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FACTS:
ISSUE/S:
RULING:
RATIO:

PART II
RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT

People v. Panis, G.R. Nos. L-58674-77, July 11, 1986

ARGEL, AIVAN RAY DELA CRUZ

FACTS:
1. 4 informations were filed in the CFI of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that private respondent
Serapio Abug, without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate
a fee-charging employment agency, criminally operated a private fee charging employment agency by
charging fees and expenses from and promising employment in Saudi Arabia, to 4 separate individuals.
2. Abug filed a motion to quash, contending that he cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more
persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.
3. Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the trial court in its Orders.
4. Hence, the prosecution brought the case to the SC on certiorari and Petitioner argues that the private
respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article
13(b) is not applicable.
5. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and
placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
6. Private respondents contend that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this
article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement.
7. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only
where the recruitment and placement consist of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and
always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abug should be prosecuted for illegal recruitment.
RULING:
9. Yes, Abug should be protected from illegal recruitment and the Court fails to see why the proviso
should speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of
two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule.
10. For its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where
the recruitment and placement consist of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done
through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
11. The proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. " The number of persons
dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers.
12. It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of
records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had
been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree.
13. The trouble with PDs' is that they could be issued without previous public discussion or consultation.
14. At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal
recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign
land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be
awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500, June 28, 2017

ASILO, JEFFREY HERALDO

PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ

GR No 214500 June 28, 2017

Facts:

That in or about and sometime from September 21, 2004 to February 18, 2005, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused not being
authorized by the POEA of the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for overseas
employment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promise and recruit the following
complainants, to wit:
ARMELY AGUILAR UY,
SHERYL AGUILAR REFORMADO
& ADONA LUNA QUINES LAVARO
for an overseas job placement abroad and in consideration of said promise, said complainants paid and
delivered the total amount of P300,000.00 as processing fees of their papers, but despite said promise,
accused failed to deploy complainants and despite demand to reimburse/return the amount which
complainants paid as processing fees, accused did then and there refuse and fail to reimburse/return to
said complainants the aforesaid amount, thus in large scale amounting to economic sabotage, in violation
of the aforecited law.

The prosecution presented the three (3) private complainants as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal
Recruitment on Large Scale, namely: Armely Aguilar-Uy (Aguilar-Uy), Sheryl Reformado (Reformado),
Adona Lavaro (Lavaro), and Rosalina Rosales (Rosales) from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).

Meanwhile, prosecution witness, Rosalina Rosales testified that as per Certification32 issued by Noriel
Devanadera, Director IV, Licensing and Regulation Office, POEA, appellant Dela Cruz is not authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment during the year 2005 up to the present. Rosales was the one
who prepared the Certification signed by Director Devanadera.
On October 21, 2010, the RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale and estafa. appellant appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals. On July
2, 2013, in its disputed Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied the appellant’s appeal for lack of merit.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Michelle Dela Cruz is liable for illegal recruitment?

Held:

1. The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,40 as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition.—For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such
non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, x x x:
xxxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

Thus, in order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must concur: (1) the
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of
illegal recruitment in large scale, as in this case, a third element is required: that the offender commits any
of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

In the instant case, appellant committed the acts enumerated in Section 6 of R.A. 8042. As testified to by
Aguilar-Uy, Reformado and Lavaro, appellant gave them an impression that she is capable of sending
them to South Korea as domestic helpers.

RATIO:

Thus, in order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must concur: (1) the
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of
illegal recruitment in large scale, as in this case, a third element is required: that the offender commits any
of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
CF SHARP CREWING MANAGEMENT VS.
ESPANOL GR NO. 155903

Facts:

In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd. (PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in
turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the
Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCL’s vessel.

It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines. C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation
as the new manning agency of LCL with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), but
Rizal objected on the ground that its accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31,
1996.

Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris of LCL arrived in the
Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharp’s office. Rizal reported LCL’s
recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, and requested an ocular inspection of C.F.
Sharp’s premises.

On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found Savva and Tjiakouris
at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V Cyprus, with scheduled
deployment in January 1997.4 The Inspection Report signed by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and
countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was thereafter submitted to the POEA.

On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint for illegal recruitment, cancellation or revocation of license,
and blacklisting against LCL and C.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-004.
Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental Complaint adding violation of Section 29 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, for designating and/or appointing agents, representatives and employees,
without prior approval from the POEA.

The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment. According
to the Administrator, the inspection report of Ms. Aquino established that Savva and Tjiakouris had
conducted, and, at the time of the inspection, had been conducting interviews, selection and hiring for
LCL, without any authority from the POEA. The Administrator also held that C.F. Sharp violated Section
29 of the Labor Code when it designated officers and agents without prior approval of the POEA.

C.F. Sharp’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5, 1999 by the then
Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,15 it elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, with the
case docketed as G.R. No. 137573.
Consequently, on April 30, 2002, the CA denied C.F. Sharp’s petition for certiorari,17 holding that C.F.
Sharp was already estopped from assailing the Secretary of Labor’s ruling because it had manifested its
option to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed upon it. By paying the
adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp effectively executed the judgment, having acquiesced to, and ratified the
execution of the assailed Orders of the Secretary of Labor. The CA also agreed with the POEA
Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that Savva and Tjiakouris of LCL, along with C.F. Sharp,
undertook recruitment activities on December 7, 9 to 12, 1996, sans any authority. Finally, it affirmed both
labor officials’ finding that C.F. Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k), Rule I, Book
VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio as agent, without prior approval from the POEA.
Thus, the appellate court declared that the Secretary of Labor acted well within his discretion in holding
C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment.

