German Army (1935–1945)

The German Army (German: Heer, German: [heːɐ̯] ; lit. 'army') was the land forces component of the
Wehrmacht,[b] the regular armed forces of Nazi Germany, from 1935 until it effectively ceased to
exist in 1945 and then was formally dissolved in August 1946.[4] During World War II, a total of
about 13.6 million volunteers and conscripts served in the German Army.

Only 17 months after Adolf Hitler announced the German rearmament programme in 1935, the
army reached its projected goal of 36 divisions. During the autumn of 1937, two more corps were
formed. In 1938 four additional corps were formed with the inclusion of the five divisions of the
Austrian Army after the annexation of Austria by Germany in March.[5] During the period of its
expansion under Hitler, the German Army continued to develop concepts pioneered during World
War I, combining ground and air units into combined arms forces. Coupled with operational and
tactical methods such as encirclements and "battle of annihilation", the German military
managed quick victories in the two initial years of World War II, a new style of warfare described
as Blitzkrieg (lightning war) for its speed and destructive power.[6]

Structure

Adolf Hitler with Wilhelm Keitel,

Friedrich Paulus, and Walther von
Brauchitsch, October 1941

The Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) was Nazi Germany's Army High Command from 1936 to
1945. In theory, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) served as the military general staff for
the Reich's armed forces, co-ordinating the Wehrmacht's (Heer, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, and the
Waffen-SS) operations. In practice, the OKW acted in a subordinate role to Hitler's personal
military staff, translating his ideas into military plans and orders, and issuing them to the three
services.[7] However, as World War II went on, the OKW found itself exercising an increasing
amount of direct command authority over military units, particularly in the west. This meant that
by 1942, the authority of the Army High Command (OKH) was limited to the Eastern Front.[8]

The Abwehr was the army intelligence organisation from 1921 to 1944. The term Abwehr
(German for "defence", here referring to counterintelligence) had been created just after World
War I as an ostensible concession to Allied demands that Germany's intelligence activities be for
defensive purposes only. After 4 February
German Army
1938, the name Abwehr was changed to the
Overseas Department/Office in Defence of the Deutsches Heer
Armed Forces High Command (Amt
Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht).

Germany used a system of military districts

(German: Wehrkreis) in order to relieve field
commanders of as much administrative work
as possible and to provide a regular flow of
trained recruits and supplies to the field
forces. The method the OKW adopted was to
separate the Field Army (OKH) from the Home
Command (Heimatkriegsgebiet) and to entrust
Helmet decal used by the German Army in the
the responsibilities of training, conscription, mid-1940s
supply, and equipment to Home Command.
Founded 1935

Disbanded August 1946[a]

Organisation of field forces
Country Germany

Allegiance Adolf Hitler

Type Army

Size Total served:

13,600,000[3]
German soldiers in Greece, April 1941
Part of Wehrmacht
The German Army was mainly structured in
Headquarters Maybach I, Wünsdorf
army groups (Heeresgruppen) consisting of
several armies that were relocated, Equipment List of army
restructured, or renamed in the course of the equipment
war. Forces of allied states, as well as units
Engagements Spanish Civil War
made up of non-Germans, were also assigned
(1936–1939)
to German units.
World War II (1939–
1945)
For Operation Barbarossa in 1941, the army
forces were assigned to three strategic Commanders
campaign groupings:
Commander-in-chief Adolf Hitler
 Army Group North with Leningrad as its Commander-in-chief See list
campaign objective of the Army

Army Group Centre with Smolensk as its Chief of the General See list
campaign objective Staff

Army Group South with Kiev as its campaign Insignia

objective
Unit flag
Below the army group level forces included
field armies – panzer groups, which later
became army level formations themselves,
corps, and divisions. The army used the
German term Kampfgruppe, which equates to
battle group in English. These provisional
combat groupings ranged from corps size, such as Army Detachment Kempf, to commands
composed of companies or even platoons. They were named for their commanding officers.

