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P-1100-E
March 2010

Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

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On September 30, 1992, Dr. Wendelin Wiedeking was assigned the job of speaker of the
management board of Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG, a privately held maker of sports cars in
Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen, Germany. The setting for taking on the new position could not have
been more challenging: the automotive industry was in a crisis, Porsche’s automobiles were
piling up in the dealerships, the company had let go of his predecessor after only two years,
and Porsche’s unit sales had dropped from a high of 60,000 a few years earlier to less than
15,000 in 1992. The media had rather low expectations for the new man at the helm of
Porsche: “…The move eliminates sources of internal friction, but does little to deal with the
German car maker’s deeper problems.” 1 The question on everybody’s mind was: would
Porsche survive this severe crisis?

The History of Porsche

Ferdinand Porsche, an Austro-Hungarian engineer, was born in Maffersdorf, Bohemia, on
September 3, 1875. At age 14, he began working as an apprentice plumber in his father’s
workshop, and never attended university or engineering school. In 1893, Porsche was hired
by Béla Egger Electrical in Vienna, where he developed his first electric motor. In 1898,
Porsche joined Jakob Lohner & Co, a coach maker based in Vienna. In 1900, Porsche created
the first petroleum-electric hybrid car. In 1906, Austro-Daimler hired Porsche as their
technical director, and he was later promoted to managing director. In 1923, Porsche left
the company after differences in opinion about the future direction of its car design.2 A few

1 Wall Street Journal, Sep. 28, 1992.

2 Kelly, P., “Ferdinand Porsche”, http://www.autohistory.org/feature_6.html, accessed February 17, 2009.

This case was prepared by Arturo Orozco, Research Assistant, under the supervision of Professor Marc Sachon, as the
basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
March 2010.
This case was written with the support of the CIIL (International Center for Logistics Research), IESE.

Copyright © 2010, IESE. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact IESE PUBLISHING via the
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Last edited: 5/24/12

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

months later, he joined the Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft in Stuttgart, where he designed

several successful race cars and the Mercedes Compressor. 3 In 1926, Daimler and Benz
merged, but Porsche’s concept of small, fast cars was not popular among the board of
Daimler-Benz. As a result, Porsche left the company in 1929.4

In 1931, Porsche founded Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche GmbH, a company specializing in
engineering consulting and motor design with offices in Stuttgart, Germany. For this project,
Porsche recruited his son, “Ferry” Porsche, his son-in-law, Anton Piëch and several previous
co-workers. This was also the beginning of the involvement between the Porsche and the
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Piëch families in managing the company – an involvement lasting until today. In 1934,
Adolf Hitler hired the firm to design and build a prototype of a people’s car (Volkswagen).
The result was the well-known Volkswagen Beetle (see Exhibit 1).5 During WWII, Porsche
worked on the development of military cars, trucks and tanks, like many other companies in
the automotive sector (see Exhibit 2).

Immediately after the war, the company repaired cars and built water pumps and winches to
stay afloat.6 During this time, “Ferry” Porsche, the son of the founder, designed the Porsche
356, a light, rear-engine car with a tubular chassis, which is considered to be the first sports
car to bear the name Porsche. The first models of Type 356 were built in a workshop in
Gmünd, Austria in 1948. Serial production of the model started in 1950, when the company
returned to Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen (see Exhibit 3). For more than 10 years the 356 sold
steadily, reaching a total of more than 70,000 units (see Exhibit 4).

In 1951, Ferdinand Porsche died at the age of 75 and “Ferry” Porsche, an avid supporter of
car racing, took control of the company. In 1953, Porsche launched the 550 Spyder, a light-
weight four-camshaft engine sports car designed for racing. The car reached dubious fame
when the Hollywood star James Dean had a fatal accident in it. Porsche continued to develop
race cars and to this day holds many records, including (to this day) the fastest average speed
at Le Mans (222km/h by a Porsche 917K in 1971).

By the beginning of the 1960s, it was clear that a new car was needed to replace the 356. In
1964, Porsche discontinued the 356 and introduced the legendary 911, an air-cooled, rear-
engined sports car, designed by “Butzi” Porsche, “Ferry’s” eldest son. The 911 was to become
the most recognized sports car of the 20th century and defined the Porsche brand. During the
rest of the ’60s, Porsche introduced several variants of the 911, as well as racing cars (904
Carrera7 GTS, 906, 907-8, 917, etc.).

3 http://www.porsche.com/usa/aboutporsche/porschehistory/milestones/, accessed February 13, 2009.

4 Kelly, op. cit.
5 Vettraino, J.P. “Porsche at 60: The little sports-car company that could”, http://www.autoweek.com/article/20081222/FREE/812229989,
accessed February 17, 2009.
6 Kelly, op. cit.
7 The name Carrera was based on a famous race in Mexico that was won by Porsche.

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

The Porsche and Piëch Families

Ferdinand Porsche, the founder of the company, had two children: Louise and Ferdinand
Anton Ernst “Ferry” Porsche (see Exhibit 5). Louise married Anton Piëch, an Austrian lawyer,
who joined his father-in-law in starting his company in 1931. In the late 1940s, Louise Piëch,
who proved to be an excellent businesswoman, founded a company that imported Porsche
and Volkswagen cars to Austria. This company grew to be one of the largest car distributors
in the world and handled the distribution of Porsche cars in the USA and other countries
until the 1990s.
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The next generation of the Porsche family entered the business in the late 1960s. “Ferry’s”
eldest son, “Butzi” Porsche was the first to find a place as head of the styling department. His
brother, Hans-Peter, entered the company in 1963 as head of production and operations.
Ernst and Ferdinand, the sons of Louise and Anton Piëch, also joined the extended company:
Ernst became active in the operations of his mother’s company, Porsche Salzburg, and his
brother Ferdinand made his way to head of development in Zuffenhausen in 1970.

