R.D Saxena v.
Balram Prasad Sharma, (2000)7SCC264
Facts:
The appellant, R.D. Saxena, was an advocate and legal advisor for the Madhya Pradesh
State Cooperative Bank Ltd. When the bank terminated his services, they asked for the
return of their legal files related to ongoing cases.
The advocate refused to return the files, claiming that he had a right to retain them until
the bank paid his outstanding fees.
The bank needed the files for ongoing cases but refused to pay the fees as a precondition.
As a result, the Managing Director of the Bank filed a complaint with the State Bar
Council, accusing the advocate of professional misconduct for not returning the files.
Issue:
Whether an advocate has the right to retain client litigation papers (files) using a "lien"
for unpaid fees.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court held that advocates do not have a right of lien over litigation papers
entrusted to them by a client.
The court explained that legal files and documents are not considered "goods" under the
Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and therefore cannot be withheld for unpaid fees.
The concept of bailment under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, also does not apply to legal
files.
Withholding client files could harm the client's legal case, and advocates should not
withhold records for non-payment of fees. Instead, they can pursue other legal remedies
to recover fees.
The court emphasized the ethical and social duty of advocates to ensure clients are not
deprived of their rights, and held that R.D. Saxena was guilty of professional misconduct.
In summary, the case clarifies that advocates cannot hold on to a client’s legal documents due to
unpaid fees and must return them if requested, even if their dues are unsettled.
Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry, (2001)2SCC221
Facts:
The respondent, an advocate, represented a client, Mahant Rajgiri, in a civil suit. He
wrote a letter to his client, suggesting that the judge involved in the case was open to
accepting bribes.
The respondent implied that if the client could influence the judge through another person
or pay Rs. 10,000, they could secure a favorable judgment. He also mentioned that if the
client could personally win over the judge, there would be no need for payment.
A complaint was filed with the Bar Council of Rajasthan for professional misconduct.
Issues:
1. Can the Bar Council's Disciplinary Committee review and alter its own punishment
decision?
2. Does suggesting to a client that they should bribe a judge amount to serious
professional misconduct?
3. What is the Bar Council’s duty as a disciplinary body in maintaining professional
ethics?
Judgment:
Power of Review: The Supreme Court held that the Disciplinary Committee has the
power to review its orders under Section 44 of the Advocates Act. However, altering a
decision based on the same set of facts is not permitted unless new facts arise. The earlier
decision to permanently debar the advocate was appropriate, and the review that reduced
the punishment was improper.
Serious Misconduct: The court emphasized that suggesting a bribe to a client is a serious
breach of professional ethics. The advocate’s defense that he had no intention to bribe
was rejected, as there was no evidence to support such a claim. His actions were deemed
unfit for a member of the legal profession.
Duty of the Bar Council: The court reaffirmed the role of the Bar Council in
safeguarding the integrity of the legal profession. It held that disciplinary bodies must
take strong action against misconduct to maintain public trust in the legal system.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court restored the original order from the Bar Council of India, permanently
debarring the respondent from practicing law due to his serious professional misconduct of
suggesting bribing a judge. This case highlights the importance of upholding ethical standards
within the legal profession
Bhupinder Kumar Sharma v. Bar Association Pathankot
Facts:
Bhupinder Kumar Sharma, the appellant, was enrolled as an advocate in 1994. The Bar
Association of Pathankot accused him of continuing business activities even after his
enrollment as an advocate.
He was running a photocopy and documentation center and an STD/PCO booth in the
court compound under a special handicapped quota. He was also involved in a business
called Punjab Coal Briquettes as its proprietor.
The State Bar Council’s Disciplinary Committee found evidence supporting these
allegations and ordered the removal of the appellant's name from the Roll of Advocates
under Section 35(3)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961, debarred him from practicing law.
The Bar Council of India confirmed the decision, which was further appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Was the appellant engaged in any business, trade, or profession after his enrollment
as an advocate?
2. Was the removal of his name from the State Roll of Advocates and his debarment
from practice valid?
Judgment:
The Supreme Court found that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct,
supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the court noted that a lifetime ban
was too harsh considering his handicap.
The appellant was debarred from practicing law until the end of December 2006 (a 5-year
ban), rather than for life.
Conclusion:
This case emphasizes that an advocate cannot engage in any other business or profession while
practicing law. Doing so constitutes professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961.
Advocates may be involved as shareholders or investors in a business, but they cannot personally
manage or run any business as it conflicts with the nobility of the legal profession.