Issue:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
IS IN ESTOPPEL IN QUESTIONING THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 19, 1997 AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A. NO. 8042 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE
13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND
SECTIONS 1 AND 6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 29 OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, IN
RELATION TO SECTION II (k)[,] RULE I, BOOK VI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT?

Held:

1. The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction
being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby
established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to
and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.

[W]e write in behalf of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management Inc., regarding the Advice To Operating
Units dated April 15, 1999, which arose from the Decision of the Office of the Secretary of Labor in the
case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01-004.
In this connection, we would like to express our option to have the cash bond posted by us in the case
entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01044 to
answer for any fine that the Supreme Court may finally decide that our client should pay in the Case
entitled, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing and Rizal International
Shipping Services and docketed as G.R. No. 137573.
Under the circumstances, it is most respectfully requested that the aforesaid advice be RECALLED and
that a clearance be issued in favor of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc.
2. Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to recruit. C.F. Sharp’s
accreditation as LCL’s new manning agency was still pending approval at that time. Yet Savva and
Tjiakouris, along with C.F. Sharp, entertained applicants for LCL’s vessels, and conducted preparatory
interviews.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
“any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether
for profit or not:

Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”
On the basis of this definition—and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray—the conduct of
preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.
The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no moment. From the
language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be “for profit or not.” Notably, it is the lack of the
necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity of LCL
unlawful.

3. C.F. Sharp also denies violating Article 29 of the Labor Code. It insists that Henry Desiderio was neither
an employee nor an agent of C.F. Sharp. Yet, except for its barefaced denial, no proof was adduced to
substantiate it.
Desiderio’s name does not appear in the list of employees and officials submitted by C.F. Sharp to the
POEA. However, his name appeared as the contact person of the applicants for the position of 2nd and
3rd assistant engineers and machinist/fitter in C.F Sharp’s advertisement in the February 2, 1997 issue of
The Bulletin Today.27
Article 29 of the Labor Code is explicit, viz.:

“Art. 29. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF LICENSE OR AUTHORITY

No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor
it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or
authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business
address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of
additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor.” (Emphasis
ours)
Thus, Section 2(k), Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules Governing Overseas Employment provides:
“Section 2. Grounds for Suspension/Cancellation of License.
xxxx
k. Appointing or designating agents, representatives or employees without prior approval from the
Administration.”
The appointment or designation of Desiderio as an employee or agent of C.F. Sharp, without prior
approval from the POEA, warrants administrative sanction. The CA, therefore, correctly rejected C.F.
Sharp’s posture.

Ratio:

The act of an accused of promising, offering and assuring employment overseas to certain persons falls
squarely within the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13, par. (b) of the Labor
Code, and the fact that she did not sign nor issue some of the receipts for the amount received from the
latter has no bearing on her culpability.

People v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017

DACUMOS, ACE MARK FRIAS

Facts:

Casuera and Magalona met appellant and the latter briefed Castuera on the requirements for working as
a fruit picker in Australia. She introduced Castuera to another man who related that he was able to go to
Australia with her help. She also showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped to
get employment in Australia. Appellant further narrated that a couple she had helped had given her their
car as payment. Because of her representations, Caustera believed in her promise that she could send
him to Australia. Appellant asked Castuera for P180,000.00 for processing his papers.

Appellant, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. Together with Dedales and Bacomo,
appellant convinced Castueara that that it was difficult to get an Australian visa in the Philippines so they
had to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia to get one. Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian
visa in Indonesia was denied. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his U.S. visa, which he
paid. However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian passport bearing an
Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return to the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty of syndicated estafa.

Ruling:

Yes. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority commits illegal recruitment for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking
any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042. In this case, appellant herself admits that she
has no license or authority to undertake recruitment and placement activities. Since it was proven that the
three accused were acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal recruitment activity is
considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage.

Ratio Decidendi:

It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. Gist:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding Sison guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Section 6, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 8042 or
illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage.

People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 225730, February 28, 2018

DE GUZMAN, CHESTER BERGONZADO
People v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 226140, February 26, 2020
ESGUERRA, ISAAC PILAPIL

FACTS: ISABEL RIOS, ANA ESPIRITU and ELLEN MABBORANG was accused of being the owners,
officers, employees of Green Pastures International Staffing Incorporated ("Green Pastures") and
engaged in the business of overseas recruitment as licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency ("POEA"). Wherein they were alleged to defraud, promise employment and receive varying
amounts as placement and documentation fees from private complainants Liwayway M. Tiglao, Michael
B. Custodio, Marlone S. Papio, Eduardo N. Milanes, Elmer Q. de Mata, Rico H. Dacillo, Victoriano T.
Agcaoili, Jr., and Mylene U. Arevalo; and thereafter demand, on various occasions, placement and
documentation fees from said private complainants, but without valid reasons and through no fault of said
private complainants, accused fail to actually deploy them abroad; that despite repeated demands to
reimburse expenses incurred by private complainants in connection with their documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, respondents fail and refuse and continues to fail and refuse to
reimburse the amounts received, to the damage and prejudice of herein private complainants.

