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The End of Credit Suisse

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The End of Credit Suisse

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UV8863

Dec. 20, 2023

The End of Credit Suisse

Dear shareholders, clients, and employees…This will be our last ordinary General Meeting.
—Ulrich Körner, Credit Suisse CEO 1

Credit Suisse Group AG (Credit Suisse), a symbol of Swiss wealth and power and the Swiss banking system,
was set to close its doors. “We failed to stem the impact of legacy scandals and counter negative headlines with
positive facts in order to rebuild the lost confidence,” said Axel Lehmann, chair of the board, in his final address
to shareholders, clients, and employees in the annual general meeting on April 4, 2023. 2 Seated beside Lehmann
was CEO Ulrich Körner.

Körner had been appointed the group’s CEO just eight months earlier in August 2022. A legacy institution,
Credit Suisse was Switzerland’s second-largest bank and one of the leading global wealth managers with around
USD1.3 trillion in assets under management in 2022. 3 Körner’s predecessor had stepped down after only two
years in the office and with insufficient results to regain shareholders’ confidence. Following a stream of legacy
scandals, pending lawsuits, unfinished restructuring, and growing losses, Credit Suisse was in desperate need of
credible management and a convincing plan for the future. With the new CEO, Credit Suisse Group announced
a comprehensive strategic review in October 2022. The goal of the review was to restructure Credit Suisse and
create a stronger, simpler, and more efficient bank with sustainable returns.

Instead of celebrating a new start, depositors and investors alike had lost faith in the bankers and their
planning. In the days leading up to Credit Suisse’s collapse, customers withdrew their money—roughly
USD69 billion moved out of the business.4 Credit Suisse was then sold for a bargain to UBS Group AG (UBS),
one of its staunchest competitors. What was the root cause of the collapse of Credit Suisse? Was there anything
that could have been done differently? Would a more stable market environment have changed Credit Suisse’s
fate? Was the UBS takeover the only viable option?

1 “Speech by Ulrich Körner, Group Chief Executive Officer,” Credit Suisse Annual General Meeting 2023 notes, April 4, 2023, https://www.credit-

suisse.com/media/assets/about-us/docs/events/annual-general-meeting/agm-2023-speech-uk-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

2 “Speech by Axel P. Lehmann, Chairman of the Board of Directors,” Credit Suisse Annual General Meeting 2023 notes, April 4, 2023,

https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/about-us/docs/events/annual-general-meeting/agm-2023-speech-al-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

3 USD = US dollars; CHF = Swiss francs. “Credit Suisse Makes Strong Progress on Group Strategic Priorities,” Credit Suisse press release, February

9, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2023/02/q4-22-press-release-en.pdf (accessed

Dec. 14, 2023).
4 Michael J. de la Merced, “Final Days at Credit Suisse Were Marked by a $69 Billion Race for the Exits,” New York Times, April 24, 2023,

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/business/dealbook/credit-suisse-withdrawals.html (accessed Nov. 9, 2023).

This case was prepared by Boban Markovic (MBA ’23); George (Yiorgos) Allayannis, Robert F. Bruner Distinguished Professor of Business
Administration; and Gerry Yemen, Senior Researcher. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling
of an administrative situation. Copyright  2023 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To
order copies, send an email to sales@dardenbusinesspublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or
transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. This publication
is protected by copyright and may not be uploaded in whole or part to any AI, large language model, or similar system, or to any related training database. Our goal is to publish
materials of the highest quality, so please submit any errata to editorial@dardenbusinesspublishing.com.

This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Tse-chun Lin's PMBA6003 Corporate Finance 2024-25 (PT Class A and B) at The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business & Economics
from Nov 2024 to Apr 2025.
Page 2 UV8863

Credit Suisse—Best Private Bank

Credit Suisse was founded in 1856 by Alfred Escher, a Swiss entrepreneur and politician who was
instrumental in the development of Switzerland’s railway network. The bank was established under the name
Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (SKA) to provide funding for the construction of railways and other infrastructure
projects. In the early years, SKA played a key role in developing Switzerland’s economy, financing numerous
infrastructure projects, and helping establish Switzerland as a major industrial power in Europe. In 1876, the
bank moved to its headquarters on Paradeplatz in Zurich.

Over time, SKA expanded its services to include private and investment banking. In July 1939, SKA opened
a subsidiary in New York, Swiss American Corporation, which focused on underwriting, investment business,
and investment consultancy. In the post–World War II period, SKA rapidly expanded, establishing itself as a
major global investment bank.

In 1988, CS Holding, a sister company of SKA, made a minority investment in First Boston, a prominent
US investment bank facing challenges. With a takeover of 44.5% by CS Holding, First Boston changed its name
to CS First Boston. By 1989, CS Holding had acquired a majority stake in CS First Boston and became a parent
company of the SKA group. Within less than a decade, CS Holding acquired several prominent banks such as
Bank Leu and Swiss Volksbank, and in 1997 it started operating as part of the Credit Suisse Group.

In the following years, Credit Suisse continued to expand its operations with the acquisition of a well-
known Wall Street name, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ), and an asset-management business from
Warburg Pincus. At the onset of the new millennium, Credit Suisse was one of the largest banks in the world.
On its 150th birthday in 2006, Credit Suisse started operating as an integrated universal bank providing
comprehensive solutions to its clients in private banking, investment banking, and asset management. 5

While the global financial crisis (GFC) was brutal for most in the banking sector, Credit Suisse went through
it seemingly unscathed. To stabilize financial markets and overcome turmoil caused by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, government authorities stepped in and bailed out systemically important banks. In October 2008, the
Swiss government resorted to emergency laws to offer a CHF6 billion bailout and rescue UBS, Credit Suisse’s
main competitor.6 UBS also received USD54 billion in guarantees from the central bank to transfer illiquid
securities into a special stability fund. In contrast, Credit Suisse was one of the few big banks that did not take
a government bailout (the other was Barclays). Instead, Credit Suisse management raised CHF10 billion in
exchange for an equity stake of around 12% from a group of private investors, including Qatar Investment
Authority and Saudi Arabia’s conglomerate Olayan. 7 There was still a shortfall, though—in fiscal year 2008,
Credit Suisse reported a net loss of USD8.2 billion, its largest-ever annual loss. The bank announced an 11%
staff reduction and cost-cutting plans. Less than six months later, Credit Suisse beat market expectations for
the first half of the year. Despite the large fair-value charges on debt, net profit rebounded on the back of a
gain in investment-banking market share and hefty wealth-management inflows. 8 Indeed, by 2012, Euromoney
had named Credit Suisse the world’s best private bank three years in a row. 9

5 “About Us,” Credit Suisse, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/our-company/who-we-are.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
6 Armando Mombelli, “The Big UBS, the Biggest Swiss Bank, Was Saved,” Swiss Info, October 16, 2018,
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/2008-crisis_the-day-ubs--the-biggest-swiss-bank--was-saved/44474630 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
7 “Credit Suisse Q2 Profit Beats Forecasts,” Reuters, July 23, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/creditsuisse/timeline-credit-suisse-q2-profit-

beats-forecasts-idUSLN48843820090723 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

8 https://www.reuters.com/article/creditsuisse/timeline-credit-suisse-q2-profit-beats-forecasts-idUSLN48843820090723.
9 “Credit Suisse Retains Crown as Top Global Private Bank in Benchmark Euromoney Survey,” Euromoney, February 7, 2012,

https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjq4q2l96q1/credit-suisse-retains-crown-as-top-global-private-bank-in-benchmark-euromoney-survey
(accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

New Rules of the Game

In the aftermath of the GFC, the new macroeconomic environment, evolving regulatory standards, and
increasing industry oversight marked the beginning of uncertainty. In 2011, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
and the austerity measures that ensued in Greece, Spain, and Italy raised fears of a double-dip recession. 10 On
the other side of the ocean, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) lowered the US credit rating for the first time in history,
while economic indicators failed to show convincing signs of economic recovery. 11 Adverse market conditions
and the announcement of new capital requirements dampened investors’ appetite for European banks. 12 In
June 2012, Moody’s downgraded 15 global banks, citing exposure to market volatility and risk of losses. 13 While
US banks on average lost two notches, Credit Suisse was downgraded by three notches to an A2 rating.

There was more unpleasant news. Credit Suisse saw more than USD30 billion in net outflows from mature
offshore markets between 2009 and 2012. 14 US authorities launched an investigation into Swiss banks over
offshore accounts of US citizens who failed to pay taxes. 15 Starting in 2012, Credit Suisse underwrote two bond
offerings and participated in a syndicated loan that raised over USD1 billion in funds on behalf of state-owned
entities in Mozambique to support the tuna-fishing industry (referred to as tuna bonds). Credit Suisse was
responsible for the placement. But the funds were used in a secret debt scheme to pay kickbacks to Credit
Suisse investment bankers and their intermediaries, and to bribe government officials of Mozambique.16 As a
result, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) eventually halted aid to Mozambique, and in 2016, the country
was in financial crisis.

