marine Energy ernment Arctic policy and UK-based scientists and research
Centre (EMEC) provides “an ideal base for the world-leading bodies” (2018, 12). There is also the following research funding
test facility with its excellent oceanic wave regime, strong tid- by the NERC through the Arctic Research Programme: “£15
al currents, close proximity to sheltered harbour facilities, and million available for research into changes in the Arctic and
a wealth of renewable, maritime and environmental expertise their possible future consequences worldwide» from 2011–
within the local community” (2018, 26). Moreover, “digital 2016 (2018, 15), the Changing Arctic Ocean “£16 million in the
connectivity through increased internet fibre cables and good 5-year [period] (2017–2022)” on Implications for marine biol-
broadband coverage” will benefit developed parts of the Arctic. ogy and biogeochemistry,” and “£2.3m towards funding the UK
In the underdeveloped and remote parts of the Arctic, the tech- research community participation in this truly international
nological challenge is greater, but could be solved by innovative collaboration [MOSAiC]” (2018, 14).
technical solutions (2018, 29).
The 2018 Policy also explicitly notes “that only by learning about
The 2013 Policy states its belief that “the UK ports and ship- the use of traditional and local knowledge from the Indigenous
ping industry, together with the wider UK maritime cluster, and local communities themselves can changes be properly
are generally well placed to take advantage of any commercial understood and genuinely sustainable responses proposed…
opportunities that expansion of Arctic shipping may present [therefore] “researchers in the UK are committed to listening
in the short term” (2013, 25). The UK aims to review over a to, and working with, Indigenous communities, to ensure the
longer term what can best be done do “to facilitate worthwhile best outcomes for local communities and for science,” for exam-
trade opportunities and help ensure that [there is] due regard to ple, in the Yamal-Nenets region in Russia and among the Inuit
safety and the environment” (2013, 25). The “sea routes to and in Canada, “It is increasingly recognised that only by learning
from Asia are becoming increasingly ice-free for more days of about the use of traditional and local knowledge from the In-
the year” which would bring “the potential [for] growing levels digenous and local communities themselves can changes be
of commercial shipping traffic between Europe and Asia over properly understood and genuinely sustainable responses pro-

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

posed” (2018, 17). Educational attainment is also included the very influential in funding research programs. The Scott Polar
2018 Policy, for example, “by providing educational tools and Research Institute has a long tradition of social sciences and
learning materials, schools can engage their pupils on a wide humanities research, for example, among the Inuit “to bridge
range of issues that affect the Arctic” (2018, 5), “Discovering the their own traditional knowledge with the sciences can be traced
Arctic’ telling stories of Arctic people and places,” the Model back to the needs of 18th century scientific travellers to acquire
Arctic Council initiative, and via the UArctic consortium and local knowledge” (2013, 16). The Circumpolar History and Pub-
the UK Polar Network (2018, 12). lic Policy Research Group at Scott Polar Institute “uses histori-
cal, ethnographic, and economic research to explore policy is-
The 2013 Policy notes that “by its nature, science contributes sues and options over a longer timeframe, focusing in particular
directly to diplomacy, policy and our understanding of the Arc- on science policy, traditional knowledge of northern peoples,
tic, and is the basis of much of our co-operation with Arctic and transnational governance” (2013, 16). Furthermore, “polar
States, the Arctic Council and other actors” (2013, 9). It also matters are part of the English National Curriculum for geog-
states that the UK “will work towards an Arctic that is safe and raphy at both primary and secondary school” run by the Royal
secure; well governed in conjunction with Indigenous peoples Geographical Society (2013, 5).
and in line with international law; where policies are developed
on the basis of sound science with full regard to the environ- The Implementation indicator is not explicitly included in either
ment” (2013, 7) It also states that “global Arctic policy needs to of the UK Arctic Policy documents, nor is there a list of recom-
keep up with the rapid changes being seen in the Arctic and use mendations. The 2013 Framework document is “reviewed reg-
the scientific evidence available” (2013, 17). As a result, “highly ularly” (2013, 9) and updated “on a regular basis… In response
regarded UK science is present in most areas of Arctic research to the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Arctic in
and also helps to underpin good policy, stable governance and December 2015, the Government also [has] committed to keep
responsible commerce” (2013, 8), and the UK “will encourage our approach under review” (2018, 2). This is echoed by the
the timely feedback of robust evidence into decision making 2018 Policy which is considered to be a review of the 2013 one,
mechanisms” (2013, 17). Several examples, plus evidence of UK given that “it was always the intention of the UK Government
science in the Arctic, are also included in the 2013 Policy, such that the Framework would receive regular updates” (2018, 3).
as the UK research station in Ny-Ålesund (a summer research Another issue is the consideration given by 2018 Policy to the
facility), “two ice-capable research vessels operated by the Brit- rapid environmental changes in the Arctic region.
ish Antarctic Survey,” and “a large, active and growing Arctic
science community, with at least 77 UK institutions involved To sum up
in Arctic research, including 46 universities and 20 research
institutes” (2013, 10). Moreover, steadily increased funding The United Kingdom was one of the first Arctic Council ob-
for Arctic environmental research activities, “with over £50m server countries, and among the first to launch its own na-
awarded to 138 individual research projects,…Top class climate tional policy on the Arctic region; it was the only one in our
research will continue to be funded, for example, through “the analysis with an updated Arctic policy. Both documents are
Met Office Hadley Centre’s Climate Programme and the Natural entitled ‘UK policy towards the Arctic.’ However, they are
Environment Research Council’s £15 million, five-year Arctic actually called ‘Framework’ (2013) and ‘Arctic Policy Frame-
Research Programme, to increase understanding of the changes work’ (2018). Why the term ‘framework’ was chosen, and not
in the Arctic and their impacts on the global system” (2013, 18). ‘policy’ or ‘strategy,’ is unclear. It has been speculated that this
was “in order to de-dramatize the statement and in particular,
Innovation in technology is explicitly noted: submarines and not to alienate states within the Arctic who might be sensitive
more recently satellites (the UK-led European Space Agency about ‘outsider’ involvement” (Bailes 2013, 11).20
satellite Cryosat 2) “demonstrate decreasing sea-ice thickness
across the Arctic… [and also] provide insights into how the In any case, the 2018 Framework, as the UK’s Arctic Policy,
ocean circulation will alter as sea-ice diminishes over time” provides and emphasizes the interpretation that UK has “al-
(2013, 22); new marine technology will provide insights into ways been a world leader in Polar affairs where British views
how the “ocean circulation will alter as sea-ice diminishes over have long held sway in the fields of polar science, exploration,
time... [something which is also confirmed by] sophisticated diplomacy, business and environmental protection” (2018, 2).
models of this oceanic circulation developed by other UK re- Indeed, the UK “is well placed to transfer knowledge and ex-
searchers” (2013, 22). pertise across both polar regions... [and] the UK’s wider Ant-
arctic science community is substantial,” as the 2013 Policy
This indicator interestingly reveals that UK’s Arctic research, ac- notes (2013, 11). Brexit is also taken into consideration here,
cording to the 2013 Policy, consists of natural sciences, through as the Minister of State for the Polar Regions in his foreword
the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) which is to the 2018 document interprets the Framework as reaffirming

20 The UK government earlier “to develop an overarching formal Arctic strategy to bring together the diffuse strands of government policy… [it] would also send
a clear signal to the Arctic States that while their sovereignty in the region is indisputable, pursuing greater exclusivity in the region is neither constructive nor
warranted when so many ramifications of environmental and economic change in the Arctic reach out beyond the region” (Duncan 2012, 132).

