CULPABLE HOMICIDE AND MURDER

 Homicide is a term which originates from the Latin term ‘Homo’ means human and ‘caedere’
means killing. In India homicide is divided into two forms- Culpable Homicide (Section 299 of
the Indian Penal Code) and Culpable Homicide amounting to murder (Section 300 of the Indian
Penal Code). Both of these have a very minimal difference but these differences prove to be very
crucial for the legal system as the delivery of a fair judgment is dependent on these differences.
 Culpable Homicide in IPC refers to causing the death of a person by engaging in acts with the
intention of causing death, intending to cause such bodily injury that is likely to cause death, or
having knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. It is a serious offence, but distinct from
murder, as it lacks certain elements of premeditation and extreme culpability.
 Culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC focuses on the offender’s intention and knowledge,
making it a crucial legal concept in distinguishing various degrees of criminal liability for
causing the death of another person.
 Section 299 IPC states:
“299. Culpable Homicide.—Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing
death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
Homicide.”
It states that if a person causes the death of another in any of the following ways:
 By doing an act to cause death.
 Doing an act to cause bodily injury likely to cause death.
 By doing an act knowing it is likely to cause death.
 Then, that person commits the crime of culpable Homicide in IPC.
To establish culpable Homicide in IPC not amounting to murder, the Indian Penal Code’s Section 299
defines three crucial elements that need to be proven:
 The intention of causing death.
 The intention of causing bodily injury that is likely to cause death.
 The knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.
Every murder is culpable homicide, but every culpable homicide is not murder. Culpable homicide is the
genus and murder is its species, this was held in the case of Nara Singh Challan v. State of Orissa
(1997). It was observed that, “For deciding the proper punishment which is proportionate to the current
offense, IPC has divided culpable homicide into three degrees. First is the gravest form which is Murder
it is defined under section 300 of IPC, the second is the culpable homicide of the second degree which is
punishable under Section 304 part 1 of IPC and Third is the lowest degree of culpable homicide which
is punishable under Section 304 part 2 of IPC.”
Section 300 defines murder, which is also a culpable homicide with some special characteristics, which
are set out in clauses 1 to 4 of section 300, subject to the exceptions given therein. If any culpable
homicide falls within any of these four clauses, then it will amount to murder. All other instances of
culpable homicide including the ones, which may fall within the exceptions to section 300, will be
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
The definition itself provides for three circumstances, wherein the presence or absence of certain factors
in causing death is nevertheless treated as causing culpable homicide. These circumstances are dealt
with in explanations 1-3.

Explanation 1 provides for a situation where the injured person is suffering from some disorder, disease
or bodily infirmity, which quickened his death. The fact that his death was quickened or hastened by the
disorder or disease he was already suffering from, will not reduce the guilt or culpability of the person
causing the injury. In other words, the person who caused the injury cannot escape criminal liability of
culpable homicide by stating that if the person injured did not suffer from the said disease or disorder, he
would not have died.

Explanation 2 provides for a situation wherein a person who has been injured could have recovered and
escaped death, if, he had been given prompt and proper medical treatment. In such situations too, the
fact that the injured person died because he could not avail of good medical treatment, cannot be a
ground for negating guilt or culpability of the person who inflicted the injury in the first place.

Explanation 3 is in respect of a slightly different situation. It takes into consideration death caused to a
child in the mother’s womb. The law states that if the death of the child is caused when still in the
mother’s womb, it is not culpable homicide. However, if any portion of the child, comes out of the
mother’s womb, even if it is not fully born, and if death is caused to such child, then it would amount to
culpable homicide.
Essential ingredients of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 299 IPC
Causation of death is one of the most important essentials of the offence of culpable homicide, not
amounting to murder. There could be various reasons for such a death, and same have been listed below
which can be considered to be the essential ingredients of culpable homicide not amounting to murder:
As per Section 299 of the IPC, these are:
Causation of death
One of the most essential ingredients of proving culpable homicide is the death of the victim through
any act or omission by the accused. If the end result is not death, then no offence of culpable homicide
could be made against an accused. However, there may be hurt or grievous hurt in such cases but not
culpable homicide or murder. The Supreme Court in the case of Rama Nand v. State of Himachal
Pradesh (1981) has clearly held that one of the essential ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide
required to be proved by prosecution is that the accused caused the death of the person alleged to have
been killed. The same can be proved by circumstantial evidence and discovery of the dead body of the
victim has never been considered as the only mode of proving death.
The term “whoever causes death” may be simple enough to understand, but has shown itself to be words
of great import in deciding whether a particular act would amount to culpable homicide or not. The very
first test to decide whether a particular act or omission would be covered by the definition of culpable
homicide, is to verify whether the act done by the accused has “caused” the death of another person. The
relevant consideration for such verification is to see whether the death is caused as a direct result of the
act committed by the accused. The connection between the primary cause and the death should not be
too remote. There needs to have a proximate causal link between the two (Moti Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh). The death must be a direct consequence of the injuries inflicted on the deceased. Intervening
or supervening cause, if any, should not be independent or unconnected with the injuries sustained by
the deceased. (Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab)
This judgement was followed in the case of Rishipal v. State of Uttarakhand (2013), and the court noted
that failure of the prosecution to assemble evidence of death of the victim would result in failure of most
essential requirements in cases of Culpable homicide and murder.
Intention or Knowledge
Both the terms “intention” and “knowledge” appear in sections 299 and 300, however, having different
consequences. Intention and knowledge are used as alternate ingredients to constitute the offence of
culpable homicide. However, intention and knowledge are two different things.
