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Presidential Impeachment and

the New Political Instability
in Latin America

AN ÍBAL P ÉREZ-LI Ñ ÁN

University of Pittsburgh
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Preface and Acknowledgments

Gonzalo Quintana, Francisco J. Recalde Trujillo, Miguel A. Saguier, and

Angel R. Seifart provided valuable information.
In addition to these people, other scholars and friends read drafts,
discussed ideas, shared data, and supplied generous encouragement.
Manuel Alcántara, David Altman, Samuel Amaral, Barry Ames, Adriana
Bacciadonne, Jody Baumgartner, Andrea Castagnola, Rossana Castiglioni,
Brian Crisp, Douglas Dion, Susan Eckstein, Andreas Feldmann, Agustı́n
Ferraro, Andrew Gould, Agustı́n Grijalva, Carlos Guevara Mann, Russell
Hahn, Fred Hansen, Susan Hansen, Gretchen Helmke, Rodney Hero, Vic-
tor Hinojosa, Mark Jones, Naoko Kada, William Keech, Charles Kenney,
Marcelo Leiras, Néstor Legnani, Margaret Levi, Rissig Licha, Germán
Lodola, Andrés Mejı́a Acosta, Martha Merritt, Scott Morgenstern, Kajal
Mukhopadhyay, Robert Muncaster, Gerardo Munck, Marı́a Matilde Ollier,
Benjamin Radcliff, Juan Carlos Rodrı́guez Raga, Sebastián Saiegh, Alberta
Sbragia, Mitchell Seligson, Peter Siavelis, Susan Stokes, Marı́a Clara Tena,
Sanford G. Thatcher, Brian Turner, Silvio Waisbord, Kurt Weyland,
Laurence Whitehead, Dina Zinnes, and Carlos I. Zúñiga Guardia all made,
in very different ways, significant contributions to this enterprise.
Research for this five-country project was supported by several donors.
The University of Notre Dame granted a Philip Moore Dissertation Year
Fellowship. The Kellogg Institute for International Studies awarded a Seed-
Money Grant for the project to take off and a Dissertation Year Fellow-
ship for it to land smoothly. The Social Science Research Council and the
American Council of Learned Societies contributed with a generous Inter-
national Field Research Fellowship to complete research in Brazil, Ecuador,
Colombia, and Venezuela during 1999 and 2000. The Center for Latin
American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh supported field research
in Paraguay during 2002 and additional data collection during 2003. It goes
without saying that without such vast support, this book would have never
been possible.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
August 2006

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Institutional Crises in Presidential Regimes

The president’s seat represents the dream job for most politicians. Presi-
dents are power brokers, party leaders, role models, the daily focus of public
opinion. Presidents speak for the nation, they are primi inter pares among
national political figures. “They say,” former Chilean president Patricio
Aylwin once joked, “that the most difficult task after being president is get-
ting used to not being president.” Presidents, however, are not free from
failure. And the completion of their terms, particularly in Latin America,
is never guaranteed.
This book deals with an extreme form of political failure: presidential
impeachment. Impeachment transforms the luck of the most successful
politician in the country into a model of defeat. Presidents are deprived
of honor and power, deserted by former allies and voters, prosecuted as
ordinary citizens, and many times incarcerated or forced into exile.
In the 1990s, an unprecedented wave of impeachments swept Latin
America. Dwellers of presidential palaces, from Carondelet to Miraflo-
res and from Planalto to the House of Nariño, unexpectedly confronted
this threat. In just over a decade, between 1992 and 2004, six presidents
faced an impeachment process, and four of them were removed from office.
Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 and Venezuelan Pres-
ident Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1993 were accused of corruption and ousted
on impeachment charges. In 1996, Colombian President Ernesto Samper
was charged with receiving illegal campaign funds from the Cali drug car-
tel. Congress ultimately acquitted Samper, but his political leverage was
greatly diminished as a consequence of the scandal. The following year, the
Ecuadorian Congress confronted President Abdalá Bucaram and, in order
to avoid the institutional intricacies of impeachment, declared the president
mentally impaired. Paraguayan President Raúl Cubas Grau confronted an
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impeachment after releasing from prison a popular military leader accused