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Another
Introduction:
The case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Another, decided on 17th December
2002 by the Supreme Court of India, focuses on whether lawyers have the right to strike and its
impact on the administration of justice. It explores the conflict between lawyers’ right to express
grievances and the right of litigants to access justice in a timely manner.
Facts:
Ex-Captain Harish Uppal, a retired army officer, was court-martialed and convicted of
embezzlement. Due to delays in his case, caused in part by a lawyers' strike, he filed a writ
petition challenging the legality of such strikes. He argued that lawyer strikes caused delays in
justice, violated his rights, and disrupted the judicial process. The case became a platform to
debate whether lawyers could lawfully go on strike.
Issues:
1. Do lawyers have a fundamental right to strike under Article 19(c) of the Indian
Constitution?
2. Are lawyer strikes lawful considering their impact on the administration of justice?
3. Is a ban on lawyers’ strikes justified, and how should the balance between lawyers’
interests and the efficient functioning of the legal system be maintained?
4. Under what circumstances, if any, are lawyer strikes permissible?
5. How can the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution be
safeguarded against frequent lawyer strikes?
Contentions:
Petitioner (Harish Uppal):
The petitioner argued that lawyer strikes were unlawful as they delayed court proceedings
and violated clients' rights to timely justice. He contended that lawyers, as officers of the
court, had a duty to ensure the smooth functioning of the judicial system.
Respondents (Union of India and Others):
The respondents claimed that the right to strike was part of the freedom of association
under Article 19(c) and that lawyers had a right to protest to defend their interests.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court ruled that lawyers do not have the right to strike or call for court boycotts.
The Court emphasized that:
1. Lawyers are officers of the court and have a duty to ensure the judicial system's proper
functioning. Strikes disrupt court proceedings and violate the right to a speedy trial under
Article 21.
2. Strikes by lawyers interfere with justice, delaying cases and burdening litigants.
3. Lawyers must express grievances through non-disruptive means, such as press
statements, peaceful protests, or media engagement.
4. Only in the rarest of rare situations where the integrity of the judiciary is directly
threatened may lawyers consider protests, but even then, strikes should be avoided.
Legal Reasoning:
Duty as Officers of the Court: Lawyers hold a unique position in the justice system and
are obligated to assist in the smooth administration of justice.
Article 21 (Right to Speedy Trial): Lawyer strikes delay court proceedings, violating
the fundamental right to a speedy trial.
Article 19(c) (Freedom of Association): While freedom of association is protected, the
right to strike is not absolute. The Court reasoned that lawyer strikes disrupt the judicial
process and therefore must be restricted.
Precedents: The Court referred to prior judgments upholding prohibitions on strikes,
strengthening its stance on lawyers' duties to maintain court operations.
Impact/Precedent:
This ruling firmly established that lawyers in India cannot go on strike or boycott court
proceedings, setting a legal precedent to curb such practices. The case highlights the balance
between lawyers' rights and the public's right to timely justice. It has since been used to reinforce
the duty of lawyers to uphold the integrity of the legal profession and ensure the efficient
functioning of courts.
Conclusion:
The Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal case reiterates that lawyers must not resort to strikes, as they
undermine the justice system. Their duty to the court and to their clients takes precedence over
any protest-related activities. While lawyers’ grievances should be addressed, alternative forms
of peaceful expression are encouraged, ensuring that the right to a speedy trial and access to
justice remains protected.
R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009)8SCC106
I. Facts
1. On January 10, 1999, a hit-and-run incident in Delhi resulted in six deaths, including
three police officers, caused by Sanjeev Nanda, who was intoxicated and driving
recklessly.
2. Sunil Kulkarni, a key prosecution witness, was shown negotiating with defense lawyer
R.K. Anand and special public prosecutor I.U. Khan in a 2007 sting operation by
NDTV.
3. Following the sting operation, the Delhi High Court initiated contempt proceedings
against both lawyers, finding them guilty of criminal contempt of court.
4. They were punished by stripping their seniority and banning them from appearing in
court for four months.
II. Issues
1. Was the conviction of the two appellants for criminal contempt of court justified?
2. Was the procedure adopted by the High Court fair and reasonable?
3. Did the High Court have the authority to prohibit the appellants from appearing in court
and strip them of their seniority?
4. Were the punishments proportionate to the misconduct of the appellants?
III. Judgment
1. The Supreme Court upheld R.K. Anand’s conviction for criminal contempt, stating his
actions interfered with justice.
2. I.U. Khan was acquitted, with insufficient evidence for a similar punishment.
3. The Court confirmed the validity of the sting operation evidence, condemning R.K.
Anand's unethical behavior.