The difference between the two came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Basdev v State of
Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, wherein the accused was alleged to have shot a 16-year old boy after having
got drunk and took the defence that he was so drunk that he did not have the knowledge or intention to
kill the boy for what was a trifling incident. The court differentiated between motive, intention and
knowledge:
“Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention. Knowledge is an awareness of the
consequences of the act. In many cases, intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the
same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between
knowledge and intention is no doubt thin, but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different
things.”
When an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified
harmful consequences would or could follow. But that knowledge is a bare awareness and not the same
as intention that such consequences should ensue. “Intention”, compared with “knowledge”, requires
something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely, the purposeful doing of a thing to
achieve a particular end.( Nankaunoo v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 317)
“Intention” becomes crucial in the offence of culpable homicide, because degree of intention of the
accused determines the degree of crime. In other words, it is the mental element of the accused alone,
which is material to decide whether a particular act is culpable homicide amounting to murder, or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
As far as the offence of culpable homicide is concerned, there are three species or degrees of mens rea
present:
(i) an intention to cause death;
(ii) an intention to cause dangerous bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
(iii) knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.
Intention of causing death
The degree of intention under culpable homicide not amounting to murder is comparatively less and not
sufficient so as to cause death like in murder. The Delhi High Court in the case of Satpal v. State (1998)
observed that the intention to cause a death has to be gathered and inferred from the actions of the
accused and the surrounding circumstances such as motive of the accused, utterances made, nature of
attack, the time and place of attack, the nature and type of weapon used, the nature of injuries caused
and so on. These and other factors are to be taken into consideration to determine whether the accused
had requisite intention or not. In this case, there was no material or evidence to show that the act of
throwing the stone was such that it can be attributed that such act was likely to cause death of the victim.
Hence, the court did not gather the intention of the accused to place it either for culpable homicide or
murder.
Intention of causing bodily injury that is likely to cause death
This ingredient talks about such an intention of causing bodily injury to a person which is likely to result
in death of that person. For instance, in a fight between A and B, A gave two blows with lathi on head of
B which is likely to cause his death and death will not be the result in all probability. Here, bodily injury
was the result of his intention only, but death was not the ultimate intention.
Knowledge of the likelihood of causing death
The degree of knowledge is less, and it need not be compulsorily present as in case of murder. In the
case of a person giving chokeslam to another person and having knowledge that it is likely to cause the
death of such a person and will not in all probability cause the death of that other person. This will be
covered under culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Unlike murder, the knowledge is not
accompanied by the intention in culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Knowledge means consciousness. It denotes a state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which
human mind remains inactive. It connotes a bare awareness of the consequences of his conduct (Jai
Prakash v State (Delhi), (1991) 2 SCC 32). The offender should reasonably expect that the consequence
of his act would probably result in the death of a person, even if he did not intend to cause the death
(Takhaji Hiraji v Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, AIR 2001 SC 2328). The word “likely” as used in
section 299 is to denote a lower degree of likelihood, whereas the same word “likely” in section 300
would denote a higher degree of likelihood of death. The word “likely” in section 299 conveys the sense
of probability as distinguished from merely possibility or probability (Raj Pal v State of Haryana, (2006)
9 SCC 678). The absence of intention to cause death or bodily injury which is in the ordinary course of
nature likely to cause death is not conclusive. What is required to be seen is whether the act is one where
the offender must be deemed to have had knowledge that he was likely, by his act, to cause death.
In the case of State v. Sanjeev Nanda (2012), the Supreme Court accepted the appeal of the State that the
accused driver was having the requisite knowledge of the consequence of his dangerous driving and was
made liable under part II of Section 302. The court inferred such knowledge through the driver’s post-
accident conduct and fleeing from the spot without caring for the victim.
Proof of Intention
Direct proof of intention is always very difficult to obtain. However, intention is something which can
be gathered and inferred from the action of the person and the surrounding circumstances, such as
motive of the accused, the nature of the attack, the time and place of attack, the nature of weapons used,
the nature of injuries caused to the deceased, the amount of force employed in causing injury; prior
enmity, premeditation, and so on. These and other factors may be taken into consideration to determine
whether a person had the requisite intention.
When injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body like the abdomen by a lethal or sharp-edged
weapon, the irresistible inference is that the accused intended to kill the deceased.
Culpable homicide by causing the death of a person other than the person whose death was
intended
The notion of ‘culpable homicide by causing the death of a person other than the person whose death
was intended’ is enshrined in Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code which states that:
“A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the death of another person while trying to kill
the other person. Here the intention of the person who killed or grievously hurt any other person whom
he didn’t want to kill or hurt is not considered.”
The law didn’t make any distinction between the cases where the person died whether his death was
intentional and unintentional. According to Section 299 and Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, there
is nowhere mentioned that the intention to cause injury or death of someone or knowing the
consequences of the act is with respect to a particular person only. Hence, a person who has shot
someone intentionally but accidentally the bullet changes its direction killing another person, the person
who fired the shot is equally liable for the death of the other person as he would have been for the
person he intended to shoot.
In the case of R. v Latimer (1886) a person got into a fight and in course of the fight, to beat the man he
took out his belt and struck the belt but it rebounded and hit a lady, she was grievously injured. The
court held that the defendant is to be held liable for the injuries inflicted on the woman ignoring the fact
that he had no intention to harm her. The mens rea has transferred to the woman from the man he was
going to hit with his belt.
Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P. (2006): Herein the Supreme Court came thrashing on the Allahabad High
Court for not considering Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code in the present case.