ISSUE/S: whether the accused parties are guilty of Illegal Recruitment under Article 38 of the Labor Code

RULING: Section 6(m) of RA 8042 pertains to Illegal Recruitment committed through the failure of any
person (whether or not a holder of license or authority) to reimburse documentation and processing
expenses incurred by the worker when the deployment did not occur without the worker's fault. This
provision also defines Syndicated Illegal Recruitment as being committed by three or more persons and
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as being committed against three or more persons. Rios was convicted
in her capacity as president and general manager of Green Pastures, Inc. While corporate officers are
generally not held personally liable for corporate acts as corporations have separate and distinct legal
personality from the persons comprising it, they may be found liable when a specific provision of law
makes them personally liable for a corporate action. The Court affirms Rios' conviction for Large Scale
Illegal Recruitment under Section 6(m) of RA 8042 committed against Tiglao, Dacillo, Milanes, Papio and
Custodio. As regards the offense purportedly committed by Rios against complainants De Mata, Arevalo
and Agcaoili, the Court holds that Rios' guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020

SORIANO, PATRICIA ELAINE VILLAFUERTE

People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500, June 28, 2017

MILLO, ARJAY JUNIO

FACTS: The accused was charged with Illegal Recruitment in large scale and 3 counts of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. 3 complainants were presented as witnesses. According to the
first witness, she was enticed to work in South Korea with a prospective salary of 50,000 to 80,000.
She gave the accused a total amount of 200,000 for the expenses on her visa and documents.
However, after waiting for several months, the accused failed to give them their visa and upon inquiry,
they were given stubs allegedly for the Embassy of South Korea, which all turned out to be fake. The
third witness was also duped in the same manner and gave a total amount of 82,000 plus USfi272.
The accused for her defense claimed that she never promised them deployment abroad and that she
merely assisted them in accomplishing their required documents.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.

HELD: Yes. The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The
testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of
overseas employment, appellant received monies from private complainants. Such acts were
accurately described in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We can conclude that all three
elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are present in the instant case. To recapitulate: First,
appellant engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to be capable of deploying workers to
South Korea upon submission of the pertinent documents and payment of the required fees; Second,
all three (3) private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who promised them
employment as domestic helpers in Korea for a fee; and Third, Rosalina Rosales of the Licensing
Division of the POEA, testified that as per Certification issued by Noriel Devanadera Director IV,
Licensing and Regulation Office, appellant is not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved
by the prosecution.

Furthermore, we agree with the court a quo that the same pieces of evidence which
establish appellant's liability for illegal recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability for
estafa. In the instant case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded private
complainants by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them to South Korea for
work as domestic helpers, even as she does not have a license or authority for the purpose. Such
misrepresentation came before private complainants delivered various amounts for purportedly
travel expenses and visa assistance to appellant. Clearly, private complainants would not have
parted with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant. As a consequence of
appellant's false pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised
employment abroad never materialized and the money they paid were never recovered. All these
representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable
under par. 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017

RALUTA, JOSEPH TABAGAN

People v. Estrada,G.R. No. 225730, February 28, 2018

REYES, MATEO GARCIA

People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500, June 28, 2017

ROBLES, JERALD TROY GUEVARRA

People v. Racho, G.R. No. 227505, October 2, 2017

SIGUA, PAOLO ISMAEL MANANSALA

People v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 226140, February 26, 2020

SORIANO, GOERGE ATTABAN

People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020

SORIANO, LORENZO MIGUEL ABALOS

People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014

SUNDIAM, JALPER RONQUILLO
FACTS:
This case was initiated by the filing of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City the RTC two
informations charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with
illegal recruitment and estafa. Only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having
remained at large. The prosecution presented the five (5) private complainants as witnesses to prove the
crime of Illegal Recruitment. All of the Complainants attested that they went to Harvel International Talent
Management and Promotion (HARVEL) and interacted with Inovero among others, who conducted
orientations and briefings, collected fees, and promised deployment to Japan. However, all of these never
materialized. Hence leading to the discovery that the HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers
including overseas workers. Inovero, on one hand, denied the allegations and claimed that she only
worked as an office assistant serving her uncle (owner of HARVEL) foods and other needs.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafa but convicting her
of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Innovero appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of RTC and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the RTC due to the reason of Inovero is not an
employee of HARVEL.

RULING:
No. The appeal lacks merit. The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1)
that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b)
of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused
had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to
the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused
committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed
by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes. In Our view, despite Inovero’s protestations that she did
not commit illegal recruitment, the following circumstances contrarily convince us that she was into illegal
recruitment.

Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero committed
illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression that she can send them
abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or authority to do so. All that
Inovero’s appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the complainants.
But the complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the commission of the crime
of illegal recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her mere denial. We concur with
the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal recruitment charged against her.
Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her
co-accused in the recruitment of the complainants.

Meco Manning & Crewing Services, Inc. v. Cuyos, G.R. No. 222939, July 3, 2019
ALVARO, REINALYN MARI CRUZ

FACTS:
Cuyos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and claims for salaries and other benefits for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract, damages, and attorney's fees.