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

“our intention to remain a significant player in Arctic affairs,” Taking into considetation the long British tradition of explora-
as the UK leaves the European Union (2018, 2). tion in the Polar regions, including the Arctic; the British voyag-
es of discovery; its national geostrategic and military interests,
This is supported by the projection of a vision of ‘Global Brit- for example, British strategic nuclear submarines occasionally
ain’ in the 2018 Policy that is respected abroad and engaged visiting the Arctic Ocean; colonialism and neo-colonialism,
in the world, while “working with… international partners to with Canada as a former British colony and current member of
advance prosperity and security around the world… [and] in the British Commonwealth—the UK strategy is not just about
the Arctic” (2018, 4, 7). geography, but also history, geopolitics, geostrategy, economics,
and science. Is the UK the “forgotten Arctic state,” as Duncan
Further, the UK will continue to “display the same strong lead- (2018) put it?
ership shown” on becoming the first country in the world to set
legally binding emission reduction targets through the 2008 Cli- Finally, after comparing the results of the coding and analysis
mate Change Act [and] one of the first Arctic Council Observer to the quite broad priorities, they are all concluded to be in fo-
States” (2018, 4). cus, in particular Promoting prosperity, and Protecting global
influence, including science and international cooperation; also
The 2013 Policy has an explicitly global approach, stating that Protecting the environment to a certain extent, but less so Pro-
the inextricable links “to global processes, whether they are cli- tecting people.
matic, environmental, social, legal or economic” (2013, 4) also
give non-Arctic states, and the UK, “legitimate interests and
roles to play in finding solutions to many of the most pressing Comparing and Discussing
issues facing the Arctic” (2013, 7).
the Strategies
As mentioned earlier, the 2018 Framework is an updated ver-
sion of the 2013 policy document, as a result of review. It is thus The previous section provides an overview of, and analysis of, the
to be expected that the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining indicator contents of the national Arctic strategies and policies of the nine
more or less reprises the notion of the 2013 Policy that UK is observer states of the Arctic Council policy, and how they have
“the northernmost country outside of the eight Arctic States” developed recently. To obtain a more holistic picture of the state
and that of the 2018 Policy , namely, the UK as the “nearest of Arctic governance of the 21st century, a better understanding of
neighbour, with Lerwick… closer to the Arctic Circle than it is how the region is currently being governed, and how these policy
to London.” These remapping and self-identified efforts based papers combine with each other, an inter-comparison is needed.
on geography are to convince a British audience, as well as audi- What follows is a broader discussion and analysis on each policy
ences outside the UK. document, which is then followed by some relevant findings and
summing up of these national policies. Finally, there is a short
Science and research are much discussed in, and reflected by, comparative study and discussion of all the policies.
the policy documents on an even basis. They are thus, without a
doubt, one of the priorities of the UK Arctic policy, as they are Interestingly, unlike most of the current national strategies of
the main similarity between the two. Based on our coding and the Arctic states, released between 2009 and 2013, these doc-
quantitative measuring, the second similarity between the two uments are much more current, as they were released between
is the Economy indicator, which is more explicitly and evenly 2013 and 2018.
discussed in, and reflected by, the two documents. Furthermore,
the quantitative measuring reveals that Environmental Protec- The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator.
tion and International Cooperation are also among the priori- Except for the ROK, each national policy of the non-Arctic Ob-
ties of the UK’s Arctic policy, the former being reflected more server countries has its own definition of the Arctic and/or its
evenly by the policies and the latter less so. special features, Many remap their geographical position, and
even reidentify their relationship with the Arctic.
Concerning other indicators, other similarities are: the Human
Dimension indicator, the combined Environmental Protection All the strategies use the term “Arctic,” France also uses the
and Climate Change indicators and, the Tourism indicator are term “the North,” while the UK comments on a region without
discussed evenly, as are the indicators and the combined Securi- a single “universally agreed definition.” The Arctic could mean
ty and Safety and SAR themes. “an ocean surrounded by continents” plus the Arctic Ocean
(France); or “the area within the Arctic Circle with the Arc-
The main differences between the two policy documents are tic Ocean as the heart” (Germany); or a “home to about four
as follows: the 2013 Policy puts much more emphasis on the million people including Indigenous peoples” (Japan); or “a
Governance indicator than the 2018 one; the International region in transition” (Germany). The Arctic region is defined
Cooperation indicator is more explicitly identified in the 2018 as “vulnerable” with “peculiar and sensitive ecosystem” (Italy),
Policy than in the 2013 one; the Pollution indicator and the In- “extraordinary fragile” (Spain), with “a unique environment of
frastructure indicator are noted more in the 2018 policy than in global significance” (UK), and “the [climate change] canary in
the 2013 one. the coal mine” (France).

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A relevant difference between the policies is the self-identifica- it, and it is particularly mentioned by Italy and the UK (higher
tion toward the Arctic region, either to include it or not. France, than 6 %). These eight policies explicitly note Indigenous peo-
the PRC and the UK do (re)identify themselves vis-à-vis the ples of the Arctic, or the North, and comment on their ways of
Arctic: for France the Arctic is “both far from France and near life, rights, and languages. Arctic Indigenous peoples account
to it.” The PRC re-identifies itself as a “‘Near-Arctic State.’” The for “ten percent of the four million people” (Germany), are rec-
UK is the “nearest neighbour” of the Arctic states. ognized as being “easily affected by environmental changes and
expanded economic activity” (Japan), and are “currently facing
All in all, the (Re)defining the Arctic indicator shows striking fast changes in their habitats and their ways of life” (Spain).
similarities among states, and self-reidentification towards the There is thus a need for “protection of their rights to a free and
Arctic region shows relevant differences. (see Figure 27. Current self-determined life in their homeland” (Germany) and to “re-
Observer Strategy Comparison, p. 243). spect the views, interests, culture and traditions of the Arctic
Indigenous peoples” and their communities (UK).
Based on our coding and quantitative measuring (see Table 27,
p. 119), the most-quoted indicator in/by the national Arctic The policies of Germany, Italy, PRC, ROK and the UK also ex-
policies and strategies of the observer states is Science and Ed- plicitly mention people other than the Indigenous populations,
ucation. In particular, the policies of the Netherlands, the ROK, meaning the whole population of the Arctic region. France takes
and Spain—all about 30 % or more—explicitly note and discuss into consideration that the “northern territories [have] very
issues on science and scientific cooperation, although there is small populations,” about four million people (Germany, Ja-
less about education per se. These are followed by Japan and pan). Interestingly, Italy includes two aspects of the Human Di-
Italy — both 20 % or more. mension indicator: urban areas and Indigenous peoples. There
is thus a need to “protect[ing] people and the environment”
The second most-quoted is the International Cooperation & In- (UK) in general, and to realize “harmonious coexistence be-
ternational Treaties indicator, explicitly noted and discussed, in tween man and nature… and intergenerational equity” (PRC).
particular, by the policies of Japan and Germany—more than
20 % each—followed by the ROK, PRC, and the UK—all higher All in all, there is a striking similarity between those national
than 15 %. The third most quoted indicator is the Economy one; policies including and explicitly discussing the Human indica-
the policies of PRC, ROK, the UK and France—all by more than tor, and it is noteworthy that five (out of nine) recognize the
17 %—explicitly note and discuss issues on economy/economic whole population, not only the Indigenous peoples.
cooperation and trade, including sustainable development.
The Governance indicator is not among the most-quoted is-
The least-quoted among indicators is the Tourism indicator— sues of the national policies of these observer countries. Re-
between 0 and 3 %—with Japan, for example, not noting it at all. ferring to the criteria for Arctic Council observership, several
Among the other little-quoted indicators are the Infrastructure, policies note the existing governance structures of the Arctic
Pollution, Security, Safety and SAR, and Human indicators. region, and the international agreements relevant to them,
Finally, the remaining indicators, Governance, Environmental such as UNCLOS, the AC and the Spitsbergen Treaty, and
Protection, and Climate Change, lie in the middle. commit to keeping the region peaceful and stable (e.g., Japan,
UK). They also recognize the national jurisdictions of the Arc-
However, if the quotations concerning the Environmental Pro- tic states (e.g., Italy, Spain, UK) and “respect [to] the sovereign
tection, Pollution, and Climate Change indicators are put to- rights of the Arctic states” (PRC). The emphasis here is on Arc-
gether, this new indicator would be higher—by 20 % or more tic Ocean governance, the five littoral states and their influ-
(with the exception of the Netherlands, the ROK, and Spain)— ence over the ocean, and also UNCLOS and other internation-
than those of the International Cooperation and Economy indi- al regimes, such as OSPAR, MARPOL, and organizations, like
cators, and only a little lower than that of the Science & Educa- the IMO. It is also stated that increasing human activities in
tion indicator. the polar regions “will require further international consulta-
tion, governance and regulation” (the Netherlands) and legally
To conclude, based on quantitative measuring, the top three binding regulations (e.g., Germany).
priorities of these nine policies are Science and Education, In-
ternational Cooperation, and Economy. If the newly formed All, except the Netherlands, explicitly mention the Arctic Coun-
Environment, Pollution, and Climate Change indicator is taken cil. It is recognized as the central body for Arctic cooperation
into account, the top four indicators accord more or less with (e.g., by Germany), not least due to the legally binding agree-
the official priorities or policy goals/aims/principles of several ments, such as SAR. The Ilulissat Ministerial Declaration is
national policies. The policy documents of Germany, Italy, Ja- mentioned by France.
pan, and Spain, however, do not explicitly include priorities/
priority areas. A few policy documents note that there is no comprehensive
treaty on the Arctic, although UNCLOS plays an important role
The Human Dimension indicator is not among the most-quot- in Arctic Ocean governance. It is recognized that there are “col-
ed issues of the national policies of the nine Arctic Council’s lective governance issues [that] potentially concern the interna-
observer countries. All but the Netherlands, however, include tional community” (France). The term “international commu-

