STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS & CONSUMER COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. BCD-REA-2022-00010

RICHARD G, TAPPEN and

SHEILA TAPPEN,

Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim-Defendants,

JUDGMENT

CLARK T. HILL, et. al,

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Defendants and
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs. :
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Richard Tappen and Sheila Tappen ("Plaintiffs") filed a one-count Complaint in this matter

asserting their ownership of real estate located within the Popham Beach Estates subdivision, and :

seeking, in part, to exclude Defendants! from the property. In response, Defendants advance

counterclaims under which they allege competing rights over the real estate claimed by Plaintiffs:

easement by prescription, implied easement by subdivision and sale, and adverse possession.

As the case was tried, the court is confronted with the following issues to resolve.

1. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy an implied easement by subdivision and sale

over the Triangular Portion.

2. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy a prescriptive easement over any portion of the

Triangular Portion.

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Defendants are Clark Hill, Meredith Inosencio, Richard Hill, Dianna Kilgailen, Brian Kilgallen (the
"Individual Defendants"), and the Hill Family Cottage Corporation ("HFCC") (collectively, the
"Defendants"),

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 3. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy an easement by prescription over any portion of :

the property that the Plaintiffs purchased from Mary McNamara between the low tide

line and the southerly boundary of Lots 204, 205, 206, 207 and 208.

4. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy an easement by prescription over any portion of :

Lot 205. :

5. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy an implied easement by subdivision and sale over

any portion of the property that the Plaintiffs purchased from Mary McNamara between :

the low tide line and the southerly boundary of Lots 204, 205, 206, 207 and 208.

6. If any of the Defendants enjoy an implied easement over any portion of the property,

then what is the location of the boundary between Lot 205 and the boundary of Seawall

Beach as depicted on the plan.

7. Whether the Plaintiffs are liable to the Defendants for Slander of Title.

The issues that were not tried to the court include the public's right to use the beach; any

one's right to use a footpath crossing Lot 204; any property rights of any party other than those

joined in the lawsuit; or any challenge to the conveyance from McNamara to Plaintiffs, except to

the extent it is burdened by Defendants' claimed easement. :

When drafting the decision, the court realized it could not decide the boundary between :

the 200 numbered lots and Seawall Beach without the owners of those lots joined to the lawsuit.

Therefore, the court would not be able to decide the prescriptive easement and implied easement

issues to the extent they involve any areas within the disputed portions of those lots. While the

Tappens have an interest in Tapco, LLC ("Tapco"), the title owner of Lot 205 and apparent

owner of Lot 206 by adverse possession, they are not the only members of that entity. Because

the parties had vigorously litigated the issue, the court arranged a conference with counsel on

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September 20, 2024, to inquire whether the parties wished to join Tapco so that the court could

adjudicate the boundary line, at least with respect to Lot 205, resolving the dispute amongst these

parties. Ultimately, the Tappens wished to join Tapco, has served Tapco and presented the court :

with Tapco's agreement to be bound. The Defendants opposed the joinder of Tapco. The court :

ordered the parties to brief the issue, which was completed on October 23, 2024. The court will :

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decide the Motion for Joinder before proceeding to the merits. :

MOTION FOR JOINDER

The parties agree that the court has the discretion to join Tapco to the litigation even at

this late stage "on such terms as are just." M.R. Civ. P, 21. The court cannot decide the parties' :

rights to property within the disputed location of the seaward boundary of lots 204-208, which

would include the dry sand portion of Seawall Beach, unless the property owners were joined in :

the case. See MLR. Civ. P. [9(a).

The Defendants object to allowing Tapco on the grounds the amendment comes after :

undue delay and unfairly prejudices them. M.R. Civ. P. 15(a); Paul v. Town of Liberty, 2016 :

ME 173,19, 151 A.3d 924. They also argue that the court, by determining where the Tappens :

have proven "standing," does not need to join Tapco in order to determine the boundary location.

