Counterterrorism: A New Organizing Principle for American National Security?
Author(s): James Steinberg
Source: The Brookings Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 4-7
Published by: Brookings Institution Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20081044
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By James Steinberg
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In his address to Congress nine days after the September 11 tionship with the International Monetary Fund.
attacks, President Bush declared war on global terrorism and What a difference a day makes. Following the September 11
announced his intent to deploy "every resource at our com attacks and Musharraf's decision to provide political and mili
mand" to defeat terrorist networks and to treat states that tary support to the U.S. effort to oust the Taliban, Musharraf
harbor and support terrorism as "hostile regimes." The speech became a welcome interlocutor, and a meeting was arranged
appeared to presage a political reorientation of U.S. foreign and with President Bush in New York. Sanctions were quickly
security policy on a scale not seen since the early days of the lifted, and new aid totaling $1 billion was offered along with
Cold War, comparable in scope to the Truman Doctrine and promises of more debt relief. In the war against terrorism, Pak
the adoption of the strategy of containment in the late 1940s. istan is once again a U.S. ally.
The experience of the Cold War illustrates the potentially Similar though less dramatic changes have marked U.S. rela
far-reaching consequences for foreign (and domestic) policy of tions with Central Asian countries. Although Washington had
a decision to make antiterrorism the organizing principle for begun to develop ties with former Soviet states in the 1990s,
U.S. international relations and domestic security. During the serious concerns about repressive regimes, lack of democracy,
Cold War, the United States defined its relations with other and corruption were a brake on moves to further deepen the
countries through the benchmark of who was with us and who relationship.Yet, as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan opened their terri
against us in the struggle against communism and the Soviet tory to stationing U.S. forces, the Bush administration began to
Union. We built alliances with democracies and authoritarian be more forthcoming, both in economic and military assistance
governments alike if they shared our commitment. We orga and in political support, to these new partners.
nized our military forces and doctrine to shape that struggle. We Other adversaries-turned-friends include Yemen, seen
intervened politically and militarily based on a perception of before September 11 as noncooperative in investigating the
how regional conflicts and national governments would affect bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and Sudan, long the object
_ the East-West balance. - of U.S. criticism for a broad range of policies. No doubt wish
terrorism
ing to avoid the Taliban's fate, both governments have shown
new zeal in counterterrorism cooperation with Washington.
For the United States and India, September 11 has strength
ened ties that had already begun to improve with President
Clinton's visit in 2000. The U.S. military action in Afghanistan
We helped reconstruct Europe and Japan and provided for ousted India's nemesis, the Taliban, which had supported
eign aid based on those same criteria. We supported a defense Islamic militants in Kashmir. And India's positive disposition has
industrial establishment to assure the wherewithal to sustain been further enhanced by the U.S. decision to resume military
our technological edge. We even sent a man to the moon to sales, which had been cut off for decades.
demonstrate the superiority of Western democracy over Soviet Even before September 11, Russian testiness about missile
totalitarianism and the command economy. defense, proliferation, and its military operations in Chechnya
To the extent that counterterrorism becomes a comparable, had been easing with the budding personal tie between Presi
new organizing principle, it will have similarly widespread con dents Bush and Putin. But the courtship blossomed into a full
sequences for a broad range of U.S. policies. Nearly nine blown romance when Putin was the first to call Bush after the
months after the September 11 attacks, it is now possible to see attacks, offering not only political support, but invaluable intel
the extent?and the limits?of counterterrorism as an organiz ligence cooperation and the benefit of Russia's own difficult
ing principle for U.S. foreign policy. experience in Afghanistan. In return, Washington has softened
its rhetoric on Chechnya, shown new flexibility in discussing
New Friends arms control and Russia's entry into the World Trade Organiza
The clearest impact of this strategic shift can be seen in the tion, and become more forthcoming on Russia-NATO ties?
reorientation of U.S. relations with key international partners, although taking care not to appear to give Russia a veto over
particularly in connection with the military operations in NATO military decisions.
Afghanistan. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is Pakistan. U.S.-China relations too have felt the transformative winds
Just before September 11, U.S. relations with Pakistan had sunk of September 11. Relations had warmed considerably from the
< to unprecedented lows. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program early days of the Bush administration?when the new team had
S had led to strict sanctions; formerly close military ties had been spoken of China as a strategic competitor. But following the
? cut off; and further sanctions had been imposed when General World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, China supported the
S Pervez Musharraf ousted the elected government of Nawaz United States in the Security Council, and while not exactly
? Sharif in 1999. Pakistani support for Islamic militants in Kash endorsing the military effort in Afghanistan, conspicuously
t mir threatened to land Pakistan on the U.S. terrorism list, and refrained from attacking it. And the United States reciprocated.
