SECTION A Vishwa Nath v. Ramraj & Others (AIR 1991 All 193) Case Information 1. Case Name: Vishwa Nath v. Ramraj & Others 2. Citation: AIR 1991 All193 3. Court: Allahabad High Court 4. Key Issue: Ownership and possession of the disputed land and whether respondents were entitled to relief for perpetual injunction and demolition of constructions raised by the appellants. Facts of the Case 1. Nature of the Sui a. The respondents (Ramraj and others) filed a suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the appellant ( b. Relief was also sought for demoli recovery of possession of the land. 2. Respondents’ Claim: a. They alleged that they were the owners in possession of the disputed land. b. The appellants had no rights over the land. 3. Appellants’ Defense: a. The appellants claimed the land had been in their possession since the time of their ancestors. b. The disputed construction was on their land, replacing their "Nai structure), ishwa Nath) from interfering with their possession of the disputed land. n of constructions raised by the appellants and " (a traditional Key Issues Before the Court Whether the respondents were the owners of the disputed land and had been in possession. Whether the land was included in the property covered by the gift deed dated 31st April 1934. Whether the transfer of trees on the land also indicated the transfer of the land itself Whether the land had been in possession of the respondents. Whether findings of the lower court based on misreading of evidence and misapplication of law could be set aside. yReNe Decisions of Various Courts 1, Trial Court + Findings: © Therespondents were not the owners of the land. © TheyWwere not entitled to the demolition of constructions or possession of the land.© Theland was not covered under the gift deed dated 31st April 1934. © The respondents failed to establish that the disputed land was appurtenant to their house under Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 © Based on evidence, the oral testimony of Devi Devta Div (aged 65 years) was deemed more reliable than that of Ravi Narain (aged 25 years). ‘+ Outcome: © The respondents’ suit was dismissed with costs on 25th February 1978. 2. District Court © Findings: © The lower appellate court reversed the Trial Court’s decision, holding that the respondents had title to the land and were entitled to relief. © The appellants were restrained from interfering with the respondents’ possession. © The respondents costs in both courts were ordered to be paid by the appellants. ‘* Basis for Decision: © The lower appellate court examined the gift deed and found that the house of the respondents had been transferred to them in 1934. © Iterroneously inferred that trees and bamboo clumps transferred along with the property implied that the land itself was also transferred. Contentions Before the High Court Appellants’ Contentions The lower appellate court erred in reversing the Trial Court’s findings The respondents failed to establish their title or possession over the disputed land. The gift deed did not include the disputed land. The land was not appurtenant to the respondents’ house, and its transfer could not be presumed from the transfer of trees. ReNo 5. The appellate court’s decision was based on misreading of evidence, misapplication of law, and conjectures. Allahabad High Court’s Analysis 1, Ownership and Possession: a. The evidence did not establish that the respondents were the owners or had been in possession of the land. b. The Trial Court’s finding that the disputed land was not covered by the gift deed was upheld, 2. Gift Deed: a. The court found no evidence to support the claim that the disputed land was included in the gift deed.b. Transfer of trees and bamboo clumps did not imply transfer of the land. 3. Procedural Error: Lower Appellate Court: a. The appellate court’s findings were based on misreading of evidence anda ion of the gift deed. b. Itincorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the appellants, which was a legal error. 4. Credibility of Evidence: a. The oral testimony of Devi Devta Divwas rightly given more weight than that of Ravi Narain bythe Trial Court. 5. Legal Inference on Appurtenance: misconstru a. The disputed land could not be deemed appurtenant to the respondents’ house under Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Decision of the High Court 1. Appellate Court’s Decision Set Aside: a. The findings of the lower appellate court were set aside as they were based on misreading of evidence and misapplication of law. 2. Trial Court’s Judgment Restored a. The High Court restored the Trial Court’s decree, dismissing the respondents’ suit. 3. Outcome: a. Appeal Allowed: The appellants succeeded, and the respondents were denied any relief. b. Costs: The respondents were ordered to bear the costs incurred by the appellants. Legal Principles Established 1, Burden of Proof: The burden of proving ownership and possession lies on the party asserting it 2. Transfer of Land and Trees: Transfer of trees does not automatically indicate transfer of the land unless explicitly mentioned in the property deed. 3. Appurtenance under Zamindari Abolition Act: Land appurtenant to a house must be clearly established as such; mere proximity is insufficient. 