In January 2013, Swiss ordinances on implementing Basel III and too-big-to-fail (TBTF) requirements
started to be incrementally phased in, with a target completion date of January 1, 2019. These requirements
would provide tougher standards on capital, liquidity, diversification, and resolution (Exhibit 1). 17 With cost-
cutting, investment-bank de-risking, and deleveraging underway, new rules were expected to add a strain on
future earnings. To boost private banking and reduce exposure to more volatile investment banking, in 2013
Credit Suisse acquired Morgan Stanley’s private wealth-management businesses in Europe, the Middle East,
and Africa. 18

As the fear of deflation spread across the Eurozone, in September 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB)
cut interest rates for the Eurozone to 0.05% and lowered the rate on bank overnight deposits to −0.20%, where
they stayed until July 2022. 19 Just four months later, in January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) took the
unexpected action of removing the minimum exchange rate of CHF1.20 per euro, causing the Swiss franc to

10 Heather Stewart, Larry Elliott, and Giles Tremlett, “European Stock Market Rocked by Panic Selling as Debt Crisis Reignites,” Guardian, April 10,

2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/10/european-stock-market-panic-selling (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

11 “United States Loses Prized AAA Credit Rating from S&P,” Reuters, August 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-debt-

downgrade/united-states-loses-prized-aaa-credit-rating-from-sp-idUSTRE7746VF20110806 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

12 “Investment Bank Slump Tips C. Suisse to Q4 Loss,” Reuters, February 9, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-creditsuisse/investment-

bank-slump-tips-c-suisse-to-q4-loss-idUSTRE8180E120120209 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

13 Rick Rothacker and Steve Slater, “Moody’s Cuts Ratings of 15 Banks, Morgan Stanley Down Two Notches,” Reuters, June 22, 2012,

https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-financial-moodys/moodys-cuts-ratings-of-15-banks-morgan-stanley-down-two-notches-
idUKBRE85K1I120120622 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
14 “Credit Suisse Clients May Withdraw $37 Bln over Tax,” Reuters, September 12, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/creditsuisse/update-1-

credit-suisse-clients-may-withdraw-37-bln-over-tax-idUSL5E8KCLLZ20120912 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

15 Silke Koltrowitz, “Credit Suisse Faces Threat of New U.S. Tax Probe,” Reuters, April 7, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-creditsuisse-

shares/credit-suisse-faces-threat-of-new-u-s-tax-probe-idUKBREA3617E20140407 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

16 “Credit Suisse to Pay Nearly $475 Million to US and UK Authorities to Resolve Charges in Connection with Mozambican Bond Offerings,” US

Securities and Exchange Commission press release, October 19, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-213 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
17 “Switzerland Financial Sector Stability Assessment,” International Monetary Fund country report no. 14/143, May 2014,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14143.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
18 Katharina Bart, “Credit Suisse Buys Morgan Stanley’s European Wealth Arm,” Reuters, March 27, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-

creditsuisse-morganstanley/credit-suisse-buys-morgan-stanleys-european-wealth-arm-idINBRE92Q0NC20130327 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

19 “ECB Cuts Rates to Ward Off Euro Zone Deflation Threat,” Reuters, September 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ecb-rates-

decision/ecb-cuts-rates-to-ward-off-euro-zone-deflation-threat-idINKBN0GZ1A520140904 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).

soar roughly 30% against the euro. 20 Bank profits were burdened once more, as low interest rates narrowed the
margin that banks could earn, and the Swiss franc appreciation increased the cost base for Swiss banks.

In addition to the inflation policy changes, US officials’ investigation into offshore accounts resulted in
Credit Suisse pleading guilty on May 19, 2014, to conspiracy to aid and assist US taxpayers in filing false returns.
As part of the plea agreement, the bank agreed to pay USD2.6 billion in fines and admitted that “for decades
prior to and through 2009, it operated an illegal cross-border banking business that knowingly and willfully
aided and assisted thousands of US clients in…concealing their offshore assets and income from the IRS.” 21
Credit Suisse became the largest bank in 20 years to plead guilty to US criminal charges.

During this time, Credit Suisse management had made modest cuts to reduce volatility and optimize the
size of the investment bank. The share price of the Swiss banking giant had seen few gains since 2009. Within
three years of being named the world’s best private bank, a new regulatory environment, outstanding legal
disputes, and sizable outflows in client funds brought into question Credit Suisse’s future profitability. 22

Restructuring 1.0

In March 2015, the Credit Suisse board appointed Tidjane Thiam as the new CEO. Ivorian by origin, he
was the only black CEO of a top global bank and the only one without prior banking experience. Thiam had
worked at the World Bank and McKinsey, and he had served as the CEO of the British financial services firm
Prudential. 23 During his tenure, Prudential’s profits had doubled and its stock price had tripled. The price of
Credit Suisse shares jumped more than 7% following the board’s announcement. 24

With strong support from the board and Chair Urs Rohner, Thiam launched a three-year restructuring plan
intended to reduce costs, increase assets under management, and return the bank to profitability. Thiam’s
strategy would focus on the bank’s core strengths to position Credit Suisse as a leading private bank and wealth
manager with strong investment-banking capabilities. 25 His three-pronged strategy included the following goals:
• Capture the wealth-management opportunity in emerging markets by accelerating growth in the Asia–
Pacific region and replicating the successful model in other emerging markets.
• Create a Swiss universal bank to expand its position with Swiss private, corporate, and institutional
clients.
• Right-size the investment bank to optimize profitability and capital usage, reduce earnings volatility,
and support wealth-management customer needs.

Within the first year, Credit Suisse raised CHF6 billion through private placement and rights offerings that
strengthened its capital position. 26 Nonetheless, restructuring costs, write-offs, and legal settlements with the
US Department of Justice over residential mortgage-backed securities meant Credit Suisse finished 2015 and

20 Katrina Bishop, “Swiss Franc Soars, Stocks Tank as Euro Peg Scrapped,” CNBC, January 15, 2015, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/15/swiss-

franc-sours-stocks-tank-as-euro-peg-scrapped.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

21 “Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Aid and Assist US Taxpayers in Filing False Returns,” US Department of Justice, Office of Public

Affairs press release, May 19, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-aid-and-assist-us-taxpayers-filing-false-

returns (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
22 John Letzing, “Credit Suisse Names Tidjane Thiam as New CEO, Replacing Brady Dougan,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2015,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-suisse-ceo-brady-dougan-to-quit-1425969707 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

23 “Tidjane Thiam,” Kering, 2023, https://www.kering.com/en/group/our-governance/board-of-directors/tidjane-thiam/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
24 https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-suisse-ceo-brady-dougan-to-quit-1425969707.
25 “2015 Investor Day,” Credit Suisse, 2015, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/events/investor-day-2015.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
26 “Credit Suisse Announces Full-Year and 4Q15 Results,” Credit Suisse press release, February 4, 2016, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-

news/en/articles/media-releases/4q15-press-release-201602.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

2016 with losses. Fiscal year 2015 marked the first net loss for the bank since 2008, mainly driven by
USD3.8 billion in write-offs related to the DLJ legacy bank acquisition in 2000. 27 In March 2016, Thiam made
a statement to Credit Suisse traders that the bank had “an attitude to risk that has to change…there has to be
consequences.”28

Three years after taking over as CEO, Thiam could share that Credit Suisse was once more profitable
(Exhibit 2). The bank had reduced operating leverage, added new assets under management, improved risk
metrics, reduced leverage exposure to volatile market operations, and settled major lawsuits (Exhibit 3).
Following what seemed like a successful turnaround, Euromoney named Thiam its 2018 Banker of the Year. 29

There were some, however, who believed that when assessing and managing risks under Thiam’s
leadership, executives and managers felt enormous pressure to produce and set aside caution. 30 “Pressure from
top management to achieve growth and profitability targets undermined employees’ incentives to be risk-
prudent, lowered compliance discipline, and blurred risk accountability and ownership,” Evgueni Ivantsov,
chair of the European Risk Management Council, noted in retrospect: “This resulted in a steady decline of the
bank’s risk culture, leading to aggressive risk-taking, financial losses and misconduct, over time.” 31

In 2019, the bank was caught in a corporate espionage scandal and eventually admitted to hiring private
detectives to track two outgoing executives. Namely, Credit Suisse’s chief operating officer, Pierre-Olivier
Bouée, ordered another Credit Suisse employee to initiate the observation of Iqbal Khan, a star private banker
who left the bank to join competitor UBS. An independent report found that Thiam neither approved the
observation of Khan nor was aware of it. 32 A spying scandal in otherwise-calm Zurich and the involvement of
top banking officials disturbed the Swiss public and banking community. Thiam resigned in February 2020. 33
“I am who I am,” Thiam said. “The same way I was born with a right hand, I cannot change being right-
handed.” He added, “If people don’t like right-handed people, then I’m in trouble. That’s all I can say, because
I can’t become left-handed.” 34

Restructuring, Again?

Thomas Gottstein, a two-decade Credit Suisse veteran and the head of the bank’s Swiss unit, was appointed
CEO in February 2020, just before what would become a global pandemic. Gottstein, a Swiss native, had
worked for rival UBS until 1999, when he joined Credit Suisse. 35 He spent much of his career in the wealth
management and the investment bank, both in London and Switzerland. 36

27 Ivana Kottasova, “Credit Suisse Shares Crash to 24-Year Low,” CNN Business, February 4, 2016,
https://money.cnn.com/2016/02/04/news/companies/credit-suisse-loss-jobs/index.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
28 Owen Walker and Stephen Morris, “Credit Suisse Lurches from One Risk Management Crisis to the Next,” Financial Times, March 31, 2021,

https://www.ft.com/content/928b263d-38fc-4484-beb9-3e2fc4c017cb (accessed Nov. 9, 2023).

29 “Banker of the Year 2018: Tidjane Thiam, Credit Suisse,” Euromoney, July 11, 2018,
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b18k8p8h1cm3mw/banker-of-the-year-2018-tidjane-thiam-credit-suisse (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
30 Evgueni Ivantsov, “Strategic Risk Failure Is What Unites Credit Suisse and SVB,” Financial Times, May 15, 2023,
https://www.ft.com/content/c0155638-bd0f-4e0f-9f68-d42f4834a301 (accessed Nov. 30, 2023).
30 https://www.ft.com/content/c0155638-bd0f-4e0f-9f68-d42f4834a301.
32 “Independent Investigation Regarding the Observation of Iqbal Khan: Key Findings Report for the Board of Directors of Credit Suisse Group

AG,” Homburger, September 30, 2019, https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2019/10/2019-

09-30-homburger-key-findings-report-observation-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
33 Elliot Smith, “Tidjane Thiam Quits as Credit Suisse CEO Following Spying Scandal,” CNBC, February 7, 2020,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/07/tidjane-thiam-to-step-down-as-credit-suisse-ceo-on-feb-14.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
34 Kate Kelly, “The Short Tenure and Abrupt Ouster of Banking’s Sole Black CEO,” New York Times, October 3, 2020,

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/business/tidjane-thiam-credit-suisse.html (accessed Nov. 30, 2023).

35 Berengere Sim and Paul Clarke, “Who Is Thomas Gottstein, Credit Suisse’s New CEO?,” Financial News London, February 7, 2020,

https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/who-is-thomas-gottstein-credit-suisses-new-ceo-20200207 (accessed Nov. 8, 2022).