5 persistent economic mismanagement imperiled Pakistan's rela During President Bush's trip to Shanghai for the APEC summit
in October, the dialogue with President Jiang steered clear of
< James Steinberg is vice president and director of the Brookings Foreign Policy blunt talk that might have been anticipated just a few months
% Studies program. earlier. Bush avoided public confrontations on the familiar
SUMMER 2002 5
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sources of disagreement?from Tibet to Taiwan to prolifera Korea, were further troubled by Bush's decision to include
tion?and the largely cooperative tone continued during North Korea as the eastern wing of the axis of evil. Although
Bush's second visit to China in February. the move appeared again to distance the United States from
The search for new partners in the fight against terrorism President Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy, its long-term impact
found support in unexpected quarters. For example, the Bush is uncertain. Despite the rhetoric, the Bush administration con
administration found a new predicate for seeking to improve its tinued to advocate dialogue with North Korea, and coming
relations with a frequent nemesis?President Mahatir of elections in South Korea could bring to power a government
Malaysia, whose own struggle with Islamic extremists in his more in tune with Washington.
country put Malaysia "on our side" in the counterterrorism
campaign. The Middle East: Testing Ground for
In the first weeks following September 11, it even appeared the New Paradigm
briefly that the new counterterrorism paradigm might portend In perhaps no corner of the world does the counterterrorism
a new opportunity for rapprochement between the United paradigm have the potential to transform U.S. policy more than
States and Iran. Although U.S.-Iran relations were confronta in the Middle East, where relations with traditional Arab part
tional on the eve of the attacks, in their immediate aftermath ners Saudi Arabia and Egypt are now in question. For many in
President Mohammad Khatami strongly stated his sympathy for the United States, both in and out of government, the rise of al
the victims and, even more notably, granted the United States Qaeda can be directly linked to the policies of the Saudi gov
overflight rights for humanitarian and search-and-rescue oper ernment?suppressing dissent at home but supporting funda
ations in Afghanistan. But the honeymoon proved short-lived. mentalism abroad, with deadly consequences for the United
Intelligence reports linked Iran to arms sales to the Palestinian States.Tensions were exacerbated by a perception that the Saudi
Authority and to ongoing support for terrorist groups in the and Egyptian governments failed to speak out forcefully against
Middle East. The administration claimed that Iran was under the attacks, tolerated (if not encouraged) anti-Americanism in
mining Hamid Karzai s interim government in Afghanistan. their state-sponsored media, and offered only lukewarm mili
Iran soon found itself on the "axis of evil"?"against us" in the tary support for the operation in Afghanistan. Some members
new bipolar geopolitics of counterterrorism. of Congress have proposed cutting U.S. aid to Egypt and with
drawing U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia.
Old Friends The Middle East has also demonstrated the tensions inher
September 11 was also consequential for America's traditional ent in a single-minded application of counterterrorism as an
partners worldwide. Europe's initial response was overwhelm organizing principle. As the suicide bombings against Israel
ing sympathy: even the traditionally skeptical French press intensified through last fall and winter, the government of Ariel
declared, "We are all Americans." NATO allies invoked for the Sharon sought to wrap its forceful response in the mantle of
first time the "Article 5" guarantee to come to the aid of any Bush's categorical language against those who harbor terror
alliance member who was attacked; they conducted sweeping ism?and for a time, the Bush administration largely adopted a
raids on suspected al Qaeda members throughout Europe. similar view, ostracizing Yasser Arafat and placing the onus on
But some Europeans felt slighted that the United States did the Palestinian Authority to halt the violence. But it became
not make greater use of the NATO military apparatus in apparent, during Vice President Cheney's trip to the Middle
Afghanistan or act quickly to incorporate other European mil East in March, that the deepening violence had become a
itary forces into Operation Enduring Freedom. Those who had major obstacle to the administration's strategy to remove Sad
hoped that Washington would turn away from what they feared dam Hussein. Thus, as Israel accelerated its military moves fol
was excessive unilateralism were initially comforted by the U.S. lowing the Passover suicide bombings, the administration was
approach to Afghanistan (including securing a United Nations finally forced to call for limits on Israel's use of force and defend
Security Council resolution), but disquiet grew as the rhetoric Arafat's continued involvement in the peace process. In short,
shifted to the axis of evil and the focus appeared to shift from the administration came to realize that it had to juggle multiple
stabilizing Afghanistan to overthrowing Saddam Hussein. objectives and interests, not all of which could fit into the "with
U.S.-Japan relations also received a boost. Determined, after us or against us" mantra of the counterterrorism paradigm. But
the shock of September 11, to demonstrate that Japan could critics of this shift denounced it as a betrayal of "moral clarity"
provide not just financial support, but meaningful operational in the campaign against terrorism.
assistance to the military effort in Afghanistan, Prime Minister The administration's efforts to calm the Israeli-Palestinian
Koizumi won approval for changes in the interpretation of conflict were motivated in part by its own plans for "regime
Japan's constitution that permitted Japan to deploy forces to the change" in Iraq. Although the nexus between Iraq and al Qaeda
Indian Ocean. Although the Diet imposed some restrictions, remains in dispute, Iraq's robust weapons of mass destruction
such as a time limit on the deployment, the policy change was program is universally acknowledged?as is the possibility that
momentous. And in a sign of the broad effect of September 11, Iraq might share its know-how with terrorists. But, as Cheney
it received a muted reaction in both Beijing and Seoul. learned during his trip, Arab willingness to support Bush's
By contrast, U.S.-South Korean relations, already rocked by counterterrorism agenda on Iraq depends on U.S. willingness
disagreements over what strategy to pursue toward North to address the Arab priority?the Palestinian issue.