During the late 1960s, a number of members of the Porsche and Piëch families were working
in the company. Sometimes these family members didn’t share the same views on how the
company should be run and tensions emerged. In 1972, the two families decided to put an
end to their internal quarrels, leave the company (e.g., Ferdinand Piëch joined Audi’s R&D
department, becoming CEO in 1988; “Butzi” Porsche left to found “Porsche Design.”) and put
management into the hands of a non-family CEO: Dr. Ernst Fuhrmann, who at the time was
the technical director and head of purchasing and production, with many years of experience
at Porsche.

By 1992, the supervisory board of Porsche, chaired by “Butzi” Porsche, was dominated by
members of the two families. The board was criticized8 by the workers’ council at Porsche for
the dual role assumed by Ferdinand Piëch, who was also CEO of Audi AG. Porsche employees
were concerned that there was a conflict of interest. At the same time, Ferdinand Piëch was
probably the most knowledgeable person on Porsche’s board when it came to cars
and operations: he was the person behind Audi’s strategic repositioning in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.

In 1992, the Porsche and Piëch families were headed by “Ferry” Porsche and his sister Louise
Piëch. The total stake of the Porsche and Piëch families in Porsche AG was worth about $420
million.9 The two families owned all Porsche’s voting shares, which were not traded publicly
and represented 50% of the total stocks. The remaining shares were preference stocks with no
voting rights, and it was estimated that 40% of them were also under the control of the
families.10

8 “Porsche holders criticize supervisory board at meeting”, Dow Jones News Service, March 13, 1992.
9 “A family affair”, Forbes, April 27, 1992.
10 “Stalled Porsche – But is there a U-turn in its future?”, Barron’s, June 27, 1988.

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Porsche in the 1970s

In 1972 the company was taken public, with the Porsche and Piëch families holding the
majority of the voting stock. One year later, the name “Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG” was
officially registered. That year the oil crisis hit, and Porsche was in a difficult position: its
air-cooled six-cylinder 911 was not suited for low gas consumption. Porsche used its good
ties with Audi and in 1975 launched the Porsche 924, a four-cylinder car built in
collaboration with Audi. While the car did meet the objective of being an entry model with
lower consumption than the 911, it was never accepted as a “true” Porsche and received the
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nickname “secretary Porsche” in Germany. The 924 was the first model in a line of four-
cylinder sports cars, followed by the 944 in 1981/2 and the 968 in 1991/2. The original 924
sold more than 100,000 units during its lifetime and generated volume for the Porsche and
Audi factories. The 968 was derived from the 944, but more than 80% of its parts were
designed from scratch.

By the 1970s, the Porsche 911 had been in continuous production for almost ten years with
only cosmetic changes. Dr. Fuhrmann was convinced that the time had come to replace the
six-cylinder, air-cooled Porsche 911 with a car sporting a more modern design, larger engine
and better sales appeal. This car was to be the 928, a high-performance sports car with a
light-metal alloy, water-cooled V8 front-engine and larger interior, designed from scratch
with Porsche’s usual attention to detail: all its parts were designed exclusively for this car.
The 928 was introduced in 1977/8 at a price point above the 911. This decision created
increasing tensions with the owner families, especially with “Butzi” and “Ferry” Porsche, the
family members behind the 911. The increasing tensions led to the decision to replace Dr.
Fuhrmann with a new CEO whose strategy was more in line with that of the owner families.

Porsche in the 1980s

In 1981, Peter Schutz, a German-American engineer and passionate aviator, was named new
CEO. At that time, the US market accounted for only 27% of Porsche’s total unit sales. Schutz
decided to increase sales in this important market, with success:11 by 1985, sales in the US
had risen to 54% of the total. 12 Moreover, the US dollar – Deutsche Mark exchange rate
during the mid-1980s gave Porsche a windfall profit from North American sales. At more
than 3 DM per US dollar during 1984 and 1985, Porsche was able to make some strategic
investments. In 1985, a new paint shop was built at the Zuffenhausen facilities. It allowed for
an unlimited color range (“Porsche can match the color of the car to the nail polish of your
wife,” it was said) and had a capacity of 50,000 cars per year. In 1986, Porsche also
completed the installation of a facility for engine and drive-train testing as well as new wind
tunnels for both full-size cars and one-quarter-scale models.13 Schutz also launched one of
Porsche’s most expensive projects: the legendary 959, priced at DM 420,000 (or $220,000) in
1987. By 1989 collectors were willing to pay more than DM 1,000,000 for one of the 300

11 “American to Depart as Head of Porsche”, New York Times, December 17, 1987
12 Ludvigsen, K. “Porsche, excellence was expected: the comprehensive history of the company, its cars, and its racing heritage”,
Vol. 1-3, Bentley Publishers, 2008.
13 Ludvigsen, op. cit.

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

units produced. While the 959 was impressive in its engineering achievements, the cost of the
whole program added up to $204 million. The production lines of the 959 were also
criticized: cars were hand-assembled in the upper story of a former bakery next to the
Porsche factory requiring, at the outset, a high level of labor input, amounting to 3,200 man-
hours per car.14 Schutz also expanded the 911 line by launching, in 1982, the SC Cabriolet
model, a convertible version of their classic 911.

Although Porsche had an extremely good technical and creative design staff, this entailed
problems for the production people, in particular. The design of type 944, for example,
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specified 85% new parts just to provide more power.15 The same principle held true for the
design of the 964 model during the Schutz period. The 964 was supposed to share many parts
and components with the 911, but eventually only 13-15% of the parts were transferred to
the new model.