4. The Supreme Court found the Delhi High Court's actions regarding R.K. Anand's
punishment justified and dismissed his appeal, while cautioning I.U. Khan about his
improper conduct.
In Re Arundhati Roy, AIR2002SC1375
Facts of the Case
This case involves a suo-motu contempt petition initiated by the Supreme Court against
Arundhati Roy, a prize-winning author. The background stems from the Narmada Bachao
Andolan, where the Supreme Court ordered an increase in the height of a dam, resulting in the
displacement of nearby communities. Arundhati Roy publicly criticized this decision and
protested outside the Supreme Court, claiming it would make families homeless.
Despite being aware of the court's orders, Roy and other protesters allegedly displayed
inappropriate banners and slogans. Roy denied these allegations, criticized the court's
proceedings, and questioned the credibility of the judiciary, alleging corruption among high-
ranking officials. The court initiated contempt proceedings against her for these remarks,
asserting that she was impugning the court's motives.
In her defense, Roy argued that her dissent was not merely about the court's decision but about
her right as a citizen and writer to express her opinions and advocate for justice.
Issues Raised
1. Judicial Decision: Whether the Supreme Court's decision to increase the dam's height
and displace residents was appropriate.
2. Freedom of Speech: Whether Roy's right to express her opinion allows for criticism of
the judiciary or its decisions.
3. Judicial Integrity: The implications of questioning the judicial system and its personnel.
Parties' Contentions
Court:
Allegations against Roy were false; her actions misrepresented the court.
The protests conducted by Roy were deemed illegal and inappropriate, undermining the
dignity of the apex court.
Respondent (Arundhati Roy):
She claimed her right to freedom of expression protected her criticisms.
Argued that the court's decision harmed poor families by forcing their relocation.
Judgment
The court acknowledged that freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution but comes
with reasonable restrictions to maintain the integrity of the judiciary. It ruled that the allegations
made by Roy against the court were contemptuous and damaging to its reputation. Although the
court noted that truth could be a defense in contempt proceedings, Roy's affidavit contained
allegations that were deemed irrelevant and harmful.
The court found Roy guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her to one day in prison, along
with a fine of Rs. 2000, stating that failure to pay would result in three months of imprisonment.
Rule of Law
The ruling highlighted that contempt of court is not permissible if it dishonors the integrity of the
apex court.
Conclusion
The court's decision reinforced the principle that while individuals have the right to personal
expression, such rights are subject to restrictions aimed at preserving the dignity of the judiciary.
Roy's statements were viewed as damaging to the court's reputation, leading to her conviction for
contempt.
Bal Thackeray v. Harish Pimpalkhute and Ors (2005):
Background
What Happened: Bal Thackeray, a political leader, made a public speech in 1996,
accusing a judge of demanding a bribe for a favorable judgment. This led to two
contempt petitions being filed against him, claiming he had disrespected the court.
Legal Procedure: The petitions were filed without getting the necessary permission from
the Advocate General, which is required for such actions. One of the petitioners had tried
to obtain this permission but was unclear about the outcome.
Court Proceedings
High Court's Decision: The High Court found Thackeray guilty of contempt and
sentenced him to one week in jail and imposed a fine of Rs. 2000. Thackeray appealed
this decision to the Supreme Court.
Main Issue
Key Question: The Supreme Court had to decide whether the contempt proceedings
were initiated by the court on its own (suo motu) or by the private parties (the
petitioners).
Supreme Court's Findings
No Suo Motu Action: The Supreme Court determined that the High Court did not take
action on its own. Instead, the contempt petitions were filed by private parties.
Improper Procedure: The Supreme Court noted that the proper procedure, as
established in earlier cases, was not followed. Specifically, when someone files a
contempt petition, it should be placed before the Chief Justice to decide whether to take
action.
Outcome: Because the High Court did not follow these procedures, the Supreme Court
declared the contempt petitions invalid and set aside the High Court's decision.
Thackeray’s fine was to be refunded.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court emphasized that proper procedures must be followed in contempt cases and
directed the High Courts to establish clear rules for handling such cases in the future. Essentially,
the case highlights the importance of following legal protocols to maintain the integrity of the
judicial process.
In re Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995)2SCC584
Vinay Chandra Mishra
Facts:
Background: This case concerns criminal contempt involving Advocate Vinay Chandra Mishra.
On March 9, 1994, during the hearing of M/s Bansal Forgings Ltd v. UP Financial Corporation,
Mishra represented Bansal Forgings, which had defaulted on a loan from the UP Financial
Corporation. The Finance Corporation sought to recover the loan, leading to court proceedings.
Trial Court Decision: The Trial Court ordered Bansal Forgings to pay the installment and provide
security while also granting an injunction against the sale of the company's assets.