36 “Thomas Gottstein,” Credit Suisse, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/microsites/sustainability-week/iwm/speaker-bios/thomas-
gottstein.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

Not long after the COVID-19 pandemic hit in early 2020, the global economy froze. The S&P 500 fell
8.4% in February, then plunged 12.5% in March. Although Credit Suisse beat analysts’ expectations on net
earnings for 2020 Q2, 37 its share price was down about 27% since the start of the year, reflecting wider
uncertainty in financial markets. 38

Gottstein’s strategy relied on the existing vision of Credit Suisse as a leading wealth manager with strong
global investment-banking capabilities—building on the benefits of Thiam’s restructuring. 39 Described as three
tenets, his strategy was as follows:
• a balanced approach between mature and emerging markets,
• a bank for entrepreneurs focused on ultra-high-net-worth individuals (UHNWI) as a core strength,
and
• a regional wealth-management model providing proximity to clients.

“The reaffirmation of our existing group strategy builds on its success and is designed to ensure that we
will continue to allocate the majority of capital deployed into wealth management,” Rohner noted. 40 To
maintain cost discipline, Credit Suisse announced the integration of its global-markets, investment-banking,
and capital-markets divisions into the global investment bank, a move that was expected to save approximately
CHF400 million per year, starting in 2022 (Exhibit 4). 41

In his first quarterly earnings announcement (2020 Q1) in April 2020, Gottstein announced the highest
quarterly net income of CHF1.3 billion and a return on total equity (ROE) of 13.1% in the last five years. 42 The
bank had a solid capital and liquidity position, with a common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 12.1%, a tier 1
leverage ratio of 5.8%, and a liquidity coverage ratio of 182%. In December 2020, Moody’s raised the long-
term senior unsecured debt and deposit rating of Credit Suisse from A1 to Aa3. The rating agency cited
successful restructuring in the past and the group’s “improved and more stable profitability,” driven by a
structurally lower cost base and a growth in revenue from its core businesses. 43

Deals gone bad

Although Credit Suisse started 2020 in a shaky position, by the end of the year the share price had rallied,
investors seemed pleased, and despite a pandemic, conditions held promise. That was until two bank deals in
particular, happening almost simultaneously, caused a severe strain on the bank and raised questions about the
way the Credit Suisse conducted its business.

37 “Credit Suisse to Merge Investment Banking Units, Posts Q2 Profit Hike,” Reuters, July 30, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/credit-suisse-

results/rpt-credit-suisse-to-merge-investment-banking-units-posts-q2-profit-hike-idUSFWN2F01OO (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

38 Silvia Amaro, “Credit Suisse Reports 24% Rise in Net Profit as It Merges Its Investment Banking Units,” CNBC, July 30, 2020,

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/credit-suisse-q2-2020-earnings.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

39 “Building on Strong 2Q20 Performance, Credit Suisse Launches Key Initiatives to Reinforce Strategy,” Credit Suisse press release, July 30, 2020,

https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2020/07/credit-suisse-launches-key-initiatives-
reinforce-strategy-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
40 https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2020/07/credit-suisse-launches-key-initiatives-
reinforce-strategy-en.pdf.
41 https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2020/07/credit-suisse-launches-key-initiatives-
reinforce-strategy-en.pdf.
42 “Quarterly Earnings Material,” Credit Suisse, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/investor-relations/financial-regulatory-

disclosures/quarterly-earnings-material.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

43 Adrian Jimenea, “Moody’s Upgrades Credit Suisse on Better Profitability,” S&P Global, December 1, 2020,
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/moody-s-upgrades-credit-suisse-on-better-profitability-
61519472 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

On March 1, 2021, Greensill Capital (Greensill), a British financial firm specializing in supply chain
financing, became insolvent after failing to renew insurance coverage. Greensill provided loans to businesses
that needed capital between the time they invoiced customers and the time customers paid the invoices. These
loans were then repackaged and sold to investors. The portfolio manager of four of Greensill’s supply chain
finance funds (SCFF) was Credit Suisse, which marketed to investors. 44 The problem was that Greensill
increasingly granted loans to businesses that lacked creditworthiness—a lot of them. 45 They didn’t pay their
bills—and given the impact of the global pandemic, this might have been understandable to some. In October
2020, Credit Suisse’s chief risk and compliance officer approved a USD160 million bridge loan to Greensill. 46
Five months later, on March 8, 2021, Greensill filed for bankruptcy. As a consequence, Credit Suisse closed
four funds and froze USD10 billion in funds that were invested in Greensill’s financial products and held by
its supply chain investment funds.47 “It drives me nuts,” said one participant in the funds. “[Credit Suisse]
created a flawed structure in the first place. Then had zero governance and monitoring. And now it has blown
up, they are taking no responsibility and letting the investors pay for everything.” 48 Apparently SoftBank had
been writing off its investment since 2020. 49

The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) found that Credit Suisse totally violated
supervisory obligations around risk management.50 “Given the reputational impact of the SCFF matter on us,
actions have been taken against a number of employees where the Board deemed it was appropriate,” Credit
Suisse annual filings reported. 51 The board also pledged to “strengthen risk management processes.” 52

By the end of the same month, on March 26, Archegos Capital Management (Archegos)—a hedge fund
and family office of US investor Sung Kook “Bill” Hwang—imploded after losing USD20 billion in two days. 53
Hwang was a multimillionaire who fell from favor in 2012 over insider trading for a different hedge fund firm
he owned. With Archegos, the hedge fund failed to meet the margin calls, exposing its prime brokers to large
losses. Archegos started breaching stress scenario limits in spring 2020.

Archegos was a large client at Credit Suisse, and any hesitation raised in 2015 around Hwang’s reputation
as an investor failed to cause much concern—Credit Suisse wasn’t the only large global bank that had Archegos
as a client. 54 Credit Suisse made interest income and fees (USD54 million) off Archegos’s use of borrowed
money to make large bets—eventually beyond the limit amount of risk it should have been allowed. 55 Even
though the large size of the client would merit board-level oversight, it was absent. 56 Indeed, Credit Suisse
repaid Archegos USD2.4 billion a couple of weeks before the capital-management firm folded. 57

44 Credit Suisse annual report, 2021.

45 “Greensill Capital’s Woes Will Reverberate Widely,” Economist, March 4, 2021, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2021/03/06/greensill-capitals-woes-will-reverberate-widely (accessed Nov. 8, 2023).
46 Stephen Morris, Robert Smith, Arash Massoudi, and Owen Walker, “Credit Suisse Executives ‘Overruled’ Risk Managers on $160m Loan to

Greensill,” SWI, March 12, 2021, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/credit-suisse-executives--overruled--risk-managers-on--160m-loan-to-

greensill/46442476 (accessed Dec. 15, 2023).
47 Duncan Mavin and Julie Steinberg, “Behind Greensill’s Collapse: Detour into Risky Loans,” Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2021,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-greensills-collapse-detour-into-risky-loans-11615611953?page=1 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

48 Stephen Morris and Robert Smith, “Credit Suisse Charges Investors to Prop Up Greensill,” Financial Times, September 20, 2021.
49 Robert Smith and Arash Massoudi, “Credit Suisse’s Supply Chain Funds Missed Out on SoftBank Injection,” Financial Times, March 18, 2021.
50 “FINMA Concludes ‘Greensill’ Proceedings against Credit Suisse,” FINMA, February 28, 2023,
https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2023/02/20230228-mm-greensill/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
51 Credit Suisse annual report, 2021.
52 Credit Suisse annual report, 2021.
53 Erik Schatzker, Sridhar Natarajan, and Katherine Burton, “Bill Hwang Had $20 Billion, Then Lost It All in Two Days,” Bloomberg, April 8, 2021,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-04-08/how-bill-hwang-of-archegos-capital-lost-20-billion-in-two-days (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

54 Jack Ewing, “Credit Suisse Finds Incompetence but No Criminal Conduct in Archegos Debacle,” New York Times, July 29, 2021,

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/business/credit-suisse-archegos.html (accessed Nov. 9, 2023).

55 Timothy L. O’Brien and Chris Hughes, “Credit Suisse Bet So Much on Archegos for So Little,” Bloomberg, August 1, 2021,

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-08-01/credit-suisse-risked-so-much-on-archegos-for-so-little#xj4y7vzkg (accessed Nov. 9, 2023).

56 Stephen Morris, “Credit Suisse Fined $388mn over Archegos Collapse,” Financial Times, July 24, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/bee46da8-

6677-4ecd-9e27-9a3760737d9f (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

57 https://www.ft.com/content/bee46da8-6677-4ecd-9e27-9a3760737d9f.