The court finds that the Defendants have not shown undue delay causing them prejudice. :
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The parties tried the issue without objection. The issue was raised in the court's August 26, :

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2024, summary judgment order. It was raised in a pretrial request for admissions. Two of the

three possible boundaries were raised in an expert's survey during the litigation. It was raised, :

albeit briefly, at the deposition of Christopher Pazar. It was raised in the pretrial memorandum :
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filed with the court. Both parties were in a position either to join any lot owners or to object to :

introduction of testimony on the grounds the lot owners had not been joined. Therefore, while :

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waiting until after the trial was "undue delay," the court does not find unfair prejudice.
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The Defendants object and suggests the joinder of Tapco is unnecessary to determine the :
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boundary and that the court can make that determination when determining the Tappen's

standing to litigate those issues. The court agrees with the Defendants that the court's

determination would not be binding with respect to Lots 204, 207 and 208. It also would not :

205,
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bind the record owner of Lot 206. It would only be legally binding with respect to Lot

Given the Tapco's willingness to be bound, the court sees no reason not to proceed to attempt to

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determine the boundary between the litigating families. It was a purpose behind the lawsuit and :

was fully litigated. Therefore, the court grants the Motion for Joinder.

FACTS
After a two day bench trial, the court finds the following facts. :

1-33. The court adopts the stipulated facts 1-33. Ex. 1.

34. From 1893 onward, the unconveyed property depicted in the 1893 and 1922 maps was owned

by a series of different owners. Together, the court refers to the owners as the "Developer."

35. Lots 205 and 206 were first conveyed by the Developer in 1914 and the deeds incorporated

the 1893 Plan.

36. Lot 205 is currently owned by Tapco. The Tappens are principles of Tapco but are not the sole

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The court finds that the failure to join the title owners of lots 204, 206 208 prevents the court from
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deciding the location of their southerly boundary. M.R.Civ. P. 19(a); Larrabee v. Town of Knox, 2000 ME
15,[10,744 A.2d 544 (if service of a necessary party is possible, then joinder is mandatory); Caron 12
Auburn, 567 A.2d 66, 68 (Me. 1989); Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bark, 391 A.2d 311, 315 n4 (Me.
1978). See also, 14 M.R.S.A. § 5963 (1980) (requiring that all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim an interest that would be affected by a declaratory judgment and that no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.)

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owners of that entity. The Lot has no building on it.

37. The record owner of Lot 206, as depicted in the plans, is not the Tappens or Tapco, but instead :

is the owner of Lot 207. The Tappens built a cottage on Lot 206 that they have exclusively used :

for well over 20 years. The cottage is currently owned by Tapco. The Lot 206 owners also obtained

a deed purporting to run from the southerly boundary of Lot 206 to the high tide line, thinking they

were adding Lot 207.3 Tapco has an ownership claim to Lot 206, as extended, through adverse :

possession. That has not been placed at issue in this case. :

38. The record owner of Lots 76 and Lot 77 is the Hill Family Cottage Corporation. The Lots have :

been in the Hill family since 1952 (Lot 76) and 1948 (Lot 77). Lots 76 and 77 were originally :

conveyed from the Developer in 1926 and incorporating the 1893 map. The Hill ownership of Lot :

77 consisted of two deeds, explicitly extending the Hill property to the high tide line. :

39. The Hill Family, while using the property consisting of Lots 76 and 77 frequently used the :

both the dry sand and wet portions of the beach in the vicinity of their beach front home, including
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extending in both directions from their home for typical beach purposes for over 20 years.

40. There was little to no specific evidence of the Hill Family's use of the beach in front of any :
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individual lot, much less any portion of Lot 205, :

41. The location of the high tide line as well as the location of the dunes has changed dramatically
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due to erosion and accretion since 1948, when Richard Hill began using the property. He recalls :

trees growing between the cottages and the beach. At other times, however, the ocean has lapped :
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at cottages. A seawall was constructed in front of Lots 206 and 207 to protect them from the :

encroaching sea. The cottage on Lot 77 was moved to Lot 76 to escape the water. At that point,
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the cottage was surrounded by sand. :

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That conveyance would be subject to an implied easement created by subdivision and sale to the the extent the
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parcel is included in "Seawall Beach."

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42. Except for what is depicted on the plans, the court has no evidence of the location of the
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tide lines or the dunes either at the time the Developers first conveyed the properties in 1893, or in :
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1922, :

43. These sameeologic changes would also have significantly changed the dune lines over time

since the property was first developed.