Appeal to High Court: Mishra appealed the Trial Court's decision, arguing that the Trial Court
lacked jurisdiction. During the appeal, when Justice Keshote questioned him about the legal
basis for the Trial Court's order, Mishra responded aggressively, claiming he could have the
judge transferred or impeached.
Judicial Response: Justice Keshote reported Mishra’s behavior to the Chief Justice, which led to
a suo motu contempt proceeding initiated by the Supreme Court.
Key Legal Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Does the Supreme Court have the authority to initiate
contempt proceedings against an advocate for contempt towards a High Court?
2. Liability for Contempt: Should Advocate Mishra be held liable for contempt of court based on
his behavior during the hearing?
Laws Applicable
Article 129: Establishes the Supreme Court as a Court of record with power to punish for
contempt.
Article 215: Grants High Courts power to punish for contempt of themselves.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Relevant sections include:
o Section 14: Outlines the procedure for contempt committed in the face of the court.
o Section 16: Defines contempt of court.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings
1. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:
o The Supreme Court affirmed its jurisdiction to punish contempt committed against High
Courts, based on Article 129, as it serves as the highest custodian of justice. This was a
crucial ruling emphasizing the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over all lower
courts.
2. Conduct of Advocate Mishra:
o The Supreme Court found that Mishra's behavior in court amounted to contempt due to
his disrespectful remarks, threats of impeachment, and attempts to intimidate the
judge. This conduct not only lowered the dignity of the court but also obstructed its
functioning.
3. Rights of the Contemner:
o Mishra's argument that he had the right to investigate the judge's conduct was rejected.
The court upheld that the contempt was evident in the courtroom, negating his claims
of unfair treatment.
4. Freedom of Speech and Expression:
o The Court clarified that punishing an advocate for contempt does not violate their
freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), as the actions in question directly threatened
the integrity of the judicial process.
Punishment
Consequences for Mishra:
o He was sentenced to six months of simple imprisonment and suspended from
practicing as an advocate for three years. All positions held in his capacity as an
advocate were also vacated.
Conclusion
This case underscored the Supreme Court's authority to address contempt against any court,
reinforcing judicial dignity and the necessity for advocates to respect the judiciary. The judgment
reaffirmed that contemptuous conduct, particularly threats and disrespect towards judges, cannot
be justified by an advocate’s role in representing clients. It emphasized the need for maintaining
the rule of law and the integrity of the judicial system.
In re Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995)2SCC584
Here’s a simplified explanation of the Vinay Chandra Mishra case, breaking down the key
points into easy-to-understand terms:
Background of the Case
1. Parties Involved:
o M/s Bansal Forgings Ltd: A company that took a loan from UP Financial Corporation.
o UP Financial Corporation: The lender that wanted to recover the money after Bansal
Forgings defaulted on the loan.
2. Initial Court Decision:
o The Trial Court ordered Bansal Forgings to pay the loan installment and provide security
for the disputed amount while preventing the sale of its assets.
o Bansal Forgings filed an appeal against this decision, arguing that the Trial Court didn’t
have the authority to issue such orders.
Incident in Court
During the appeal hearing, Advocate Vinay Chandra Mishra, representing Bansal Forgings,
became aggressive when questioned by Justice Keshote about the legal basis for the Trial
Court’s order.
Mishra yelled at the judge, saying he could have him transferred or impeached, claiming to have
done so in the past.
Judicial Response
Justice Keshote was concerned about Mishra's behavior and wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of
the Allahabad High Court, leading to the Supreme Court taking notice of the situation.
Court’s Findings
1. Authority to Punish:
o The Supreme Court determined it does have the authority to punish for contempt
against High Courts. This is because it is the highest court and responsible for
maintaining justice.
2. Behavior of Advocate Mishra:
o Mishra’s outburst and threats were seen as disrespectful and disruptive. The Court
stated that such behavior lowers the dignity of the judiciary and obstructs its functions.
3. Rights of the Advocate:
o Mishra claimed he should be allowed to investigate the judge’s actions. However, the
Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the contempt was clear and happened right in
front of the judge.
4. Freedom of Speech:
o The Court explained that punishing Mishra for his actions does not violate his right to
free speech, as his comments were harmful to the judicial process.
Punishment
Outcome for Mishra:
o He was sentenced to six months in prison and banned from practicing law for three
years. He also had to vacate any official positions he held as an advocate.
Conclusion
The case emphasized that:
The Supreme Court has the power to ensure respect for the judiciary, even against actions
related to High Courts.