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

Human Dimension Governance International Cooperation

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

FRA FRA

GER GER

ITA ITA

JPN JPN

NLD NLD

PRC PRC

ROK ROK

ESP ESP

UK UK

Environmental Protection Pollution Climate Change

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

FRA FRA

GER GER

ITA ITA

JPN JPN

NLD NLD

PRC PRC

ROK ROK

ESP ESP

UK UK

Security Safety & SAR Economy

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

FRA FRA

GER GER

ITA ITA

JPN JPN

NLD NLD

PRC PRC

ROK ROK

ESP ESP

UK UK

Tourism Infrastructure Science & Education

5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 % 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 % 30 %

FRA FRA

GER GER

ITA ITA

JPN JPN

NLD 46 % NLD

PRC PRC

ROK 32 % ROK

ESP ESP

UK UK

FRA 2016 GER 2013 ITA 2015 JPN 2015 NLD 2014 PRC 2018 ROK 2013 ESP 2016 UK 2018

Figure 27. Current Observer Strategy Comparison

Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.

243
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

nity” is also used by Japan and PRC. The freedom of the seas
is included—including rights to scientific research, navigation,

ROK 2013
NLD 2014
GER 2013
FRA 2016

PRC 2018
JPN 2015

ESP 2016
ITA 2015

UK 2018
overflight, fisheries, laying of submarine cables and pipeline—
which motivates non-Arctic (littoral) states to increase their
involvement “in the planning and decision-making processes MARPOL X X X
relating to sustainable and responsible governance of the Arctic OSPAR X X X
Ocean” (France). A global approach is reflected by the policies Paris Agreement X X X
of Japan. The EU and its interests in the Arctic, such as environ-
SOLAS X X X
mental protection and sustainability, is recognized by France as
Spitsbergen Treaty X X X
“the world’s largest maritime economic power” (France), and
by Italy and by Spain as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and UNCLOS X X X X X
Security Policy. Only Germany explicitly notes Indigenous peo-
ples’ right to self-determination. Table 67. International Agreements and Treaties

Overall, a striking similarity is the observers’ recognition of the Among the international organizations mentioned are: BEAC
Arctic Council, and in the twofold interpretation of Arctic/Arc- (France, Germany, Spain); CBSS (Spain); EPB (France, Germa-
tic Ocean governance based on the existing Arctic structures, in ny, Italy, Netherlands, Spain); EU (especially by France, EU’s
particular, the AC and international regimes; and also the uni- CFSP by Germany, EU Mediterranean policy by Spain); EU’s
versal freedom and rights of non-Arctic states to be involved in ND (France, Germany, Spain); G7 (UK); IMO (France, Japan,
Arctic Ocean governance. PRC, UK); AHDR (ROK); IASC (Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
PRC, ROK, Spain); IPCC (Italy, Netherlands); ICSU (Italy);
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in- NEAFC (Germany); UN Security Council (PRC); UNEP (UK);
dicator is the second-most quoted issue in these national poli- UNFCCC (PRC, Spain).
cies. That is why international cooperation in and for the Arctic,
as well as international rules for the region based on agreements

ROK 2013
NLD 2014
GER 2013
FRA 2016

PRC 2018
JPN 2015

ESP 2016
ITA 2015

UK 2018
and treaties on the Arctic/Arctic Ocean, are so greatly empha-
sized by the national policies; for example, to stand “for steadily
advancing international cooperation on the Arctic” (PRC); or to EPB X X X X X
“reaffirm our commitment to support and work in partnership
EU X X X
with the eight Arctic States and the region’s Indigenous peoples,
to uphold this position” (UK). IASC X X X X X X
IMO X X X X
Following on from the previous indicator, the focus of a few
policies (e.g., France) is on international cooperation concern- Table 68. International Organizations
ing the Arctic Ocean. “Science-driven research, which should
include the effectiveness of existing law” is also reflected (the Among the international forums mentioned are: Arctic Circle
Netherlands). Being present in relevant international forums on (PRC, ROK, UK); Arctic Frontier (PRC, ROK, UK); Territory
the Arctic is important “to promote France’s interests” (France); of Dialogue (PRC).
or to “have a high profile in the forums, initiatives, and actions
carried out in the areas of scientific research, technology, sus- All in all, it is fragmented how international forums are pre-
tainable use of natural resources, and freedom of navigation” ferred, as UNCLOS is explicitly mentioned by five policies,
(Spain). Bilateral relations with the Arctic states will bring IASC by six ones, and IMO by four ones.
“greater depth to our Arctic engagement” (UK).
The Environmental Protection indicator is not among the
Among mentioned international agreements and treaties are: most-quoted issues of the national policies of the nine Arctic
UNCLOS (France, Germany, Italy, PRC, UK); UN Charter Council’s observer countries, and is emphasized by France, Ita-
(PRC); Polar Code (France, Japan); MARPOL (France, Ger- ly, PRC, and the UK (more than 10 % each). The starting point
many, Japan); CBD (Germany, Italy); CLRTAP (Italy); MEPC here is, not surprisingly, the consideration of the Arctic as “one
(France); SOLAS (France, Italy, Japan); HABITAT III (Ita- of the most vulnerable of our planet” (Italy), an “ecologically
ly); STCW (Japan); Kyoto Protocol (Japan, PRC); Spitsber- significant and sensitive region” (Germany), including a “partic-
gen Treaty (Germany, PRC, ROK); Prevention of Unregulat- ularly fragile marine environment” (France), and that “the poles
ed High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (France); are extremely sensitive to changes in climate” (the Netherlands).
Ilulisat Declaration (France); OSPAR (Germany, Spain, UK); Thus, any changes and their impacts “on the Earth as a whole
Minamata Convention (UK); UNSDG (UK); Paris Agreement must be understood with a comprehensive and wide-ranging
(PRC, Spain, UK); Convention of Protection of Marine Envi- perspective” (Japan); and environmental protection and secu-
ronment of N-E Atlantic (Germany); SAR and two other AC rity are tied and fostered together (Spain). Arctic regional ac-
treaties (PRC, Germany). tion must also be taken for environmental protection and there