Constantino alleged that MECO, for and on behalf of its principal, ICS, hired him as the Second Marine
Engineer of the vessel "M/V Crown Princess." The employment was for a period of 8 months. Constantino
claimed that the ship's Chief Engineer, Vera, mistreated him. He recounted that Vera started shouting at
him whenever he would ask questions concerning the engine operations of the vessel; that when he was
attending to the freshwater generator, Vera slapped his hand and kept on shouting at him. Constantino
was shocked when the Third Mate of the vessel handed to him an electronic plane ticket and informed
him that he must disembark at Cristobal, Panama, where a reliever would take his place. After inquiring
for the reason why he was suddenly being relieved, however, Capt. Kolidas told him that it would be
better for him to just go home as he did not have a good relation with Vera. Thus, Constantino was made
to disembark from the vessel against his will.

Petitioners claimed that Constantino's dismissal was valid. They narrated that Constantino openly and
strongly protested and was already prepared for a fight instead of carrying out an order. Vera instructed
Constantino to dismantle the ship's pump but noticed that Constantino was not dismantling the pump
properly. Vera showed him the proper manner but Constantino turned ballistic. In order to avoid more
trouble, Vera chose to report the incident to Capt. Kolidas.

Petitioners claimed that Constantino's dismissal was necessitated by reason of his unsatisfactory
performance evaluation, violation of his contract of employment as he violated the provisions on
insubordination and inefficiency, his angry and provocative utterances and his attempt to physically
assault his superior. Thus, Constantino's dismissal was for a just cause and was resorted to in order to
protect and maintain the peace of the vessel and the safety of its crew.

ISSUE:
Whether Capt. Sorrera as MECO's President and General Manager is liable for the monetary claims and
damages.

RULING:
Petitioners failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Constantino's dismissal was grounded on just
and valid causes.Hence, Capt. Sorrera shall be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation for the
claims and damages against it.

RATIO:
Court has held that illegally dismissed overseas workers, including seafarers, shall be entitled to salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. This includes the monthly vacation
leave pay and all other benefits guaranteed in the employment contract which were not made contingent
upon the performance of any task or the fulfilment of any condition.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. 10022, provides that if the recruitment or placement
agency is a juridical being, its corporate officers, directors, and partners, as the case may be, shall be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the claims and damages against it. Here,
there is no dispute that MECO is a corporation engaged in the recruitment and placement of Filipino
seafarers for its foreign principal. It is also not disputed that Capt. Sorrera is MECO's President and
General Manager; hence, he is a corporate officer. Thus, the appellate court correctly adjudged Capt.
Sorrera as among those who are jointly and solidarily liable to Constantino.

Cuartocruz v. Active Works, Inc., G.R. No. 209072, July 24, 2019
ARANCES, SION AVILA

Prime Stars International Promotion Corporation v. Baybayan, G.R. No. 213961, January 22, 2020
BALGOS, KISSIA SEVINE BORJA

Joint Ship Manning Group, Inc. v. SSS, G.R. No. 247471, July 7, 2020
BATA, MA. LYN NOPUETO

Sunace International Management Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, January 25, 2006
RAMOS, REIN JUSTINE NICOLE GAERLAN

Facts:
Sunace International Management Services deployed Divina Montehermozo to Taiwan under a 12-month contract,
starting February 1, 1997. After her contract expired, Divina continued working under an extended two-year contract
without Sunace’s direct involvement. Upon returning to the Philippines, Divina filed a complaint for underpayment
and other claims, alleging that Sunace knew and consented to the contract extension. Sunace denied any knowledge
of the extension and argued it should not be held liable for claims arising from the extended period.

Issue:
Whether Sunace is liable for Divina’s claims based on the theory of imputed knowledge, despite denying knowledge
and consent to the extension of the contract.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sunace and reversed the lower court decisions. The Court held that the theory
of imputed knowledge was misapplied, as it only works from agent to principal, not the other way around. There
was no substantial proof that Sunace knew of or consented to the contract extension. Additionally, the direct
negotiation between the foreign employer and Divina impliedly revoked Sunace’s agency. As a result, Sunace was
not liable for any claims arising from the extended employment period, and the complaint was dismissed.

APQ Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. v. Caseñas, G.R. No. 197303, June 4, 2014
ROGACION, MARINEL-RAIZA MERCADO

Prieto v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93699, September 10, 1993

CAMPANG, ROSELLE SANTANDER

FACTS:
AR and Sons International Development Corporation, Saudi Services and Operations Co. Ltd. (SSOC),
and Saudi Arabian Morrison (SAM). Petitioners were recruited by AR and Sons for employment in Saudi
Arabia under contracts approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Prieto
and Azuela were hired as A/C mechanics with a monthly salary of $370; Canillo was hired as a clerk with
a monthly salary of $420. Petitioners were coerced into signing another contract with SAM for lower
positions as assistant cooks with a salary of SR625 per month. Upon arrival in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, they
were asked to sign yet another contract reducing their salary to SR250 per month, which they refused.
They were confined in a small room, given spoiled food, and eventually dismissed and repatriated to the
Philippines. The POEA ruled in favor of the complainants, ordering AR and Sons and SAM to pay them
for unpaid salaries and the unexpired portion of their contracts. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed this decision, leading to the petitioners seeking a modification of the NLRC's ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were unjustly dismissed.

RULING:

Yes. The Court found that the petitioners were unjustly dismissed and that the principle of "no work, no
pay" did not apply because the petitioners' inability to work was due to the respondents' actions.

