David A. Cooper.

Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age: Between Disarmament and
Armageddon. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021. xvi + 227 pp.
$110.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-64712-131-0.

Reviewed by Patrick Conraads (Oregon State University)

Published on H-Sci-Med-Tech (December, 2023)

Commissioned by Penelope K. Hardy (University of Wisconsin-La Crosse)

Much like the title suggests, David A. Cooper’s years of disarmament serving as the dominant
Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age: Between strategy, Russia, China, and the United States now
Disarmament and Armageddon argues that “the find themselves in an incipient nuclear arms race,
United States is facing a new era of nuclear arms with the potential emergence of South Korea, Tur‐
racing for which it is conceptually unprepared” (p. key, and Saudi Arabia as nuclear powers. The key
1). Nuclear disarmament has dominated interna‐ to nuclear peace, for Cooper, is reaching strategic
tional agreements since the end of the Cold War— stability where no nuclear power would have a
the second nuclear age—but the concept is not complete strategic advantage over other powers,
suited for the emerging multipolar nuclear world thus deterring a nuclear first strike out of fear of
that has Russia, China, and the United States in a retribution.
ternary struggle. Arms Control for the Third Nuc‐ In the vein of stability, chapter 2 provides
lear Age demonstrates that despite a very complic‐ readers with a summary of classic Cold War arms
ated nuclear future, classic arms control concepts control theory serving as a national security tool.
could be the backbone of future nuclear weapons The year 1961 saw the publication of two seminal
treaties. Cooper’s work stands out among recent books: The Control of the Arms Race: Disarma‐
scholarship that shies away from classic arms con‐ ment and Arms Control in the Missile Age by Hed‐
trol concepts like mutual deterrence. ley Bull and Strategy and Arms Control by
The book is divided into five chapters, with Thomas Schelling and Morton Halpren. Together,
each containing succinct introductions and con‐ these two books advocated for “adversarial co‐
clusions that provide a useful roadmap for the operation” to achieve “cooperative security” (p.
chapter’s argument and key points. Chapter 1 40). Cooper identifies that “the critical presump‐
traces the changing denuclearization paradigm es‐ tion of classic arms control theory is that rivals
tablished since the Cold War ended. After thirty share an overriding interest in preserving stra‐
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tegic stability, even within an otherwise antagon‐ post-9/11 fears of terrorists acquiring nuclear
istic relationship” (p. 54). This arms control argu‐ weapons greatly accelerated nuclear disarmament
ment contrasts the more hawkish notion of de‐ trends. President Obama’s New START of 2009 pro‐
terrence through nuclear superiority at every posed deep cuts to US and Russian nuclear arsen‐
level, which came to be primarily associated with als with the goal of bringing China to the negotiat‐
Herman Kahn of the RAND Corporation. Cooper ing table once strategic parity was reached. How‐
notes that a blend of each approach can be useful, ever, New START was negotiated in a short win‐
as holding strategic advantages in certain areas dow by the Obama administration in 2010 before
can motivate adversaries to come to the negotiat‐ the original START expired. New START had less
ing table. verification and fewer restrictions on key techno‐
Chapter 3 traces how these theories served as logies, and it was only intended to be a placehold‐
the conceptual foundation for arms control until er for further negotiations. These negotiations
the end of the Cold War. Cooper admits that his ac‐ never occurred, and the 2014 Russian invasion of
count of traditional arms treaties “is not a history Crimea ended any possibility of future talks. The
in any proper sense” but rather an exploration of situation has become bleaker since the publication
how classic arms control theory evolved during of this book, with Russia launching a full-scale in‐
the Cold War “in order to glean useful lessons for vasion in February 2022 and withdrawing from
today” (p. 78). From the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, New START in January 2023.
Cooper derives the lesson that the United States Chapter 5 is where Cooper’s argument culmin‐
taking a hard-nosed approach with regard to ates by asserting that the United States should ad‐
weapons testing compelled the Soviets to the nego‐ opt two broad strategies. First, it should adopt a
tiating table. The lesson from the more robust dual-track approach of modernizing its forces in
Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties I & II of the categories like hypersonic missiles while also sig‐
1970s is the importance of a bipartisan consensus naling a willingness to negotiate. Second, it should
that allowed talks to survive multiple administra‐ seek to negotiate only what is verifiable, some‐
tions. Lastly, while Cooper sees Ronald Reagan thing Cooper notes could be difficult given that
succeeding by being hard-nosed in negotiations to China views keeping its adversaries uncertain as a
protect US interests while willing to make conces‐ strategic advantage. Cooper sees the five perman‐
sions to achieve strategic stability, the break‐ ent members of the UN Security Council—China,
through—and lesson for today—was Mikhail France, Great Britain, the United States, and Rus‐
Gorbachev’s acceptance of intrusive inspections sia—as a potential group among whom talks could
that resulted in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces begin. Cooper notes that any successful negoti‐
(INF) treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction ations will also have to involve compromises
Treaty (START). These intrusive inspections al‐ among all parties. The book ends with an explora‐
lowed each side to verify their adversary’s ability tion of the strengths and weaknesses of Russia,
to reciprocate a nuclear first strike. China, and the United States, and what each might
Chapter 4 revisits themes from chapter 1, de‐ have to compromise to reach strategic stability.
scribing in greater detail how the “the post-Cold Cooper’s sources limit the strength of the ar‐
War focus of American nuclear policy shifted from gument that Cold War tactics could have success
strategic competition to preventing proliferation for today. The sources are mostly manuscripts fo‐
and nuclear terrorism” (p. 118). The United States cused on the US experience, augmented by inter‐
began making unilateral disarmament decisions views with former defense officials and docu‐
in the first decade after the Cold War, but the ments from some US archives. This makes it diffi‐

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cult for the book to accurately describe why the

Soviet Union came to the negotiating table in the
Cold War and complicates prognosticating how
adversaries would respond to actions by the
United States. For example, when discussing the
first Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Cooper sug‐
gests that the United States’s hard-nosed approach
to continued atmospheric testing is what motiv‐
ated the Soviet Union to negotiate, but this misses
the fact that the Soviet Union had reached a point
where it no longer needed to conduct above-
ground tests. Similarly, without an accurate un‐
derstanding of China’s positions today, it is diffi‐
cult to prognosticate how any American proposals
would be received internationally.
Despite its limitations, Arms Control for the
Third Nuclear Age would work well in upper-divi‐
sion courses on US foreign policy or US history of
the Cold War. The argument is compelling and ac‐
cessible, which should generate a lot of discussion.

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Citation: Patrick Conraads. Review of Cooper, David A, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age: Between
Disarmament and Armageddon. H-Sci-Med-Tech, H-Net Reviews. December, 2023.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=59673

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