In this case, a girl died of a bullet which was fired on another person. The High Court stated in its
decision that there was mistake involved and there was no intention of the accused to kill the girl. The
supreme court held that the intention of the accused should be ignored in the present case. The court also
held that the Allahabad High Court’s reasoning behind stating the act as an accident is not to be
sustained as their reasoning was erroneous. Ultimately he was held liable for his actions.

Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Being an offence that is less grave than murder, the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder does not extend to the death penalty but goes up to life imprisonment, depending upon the
degree of intention and knowledge as mentioned under Section 304 of the IPC. The punishment under
this Section is divided into two paragraphs. The acts which are covered under Section 299 are made
punishable under either of these two parts of Section 304 of IPC.
Section 304: Paragraph 1 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
When an act is done with the intention of causing death or bodily injury which is likely to cause death,
then the same is punishable with imprisonment for life, rigorous or simple imprisonment for a maximum
period of ten years, and also fine.
Section 304, Part I, prescribes a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description
for a term up to ten years and fine, if, the act is done with the intention of causing death or causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. This clause corresponds to clauses (a) and (b) of section 299.
This Part also covers cases wherein an offence of culpable homicide does not amount to murder, on
account of the fact that the act falls within one of the exceptions to section 300. Section 304, Part I, thus
applies to culpable homicide, wherein the accused has the intention either to cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death. If the offender has the intention to cause bodily injury accompanied
with the knowledge that such injury is likely to cause the death of the person injured as defined in
section 300, clause (2), then the offence will come under section 302 and not under section 304, Part I,
unless it falls under any of the five exceptions under section 300, IPC. A reference to section 304, Part I,
clearly shows that this part covers offences where intention to commit the offence is present.
In the case of Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012), the accused used the blunt side of the aruval and a
stick on the deceased. The court noted that they did not have any intention to cause the death of the
deceased. However, the injuries were caused on the head of the deceased, through which the court
concluded that they had intention of causing bodily injury which is likely to cause death. Thus, they
were made liable under Part 1 of Section 304. Further, in the case of Laxman v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2006), wherein the accused was shooting arrows and pelting stones without any accuracy and
one of the arrows hit the deceased person and caused his death. The court held him liable under Part 1 of
Section 304.
In the case of Shanmugam v. State of T.N., it was held that offences under Section 304 can be
considered as cognizable, non-bailable and triable by the Court of Sessions. In this, there arose a quarrel
between the accused and the deceased In course of the quarrel the accused stabbed the deceased with a
spear in the abdomen and the chest resulting in the death of the victim because of septicemia. The
accused was sentenced to life imprisonment under part I of Section 304 of IPC.
Section 304: Paragraph 2 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 304, Part II, applies to homicides that result from the act done with the knowledge that it is
likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death. This clause corresponds to clause (c) of section 299. However, if an offence is committed with the
knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, and such act is done without any excuse, then the offence will be taken
out of the purview of section 304, Part II, and would be covered under section 302, as the offence would
amount to murder under section 300, clause (4). Thus, the knowledge referred to in Part II of section 304
is of a lesser degree than the special knowledge referred to in clause (4) of section 300.
In the case of Dharam Pal and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008), the court held that there was no
premeditation by the accused and the fight started in the area where the hand pipe was situated after the
exchange of excuses between the deceased and the accused. The court could not gather any intention of
the accused to cause the death of the deceased. He was made liable under Part 2 of Section 304 since the
case fell under Exception 4 of Section 300.
In the case of Vijender v. State (2020), deceased A was a sister of V and wife of O but at the time of her
death, she was living with Z. O and V entered the house and attacked Z where they caught hold of the
deceased also. O attacked her with a knife and she died. It was not possible to know if V was aware that
O was carrying a knife. The court noted that the assault took place after the exchange of heated words
between the accused and Z. The intention of accused O was beyond any doubt, however, there was a
doubt on V’s intention to kill A since he was without any arms. Thus, the court concluded that appellant
V caused the death of A without any intention but with a knowledge that it is likely to cause death. The
conviction of appellant V was converted from Section 302 to Part 2 of Section 304. Intention per se
makes the offence more heinous as compared to knowledge of likelihood, which is of a lesser degree
than intent and is punishable for a lesser term as well.
Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Section 308 of the IPC covers the penalty for attempting to commit culpable homicide, not amounting to
murder. Even an attempt to commit an act with such knowledge and intention as if he can cause death by
such an act and will be punishable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder is liable to be
punished even if the death is not so caused. The punishment prescribed for the same is rigorous or
simple imprisonment for a maximum term of three years, a fine, or both.
Further, if hurt is caused by such an act to any person, then that person will be punished for rigorous or
simple imprisonment for a maximum term of seven years or fine or both.
For instance, if there is a person, A, who is a public servant, and he, by exceeding his powers without
any ill-will towards B, fires a pistol at him under such circumstances as to cause his death, but the pistol
could not hit him, then he will be made liable under this section.
Illustrations
 A knows that S is behind the tree, but B is not aware of it. A, intending to cause S’s death or
knowing it to be likely to cause S’s death, induces B to fire at the tree. Here, A is guilty of the
offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder since no definite knowledge is present
and there is also no 100% probability that S will be killed.
 A induced B to put the fire at the house, knowing that Z was sitting on the balcony and that fire
is likely to cause his death. Here, A is liable for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder because A has knowledge but B has no such knowledge or intention. So, only A will
be liable.
 A gives a chokeslam to B, which, to his knowledge, is likely to cause B’s death. Here, A is liable
for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder because here A only has
knowledge that a certain act is likely to cause B’s death. Thus, falling under Section 299 of the
IPC.