During the early 1980s, Porsche was spending approximately 15% of sales on R&D – versus
4% to 6% in other car companies. A large percentage of this money was spent on Porsche’s
legendary research center in Weissach. Originally founded in the 1972, the center continued
Porsche’s tradition as a technology development company. Clients of Weissach included
companies such as Ferrari, Audi or even Opel and many industry experts considered the
2,200 engineers, designers, mechanics and technicians to be the best in the automotive
world. Even with these significant expenditures in R&D Porsche was generating high profits
in the early 1980s. The owner families received their annual dividends and benefitted from
the increasing share price: by 1985, Porsche’s share price rose to a peak of $525 (from a
launch of $300).16

But clouds were gathering on the horizon: Schutz’s strategy of increasing sales in North
America to 60% of unit volume had exposed the company to a considerable foreign
exchange rate risk (see Exhibit 6). By the end of 1986, the dollar had fallen below 2 DM and
Porsche had to increase prices in North America. In 1987, after a continued drop of the dollar
and increased competition, 17 sales in the USA fell more than 20% (24,000 units against
30,471 a year earlier). Instead of getting better, things got worse: on October 19, 1987 the
stock market crashed – and with it the liquidity of many of Porsche’s typical clients, such as
stock brokers and investment bankers. As a result, at the end of that year Porsche’s market
value fell by 30%. The company’s management was not too optimistic and Hans Halbach,
director of sales, opined: “People who buy our type of car, regardless of the price, are so
closely involved with the stock market and the economy in general that they simply say ‘wait
and see’ before taking a decision.”18

In November 1987, the company announced cuts in production and short-shift work,
affecting 5,500 workers. During the first quarter of 1988, production was stopped for several
weeks at Porsche’s factory in Zuffenhausen. Schutz justified the measure, pointing out that,

14 Ludvigsen, op. cit.

15 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
16 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
17 “American to Depart as Head of Porsche”, New York Times, December 17, 1987
18 Ludvigsen. op. cit

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“we would have ended up with a lot of unsold inventory, which is no way to run this
business.”19 In the middle of the crisis, the Piëch family, who were not very supportive of
Schutz’s strategies, put pressure on the supervisory board and Schutz was dismissed
(December 1987). He was replaced by Heinz Branitzki, who at the time was director of
finance and seen by many as an interim CEO.

Mr. Branitzki took over on January 1, 1988 and was faced with the effects of the market
crash of October 1987, a weak dollar and a general economic downturn. In this time of crisis
the families had turned to a person who had experience in financial matters and who knew
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the limits of the small company.20 Branitzki steered the company away from currency risk
exposure by reducing Porsche’s dependency on the US market and cutting the workforce by
more than 300.21

Even though Branitzki had a relatively short spell as Porsche’s CEO, he made several strategic
decisions for the company. One of these decisions involved the future of the 944 model series
(including the 944S and 944 Turbo). The 944 was a high performance sports car with a four-
cylinder engine, but was never seen as a true Porsche by the critics. It was supposed to be an
affordable car, but as it was contract manufactured by the VW-Audi Neckarsulm plant,
Porsche didn’t have total control over the production costs. As a result, the 944 didn’t report
high profits for Porsche, as Branitzki acknowledged: “the profitability of the four-cylinder
range is modest, but it nevertheless still brings a positive financial contribution.” In 1989, the
management board took the decision to bring back to the underutilized Zuffenhausen
facilities the production of the four-cylinder models, sharing assembly lines with the eight-
cylinder 928 model. Paul Hensler, from the development team, stated: “We felt if we built it
here it would be cheaper.” 22 Two years later, the first 944s were being assembled at the
Stuttgart facilities.

The unused capacity of Porsche’s facilities (as a result of the crisis) became an important
topic for the company. Following the manufacturing decision concerning the 944s, Porsche
decided to sell not only its engineering capacity, but also their production capacity. In 1989,
Porsche started negotiations with Daimler-Benz, and one year later, Zuffenhausen was
assembling the first unit of the Mercedes-Benz 500E,23 the top version of Mercedes’ E line.

Another important decision was taken in 1988, when Branitzki announced an investment of
$546 million to develop a new model that would replace the 928 and 944 series in the
following years. With this decision, Branitzki tried to move the company away from
the strengthening competition (particularly from the Japanese24) by developing a model to
address higher niches of the market. The result was the 989, a visually stunning four-door25

19 Ludvigsen, op. cit.

20 Viehöver, U. “Der Porsche Chef”, Campus Verlag, 2003.
21 “Porsche reverses two-year slump, profits soar”, Reuters News, January 24, 1990.
22 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
23 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
24 The Nissan 300ZX cost 36% less than the Porsche 944S2, but was very close in performance according to critics.
25 While there were previous experiments to incorporate room for four passengers in the 911, the 989 was the first model to be
designed with that specific purpose.

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

next-generation vehicle powered by a water-cooled V8 engine. However, the ambitious

project was cancelled a year later due to high costs and low sales projections.26

Although Branitzki’s efforts helped sales to rise 2% in the 1988/1989 fiscal year, the owner
families were not satisfied with the results: “Ferry” Porsche told Branitzki: “We want to see
better numbers.” 27 Toward the end of 1989, the 60-year-old Branitzki announced his
retirement after completing what analysts said was the turn-around of Porsche.28 In spite of
Porsche’s apparent success being back on track, sales were still stagnant and there was a
weak product line-up. That year, a US Porsche dealer commented:
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“Look outside my showroom. The 911 is an old car. The 928 is an old car. The 944 is an old
car. So what if they’ve finally made a cabriolet out of the 944, and reintroduced the
Speedster concept. They’re still old cars. And now, they’re very, very expensive.”29

The supervisory board, lead by “Ferry” Porsche, was looking for a new CEO. Among the
possible candidates there were leading executives from Mercedes-Benz and BMW, but none
of them was really interested in taking the helm of Porsche. Robert (“Bob”) Lutz, one of the
most famous US automotive managers, and then with Chrysler, stated: “I don’t believe that
the family would let me do my job.”30 Finally, 42-year-old Arno Bohn, a marketing man,
accomplished pianist, private pilot and former CEO of the German computer maker Nixdorf
Computer AG was chosen to replace Branitzki in 1990. Bohn was determined to continue the
restructuring of global sales that his predecessor had started (see Exhibit 7).