of conspiring to kill the vice president. Cubas resigned and fled to Brazil
in 1999, after a harsh confrontation with Congress. His successor, Luis
González Macchi, was accused of corruption two years later. In a desperate
attempt to prevent his fall, his party majority in Congress forestalled an
impeachment and finally acquitted the president in early 2003.
These episodes inaugurated a new pattern of presidential instability
in the region. Anticipating an impeachment process, Peruvian President
Alberto Fujimori fled the country in November of 2000. Ecuadorian Pres-
ident Lucio Gutiérrez narrowly escaped an impeachment in November of
2004 and was ousted in April of 2005. Opposition protests forced the resig-
nation of Argentine President Fernando de la Rúa in 2001, and of Bolivian
Presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa in 2003 and 2005.
Until very recently, the Latin American crises of the last fifteen years were
treated in isolation rather than as part of a regional trend (for exceptions,
see Bermúdez 1999; Carey 2005; Coslovsky 2002; Hochstetler 2006; Kada
2002; Pérez-Liñán 2000; 2003a; 2005; Valenzuela 2004; Whitehead 2002,
102–107). The concentration of multiple impeachment crises in a few years,
however, has opened important questions that are difficult to ignore. Is
this pattern indicative of a major change in Latin American democracies?
Are impeachments a functional equivalent of old-fashioned military coups?
Are we witnessing a turn in executive-legislative relations throughout the
region? And if this is the case, why are some corrupt presidents impeached
while others are not?
The lack of a comparative theory of impeachment has complicated the
search for answers to these questions. Because impeachments are rare events
(and have been particularly infrequent in this region in the past), the tra-
ditional literature on Latin American institutions for the most part disre-
garded them. A classic textbook of the 1950s noted in passing that “although
there are a few instances in which presidents have been removed through
this procedure, those cases are exceptional and in most countries no pres-
ident or vice-president has ever been impeached” (Pierson and Gil 1957,
240). Published in 1992, the year in which Fernando Collor was removed
from office, Shugart and Carey’s seminal book on Presidents and Assemblies –
which devoted a whole chapter to discussing constitutional deviations from
the principles of dual legitimacy and fixed terms in office – virtually ignored
the issue of impeachment (Shugart and Carey 1992, Chapter 6).
This book argues that recent impeachments constitute the tip of the ice-
berg of a much broader emerging trend in Latin American politics. Latin
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America is confronting a distinctive pattern of political instability, one that

represents a break from the past. As in previous decades, democratically
elected governments continue to fall, but in contrast to previous decades,
democratic regimes do not break down. Several reasons explain this para-
dox of democratic regime stability in the midst of government instability.
Among them are the end of the Cold War, changes in U.S. foreign pol-
icy, the political lessons derived from the dramatic experience of military
dictatorships in the 1960s and the 1970s, and the new role of international
institutions. Because in this context civilian elites cannot invoke a military
intervention, they have been forced to find constitutional mechanisms to
solve their disputes. Presidential impeachment has emerged as the most
powerful instrument to displace “undesirable” presidents without destroy-
ing the constitutional order.
Opposition politicians, however, are not always able to unleash an
impeachment process against the chief executive. In the following chap-
ters, I show that impeachments are likely when the mass media system-
atically investigate and expose political scandals and when the president
fails to keep tight control over Congress, either because the ruling party is
very small or because it is under the control of an adversarial faction. At
the same time, the ability of the legislature to remove the president from
office ultimately hinges on the degree of popular mobilization against the
government. When a broad social coalition takes to the streets to demand
the resignation of the president, the fall of the administration is usually in
sight.
The new pattern of instability poses a major theoretical challenge for
comparative studies of presidentialism. For more than two decades, the
conventional wisdom in the field claimed that extreme forms of executive-
legislative confrontation are likely to destabilize presidential democracies.
Recent crises, however, have led to the downfall of elected presidents
without triggering democratic breakdowns. In order to explain this phe-
nomenon, some scholars have argued that Latin American presidential
democracies are developing “parliamentary” traits (thus making presiden-
tial impeachments akin to votes of no confidence), while others have claimed
that social movements are expanding the realm of democratic citizenship
by fighting against neoliberal policies and toppling unpopular presidents.
These interpretations are partly correct, but, as the following chapters will
show, the contribution of recent presidential crises to the process of democ-
ratization has often been ambiguous, and we should probably avoid any
overly optimistic assessment of this trend.
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This introductory chapter serves three purposes. In the first section, I

explian why a better understanding of impeachment is essential if we are
to update our theories of democracy and presidentialism in Latin America.
The second part introduces my approach to impeachment as a particular
outcome of executive-legislative crises. In the last section, I summarize the
argument of this book and outline the contents of the coming chapters.