244
 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

must be “sustainable exploitation and conservation of biodiver-

ROK 2013
NLD 2014
GER 2013
FRA 2016

PRC 2018
sity and environmental quality” (the Netherlands). Establishing

JPN 2015

ESP 2016
ITA 2015

UK 2018
“a framework for the sustainable management of Arctic fish-
eries” is defined as important (France). The PRC promises to
Marine litter X X
support the Arctic coastal states “in their efforts to reduce pol-
lutants in the Arctic waters from land-based sources.” Ship discharge, oil X X X X
Greenhouse gases X X X
Protected areas and/or biodiversity are identified as being im- Black carbon X X X
portant (by France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, PRC, Spain, Plastic X
UK), although it is not proposed that the Arctic should “become
a national park but…continue as a lived, and managed, environ- Table 69. Pollutants
ment” (UK). Monitoring is not explicitly discussed by most of
the policies, except France which would “step up the exchange
of oceanographic information between the French Navy and its Polluters are not explicitly mentioned in any of the policies.
foreign counterparts.” Only the PRC mentions risk assessment. However, it is noted that there are “pollutants… [that] originate
outside the region” (UK), and that “expanded economic activi-
As a conclusion, protected areas are mentioned by seven poli- ties” are resulting in pollution of the air and water (Japan).
cies, and monitoring by none.
All in all, there is fragmentation in pollutants, similarities with
The Pollution indicator is among the least-quoted indicators of polluters, since they are only pointed indirectly, coming from
the national policies, with only Germany, Italy, and the UK plac- “outside the region”.
ing some emphasis on the issue (more than 7 % each). The ROK
does not include the indicator. Echoing the previous indicator, it The Climate Change indicator is not among the most-quoted is-
is not surprising that the starting point here is the consideration sues of the national policies of these observer countries. Climate
that “the Arctic is becoming increasingly polluted,” and visit- change is, however, explicitly and evenly discussed in all the pol-
ed (UK). “The vast majority of litter and pollutants impacting icies (between 6 and 10 %), except for the ROK (only 2 %). The
the Arctic originate outside the region” (UK); greenhouse gases countries note that “the consequences of climate change in the
that reach the polar environments… [are generated] outside the Arctic are dramatic” (Germany), and that the Arctic is warm-
polar regions in areas [through] high-intensity urbanization, in- ing much faster compared to global average warming (UK);
dustrialization and farming“ (Spain). Pollution is “an accepted “the Arctic environment is responding very sensitively to global
scientific fact” (Spain), and it “is essential for us to take action” warming” (Japan), and there are also consequences and impacts
(UK), with problem solving through scientific research (the [of warming in the Arctic] for non-Arctic regions (Germany,
Netherlands). Netherlands). The scientific evidence “defines [as]‘extremely
likely’ the link between climate change and human activities”
A few policies explicitly mention the interdependence and in- (Italy). Indeed, Italy explains that global warming is one of the
terrelations between the Arctic and global perspective and motivations for Italian presence in the Arctic. To address warm-
therefore the UK “will continue to display the same strong lead- ing in the Arctic we must be prepared to make use of “the best
ership shown when we became the 1st country in the world to available scientific knowledge at any given moment” (Spain).
set legally binding emission reduction targets.”
Potential impacts on economic opportunities of Arctic warming
Among explicitly mentioned pollutants are: “pollutants… [that] are also recognized by France, the Netherlands, and the PRC.
originate outside the region” (UK); marine litter (PRC, UK);
ship discharge, offshore dumping & oil spills, air pollution ( The scientific community is important in terms of problem-solv-
France, Germany, Japan, PRC); greenhouse gas emissions (Ger- ing in the Arctic (Germany), with the region having become “an
many, Netherlands, Spain); plastic (UK); mercury (UK); black important natural laboratory for studying climate change at the
carbon (Germany, Italy, UK); SLCFs (methane, HLC, black car- global level.” The Netherlands in this regard mentions the work
bon) (Germany, Italy); sea transport, tourism, mining and har- of the IPCC and AMAP.
bour operations (Italy); mining (France).
Mitigation is explicitly noted by Japan “if effective mitigation
measures are not taken… a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean… is
likely…[and] advanced efforts in both mitigation and adapta-
tion” are needed. Mitigation is also mentioned by France. The
UK mentions its “strong record of implementing policies that
mitigate the release of harmful emissions into the atmosphere”
(UK). Spain notes mitigation and adaptation in the context of
UNFCCC.

245
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

As a conclusion, adaptation or mitigation are not explicitly

ROK 2013
NLD 2014
GER 2013
FRA 2016

PRC 2018
JPN 2015

ESP 2016
ITA 2015
noted by Germany, Italy, Netherlands, PRC, and ROK. The

UK 2018
PRC uses the term “emission reduction measures” taking place
in China. IMO X X X X X
Polar Code X X X X X X
The Security indicator is among the least-quoted issues of the
national policies of the nine Arctic Council observer countries. SAR Agreement X X
Only France, Germany, Japan, PRC, and the UK explicitly note
Table 70. Safety
the issue (more than 5 % each). The Netherlands and the ROK
do not refer to security.
Finally, food/water safety is not explicitly noted by the policies,
Partly reflecting the Governance indicator, several policies re- except by Japan.
fer to the objective of maintaining the Arctic “as a peaceful and
stable region” (UK) based on the maxim, “Let the North Pole be The Economy indicator is the third most-quoted issue, as men-
a pole of peace” (France). Peace and stability must be promot- tioned earlier, and occurs quite evenly in national Arctic poli-
ed in the Arctic, including the security of maritime trade and cies. In particular, the PRC and ROK focus on economic activi-
transport, as stated by the PRC. The fostering of “peacekeeping, ties in, and related to, the Arctic (more than 20 % each).
environmental protection and security in the polar regions” is
mentioned by Spain. The Arctic states and the Arctic Council This indicator is a broad one, as among the explicitly identified
are identified as the appropriate bodies for promoting mutual economic and commercial activities in the Arctic are marine
confidence in the region (Italy, UK). transport (e.g., energy, cargo, tourism) and shipping, fisheries,
exploitation of oil, gas, mineral and other non-living resources,
There is also concern that the overlapping interests of Arctic energy supply, tourism, and international trade. All these ac-
states could trigger a geopolitical race for sovereignty or natural tivities are poised to “bring about major social and economic
resources (Germany). Japan’s policy reflects the importance of changes, and exert important influence on the way of work and
preventing “moves to strengthen military presence in the re- life of Arctic residents” (PRC).
gion,” and of paying “full attention to security developments in
the Arctic.” A few policies, such as those of Germany and the Concerning fisheries, the Spanish strategy is twofold: first,
UK, explicitly note and discuss defence and military-security Spain confirms that it will carry out fishing activities in accor-
activities. NATO is mentioned by Germany and the UK, al- dance with international/national regulations, and to ensure
though the military alliance has kept a low profile in the Arctic the sector’s sustainability, “which includes respecting the envi-
since the annexation in Crimea. In addition to the Arctic Secu- ronment and combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated
rity Forces Roundtable, “there should be a bilateral approach fo- fishing.” Second, Spain recalls that the “fishing industry must
cusing on practical objectives” (France, Germany), such as cold consider …that the management of fishery resources is an EU
weather training exercises (UK). mandate… that Spain, as an EU Member State, is now a mem-
ber of the NEAFC, whose remit includes Arctic waters.” The UK
All in all, concerning the global perspective, the UN Charter Government, based on its experience of the Arctic, undertakes
and UN Security Council are explicitly noted by PRC. to “continue to adopt a science-led, precautionary and ecosys-
tem-based approach to the establishment and management of
The Safety and SAR indicator is quoted a little more than the any new and emerging fisheries in the Arctic region” (UK 2018).
Security indicator in all the policies. Safety here is primarily
defined to mean maritime safety and thus focus on maritime Furthermore, companies of several non-Arctic states already
transport and shipping (e.g., Germany, UK). There is an insuf- have “political and economic interests in the Arctic” (France),
ficient emergency rescue capacity (Germany). Increased eco- such as Total and Engie of France, and several other French
nomic activities and tourism could pose safety risks for local companies present in the Canadian, Norwegian, and Russian
communities and the environment (Netherlands, UK). Arctic that are “bound to grow” (France); “Germany and its
companies” as well as the European Investment Bank is men-
Concerning international agreements on maritime and other tioned by Germany; Eni by Italy; JOGMEC by Japan; Shell by
safety measures, the focus is on IMO (France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands; and the Polar Silk Road initiative by the PRC.
PRC, Spain); SAR Agreement (Germany, UK); the Polar Code Resource utilization is carried out in cooperation with the
(France, Japan, PRC, ROK, Spain, UK); SOLAS and MARPOL Arctic states, for example, to “pursue joint research… in the
(France); the 2013 EU Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and fields of resources development, cargo shipping infrastructure,
Gas Operations (Italy); UNCLOS (Spain); and the goals of the transshipment ports, and the commercial use of NSRs”, or to
Association of Arctic Cruise Operators of “managing responsi- “develop Offshore Plant Technology for Deepwater Resources
ble, environmentally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and Development” (ROK).
[striving] to set the highest possible operating standards” (UK).