 A, who was the sister of B, was seen marrying S after running from her home. B in grave and
sudden provocation fired a pistol at S, which killed him. Here, the case will fall under the first
exception to murder, and B will be liable for culpable homicide.
 B provoked A on 1st July, 2023. On 3rd July, 2023, A stabbed B to death. Here, the provocation
cannot be called grave and sudden; therefore, A will be held liable for murder.
  A, a police officer goes to arrest a person, B, and he was running away. A shoots at B. Here, A
will not be held liable for murder but for culpable homicide not amounting to murder as he
exceeded his powers of lawfully arresting B.
 A was suffering from a disease and had been lying in the hospital for several weeks. B was not
able to see A in such a situation and therefore accelerated his death. He will be liable for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder as per Explanation 1 of Section 299 of the IPC.
MURDER
[s 300] Murder.—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by
which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
Secondly—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely
to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
Thirdly—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
Fourthly—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Scope of Section 300
Section 300 defines murder with reference to culpable homicide defined in section 299. If the special
requirements provided in clauses 1-4 of section 300 are fulfilled, culpable homicide will then amount to
murder, provided, of course, the act does not fall within any of the Exceptions provided in section 300.
If an act, which falls within clauses 1 to 4 of section 300, also falls within one of the Exceptions, then it
will be culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Culpable homicide is murder, if it is done with:
(i) intention to cause death; or
(ii) intention to cause bodily injury knowing that the injury caused is likely to cause death; or
(iii) intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or
(iv) knowledge that the act is:
(a) imminently dangerous that in all probability it will cause death or bodily injury which
is likely to cause death, and
(b) done without any justification for incurring the risk of causing death or the injury.
Intentionally Causing Death—Clause (1) of Section 300
The first clause of section 300 stipulates that when an act (including legal omission) is done with the
intention of causing death, then it is culpable homicide amounting to murder. It is the action of a person
with the clear intention of killing a person. The intention of the person can be gathered from the action
of the person. It can be proved only by its external manifestations. When a person, for example, sets
another on fire, or hits with sharp weapon another on vital parts of his body, or stabs him with a knife,
his intention to kill the deceased becomes very clear.
In the case of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012), accused and the deceased were having
no animosity earlier and a dispute was started between them at a spot of construction which was being
made by the deceased on his land. A heated exchange of words took place between them, which resulted
in a physical fight. In the midst of this, the accused brought a rifle from his home and on the provocation
of the deceased, he fired a shot which hit the deceased and caused his death. Accused was a person
belonging to the armed forces and was very well aware of his actions. The court noted that though the
offence was not committed with any premeditation and intention to kill the deceased, but it was
committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which could result in death of the deceased. It was a
case involving intention and not knowledge as per the facts, thus the punishment was altered by the
Supreme Court from section 302 to Part 1 of Section 304.
It is pertinent to note that the first clause of section 300, which is “act done with intention of causing
death”, is identical to the first clause of section 299, which is also “doing an act with the intention of
causing death”. Therefore, an act coming under clause (1) of section 300 will also fall under clause (1)
of section 299, and in both instances, it will be culpable homicide amounting to murder. (Gudar
Dusadh v State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 118)
Intentional Causing of Bodily Injury with Knowledge That It will Cause Death—Clause (2) of
Section 300
The second clause of section 300 stipulates that if a person intentionally causes bodily injury, with the
knowledge that such bodily injury will cause death of the person injured, then it will be culpable
homicide amounting to murder. Thus, the mens rea or the mental attitude contemplated under clause 2 of
section 300 is twofold. First, there must be an intention to cause bodily harm. Secondly, there must be
“knowledge” that death is the “likely” result or consequence of such intended bodily injury.
The second clause of section 300 will apply if there is first, the intention to cause bodily harm and next,
there is the “subjective knowledge” that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury
(Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 (1878)). It is said to be “subjective knowledge”,
because it is the accused’s own personal perception of the consequences of his act. The knowledge here
is subjective, as opposed to the objective requirement in clause 3 of section 300. Clause 3 of section 300
stipulates that the bodily injury intended is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Therefore, the requirement of clause (3) of section 300 is that it must be objectively established that the
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. By objective, it means it is not the personal
perception of the accused that matters, but whether objectively speaking, in real terms, the injury
intentionally caused is sufficient to cause death. Thus, the only difference between clause (1) and clause
(2) is the degree of intention. In a way, the essence of clause (2) is the knowledge of the accused that the
act is likely to cause death.
Intentional Causing of Injury Sufficient to Cause Death—Clause (3) of Section 300
The third clause, as stated earlier, views the matter from an objective standpoint. It consists of two parts.
Under the first part, it has to be shown that there was an intention to inflict the particular injury. The
second part requires that the injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. The essence of the clause is the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. When the word “sufficiency” is used, it means where there is a very
high probability of the injury resulting in death.
In Virsa Singh v State of Punjab 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that in order to bring a case
within clause (3) of section 300, the prosecution must prove the following:
(1)It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.
(2)The nature of the injury must be proved.
(3)It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that
it was not accidental or unintentional, or some other kind of injury was intended.
•Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and
(4)It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out
above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
In the Virsa Singh case, while postulating the ingredients of clause (3) of section 300, the apex court has
observed inter alia that “it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was
intended”.
Knowledge that Act is so Imminently Dangerous so as to Cause Death—Clause (4) of Section 300
Clause (4) of section 300 contemplates generally, commission of acts which are so imminently
dangerous that it is likely to cause death. Under this clause, the act need not be directed at any particular
individual nor there be an intention to cause the death of any particular individual. It has to merely be a
reckless act, which is imminently dangerous. Illustration (d) clearly sets out the scope of the clause. “A
without any excuses fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of
murder, although he may not have had a pre-meditated design to kill any particular individual.”