Impeachment as a Theoretical Puzzle

Recent cases of impeachment have challenged much of the common wisdom
about democracy in Latin America. For years, the conventional view was
that Latin American presidential democracies were unable to resist much
executive-legislative conflict. In contrast to parliamentary regimes, where
the prime minister (through the dissolution of the parliament) and the
parliament (through a vote of no confidence) have constitutional tools to
avert government deadlock, presidential regimes, where the two branches
are popularly elected and their terms in office are fixed, were seen as prone to
stalemate. According to this argument, attempts to overcome such stalemate
in Latin America had usually led to political polarization and created the
conditions for military intervention (Lamounier 1994; Linz 1990; Stepan
and Skach 1993; Valenzuela 1994).
In the mid-1990s, this argument was recast in terms of an excess of
“veto players” in presidential systems. George Tsebelis argued that “in
regimes where government change is impossible (except for fixed intervals
like in presidential regimes), policy immobilism may lead to the replacement
of the leadership through extra-constitutional means (regime instability)”
(Tsebelis 1995, 321–322). Thus, while divided government was expected to
create policy stability in advanced presidential democracies, it was expected
to promote regime instability in weakly institutionalized ones.
The critics of this perspective argued that some forms of presidentialism
were more prone to interbranch confrontation than others, without ques-
tioning the underlying assumption that extreme executive-legislative con-
flict was dangerous for democracy (Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1993; Main-
waring and Shugart 1997a; Shugart and Carey 1992; for an interesting
exception, see Cheibub 2002). Some of these studies even acknowledged
the role of impeachment as a constitutional instrument allowing Congress
to remove the president from office without disrupting the democratic pro-
cess, but they claimed that this highly restrictive procedure was virtually

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impossible to activate in the context of an institutional crisis (Linz 1994,

10; Shugart and Carey 1992, 29).
History likes to scoff at political scientists. Just as this dominant view
unfolded in the 1990s, presidential impeachment became a common mech-
anism used to overcome executive-legislative crises while avoiding demo-
cratic breakdown. This emerging pattern posed an important challenge
for the prevailing argument about the perils of presidentialism. The fact
that impeachment replaced military coups as the standard procedure to
oust presidents throughout the region suggested that executive-legislative
conflict could lead to democratic breakdowns only under certain historical
circumstances that had changed since the 1980s (Pérez-Liñán 2003b).
The proliferation of impeachments also challenged another leading
assumption among students of Latin American presidentialism – the idea
that presidents are too strong and that legislators are unable to hold them
accountable. Presidential dominance over Congress was a distinctive histor-
ical trait of Latin American politics (Pierson and Gil 1957, 240; for impor-
tant exceptions, see Stokes 1945), and it persisted after an extended period
of democratization during the 1980s. The inability of Congress to check the
president’s corruption or abuse of power has been characteristic of, but not
exclusive to, what Guillermo O’Donnell called “delegative democracies”
(O’Donnell 1994). To different degrees and for different reasons, horizon-
tal (i.e., interbranch) accountability was absent from democratic regimes
like the Punto Fijo system in Venezuela (1958–99); from semidemo-
cratic regimes like the first Perón administration in Argentina (1946–
52); and, not surprisingly, from authoritarian presidential regimes like the
Stronismo in Paraguay (1954–89), the Somozas’ rule in Nicaragua (1936–
79), and the Trujillo era in the Dominican Republic (1930–61). Congres-
sional weakness did not result solely from a concentration of formal con-
stitutional powers in the chief executive. In most cases, the concentration
of substantive political resources – control over state revenues, mass sup-
port, and loyal security forces – in the hands of the president made it very
difficult for Congress to exercise strong checks and often encouraged oppo-
sition legislators to ally themselves with rebel military leaders in order to
check the executive by undemocratic means.
Defying this tradition, the political events at the turn of the century
proved that legislators were becoming increasingly capable and willing to
serve as agents of democratic accountability. The new trend came as a sur-
prise in a region where impeachment – despite having been contemplated