4, Errors in Lower Appellate Courts: Findings based on misreading of evidence and legal misinterpretation cannot be sustained. SECTION B Om Parkash v. Jai Parkash (AIR 1992 SC 885) Case Information Case Name: Om Parkash (Defendant Applicant) v. Jai Parkash (Plaintiff Respondent) Citation: AIR 1992 SC 885 Court: Supreme Court of India Bench: Justice K.N. Singh and Justice M.H. Kania Date of Judgment: Not explicitly mentioned; post-1989. yReNeFacts of the Case 1. Parties: a. Om Parkash (Defendant Applicant 1 or DA1) and Jai Parkash (Plaintiff Respondent or PR) were real brothers. b. Satyawati (DA2), the wife of DA1, was also a defendant. 2. Background: a. DA1 was in government service since 1953. PR was managing the family’s agricultural property in the village. b. Consolidation proceedings were held, and property partition was recorded in the revenue records. Separate chaks were carved out as per the shares allotted. 3. Disputed Property: a. The dispute concerned land purchased through four sale deeds dated 10th June 1968, 21st June 1968, 17th January 1976, and 23rd June 1977. b. PR claimed he was the real owner, alleging that DA1 and DA2 were mere benamidars. c. The DAs contended that they had paid their respective shares of the sale consideration, making ita joint property. Legal Issues Involved 1. Whether the defendants were benamidars under the transactions? 2. Whatis the effect of Section 4 of the Benami Transactit ns (Prohibiti n) Act, 1988 on the claim? Decisions by Lower Courts 1. Trial Court * Decision: © Dismissed the suit filed by PR, holding that the DAs were not benamidars. © Thecourt noted that PR did not object during the consolidation proceedings. 2. District Court * Appeal: © PRappealed against the Trial Court's decision. + De n: © The District Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court. © Held that PR was the real owner and was entitled to relief. 3. High Court + Appeal: © DAfiled an appeal against the District Court’s decision in the High Court,© The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the District Court's findings in favor of PR. Proceedings in the Supreme Court 1, Special Leave Petition (SLP): a. DAs filed an SLP before the Supreme Court on 15th March 1988. 2. Intervening Legislation: a. During the pendency of the appeal, the Benami Transactions (Pro! came into force on Sth September 1988 b. On 1stJune 1989, the DAs filed an application to include the provisions of the Benami Act in their defense. 3. Arguments of Defendant Applicants: a. PR's suit was barred under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954, as the issue of benami transactions was not raised during the consolidation proceedings. b. Section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act prohibited PR from claiming ownership of the property in question. jon) Act, 1988 Supreme Court’s Decision 1. Applicability of Section 49 (U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act): + The Supreme Court rejected the DAs’ claim under Section 49, stating itwas raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. ‘+ Relief under Section 49 could not be granted as it was not pleaded earlier. 2. Applicability of Section 4 (Benami Transactions Act): * Section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act imposes a complete prohibition against any suit based on benami transactions. * The Supreme Court emphasized that appeals are a continuation of the suit, and the Act applied to all pending cases as of its enactment. 3. Prospective Nature of the Benami Transactions Act: ‘+ Referring to Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, the Court reiterated that Section 4 applied prospectively to present and future suits but could also impact pending appeals. ‘+ PR’s contention that no appeal was pending when the Benami Act came into force was rejected. The Court clarified that the appeal was pending because the High Court decision had already been challenged in the Supreme Court. 4, Ruling on Ownership and Relief: ‘+ Inlight of Section 4 of the Benami Act, PR’s claim of ownership was unsustainable. © The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the District Court and High Court. + The Trial Court's decision dismissing PR’s suit was reinstated.Final Judgment 1. Appeal Allowed: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the DAs. 2. PR's Claim Dismissed: PR was held not entitled to any decree based on the benami transaction. 3. Costs: No costs were awarded to either party. Key Legal Principles Established 1, Benami Transactions Act: a. Section 4 of the Benami Act prohibits any claim or defense based on benami transactions. b. The Act applies prospectively but affects all pending cases and appeals. 