44, John Schwanda testified that erosion and accretion caused the high tide line on a Popham
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Beach lot he surveyed to change by as much as 40 feet in six months.

45. As depicted by the Plan, the Triangular Portion is contiguous to a section of land similarly :

unallocated to any lot that runs eastward between the beach and the ocean side lots. Except where :
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that unallocated strip is bisected by three lots and several roadways, the unallocated strip runs :

eastward between the waterfront lots and the beach, around the point and then northward up to Lot :

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30.

46. The Triangular Portion was severed from the contiguous strip in 1948 when the Developers :

conveyed the portion between Lot 77 and the high tide line to Harriet Hill.

47. The map depicts a series of roadways that are part of the road network and run to the areas on :

the Plans labelled Seawall Beach and Riverside Beach. Together, the two beaches are a contiguous :
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strip.

48. There is a path to the beach that crosses over Lot 204. Anyone's right to use that path is not :
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at issue in this case. :

49. There is a short section of path branching off the access path over Lot 204 that crosses the a

comer of the Triangular Portion. The section of path is well used and sometimes maintained by :

one or more of the Defendants, or their renters.

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50. The Defendants have not met their burden, however, to show a 20 year continuous use of that :

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section of path tied to any particular property or person. Although nearby, the path is not the :

normal route to the beach for Lots 76 and 77, :

DISCUSSION

A. Prescriptive easements

To prove a prescriptive easement on their counterclaim, the Defendants must show (1)

continuous use for at least twenty years; (2) under a claim of right adverse to the owner; (3) with :
:

the owner's knowledge and acquiescence, or with a use so open, notorious, visible, and

uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be presumed. Androkites 1

White, 2010 ME

133, 1 14, 10A.3d 677. Continuous use must be calculated by tacking owners who are in privity :

of title for each individual lot. Flaherty Muther, 2011 ME 32, 781, 17A.3d. It does not :

require daily use, only the type of use and enjoyment that the average owner would make of the

property. Almeder y. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 139, P 22, 2014 ME 139. In the case of

adversity, the person claiming an easement must use the property as their own without :

permission. Androkites, 2010 ME 133, P 16, 10A.3d 677. When the first and third elements are

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met, adversity is presumed unless "contradicted or explained."* Id. P17. :
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-1. Whether any of the Defendants' Lots, other than 76 and 77, enjoy a prescriptive :

easement over any portion of the property that the Plaintiffs purchased from Mary :

McNamara or belonging to Tapco.

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With respect to Lots 74, 75, 180, 181, 188, 189, 202, 203, they were either conveyed to a

Defendant or a cottage was built within the 20 year prescriptive period. There was no evidence to :

find use of the Triangular Portion or the beach relating to those Lots prior to purchase or :

construction, The court does not find a continuous use tied to any one of those lots.
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"The presumption of permission for "wild and uncultivated" lands applies only to claims of public prescriptive
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easements. Almeder, 2014 ME 139, 29, 106 A.3d 1099. :

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 Richard Hill purchased Lot 182 in 1994. He testified that he would sometimes park and

use the beach and branch of the path that crosses the Triangular portion. Clark Hill purchased a

back lot and built a cottage in 2000. He also testified about use of the Beach. Although ownership

of both lots extends beyond the 20 years, the court is unable to find it is more likely that not that :
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any Defendant established either sufficiently continuous use to put the Tappens or the prior owners

of the Triangular Portion on notice ofa claim of right related to those lots. :

The prescriptive rights claims of the "back lot" owners fail.

2. Whether the ownersof Lots 76 and 77 enjoy an easement by prescription over any :

portion of the property that the Plaintiffs purchased from Mary McNamara or :

to
belonging Tapco.

Members of the Hill family have owned and used a cottage on Lots 76 and 77 since 1948.

The parties have stipulated to a prescriptive easement appurtenant to Lots 76 and 77 across the :
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Triangular Portion along an existing path running from the cottage on Lot 76 to the sand. The

parties have also stipulated that HFCC has proven a claim of adverse possession to the extent the :

cottage encroaches on the Triangular Portion. :

The court did not receive any evidence specific to HFCC's use of the rest of the :

Triangular Portion. Therefore, the court denies any prescriptive easement claim with respect to

the Triangular Portion.