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in the constitutions – was virtually unknown. In the four decades preceding

the 1990s, only one episode – the trial of President José R. Guizado of
Panama in 1955 – could be considered a true case of impeachment, and the
reasons for that trial remain obscure (Romeu 2000; Zúñiga Guardia 1957).
The sudden multiplication of cases since 1992 suggests that the pattern of
congressional weakness traditionally manifested in the lack of presidential
accountability was also changing rapidly.
A comparative analysis of impeachment is also critical for the study of
presidentialism beyond Latin America. The American Congress has con-
sidered impeaching the president at least seven times since 1832, and a
prominent dweller of the White House was impeached just as this book
was being written (Perkins 2003). Over the last decade, the specter of
impeachment has also threatened presidents in Madagascar (1996), Nigeria
(2002), the Philippines (2000), Russia (1998–99), Taiwan (2000), South
Korea (2004), and Lithuania (2004) (for discussions of some of these cases,
see Allen 2003; Baumgartner 2003b; Kasuya 2003; Ohnesorge 2006). Yet
scholars and policy makers lack a comparative framework to interpret such
cases;1 and because impeachment is a rare event, they have been unable to
deploy their powerful statistical arsenal to address this research problem.
The last decade and a half in Latin America offers an interesting labo-
ratory for the development of a comparative theory of impeachment. The
concentration of several cases in a short period allows us to trace the politi-
cal conditions that trigger an impeachment crisis while “holding constant”
cultural and historical factors. If this explanation travels well in time and
space, it may serve as the basis for a more general theory of presidential
accountability (Hinojosa and Pérez-Liñán 2007).

Impeachment as an Institutional Outcome

In presidential systems, the term “impeachment” describes a particular trial
of the president by which Congress (sometimes with the necessary agree-
ment of the judiciary) is allowed to remove the president from office. In the
United States, the first country to adopt a presidential constitution, the pro-
cess is initiated by the House of Representatives and the trial is conducted
by the Senate. An impeachment is intended to be not a criminal trial but a
political procedure allowing the Senate to remove the president from office

1 For a recent attempt to offer such comparative framework, see Baumgartner and Kada
(2003).

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in response to accusations of treason, bribery, or other “high crimes and

misdemeanors.” Although other presidential systems have often modified
the details of the procedure (for instance, placing the trial in the hands
of the Supreme Court rather than the Senate) and the range of impeach-
able offenses (for instance, allowing Congress to impeach the president
on grounds of “misperformance in office”), presidential impeachments are
always initiated by the legislature.
The latter point deserves careful consideration. When analyzed in com-
parative and historical perspective, presidential impeachment emerges as
one among many tools used by legislators to prevail in their occasional
confrontations with the executive branch. A major contention of this book
is that impeachment is one of the many possible outcomes resulting from
a presidential crisis.
I use the concept “presidential crisis” to refer to extreme instances of
executive-legislative conflict in which one of the elected branches of gov-
ernment seeks the dissolution of the other. The term “crisis” is chosen
to describe a pressing political situation marked by a sense of “immedi-
acy and urgency” among powerful actors (Kiewe 1994, xvii). The adjective
“presidential” simply identifies the constitutional framework in which such
crises take place. In parliamentary regimes, this kind of confrontation can be
resolved through ordinary procedures (the fall of the government following
a vote of no confidence or the dissolution of the parliament followed by an
election), but such procedures are prevented in most presidential regimes
by rigid constitutional rules.
Operationally, this definition covers any situation in which the president
attempts to disband Congress, Congress attempts to remove the president
from office, or in which either of the elected branches supports a military
or civilian uprising against the other (Pérez-Liñán 2003b). The common
denominator in all of these cases is an attempt by some elected politicians
to remove other elected officials from office, thus compromising the prin-
ciple of fixed terms in office that characterizes presidential constitutions.
As I show in Chapter 3, presidential crises may lead to the activation of
constitutional mechanisms (such as impeachment), or they may unleash
unconstitutional actions (e.g., a legislative coup against the president).
The analysis of presidential crises allows us to explore two critical ques-
tions: when and why Congress is able to hold the president accountable,
and when and why executive-legislative conflict leads to the breakdown
of democracy. Between 1950 and 2004, some fifty-eight presidential crises
took place in Latin America, but only six of them involved a serious attempt
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to impeach the president, and twenty-one of them involved a military