2. Continuity of Appeals: a. An appealis a continuation of the suit, and subsequent legislative changes can impact pending appeals. 3. Procedural Limitation under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act: a. Claims barred by procedural statutes like Section 49 of the U.P. Act must be raised at the earliest stage; they cannot be introduced at the appellate stage. Nathu Lalv. Phool Chand (AIR 1970 SC 546) Case Information Case Name: Nathu Lal (Appellant) v. Phool Chand (Respondent) Citation: AIR 1970 SC 546 Court: Supreme Court of India Bench: Justice K.S. Hegde, Justice A.N. Grover Date of Judgment: Not explicitly mentioned in the summary. ge ers Main Facts of the Case 1. Background: a. Nathu Lal (Appellant) was the owner of a ginning factory situated on agricultural land (Khasra No. 259/5). The land was recorded in the revenue records under the name of Nathu Lal's brother, Chittarmal. b. On 26th February 1951, Nathu Lal entered into a contract of sale with Phool Chand (Respondent) to sell the land and ginning factory for 43,011. 2. Terms of the Agreement: a. Phool Chand paid ¥22,011 as part payment. b. Phool Chand was given possession of the property. c. The remaining 21,000 was to be paid by Phool Chand on or before 7th May 1951. 3. Subsequent Dispute a. Phool Chand failed to pay the balance amount by the due date.b. On Sth October 1951, Nathu Lal rescinded the contract and filed a suit seeking possession of the property, claiming that Phool Chand was in unlawful possession after the breach of the agreement. Arguments of the Parties Appellant (Nathu Lal): 1, Claimed that Phool Chand was a trespasser after defaulting on the payment. 2. Alleged that Phool Chand was not willing to perform his part of the contract. 3. Contended that Section 70(4) of the M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act barred Phool Chand from relying on the doctrine of part performance. Respondent (Phool Chand) 1. Argued that Nathu Lal failed to fulfill his part of the contract, which included: a. Deleting Chittarmal’s name from the revenue records. b. Obtaining the necessary permission under Section 70(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 2. Claimed he was ready and willing to pay the balance amount and had even senta telegram on 7th May 1951, offering to pay. 3. Alleged that Nathu Lal unlawfully altered the agreement by adding a clause declaring his, possession unlawful in case of default in payment. 4. Argued that he had already arranged financing for the payment through his banker. Legal Issues 1, Whether all conditions under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act were fulfilled to enable Phool Chand to claim part performance? 2. Whether Phool Chand was required to produce money or a financing scheme under Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act to prove his willingness for part performance? 3. Whether obtaining permission under Section 70(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was a condition precedent for the sale? 4. Could Phool Chand defeat Nathu Lal's claim by establishing that the latter breached the contract by ailing to delete Chittarmal’s name from the revenue records? Decisions by Lower Courts 4. Trial Court ‘+ Held that Phool Chand had failed to procure the balance of 321,000 by the due date (7th May 1951) and therefore breached the contract. ‘* Ordered in favor of Nathu Lal. 2. High Court ‘* Reversed the Trial Court's decision.© Held that: © Phool Chand was entitled to possession and part performance under Section 53-A. © Directed that Phool Chand deposit the balance amount (721,000) within two months and pay mesne profits to Nathu Lal © Allowed Nathu Lal to reclaim possession if Phool Chand defaulted on the payment. Supreme Court's Decision 1. Applicability of Section 53-A (Transfer of Property Act) + The Supreme Court observed that all necessary conditions for invoking Section 53-A were fultilled: Contract of Sale: Awritten and signed agreement existed. Possession: Phool Chand had taken possession as part performance of the contract. Furtherance of Contract: Phool Chand had paid 22,011 as part payment. Willingness to Perform: Phool Chand had demonstrated willingness to pay the remaining amount but was prevented due to Nathu Lal's failure to fulfill his contractual obligations. 2. Readiness and Willingness (Section 55, Indian Contract Act) 2° ° ‘+ Phool Chand was not obligated to produce the balance amount until Nathu Lal completed his part of the contract, which included: © Deleting Chittarmal’s name from the revenue records. © Obtaining necessary permissions under Section 70(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 3. Section 70(b), M.P. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act ‘+ The Supreme Court held that where property requires permission for transfer, there is an implied condition that the transferor (Nathu Lal) must obtain such permission, ‘+ Failure to secure permission fulfill this obligation. 