Porsche in the Early 1990s

Bohn’s arrival coincided with the decision of 80-year-old “Ferry” Porsche to step down as
chairman of the supervisory board. The position was filled by “Ferry’s” eldest son, Ferdinand
Alexander “Butzi” Porsche. When Bohn took control as Porsche’s CEO in March 1990, the
company was optimistic: their profits in the first half of the fiscal year had doubled to $44
million and they were expecting further improvements.31

Unfortunately, the upswing was short-lived: in 1991, Porsche AG reported a 70% fall in its
group net profit. Bohn said:

“You cannot expect quick results in one or two years. But in a cycle of four to six years,
which are also needed to develop a new car, Porsche will have success…. Two years ago

26 Ludvigsen, op. cit.

27 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
28 “Porsche chairman Branitzki to retire in 1990”, Reuters News, December 5, 1989.
29 “Porsche and Audi: can these two Germans regain their strength in the US or will they become the Quick and the Dead?”,
Automotive Industries, October 1, 1989.
30 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
31 “Porsche profits doubles in first half of business year”, Reuters News, March 9, 1990.

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

we had to sell 29,000 cars a year to cover costs. Now the figure has come down to near
21,000 units.”32

By the end of the fiscal year 1991/1992, the company reported a 19% decline in sales, and
pretax profits collapsed to two million Deutsche Marks, from 64 million one year
previously. 33 According to industry experts, Porsche was blaming the luxury goods tax
imposed by the US government. However, some critics suggested other factors might be
behind the poor performance: Japanese luxury automakers were enjoying unchanged, or
even increased, sales that year (see Exhibit 8).34
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In addition to the declining financial results, Bohn faced the departure of many of Porsche’s
key directors, including Ulrich Bez, head of research and development, Hans Holbach,
marketing director and Rudi Noppen, the head of production. To make things worse, there
were growing rumors of a takeover by another car manufacturer. After all, Porsche was one
of the only sports-car makers that was still independent (in 1989, Chrysler had bought
Lamborghini and Ford had acquired Jaguar). Bohn said: “It’s not always the big fat ones that
eat the smaller ones. Sometimes the faster ones have the advantage.”35

During his time at Porsche, Bohn made some important decisions: he started the Boxster
project (introduced in 1996), pushed the development of the four-door Porsche 989 (with
development costs of DM300 million – cancelled in January 1991), initiated a strategy of
using common parts across platforms, and worked on an engine assembly line that could be
used for two different engines: that of the 911 and the Boxster. He also initiated a system of
consensus decision-making, involving R&D, finance, marketing, controlling, production and
other areas in important decisions.

Bohn entered in disagreement with Ferdinand Piëch when he claimed that the latter misused
his position as member of the advisory board to gain access to Porsche R&D material, which
later found its way into Audi products (Audi TT). Piëch, a no-nonsense top executive with
decades of experience in the automotive industry and a personality with “little need for
harmony” decided to remove Bohn from his Christmas card list, and worked towards his
removal from Porsche.36

In 1992, Mr. Bohn’s contract with Porsche was up for renewal. By then, the owner families
had lost a lot of the faith they had put into Bohn, and in the meeting dedicated to deciding
whether or not to prolong Bohn’s contract he didn’t achieve the necessary majority. In a
preemptive move, Bohn informed the board that he would like to know within a week
whether his contract would be prolonged or not – otherwise he would not be available
anymore. In an emergency meeting (March 1992), the board prolonged his contract for
another three years.

32 “Porsche sees renewed success in 4-6 years”, Reuters News, March 8, 1992.
33 “Reason for Porsche exec departure nuclear”, Reuters News, September 23, 1992.
34 “Living Dangerously in the Fast Lane: The background to the current difficulties afflicting the luxury sports car maker”,
Financial Times, September 18, 1991.
35 “Porsche’s Bohn faces tough assignment – New CEO seeks to maintain impressive Comeback”, The Wall Street Journal, May
18,1990.
36 Viehöver, U. “Der Porsche Chef”, Campus Verlag, 2003.

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

Tensions mounted as complaints grew that Bohn lacked automotive experience, meddled too
much in PR (for instance, ordering promotional photos to be reshot because he didn’t like the
way the light was reflected), and operated in a grey zone regarding the airplane rentals for
his frequent travels (the rental company was owned by him and his brother). By September
25, 1992 Bohn had handed in his resignation. Once again the old saying at Porsche had come
true: “It is very difficult to work for a family business, but it is almost impossible to work in
a two-family business.”

The new “speaker of the management board” was Dr. Wendelin Wiedeking, taking over the
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leadership of Porsche during a period of falling sales and numerous rumors of a pending
takeover of the company by BMW, Mercedes, VW – or Toyota (the latter was supposed to
have offered DM3 billion for Porsche).