After the net asset value of the fund fell from USD3.5 billion to USD2 billion in April 2020, Credit Suisse’s
Prime Services business decided not to exercise its right to terminate Archegos’s swaps portfolio. In September
2020, a risk-management analyst covering Archegos raised a red flag, pointing out that the New York team was
not “adequately staffed to be reliable.” 58 After a follow-up on the raised concerns, Prime Services Risk noted
that progress was being made—employees were ignoring risk limits and acting in favor of the client, not Credit
Suisse. 59 Nonetheless, Archegos remained in breach of its stress scenario limits every week until its collapse in
March 2021. 60 Other banks, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, had exposure to Archegos as well,
but Credit Suisse and Nomura were the slowest to unwind their positions. Two weeks before Archegos
collapsed, Credit Suisse recorded more than USD5 billion in losses due to its risk exposure. This was the largest
trading loss in Credit Suisse history. The stock price dropped by 14% in one day after the announcement
(Exhibit 5). 61

An independent external investigation found “a failure to effectively manage risk in the Investment Bank’s
Prime Services business by both the first and second lines of defense as well as a lack of risk escalation” and
“an insufficient discharge of supervisory responsibilities in the Investment Bank and in Risk.” The report also
noted that “it seems likely that Archegos deceived Credit Suisse and obfuscated the true extent of its positions.”
However, the “risks were not hidden. They were in plain sight from at least September 2020.” 62

Indeed, a report prepared by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison showed that an increase
in Credit Suisse’s net revenues by 31% for 2021 Q1, driven by a strong performance of the investment bank
and the broad market, was more than offset by CHF4.4 billion in provisions for credit losses related to the
Archegos collapse (see Figure 1). 63 It also concluded that no bank employees “engaged in fraudulent or illegal
conduct or acted with ill intent,” 64 instead laying blame directly on “overworked and underqualified staff,
miscommunication between departments, inattentive senior managers and a system geared to increase sales
rather than monitor risk.” 65

58 “Key Points of Credit Suisse Archegos Post-Mortem,” Reuters, July 29, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/key-points-credit-suisse-

archegos-post-mortem-2021-07-29/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

59 https://www.ft.com/content/bee46da8-6677-4ecd-9e27-9a3760737d9f.
60 “Archegos Info Kit,” Credit Suisse, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/archegos-info-kit.html (accessed Dec. 14,

2023).
61 Elliot Smith, “Banks Warn of ‘Significant Losses’ as They Exit Positions with Large US Hedge Fund,” CNBC, March 29, 2021,

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/29/credit-suisse-exits-positions-with-hedge-fund-warns-of-losses.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

62 “Credit Suisse Group Publishes the Report of the Independent External Investigation into Archegos Capital Management,” Credit Suisse press

release, July 29, 2021, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/media-releases/archegos-202107.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

63 Archegos owner Bill Hwang pleaded not guilty in front of Manhattan Federal Court on nearly a dozen accounts of fraud, market manipulation, and

racketeering conspiracy and awaited trial while out on bail as of November 2023. See case at Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sung Kook (Bill) Hwang,
Patrick Halligan, William Tomita, Scott Becker, and Archegos Capital Management, LP, US District Court case 1:22-cv-03402, April 27, 2022,
https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2022/comp-pr2022-70.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
64 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/business/credit-suisse-archegos.html.
65 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/business/credit-suisse-archegos.html.

Figure 1. Credit Suisse quarterly pretax income by business unit.

Data source: Credit Suisse quarterly and interim reports.

In response to the Archegos exposure, Credit Suisse launched an independent investigation and enhanced
review of risk across the bank. Over the course of a few weeks between mid-March and late April 2021, the
board named new CEOs of the investment-bank and asset-management units and a new chief risk officer and
global head of compliance. 66 To bolster the credibility of the path forward, the bank replaced all seven members
of the executive board. On April 22, 2021, Credit Suisse announced the issuance of CHF1.7 billion in
mandatory convertible notes to strengthen its capital base. Over the following several months, Credit Suisse
created 20 new credit-risk roles and appointed a chief business risk officer for its investment bank. Nine
executives were ousted and 23 people involved in the Archegos scandal received some sort of punishment,
while USD70 million was recouped in pay, including from clawbacks of bonuses. 67

Corporate governance issues

Archegos and Greensill were not the only problems Credit Suisse faced. After reaching a statutory term of
12 years, Rohner stepped down as board chair, welcoming to the position António Horta-Osório, the group
CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, in May 2021. 68 Horta-Osório pledged to put risk management at the heart of
the group’s culture and guide the bank to stability. Nine months later, he resigned after twice breaking COVID-
19 quarantine rules in Switzerland and the United Kingdom to attend football and tennis matches in London. 69
The investigation also found that the 57-year-old Portuguese banker used a corporate jet for personal travel
and a holiday trip to the Maldives. Horta-Osório apologized for his mistakes and characterized them as
unintentional. 70 Axel Lehmann was appointed board chair (he had been on the board since October 1, 2021)
and was elected at the annual general meeting on April 29, 2022. 71

Around the same time that Lehmann joined the Credit Suisse board in October 2021, Credit Suisse agreed
to pay USD475 million to the US and UK authorities to settle the bank’s role in the Mozambique tuna bonds

66 “First Quarter 2021 Financial Results,” Credit Suisse press release, April 22, 2021, https://www.credit-
suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2021/04/q1-21-press-release-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
67 Marion Halftermeyer, “Credit Suisse Claws Back Pay as It Faults Staff for Archegos,” Bloomberg, July 29, 2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-29/credit-suisse-clawed-back-pay-as-it-faulted-staff-for-archegos (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
68 Patrick Brusnahan, “Credit Suisse to Hire Lloyds Boss as Chairman,” Private Banker International, December 1, 2020,
https://www.privatebankerinternational.com/news/credit-suisse-to-hire-lloyds-boss-as-chairman/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
69 Owen Walker, “António Horta-Osarió Resigns as Credit Suisse Chair over Covid Breaches,” Financial Times, January 17, 2022,

https://www.ft.com/content/48d159bd-a3c0-4025-8c5b-d7dfbf59526a (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

70 https://www.ft.com/content/48d159bd-a3c0-4025-8c5b-d7dfbf59526a.
71 “Credit Suisse Group Appoints Axel P. Lehmann as New Chairman; António Horta-Osarió Has Resigned,” Credit Suisse press release, January 17,

2022, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/media-releases/csg-bod-changes-202201.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

loan bribery back in 2012. 72 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report found that Credit
Suisse’s deficient internal accounting controls failed to address significant bribery risks in the Mozambique case.
“Credit Suisse provided investors with incomplete and misleading disclosures despite being uniquely positioned
to understand the full extent of Mozambique’s mounting debt and serious risk of default based on its prior
lending arrangements,” noted Anita B. Bandy, associate director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. 73

In early 2022, a Bermuda court ruled that Credit Suisse was liable for more than USD500 million in damages
to the former Georgian prime minister due to the failure of the bank’s affiliate, Credit Suisse Life Bermuda, to
fulfill its fiduciary duty. 74 A year earlier, in a request for compensation, CS Victims, a group representing
defrauded Credit Suisse clients, highlighted that FINMA’s investigation report on the issue painted a
“devastating picture of dysfunction, inadequate controls, and a jarring lack of oversight.” 75 The case related to
a former Credit Suisse star banker, Patrice Lescaudron, who was sentenced to five years in prison after admitting
to forging client signatures to divert money. Lescaudron took his own life in 2020. 76

Restructuring 2.0

By the end of 2021, management announced a new strategy to simplify, strengthen, and invest in the bank’s
growth. The restructuring plan envisioned a capital-light advisory model for the investment bank and
strengthening of the wealth-management unit (Exhibit 6). The streamlined organizational structure was
expected to bring between CHF1.0 billion and CHF1.5 billion per year in cost savings by 2024. 77 By exiting
prime services, management planned to free up to USD3 billion, around 25% of capital, from the investment
bank and deploy it to wealth management by 2024. 78 Management planned to distribute approximately 25% of
net income for 2022.

When it became clearer that the rollout of the COVID-19 vaccines would help abate the global pandemic,
businesses worldwide reopened. With travel restrictions and lockdowns easing, low borrowing costs,
government emergency distributions, and pent-up demand fueled economic activity. However, supply chain
issues created market imbalances. After a decade of low inflation, prices started picking up.

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, calling it a special military operation, sending oil prices to over
USD100 per barrel and adding to inflationary pressures. Since March 2022, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) had
started rapidly raising its policy interest rate (Exhibit 7). Raging conflict in Eastern Europe, surging commodity
prices, a threat of inflation, and growing interest rates sent global markets into turmoil. After a strong 2021,
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market activity was in decline. By the end of June, MSCI’s 47-country world
index (ACWI) recorded the biggest drop in the first half-year since it was created in 1990 (Exhibit 8).

72 https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-213.
73 https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-213.
74 Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi, “Credit Suisse Faces $500 Mln Plus Bill after Ex-Georgian PM Wins Court Case,” Reuters, March 29, 2022,

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/former-georgian-pm-wins-bermuda-claim-against-credit-suisse-subsidiary-2022-03-29/ (accessed Dec. 14,

2023).
75 “CS Victims Laud Fraud Report Findings and Demand Credit Suisse Return Client Funds,” Cision, February 8, 2021,

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cs-victims-laud-fraud-report-findings-and-demand-credit-suisse-return-client-funds-301223110.html
(accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
76 Nathalie Olof-Ors, “Credit Suisse: A Bank Sunk by Scandals,” Barron’s, March 19, 2023, https://www.barrons.com/news/credit-suisse-a-bank-

sunk-by-scandals-2b069676 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

77 “Credit Suisse Announces Its Group Strategy with a Clear Focus on Strengthening, Simplifying and Investing for Growth,” Credit Suisse press

release, November 4, 2021, https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2021/11/id-gsr-2021-press-

release-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
78 https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2021/11/id-gsr-2021-press-release-en.pdf.

Approximately USD13 trillion was wiped out in stocks worldwide. In the same period, 10-year US Treasuries—
a traditional safe haven in troubled times—had their worst first half since 1788.79

In the second quarter of 2022, Credit Suisse announced CHF1.6 billion in losses, four times more than
what analysts had expected and equivalent to the losses for the entire fiscal year of 2021(Exhibits 9 and 10). A
29% annual decline in group net revenue reflected poor performance across all business segments. 80 In May,
Lehmann supported Gottstein, publicly stating, “because he is good.” 81 After announcing the 2022 Q2 earnings
in July 2022, Gottstein resigned as CEO of Credit Suisse. By mid-2022, Credit Suisse management issued a
third consecutive quarterly profit warning.

In June 2022, Credit Suisse was fined over USD2 million by a Swiss court for its failure to prevent money
laundering associated with a Bulgarian criminal group over 15 years before (between July 2007 and December
2008), “despite the presence of concrete indications as to the criminal origin of the funds.” 82 As the stream of
legacy issues continued bringing the bank’s name to the news headlines, investor confidence deteriorated.