The essential ingredients of this clause are: (i) the act must be imminently dangerous; (ii) the person
committing the act must have knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous; (iii) that in all probability it
will cause (a) death or (b) bodily injury as is likely to cause death dangerous, and (iv) such imminently
dangerous act should be done without any reason or justification for running the risk of causing death or
such inquiry.
The mental element contemplated under this clause is “knowledge” that the act is so imminently
dangerous that it is likely to cause death or such bodily injury that is likely to cause death (Santosh v
State of Maharashtra, (2015) 7 SCC 641). The term “imminently dangerous” requires that the danger
should be immediate and close at hand. Hence, under this clause, the intention to kill anybody is not
required in order to constitute the offence of murder.
Section 300 “fourthly” requires the proof that the accused incurred the risk of causing death or bodily
injury “without any excuse”. A casual reading of the clause might create an impression that the phrase
“without any excuse” refers to the special five exceptions appended to section 300. But a careful reading
thereof reveals that the words “without any excuse” do not contemplate the situations that fall within any
of these exceptions to section 300. The phrase does connote the situations that fall short of, or other
than, these exceptions. It conveys that culpable homicide based on knowledge does not amount to
murder if the accused has an “excuse” for “incurring the risk”, even if none of the five special
exceptions to section 300 is applicable. The words “without excuse” used in clause 4, thus, contemplate
situations other than those which fall within the five exceptions to section 300, IPC. (Emperor v
Dhirajia, AIR 1940 All 486; Gyarsibai v State, AIR 1953 MB 61)
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder under exceptions to Section 300 IPC
Any of these exceptions mentioned under Section 300 can be availed as a defence by the accused. These
acts mentioned below are not purely intentional acts done by the accused alone and are a result of a
reaction to the actions of the deceased or derived through lawful powers.
The exceptions provided for under section 300 are: (1) grave and sudden provocation; (2) private
defence; (3) acts of public servants; (4) sudden fight, and (5) consent. First, these are the “special
exceptions” to murder only. In this sense, they are distinct from “General Exceptions” enumerated in
Chapter IV (sections 76 to 106) of the IPC. The latter, unlike the former, by virtue of section 6 read with
section 40, IPC, are applicable to offences created under the IPC as well as under other special or local
laws in force in India. Secondly, the “special exceptions” merely cover “murder” to “culpable homicide
not amounting to murder” and thereby reduce the criminal liability of its perpetrator. Thirdly, these
exceptions to section 300, unlike the “general exceptions”, do not exonerate the wrongdoer. They only
operate as mitigating factors.
As per the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, the essentials of the offence of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder are:
Grave and sudden provocation
Deprivation of the power of self-control and by grave and sudden provocation causes that person’s death
who gave provocation or causes the death of any person by mistake or accident. There are three provisos
to this exception. The first proviso states that the same should not be voluntarily provoked by the
offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm. The second proviso states that the provocation not to be
given by anything done in obedience of the law or by a public servant during his lawful exercise of the
powers. The third proviso states that the provocation should not be made through lawful exercise of the
right of private defence. In order that this exception should apply, the provocation should be both grave
and sudden. If the provocation is sudden but not grave, or grave but not sudden, then the offender cannot
avail of the benefit of this exception. The expression “grave” indicates that provocation be of such a
nature so as to give cause for alarm to the accused. “Grave provocation” within the meaning of
Exception 1 to section 300 is a provocation where judgement and reason take leave of the offender and
violent passion takes over.( BD Khunte v UOI, (2015) 1 SCC 286)
“Sudden” means an action which must be quick and unexpected so far as to provoke the accused.39
Further, it should also be shown that the provocation was of such a nature that the offender was deprived
of the power of self-control.
In KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605, the accused was a naval officer. He was
married with three children. One day, his wife confessed to him that she had developed intimacy with
the deceased. Enraged at this, the accused went to his ship, took a semi-automatic revolver and six
cartridges from the store of the ship, went to the flat of the deceased, entered his bedroom and shot him
dead. Thereafter, the accused surrendered himself to the police. The question before the Supreme Court
was whether the act of the accused could be said to fall within Exception 1 of section 300. The Supreme
Court laid down the following postulates relating to grave and sudden provocation:
1. (1)The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the
same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed,
would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
2. (2)In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden
provocation to an accused, so as to bring his act within the first exception to section 300, IPC.
3. (3)The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation
for committing the offence.
4. (4)The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that
provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving
room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
The Supreme Court held that the accused, after his wife confessed to her illicit relationship with the
deceased, may have momentarily lost control. He had thereafter dropped his wife and children at a
cinema, went to the ship, collected the revolver, did some official business there, drove his car to the
office of the deceased and later to his house. Three hours had lapsed by then and therefore, there was
sufficient time for him to regain his self-control.42 A considerable time lapsed that was sufficient to
cool off. In view of this, the court held that the provisions of Exception 1 to section 300 were not
attracted. The accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Suljina Dhan v. State of Assam
Facts: The appellant, Suljina Dhan, was accused of murdering her husband. It was alleged that the
appellant attacked her husband with an axe, leading to his death. During the trial, Suljina Dhan claimed
that her husband had accidentally fallen on the axe, resulting in his death. The trial court found the
appellant guilty under Section 302 IPC (murder). The court determined that the appellant failed to prove
the facts exclusively within her knowledge, as required under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The
injuries described in the post-mortem report made the appellant’s defense improbable.