Where the employer-employee relationship has been establishe9d, the burden of proof in termination
cases lies with the employer. This burden was not discharged by the private respondents. It is clear from
the record that the petitioners were hired as mechanics and clerk (or as assistant cooks under the second
contract) after presumably having passed the corresponding trade tests conducted by the recruiting
agency prior to their deployment. If AR and Sons felt they were not qualified for these positions, it should
have rejected their applications outright instead of accepting their recruitment fees just the same and
assuring them that their employment had already been approved by the foreign principal. It was the fault
of AR and Sons for holding the petitioners to its foreign principal as qualified when they were found later
to be deficient.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
CASTILLO, ARBIE CAROLINE DE JESUS

IndustrialPersonnel&ManagementServices,Inc.v.DeVera,G.R.No.205703,March 7, 2016
CHAN, RUBY MAY VENTURA

Gopio v. Bautista, G.R. No. 205953, June 6, 2018

CLAVERIA, AILEEN MAE TOLEDO

FACTS:
Salvador Bautista was hired as a Project Manager for Shorncliffe in Papua New Guinea through Job Asia,
a single proprietorship owned by petitioner Dionella Gopio, which deploys manpower for overseas work.
Although he was to be employed for 31 minths, just nine months after his deployment, Bautista was
notified that his services will be terminated due to unsatisfactory performance and failure to meet the
company’s standards. Bautista filed a complaint with the NLRC against petitioners for illegal dismissal,
claiming that he was dismissed without just cause since there had been no job evaluation conducted prior
to Shorncliffe's decision to dismiss him from employment. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that
there was just cause as Bautista performed below the company’s standards and that this cause falls
under “other grounds” of termination in the employment contract. Also, Shorncliffe claimed that Article 4.3
of the employment contract provides that a one-month salary may be given in lieu of the one month
written notice. Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision finding Bautista to have been illegally dismissed as the
dismissal was not proven to be for a just cause and Shorncliffe failed to observe due process. The work
performance evaluation allegedly showing Bautista's inefficiency and shortcomings in the performance of
his job was made only more than one month after Bautista's dismissal. Thus, the findings therein are
mere conclusions of fact. On appeal, NLRC held that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions
of the employment contract that bore the stamp of approval of the POEA. Thus, Bautista’s employment
was pre-terminated in accordance with their contract. On appeal, CA upheld LA’s ruling and found the
term "other grounds" is all-encompassing and makes the employee susceptible to arbitrary dismissal and
that the contract violates the provisions of the Labor Code on security of tenure since it gives the
employer the option to do away with the notice requirement as long as he grants one-month salary to the
employee in lieu thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bautista’s employment validly terminated.

RULING:
The evaluation reports were made as an afterthought in order to lend credence to the claim that the
termination of Bautista's employment was for a valid reason. Such report can no longer be a fair and
accurate assessment of his competence as the same was presented only after the complaint was filed.
Thus, Bautista's incompetence was not proven by substantial evidence. In addition, Bautista was not
accorded due process. To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker
sought to be dismissed with a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of
the employer's decision to dismiss him, before termination of employment can be legally effected. Here,
Bautista was dismissed under Article 4.3 of the employment contract which permits his employer,
Shorncliffe, to terminate the contract on unspecified "other grounds" by giving one month's written notice
of its intention to terminate, or in lieu thereof, to pay the employee a sum equivalent to one month's salary.
Article 4.3 deprives the employee of his right to due process of law as it gives the employer the option to
do away with the notice requirement provided that it grants one-month salary to the employee in lieu
thereof. It denies the employee of the right to be apprised of the grounds for the termination of his
employment without giving him an opportunity to defend himself and refute the charges against him.
Moreover, the term "other grounds" is all-encompassing. It makes the employee susceptible to arbitrary
dismissal. The Court considers that the provision is intended to prevent any security of tenure from
accruing in favor of Bautista even during the limited period of 31 months. Overseas workers, regardless of
their classification, are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in their contracts.
This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due process. The
employment contract between Shorncliffe and Bautista is governed by Philippine labor laws. Hence, the
stipulations, clauses, and terms and conditions of the contract must not contravene our labor law
provisions. There being no showing of any clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of Bautista's
employment and that he was not afforded due process, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal for which Bautista is entitled to indemnity.

No. Bautista was illegally dismissed.

PRINCIPLES:
Article 4.3 of the employment contract which permits his employer, Shorncliffe, to terminate the contract
on unspecified "other grounds" by giving one month's written notice of its intention to terminate, or in lieu
thereof, to pay the employee a sum equivalent to one month's salary. Article 4.3 deprives the employee of
his right to due process of law as it gives the employer the option to do away with the notice requirement
provided that it grants one-month salary to the employee in lieu thereof.

Millares v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002

DE VERA, CRISHA MAE DE GUZMAN

Ravago v. Esso Eastern Marine, Ltd., G.R. No. 158324, March 14, 2005
DESABELLE, JIREH JANNIE TANAEL

Manansala v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 208314, August 23, 2017
GARI, JOANNA VERDUZ

IndustrialPersonnel&ManagementServices,Inc.v.DeVera,G.R.No.205703,March 7, 2016
GUMPAL, MARIA ROSARIO ISABEL PALOMARES

Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, June 26, 2006
HACHERO-GURIT, IDA JANINA TRABALLO

Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, G.R. No. 179177, July 23, 2009
HO, MARIA CRISTINA ROCEL SANCHEZ

FACTS:
Petitioners' termination of employment under the CEIP do not fall under Section III-A (Retirement, Death
and Disability) or Section III-B (Voluntary Termination), nor could they be they be considered under the
second paragraph of Section III-C, as earlier discussed; it follows that their termination falls under the first
paragraph of Section III-C for which they are entitled to 100% of the total amount credited to their
accounts. The private respondents can not now renege on their commitment under the CEIP to reward
deserving and loyal employees as the petitioners in this case.