Restructuring 3.0

On the same day Gottstein resigned, the board named Körner the new CEO of Credit Suisse Group as of
August 2022. After spending 11 years at UBS, Körner returned to Credit Suisse to lead the asset-management
division in 2021. In the same announcement, the board and management revealed a plan to conduct a
comprehensive strategic review to create a capital-light, advisory-led banking unit and more focused markets
business that would complement core capabilities and wealth-management growth. The development and
implementation of the new strategy were to be overseen by the board directly and supported by the ad hoc
Investment Bank Strategy Committee, with nonexecutive director Michael Klein as a chair. 83

Within three months, on October 27, 2022, Credit Suisse management claimed that the strategic overhaul
would build a new Credit Suisse that would be “a simpler, more focused and more stable bank centered around
Wealth Management.” 84 A broad and fragmented business portfolio, insufficient capital discipline, high-cost
operating model, reputational and litigation issues, and subpar investment-bank returns were identified as key
issues. 85 The three-year strategic transformation had three pillars: restructuring the investment bank,
strengthening and reallocating capital, and accelerating cost transformation (Exhibit 11). Key transformation
steps were laid out:
• Raise roughly USD4 billion of new equity capital;
• Cut costs by 15% (about CHF2.5 billion), decrease risk-weighted assets (RWAs) by 40%, and reduce
headcount by about 17% (9,000 people) by the end of 2025;

79 Marc Jones, “Markets in H1: The Almost Perfect Storm,” Reuters, June 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/global-markets-h1-

pix-2022-06-30/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

80 Elliot Smith, “Credit Suisse Names Ulrich Koerner as CEO, Launches Strategic Review as Losses Deepen,” CNBC, July 27, 2022,

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/27/credit-suisse-q2-2022-earnings.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

81 Elliot Smith, “Credit Suisse Chairman Denies Reports of Talks to Replace CEO Gottstein,” CNBC, May 23, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/23/credit-suisse-chairman-denies-reports-of-talks-to-replace-ceo-gottstein.html (accessed Nov. 10, 2023).
82 https://apnews.com/article/money-laundering-switzerland-bulgaria-3b9848d5cbb6e4c201fbae5fb9c17629.
83 “Credit Suisse Fined for Facilitating Cocaine Case Laundering,” AP News, June 27, 2022, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-

news/en/articles/media-releases/cs-appoints-ulrich-koerner-new-ceo-announces-comprehensive-strategic-review-202207.html (accessed Dec. 14,

2023).
84 “Credit Suisse Unveils New Strategy and Transformation Plan,” Credit Suisse press release, October 27, 2022, https://www.credit-

suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2022/10/strategy-update-press-release-en.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

85 “2022 Strategy Update,” Credit Suisse, 2022, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/events/investor-day-2022.html (accessed Dec. 14,

2023).

• Establish an independent investment-banking unit, CS First Boston, that would focus on capital
markets and advisory (Exhibit 12);
• Create a capital release unit with the aim to free capital by exiting Securitized Products Group; and
• Generate a group-level return on tangible equity (ROTE) of roughly 6%, achieve a CET1 ratio of more
than 13.5% by 2025, and start paying “meaningful dividends” from that year on.

Upon the announcement of the strategic overhaul, Credit Suisse stock dropped 19%, the biggest daily loss
since 1985. 86 With the increasingly challenging market conditions, material execution risk overshadowed the
ambitious overhaul plan in the eyes of investors. A week after the announcement, S&P downgraded Credit
Suisse Group to BBB−, just a notch above investment grade (Exhibit 13). 87 In 2022 Q4, net asset outflows
reached CHF110.5 billion, driven by a CHF138 billion decline in customer deposits (Exhibits 14 and 15). 88
Credit Suisse’s market capitalization fell below CHF10 billion by the end of 2022 (Exhibit 16), CHF50 billion
less than in 2010. 89 Some key senior executives, regional group heads, and managing directors left the bank and
joined competitors.

Despite significant losses for fiscal year 2022, it seemed that early 2023 brought some hope to shareholders
as Credit Suisse management announced progress in the execution of its strategy. Between October 2022, when
the strategic review was announced, and February 2023, Credit Suisse did the following: 90
• Successfully raised CHF4 billion from Saudi National Bank and the existing shareholders, making the
Saudi lender the biggest shareholder with 9.88% ownership (Exhibit 17);
• Completed debt issuances of around CHF10 billion;
• Made progress in negotiations with Apollo Private Equity to sell Securitized Products Group;
• Advanced carve-out of CS First Boston with the acquisition of the investment-banking business M.
Klein & Company (Klein);
• Initiated 80% of planned around CHF1.2 billion in cost reduction for 2023; and
• Reduced RWAs and leverage exposure by around USD5 billion and around USD15 billion,
respectively.

While most of the progress was positive, the carve-out and revival of the heritage name of the investment
bank caught some attention—not all favorable. Credit Suisse agreed to pay USD175 million in the form of
CS First Boston convertible notes and additional warrants to acquire Klein. Since its formation in 2010, Klein’s
boutique investment bank advised around USD1.5 trillion in transactions with a notable reputation in the
Middle East. According to Credit Suisse’s media release, Michael Klein stepped down from the board of

86 Marion Halftermeyer and Donal Griffin, “Credit Suisse Plunges Most Ever after Radical Reboot Disappoints,” Bloomberg, October 27, 2022,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-27/credit-suisse-s-radical-reboot-risks-falling-short-for-investors (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

87 “S&P Cuts Credit Suisse Group Rating to One Step above Junk Status,” Reuters, November 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/sp-

downgrades-credit-suisse-group-moodys-cuts-some-ratings-2022-11-02/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

88 Form 4, Amendment No. 4, UBS, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386

(accessed Dec. 14, 2023), 43.

89 Jonathan Ponciano, “Credit Suisse Tumbles: Stock Hits New Record Low after Banking Giant Warns of ‘Substantial’ Losses,” Forbes, November

28, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2022/11/28/credit-suisse-tumbles-stock-hits-new-record-low-after-banking-giant-warns-

of-substantial-losses/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
90 Credit Suisse 2022 Q4 Investor Presentation, 7.

directors of Credit Suisse to take the CEO role of CS First Boston. 91 Credit Suisse paid a USD10 million fee to
Klein for advising the bank restructuring. 92

Amid the stir, Körner strived to give the impression that the situation was under control. “I think the plan,
the strategy resonates very much. We are in full execution swing, so I think we are making really good progress,”
he said in an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2023. 93 However, behind closed
doors, Körner and Lehmann met representatives of the Swiss government and regulatory bodies numerous
times between December 2022 and mid-January 2023 to discuss contingency plans, including a potential merger
with UBS Group.

On February 20 and 22, the UBS Strategy Committee and UBS board concluded that a potential acquisition
of Credit Suisse was not desirable for UBS. “Uncertainty of establishing a reliable valuation of Credit Suisse,
recent business performance and risks of Credit Suisse, further potential liabilities as well as the risk that
regulatory approvals required to complete a transaction might not be obtained,” UBS noted. 94 Nonetheless, the
UBS board asked management to continue monitoring the situation, anticipating that if the position of Credit
Suisse deteriorated further, UBS might be asked to intervene.

Something Broke on Both Sides of the Atlantic

There were some on Wall Street who claimed that when the Fed started to raise interest rates, it generally
kept doing so until something broke. 95 After a somewhat optimistic beginning of the year, early March 2023
brought reckoning to financial markets. The pace of inflation decline appeared to be slower than anticipated,
leading the Fed to increase short-term interest rates by another 0.25% to between 4.5% and 4.75% in February
and signaling plans for another increase in March. 96 Markets priced in expectation of a prolonged period of
high rates and three more near-term hikes (0.25% each). 97 With leading consumer companies offering a more
cautious outlook on consumer spending, market participants faced the economic reality and adjusted valuations,
driving S&P 500 returns into the red.

On Wednesday, March 8, 2023, half an hour after market close, at 4:30 p.m. eastern time (ET), California-
based Silvergate Bank, one of two leading lenders to cryptocurrency customers, announced it would wind down
its operations. Silvergate had struggled for months, as one of its leading customers and cryptocurrency
exchange, FTX, had gone bankrupt in November 2022. 98 After wiping out a decade of profits in a single quarter,
fire-selling assets, and failing to submit an annual report with the SEC, bank management announced that “in
light of recent industry and regulatory developments,” liquidating the bank was the best path forward. 99

91 https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/media/media-release/2022/10/strategy-update-press-release-en.pdf.
92 Margot Patrick, Justin Baer, Julie Steinberg, “The Fatal Flaw in Credit Suisse’s Last-Ditch Attempt to Save Itself,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2023,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fatal-flaw-in-credit-suisses-last-ditch-attempt-to-save-itself-707d69f7 (accessed Nov. 10, 2023).
93 “Credit Suisse Making Really Good Progress, Says CEO,” CNBC, January 18, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/video/2023/01/18/credit-suisse-

making-really-good-progress-says-ceo.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

94 https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386.
95 Jeff Cox, “Something Broke, but the Fed Is Still Expected to Go Through with Rate Hikes,” CNBC, March 13, 2023,

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/13/something-broke-but-the-fed-is-still-expected-to-go-through-with-rate-hikes.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

96 Nick Timiraos, “Fed Slows Its Tightening with Quarter-Point Interest Rate Rise,” Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2023,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-approves-quarter-point-rate-hike-signals-more-increases-likely-11675278190?mod=article_inline (accessed Dec. 14,

2023).
97 Howard Silverblatt, “US Equities Market Attributes February 2023,” S&P Global, March 2, 2023,
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/commentary/article/us-equities-market-attributes-february-2023 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
98 MacKenzie Sigalos, “Crypto-Focused Bank Silvergate Is Shutting Operations and Liquidating after Market Meltdown,” CNBC, March 8, 2023,

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/08/silvergate-shutting-down-operations-and-liquidating-
bank.html#:~:text=Silvergate%20Capital%20announced%20on%20Wednesday,liquidation%20plan%20shared%20on%20Wednesday (accessed Dec.
14, 2023).
99 “Silvergate Capital Corporation Announces Intent to Wind Down Operations and Voluntarily Liquidate Silvergate Bank,” Silvergate press release,

March 8, 2023, https://ir.silvergate.com/news/news-details/2023/Silvergate-Capital-Corporation-Announces-Intent-to-Wind-Down-Operations-and-

This failure, along with the announcement 25 minutes earlier from another California-based bank, marked
the beginning of the worst banking turmoil since the collapse of Lehman Brothers back in 2008. Silicon Valley
Bank (SVB) announced plans for a USD1.25 billion common stock issuance and USD500 million of depository
shares to offset USD1.8 billion in losses on its Treasury and mortgage-backed securities portfolios, driven by
rising interest rates. 100 At the time, nearly half of the US venture-backed technology and life science companies
held deposits at SVB. 101 The company filings showed that at the end of 2022, USD152 billion, or 87.5% of
deposits at SVB, were uninsured. By the end of the next day, Thursday, March 9, SVB lost 60% in stock market
value and USD42 billion in customer deposits, recording the largest bank run in history. 102

The timing could not have been worse for Credit Suisse to take the spotlight. After receiving a late-night
call from the SEC citing material weaknesses related to its consolidated cash flow statement (Exhibit 18) on
Thursday, March 9, Credit Suisse announced a surprising delay in publishing its annual report for the fiscal year
2022. 103 In response, the share price fell by 6.4% to USD2.67, hovering near an all-time low.