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 Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

This indicator clearly notes the ambivalence of Arctic develop- All in all, the policies of the PRC and ROK, in particular, focus
ment in the 21st century. Around “20 to 30 percent of the world’s on economic activities in, and related to, the Arctic.
undiscovered fossil fuels… are suspected to lie north of the
Arctic Circle” (Germany). The Arctic is a region with a fragile The Tourism indicator is the least-quoted issue of the national
ecosystem, which would “pose immense challenges, such as the policies of the nine Arctic Council’s observer countries, as only
need to mitigate the inevitable loss of biodiversity, the increased France, Germany, the Netherlands and UK have put some em-
risk of sea pollution and the impact on the ways of life of Indige- phasis on the issue (between 2 and 3 %). Japan and ROK do not
nous populations” (France); the rapid and significant changes in explicitly include the indicator.
the region bring and provide new major economic and business
opportunities for and in the Arctic: for example, “shipping and New transport routes also mean new opportunities for polar
fisheries” (France) as a policy goal of several non-Arctic states, tourism (Germany, the Netherlands). All forms of tourism in
such as France, Germany, PRC, and the ROK. As a result of cli- the Arctic, “from small expedition ships to large convention-
mate change “new opportunities are arising in this connection, al cruise liners” (UK), in particular “pleasure cruises” is on the
for example, for fisheries, maritime routes and tourism” (Germa- increase and has been booming in recent years (France, Germa-
ny). At the same time as advocating “protection and rational use ny). Correspondingly, tourism is defined to be a field of “spe-
of the region,” the PRC encourages “its enterprises to engage in cial interest” in Arctic affairs (Spain), or ‘Arctic tourism’ is “an
international cooperation on the exploration for and utilization emerging industry” (PRC).
of Arctic resources by making the best use of their advantages in
capital, technology and domestic market,” for example, for the Finally, there is good reason to support “safe, responsible and
Polar Silk Road initiative. Interestingly, the UK explicitly defines sustainable tourism in the Arctic (UK) and despite SAR and
the implementation of the initiative as having potential risks. the legal regimes “extra caution is required when planning all
tourism activities and maritime operations in the Arctic” (UK).
The French Policy points out its “ecological ethics concerns about Further, tourism agencies and professionals, as well as tourists,
the region in its ‘Grenelle’ environment project:… “with the aim need training and a regulatory regime (PRC). Providing sus-
of protecting the Arctic environment” (France). Thus, there is the tainable tourism means meeting the most strongest safety and
other side of the coin, which is the main reason why this indi- environmental standards (Germany).
cator explicitly includes sustainable development. For example,
“urban sustainable development is one of Italian national priori- The Infrastructure indicator is one of the least-quoted issues of
ties. The approach to Arctic activities of the Italian company Eni, the national policies of the Arctic Council’s observer countries,
is based on key principles, such as “operations are to be conduct- mentioned only by France, Germany, Japan, and Spain (5 % or
ed only during periods of the year when repercussions on the more).
marine environment (in particular, on mammals) are minimal”
and “local inhabitants have to be involved and informed” (Italy); In all of the policies, except for Italy, infrastructure means
there is a need “to examine how we can contribute to achieve marine transportation, navigation and/or shipping. Germany
sustainable development of which Indigenous peoples can see places strong emphasis on the safety of maritime transport. As
benefits, while protecting the foundations of traditional cultures mentioned earlier, the Spanish Polar Strategy concerns marine
and lifestyles” (Japan); “exploitation of resources in the polar re- transportation and shipping, which brings a strong global per-
gions and their transport must be carried out in a stable, sustain- spective and global scale to this indicator. Aviation is not explic-
able and environmentally-friendly manner” (Spain). itly mentioned by any of the policies.

Further, the Dutch polar strategy demonstrates synergy between The Arctic is “a laboratory for new technologies in informa-
the business and scientific community interpreting scientific re- tion and communication, robotics, automation, airborne
search to be important “to the Dutch business community and systems and sensors” (France). The “development of environ-
to the Dutch government.” The 2018 UK Policy looks for a bal- ment-friendly polar technical equipment… [is vital] in the
ance by “promoting the Arctic as a place where economic and building of infrastructure for Arctic development” (PRC). In-
commercial development occurs in a sustainable and responsi- novation, particularly technological innovation, is explicitly
ble manner… where the people of the region benefit from the noted by France, Italy, and the UK as an important part of this
prosperity that a changing Arctic may bring [and which] also indicator. Investments in renewable energy and development of
supports “UK companies investing in the Arctic; making them ‘green’ products are mentioned by Italy.
aware, and connecting them to, the opportunities available” (UK
2018). And at the same time, conservation is defined “of high As a conclusion, a striking similarity between the policies is that
importance but… will be maintained alongside the utilisation of they all explicitly note marine transportation, navigation and/or
Arctic resources” (UK 2018). shipping, and do not note aviation.

Finally, the Arctic Economic Council, established in 2014, is ex-

plicitly mentioned by Spain and the UK.

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Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States

The Science and Education indicator is the most-quoted issue Education in general is explicitly mentioned only by Italy and
area in research and scientific cooperation by the national pol- the UK, and UArctic (University of the Arctic) by PRC, ROK
icies of the Arctic Council’s Observer countries. In particular, and the UK.
the policies of the Netherlands, ROK, and Spain focus greatly
on scientific research in the Arctic (30 % or more): note that, All in all, in the Science indicator, a striking similarity among
in the case of the Netherlands and Spain, the actual focus is documents is mention of the research station in Svalbard.
research on the polar regions.
The Implementation indicator is explicitly included in the na-
It is suggested by many of the policies (e.g., Germany, the tional policies of France, ROK, and Spain, but not in those of
Netherlands) that research drivers are related to the environ- Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, PRC, and the UK.
ment and climate change ‘Space for science’ (Netherlands);
fisheries (Spain). As a conclusion, this section shows, that based on the used
quantitative measuring the indicator most-quoted by the na-
Traditional knowledge is explicitly mentioned only in the pol- tional Arctic policies and strategies of the nine Observer States
icy documents of the ROK and the UK. is the Science & Education indicator, followed by the Interna-
tional Cooperation and Economy indicators. The fourth is the
Among the different types of research infrastructure includ- new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of En-
ed are: i) research institutes—national (e.g. AWI in Germany) vironmental Protection coupled with Pollution and Climate
and international (e.g. IASC, EPB); ii) research stations, most- Change). These top four indicators accord more or less with the
ly in Svalbard, by France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, official priorities or policy goals/aims/principles of these states’
PRC, ROK, UK; iii) research vessels and expeditions by Italy, national policies.
PRC, ROK, UK; iv) new technological equipment (e.g., sat-
ellites); v) scientific or science-related international networks Finally, at the end of this research, in a synthesis of the different
and conferences (e.g., IPY by France, ASSW by Japan, Arc- parts of this study, the national policies of the Arctic Council
tic conferences in Berlin by Germany, Tavolo Artico by Italy, observer states will be discussed with respect to the national
CNARC by PRC); and vi) research funding/funders—both na- policies of the Arctic states and the policies of the PPs on the
tional funds (e.g., NERC in UK) and international ones (e.g., one hand, and on the other hand, based on the analyses of these
EU Framework Programmes). existing policies main themes will be concluded as new and
emerging trends of Arctic governance and geopolitics.
ROK 2013
NLD 2014
GER 2013
FRA 2016

PRC 2018
JPN 2015

ESP 2016
ITA 2015

UK 2018

Research institutes X X
Research stations X X X X X X X X
Research vessels X X X X
Formal networks X X X X X X X X
Informal networks X X X X
Education & UArctic X X X X