Decision: The Gauhati High Court reviewed the trial court's record and found no infirmity in the fact-
finding process. The court noted that the appellant failed to discharge her burden under Section 106 of
the Evidence Act, as she was alone with the deceased at the time of the incident. The nature of injuries,
as per the post-mortem report, made the appellant's defense (that her husband accidentally fell on the
axe) improbable. Testimonies indicated that the deceased was a habitual drunkard who often fought with
the appellant. On the day of the incident, a fight had occurred, leading to the act of violence. The court
determined that the fight between the appellant and her husband provided grave and sudden provocation,
which led to the appellant’s act. This qualified for Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which reduces
culpable homicide to not amounting to murder. The High Court altered the conviction from murder
under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304(II) IPC,
acknowledging the appellant as a victim of circumstances. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
Muthu Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu
Facts: On April 9, 1998, around 8 A.M., Muthu, the accused, was working in a waste paper merchant
shop. The deceased, Siva, who collected waste paper, threw waste papers and cardboard boxes into the
shop. Muthu got angry, pulled Siva's hair, and during the altercation, Muthu picked up a knife from a
table and stabbed Siva in the chest, causing his death. He was found guilty under Section 302 IPC
(murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were upheld by the High
Court.
Judgement: In appeal the Supreme Court found that the case fell under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC,
which deals with acts committed due to grave and sudden provocation. The Court noted that Muthu was
deprived of self-control by the provocation of waste being thrown into his shop, a situation likely to
upset anyone. It was evident Muthu had no premeditated intention to kill Siva, as he picked up the knife
during the scuffle. The Court also considered Exception 4, which covers cases of sudden fight and heat
of passion without premeditation or cruel conduct, further supporting the reclassification under Section
304 IPC. The Court decided the case came under Part II of Section 304 IPC, considering the act was
done with knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without the intention to cause death. The
sentence was reduced to five years of simple imprisonment, with any period already served to be
deducted from this term.
Private defence
Exercise of right of private defence of body or property in good faith and exceeds his power given by
law and causes death of person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without any
premeditation and intention of doing more harm than is necessary for taking such defence.
It merely is considered as a mitigating factor to reduce the offence from that of murder to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. Of course, before this exception can be availed of, it has to be
proved that the accused had the right of private defence as stipulated in sections 96 to 106, IPC. It is
only after the existence of the right is established that the question whether the accused had exceeded his
right to private defence will arise. If, in the first instance, it appears that the accused does not have the
right of private defence, then obviously this clause will not come into play.
As already noted in the chapter on General Exceptions, if a person genuinely exercises his right of
private defence within the limits prescribed by law, then he commits no offence. However, if he exceeds
the right, it will amount to a lesser offence than murder. The most important circumstance in
determining this factor is the intention of the offender. The second exception stipulates that the
exceeding of the right of private defence should be without pre-meditation, and without any intention of
doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of coverage by the exception. In other words, the
exceeding of private defence by the accused should be done unintentionally.
In Raj Singh v State of Haryana (2015) Cr LJ 2803 (SC), the Supreme Court has beautifully
articulated the manner of judicial determination of claim of the accused that he has caused homicide by
exceeding his lawful right of private defence and thereby deserves liability not for murder but for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It observed:
A conjoint reading of provisions of ss 96 to 103 and Exception 2 to s 300 of the Code leaves no manner
of doubt that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of
private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the
person against whom he is exercising such right of defence, provided that such right is exercised without
premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such
defence. A fortiori in cases where an accused sets up right of private defence, the first and the foremost
question that would fall for determination by the Court would be whether the accused had the right of
private defence in the situation in which death or other harm was caused by him. If the answer to that
question is in the negative, Exception 2 to s 300 of the Code would be of no assistance. Exception 2
presupposes that the offender had the right of private defence of person or property but he had exceeded
such right by causing death. It is only in case answer to the first question is in the affirmative viz. that
the offender had the right of defence of person or property, that the next question viz. whether he had
exercised that right in good faith and without premeditation and without any intention of doing more
harm that was necessary for the purpose of such defence would arise. Should answer to any one of these
questions be in the negative, the offender will not be entitled to the benefit of Exception 2 to s 300 of the
Code. Absence of good faith in the exercise of the right of private defence, premeditation for the exercise
of such right and acts done with the intention of causing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of
such defence would deny to the offender the benefit of Exception 2 to s 300.
Jassa Singh V. State Of Haryana (2002) 2 SCC 481
The Supreme Court held that the right of private defence of property would not extend to the causing of
the death of the person who committed such acts if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land. Only
a house trespass committed under such circumstances as may reasonably caused death or grievous hurt
is enumerated as one of the offences under Section 103.
Public servant
If the offender is a public servant or aiding a public servant and exceeds his powers in good faith
believing to be lawful and necessary for due discharge of his duty ,and without ill-will. Exception 3 is
similar to Exception 2, in the sense that it deals with situations where a public servant exceeds his lawful
powers in the discharge of his duties and thereby causes death. The essential ingredients of this
exception are: (i) the offence must be committed by a public servant or by a person aiding a public
servant; (ii) the act alleged must have been committed by the public servant in the discharge of his
official duties; (iii) he should have exceeded the powers given to him by law; (iv) the act should be done
in good faith; (v) the public servant should have believed that his act was lawful and necessary for the
due discharge of his duties and (vi) he should not have borne any ill-will towards the person whose
death was caused.