On Friday, March 10, US regulators took control of SVB. The event marked the beginning of a busy
weekend, as the markets expected credible steps in addressing issues before markets opened on Monday. On
Sunday night, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced it would backstop all SVB
deposits and allow all SVB’s physical branches to reopen on Monday morning. 104 Several hours earlier, in an
attempt to prevent a systemic banking crisis, the New York State Department of Financial Services and FDIC
had shut down Signature Bank, a big lender in the cryptocurrency industry with USD110 billion in assets. “All
depositors of this institution will be made whole. As with the resolution of SVB, no losses will be borne by the
taxpayer,” regulators stated in a press release, carefully avoiding words such as “bailout” or “rescue.” 105

On Monday, March 13, half an hour before market opening in New York at 9:00 a.m. ET, US President
Joe Biden held a press briefing in which he tried to calm the public and instill confidence in the banking system
and regulatory response. The speech he gave included the following three remarks: 106
• “Americans can rest assured that our banking system is safe.”
• “The management of these banks will be fired.”
• “Investors in the banks will not be protected…That’s how capitalism works.”

Biden’s press briefing did not bring respite to the banking sector. As contagion fear spread, by the end of
trading hours on Monday, shares of First Republic Bank, a regional bank from California with over
USD200 billion in assets, tanked 61.8%. 107 The SPDR S&P Regional Banking exchange-traded fund (ETF) lost

Voluntarily-Liquidate-Silvergate-Bank/default.aspx; Jack Denton, “Silvergate Stock Dives 40%. The Bank Faces a Financial Crisis,” Barron’s, March 2,
2023, https://www.barrons.com/articles/silvergate-crypto-bank-stock-price-fe2b66bf (both accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
100 “Q1’23 Mid-Quarter Update,” Silvergate press release, March 8, 2023, https://ir.svb.com/events-and-presentations/event-details/2023/Q123-

Mid-Quarter-Update/default.aspx (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

101 “Strategic Actions/Q1’23 Mid-Quarter Update,” SVB, March 8, 2023,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/719739/000119312523064680/d430920dex992.htm (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
102 Felix Salmon, “The Largest Bank Run in History,” Axios, March 11, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/03/11/the-largest-bank-run-in-history

(accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

103 “Credit Suisse Announces Technical Delay of Publication of 2022 Annual Report,” Credit Suisse press release, March 9, 2023, https://www.credit-

suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/media-releases/csg-announces-delay-publication-2022-annual-report-
202303.html#:~:text=Credit%20Suisse%20Group%20announces%20today,about%20the%20technical%20assessment%20of (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
104 “FDIC Creates a Deposit Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara to Protect Insured Depositors of Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara, California,”

FDIC press release, March 10, 2023, https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23016.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
105 https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23018.html.
106 “Remarks by President Biden on Maintaining a Resilient Banking System and Protecting our Historic Economic Recovery,” White House press

release, March 13, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/03/13/remarks-by-president-biden-on-maintaining-a-

resilient-banking-system-and-protecting-our-historic-economic-recovery/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
107 Jesse Pound and John Melloy, “First Republic Drops 60%, Leads Decline in Bank Stocks Despite Government’s Backstop of SVB,” CNBC, March

13, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/13/first-republic-drops-bank-stocks-decline.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

12%, and trading was halted for over a dozen regional banking stocks (Exhibit 19). 108 European banking stocks
did not stay immune, losing 5.7% that same Monday. 109 UBS’s share price dropped 8%, while Credit Suisse’s
share price recorded a 12% decline and once more reached an all-time low at USD2.41 (Exhibit 20). Körner
was in a difficult position, running against the clock and struggling to shore up some market confidence.

Credit Suisse responds

On Tuesday, March 14, Körner appeared on Bloomberg TV, trying to highlight Credit Suisse’s strong capital
position (Exhibit 21), pleading for patience, and hoping to woo back some clients and investors. In response
to questions about share price and progress in strategy execution, Körner explained, “We said it’s a three-year
transformation, and you can’t come after two months, [and ask] ‘why is everything not done?’” He tried to
decouple Credit Suisse from SVB’s collapse and concerns about the banking sector’s health. “In comparison
to SVB, this is a different situation. We are a GSIB [Globally Systemically Important Bank]. We are following
materially different capital standards when it comes to liquidity, capital standards, and so on. We had a liquidity
coverage ratio of 144% last quarter” (Exhibit 22). 110

Less than 24 hours later, a short Bloomberg interview with Ammar al-Khudairy, chair of Saudi National Bank,
would trigger a market reaction that brought into question the survival of Credit Suisse. Following a capital
infusion and restructuring announcement in late 2022, the Saudi state-controlled bank had become Credit
Suisse’s largest shareholder. In response to a question about whether Saudi National Bank was open to making
further investments in Credit Suisse if there was another call for additional funds, al-Khudairy said: “The answer
is absolutely not, for many reasons outside the simplest reason, which is regulatory and statutory.” 111 The
markets picked up only the first part of his answer. Credit Suisse’s shares entered a free fall, losing 22% in value.
One-year credit default swaps (CDS) surpassed 835 basis points, meaning it would cost more than USD835 to
insure USD10,000 of the bank’s senior debt against default for a year. 112 The price of a five-year CDS was more
stable but still trading at a multiple of those related to UBS and Deutsche Bank (Exhibit 23). 113

In response to a request by Credit Suisse the very same day, FINMA and SNB issued a joint statement
pointing out that “Credit Suisse meets the capital and liquidity requirements imposed on systemically important
banks” and added that “if necessary, the SNB will provide CS with liquidity.” 114 The shares of the other
European banks such as Société Générale, BNP Paribas, and Banco de Sabadell, fell more than 10% on that
day. The sell-off on Wednesday, March 15, wiped out USD60 billion in market value across European banks. 115

Several hours after the interview with al-Khudairy and the initial market reaction, representatives of the
Swiss government, SNB, and FINMA convened a meeting with the UBS board chair and management to
discuss the heightened fragility of the financial system and the potential acquisition of Credit Suisse. UBS
management had hired Morgan Stanley several months earlier to assess the impact of the potential acquisition

108 Khristopher J. Brooks, “First Republic Bank Shares Plummet as Banking Fears Spread,” CBS News, March 13, 2023,

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/first-republic-bank-stock-price-silicon-valley-bank-signature-bank/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

109 Sruthi Shankar and Ankika Biswas, “European Stocks Log Steepest One-Day Fall This Year as Banks Extend Slide,” Reuters, March 13, 2023,

https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/no-relief-european-stocks-bank-selloff-continues-2023-03-13/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

110 Marion Halftermeyer, Myriam Balezou, and Francine Lacqua, “Credit Suisse CEO Urges Patience as Bank Sees Recent Inflows,” Bloomberg, March

14, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-14/credit-suisse-ceo-urges-patience-as-bank-sees-inflows-this-week (accessed Dec. 14,

2023).
111 “Top Credit Suisse Investor Says No to Investing More Money,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2023-

03-15/top-credit-suisse-investor-says-no-to-investing-more-video (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

112 Tasos Vossos, “Credit Suisse Default Swaps Are 18 Times UBS, 9 Times Deutsche Bank,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2023,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-15/credit-suisse-one-year-default-swaps-near-1-000-basis-points (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

113 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-15/credit-suisse-one-year-default-swaps-near-1-000-basis-points.
114 “FINMA and the SNB Issue Statement on Market Uncertainty,” FINMA press release, March 15, 2023,
https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2023/03/20230315-mm-statement/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
115 Julien Ponthus and Tasos Vossos, “Credit Suisse Ignites Global Market Rout as Banking Fears Return,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2023,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-15/credit-suisse-is-fueling-a-broader-rout-in-european-bank-stocks (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

of Credit Suisse. Still, without thorough due diligence, the risks of such a transaction were considered very high.
Nonetheless, the involved parties feared that the failure to provide an adequate solution by the end of the week
could potentially have severe consequences for the Swiss and global financial markets. In light of the situation,
UBS indicated it would be ready to undertake a potential transaction if it could be “executed in a manner that
was in the best interests of its shareholders and other stakeholders.” 116

On the other side of the Paradeplatz in Zurich, Körner and the Credit Suisse board explored alternatives
to the merger with UBS, including the following:117
• Securing a large capital injection from the Swiss government and/or third-party investors;
• Public stock issuance with backstop underwriting by third-party investors and/or the Swiss
government;
• Structuring options for a negotiated sale of Credit Suisse to a third-party strategic buyer;
• An economic transfer of assets using total return swaps; or 118
• Restructuring procedures.

Financial conditions and liquidity continued to deteriorate for Credit Suisse on March 15, and the
downward spiral of deposit outflows continued the following day. Behind closed doors, Swiss authorities
indicated that failure to find a solution by the end of the day, March 19, 2023, would put Credit Suisse into
resolution or bankruptcy. Measured by the size of the balance sheet, Credit Suisse was approximately twice the
size Lehman Brothers had been when it collapsed in 2008. Given the urgency and the complexity of the
situation, none of the explored alternatives were feasible on such a short timeline. The proposed merger with
UBS seemed to be the only available option that could meet the deadline.