coup.2
In order to address these questions, it is important to establish from the
outset what presidential crises are not. From the definition outlined earlier, it
is easy to infer that any presidential crisis constitutes an emergency situation
for the president and his or her cabinet. The opposite, however, is not true.
Presidential crises are defined here as a pattern of institutional conflict
that affects the stability of the government (the executive in relation to the
legislature) in the context of a presidential constitution. But not every major
challenge demanding immediate action from the executive will fall into this
category. Congress may not play a major role in some political crises, or it
may cooperate with the president in the face of a national emergency.
This definition differs from one adopted in the literature on U.S. for-
eign policy. For authors like Windt (1973) and Kuypers (1997), crises are
rhetorical constructs deployed by the president in order to frame the need
for immediate policy action. Similarly, Kiewe (1994, xvii) describes them
as characterized by the expectation of strong leadership qualities. This
approach usually refers to policy crises rather than to institutional crises.
As will become clear later in this work, policy challenges may lead to insti-
tutional turmoil, but this is not necessarily the case.
The previous discussion also suggests an important distinction between
presidential crises as processes affecting the survival in office of particu-
lar elected officials and broader regime crises jeopardizing the stability of
democracy. Government and regime crises may overlap, but they repre-
sent different analytical constructs in at least two ways. On the one hand,
executive-legislative confrontation is not a necessary condition for regime
instability. Quite often, the military have intervened against a ruling party
controlling both the executive and the legislature. In fact, of forty-two mil-
itary coups taking place in Latin America between 1950 and 2004, only
twenty (48 percent) were related to a presidential crisis.3 On the other

2 I describe the procedure employed to identify and code presidential crises in Chapter 3.
3 This figure includes only coups that took place in situations in which a presidential crisis
was possible (i.e., when a president and a legislature coexisted at the time). I defined as a
coup any episode in which the military successfuly removed the president from office, closed
Congress, or both. The cases are: Argentina (1955, 1962, 1966, 1976); Bolivia (1951, 1964,
1969, 1979, 1980); Brazil (1954 [an ambiguous case because President Vargas committed
suicide in anticipation of the coup], 1955, 1964); Chile (1973); Colombia (1953); Cuba
(1952); the Dominican Republic (1963); Ecuador (1961, 1963, 1970, 2000); El Salvador
(1960, 1979); Guatemala (1954, 1957, 1963, 1982, 1993); Honduras (1954, 1957, 1963,
1972); Panama (1951, 1968, 1985, 1988); Paraguay (1954, 1989); Peru (1962, 1968, 1992);

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hand, presidential crises are not sufficient for democratic instability. About
half (45 percent) of the presidential crises taking place in Latin America
during this period led to some sort of military intervention, and 36 percent
ended with a full-blown military coup; but this book is inspired by the fact
that a vast majority of presidential crises over the last decade and a half have
not been related to any form of regime breakdown.
Episodes of impeachment are thus presented in this book as a subset
of the universe of presidential crises, in turn an extremely hostile form of
executive-legislative interaction. This perspective suggests that impeach-
ment is not just a legal recourse to remove presidents who are proven
guilty of high crimes; it is often an institutional weapon employed against
presidents who confront a belligerent legislature. This may be true even
in well-established democracies like the United States (Perkins 2003, 21).
The question about the proper use of impeachment – that is, its use for the
purpose of punishing actual misdemeanors rather than for merely partisan
reasons – is often difficult to confront, both for the contemporary observer
and for the analyst claiming the advantage of historical hindsight.
In spite of this approach, the reader should not be tempted to assume
that the only relevant actors in the drama are the executive and the legisla-
ture. Impeachment crises often involve subtle negotiations to appease the
military, media investigations, popular protests, and attempts to manipulate
the judiciary (Whitehead 2002, 104). In fledgling democracies, the military
may play a crucial role in shaping the outcome of a crisis – even when
the survival of the regime is not threatened, for instance, generals may act
as mediators. In well-established democracies, other institutions such as
the press and the judiciary may play powerful roles in the confrontation.
Executive-legislative conflicts may implicate various third parties according
to the circumstances, but they usually involve a complex structure in which
both institutions seek the support of a third party against the other branch
(on the role of third party players in different contexts, see Caplow 1968).
Consider, for instance, the strategies adopted by legislators seeking to
oust the president. In some cases, they investigate presidential misdeeds
originally exposed by the press. The Watergate scandal in the United
States and the Brazilian crisis of 1992 illustrate this situation. In other