Table 71. Research Infrastructure

248
Conclusions:
Synthesis and Trends

How can one begin to describe, define, and interpret the reality bringing relevant stakeholders together for fruitful dialogues
of the Arctic, or even try to (re)shape its politics? There are every year and identifying the sustainability indicators needed
many different perceptions and discourses and much mis-/dis- to guide decision-makers along the right pathways.
information about the Arctic in the media, on the part of policy
makers, and among researchers. Traditional images and visions As mentioned in the Introduction, the mainstream narrative
also abound—the Arctic as a homeland for Indigenous peo- of international Arctic cooperation is based on the notion of
ples, a place on the world’s margins, storehouse of resources, ‘constructive cooperation.’ The Arctic States, through their
military theater of the Cold War, and environmental linchpin commitment to sustainable development and protection of
for the planet (e.g., AHDR 2004; Contesting the Arctic 2015). the Arctic environment, recognize the value of high geopo-
litical stability and are committed to maintaining it through
There are Arctic development success stories, such as the main- international, mostly functional, cooperation. Behind this lie
tenance of cultural integrity, technological advances, and po- States’ common interests and some important prerequisites for
litical and legal innovations (see, Human Development Report international cooperation (e.g., Heininen 2018). These include
2004, esp. pp. 229–237). There are trends and megatrends, such the original nature of Arctic militarization as a means of global
as increased urbanization, dependency on financial transfers, nuclear deterrence, the high degree of legal certainty, the re-
and resource exploitation (Nordic Council on Ministers 2011). lated policies to avoid armed conflicts, and the positive stance
Narratives also exist on how the development and future of the regarding the regional devolution of power. Building on these
Arctic region is being (re)constructed. principles, the Arctic States, supported by Indigenous peoples
and local communities, have consciously constructed their
One widespread narrative is related to development projects own reality of post–Cold War governance and geopolitics.
throughout the North. These are far from over; they will con-
tinue both as new and traditional economic opportunities with Related to this is the ardent narrative of ‘Our shared home-
different implications for regional development. According land’ through which the Arctic Indigenous peoples emphasize
to Petrov (2018, p.7), “the State has controlled the state of the self-determination, including Greenland self-governance and
North” in Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), in Canada, and Indigenous rights. This approach is due greatly to cultural in-
in several Nordic countries. The State is “the central negotia- tegrity. Cultures and languages have been resilient in the face of
tor… in the ‘hegemonic project’ of developing the frontier.” The rapid and multi-dimensional changes, and the Arctic people’s
bottom line of this particular narrative is “that the evolution of consciousness of their own nationhood is reflected in a growing
development paradigms (propagated by the State) has always demand for self-determination and satisfaction of their rights.
been followed by the transformation of public policies.”
Another narrative relates to the increasing use of, and poten-
Here, the question is if state centrism would still be the right tial race for, Arctic natural resources, as the rising temperatures
recipe for the Arctic region, when development needs and de- and melting sea ice expose previously economically non-viable
sires differ. Or do different (regional) development trajectories sources of hydrocarbons and other minerals, fishing grounds,
need to be captured, given that the pathways of different Arctic hydro power, and even fresh water (e.g., Smith, 2010). Despite
regions toward sustainability differ one from another? For ex- the fact that Arctic waters will be icy or slush-covered for de-
ample, would Indigenous self-reliance in managing renewable cades, decreasing sea ice will open up new economically and
resources help maintain ecological balance? Or, would a trian- technically viable trans-Arctic shipping routes, simultaneously
gular alliance of government, academia, and private business with a growth in industrial interests. This has the potential to
be beneficial? A successful combination of development path- lead to growing infrastructure development, increasing pres-
ways, determined by public policy, research, as well as econom- sure on the Arctic ecosystem, and even to emerging conflicts
ic action by the public and private sectors, is needed. Strong between the Arctic States and major non-Arctic States. The
stakeholder engagement is necessary to reveal those desired Doomsday scenario is that the sea cover of the Arctic Ocean
futures. For example, the so-called “Oulu phenomenon” came will rapidly disappear, and that most of the glaciers and per-
about through the engagement of university, municipal ad- mafrost will melt. The significant rise in sea levels, as well as
ministration, and commercial companies (https://www.ouka. increasing uncertainty, will decrease human and societal secu-
fi/oulu/english/phenomena-from-oulu). The Arctic Circle As- rity in the Arctic and globally, in particular in coastal areas of
sembly (www.ArcticCircle.org), on the other hand, grew from developing countries and small island States.

249
Conclusions: Synthesis and Trends

Thus, the question of future development, when defining societal of perceptions, visions, and narratives there are concerning the
security, is not only about how to tackle resources— either too region: this will give them a better understanding of processes
many or too few—but also how to resolve ethical questions, as taking place in, and impacting, the Arctic now and in future. It
well as the role of environmental protection and sustainable de- would also be politically useful for Arctic stakeholders, as well
velopment. Key questions of the global climate ethics debate, such as the Arctic Council, to know more about new and/or emerg-
as moral responsibility and distribution of burdens and benefits, ing trends in Arctic governance and geopolitics that underpin
have recently found their way into Arctic politics (Palosaari and these processes—this is the final task of our scientific study.
Tynkkynen 2015; also Conference Statement of Parliamentarians
of the Arctic Region 2018), as part of the Global Arctic narrative.
There are conflicting views, ranging from support for unlimited Summary of Priorities of
oil and gas development by State-owned and private oil compa-
nies through to the proposal by international environmental or- Arctic Policies/Strategies
ganizations for an offshore oil drilling ban. There are also varying
views regarding the extent to which stakeholders—governments, All the Arctic States, except the United States of America, clearly
companies, communities, and Indigenous peoples—are respon- declare the economy/(socio)economic development to be a pri-
sible for mitigating climate change and reducing the related un- ority, and hold climate change or environmental protection as an-
certainty, at a time when some are stressing economic growth and other priority, which is striking. All countries, except Canada and
others are highlighting the environmental risks of exploitation. Sweden, state that international cooperation is a priority, which
The new ethical questions regarding Arctic oil and gas develop- is relevant. As an overall conclusion, a comparison of the current
ment have a fundamental global dimension, highlighted by an official national strategies and policies shows economy/economic
‘Arctic Paradox,’ namely, that global warming will open access development, international cooperation, and environmental pro-
to resources whose utilization will speed up the changes and the tection to be the overarching priorities of the Arctic States.
melting of sea ice.
On the other hand, according to the coding of different indicators
Finally, due to climate change and its implications for global in the present analysis, the most-coded quotes are ordered as fol-
security, there is a narrative that seeks an urgent shift in mind- lows: Governance, the new Environmental Protection indicator
set toward political ability and the search for a new security (composed of Environmental Protection coupled with Pollution
paradigm for the Arctic (e.g., Climate Change and Arctic Se- and Climate Change), Economy, International Cooperation, and
curity 2019). The narrative further holds that an issue-oriented the Human Dimension.
change ‘from theory to action’ could be facilitated via a co-de-
sign approach involving all relevant stakeholders and based on The Arctic Council chairmanship programs tend to focus on
open dialogue and transdisciplinarity. Instead of the ‘political issues pertaining to the Environmental Protection indicator. In
inability’ of the Arctic states, ‘ethics’ will be applied and ‘po- the past few years there has also been a focus on pollutants that
litical ability’ achieved so that strict environmental protection contribute to climate change. As for the social aspect, there is an
can be adopted. Stricter environmental regulations are possible, overall focus on health and wellbeing, and also on culture and/
even to stop offshore drilling in Arctic seas; resilient solutions or language protection. Gender equality shows up on the agenda
and building a ‘regional security community’ are also possible. every few years or so. Maritime safety, as a part of the Safety &
However, all this calls for a holistic understanding of the state SAR (search and rescue) indicator has also emerged as a safety
of the Arctic and its governance and geopolitics, and of what concern over the past few chairmanship programs.
kind of policies stakeholders have adopted, and are designing,
for the region and its future development. The content of the ministerial declarations of the Arctic Council
tend to prioritize issues around the International Cooperation,
Strategies and policies are developed within the geopolitical Governance, Human Dimension and Environmental Protection
context of the region, as described earlier in this study. Howev- indicators, which have proved to be the most-quoted indicators
er, as they are generally designed to be in place for a few years, over time. The declarations all mainly deal—directly or indirect-
they cannot always account for specific events/issues of world ly—with the two main functions of the Arctic Council: environ-
politics as they develop (e.g., Ukraine) (see, Figure 3, Arctic mental protection and sustainable development. Under the Hu-
Events - International Events, p. 23). However, to address the man Dimension indicator there is also a focus on issues related to
issues, they should be able to provide the governance structure ensuring the health and wellbeing of Northerners. Issues related
that informs States’ work. This is where the Declarations of the to the Economy and Infrastructure indicators are also discussed,
Arctic Council Ministerials can provide further guidance ev- although not to the same extent as the others.
ery two years, not only to the Council, but also to the Member
States, the Permanent Participants, and the Observer States and The policy documents of the four Indigenous peoples’ organiza-
other Observers. tions, as among the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Coun-
cil, are somewhat fragmented. They do not cover all the indica-
Against a background of significant multidimensional change, tor fields in full detail, as their focus varies. There is a striking
it is important, even crucial, for the Arctic States, Indigenous similarity in that all policy documents explicitly address issues
peoples organizations, and non-Arctic States to know what kind surrounding the issue of Indigenous rights (individual and col-