On March 16, Credit Suisse announced it would strengthen liquidity by exercising the option to access
CHF50 billion from SNB under the covered loan and short-term liquidity facilities. 119 The lifeline from SNB
was enough to calm the markets for a day and buy time for negotiations. That very day, March 16, Credit Suisse
and UBS entered a confidentiality agreement, allowing UBS and its advisers to start due diligence. 120 In making
a merger decision, the board of UBS considered positive the fact that a somewhat risky and volatile investment-
banking business would constitute less than 25% of combined RWAs. The preliminary estimates showed that
the merger could lead to USD8 billion in aggregate cost savings and become accretive to earnings per share of
UBS by 2027. If completed, the merger would create a leading global wealth manager with USD5 trillion of
invested assets (Exhibit 24). The transaction did, however, carry numerous risks, such as potential contingent
liabilities at Credit Suisse, complexity and cost of integration, winding down noncore assets, and substantial
litigation and regulatory matters to address.

Körner and the Credit Suisse board were not in a position to negotiate. Credit Suisse’s ratio of price-to-
tangible book value fell below 0.2 (Exhibits 25 and 26). When the markets closed on Friday, March 17, the

116 https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386.
117 Graeme Wearden and Julia Kollewe, “SNB to Provide Credit Suisse with Liquidity if Needed; £75bn Wiped off FTSE 100 – As It Happened,”
Guardian, March 15, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2023/mar/15/government-extends-energy-bill-suppport-three-months-
budget-for-growth-silicon-valley-bank-markets-business-live (accessed Nov. 30, 2023).
118 A total return swap was a transaction (not a loan) where one party agreed to pay a fee to another party for an asset or assets over an agreed length

of time and receive profits (and losses) from the assets. See Peter Santilli, “Swap Type Saw Scrutiny before Firm’s Woe,” Wall Street Journal, March 31,
2021, https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/j9yhQuvcjBD0YgaW9PNr-WSJNewsPaper-3-31-2021.pdf (accessed Nov. 30, 2023)
119 “Credit Suisse Group Takes Decisive Action to Pre-emptively Strengthen Liquidity and Announces Public Tender Offers for Debt Securities,”

Credit Suisse press release, March 16, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-news/en/articles/media-releases/csg-announcement-202303.html

(accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
120 https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386.

market capitalization of UBS was around USD65 billion, or USD18.2 (CHF16.8) per share, and Credit Suisse’s
market capitalization was around USD8 billion or USD2.01 (CHF1.86 ) per share. Following UBS’s initial offer
of CHF1 billion, the parties entered weekend-long negotiations.

The Swiss Bank Deal

On Sunday, March 19, 2023, at 8:00 p.m. central European time (CET), UBS and Credit Suisse announced
a transaction in which the two banks would merge, with UBS Group being the surviving entity. Prior to
announcing the transaction, between March 18 and March 19, Credit Suisse and government representatives
met approximately five times. 121 The parties agreed that Credit Suisse shareholders would receive 1 UBS share
for every 22.48 Credit Suisse shares held, equivalent to CHF0.76 per share, for a total consideration of
CHF3 billion. Credit Suisse published a press release titled “Merger.” “This is a historic moment. It is a sad and
very challenging day for Credit Suisse, for Switzerland, and for the global financial markets,” Lehman said to
the public. 122 UBS announced it as an acquisition. “This acquisition is attractive for UBS shareholders. But, let
us be clear: as far as Credit Suisse is concerned, this is an emergency rescue. We have structured a transaction
which will preserve the value left in the business while limiting our downside exposure.” 123 The success of the
transaction depended on the guarantees provided by the Swiss authorities and regulators. Given the merger
agreement, Credit Suisse and Klein mutually agreed to terminate the Klein acquisition. 124

To announce the deal in such a short time frame and ensure the viability of Credit Suisse in terms of
liquidity and capital until the transaction was completed, Swiss authorities had to extend financial and regulatory
support to involved parties. Swiss finance minister Karin Keller-Sutter pointed out that Credit Suisse had
liquidity issues, not liability issues, and as such, it could not be considered a TBTF scenario. “This is a
commercial solution, not a bailout,” she stressed. 125 On March 19, the Swiss Federal Council (the government)
revised the Special Ordinance it had passed a few days earlier and adopted a package of measures that enabled
SNB and FINMA to support the takeover. 126 Some of the key measures were as follows: 127
• Inapplicability of the requirement that UBS and Credit Suisse shareholders approve the acquisition;
• Loss protection agreement with UBS, where the Swiss government would cover up to CHF9 billion in
potential losses pertaining to Credit Suisse assets (CHF44 billion in leveraged exposure) after UBS
covered the first CHF5 billion;
• SNB liquidity assistance loans of up to CHF100 billion, available to Credit Suisse in addition to the
emergency liquidity assistance;
• Up to CHF100 billion in liquidity assistance loans to Credit Suisse and UBS combined;
• Possibility of FINMA to order Credit Suisse to write down additional core capital; and

121 https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386.
122 “Credit Suisse Chairman: This Is a Sad and Historic Day,” Bloomberg, March 19, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2023-03-
19/credit-suisse-chairman-this-is-a-sad-and-historic-day (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
123 “UBS to Acquire Credit Suisse,” UBS press release, March 19, 2023, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/media/display-page-ndp/en-20230319-

tree.html; “Credit Suisse and UBS to Merge,” Credit Suisse press release, March 19, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us-
news/en/articles/media-releases/credit-suisse-and-ubs-to-merge-202303.html (both accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
124 https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386.
125 “Swiss Finance Minister: UBS Buying Credit Suisse Is Not a Bailout,” Bloomberg, March 19, 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2023-03-19/swiss-finance-minister-ubs-buying-credit-suisse-is-not-a-bailout (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
126 “Safeguarding Financial Market Stability: Federal Council Welcomes and Supports UBS Takeover of Credit Suisse,” Switzerland Federal Council,

March 19, 2023, https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-93793.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

127 https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investor-relations/financial-information/sec-filings.html#tab-2083256386.

• FINMA decree ordering Credit Suisse to write down the principal and interest of all additional tier 1
(AT1) securities.

The deal was set to be completed by early June 2023, and implementation of the postmerger integration
plans was expected to take three to five years. The hastily arranged deal was everything but done. Some believed
the merger would fail. The “track record of shotgun marriages in the banking sector is mixed,” wrote Andrew
Kenningham, chief Europe economist at Capital Economics. 128 A professor of finance at Swiss business school
IMD shared Kenningham’s skepticism. “One of the most established facts in academic research is that bank
mergers hardly ever work,” said Arturo Bris.129

As deal details were divulged, at least one key element became problematic. FINMA’s decree ordering a
complete write-down of CHF16 billion (USD17.5 billion) of AT1 bonds stirred a controversy. AT1 bonds, also
known as contingent convertibles or CoCos, were created in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis to help banks
fulfill Basel III requirements. Namely, if certain capital requirements fell below an assigned threshold, CoCos
could convert into equity, provide an additional tier of capital, and help banks absorb losses. Issued as debt
instruments, CoCos were typically expected to be senior in relation to equity in the case of bankruptcy, meaning
that equity holders would carry the burden. Given that Credit Suisse equity holders received CHF3 billion in a
takeover, while AT1 bonds were written down to zero, the typical hierarchy did not hold. As a result, a number
of law offices representing AT1 bondholders announced lawsuits. “No financial analyst had ever believed that
AT1 bonds would be brought to zero…given the level of solvency of Credit Suisse…[and] pretty high level of
regulatory capital,” noted David Benamou, chief investment officer of Axiom Alternative Investments. 130

A number of European financial institutions and regulators rushed to calm the USD275 billion AT1 market
and to reassure bondholders of the applicability of the existing laws. The Single Resolution Board, the European
Banking Authority, and ECB Banking Supervision issued a joint statement noting that “common equity
instruments are the first ones to absorb losses, and only after their full use would Additional Tier One be
required to be written down.” 131 In response to the market uproar, FINMA defended its action from March 19,
citing contractual obligations in the Credit Suisse AT1 bond prospectus, which provided that AT1 instruments
“will be completely written down in a ‘Viability Event,’ in particular, if extraordinary government support is
granted.” 132

Only One Bank on Paradeplatz

The merger of Credit Suisse and UBS created a banking behemoth with around USD1.7 trillion in balance
sheet assets—roughly twice the size of the Swiss economy in 2022. Körner joined the UBS executive board in
May 2023 to spearhead the transition and integration of Credit Suisse into the UBS operating structure. 133
Sergio Ermotti, the new CEO of UBS, described Körner’s position: “at the time he took the job, it was like a
firefighter being asked to rush into a burning building. It is extremely challenging and difficult to turn this

128 Hanna Ziady, “Too Big for Switzerland? Credit Suisse Rescue Creates Bank Twice the Size of the Economy,” CNN Business, March 24, 2023,

https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/23/investing/credit-suisse-ubs-impact-switzerland (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

129 https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/23/investing/credit-suisse-ubs-impact-switzerland.
130 Anna Cooban, “What Are AT1 Bonds and Why Are Credit Suisse’s Now Worthless?,” CNN Business, March 20, 2023,

https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/20/investing/credit-suisse-at1-bond-write-down-explainer/index.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

131 “SRB, EBA and ECB Banking Supervision Statement on the Announcement on 19 March 2023 by Swiss Authorities,” European Banking Authority

press release, March 20, 2023, https://www.eba.europa.eu/srb-eba-and-ecb-banking-supervision-statement-announcement-19-march-2023-swiss-

authorities (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
132 “FINMA Provides Information about the Basis for Writing Down AT1 Capital Instruments,” FINMA press release, March 23, 2023,

https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2023/03/20230323-mm-at1-kapitalinstrumente/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

133 “UBS Announces New Operating Model and Leadership Team,” UBS press release, May 9, 2023,
https://www.ubs.com/global/en/media/display-page-ndp/en-20230509-operating-model.html (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

around.” 134 In his last address to Credit Suisse shareholders and employees, Körner said, “After 167 years,
Credit Suisse is giving up its independence. A proud and, at times, turbulent company history is drawing to an
end—and something new is being created.” 135

Some, such as a former regulator at the Swiss Stock Exchange, claimed they all worked for UBS now. He
paraphrased Warren Buffett’s comment about derivatives, saying, “the new, expanded UBS might well become
a financial weapon of mass destruction, capable in a collapse of taking down the entire Swiss economy with
it.” 136 Others lamented that banks outside Switzerland would be “popping corks” and that Credit Suisse
represented damage to the reputation of Swiss banking and the changed views about the entire country. 137

As the once highly respected Credit Suisse Bank that symbolized Swiss financial strength was set to close,
questions remained for many. What went wrong? At what point in time? Would there have been a way forward
for Credit Suisse without UBS?