Select arms of service

Afrika Korps (Africa Corps)

Feldgendarmerie (Field Military Police)

Feldjägerkorps (Field Police Corps)

Gebirgsjäger (Mountain Troops)

Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police)

Ostlegionen (Eastern Legions)

Panzergrenadier (Mechanized Infantry)

Panzerjäger (Anti-Tank Troops)

Panzerwaffe (Armoured Forces)

Nachrichtentruppe (Signal Corps)

Sicherungs-Divisionen (Security Divisions)

Doctrine and tactics

The German operational doctrine emphasized sweeping pincer and lateral movements meant to
destroy the enemy forces as quickly as possible. This approach, referred to as Blitzkrieg, was an
operational doctrine instrumental in the success of the offensives in Poland and France.
Blitzkrieg has been considered by many historians as having its roots in precepts developed by
Fuller, Liddel-Hart, and Hans von Seeckt, and even having ancient prototypes practised by
Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon.[9][10] Recent studies of the Battle of France
also suggest that the actions of either Erwin Rommel or Heinz Guderian or both of them (both
had contributed to the theoretical development and early practices of what later became
Blitzkrieg prior to World War II),[11][12] ignoring orders of superiors who had never foreseen such
spectacular successes and thus prepared much more prudent plans, were conflated into a
purposeful doctrine and created the first archetype of Blitzkrieg, which then gained a fearsome
reputation that dominated the Allied leaders' minds.[13][14][15] Thus 'Blitzkrieg' was recognised
after the fact, and while it became adopted by the Wehrmacht, it never became the official
doctrine nor got used to its full potential because only a small part of the Wehrmacht was trained
for it and key leaders at the highest levels either focused on only certain aspects or even did not
understand it.[16][17][18]

Max Visser argues that the German Army focused on achieving high combat performance rather
than high organisational efficiency (like the US Army). It emphasised adaptability, flexibility, and
decentralised decision making. Officers and NCOs were selected based on character and trained
towards decisive combat leadership. Good combat performance was rewarded. Visser argues
this allowed the German Army to achieve superior combat performance compared to a more
traditional organisational doctrine like the American one; while this was ultimately offset by the
Allies' superior numerical and materiel advantage, Visser argues that it allowed the German Army
to resist far longer than if it had not adopted this method of organisation and doctrine.[19] Peter
Turchin reports a study by US colonel Trevor Dupuy that found that German combat efficiency
was higher than both the British and US armies – if a combat efficiency of 1 was assigned to the
British, then the Americans had a combat efficiency of 1.1 and the Germans of 1.45. This would
mean British forces would need to commit 45% more troops (or arm existing troops more heavily
to the same proportion) to have an even chance of winning the battle, while the Americans would
need to commit 30% more to have an even chance.[20]
Tactics

Soldiers of the Großdeutschland

Division during Operation
Barbarossa, 1941

The military strength of the German Army was managed through mission-based tactics
(Auftragstaktik) rather than detailed order-based tactics, and rigid discipline. Once an operation
began, whether offensive or defensive, speed of response to changing circumstances was
considered more important than careful planning and co-ordination of new plans.