There was substantial testimony regarding the use of the beach by the Hill family and :

their guests. Until the Tappens objected to it in 2021, the Hill's activities ranged far and wide :
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over the beach in both directions. The section of the beach that the Tappens obtained from :
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McNamara in front of Lots 204, 205, 206, 207 and 208 is near their cottage and they would have :

used it for recreational purposes. As described below, the Hills already enjoy an implied :

easement to use any portion of the Seawall Beach to the south of lots 204 206 for recreational :

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 purposes. Therefore, the Hills' use would not be adverse, and the prescriptive easement claim is :

not viable, or necessary. The Hills have not shown continuous use of Lot
specific to any portion

205 to establish a prescriptive easement on any portion of that Lot, even if it was sandy beach.°
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Almeder, 2014 ME 139, 25, 37, 106 A.3d 1099 (requiring a parcel-by-parcel evidentiary :

record as opposed to use of the beach in general).

Except for the path directly from the cottage to the sand, the court finds that HFCC has

not established a prescriptive easement. :

B. Implied Easement. :

When a deed distinctly refers to a plan, the plan is incorporated into that deed
by :

reference. Gravison Fisher, 2016 ME 35, 1 38, 134 A.3d 357 (citing Sleeper v. Loring, 2013

ME 112,§ 13, 83 A.3d 769). The Plan is then interpreted pursuant to the same rules that govern :

construction of the deed. /d. ? P38. When a deed "is susceptible of more than one meaning, the :

trial court must determine the grantor['s] intent from contemporan

eous circumstances and from
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standard rules of construction." Harvey Furrow, 2014 ME 149, 9, 107 A.3d 604 (citations
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omitted). Rules of construction are applied according to the overarching goal of giving effect to :

the developer's intent. See Lloyd Benson, 2006 ME 129, § 13,910A.2d 1048 (citation :

omitted). :

Easement rights that are implied by reference to a plan could include "streets,
parks, :

squares or... other modes of general nature." Arnold v. Boulay, 147 Me. 116, 121, 83 A.2d 574,
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577 (1951) (emphasis added). Creating the implied easement to the areas of
general use :
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The court dees not reach any portions of the beach owned by any person or
entity other that the Tappens
and Tapco. See supra, n, 2,

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 conveys to the grantee and subsequent purchasers of property shown on the plan "those benefits,

the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy

portions of a tract laid out :

on the plan indicated." Arnold, 147 Me. at 121, 83 A.2d at 577. When
considering the

Developer's intent, it is appropriate to consider the apparent purpose and appeal of the

development to purchasers. Gravison, 2016 ME 35, 54 48, 134 A.3d 357 (finding no error in the :

trial court's determination that a dotted line on a plan was a right of way that was granted "for :

purposes that appear to be recreational and that are tied to the appeal of the land, which is its :

proximity to the water.") :

-1. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy an implied easement by subdivision and sale over :

the Triangular Portion.

The only real evidence the court has of the Developer's intent with respect to the
:

Triangular Portion is the map itself. The court cannot infer that the Plan implies a right for lot :

owners to use the Triangular portion to access the beach. There are
clearly marked routes to the

beaches on the map. Some of them cross over similar blank unallocated fand retained by the

Developer. There may be an implied promise that the Developer wili not develop those areas, :

but that is not at issue here. Given that the plans identify specific routes to access the
beach, the
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court cannot conclude that the Plan bestows an implied right to use unallocated areas such as the :
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Triangular Portion to access the beach.® :

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The court conciudes that access to the beach would be across the roads delineated
by parallel lines. The :

court realizes that actual access may have evolved differently. The only access
point at issue before the :

court was the Triangular Portion, which, except for the path from the Hill
cottage to the beach, the court :

does not find access. The court makes no decision regarding actual access in any other location,

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 2. Whether any of the Defendants enjoy an implied easement by subdivision and sale over :

any portion ofthe property that the Plaintiffs purchasedfrom Mary McNamara between
the low tide line and the southerly boundary of Lots 204, 205, 206, 207 and 208.