Advocates must conduct themselves respectfully in court; disrespectful behavior can lead to
serious consequences.
Freedom of speech does not protect actions that harm the court’s authority.
Bhuramal Swami v. Raghuveer Singh & Ors. (2016)
Background:
On December 18, 2000, a trade union activist named Darshan Koda was murdered.
In February 2001, some accused were granted anticipatory bail by the Rajasthan High
Court.
The appellants, from the Marxist Communist Party, held a public gathering on December
23, 2001, where they made disrespectful statements about the High Court's order,
accusing it of corruption and bias. These statements were published in a newspaper.
Legal Action:
Raghuveer Singh filed a contempt petition against the appellants, claiming their
statements undermined public confidence in the judiciary.
The High Court found the appellants guilty of criminal contempt and imposed a two-
month prison sentence and a fine of ₹2000 each.
Issues Addressed:
1. Did the statements published amount to criminal contempt?
2. Is a newspaper editor liable for everything published, or can they avoid liability for
accurately reporting others' statements?
3. Was it proven that the appellants made the statements attributed to them?
Court's Findings:
The court ruled that the appellants' statements scandalized the judiciary and were not
protected as fair criticism.
Criticism of the judiciary must be respectful and based on facts; baseless allegations
undermine public confidence.
An apology from the appellants was deemed insincere, as it came only after their
arguments failed.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court upheld the contempt ruling but reduced the punishment to just a fine
of ₹2000, considering the context of the statements.
Perspective Publication v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 221
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: November 19, 1968
Judges: Chief Justice P.K. Sen, M. Hidayatullah, I.C. Chagla, N.L. Untwalia, and J.M. Shelat
Facts:
Petitioner: Perspective Publications Private Limited published an article in the Marathi
weekly magazine "Maratha."
Content of Article: The article criticized a Bombay High Court judge's conduct in a
specific case.
Contempt Proceedings: The state government initiated proceedings under Section
123(2) of the Indian Penal Code, claiming the article "scandalized the court."
Outcome in High Court: The Bombay High Court found the petitioner guilty of
contempt, sentencing the editor and manager to imprisonment and a fine.
Issue:
Did the article constitute criminal contempt of court under Section 123(2) of the Indian
Penal Code?
Arguments:
State's Argument: The article attacked the judge's integrity, potentially undermining the
court's authority and interfering with justice.
Petitioner's Argument: The article was a fair criticism of the judge’s actions and did not
intend to discredit the court.
Holding:
The Supreme Court upheld the Bombay High Court's contempt finding, establishing
several principles:
o Fair criticism of judicial decisions is allowed, but direct and insulting attacks on
judges are not.
o The intent and impact of the publication determine whether it constitutes
contempt.
o The test for contempt is whether the publication poses a real and reasonable
likelihood of interfering with justice.
Rationale:
The Court stressed the importance of balancing freedom of speech with maintaining the
judiciary's dignity and authority.
It highlighted that unrestrained criticism could damage public confidence in the judiciary
and disrupt the legal system's functioning.
Significance:
This case established a precedent in Indian law for understanding criminal contempt,
clarifying the difference between acceptable criticism and inappropriate attacks on
judges.
It set a higher standard for determining contempt, focusing on the potential impact on the
administration of justice rather than merely offensive language.
Daroga Singh and Others vs. B.K. Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26:
Daroga Singh and Others vs. B.K. Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26, one Additional District and Sessions Judge
was attacked in a pre-planned and calculated manner in his courtroom and chamber by police officials
for not passing an order they sought. This Court held that, "The Courts cannot be compelled to give
"command orders"
In Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC
650
In this Court held that an advocate found guilty of
contempt cannot be allowed to act or plead in any court
till he purges himself of contempt.
Anees Ahmed and Anr. vs University Of Delhi and Ors, AIR 2002 Delhi 440
Court: Delhi High Court
Key Judgment: The Delhi High Court upheld the ban on practicing another profession along
with advocacy, emphasizing that allowing simultaneous practice could adversely affect the
commitment expected from legal professionals. The Court stated that if the State Bar Council
deemed it unfit to permit dual practitioners, such a decision was not unreasonable.
Key Points:
Legal Provisions: The procedure was sustained under Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice
any profession) with reference to Article 19(6) (reasonable restrictions).
Outcome for Law Teachers: Full-time law teachers at Delhi University could not enroll
as advocates; their enrollment was deemed void. The Bar Council's subsequent
rectification was upheld as valid.
Part-Time Teachers: A part-time law teacher could enroll as an advocate, and advocates
could also take up part-time law teaching.
The court upheld that full-time law teachers cannot be advocates, but
part-time law teachers can