Uruguay (1973); and Venezuela (1958). Twenty other coups taking place in countries without
an operating legislature (e.g., Ecuador in 1972) were excluded from the count. These events
were identified using The New York Times Index and other historical sources (Fossum 1967;
Needler 1966).

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circumstances, Congress confronts the executive in an attempt to contain a

broader crisis triggered by the mobilization of the mass public. This was the
case in Venezuela during 1993 and in Ecuador during 1997. Congress may
even become a peripheral actor in a confrontation between the president
and powerful groups, such as the military or social movements, acting sim-
ply to legalize the ousting of the president. In such cases, legislative action is
a marginal event in a much larger shakedown of democracy. Here the role of
Congress is typically reduced to swearing in the new president, preserving
a minimum appearance of constitutionality. The crises of Ecuador in 2000,
Argentina in 2001, and Bolivia in 2003 and 2005 (discussed in Chapter 7)
represent this pattern.
I contend that the democratization process that took place in Latin Amer-
ica during the 1980s and early 1990s altered the relative weight of different
political players. Military officers, once the arbiters of the political process,
found themselves unable to remove civilian politicians from power. Media
corporations, once vehicles of personal political ambitions or mouthpieces
for the executive, claimed a new role as the guardians of public moral-
ity. Popular movements, once repressed or controlled by populist leaders,
realized that politicians in competitive electoral systems could not ignore
their grievances. These changes took place in parallel with major transfor-
mations in the model of economic development, as countries struggled to
adopt neoliberal policies. The unexpected result of those realignments was
a surprising erosion of presidential power.

About This Book

It has been more than forty years since Richard Neustadt distinguished
between presidential “powers” (the legal or customary sources of presiden-
tial authority) and presidential power (the chief executive’s actual influence
in politics) (Neustadt [1960] 1990). Important as it was to understand the
workings of the American presidency, the distinction is of even greater rel-
evance in most Latin American countries, where the gap between formal
(legal) powers and informal (de facto) power deserves serious consideration
(for some examples, see Casar 2002; Corrales 2002a; Hartlyn 1998; Helmke
2002; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Siavelis 2002).
Over the last decade, important works (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b;
Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Haggard 2001) have emphasized that
Latin American countries differ in their institutional configurations and
that the accuracy of some stereotypes (like the excessive concentration of
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power in the executive or the supposed inability to overcome the deadlock