The Porsche Production Process

In 1950, Porsche engines were built in the Porsche factory in Zuffenhausen (near Stuttgart),
while body production and the final vehicle assembly were conducted in Reutter Coachworks,
located just across the street. In 1953, Porsche built a new facility for the engine and vehicle
assembly. In 1964, shortly after the introduction of the 911, Porsche acquired the Reutter car
body factory and integrated it into the company’s production process. In 1969, Porsche
finished a new three-story building in the Zuffenhausen facilities, which provided an
additional area of about 15,000 square meters, increasing production capacity from 15,000 to
19,000 units per year. The new building also included a new paint shop that provided more
colors and improved prime-coating and corrosion protection processes. The ground floor was
dedicated to the reception and inspection of suppliers’ components, while the upper two
floors were configured as assembly halls. On the top floor, bodies from the paint shop were
prepared and then sent for final assembly to the second floor. This floor also housed the
suspension and powertrain subassembly. The other key process, namely engine assembly,
continued to take place in the old facility built in 1953.

In 1983, Porsche hired a promising new recruit, a recent graduate with a Ph.D. in engineering
(summa cum laude): Dr. Wendelin Wiedeking. He entered the department of the famous
automotive expert Prof. Rudi Noppen, head of production at Porsche. Dr. Wiedeking’s first
project was to manage the building of a new, state-of-the-art paint shop, in tight cooperation
with suppliers Dürr and BASF. By 1986, the new paint shop was finished, increasing the
body-painting capacity to 140 daily units. In a follow-up project, Wiedeking was part of a
team put in charge of remodeling the body-shop. During these projects, Wiedeking had the
opportunity to work with Peter Schutz, Porsche’s CEO at the time. “Schutz was an excellent
CEO,” Wiedeking said, “but without enough detailed knowledge to understand what’s
happening in R&D and production. You have to understand your key processes; in an
automobile company these are vital.”37

Based on his good results and hard work, top management elected Wiedeking to join a
special team: the twelve-member strategy task force, created in April 1988, with the objective

37 Ludvigsen, op. cit.

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

of developing plans for a severe headcount reduction. They were to identify the “non-
productive” employees and workers among the 4,000 employed by Porsche, with the help of
a leading consulting company. The consultants were specialized in helping companies whose
costs were out of hand, processes ineffective and headcounts too high. The project resulted in
a list of 1,000 people – 25% of “Porscheaners” – but nothing happened: instead of
implementing the results of the work of the task force, Porsche’s CEO shelved the plan and
actually hired an additional 300 engineers for the R&D center. Disillusioned by these results,
Wiedeking decided to leave the company in 1988 and joined Porsche’s supplier Glyco Metall-
Werke AG as a division manager. Two years later, he was named CEO and Chairman of the
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Board of Management of Glyco. During that time, Wiedeking had the opportunity to learn
about what American and Japanese firms were doing in terms of parts flow and setup times.
Moreover, Wiedeking recalled: “At Glyco I also learned what a car manufacturer should not
do with a supplier.”38

In 1988, Porsche built a new body shell manufacturing plant (Werk 5) with an investment of
DM125 million and a capacity of 30,000 units per year. The new body assembly hall was
connected to the paint shop by an enclosed conveyor bridge. For the first time in the
company’s history, the new body plant was equipped with 15 robots, controlled
electronically, that were able to spot-weld any kind of body. This and other projects were
under the control of Prof. Noppen, Porsche’s famous head of production. His management of
Porsche’s production was numbers-driven and he was rarely seen on the production floor.
Production processes at the company had grown historically – as had its facilities in
Zuffenhausen – and Noppen always stayed in contact with members of the Porsche family.
He introduced cellular manufacturing methods in some areas of engine assembly – but the
final assembly of an engine was always done by one highly experienced worker, and by one
worker only. One of Noppen’s pet projects was a sophisticated warehouse: at the time it was
the most modern one in Europe and housed all parts needed for production, with an
estimated inventory of DM40-50 million (see Exhibit 9 for more details).

The introduction of Porsche’s different model lines (four cylinder – 924/944/968, six cylinder
911 and eight cylinder 928), as well as different versions (Cabrio, Coupé), had resulted in a
system whereby Porsche cars were travelling all across Germany. For example, the
production process of a 968 Cabriolet (convertible) started at Karmann, an automotive
supplier in Osnabrück (northern Germany), with the building of the 968 Cabriolet body. Next,
the body was transported to Zuffenhausen, and the engine, gearbox and powertrain were
added, after which the car would be transported to nearby Heilbronn to receive its soft-top
(imported from the US), as well as other work on the interior. Finally, the almost finished car
was shipped back to Zuffenhausen for final assembly and quality control – where many
errors had to be corrected by a team of highly qualified engineers. Some models, such as the
924, were completely outsourced: the car was built, assembled and shipped from the Audi
plant in Neckarsulm, some 50km away. Due to its relatively low price and high labor costs,
the 924 (as well as its follow-up models) were barely profitable for Porsche. Some thought
that one of the reasons might have been Noppen’s lack of interest in managing the

38 Ludvigsen, op. cit.

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

relationship with Audi: instead of coordinating the processes with Audi personally, he sent
marketing and sales people – most of whom were good business people, but not engineers.39

By 1991, Noppen’s management of production was under severe criticism by a Porsche board
member: Ferdinand Piëch, CEO of Audi. While Noppen had introduced robots, built a new
and environmentally friendly paint shop and installed the most advanced warehouse in
Europe, his processes generated too many problems with quality, all of which had to be
repaired at the end of the production line. On September 30, 1991, Noppen left the company
and was followed by a man he had once hired from university: Dr. Wendelin Wiedeking, new
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head of production and former Porsche employee, returning to the company after three years
of absence.