250
 Conclusions: Synthesis and Trends

lective) as a part of the Human Dimension indicator (although in 2) Ambivalence of Arctic development. Although the Arc-
different contexts), and also those related to the Governance indi- tic States are searching for a balance between environmen-
cator, both broadly and in detail. Moreover, the importance of the tal protection and economic activities, and proclaim that
International Cooperation (and treaties) indicator is highlight- there must be such a balance, there is ambivalence when it
ed. Unlike environmental protection, pollution and/or climate comes to environmental protection versus economic devel-
change are not explicitly covered by all documents. Unsurprising- opment. Climate change—due to rapid changes in fragile
ly, all the documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous ecosystems and thereby better access to the Arctic lands—is
peoples to use/utilize the resources of their homelands and also driving the utilization of resources and economic activities
the importance of ‘Traditional knowledge.’ in the public and private sectors. There are environmen-
tal initiatives, as well as small steps, such as protected areas
Based on the quantitative measuring carried out in this study, and legally binding agreements under the auspices of the
the indicator most-quoted by the national Arctic policies and Arctic Council, such as the SAR and Oil Spill agreements.
strategies of the nine Observer States of the Arctic Council is
the Science & Education indicator, followed by the International Although one of the narratives mentioned is environmen-
Cooperation and Economy indicators. The fourth is the new En- tal protection and implementation of sustainability, neither
vironmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental stricter environmental regulations nor an ‘Arctic Treaty’ are
Protection coupled with Pollution and Climate Change). These preferred by the Arctic States. It is thus not surprising that
top four indicators accord more or less with the official priorities most of the States focus their economic activities on the ex-
or policy goals/aims/principles of these states’ national policies. tractive resources (e.g., mining, energy). Tourism, which
is not reflected in most of the policies has also been on the
Finally, in addition to the narratives mentioned above, we pres- increase. This has created an overall sense that infrastructure
ent the main themes, as new and/or emerging trends of Arc- development should support economic activities, especially
tic governance and geopolitics in the 21st century based on the in the shipping industry (in spite of safety concerns).
analyses of the existing Arctic policies and strategies of the Arc-
tic States, Permanent Participants, Observer States, and the Arc- 3) Science in focus. The role of science is increasing. Mainly
tic Council chairmanship programs and declarations, as well as due to the pressure of climate change,the Arctic States have
their priorities. This information is useful for policy makers and learned to use, and have come to depend upon, scientific re-
researchers for further discussion in the context of different im- search for decision-making, including international scientif-
ages and perceptions and the dominant narratives of the Arctic ic cooperation. This is despite pollution and environmental
mentioned above. protection not being considered a trigger or driver of policy
in the 1990s, when the Arctic Council was established. At the
same time, there is a growing need and general trend toward
New/Emerging Trends of increasing access to educational/training programs to prepare
Northerners for work in the natural resources sector, although
Arctic States traditionally, the improvement of educational attainment has
been more or less neglected in the past.
1) State domination. The Arctic States dominate Arctic geo-
politics and governance, and play a crucial role in controlling 4) Political inability. Mitigate or adapt to climate change? There
the region. The new Arctic dynamics has been influenced by is no consensus on this question in the current strategies.
the involvement of Indigenous peoples and their demands, Some focus on adapting to climate change and others see ad-
which has put human and social issues on the agenda, and by aptation as a way of mitigating these changes. That said, just
the visibly growing interest of non-Arctic states in the future over half of the strategies identify greenhouse gases as a con-
of the Arctic. This is based on the high level of geopolitical cern and discuss ways of counteracting emissions. Again, no
stability and constructive cooperation—in this context, even strict environmental regulations are implemented, nor is an
the Ukrainian conflict has had very limited impact on Arc- ‘Arctic Treaty’ proposed. Instead, there is ‘political inability.’
tic cooperation. Thus, the Arctic has become ‘exceptional’
in world politics, with State sovereignty firmly legitimized.
New/Emerging Trends of AC Chair-
On the other hand, the intention of Arctic States to dominate
in the region is due to globalization and rapidly advancing manship Programs and Declarations
climate change, which means better access to Arctic resourc-
es and better chances for economic activities and develop- Chairmanship Programs
ment. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is
a willingness yet to adopt globalization per se into national 1) Fragmented priorities. Although environmental protec-
Arctic policies—there is more of an interest in accepting a tion and sustainable development, as Arctic Council func-
transformation of the Arctic Council from being the leading tions, are evenly presented, priorities in the Arctic are frag-
regional council to becoming a leading international one. mented and based on national interests. There are a variety
of foci, including recognition of culture, language, tradi-

251
Conclusions: Synthesis and Trends

tional knowledge, wellbeing, (mental) health, and gender and bio-resources, blue economy, Indigenous food (safety),
equality (although not consistently discussed). Interesting- ecosystem-based management, and support for the Arc-
ly, food security is generally not a focus of the programs, tic Economic Council as an operational body between the
which is surprising as access to healthy food is integral to public and private sectors.
health and wellbeing.
4) Transfers of pollutants. There are transfers of pollution,
2) Ambivalence of Arctic development. The search for a bal- in particular from outside the Arctic region, from radioac-
ance between the environment and economy (sustainable de- tivity (e.g., AMEC) and heavy metals to black carbon, and
velopment) emphasizes living marine resources, blue econo- methane (as GHGs) and other short-lived climate forcers
my, shipping, and tourism. Yet, despite the consensus that the and micro-plastics. Other pollutants are named in specif-
environment and economy must be balanced, there is little ic treaties relating to the pollutant in question. While the
emphasis on international cooperation or sharing best prac- declarations do address new problems as they emerge: (e.g.,
tices in this area. This seems odd, given that what happens in climate change pollutants and oil, starting with the Tromsø
one country can have effects in another. Declaration in 2009), there has also been consistency in
terms of concerns about POPs and mercury also continu-
3) Transfer of pollutants. A range of pollutants—POPs, PCBs, ing to be raised. At the same time, there is little discussion
mercury and radioactivity, black carbon, methane, marine about general shipping waste and oil pollution, which links
litter and micro-plastics—are mentioned, and there are some to the support of new economic activities.
interesting patterns. For instance, the earlier programs bare-
ly mention different pollutants, and it is not until Sweden’s 5) Focus on science. The focus on science, rather than educa-
chairmanship program in 2011 that there were consistent tion is growing, with the exception that the University of the
discussions around the different climate change pollutants. Arctic is explicitly mentioned. That said, education could
Maritime safety, search and rescue, as well as the Polar Code become an emerging issue, with the Fairbanks Declaration
and SAR, are also addressed, although more consistently in (2017) discussing general attainment and the Rovaniemi
the recent programs, suggesting that this has become a more Chair Statement (2019) seeking to ensure that “Indigenous
pressing issue, probably as access to Arctic waters increases. languages in education” are addressed.

4) Research vis-à-vis education. There is not much focus on the

purpose of research in the Arctic. Education is explicitly men- New/Emerging Trends of
tioned, both in terms of the University of the Arctic and forms
of distance or e-learning. That said, there is a little discussion Permanent Participants
about improving attainment levels.
1) International treaties on Indigenous rights. The Permanent
Ministerial Declarations Participants seek to support Indigenous peoples and im-
plement their rights (including harvesting rights) through
1) Explicit priorities. The need for priorities per se and, with- international cooperation and agreements (especially the
in them, a transition toward underlining human and social UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights) and inter-
issues (e.g., mental health, wellbeing), governance (in partic- national organizations (via United Nations bodies and the
ular Arctic Council procedure), and safety and protection of Arctic Council). International treaties tie Indigenous rights
the Arctic Ocean (e.g., SAR Agreement); into international Arctic politics through the recognition of
Indigenous peoples as legitimate political entities and as part
2) Emphasis on stability. In preambles to ministerial declara- of the internationalized and (digitally) ‘connected world.’
tions since the Nuuk Declaration of 2011—and particularly
in the 2017 Fairbanks Declaration at which Ministerial the 2) Indigenous rights to self-determination and self-govern-
foreign ministers of all eight Arctic States were present for ment. ‘Indigenous rights,’ meaning individual and collective
the first time—the wording “Maintaining peace, stability and rights (including mental health, children’s education) are
constructive cooperation in the Arctic” is emphasized. This, connected to their right to manage (their own) territory, and
at the same time, maintains the commitment of the Ottawa use and develop its resources: economy as a means to self-de-
Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, not to deal termination/self-governance. Relevant here is ‘self-determi-
with military security. Despite this, the role of international nation’ vis-à-vis ‘self-governing’—are these synonyms or is
cooperation is less emphasized in the declarations. This de- there a transition towards self-government, with Indigenous
cline in discussion around international cooperation and peoples at different stages of nation-building?
international treaties is interesting, especially as worldwide
interest in the Arctic continues to grow. 3) Focus on science. To avoid neocolonialism and the ‘green’
colonialism (wind, hydro, wave power, etc.), scientific find-
3) New economic activities. There is an increase in (new) eco- ings should be further produced and developed together
nomic activities, and within them a shift toward renewables and in partnership with Indigenous peoples and incorporat-