Defendants claim that they enjoy an implied easement over any portion of the Plaintiff's
:

land that is also part of "Seawall Beach" as depicted on the plan. The court does conclude that all

of the residents of the subdivision depicted in the 1893 and 2022 plans enjoy an implied easement :

to use "Seawall Beach" for recreational purposes consistent with beach use. The court reaches this :

conclusion after review of the plan itself. The clear intent of the Developer was to
develop a set :

of vacations homes in close proximity to the "Seawall Beach" and the "Riverside Beach." The :

Plan's road network is clearly designed to provide all residents with access to the beach. The court :

cannot infer that the Developer's Plan was to limit the residents' use to "fishing,
fowling and :

navigating" below the high tide fine. All Defendants, using the access granted by the Developer :

as depicted on the Plan, have an implied easement to use those areas of the Tappen land that fall :
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within Seawall Beach for recreational purposes consistent with the use of a beach.
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C. The location of the boundary between Lot 205 and Seawall Beach. :

The more difficult issue is where on the face of the earth is the boundary separating Seawall :

Beach and Lot 205. Any property on Seawali Beach that McNamara conveyed to the
Tappens :

would be subject to the implied easement. Any property that was part of Lot 205 at the time of the :
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original conveyance could not be part of Seawall Beach and subject to the implied easement. It :
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also was not conveyed to the Tappens.

The parties offer three plausible theories, all of which are depicted on Exhibit 20 and 20a :

(enlarged and easier to read). Each theory also has flaws. :

The Plaintiffs argue that the boundary is the high tide line. Maine law holds that use of the :

term "beach," means the area between the high tide line and the low water mark, also known as :

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the intertidal zone. Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2019 ME 151,§8,217 A.3d 1111 (citing

Hodge v. Boothby, 48 Me. 68, 71 (1861) (defining beach)). Typically, then, a reference to a beach

would suggest that the boundary runs to the high tide line. A boundary that runs along the high

water mark can fluctuate as the erosion and accretion adjust the high water line. State v Yates, 71 :
:

A. 1018, 1019-20 (1908). :

On the other hand, an area known to the public as a specific "Beach," such as Goose Rocks

Beach in Almeder or Seawall Beach in this case, may include the dry sand or upland areas as well, :

Almeder, 2019 ME 151,18, 217A.3d 1111. It depends on what specific area of land the Developer
:
:

meant when designating Seawall Beach when drafting the 1893 plan. :

The Defendants argue that the boundary is the line between the sand and the seagrass or :

the dunes. They provided a New York trial court decision holding that a call to "the southerly line :

of beach grass" is a natural monument that can be used to set a boundary, even though it can :

fluctuate. Macklowe v. Town of East Hampton, 950 N.Y.S.2d 723, No. 874008, 2012 WL 762911,
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at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2012).

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The Plaintiffs respond that calls to a natural monument that is ambulatory, unlike a
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boundary that runs along a water body, means that is must be taken to refer to the condition of the
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land at the time the deed is given. White v. Hartigan, 464 Mass. 400, 411 (Mass. 2013). If the

natural monument later migrates, the boundary remains at the original location of the monument.

Therefore, if the court reads the deed to fix the boundary at the edge of the beach grass or the foot

of the dune, then the boundary is in the location of those features in 1893. :

Because the pian offers few clues supporting either the Plaintiffs or the Defendants theories

as to the Developer's intent, the court cannot adopt either of them without resorting to speculation. :

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Seawall Beach is depicted as simply a dotted area separated from the adjacent property by a ine. :

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 The dotted area could have included only the intertidal zone. It could also have included areas of :
:

"dry sand" as well. The intent of the implied easement to allow recreational use does not support

a conclusion that the beach was intended to only include the intertidal zone. The court cannot

conclude it is more likely than not that the Developer intended that "Seawall Beach" was intended :

to be confined to the intertidal zone.

The Defendants' theory meets a similar fate. Unlike in Macklowe, however, there is no

call to the southerly line of beach grass or to the bottom slope of the dune. Instead, the map does :
:

not identify any natural feature as the boundary between Lot 205 and Seawall Beach. The dunes :

are clearly depicted as within the lots, but there is no designation that of them,
they, or any part

mark the boundary. The court cannot conclude it is more likely than not that the Developer :

intended that "Seawall Beach" extended northward to the slope of the dunes, much less a dune line

that is subject to dramatic fluctuation.

