ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES

MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE

AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and
granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the
Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners
think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because of the following issues:

ISSUES:
WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees,
and thus contrary to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

HELD:

(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked.
As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the
grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was
vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs' have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises
governmental functions of regulating gambling activities.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest

Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly).
On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly
Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November
2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice,
where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC
received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case
before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic" because of its resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made
the case moot and academic.

Ruling:

The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason
of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done
purposely to make the petition moot and academic, it will not make it
academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is
without force and effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation. It also does not appear that the petitioner had
been made aware that he was charged with graft and corruption before his
colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity
to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to
mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered
reinstatement of the petitioner.

Lina, Jr. v. Paño, G.R. No. 129093, [August 30, 2001]

FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent
by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20
for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995
ISSUE: WON the local government may deny the operation of lotto in the said
locality.

HELD: NO. The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, merely states the “objection” of the council to the
operation of lotto. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council,
which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the
operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit this
in their petition. As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection
to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean
that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor
of San Pedro cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial
Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said
resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The
Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the
national legislature.
BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET
AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 177597 • July 16, 2008

FACTS:
Congress enacted RA 9054, the Section 19, Article VI of which delegated to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays.
Pursuant to such delegation, the ARMM Regional Assembly enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
ISSUES:

Whether or not Congress validly delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives;
RULING:
No. The power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district.
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these
powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:

1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago,

Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved
by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it
amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the
approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act
merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,”
therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected is mandatory.

Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda

was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang
Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of
Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.

TAN v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (Digested Case)

TAN v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating
a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental,
in the various cities and municipalities therein, filed a case for Prohibition for the
purpose of stopping respondents from conducting the plebiscite which was
scheduled "to be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected, excluding the original province."

ISSUES: WON the law is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the
LGC as in Art. XI, Sec. 3, of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The cited provision plainly provides that, "no province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The phrase "the unit or units affected"
refers to both the original province and the new province sought to be created as
these political groups will both be affected. Hence, the two must be included in the
plebiscite contemplated therein.

PADILLA v. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735

FACTS: Pursuant to RA 7155 and Resolution No. 2312 enacted by the respondent,
the respondent conducted a plebiscite in both the proposed municipality and the
mother municipality. In the plebiscite, the creation of the proposed municipality
was declared rejected. Petitioner herein contends that the plebiscite is invalid
because the Constitution requires that the plebiscite should only be conducted in
the areas comprising the proposed municipality. He claimed further that the ruling
in Tan v. COMELEC has been abandoned by the Court, readopting the ruling in
Paredes v. COMELEC, and that this is justified by the deletion of the phrase "unit
or" in Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor.

ISSUE:

WON the plebsicite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality
and the remaining areas of the mother municipality is valid.

HELD:

(2) Yes. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of
HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994,
the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:
Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into
Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
as required?

Held:

Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same
import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be
denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB
No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of
local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as
the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE

ROBREDO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by
its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
LARRAZABAL, Respondents.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In
substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of
the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to
have a population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district
for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716,
runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district.The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the c ited 250,000
minimum population standard.
ISSUE: Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?
HELD: Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city
to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned
about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order
to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each
province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.

GR 118577, 242 SCRA 211 [Mar 7, 1995]

Facts:

RA 7854 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati in Into a Highly

Urbanized City xxx”. Sec 52 thereof provides that Makati, upon conversion into a
Highly Urbanized City, shall have at least two legislative districts xxx. The
petitioners contend, among others, that the reapportionment cannot be made by a
special law (it can only be made by a general reapportionment law), and that
Makati’s population xxx stands at only 450k hence it allegedly violates Art VI, Sec
5(3) of the Constitution.

Issues:

(1) May Sec 52 of RA 7854, a special law, make reapportionment of the legislative
districts?

(2) Does Sec 53 of RA 7854 violate Art VI, Sec 5 (3) of the Constitution?

Held:

(1) Yes. As thus worded [in Art VI, Sec 5(1)], the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA
7854 and providing an increase in Makati’s legislative district.

(2) No. Art VI, Sec 5(3) provides that a city with a population of at least 250k shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati xxx
stood at 450k, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of 250k.

MALABANG v. BENITO, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969 (Digested Case)

Re: De facto municipal corporation

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of EO 386 of the then President Carlos P.
Garcia, which created the Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of
Malabang. Petitioner relied on the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General while
respondent contended that that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no
application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the
municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized
under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers
having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having
discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution
of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be
collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo
warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner
Balindong.

WON:
(1) WON the controverted matter may be attacked collateraly.

(2) WON EO 386 is constitutional.

HELD:
(1) Yes. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a
municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other
direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise
this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only
where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is
neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence
may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one
whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory
incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.

(2) No. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such
despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could
fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other "valid law"
giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact
that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated
cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the
Administrative Code provision in question, there is "no other valid statute to give
color of authority to its creation".

Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569

FACTS: Pursuant to the Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,

the President issued EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Pelaez alleged that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No. 2370, and constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3
of RA No. 2370 stated: "Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or
by Act of Congress."

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code

constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

Ruling: Yes, there is undue delegation of power. Section 10 (1) of the

Constitution's Article VII states that: "The President shall have control of al
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Constitution is clear in
saying that only general supervision can be exercised over the local
governments. No more authority that that of checking or supervision may
be done. In this case, by creating the 33 municipalities, the law conferred
upon the President more power over the local governments.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. HON.

ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres,
Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of
Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of
San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July
1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this
municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition sought the declaration
of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality and that the
case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for
Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment
referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.

HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it
was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to
challenge the legality of the executive order.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot
allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had
been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated.
The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353
but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the
continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed
the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance
(adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs CA

G.R. No. 1167022

The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its
territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia.

Lower Court: Barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdicti

on of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay Bohol therefore
s a i d b a r r i o f o r m s p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f i t s territory and further
permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia to respect plaintiff!
s control possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to
molest disturb harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio.
Court of Appeals: rejected the boundary line claimed by petitioner because it
would place practically all of barrio Pagahat and other barrios within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay. Candijay will eat up a big
chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating
her. After an examination of the respective s u r v e y p l a n s o f p e t i t i o n e r a n d
r e s p o n d e n t s u b m i t t e d a s e x h i b i t t h a t b o t h p l a n s a r e inadequate
insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and
the Municipality of Mabini.

After weighing and considering the import of certain official acts 

including & creating municipality of Alicia and Mabini and Act 1o. /)2of the
Philippine Commission concluded that Barrio Bulawan from where Barrio
Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of the
Municipality of Alicia. 1either do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms
parto f C a n d i j a y . T h e r e f o r e t h e C A
a p p l y i n g t h e e q u i p o n d e r a n c e r u l e d i s m i s s e d t h e complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent lacked juridical personality as a result of

having been created under a void EO

Citing the case of Municipality of San Narciso vs Mendez

Petitioner’s
theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been sea
s o n a b l e brought. EO 353 validity
was only contested after almost 30 years from its issuance.G r a n t i n g t h a t t h e
EO was a complete nullity for being the result of an
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l delegation of legislative power peculiar circumstances
obtaining this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of
its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining that of a de facto
municipal corporation. Equally significant is Section 442 (d), of the Local LGC
the effect that municipal districts ;organized pursuant to the presidential
issuances or EO and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office
att h e t i m e o f t h e e f f e c t i " i t y o f t h e C o d e s h a l l h e n c e f o r
t h b e c o n s i d e r e d a s r e g u l a r municipalities.
The de jure status of the Municipality must now be conceded.