By 1992, Zuffenhausen facilities had the latest production technology, but, “compared to
other auto plants, Porsche’s buildings were still crowded, still less than ideally convenient.”40
It was not unusual to find 28 days’ worth of stocks of parts waiting to be assembled. The
company sold air- and water-cooled, front- or rear-mounted, four-, six- and eight-cylinder
engine cars, generating a total unit volume of less than 25,000 units. The number of
suppliers was about 1,000. In 1991, the 911 required 120 hours of direct and indirect labor.
Although there were ample inspections between work stations,41 rarely was a finished vehicle
considered to be without defect, thus increasing the cost of production due to reworks.
Porsche’s model development was generally driven by engineering, and issues relating to
cost, profitability, distribution, processes and logistics took a backseat to performance and
R&D. Industry experts pointed out that “their manufacturing operation needs more efficiency
and less inspected-in-quality (both help keep costs high).” 42 While the global automotive
industry was undergoing a process of change during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Porsche
was continuing with its own traditional approach to production, using high tech and
sophisticated processes.43

The Competitive Environment

In the late 1980s, the market for luxury sports cars was taking a new shape. The European
automakers started to face increasing competition from Honda, Nissan and Toyota, who
wanted to enter the market segment with high quality, aggressively priced cars. By 1991
Porsche’s share in this segment had dropped to 50%. Porsche was aware that it needed to
reduce costs to be able to face the growing competition from Japanese auto makers.

For several years, the Japanese companies had gained market share in the low-to-middle price
sector. In the US, the market share of the Japanese companies grew from 21.2% in 1982 to
30.2% in 1991. The Japanese began moving up-market with the introduction of several

39 Viehöver, U. “Der Porsche Chef”, Campus Verlag, 2003.

40 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
41 Ludvigsen, op. cit.
42 “Porsche and Audi: can these two Germans regain their strength in the US or will they become the quick and the dead?”,
Automotive industries, October 1, 1989.
43 Viehöver, U. “Der Porsche Chef”, Campus Verlag, 2003.

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

low/medium-range sports cars, such as the Toyota Supra, the Mazda RX7 (which had a strong
resemblance to the Porsche 924), the Nissan 300ZX and the Acura NSX. All of these were
catalogued as high-performance sports cars, but with lower price tags than most of the
European competitors (in 1991, Porsche’s product range was priced between $40,000 for
the 944 and more than $95,000 for the 911 Turbo). By 1990, the sales of Japanese
low/medium-range sports cars represented 51.5% of the total US sales of the segment (see
Exhibits 10 to 12). The natural next step was to target the upscale car market.

Honda was the first Japanese automotive company to introduce a luxury product line. In
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1986, the company entered the US market through a new dealer network called Acura,
delivering two luxury models: Legend and Integra.44 In 1990, Acura decided to target the
upper end of the Porsche line with the introduction of the Acura NSX, which at $61,000
became the most expensive Japanese car sold so far in the US. In a review of the NSX The
New York Times said: “Maybe the best sports car that ever was”. Demand for the NSX was so
high that the price was risen to $75,000 – nevertheless, Acura expected to sell the 3,000
allotted to the USA.

In 1989, Nissan and Toyota followed Honda’s strategy with the Infiniti and Lexus labels,
respectively. The Infiniti cars were specifically designed for American buyers. Their first two
models included the Q45, a four-door sedan, and the M30, a sports coupe and direct
competitor of the Acura Legend. The Infiniti range was launched with a strategy aimed at
ensuring exclusivity and a proper dealer network.45

Toyota was the last of the big Japanese companies to enter the luxury auto sector. The
company began their upscale plans in 1983 at a top-secret session, where Toyota’s CEO, Eiji
Toyoda, posed this question to the technical staff: “Can we create a luxury car to challenge
the very best?”46 The company then created the F147 project, which gave birth, six years and
half a billion dollars later,48 to the four-door V-8 sedan Lexus LS400, which, by 1991, had
become the best-selling luxury import car in the US, ahead of Mercedes-Benz.49 The LS400
arrived in the market along with the ES250, a V6-engined car based on the Toyota Camry. In
June 1991, Lexus launched a third vehicle, an eight-cylinder sports coupe, the SC400,
addressed to “the baby boomers moving up in age, income and lifestyle.”50

Infiniti and Lexus arrived at a moment when the Japanese were gaining market share:
In 1988, US sales for Acura soared 17%, while BMW and Mercedes-Benz were seeing drops
in sales of 16.5% and 6.8%, respectively.51 Industry experts pointed out: “The ones hurt the
most are going to be the Europeans, because their cars are too expensive. Customers can
afford to buy the European cars, but they won’t because they don’t think they are worth the

44 “Toyota Plans to Follow Honda, Nissan Into Crowded U.S. Luxury-Car Market”, The Wall Street Journal, August 25, 1987.
45 “Nissan readies Infiniti to break into ultraluxury auto market”, Chicago Sun Times, January 4, 1989.
46 Dawson, C. “Lexus, the Relentless Pursuit”, Jon Wiley & Sons, 2004.
47 The F1 name stood for “flagship number 1 vehicle”.
48 Dawson, op. cit.
49 “Upmarket Japanese cars move into fast lane”, The Financial Post, October 18, 1991.
50 “Lexus: luxury sport coupe aims to combine luxury, value”, The Associated Press, June 12, 1991.
51 “Luxury races. Japanese are taking on the Germans”, The Orange County Register, February 12, 1989.

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

extra cost…. The Acura, Infiniti and Lexus can offer the same technology found in European
imports at a better price.”52 By 1991, Japanese luxury sports cars dominated the market with
47% share of the segment53, and the sales forecasts were rising due to the new entries.

In the early 1990s, the makers of exotic luxury sports cars had nothing to celebrate: By 1992,
Ferrari, controlled by Italy’s auto giant Fiat SpA, reported a 20% fall in sales with respect to
the previous year and announced layoffs of almost 1,000 workers.54 Lamborghini (bought by
Chrysler in 1989) reported a drop in sales of about 40%.55 Maserati (owned in part by Fiat
SpA) announced plans to close its biggest plant by the end of 1992. General Motors had
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acquired Lotus in 1986 and 51% of Saab in 1990. Ford purchased 75% of Aston Martin and
bought Jaguar in 1989.56 Many industry experts opined that the same fate was in store for
Porsche, the last independent sports car maker in the world. It was up to Dr. Wiedeking to
prove them wrong. The question was: how?