4, Breach of Contract by Nathu Lal not invalidate the contract but placed the onus on Nathu Lalto + The Court found that Nathu Lal had breached the contract by failingto fulfill his obligations, which justified Phool Chand’s non-payment of the balance amount. Final Decision 1, Appeal Dismissed: The Supreme Court dismissed Nathu Lal's appeal. 2. Costs Awarded: Nathu Lalwas directed to bear the costs. 3. Rights of Phool Chand: a. Phool Chand’s possession was protected under Section 53-A. b. He was not required to pay the balance amount until Nathu Lal fulfilled his part of the contract. Key Legal Principles Established1. Doctrine of Part Performance (Section 53-A): a. Protects the possession of a transferee who has partly performed the contract, provided they are willing to perform the remaining obligations. 2. Implied Obligations of the Transferor: a. If permission is required for the transfer, the onus lies on the transferor to obtain it. 3. Willingness under Section 55: a. Thetransferee’s willingness is not negated if the transferor fails to fulfill their obligations. 4, Conditional Contracts: a. Acontract subject to statutory permissions is valid, and non-compliance by the transferor cannot be used to invalidate the agreement. SECTIONC Videocon Properties Ltd V/s Dr. Bhalchandra Laboratories & Others AIR 2003 Background of the Case: 1. Parties Involved: a. Appellant: Videocon Properties Ltd. (plainti b. Respondents: partners. 2. Nature of Dispute: a. An agreement for the sale of land was executed between the parties on May 13, 1994. b. Videocon Properties Ltd. paid Rs. 38 lakhs as earnest money or deposit. 3. Key Clauses of the Agreement: a. Clause 2.3: In case of the vendor's failure to fulfill obligations, the purchaser could either: i. Fulfill the obligations at the vendor's cost. ii, Terminate the agreement and claim the refund of eamest money with 21% annual interest. b. Clauses 17 and 18: Addressed refund and compensation in case of cancellation or willful default, Chronology of Events: in the original suit), . Bhalchandra Laboratories (a registered partnership firm) and its 1. Non-performance by Respondents: a. For five years, the respondents did not fulfill their obligations despite reminders. b. OnMarch 15, 1999, the respondents admitted their inability to fulfill the terms. 2. Termination of Agreement: a. Videocon terminated the agreement on September 27, 1999, and demanded Rs. 38 lakhs with interest. 3. Refund Offered by Respondents: a. Rs. 38 lakhs were refunded on January 8, 2000, but without interest. This was disputed by Videocon, 4. Legal Acta. Videocon filed suit No. 2145 of 2000, seeking recovery of Rs. 80,15,903 (inclusive of interest and costs) and injunctions against the sale or alienation of the disputed property. Legal Arguments and Findings: 1. Trial Court Findings: a. The Single Judge upheld the appellant's claim for interest on earnest money based on Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. b. Granted an interim injunction preventing the respondents from alienating the property during the suit. 2. Division Bench Ruling: a. Reversed the Single Judge's findings. b. Held that Section 55(6)(b) did not specifically provide for interest on earnest money as part of the statutory charge. ©. Set aside the injunction, allowing the respondents to develop or sell the property under terms. 3. Supreme Court Findings: a. Restored the Single Judge’s order, ruling that: . The earnest money was part of the purchase price, creating a statutory charge under Section 55(6)(b). ii, The appellant was entitled to a refund with interest under Clause 2.3. b. Affirmed that statutory charges under the Transfer of Property Act apply until conveyance or possession is complete. Legal Principles Established: 1. Statutory Charge: a. Abuyer's charge under Section 55(6)(b) covers purchase money, interest, and costs. b. This charge attaches immediately upon payment and continues until the property is conveyed 2, Nature of Earnest Money: a. Earnest money can serve as both security and part payment of the purchase price. b. Specific contractual terms, like those in Clause 2.3, enforce interest on such amounts. 3. Equity and Safeguards: a. Interim orders should protect buyer interests without unduly restricting the seller's, property rights. b. Courts may allow alienation if the seller sufficiently secures the buyer's claims. Outcome: ‘+ The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reinstating the injunction and securing the appellant's claim for interest. Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehravs Indravati Dwarkadas Mehra AIR 2001 Bom 470Case Overview: 1. Parties Involved: a. Plaintiff: Indravati Dwarkadas Mehra (Owner of the property in question). b. Defendant: Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehra (Son of the plaintiff and a gratuitous licensee). 