252
 Conclusions: Synthesis and Trends

ing (Indigenous) knowledge. Development of proper means, 1) Ambivalence of Arctic development. Whenever a balance
such as ‘Indigenous-led impact assessments,’ as methods is sought between environmental protection and climate
and means for both a balance between (competing issues of) change mitigation vis-à-vis an increase in (new) economic
environmental protection and sustainable development and activities for Arctic (regional) development, there is ambiv-
self-determination/self-governing are suggested. alence, and this is largely due to ‘political inability’;

2) State domination vis-à-vis internationalization/globali-

New/Emerging Trends of zation (the global Arctic). There is a new kind of interre-
lationship, and a potentially competitive one, between i)
Observer States State domination (by the Arctic States) based on geopolit-
ical stability and (State) sovereignty; ii) internationaliza-
1) Arctic stakeholders. The Observer States of the Arctic tion/globalization (prompted by the Observer States and
Council are remapping and redefining their geographical due the growing number of Arctic stakeholders) based on
and geopolitical position related to the Arctic region, and international treaties, in particular, international maritime
have their own definitions of the Arctic and/or its special law, and iii) UN declarations regarding Indigenous rights
features. Moreover, many of them are re-identifying their and self-determination (emphasized by the Permanent
relationship with the Arctic, and self-identifying as Arctic Participants);
stakeholders; this includes adopting, and even updating,
their national policies/strategies, or other policy documents 3) Focus on science. The role of science is increasing due to
on the Arctic. the pressure of the rapidly advanced climate change and the
ambivalence, mentioned above, between economic activities
2) Global Arctic. The Observer States recognize the existing and environmental protection; all Arctic stakeholders (Arc-
governance structures and international agreements, as well tic States, Permanent Participants, Observer States) are de-
as the national jurisdictions of the Arctic States and their pendent for problem-solving on scientific research, as well
(small) populations, as a way of maintaining high geopolit- as international cooperation in science;
ical stability. At the same time, they are implementing in-
ternational treaties and agreements, in particular the United 4) The Arctic and Space: As an emerging trend is the close in-
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and terrelationship between the Arctic and the Space (e.g., ITC
recognizing international maritime law and globalization of and digital services & security, stable satellite communica-
the Arctic (a global Arctic), in order to adopt and maintain tion, meteorology as a new priority including the involve-
universal freedom and rights in Arctic Ocean governance. ment of the WMO) due to globalization and the rapidly ad-
vancing climate change in the Arctic and globally.
3) Ambivalence of Arctic development. The fragile Arctic
ecosystem is undergoing significant change, where new eco- **
nomic activities are becoming possible. Therefore ‘protected These new and/or emerging overall trends of Arctic governance
areas and/or conservation’ are deemed to be of ‘high[er] im- and geopolitics are linked with a few existing narratives. For ex-
portance,’ than strict environmental regulations or an ‘Arctic ample, the ambivalence of Arctic development trend is closely
Treaty,’ with adaptation and mitigation taking a less import- linked with the narrative of increasing use of/potential race for
ant role. resources and of the global climate ethics debate. The trend of
State domination vis-à-vis internationalization/globalization is
4) Focus on science. The Arctic as a ‘space for science’ leading linked to the narratives of State-controlled development pro-
to emphasis on research—the most quoted issue area—and jects and high stability. The focus on science trend deals with
on research stations within the region (Svalbard). At the the narrative of the global climate ethics debate in terms of de-
same time, ‘Traditional knowledge’ is less recognized, al- pending on science to solve ‘wicked’ anthropogenic problems;
though the Observer States have committed to respecting but it hesitates to implement the narrative of a paradigm shift.
the values, interests, and culture of Indigenous peoples and The final one—at this stage still a silent message—the Arctic and
other inhabitants of the Arctic region. Space is another possible global approach for the Arctic, which
has the potential to bring something new to the table.

New/Emerging Overall Trends

Finally, based on these lists of new/emerging trends (of Arctic
States, Arctic Council chairmanship programs and declarations,
Permanent Participants and Observer States), there is the fol-
lowing short list of overall new and/or emerging trends of the
future of Arctic governance and geopolitics:

253
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Appendix
CAN FIN ISL DNK NOR RUS SWE USA
2009 2013 2011 2011 2017 2013 2011 2013

(%)
Human Dimension 15 9 7 8 8 12 13 5
Governance 14 13 26 18 19 6 13 18
International Cooperation 11 8 16 13 12 6 12 15
Environmental Protection 9 6 3 7 6 5 8 9
Pollution 4 2 4 5 5 3 5 4
Climate Change 4 4 3 7 3 3 7 7
Security 10 7 12 8 3 5 4 9
Safety & SAR 5 6 5 6 8 6 4 7
Economy 11 20 13 12 18 19 13 8
Tourism 1 6 1 1 1 3 3 0
Infrastructure 8 9 4 6 8 24 7 7
Science and Education 8 9 6 8 9 9 13 11

Table 72. Current Arctic State Strategy Indicators as a Percent of Total Coded Quotes
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number.

FRA GER ITA JPN NLD PRC ROK ESP UK

2016 2013 2015 2015 2014 2018 2013 2016 2018
(%)
Human Dimension 5 3 7 4 0 4 5 3 7
Governance 10 15 6 7 13 12 10 10 3
International Cooperation 13 21 14 22 8 16 17 15 15
Environmental Protection 13 7 12 7 4 12 3 5 10
Pollution 3 7 9 3 2 2 0 3 8
Climate Change 6 6 10 10 10 7 2 9 8
Security 8 5 1 5 0 6 0 2 5
Safety & SAR 7 9 6 5 1 3 8 2 4
Economy 17 12 12 10 13 22 21 10 18
Tourism 3 1 1 0 3 2 0 1 2
Infrastructure 5 6 3 5 2 4 3 9 4
Science and Education 10 7 20 23 46 10 32 29 16

Table 73. Current Observer State Strategy Indicators as a Percent of Total Coded Quotes
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number.

263
Arctic Policies and Strategies —
Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends

The following are among the new and/or emerging trends of Arctic governance and
geopolitics in the early 21st century, as identified in this scientific report.

• Ambivalence of Arctic development, including ‘political inability,’ whenever a balance is being

sought between environmental protection and (new) economic activities;

• Focus on science, with all Arctic stakeholders being dependent on scientific research and
international cooperation in science for problem-solving because of climate change;

• Close interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g., digital security, satellites, and
meteorology as a new priority area) due to globalization and rapidly advancing climate
change in the Arctic.

Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the study delivers a systematic and holistic
analysis and synthesis of the existing policies and strategies of the Arctic States (Member
States), Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants), and non-Arctic
countries (Observer States), as well as pertinent Arctic Council chairmanship programs and
declarations.

The analysis is based on coding the text of 56 policy documents. It includes a description and
understanding of how perceptions of the Arctic and its mapping have changed over time. It
also considers how different States and Indigenous peoples’ organizations define and
address issues around the following: the human dimension, governance, international
cooperation, environmental protection, pollution, climate change, security, safety, economy,
tourism, infrastructure, and science & education. For each category of the above-mentioned
stakeholders, the findings are: i) compared within the category; and ii) discussed with each
other category-wise. Based on these analyses, new and emerging trends are recognized and
formulated, as a final synthesis, to describe and define the state of the Arctic in the 2020s.

This scientific report is a research activity of the Arctic Futures Initiative of the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). It is supported by the Arctic Circle Assembly
and the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) at the University of
Helsinki, as the major partners, and co-funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
and IIASA.

The research has been carried out by Professor Lassi Heininen, Dr. Karen Everett,
Dr. Barbora Padrtova, and Dr. Anni Reissell.

ISBN-10: 3-7045-0156-5
ISBN-13: 978-3-7045-0156-1
DOI: 10.22022/AFI/11-2019.16175
ZVR 524808900