52 “Luxury races. Japanese are taking on the Germans”, The Orange County Register, February 12, 1989.
53 “The Automobile Industry”, Bernstein Research, September 1992.
54 “Gloomy Christmas for Ferrari workers”, Reuters News, November 30, 1992.
55 “Exotic car sales, values no longer ‘recession-proof’”, Automotive News, September 28, 1992.
56 “U.S. cars come back”, Fortune, November 16, 1992.

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

Exhibit 1
Key Milestones in Porsche History (from 1938 to 1992)
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Type 60 (1938) Type 356/2 (1948)

Type 356C (1964) Type 911 (1964)

Type 912 (1966) Type 914 (1970)

Type 924 (1976) Type 928 (1987)

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Source: http://www.porsche.com.
Type 911 (1989)
Type 944 (1982)
Exhibit 1 (continued)

Type 968 (1992)

Type 959 (1986)

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

Exhibit 2
Porsche Milestones

1875 Ferdinand Porsche is born in Maffersdorf.

1900 The Lohner-Porsche electric car is presented at the Paris World Fair.
1906 Ferdinand Porsche is hired as technical director at Austro-Daimler.
1909 Ferdinand Anton Ernst “Ferry” Porsche is born in Wiener Neustadt.
1923 Ferdinand Porsche is hired as technical director and board member at Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft.
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1931 Porsche founds Dr. Ing. H.c. F. Porsche GmbH.

1934 The German government contracts Porsche to build a prototype of the Volkswagen.
1948 Porsche launches Type 356, the first sports car built under the Porsche name.
1951 Ferdinand Porsche dies at the age of 75. “Ferry” Porsche takes control of the company.
1964 Porsche introduces the 911 model.
1972 Porsche becomes a public limited company (Porsche AG) with the Porsche and Piëch families on the
supervisory board. Dr. Ernst Fuhrmann is named the first CEO of the company.
1977 Porsche launches the 928, a front-engine sports car.
1987 Porsche AG sales slump as the stock market crashes.
1992 Dr. Wendelin Wiedeking takes control as CEO of Porsche AG.

Source: http//www.porsche.com.

Exhibit 3
Map of Germany and the Region of Stuttgart

Z uffe nha use n

520km

Autobahn (Freeway)
A uto b a hn (F r eew a y)

Bundesstrasse
B und esstr a sse
(la r g e r o a d )
(Main road)

Source: Google Maps.

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

Exhibit 4
Key Milestones in Porsche History (from 1934 to 1992)

Launch Horse- power Max. Speed Weight

Type Year (hp) (km/h) (kg) Description
60 1934 25 62 840 Known as the Volkswagen Beetle
110 1938 - - - Small tractor
312/313 1945 - - - Gasoline/diesel tractor
328 1946 - - - 28-bhp tractor
356 1949 40 135 680 Porsche No. 1, 4-cylinder, mid-engine two-seater sports car
356A 1956 44-100 200 780 - 930 Improved model, 1,600 cc engine
356B 1960 60-115 200 845 - 900 Improved body, higher bumpers/headlights
356C 1964 75-130 200 845 - 900 Improved body, disk breaks
550 1953 110 220 590 Mid-engine, two-seater sports/racing car
904 1963 180 258 655 Mid-engine GT competition coupe
911 1964 130 210 1,080 6-cylinder, air-cooled, rear-engine sports car
911 Carrera RS 1972 210 245 960 2.7-liter racing engine
911 Turbo 1974 260 250 1,195 3.0-liter turbo charger boosted engine
912 1965 90 185 970 4-cylinder version of type 911
912E 1975 90 180 1,050 Fuel-injected, 4-cylinder
914 1969 80-110 201 950 - 980 Mid-engine, 4-cylinder,
917 1969 580 340 800 4.5/5.0 liter engine, sports/racing coupe
924 1976 125 200 1,080 Front-engine, 4-cylinder, water-cooled sports car
928 1977 240 230 1,450 V8 front-engine, 2-door coupe sports car
944 1982 150 220 1,180 2.5 liter, 4-cylinder entry level sports car
959 1986 450 317 1,450 Rear engine, 4-wheel drive, 6-cylinder water-cooled
964 1989 247 262 1,374 - 1,475 911 Carrera 2 and 4 production model
968 1992 240 252 1,370 Front-engine, 4-cylinder, successor of 944

Source: Adapted from: (a) Ludvigsen, K. “Porsche, excellence was expected: the comprehensive history of the company, its cars, and its racing heritage”, Vol. 1-3, Bentley Publishers, 2008;
(b) http://www.porsche.com/usa/accessoriesandservices/classic/world/models.

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

Exhibit 5
The Porsche Family Tree

Ferdinand Porsche Aloisia Johanna

(1875 – 1951) Kaes
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Louise Porsche Anton Piëch

(1904 – 1999) (1894 – 1952)

Piëch
(1929 – )

Louise Daxer
Piëch
(1932 – 2006)

FerdinandPiëch
(1937 – )

Hans-Michel
Piëch
(1942 – )

Ferdinand Anton
Ernst Porsche Dorothea Reitz
(1909 – 1998)

Ferdinand
Alexander Porsche
(1935 – )

Gerhard Porsche
(1938 – )

Hans-Peter
Porsche
(1940 – )

Wolfgang Porsche
(1940 – )

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Porsche: The Crisis of 1992 P-1100-E

Exhibit 6
DM/US$ Exchange Rate
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Exhibit 7
Porsche CEOs from 1972 to 1992

Ernst Fuhrmann: 1972 – 1980

Long-time company employee; experienced engineer; good relationship with “Ferry”
Porsche; wanted to replace the 911 with the 928.

