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http://JUDIS.NIC.

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4


PETITIONER:
KUSHESHWAR DUBEY

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/09/1988

BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
BENCH:
MISRA RANGNATH
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)

CITATION:
1988 AIR 2118 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 821
1988 SCC (4) 319 JT 1988 (3) 576
1988 SCALE (2)641

ACT:
Disciplinary and criminal proceedings--Holding of--
Simultaneously--Whether legal bar--Not advisable to evolve a
hard and fast rule valid for all cases.

HEADNOTE:
The appellant, an employee of Respondent No. 1, was
subjected to disciplinary proceedings as also a criminal
prosecution simultaneously on the allegation that he
physically assaulted a supervising officer. He filed a civil
action in the trial court asking for injunction against the
disciplinary action pending criminal trial. The trial court
stayed further proceedings in the disciplinary action till
disposal of the criminal case. In appeal, the appellate
court affirmed the aforesaid order. However, the High Court
allowed the Revision Application of the Respondent and set
aside the impugned order on the ground that there is no bar
for an employer to proceed with the departmental proceeding
with regard to the same allegation for which a criminal case
is pending.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: l. The order of the High Court is vacated and
that of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored.
The criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings were
grounded upon the same set of facts. The disciplinary
proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was
not right in interfering with the trial court’s order of
injunction which had been affirmed in appeal. [826A-B]
2(i) While there could be no legal bar for simultaneous
proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it
would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings
awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class
of cases it would be open to the delinquent-employee to seek
such an order of stay or injunction from the court. [825E-F]
2(ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, there should or should not be such
simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial
consideration and the Court will decide in the given
circumstances of a particular case as to whether the
PG NO 821
PG NO 822
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disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending
criminal trial. [825F-G]
The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan,
[1960] 3 SCR 227; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen,
[1964] 7 SCR 555 and Jung Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari,
[1969] 1 SCR 134, relied upon.
Rama P. C. v. Superintendent of Police, Kolar & Anr.,
AIR 1967 54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. & Ors. v. Chairman T.A. &
C. Udhampur, [1981] 2 SLR 225; Moulindra Singh v. The Deputy
Commissioner & Ors., [1973] LIC 6 1564; Shaikh Kasim v.
Superintendent of Post Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965 Mad.
502; Khusi Ram v. Union of India, [1974] LIC 553 and Project
Manager, ONGC v. Lal Chand Wazir Chand Chandna, [1982] 1 SLR
654, referred to.
3. It is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard
and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of
general application without regard to the particularities of
the individual-situation.

JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3129of
1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.7.1987 of the Patna
High Court in Civil Revision No. 128 of 1987 (R).
R.K. Jain, Rakesh K. Khanna and R.P. Singh for the
Appellant.
R.N. Sachthey and Anip Sachthey for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered:
ORDER
Special leave granted.
The appellant is an employee in the Balihari Colliery of
the Respondent No. 1 and in 1986 was working as an
electrical helper. On the allegation that he physically
assaulted a supervising officer by name S.K. Mandal, he was
subjected to disciplinary proceedings as also a criminal
prosecution. Since the disciplinary proceeding as also the
criminal trial were taken simultaneously, the appellant
filed a civil action in the court of Munsif at Dhanbad
asking for injunction against the disciplinary action
PG NO 823
pending criminal trial. On 6.12.1986, the Munsif made an
order staying further proceedings in the disciplinary action
till disposal of the criminal case. The appeal of the
Respondent No. 1 against the order of learned Munsif was
dismissed on 31st March, 1987, by the appellate court.
Thereupon the Respondent No. 1 moved the High Court in its
revisional jurisdiction. The High Court by its order dated
7.7.1987 held:
"First information report was lodged against the opposite
party (appellant) and the same was pending before the
competent court. Meanwhile the petitioners (respondents)
started departmental proceeding against the opposite party.
The opposite party filed a suit before the trial court for
declaration that appointment of the Enquiry Officer was
illegal and for restraining the petitioners permanently from
continuing with the departmental proceeding during the
pendency of the criminal case. That was allowed by the trial
court and confirmed by the lower court. There is no bar for
an employer to proceed with the departmental proceeding with
regard to the same allegation for which a criminal case is
pending.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below
were wrong in granting injunction in favour of the opposite
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4
party.
In the result, this application is allowed and the order
impugned is set aside."
According to Mr. Jain for the appellant, the legal
position settled by this Court supported the stand that the
disciplinary action had to be stayed till the criminal case
was over. He relied upon the decisions in The Delhi Cloth
and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960] 3 SCR 227 and
Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1964l 7 SCR 555. He
also referred in the course of his submission to the
decisions of different High Courts in support of his
propositions. Two cases out of the several ones of the High
Courts he relied upon are Khusi Ram v. Union of India,
[1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal Chand Wazir
Chand Chandna, [1982] 1 SLR 654. Pathak CJ., as he then was,
In the Himachal case indicated that fair play required the
postponing of the criminal trial and Thakkar J. as our
learned brother then was in the Gujarat case had also taken
a similar view.
PG NO 824
We would like to point out that there are also
authorities in support of the position that there is nothing
wrong in parallel proceedings being taken--one by way of the
disciplinary proceeding and the other in the criminal court.
Reference may be made to decision of this Court in Jang
Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969] I SCR 134 and some
decisions of High Courts such as Rama P.C. v. Superintendent
of Police, Kolar & Anr., AIR 1967 54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. &
Ors. v. Chairman T.A. & C. Udhampur, [1981] 2 SLR 225;
Moulindra Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner & Ors., [1973]
LIC 6 l564 and Shaikh Kasim v. Superintendent of Police
Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965 Mad. 502.
Mr. Jain contended that we should settle the law in a
straight jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be
conflicting. We do not propose to hazard such a step as that
would create greater hardship and individual situations may
not be available to be met and thereby injustice is likely
to ensue.
In the Delhi Cloth & General Mills’ case (supra), it was
pointed out by this Court:
"It is true that very often employers stay enquiries
pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that
is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural
justice require that an employer must wait for the decision
at least of the criminal trial court before taking action
against an employee. In Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. M/s.
News man‘s Printing Works, [l956l LAC 188, this was the view
taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add
that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions
of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable
for the employer to await the decision of the trial court,
so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may
not be prejudiced .... " .
In Tata Oil Mills’ case (supra), Gajendragadkar, CJ,
spoke for a three Judge Bench thus:
"There is yet another point which remains to be
considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken
the view that since criminal proceedings had been started
against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been
stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal
PG NO 825
proceedings. As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and
General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, it is desirable that if
the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a
workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4
court, the employer, should stay the domestic enquiry
pending the final disposal of the criminal case .....".
In Jang Bahadur’s case (supra) this Court said:
"The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether
the employee is guilty of the charges on which it is
proposed to take action against him. The same issue may
arise for decision in a civil or criminal proceeding pending
in a court. But the pendency of the court proceeding does
not bar the taking of disciplinary action. The power of
taking such action is vested in the disciplinary authority.
The civil or criminal court has no such power. The
initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings in
good faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere with
the course of justice in the pending court proceeding. The
employee is free to move the court for an order restraining
the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. If he
obtains a stay order, a wilful violation of the order would
of course amount to contempt of court. In the absence of a
stay order the disciplinary authority is free to exercise
its lawful powers.
The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem
to support the position that while there could be no legal
bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken. yet, there may
be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary
proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case In the
latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent-
employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from
the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a
particular case there should or should not be such
simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial
consideration and the Court will decide in the given
circumstances of a particular case as to whether the
disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending
criminal trial As we have already stated that it is neither
possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-
jacket formula valid for all cases and of general
application without regard to the particularities of the
individual-situation. For the disposal of the present case,
we do not think it necessary to say, anything more,
particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general
guideline.
PG NO 826
In the instant case, the criminal action and the
disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of
facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings
should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in
interfering with the trial court’s order of injunction which
had been affirmed in appeal.
The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is
vacated and that of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is
restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs. Hearing
fee is assessed at Rs.2,000.
We would like to point out that for the first time in
this Court, the enquiry report in the disciplinary
proceedings was produced. We express no view about
it.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

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