In public opinion, the German military was and is sometimes seen as a high-tech army, since new
technologies that were introduced before and during World War II influenced its development of
tactical doctrine. These technologies were featured by Nazi propaganda, but were often only
available in small numbers or late in the war, as overall supplies of raw materials and armaments
became low. For example, lacking sufficient motor vehicles to equip more than a small portion of
their army, the Germans chose to concentrate the available vehicles in a small number of
divisions which were to be fully motorised. The other divisions continued to rely on horses for
towing artillery, other heavy equipment, and supply wagons, and the men marched on foot or
rode bicycles. At the height of motorisation only 20 per cent of all units were fully motorised. The
small German contingent fighting in North Africa was fully motorised (relying on horses in the
desert was near to impossible because of the need to carry large quantities of water and fodder),
but the much larger force invading the Soviet Union in June 1941 numbered only some 150,000
trucks and some 625,000 horses (water was abundant and for many months of the year horses
could forage, reducing the burden on the supply chain). However, the production of new motor
vehicles by Germany, even with the exploitation of the industries of occupied countries, could not
keep up with the heavy loss of motor vehicles during the winter of 1941–1942. From June 1941
to the end of February 1942 German forces in the Soviet Union lost some 75,000 trucks,
approximately half the number they had at the beginning of the campaign, to mechanical wear
and tear and combat damage. Most of these were lost during the retreat in the face of the Soviet
counteroffensive from December 1941 to February 1942. Another substantial loss was incurred
during the defeat of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–1943. These losses
in men and materiel led to motorised troops making up no more than 10% of total Heer forces at
some points of the war.

A color photo of Adolf Hitler listening

to a German soldier

In offensive operations the infantry formations were used to attack more or less simultaneously
across a large portion of the front so as to pin the enemy forces ahead of them and draw
attention to themselves, while the mobile formations were concentrated to attack only narrow
sectors of the front, breaking through to the enemy rear and surrounding him. Some infantry
formations followed in the path of the mobile formations, mopping-up, widening the corridor
manufactured by the breakthrough attack and solidifying the ring surrounding the enemy
formations left behind, and then gradually destroying them in concentric attacks. One of the
most significant problems bedeviling German offensives and initially alarming senior
commanders was the gap created between the fast-moving "fast formations" and the following
infantry, as the infantry were considered a prerequisite for protecting the fast formations' flanks
and rear and enabling supply columns carrying fuel, petrol, and ammunition to reach them.

In defensive operations the infantry formations were deployed across the front to hold the main
defense line and the mobile formations were concentrated in a small number of locations from
where they launched focused counterattacks against enemy forces which had broken through
the infantry defense belt. In autumn 1942, at El Alamein, a lack of fuel compelled the German
commander, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, to scatter his armoured units across the front in
battalion-sized concentrations to reduce travel distances to each sector, rather than hold them
concentrated in one location. In 1944 Rommel argued that in the face of overwhelming Allied air
power the tactic of employing the concentrated "fast formations" was no longer possible to
defend against the expected Allied invasion of France, because they could no longer move
quickly enough to reach the threatened locations due to the expected interdiction of all routes by
Allied fighter-bombers. He therefore suggested scattering these units across the front just
behind the infantry. His commanders and peers, who were less experienced in the effect of Allied
air power, disagreed vehemently with his suggestion, arguing that this would violate the prime
principle of concentration of force.
Campaigns

The infantry remained foot soldiers throughout the war, and artillery remained primarily horse-
drawn. The motorized formations received much attention in the world press in the opening
years of the war, and were cited as the main reason for the success of the German invasions of
Poland (September 1939), Denmark and Norway (1940), Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
(May 1940), Yugoslavia (April 1941), and the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion
of the Soviet Union (June 1941). However, their motorised and tank formations accounted for
only 20% of the Heer's capacity at their peak strength.[21] The army's lack of trucks and fuel to run
them severely limited infantry movement, especially during and after the Normandy invasion
when Allied air power devastated the French rail network north of the Loire. Panzer movements
also depended on rail, since driving a tank long distances caused serious wear.[22]

Personnel

Equipment

Contrary to popular belief, the German Army in World War II was not a mechanised juggernaut as
a whole. In 1941, between 60 and 70 percent of their forces were not motorised, relying on
railroad for rapid movement and on horse-drawn transport cross country. The percentage of
motorisation decreased thereafter.[23] In 1944 approximately 85 percent of the Army was not
motorised.[24] The standard uniform used by the German Army consisted of a Feldgrau (field
grey) tunic and trousers, worn with a Stahlhelm.