2. Core Legal Question: a. Whether a suit bya licensor against a gratuitous licensee is maintainable under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. Key Facts: 1. The plaintiff allowed her sons, including the defendant, to occupy separate rooms in her flat as gratuitous licensees. 2. Misbehavior and police complaints by the sons prompted the plaintiff to terminate their license and file for recovery of possession 3. The defendant contested the suit, claiming joint ownership of the property and that the suit was not maintainable in the Small Cause Court. Proceedings and Findings: Facts in Different Appeals and Notices: 1. Letters Patent Appeal No. 112 of 1998: a. The appellate bench upheld that the Small Cause Court lacked jurisdiction since the defendant was a gratuitous licensee. 2. Notice of Motion No. 2172 of 1998: a. Raised the question of jurisdiction regarding suits against gratuitous licensees. Legal issue: nd "Licensee": a. Defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 b. Alicense can be gratuitous or for consideration. 2. Historical Context and Amendments: a. Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act initially referred to "permission" rather than “license. b. The 1976 amendment introduced the terms "licensor" and “licensee,” aligning with tenancy under the Bombay Rent Act. 3. Nature of Gratuitous Licensees: a. Such licenses do not involve consideration and are based on personal privilege or family relations. ional Analysis: a. Proceedings under Section 41 cover licensor-licensee disputes for possession or fee recovery.b. Gratuitous licensees fall outside the purview of Section 41 since the provision implies a relationship involving material consideration Judgment: 1. Det a. Suits by licensors against gratuitous licensees must be filed in a civil court (City Civil Court or High Court) based on valuation, not the Small Cause Court. 2. Outcome: a. The Letters Patent Appeals were allowed. b. The Appellate Bench’s decision was upheld, and the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in the Small Cause Court. Legal Principles Established: 1. Applicability of Section 41: a. Limited to cases involving licensor-licensee relationships with material consideration. b. Gratuitous licensees do not qualify under Section 41. 2. Civil Court Jurisdiction: a. Civil Courts retain jurisdiction over disputes with gratuitous licensees due to the lack of explicit or implied statutory exclusion. 3. Interpretation of Statutes: a. Courts must apply strict construction when interpreting statutes that exclude civil court jurisdiction, SECTION D Maheshwari Prasad v, MunniLal, AIR 1981 1. Parties Involved ‘+ Plaintiffs/Appellants: Residents of Mohalla Thatharaee Bazar, Banda City. © Defendants/Respondents: Private individuals claiming rights over the well; State of U.P.; and the Municipal Board, Banda. 2. Core Issue: ‘+ Whether the plaintiffs have the right to draw water from the well known as "Raja Kunwa," and whether a perpetual injunction can restrain the defendants from interfering with this right. 3. Plaintiffs’ Allegations:‘+ Thewell is the only source of water in the Mohalla and has been used by residents from time immemorial. ‘+ The private defendants threatened to fill the well and construct over it, claiming to have obtained rights from the government. ‘+ The well was constructed by Raja of Ajaigarh and dedicated for public use. 4, Defendants’ Defense: ‘+ Thewell is located on plot No. 436, which is Nazul (government) property leased to them for running an educational institution. ‘* Denied any public right over the well, asserting that any such right, if existed, has been extinguished due to disuse. + Claimed the wateris unfit for human consumption. 5. Trial Court Decisio ‘* Decreed in favor of the plaintiffs. ‘+ Found that the well was constructed by Raja of Ajaigath and dedicated for the public benefit. 6. Lower Appellate Court Decision: ‘+ Reversed thetrial court's decree, dismissing the suit. © Held that: © Noevidence established the well’s construction by Raja of Ajaigarh. © Theresidents could not claim a public right over the well. © Municipal Board had the authority to close private wells if the water was unfit for drinking under Section 225 of the Municipalities Act. © The balance of convenience favored denying the injunction due to the availability of piped water and the importance of the educational institution. 7. High Court Findings: * Customary Right to Draw Water: © Recognized that customary rights, including the right to draw water, are valid under Indian law. © Evidence of immemorial use by residents supported the claim of customary rights. + Lease Cancellation: © The lease granted to private defendants was canceled during the pendency of the case, negating their claims over the well.© The Board’s statutory power to close the well remained intact, but no action had been taken under Section 225 of the Municipalities Act. ‘+ Unfit Water Argument: © Evidence suggested the water quality was similar to that of other wells in villages, commonly used for human consumption. + Balance of Convenience: © Recognized the importance of expanding education but ruled in favor of protecting residents’ customary rights since the lease had been canceled. 