ISSUE/S:
W/O Nisda is entitled to disability benefits for his work-related illness.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Nisda and ordered the Sea Serve Maritime Agency and Khalifa A.
Algosaibi Diving and Marine Services to pay him disability benefits and sickness allowance.

RATIO:
SC found that Nisda's heart condition was work-related and was developed during the term of his
employment contract in the company. The Court relied on the provisions of the POEA-SEC and the
Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels, which provide for compensation and benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses.

The Court also considered the nature of Nisda's job and that he had been deployed by Algosaibi multiple
times over a span of 15 years. This established a strong connection between his job and heart condition,
making it an occupational disease for which he is entitled to compensation. The Court emphasized that
the burden of proof belongs to the employer and in this case, the employer failed to do so.
Poseidon International Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tamala, G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013
JOGNO, JASMIN AMPARO

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
RAMOS, REIN JUSTINE NICOLE GAERLAN

Facts

Cabiles was recruited by Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (Sameer), a duly licensed placement agency, to
work as a factory worker in Taiwan. After complying with the requirements, Cabiles signed an employment contract
and was deployed to his employer in Taiwan. The contract was for a two-year term, with specified salary and
benefits.

While working in Taiwan, Cabiles was abruptly terminated from his employment. The termination was done without
any prior notice or explanation of the grounds for dismissal. Cabiles claimed that he was merely told to pack his
belongings and return to the Philippines. He was not given any opportunity to defend himself or contest the
dismissal.

Upon returning to the Philippines, Cabiles filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, and other
money claims against Sameer and the foreign employer before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). He argued that his termination was baseless and in violation of his right to security of tenure and due
process.

In defense, Sameer argued that Cabiles’ dismissal was justified based on the employer’s decision and that the agency
was merely following the instructions from Taiwan. Sameer contended that it should not be held liable because it
had no control over the actions of the foreign employer.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Cabiles, finding that the dismissal was illegal due to the absence of just cause
and non-compliance with procedural due process. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the decision, holding that the dismissal was valid. The Court of Appeals subsequently reinstated the Labor
Arbiter’s ruling, prompting Sameer to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

The primary issues raised were whether the dismissal was illegal and whether Sameer, as the local placement
agency, should be held liable for the acts of the foreign employer.

Issue

1. Was Cabiles illegally dismissed from his employment?

2. Can Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. be held liable for the illegal dismissal despite claiming that it
merely followed the foreign employer's instructions?

Ruling

Illegal Dismissal: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Cabiles was illegally dismissed. The Court held that his
termination lacked both substantive and procedural due process. There was no just cause for the dismissal, and
Cabiles was not afforded due process, which requires two written notices: one informing the employee of the
specific charges against him and the other indicating the decision to terminate him after allowing him the
opportunity to be heard. The abrupt dismissal without any explanation or hearing was a clear violation of Cabiles'
rights.
Liability of Sameer: Yes, Sameer was held liable for the illegal dismissal. The Supreme Court emphasized that
under Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), recruitment agencies are
solidarily liable with the foreign employer for any claims and liabilities arising from the employment contract. Even
if the agency claimed to have merely acted on the foreign employer’s instructions, it is still responsible for ensuring
that OFWs are treated fairly and lawfully. The law mandates that recruitment agencies cannot escape liability for
violations committed by the foreign employer.

Guerrero v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 222523, October 3, 2018
ROGACION, MARINEL-RAIZA MERCADO

Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 230527, June 14, 2021
RONE, NIVINN LARANJO

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
ROSARIO, MONIQUE GARCIA

Facts:

Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., a recruitment agency, hired respondent Joy C.
Cabiles for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy signed a one-year employment contract with a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00 and paid a placement fee of ₱70,000.00. She was deployed to Taiwan on June
26, 1997, but was assigned to work as a cutter instead of in quality control. On July 14, 1997, Joy was
abruptly terminated by her employer, Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd., without prior notice and was repatriated to
the Philippines after receiving only NT$9,000 in wages, with NT$3,000 deducted for her plane ticket.

Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sameer Overseas
and Wacoal, claiming illegal dismissal and seeking the return of her placement fee, withheld wages,
salary for the unfulfilled contract period, and damages. Sameer Overseas denied the allegations, claiming
that Joy was terminated for inefficiency and negligence and presented an official receipt for a lower
placement fee of ₱20,360.00. The agency also argued that Wacoal's accreditation had been transferred
to Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc., and thus, Pacific was responsible.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy's complaint, finding no evidence of excess placement fees and deeming
the transfer of obligations to Pacific irrelevant. Joy appealed to the NLRC, which reversed the decision,
declaring her dismissal illegal due to the agency's failure to prove just cause and lack of procedural due
process. The NLRC awarded Joy three months' salary, reimbursement of NT$3,000, and attorney’s fees,
but did not address the placement fee issue or the transfer to Pacific due to jurisdictional limitations.

Sameer Overseas appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the NLRC's finding of illegal dismissal
and the corresponding awards. The Court of Appeals also remanded the case to the NLRC to determine
the validity of Sameer Overseas' claims against Pacific.

Issues:

1.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just
causes of termination?
2.Whether or not petitioner (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc) failed to comply with the due
process requirements?