134 Stephen Morris, “Ulrich Körner, the Man Trying to Hold Credit Suisse Together,” Financial Times, March 17, 2023,
https://www.ft.com/content/fa6e2064-fe96-4882-bee0-62f7442b93b4 (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
135 https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/about-us/docs/events/annual-general-meeting/agm-2023-speech-uk-en.pdf.
136 Hugo Miller and Jan-Henrik Foerster, “The Triumph of UBS Is Also the Humbling of Swiss Banking,” Bloomberg, March 30, 2023,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-30/ubs-credit-suisse-merger-worsens-swiss-banking-reputation (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

137 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “The Era of Swiss Exceptionalism Is Over,” Telegraph, March 24, 2023,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2023/03/24/era-swiss-exceptionalism/ (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

Exhibit 1
The End of Credit Suisse
2015 Swiss Capital and Leverage Ratio Phase Requirements for Credit Suisse during Transition
(“Glide Path”: Asset Mix Changes with Target Date Fund)

17.05%
Swiss common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital 16.17%
High-trigger capital instruments 15.08%
Low-trigger capital instruments 13.79% 4.05%
Total 3.80%
12.16% 3.46%
3.04%
10.18% 3.00%
2.53% 3.00%
2.88%
1.68% 2.63%
2.25%
1.75%

9.38% 10%
8.13% 8.75%
6.75% 7.38%

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Note: Effective as of January 1 of the applicable year.
Data source: “Barclays Global Financial Services Conference,” Credit Suisse, September 9, 2014, https://www.credit-
suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/investor-relations/events-presentations/090914-creditsuisse-barclays-conference.pdf (accessed
Dec. 14, 2023).

Exhibit 2
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Profitability during the Tenure of Tidjane Thiam as CEO

3,419
Net income attributable to 2,024
shareholders (in millions (983)
of Swiss francs) (2,944) (2,710)

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Return on tangible equity*

(%)
* Rounded; based on Swiss franc.
Data source: “Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2019 Results,” Credit Suisse investor presentation, February 13, 2020.

Exhibit 3
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Key Performance Metrics during the Tenure of Tidjane Thiam as CEO

Data source: Credit Suisse Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2019 Results, Investor Presentation, February 13, 2020.

Exhibit 4
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse’s Organizational Structure in 2015, 2020, and 2023

Sources: Credit Suisse annual reports, 2016, 2020, and 2022.

Exhibit 5
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Annotated Stock Price Performance

Note: Mario Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” refers to a speech he gave in 2012 in which he said that the European
Central Bank (ECB) was ready to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro.” See “Verbatim of the Remarks Made
by Mario Draghi,” ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html (accessed Dec.
14, 2023). “Suisse Secrets” refers to an international investigation into Credit Suisse. See “What Is Suisse Secrets?
Everything You Need to Know about the Swiss Banking Leak,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project,
February 20, 2022, https://www.occrp.org/en/suisse-secrets/what-is-suisse-secrets-everything-you-need-to-know-
about-the-swiss-banking-leak (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).
Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 6
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse’s Capital Allocation by Group

Data sources: Calculations based on Credit Suisse November 2021 Investor Day clarification, Credit Suisse 2023 Q1 Earnings Spreadsheet, and
Credit Suisse 2016 Full Year Report Spreadsheet.

Exhibit 7
The End of Credit Suisse
US Federal Funds Rate and Core Inflation

(%)
Federal Funds Effective Rate
7

6 US Core Consumer Price Index (CPI)

0
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023

Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).

Exhibit 8
The End of Credit Suisse
MSCI World Index Performance

MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI)

800 MSCI ACWI Standard (large-cap + mid-cap)

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023

Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 9
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Group Financial Performance by Business Unit (2020, 2021, 2022)

Source: Credit Suisse annual report, 2022, 63.

Exhibit 10
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Group Five-Year Financial Performance (2018–2022)

Source: Credit Suisse annual report, 2022 (A2, selected five-year information).

Exhibit 11
The End of Credit Suisse
Newly Proposed Structure of the Credit Suisse Group in October 2022

Source: “Credit Suisse 2022 Strategy Update,” Credit Suisse, October 27, 2022.

Exhibit 12
The End of Credit Suisse
Impact of the Strategic Review (October 2022)

Risk-Weighted Assets Mix Revenue Mix

(ex. CC) (ex. CC and CRU)

Cap. Release CS First

13% Unit 14% Boston
Investment 9% CS First Investment
Bank 40% Bank 43%
Boston

Wealth Wealth
Management, New Management, 86% New
Swiss Bank,
78% Credit Suisse Credit Suisse
Swiss Bank,
Asset 60% Asset 57%
Management Management

2022 Q3 2025 est. 2018–22 Q3 2025 est.

CC = Corporate Center; CRU = Capital Release Unit.

Data source: “Credit Suisse 2022 Strategy Update,” Credit Suisse, October 27, 2022.

Exhibit 13
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Credit Rating History

Moody's Fitch/S&P
Aaa AAA 10
Aa1 AA+ 9
Moody’s Fitch S&P
Aa2 AA 8
Aa3 AA- 7
A1 A+ 6
A2 A 5
A3 A- 4
Baa1 BBB+ 3
Baa2 BBB 2
Baa3 BBB- 1
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Data source: “Credit Suisse Credit Ratings Development,” Credit Suisse, 2023, https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/about-
us/docs/investor-relations/debt-investors/ratings-credit-reports/credit-suisse-ratings-history-220801.pdf (accessed Dec. 14, 2023).

Exhibit 14
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Net New Assets (NNA) by Division

28.4
Billions 18.0
of Swiss 5.8 9.8 8.4 5.6 7.9
francs
1.6

(4.7) (7.7) (12.9)

Assets managed across businesses

Asset management
(61.2)
Swiss Bank
Wealth management
Total net new assets (110.5)

1Q20 2Q20 3Q20 4Q20 1Q21 2Q21 3Q21 4Q21 1Q22 2Q22 3Q22 4Q22 1Q23
Data sources: Credit Suisse quarterly and interim reports, 2023 (Q1 results spreadsheet).

Exhibit 15
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Customer Deposits and Assets Under Management (AUM)

Billions of US dollars
AUM 1,771
1,800 1,708
Customer deposits 1,560
1,600
1,443 1,413
1,368 1,386 1,371 1,403 1,371
1,400
1,214 1,230
1,200

1,000

800

600
442 431
375 371 371 370 397
337 343 350
400
253
182
200

-
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Mar. 31

Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 16
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse and UBS Market Capitalization

Billions of US dollars
Credit Suisse
120
UBS
100

0
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
Mar. 17

Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 17
The End of Credit Suisse
Significant Shareholders of Credit Suisse Group

December 31, 2022, or the Group publication Number of shares Approximate

most recent notification date of notification (millions) shareholding (%)
Saudi National Bank December 10, 2022 395.5 9.88
BlackRock, Inc. February 10, 2023 163.1 4.07
The Olayan Group December 12, 2018 126 4.93
Qatar Holding LLC (QIA) November 17, 2021 133.2 5.03
Data source: Credit Suisse annual report, 2022, 179.

Exhibit 18
The End of Credit Suisse
PricewaterhouseCoopers Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

Source: Credit Suisse annual report, 2022.

Exhibit 19
The End of Credit Suisse
Index: Market Performance of CS, SVB, and Major Equity Indices

Index (01/03/2022 = 100) Credit Suisse

140 SVB
S&P 500
120 Euro Stoxx 600

100

0
Jan-22 Mar-22 May-22 Jul-22 Sep-22 Nov-22 Jan-23 Mar-23

Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 20
The End of Credit Suisse
Stock Price Performance: Credit Suisse and UBS

US dollars per share

Credit
50
Suisse
45
40 UBS
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Mar. 17

Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 21
The End of Credit Suisse
Capital Adequacy Metrics of Credit Suisse and Peers as of the End of 2022

Data source: Bloomberg and Moody’s Investor Services.

Exhibit 22
The End of Credit Suisse
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of Credit Suisse and Peers as of the End of 2022

Data source: Bloomberg and Moody’s Investor Services.

Exhibit 23
The End of Credit Suisse
Five-Year CDS Comparison: Credit Suisse, UBS, Deutsche Bank

basis points March 17,

1,000 Credit Suisse 2023

UBS
900

800

700

600

2008–09:
500 Global March 2022:
financial Greensill
crisis collapse and
400 Archegos
2011–12: 2016: default
Eurozone Market sell-off;
300 Crisis CS announces
2020:
the first loss
COVID-19
since 2008
200 pandemic

100

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Note: CDS = credit default swaps.
Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 24
The End of Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse and UBS Comparison (end of 2022)

Revenue (billions Expenses (billions Net Profit (billions CET1 ratio (%) Leverage Ratio
of US dollars) of US dollars) of US dollars) (%)
34.6 7.6
24.9 14.1 14.2 7.7
18.5
16.1 4.4

-7.9
CS UBS CS UBS CS UBS CS UBS CS UBS

AUM (trillions of AT1 Capital Cust. Deposits Employees Market Cap

US dollars) (billions of US (billions of US (thousands) (billions of US
dollars) dollars) dollars)
72.6
525
3.9 16 50.5
13 65
252
1.4
8

CS UBS CS UBS CS UBS CS UBS CS UBS

Notes: Market capitalization as of March 17, 2023.

CS = Credit Suisse
CET1 = common equity tier 1
AUM = assets under management
AT1 = additional tier 1
Data source: Bloomberg and Credit Suisse annual report, 2022.

Exhibit 25
The End of Credit Suisse
Ratio: Price-to-Tangible Book Value (Credit Suisse and UBS)

Data source: Bloomberg.

Exhibit 26
The End of Credit Suisse
Ratio: Price-to-Tangible Book Value (Credit Suisse and Peer Banks)

Source: Bloomberg.

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