6 BROOKINGS REVIEW
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New Priorities States? Allies and partners are crucial in the fight against terror
September 11 has also changed American priorities. Just a ism. However powerful the United States may be, it will need
month before the attacks, President Bush welcomed Mexican to rely on others to carry out this multifaceted challenge. To
President Vicente Fox to Washington, proclaiming the bond sustain those partnerships, the United States must be prepared
with Mexico to be our nation's most important relationship. both to consult meaningfully (not just to inform) and to be
Today, the two countries are focusing not on deeper integra responsive to other nations' priorities. While it will always be
tion, but on how to secure the U.S. border. possible to cobble together coalitions of convenience, durable
During the presidential campaign of 2000, candidate Bush alliances provide special advantages?reliability, habits of coop
denounced the Clinton administration's preoccupation with eration, and shared outlooks.
"nation building." But after the Afghan military operation, Pres By building on the international support it gained in the
ident Bush committed the United States to "helping to build an wake of September 11, the United States has a unique oppor
Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in tunity to revive ties with traditional friends and build new
which to live," citing the post-World War II examples of the relationships with former adversaries. If the administration
Marshall Plan in Europe and the reconstruction of Japan. can capitalize on its successful coalition-building effort for
Similarly, Bush initially placed little emphasis on foreign aid the Afghan war, we could see the emergence of a new, more
as a tool of foreign policy. But the need to win friends who felt constructive set of relationships among most, if not all, global
the administration was doing too little to address the "root actors.
causes" of terrorism prompted Bush to double aid spending The counterterrorism campaign has both a short-term and a
for 2003. long-term dimension. To thwart the immediate threat, the
Perhaps the biggest question mark about the impact of Sep emphasis must necessarily be on law enforcement, intelligence,
tember 11 concerns the U.S. balance between unilateralism and and, occasionally, military tools. But in the long run, terrorist
multilateralism. Before September 11, concern was growing networks will reconstitute themselves unless we make it harder
abroad about the administration's preference for unilateral for them to recruit new members and sustain their activities.
action and its skepticism about international institutions and This means helping to build stable, prosperous, democratic soci
treaties?from the Kyoto Climate Change Protocol, to the eties in countries that have seen too little of all three, particu
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to the International Criminal larly in the Arab world, Africa, and parts of Central, South, and
Court, to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But after the attacks, Southeast Asia.
perceptions began to shift, as the administration patiently No single approach will fit all circumstances. Different ter
assembled an international coalition before launching a military rorist groups pose different challenges and require different
attack on Afghanistan. Secretary Powell famously observed, tools, even as we categorically condemn their methods. The
"We're so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day checking threat posed by al Qaeda differs from the threat posed by the
on everybody." How significant the change is may become Irish Republican Army or even by the bloody suicide killers of
clearer as the administration develops its strategy toward Iraq? the Tamil Tigers. Often a political approach will be necessary to
in particular, whether it attempts to build an international coali separate terrorists from publics with political grievances as a
tion focusing on Iraq's noncompliance with Security Council parallel track to counterterrorism.
resolutions on eliminating weapons of mass destruction before Washington must not lose sight of broader U.S. interests. The
using force to overthrow Saddam Hussein. administration's decision to boost foreign aid represented a
sound recognition that poverty, ignorance, and disease threaten
A Sustainable Focus? our interests. So does excessive reliance on partnerships of con
The U.S. campaign against terrorism will be a long one.Terror venience with countries that don't share our values. During the
ism is the most serious threat to the safety of Americans today, Cold War, from Iran to Latin America, we discovered the long
and the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction term costs of relationships of short-term expediency.
makes the threat likely to become all the more dangerous. But Finally, it is essential to maintain the vitality of key interna
terrorism is not the only peril. As the administration has recog tional institutions. Granted, these institutions pose constraints,
nized, some governments pose a threat to our interests whether but they also provide important leverage and burden sharing.
or not they are aligned with terrorists. Other transnational As we have learned in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, there
threats include organized crime, drug trafficking, and prolifera are many tasks the United States doesn't want to take on alone
tion of weapons of mass destruction, as well as risks posed to the (or at all). Organizations like the UN or the Organization for
stability of the international financial and trading systems, to Security and Cooperation in Europe can provide an impor
resources like energy and water, and to global environment and tant alternative.
health. A sustainable counterterrorism strategy must recognize By placing counterterrorism in the framework of securing
that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to counterterrorism our broader national interests, the United States will not only
and that the effort must be integrated into a larger strategy that be more effective in reducing the long-term threat from
allows the United States to reap the benefits and counter the terrorists, but will also help assure that the fight against terror
dangers of our increasingly interdependent world. ism does not inadvertently weaken our overall security and
What, in practical terms, does this mean to the United prosperity.
SUMMER 2002 7
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