Ruling:

1.No. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. They may
also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards. Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the
services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the
law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or
self-destruction of the employer." Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to security of
tenure." Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may not
be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without going
through the proper procedure.

Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.

Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction.

2.Yes. Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show
not only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the employers did not comply with the due process requirement.

A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. One of
the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.
The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision." Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be heard."

Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working on
June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and
barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed
of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.

SC affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for Illegal Dismissal with modifications.

Doctrine/Codal provisions:

By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and
after compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties may,
therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to
prove it.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause."Failure to
show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
illegal.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
1)the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged;
2)the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated tothe employee; and
3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment.

Halili v. Justice for Children International, G.R. No. 194906, September 9, 2015
SORIANO, PATRICIA ELAINE VILLAFUERTE

Republic v. Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc. (Formerly MHY New Recruitment International, Inc.),
G.R. No. 205188, April 22, 2015
ARGEL, AIVAN RAY DELA CRUZ

FACTS:
1. Renelson Carlos applied at Worldview Internation Services Corporation as a heavy equipment driver
with a salary of U$700 in Doha, Qatar.
2. His recruiting agency Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc. made him sign an employment contract
stating that he was going to work as a duct man instead of the position he applied for but he was told that
this is only for purposes of entering the country.
3. Humanlink promised that he would work as a heavy equipment driver as applied for and upon his
arrival in Doha, he worked as a duct installer with a salary of U$400.
4. Carlos filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Labor Office but the complaint was not acted
upon.
5. This prompted him to speak with the Qatar Labor Office where he discussed his grievance and Carlos
was informed that his visa was cancelled and that he was being repatriated at his own expense.
6. POEA Adjudication Office found Carlos’ assertions credible and POEA cancelled Humanlink’s license
and automatically disqualified it from participating in any overseas employment program.

ISSUE: 7. Whether the POEA can automatically disqualify officers and directors from participating in the
government's overseas employment program upon the cancellation of a license

RULING:
8. Yes. One of the roles of the POEA is the regulation and adjudication of private sector participation in
the recruitment and placement of overseas workers.
9. Article 25 of the Labor Code, as amended, reads that pursuant to national development objectives and
in order to harness and maximize the use of private sector resources and initiative in the development
and implementation of a comprehensive employment program, the private employment sector shall
participate in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, under such guidelines,
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of Labor.
10. The provides that, "The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any
license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and
the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws,
General Orders and Letters of Instruction."
11. Thus, upon the cancellation of a license, persons, officers and directors of the concerned
corporations are automatically prohibited from engaging in recruiting and placement of land-
based overseas Filipino workers.
12. The grant of a license is a privilege and not a right thus making it a proper subject of its regulatory
powers.

C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Espanol, Jr., G.R. No. 155903, September 14, 2007
ASILO, JEFFREY HERALDO

CF SHARP CREWING MANAGEMENT VS.

ESPANOL GR NO. 155903

Facts:

In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd. (PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in
turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the
Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCL’s vessel.

It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines. C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation
as the new manning agency of LCL with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), but
Rizal objected on the ground that its accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31,
1996.

Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris of LCL arrived in the
Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharp’s office. Rizal reported LCL’s
recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, and requested an ocular inspection of C.F.
Sharp’s premises.
On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found Savva and Tjiakouris
at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V Cyprus, with scheduled
deployment in January 1997.4 The Inspection Report signed by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and
countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was thereafter submitted to the POEA.

On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint for illegal recruitment, cancellation or revocation of license,
and blacklisting against LCL and C.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-004.
Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental Complaint adding violation of Section 29 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, for designating and/or appointing agents, representatives and employees,
without prior approval from the POEA.

The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment. According
to the Administrator, the inspection report of Ms. Aquino established that Savva and Tjiakouris had
conducted, and, at the time of the inspection, had been conducting interviews, selection and hiring for
LCL, without any authority from the POEA. The Administrator also held that C.F. Sharp violated Section
29 of the Labor Code when it designated officers and agents without prior approval of the POEA.

C.F. Sharp’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5, 1999 by the then
Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,15 it elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, with the
case docketed as G.R. No. 137573.

Consequently, on April 30, 2002, the CA denied C.F. Sharp’s petition for certiorari,17 holding that C.F.
Sharp was already estopped from assailing the Secretary of Labor’s ruling because it had manifested its
option to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed upon it. By paying the
adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp effectively executed the judgment, having acquiesced to, and ratified the
execution of the assailed Orders of the Secretary of Labor. The CA also agreed with the POEA
Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that Savva and Tjiakouris of LCL, along with C.F. Sharp,
undertook recruitment activities on December 7, 9 to 12, 1996, sans any authority. Finally, it affirmed both
labor officials’ finding that C.F. Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k), Rule I, Book
VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio as agent, without prior approval from the POEA.
Thus, the appellate court declared that the Secretary of Labor acted well within his discretion in holding
C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment.

Issue:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
IS IN ESTOPPEL IN QUESTIONING THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 19, 1997 AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A. NO. 8042 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE
13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND
SECTIONS 1 AND 6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 29 OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, IN
RELATION TO SECTION II (k)[,] RULE I, BOOK VI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT?

Held:

1. The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction
being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby
established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to
and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.