The court does conclude that it is more likely than not that the Developer conveyed a lot :

that was, and would remain, the size and shape of the lot as it existed in 1893. Improvements
:

would not be subject to loss because the dune line retreated to the north of them.'
Unfortunately, :

neither party has provided sufficient evidence of where the northerly boundary line was located :
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either in 1893 or today. The surveyor attempted to scale the plan to locate the boundary. He
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testified that the plan was difficult to scale and that the margin of error would be up to 20 or 30 :

feet. Neither party provided historic testimony of the location of the line, or expert testimony :

whether it is proper to locate a line by scaling the plan given the difficulties identified by the :

surveyor. Therefore, while the court finds the boundaries of Lot 205 are the same as those granted :

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Ifthe mighty forces of the Kennebec River, the Atlantic Ocean and powerful weather events move the :

high tide line back through the lot and take any improvements, then the residents have lost their beach and
the lot owner loses part or all of their lot, improvements and all.

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 at the time the lot was first conveyed, there is insufficient evidence to locate the southern
boundary

ofthe line on the face of the earth.? Markley Semle, 1998 ME 145,120,713A.2d945 (upholding

trial court's decision not to locate boundary when there is insufficient evidence to do so).
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D. Whether the Plaintiffs are liable to Defendants for Slander of Title.

When they filed suit, the Plaintiffs recorded a clerk's certificate at the Registry deeds

announcing that the suit "affects title to land and buildings" of all of the Defendants' properties

in the Development, including the back lots. To prove slander of title a claimant must prove (1) :

there was a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title; (2) the statement :

was false; (3) the statement was made with malice or made with reckless disregard of its :

falsity;

and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages. Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405,
:

409 (Me. 1996). :

The only evidence of "malice or reckless disregard of its falsity" was the Certificate itself

and the testimony of Mr. Tappen. Mr. Tappen testified he did not know what it was or that his :

attorneys' filed it. There may be a question whether the suit "affected the title" of the back lots.

The court is not persuaded, however, that Defendants met their burden to show that Tappen or his :

attorneys acted with malice or with reckless disregard of any falsity. The court does not reach the :
:

of privilege.
:
other elements or the issue :

The Defendants' claim of Slander of Title fails. :

CONCLUSION :

For the above reasons, the entry will be: :

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On Count I of the Complaint, the court declares as follows. :

*
The court appreciates that the parties may be frustrated by this result, particularly since the court raised
the issue ofjoinder and the subsequent briefing that resulted. It was the court's intent to decide the :
issue, :
:

but when testing each theory, found it could not find the location of the line without
resorting to
:

speculation. :

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 The Defendants' properties enjoy an implied easement to use the section of Seawall Beach

owned by the Plaintiffs for recreational purposes consistent with the use of a beach.

The boundary between Lot 205 and Seawall Beach has not changed since 1893. Neither :

party, however, has proven the location on the face of the earth of the boundary between Lot 205

and Seawail Beach. Therefore, the court does not make any determination of any Defendant's

right to use the beach above the high tide line or any Plaintiff's right to object to the use above the

high tide line by any Defendant or users of their properties. :

Defendant HFHC has an easement by prescription to use an existing path running from its

house to the beach for foot access to the beach. :

HFHC has acquired ownership by adverse possession of that portion of the Triangular :

Portion currently occupied by their house and deck. :

On the Counterclaims, on Count I, except for the path from the HFHC
cottage to the beach,

judgment for the Tappens on any prescriptive easement claims. :

:

On Count Il, the implied easement, judgment for HFHC as described above. :

On Count I, Slander of Title, judgment for the Tappens. :

On Count IV, except for the path from the HFHC cottage to the beach,
judgment for the
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Tappens on any prescriptive easement claims. :

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On Count V, judgment for HFHC on the adverse possession claim,

only to the extent the :

house and deck encroach on the Triangular Portion. :

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The Clerk is requested to enter this Order on the Docket, incorporating it by reference :
:

pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a). :

Date: ff A :

Thomas R. McKeon :

Justice, Business & Consumer Court :

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