In the case of State of West Bengal v Shew Mangal Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1917 an order to shoot was
given by the public servant and his subordinate carried his orders, when there was no occasion to do so,
it was held that the order of the public servant was illegal and neither the public servant nor the person
acting under the order can be said to have acted in good faith. Obedience of a superior’s lawful order
protects a subordinate. Causing death by the subordinate in pursuance of an ex facie unlawful order,
therefore, cannot be exonerated.
In the case of Dukhi Singh v. State of UP (1955), the constable of the Railway Protection Force fired
on the thief when he was escaping his arrest in order to catch him, however, it caused his death. But, the
constable was given protection under this exception and booked for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.
Without premeditation in a sudden fight
During a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without any premeditation, taking
undue advantage, or acting in a cruel or unusual manner.
This exception applies to instances, which are not covered by the first Exception. Both the Exceptions
are founded on the same principle, i.e. the absence of premeditation. But, in the case of first Exception
there is total deprivation of self-control because of provocation, while in case of fourth Exception, there
is only that heat of passion which eclipses his sober reason. Heat of passion requires that there must be
no time for the passions to cool down. There is provocation in fourth Exception as in first Exception, but
the injury caused is not the direct consequence of that provocation. There is mutual provocation and
aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. Both the
parties, notwithstanding with the fact who stuck the first blow and who initiated the quarrel, are put on
equal footing for their subsequent conduct and guilt therefor. The homicide committed is clearly not
traceable to unilateral provocation. Therefore, no whole blame cannot be placed on one side. A fight
suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. (Surain Singh v State of
Punjab, AIR 2017 SC 1904 : (2017) 5 SCC 796). In the case of Surain Singh v. State of Punjab, the
Supreme Court, comprising Justices Dr. A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, clarified Exception 4 under
Section 300 of the IPC, which pertains to deaths caused in sudden fights. The Court emphasized that the
crucial factor is not the number of wounds inflicted, but whether the occurrence was sudden,
unpremeditated, and the offender acted in a fit of anger. It held that if a person, during a sudden quarrel,
picks up a handy weapon and causes fatal injuries without taking undue advantage or acting cruelly,
they can invoke this exception. In this case, a dispute over irrigation rights led to a heated exchange,
during which the appellant-accused used a small Kirpan to assault a relative of the complainant. The
Court noted that the injuries were inflicted in the heat of passion, with no undue advantage taken, and
ruled that the accused's actions met the criteria for Exception 4 under Section 300 IPC, entitling him to
its benefit.
Further, in the case of Tularam v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2018), the facts were quite similar. There
was a quarrel between two people which escalated into an altercation and joined by a few family
members with lathis and ballam. During this altercation, appellants pierced B with a ballam on his left
chest. The Supreme Court held that all the ingredients of Exception 4 of Section 300 are present, as the
fight was sudden and not premeditated. There was no intention on the part of the appellant to cause
death or such bodily injury, but they had knowledge that piercing the chest with a ballam would cause
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Thus, conviction was converted from Section 302 to Part 2 of
Section 304 and his sentence was altered to a period of incarceration already undergone since he spent
14 years in the prison.
The requisites of the fourth Exception are that:
 the murder should have been committed without premeditation;
 it should have been committed in a sudden fight;
 it should have been committed in the heat of passion;
 it should have been committed upon a sudden quarrel and
 it should have been committed without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner.
In the case of Narayan Nair v. State of Travancore (1955), the court highlighted that in order to
establish a case under this exception, there must be a fight with the person who has been killed. Further,
in the case of Samuthram v. State of Tamil Nadu (1997), a person in the heat of passion while fighting
with another person, picks up a weapon which was handy and caused injuries to that person which
resulted in his death. This case was covered under this exception.
Consent
Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of 18
years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. The points to be proved are: (i) the
death was caused with the consent of the deceased; (ii) the deceased was then above 18 years of age, and
(iii) the consent given was free and voluntary, and was not given through fear or misconception of facts.
The person suffers death or takes risk of death with his own consent and was above the age of eighteen
years. The consent in this case has to be free and voluntary.
In the case of Emperor v Ganesh Dooley, (1879) ILR 5 Cal 351, A and B, snake charmers, induced C
and D to allow themselves to be bitten by a snake, whose fangs had been imperfectly extracted, under
the belief that they would be protected from harm. C and D died. A and B were held guilty of culpable
homicide under this Exception, on the ground that the deceased gave their consent “with a full
knowledge of the fact, in the belief of the existence of powers which the prisoners asserted and believed
themselves to possess”.
If any of these acts are done, they will not be considered or punished for murder; however, the same will
be punished for a lesser term under culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Difference between culpable homicide and murder

Basis of Culpable Homicide Murder
differentiation
Meaning/ A death is caused by doing an act that is A death is caused by an act which is
Concept likely to cause the death done with a sufficient intention to cause
the death
Essentials Death caused with the intention of Death caused with the intention of
causing death or Intention of causing such causing death or Intention of causing
bodily injury as is likely to cause death or such bodily injury and knowledge of its
knowledge of the likelihood of causing likelihood of causing death or intention
death of causing bodily injury which is
sufficient to cause death or with the
knowledge that it is imminently
dangerous to cause death or bodily injury
likely to cause death in all probability
Provisions Sections 299 and 304 Sections 300 and 302
Degree of Comparatively less Sufficient so as to cause death
intention
Knowledge Knowledge of the likelihood of causing Compulsory to be present
death
Purpose Likelihood of causing death Causing death
(majorly)
Punishment Imprisonment for life or up to ten years of Death or imprisonment for life and a fine
imprisonment and fine as mentioned in
the first para of Section 304 if the death is
caused with the intention of causing death
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death. Imprisonment for life or up to ten
years of imprisonment or fine or both as
mentioned in the second para of Section
304 if an act has been done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death
but the same is done without any intention
or cause such bodily injury as is likely to
 cause death

The degree of responsibility is taken into consideration. When the probability of death is high, it is
considered murder, and when the probability is low, it is considered to be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. To interpret the difference in both concepts, one must know the distinction
between intention and knowledge, which was laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev
v. The State of Pepsu (1956).