War crimes

Nazi propaganda had told German soldiers to wipe out what were variously called Jewish
Bolshevik subhumans, the Mongol hordes, the Asiatic flood, and the red beast.[25] While the
principal perpetrators of the killings of civilians behind the front lines amongst German armed
forces were the Nazi German "political" armies (the SS-Totenkopfverbände, the Waffen-SS, and
the Einsatzgruppen), the army committed and ordered war crimes of its own (e.g. the Commissar
Order), particularly during the invasion of Poland[26] and later in the war against the Soviet Union.
Propaganda

"Above All Stands the German

Infantry" — Nazi propaganda poster

The German Army was extensively promoted by Nazi propaganda.[27]

See also

Army Personnel Office (Wehrmacht)

Bribery of senior Wehrmacht officers

General der Nachrichtenaufklärung

Glossary of German military terms

Military production during World War II

Ranks and insignia of the German Army (1935–1945)

Waffenamt

War crimes of the Wehrmacht

Notes

a. The official dissolution of the Wehrmacht began with the German Instrument of Surrender
of 8 May 1945. Reasserted in Proclamation No. 2 of the Allied Control Council on 20
September 1945, the dissolution was officially declared by ACC Law No. 34 of 20 August
1946.[1][2]
 b. Though "Wehrmacht" is often erroneously used to refer only to the Army, it also included the
Kriegsmarine (Navy) and the Luftwaffe (Air Force).

References

1. Allied Control Authority 1946a, p. 81.

2. Allied Control Authority 1946b, p. 63.

3. Overmans 2000, p. 257.

4. Large 1996, p. 25.

5. Haskew 2011, p. 28.

6. Haskew 2011, pp. 61–62.

7. Haskew 2011, pp. 40–41.

8. Harrison 2002, p. 133.

9. Rice 2005, pp. 9, 11.

10. Paniccia 2014, p. ?.

11. Grossman 1993, p. 3.

12. Lonsdale 2007, p. ?.

13. Showalter 2006, p. ?.

14. Krause & Phillips 2006, p. 176.

15. Stroud 2013, pp. 33–34.

16. Caddick-Adams 2015, p. 17.

17. Vigor 1983, p. 96.

18. Zabecki 1999, p. 1175.

19. Visser, Max. "Configurations of human resource practices and battlefield performance: A
comparison of two armies." (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Max_Visser/publication/
222579436_Configurations_of_human_resource_practices_and_battlefield_performance_A_
comparison_of_two_armies/links/59df229ca6fdcca0d336dcc7/Configurations-of-human-re
source-practices-and-battlefield-performance-A-comparison-of-two-armies.pdf) Human
Resource Management Review 20, no. 4 (2010): 340–349.

20. Turchin, P., 2007. War and peace and war: The rise and fall of empires. Penguin, pp.257–258
21. Balsamo, Larry T. (1991). "Germany's Armed Forces in the Second World War: Manpower,
Armaments, and Supply" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/494616) . The History Teacher. 24
(3): 263–277. doi:10.2307/494616 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F494616) . ISSN 0018-2745
(https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0018-2745) . JSTOR 494616 (https://www.jstor.org/stab
le/494616) .

22. Keegan 1982, pp. 156–157.

23. Zeiler & DuBois 2012, pp. 171–172.

24. Tucker 2009, p. 1885.

25. Evans 1989, pp. 58–60.

26. Böhler 2006, pp. 183–184, 189, 241.

27. "ueber Allem Steht Die Deutshe Infantrie (Above All Comes the German Infantry)" (https://di
gitalcollections.hclib.org/digital/collection/p17208coll3/id/307) .
digitalcollections.hclib.org. Retrieved 2023-08-31.

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External links

The Nazi German Army 1935–1945 (Heer) (https://www.feldgrau.com/ww2-german-heer-arm

y/)

"The Role of the German Army during the Holocaust: A Brief Summary.": Video (https://www.yo
utube.com/watch?v=OBRuf8Sl1Oo) on YouTube—lecture by Geoffrey P. Megargee, via the
official channel of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.