[W]e write in behalf of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management Inc., regarding the Advice To Operating
Units dated April 15, 1999, which arose from the Decision of the Office of the Secretary of Labor in the
case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01-004.
In this connection, we would like to express our option to have the cash bond posted by us in the case
entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01044 to
answer for any fine that the Supreme Court may finally decide that our client should pay in the Case
entitled, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing and Rizal International
Shipping Services and docketed as G.R. No. 137573.
Under the circumstances, it is most respectfully requested that the aforesaid advice be RECALLED and
that a clearance be issued in favor of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc.

2. Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to recruit. C.F. Sharp’s
accreditation as LCL’s new manning agency was still pending approval at that time. Yet Savva and
Tjiakouris, along with C.F. Sharp, entertained applicants for LCL’s vessels, and conducted preparatory
interviews.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
“any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether
for profit or not:

Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”
On the basis of this definition—and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray—the conduct of
preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.
The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no moment. From the
language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be “for profit or not.” Notably, it is the lack of the
necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity of LCL
unlawful.

3. C.F. Sharp also denies violating Article 29 of the Labor Code. It insists that Henry Desiderio was neither
an employee nor an agent of C.F. Sharp. Yet, except for its barefaced denial, no proof was adduced to
substantiate it.
Desiderio’s name does not appear in the list of employees and officials submitted by C.F. Sharp to the
POEA. However, his name appeared as the contact person of the applicants for the position of 2nd and
3rd assistant engineers and machinist/fitter in C.F Sharp’s advertisement in the February 2, 1997 issue of
The Bulletin Today.27
Article 29 of the Labor Code is explicit, viz.:
“Art. 29. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF LICENSE OR AUTHORITY
No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor
it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or
authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business
address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of
additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor.” (Emphasis
ours)
Thus, Section 2(k), Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules Governing Overseas Employment provides:
“Section 2. Grounds for Suspension/Cancellation of License.
xxxx
k. Appointing or designating agents, representatives or employees without prior approval from the
Administration.”
The appointment or designation of Desiderio as an employee or agent of C.F. Sharp, without prior
approval from the POEA, warrants administrative sanction. The CA, therefore, correctly rejected C.F.
Sharp’s posture.

Ratio:

The act of an accused of promising, offering and assuring employment overseas to certain persons falls
squarely within the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13, par. (b) of the Labor
Code, and the fact that she did not sign nor issue some of the receipts for the amount received from the
latter has no bearing on her culpability.

Trans Action Overseas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 109583, September 5, 1997
DACUMOS, ACE MARK FRIAS

Transaction Overseas Corporation Respondent: Hon. Secretary Of Labor, ET AL. Ponente:Romero,J.

FACTS:

A group of individuals sought employment as domestic helpers and paid placement fee ranging from
P1,000 to P14,000 but Transaction Overseas Corporation failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund
proved unavailing, thus they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Art.
32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly
collected from respondents and averred that the company's employee whose only duty was to pre-screen
and interview applicants and was not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Petitioner maintains
that it even warned respondents not to give any money to unauthorized individuals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has Jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of
a private fee-charging employment agency.

HELD:

Yes, the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas
employment is vested upon the secretary of Labor and Employment under Art.35 of the Labor Code as
amended. This is in connection in the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. V. Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary of Labor has also the authority conferred by Section 36, not only to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement of activities of all agencies, but also to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said activities.

Romero v. People, G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011

DE GUZMAN, CHESTER BERGONZADO

Republic v. Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc. (Formerly MHY New Recruitment

ESGUERRA, ISAAC PILAPIL

Finman General Assurance Corporation v. NLRC (POEA), G.R. No. 94588, July 2, 1992
MILLO, ARJAY JUNIO

Pan Pacific Overseas is a recruitment agency duly registered with the POEA. It offers jobs
abroad. Finman General is acting as Pan Pacific’s surety (as required by POEA rules and Art. 31 of
the Labor Code). Pan Pacific was sued by William Inocencio and 3 others for alleged violation of
Article 32 and 34 of the Labor Code. Inocencio alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected fees
but failed to provide employment abroad.
POEA ruled in favor of Inocencio et al and had impleaded Finman (upon request of
Inocencio) in the complaint as well (Pan Pacific changed business address without prior notice to
POEA). The Labor Secretary affirmed POEA’s ruling. Finman General asserts that it should not be
impleaded in the case because it is not a party to the contract between Pan Pacific and Inocencio
et al.
ISSUE: Whether or not Finman General is solidarily liable in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying the POEA of its new
address and from responding to the complaints, Finman may well be regarded as an indispensable
party to the proceedings before the POEA. Whether Finman was an indispensable or merely a
proper party to the proceedings, the SC held that the POEA could properly implead it as party
respondent either upon the request of Inocencio et al or motu propio. Such is the situation under
the Revised Rules of Court.
Finman General is solidarily liable. Under Section 176 of the Insurance Code, as amended,
the liability of a surety in a surety bond (Finman) is joint and several with the principal obligor (Pan
Pacific).
Further, Article 31 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 31. Bonds. – All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and surety
bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed
recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of employment as
appropriate.
xxx
The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or
direct payment from, or application of, the cash and surety bond for any claim or injury
covered and guaranteed by the bonds.

Dagasdas v. Grand Placement and General Services Corporation, G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017
RALUTA, JOSEPH TABAGAN
Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. 38649, March 26, 1979
REYES, MATEO GARCIA

Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 198426, September 2,
201
ROBLES, JERALD TROY GUEVARRA