In the case involving Basdev, an ex-military man from Harigarh, he was charged with the murder of 15-
year-old Maghar Singh during a wedding event. Intoxicated, Basdev shot the boy in the abdomen after
an argument over seating. Although the trial court initially granted a lesser punishment due to his
drunken state, the Supreme Court examined whether his intoxication could reduce the charge from
murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The appellant argued that his severe intoxication
impaired his ability to form the intent to kill. However, the respondent contended that Basdev's
voluntary intoxication did not absolve him of responsibility, as he was aware of his actions and their
consequences. It was held that an intention is formed through the motive of an individual and is the
highest degree of culpability, whereas knowledge is knowing the consequences of one’s actions.
The Court agreed with the respondent, noting that Basdev could still make decisions and comprehend
his actions, thus rejecting the defense of intoxication. Consequently, the Court upheld the murder
charge, concluding that Basdev's level of intoxication did not negate his intent or knowledge of the act,
and dismissed the appeal.
Landmark case laws on culpable homicide
Reg v. Govinda (1876): In this case, husband and wife had a fight wherein the accused, who was the
husband, knocked down his wife and gave her two to three violent blows on her face that resulted in
extraversion of blood in her brain. As a result, the wife died.
Since the act was not done with the intention of causing death, and the court also noticed that bodily
injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of action to cause death, the accused was held liable for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Nathan v. State of Madras (1973)
The landlord was trying to forcefully evict the tenant, who was the accused in this case. While
exercising his right to private defence, the accused killed the landlord even when the landlord was not
carrying any deadly weapon and therefore had no fear for the accused.
The accused was held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder since he exceeded his right
to private defence by killing the landlord even when there was no fear of death to the accused.
Kusa Majhi v. State of Orissa (1985)
In this case, a mother who was deceased warned her son not to go fishing with his friends. The son, out
of anger, brought an axe and gave her blows, due to which she died.
The case was considered culpable homicide, not amounting to murder as it has caused bodily injury that
was likely to cause death. The court also noted that it was out of a sudden moment and not pre-planned.
Gurdial Singh v. State of Punjab (2011)
In this case, there were three accused persons who were involved in constructing a drain. The deceased,
when objecting to the construction of a drain, was attacked by the accused who were carrying gandasi
and dangs. As a result, he died.
The accused persons were held liable under Section 304 (paragraph 1) for culpable homicide since there
was no prior intention to kill the deceased, and it happened all of a sudden when the deceased tried to
stop them.
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2020)
In this case, the accused was pointing a gun at the top of the house, and during a celebratory gunfire, his
bullets hit someone and killed two people.
The Supreme Court held him guilty under para 2 of Section 304 IPC since he had knowledge that his
bullet could kill someone, but there was no intention on his part to kill someone.
Recent case laws on culpable homicide
Boya Badannagari Laxmanna, Siddanagattu (V) Kurnool v. State (2022)
In this case, the accused, after marrying the deceased, came to know about her infidelity. He used to beat
the deceased, and in 2008, the prosecution alleged that the accused caused the death of the victim using
a jeep mudguard. The case was heard by the High Court in an appeal.
The prosecution could not prove the presence of the accused at the time of the death of the deceased, and
all the direct witnesses turned hostile during cross-examination. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held
that the conviction under Section 304 could not be sustained, and it was set aside.
Dauvaram Nirmalkar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2022)
In this case, the appellant was convicted of murder for killing his brother. He himself made the
confession at the police station, but the same was inadmissible. He also gave a statement as to the
weapons that were recovered. The deceased was an alcoholic, and the murder took place out of sudden
provocation by the deceased. The case was brought before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The court noticed that the testimonies of the family members revealed that the deceased was an
alcoholic and used to threaten and abuse the accused often. The accused had also tried to commit
suicide. At that moment also, there was a loss of self-control, and it was due to the acts of provocation of
his brother that the accused caused his death. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court converted the
conviction of the accused from Section 302 to Para 1 of Section 304 IPC.
Ex. Ct. Mahadev v. The Director General, Border Security Force & Ors. (2022)
In this case, the appellant was posted in Tripura, adjoining the Bangladesh border, which was famous for
smuggling. The deceased was carrying out smuggling activities, and his name was also mentioned in the
list received from BSF. The appellant had fired on the deceased, and he died as a result of the same, and
it was admitted by the appellant as well. According to him, several persons who were carrying weapons
tried to gherao him, and apprehending a threat to his life, he fired at that circle. As a result, the deceased
fell to the ground and died.
The Supreme Court held that the right to private defence will be available to the appellant because the
preponderance of probabilities lies in their favour. Since the people surrounding him were armed with
weapons and had no other option left, he fired at them. The offence will fall under exception 2 of
Section 300 IPC and will attract punishment under Section 304 IPC. The court further noticed that the
appellant has already undergone the sentence of over eleven years; hence, the sentence was considered
sufficient and he was set free.
Section 302 provides punishment for murder. It stipulates a punishment of death or imprisonment for
life and fine. Once an offender is found by the court to be guilty of the offence of murder under section
300, then it has to sentence the offender to either death sentence or imprisonment for life & fine.