8. Judgment: ‘+ Appeal Allowed: © Set aside the lower appellate court's dismissal. ‘* Injunction Granted: © Defendants were restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs’ right to draw water from the well * Condition for Mur ipal Action: © The injunction does not prevent the Municipal Board from exercising its power under Section 225 to close the well if necessary. 9. Key Legal Points: ‘+ Customary Rights: © Can be established through evidence of long-term usage and are distinct from easements under Section 47 of the Easements Act. + Immemorial User: © Hearsay evidence is admissible to prove immemorial use based on precedents set by the Privy Council and the Calcutta High Court. + Altered Circumstances: © Courts can consider changes in circumstances, such as the cancellation of a lease, even if the cause of action is determined at the time of the suit. 10. Final Observations: ‘+ The judgment does not set a precedent for future injunctions in case the land is leased again for an educational institution. + Noorder as to costs, acknowledging the altered circumstances since the suit’s filing. -Mathew Varghese V.M. Amritha Kumar, AIR2015 SC 50 1. Case Details:Citation: AIR 2015 SC 50. Parties: Mathew Varghese (Appellant) v. M. Amritha Kumar (Respondent). Bench: Supreme Court of India. 2. Legal Context: This case revolves around the enforcement of secured assets under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act). Central focus: Protection of borrower's rights while allowing creditors to enforce security interests. 3. Issues Raised: Compliance with Mandatory Procedures: © Whether the auction sale complied with Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. ights: © Was the borrower given an adequate opportunity to repay the defaulted amount before the auction was finalized? Borrower's 4. Factual Background: The appellant, Mathew Varghese, was a borrower who defaulted on a loan secured against property. The secured creditor initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to recover dues and auctioned the secured asset. The appellant challenged the auction sale, claiming that: © He was not served with proper notice as required under Rule 8(6). © The auction was finalized without providing him the statutory opportunity to repay the loan. 5. Key Legal Provisions: SARFAESI Act, Section 13(2) & 13(4): © Empowersecured creditors to enforce security interest after a 60-day demand notice (Section 13(2)) and take possession of the secured asset (Section 13(4)).. Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002: © Rule 8(6): Requires a 30-day notice to the borrower before the sale of the secured asset. © Rule 9(1): Specifies that a sale should be held only after public notice and adherence to. the time period. © These provisions ensure transparency and protect borrower's rights.6. Supreme Court’s Analysi ‘+ Strict Interpretation of Notice Requirements: © The Court held that the 30-day notice under Rule 8(6) is mandatory and must be strictly followed © Borrowers have a statutory right to be informed and provided with a fair chance to rectify defaults or raise objections. ‘+ Objective of the SARFAESI Act: © The Act aims to strike a balance between the creditor's right to recover debts and the borrower's right to due process ‘+ Transparency in Auctions: © Auctions must adhere to procedural safeguards to ensure faimess and avoid arbitrary dispossession. 7. Findings of the Cour ‘+ The auction in this case was found to have violated mandatory notice requirements. ‘+ Absence of a valid 30-day notice under Rule 8(6) rendered the auction sale illegal. ‘+ The Court observed that the creditor failed to provide the borrower an opportunity to clear the dues before the sale. 8. Principles Established: + Borrower’s Rights Under SARFAESI: © Borrowers are entitled to statutory protection, including adequate notice and fair opportunity. * Auction Process: © Creditors must comply with procedural safeguards to ensure legality and transparency. ‘+ Role of the Judiciary: © Courts can intervene in SARFAESI cases where procedural lapses occur, protecting borrowers from arbitrary dispossession. 9. Judgment: + The auction sale was set aside due to non-compliance with the statutory provisions of the SARFAESI Act. ‘+ The Court reinforced that procedural fairness is critical in recovery proceedings. 10. Impact of the Judgment: + The case serves as a precedent for ensuring borrower protection under the SARFAESI Act. ‘+ Emphasized the importance of procedural compliance in enforcing security interests.* Provided clarity on the interpretation of Rules 8 and 9, reinforcing the rights of borrowers against arbitrary actions by creditors. This caseis a landmark in balancing creditor's rights and borrower's safeguards under the SARFAESI Act.