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(C//REL) Types of I AT-Advanced Open Source Multi-Hop

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(S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
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- (S//REL) Tor
»
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< ! (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide
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(S//REL) Open Source
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<s (S//REL) Active Development
(S//REL) Mitigates Threats

% (S//REL) Very Secure

(S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses
(S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity
(S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting

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(S//REL) Tor Operation (1)

BO HOW Tor Works: 1 Tor nodo

uncncryptcd link
• • •

— • oncryptod link

Alice

Step 1: Alice's Tor

client obtains a list
of Tor nodes from
a directory server.
Jane

Dave
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(S//REL) Tor Operation (2)

«
EO HOW Tor Works: 2 IO • •
Tor nodo
unoncryptod link
m — > oncryptod link ».

is h
% v 1
Alice

Step 2: Alice's Tor client

picks a random path to T-.
destination server Green
links are encrypted, red i
links are in the clear. Jane

h
«

2 >l_
Bob
Dave
Exit

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(S//SI//REL) Passive Tor Traffic Analysis

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(S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic!
(S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible How to Distinguish?
(S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in
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with myriad other TLS traffic 7

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(S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years
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(S//SI//REL) There ARE some server —» client features which are

I recognizable
- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman

CN=www.ofzfkdjxvrss.net- regex match

(DH) Modulus - byte search

- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form - ex:

(S//SI//REL) Certificate: always 2 hour lifetime - ASN. 1 parsing, more computation

- (S//SI) Multiple XKS fingerprints from multiple parties deployed

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(S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature
(S//REL) China and Iran still main adversaries
(S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies
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(S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total
(S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake
(S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server
(S//REL) Different DH Modulus
(S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this "¿4
(TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification!
(S//REL) Each Tor node will generate random-ish signatures in a volatile
way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic!

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(S//REL) Censorship Driven Protocol Obfuscation - Psiphon 3 / Tor

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(S//REL) Extreme Censorship blocking: Common encrypted protocols
• (S//REL) In the case of Psiphon 3: SSH
• (S//REL) In the case of Tor. TLS
• (S//REL) Make deep packet inspection (XKS :-)) work harder
• (S//REL) Both use work of a open source project (brl/obfuscated-openssh)
(S//REL) Idea is both sides transmit random seed and verifier information
• (S//REL) Verifier is hash of seed and other data
• (S//REL) If verifier passes data used from both side seeds to generate key
• (S//REL) Key used in symmetric cipher to encrypt native SSH or SSL protocol
• (S//REL) So for random stream, need to de-obfuscate and test for SSH / SSL
(S//REL) Details for Psiphon 3
• (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 6000 iterations SHA-1
• (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is RC-4
(S//REL) Details for Tor Obsfproxy
• (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 100K iterations SHA-256
• (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is AES-CTR-128
• (S//REL) Key uses seed from both sides!
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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity

V/ $

(S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms

S (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones - Associated browser, easy to use!

(S//REL) Tor Router Project - Modified Linksys Router (everything over Tor) M
h
(S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address • '

(S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle

h (S//REL) From "WCCL Network not part of Tor Project
• <

(S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target

(S//REL) Tor Project working on improving support for circumvention
» (S//REL) Handshake obfuscation (discussed)
» (S//REL) Better bridge proliferation / distribution
(S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor

(S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation

(S//SI//REL) Has been discussed by CT targets
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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity

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r (S//REL)Advanced Tor"Obfuscation" Project: SkypeMorph

(S//REL) Another option for pluggable transport

(S//REL) More sophisticated concept than Obfsproxy K

(S//REL) Open connection to Skype server with "bridge Skype ID"

(S//REL) Encapsulate Tor in encrypted data mimicking Skype Video Traffic

(S//REL) Sort of traffic flow steganography vice content steganography

(S//REL) True Public Key cryptography vice obfuscation with known key

(S//REL) Product of University research - Non-trivial to deploy

(TS//SI//REL) Most Recent SIGINT Work on Exploiting Tor

(TS//SI//REL) REMATION II Workshop (US/UK) at MHS spring 2012

(S//SI//REL) Unleashed Networking/CNE legions...

(S//REL) See later talk b y t h e scoop
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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity

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A
•(S//REL) Online Feud between 2 I AT Products: Ultrasurf and Tor
(S//REL)" Technical Analysis of the Ultrasurf proxying software" (Applebaum)
- (S//REL) Analysis (including some SRE) - highly critical
- (S//REL) Single hop, controlled by one authority 7
A - (S//REL) Security by obscurity
*

- (S//REL) No perfect forward secrecy (forensic traces exploitable)

- (S//REL) Responsible Disclosure: Ultrasurf notified 12/2011, published 04/2012

% (S//REL) 'Tor's critique of Ultrasurf: A reply from the Ultrasurf developers"

» (S//REL) Posted on Ultrasurf site days after Tor published critique
» (S//REL) All talk and no show
» (S//REL) Not fully analyzed
» (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Tor - higher anonymity, smaller scale
» {S//RE\-) One Approach to lAT^ Ultrasurf - focus on circumvention, massive ^cale
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