created by the separation of powers) varies significantly from country to
country. This book moves one step forward in that direction by arguing that
informal political configurations vary from administration to administration
even under the same constitutional arrangements. This is a well-established
principle in the study of the American presidency, but it has been virtually
ignored in studies of Latin American presidentialism – in which countries,
rather than administrations, are typically the unit of analysis.
In the next chapter I reconstruct the history of six impeachment crises
that took place in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and twice in
Paraguay between 1992 and 2004. This period defined the new pattern
of political instability that currently dominates the region. I argue that in
all six cases military intervention was hardly a viable option and that media
coverage of presidential scandals was powerful. Where the president failed
to command support in Congress, he was easily impeached. And where
popular protests against the president were able to integrate multiple social
sectors, the president was easily removed from office.
Chapter 3 traces the decline in military intervention as a component
of presidential crises between 1950 and 2004. The analysis of fifty-eight
crises suggests that there have been important changes in the ways in which
executive-legislative confrontations are processed by the political system.
This change has occurred not only at the level of political regimes (democ-
racies are now less likely to break down under military pressure) but also at
the level of governmental institutions (presidents are now less able to prevail
in their confrontations with Congress than in the past). I view such changes
as a consequence of deep transformations in the international context, polit-
ical learning among the Latin American elites, and a greater legitimacy of
democratic institutions in the late twentieth century (Fitch 1998).
In Chapter 4, I explore the conditions that have encouraged the mul-
tiplication of media scandals involving presidents, cabinet members, and
their close relatives over the last two decades. Greater freedom of the press,
deregulation of mass media markets, an expansion of television, and pro-
fessionalization of the press corps have all fostered the emergence of more
aggressive investigative journalism. Politicians throughout the region have
noticed this change and adapted their strategies accordingly in order to
navigate the politics of scandal.
Chapter 5 traces the impact of media scandals on the mass public. Using
data on presidential approval for the six administrations discussed in Chap-
ter 2, I show that both media scandals and economic performance drove the
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emergence of popular outrage against the president. I also argue that the
coverage of scandals may be endogenous to presidential approval: not only
did presidential approval decline with media exposés, media outlets were
also more likely to pursue new stories as presidents became less popular
among their readers and audiences. This dynamic created a characteristic
downward spiral leading to impeachment.
With media scandals hurting the administration and mounting public
outrage against the president, even loyal legislators have found it difficult to
resist public pressures for impeachment. Chapter 6 approaches this problem
from a neo-institutional perspective. To what extent can constitutional rules
facilitate or constrain the impeachment process? I argue that constitutional
rules interact with the partisan configuration of Congress, the president’s
ability to form coalitions, and the political context (the nature of the scandals
and the timing of the electoral calendar) to create a legislative shield to
protect the president.
Chapter 7 documents an emerging pattern of political instability in Latin
America. I contrast the episodes discussed in Chapter 2 with three alterna-
tive situations: presidential crises that forced the resignation of the pres-
ident without an impeachment process, presidential crises that never led
to the resignation of the president, and administrations that never faced a
presidential crisis. I use the Argentine crisis of 2001 to illustrate a char-
acteristic situation in which a political debacle outpaced the capacity of
politicians to respond to events. These situations share some important
commonalties with the core cases presented in Chapter 2, but they dif-
fer substantially in the outcome because the president resigned before an
impeachment was feasible. A qualitative comparative analysis of these cases
along with other presidential crises in which the president survived con-
firms the insight developed in earlier chapters: while scandals and legislative
politics are key to explaining the impeachment process, mass mobilization
constitutes the main factor driving the actual removal of presidents from
office – irrespective of the specific procedure employed to achieve this goal.
Further statistical analysis examining a large number of administrations that
never faced a presidential crisis confirms this hypothesis, and shows that a
distinctive form of political turmoil emerged in Latin America in the 1990s.
The last chapter explores the theoretical relevance of those findings for
the study of presidential accountability and democracy in Latin America. A
radical form of “social” accountability seems to be on the rise throughout
the region (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000). Impeachment may be the best
institutional mechanism to channel the outbursts of public indignation, but
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Institutional Crises in Presidential Regimes

it is often ineffective in preventing the episodes of corruption or abuse of

power that create popular frustration in the first place.
One of the main lessons suggested by this book is that the same forces
that sometimes grant Latin American presidents great power beyond their
formal constitutional powers also create the conditions for their demise
when they turn against the executive. Presidents may demand extraordi-
nary authority to confront corruption, but they will be discredited if they
are accused of being corrupt. They may present themselves as the only
hope to fix an economy in shambles, but responsibility for a badly perform-
ing economy will be theirs alone. Presidents may confront or bypass other
political institutions when riding a high wave of popularity, but they will
be ferociously attacked when their approval ratings are low. These princi-
ples are not unknown in the White House; they just work in more extreme
ways in many Latin American countries. The corollary is simple: presiden-
tial strength gained at the expense of other institutions’ weaknesses is no
guarantee of political survival in bad times.
In bad times, when people take to the streets to protest against the pres-
ident, strategic politicians easily realize the need to abandon the presi-
dent’s boat and join the opposition camp. Public outrage may result from
multiple factors: the imposition of unpopular economic policies, the poor
performance of the administration in power, or the relentless coverage
of government wrongdoing by the media. But expressions of public out-
rage do not necessarily result in a stronger system of checks and balances.
The emerging pattern of governmental crises without regime breakdown is
consistent with a model of spasmodic accountability in which institutional
controls are activated only when an administration has fallen in disgrace.
The paradoxical result has been Latin American legislatures with a proven
capacity to punish presidential wrongdoing but with almost no capacity to
prevent it.

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