Peter Schutz: 1980 – 1987

German-American; reversed Fuhrmann’s decision and continued the 911 line; expanded
aggressively in North America; built the Porsche research center in Weissach and invested in
expanding the Zuffenhausen factory; company hit by the Wallstreet Crash in October 1986,
sales in USA start a downward spiral.

Heinz Branitzki: 1987 – 1990

Background in finance; good relationship with owner families; hired to get company back
into profitability; automotive press sees him as an interim CEO. Puts together a team to study
cost reductions and lean initiatives; Dr. W. Wiedeking is a member of this team. The plan
developed by the team is not implemented.

Arno Bohn: 1990 – 1992

Background in marketing – former CEO of Nixdorf (leaves Nixdorf before bankruptcy);
excellent communicator, pilot, pianist; Harvard MBA. Starts cost-cutting initiatives and the
development of Boxster. Run-in with F. Piëch regarding proprietary technology of Boxster
(claimed that Piëch used his access to Porsche to get ideas for Audi TT – was proved wrong).

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P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

Exhibit 8
Porsche’s Financial Results

85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92

Sales (million DM) 3,567 3,408 2,482 2,526 3,045 3,092 2,693
Vehicle sales (units) 53,254 49,976 31,362 29,017 31,235 26,179 23,060
Vehicle production (units) 53,625 50,715 32,183 30,196 32,363 26,486 23,234
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Total assets (million DM) 1,464 1,525 1,514 1,655

Shareholder’s equity (million DM) 506 532 592 631 683
Capital expenditures (million DM) 272 272 236 182 198 291
Depreciation (million DM) 180 182 171 182 185 171 174
Cash flow (million DM) 286 278 232 282 304
Operating profit (million DM) 98 165 120 60
Net income (million DM) 75 52 25 54 68 17 -66
Dividends (million DM) 22 15 15 16 18

Source: Compiled from FACTIVA data base

Exhibit 9
Porsche’s Production Process at the Zuffenhausen Facilities in 199257
The production process of a Porsche started with the body shell assembly in a large
warehouse known as Werk V (factory 5). In this process, components were welded together to
form car body subassemblies. The welding process was supported by 15 computer-controlled
robots. After a visual inspection, the body was transferred to the paint shop by means of a
conveyor bridge that connected the body shell assembly building with the painting facility.

In the paint shop, the bodies passed through several steps: pre-treatment, cathodic dip
priming, undersealing, filler coating and top coating. After painting, the bodies were moved
to the second floor of the multi-story assembly building. In parallel, two other processes took
place: engine assembly and upholstery.

Engines were assembled in dedicated parallel lines. Each line was equipped with pneumatic
and electric bolting systems to support the assembly operation. Once the engine was
assembled, it passed to the engine test rig (also called the “hot test”). After testing, the engine
was connected to the transmission.

The upholstery process involved activities to produce the leather interior variants of a
Porsche. It was characterized by a high degree of craftsmanship and was located in a high-
bay warehouse built in 1982.

57 Adapted from http://www.porsche.com. History of Porsche Production and Tour of Production Operations at Porsche Zuffenhausen.

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Exhibit 9 (continued)

All subassemblies were sent to the multi-story building for vehicle assembly. On the second
floor, the subassemblies were installed and the carpeting was fitted. Windows were also
prepared and fitted. Next, the bodies were lowered to the first floor for assembly. The body
was then raised to enable work in the underbody area. The next step was assembling the
engine, transmission and axles into the painted body. The engine and drivetrain were then
joined with the body in an operation called “the marriage.” Finally, the wheels were fitted
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and seats and doors installed.

The finished vehicles were then transferred to the ground floor for final assembly. All
required fluids were added for the initial tests. Then, the vehicle was aligned, the headlights
adjusted and all systems checked. Finally, a thorough inspection was carried out by a team of
engineers, followed by extensive driving tests and shipment.

Paint Shop

Pre- Cathodic dip

Undersealing
treatment priming

Subassemblies Filler
Top coating coating

Body shell
assembly
Vehicle Assembly

Interior
Upholstery equipment Carpeting Windows
fitting fitting
installation

Engine Engine, Drivetrain –

Underbody transmission chassis Wheels /
Assembly components Seats fitting
& axles bolting

Outsourced Fluids Headlights Systems Final

subassemblies filling adjustment check inspection

Driving Finished
tests PORSCHE

Source: Based on data from http://www.porsche.com.

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Exhibit 10
US Market Share – Domestic vs. Foreign (Cars, Trucks, Total), in percentage

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Cars
Domestic 72.50 74.2 76.1 74.2 71.7 67.7 69.4 67.9 65.8 64.3
Japanese 21.20 19.9 18.2 19.7 20.4 23.2 22.7 25.4 27.9 30.2
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Other 6.30 5.9 5.7 6.1 7.9 9.2 7.9 6.8 6.3 5.6

Trucks
Domestic 86.7 85.6 82.8 80.9 79.7 81.6 85.5 85.8 84.4 83.4
Japanese 12.2 13.7 16.7 18.7 20.0 18.0 14.3 14.0 15.3 16.3
Other 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2

Total
Domestic 76.0 77.1 78.1 76.2 74.1 72.3 74.7 74.0 72.2 70.9
Japanese 19.0 18.3 17.7 19.4 20.3 21.5 19.9 21.5 23.6 25.4
Other 5.0 4.6 4.2 4.4 5.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 4.3 3.7

Source: The Automotive Industry, Bernstein Research, September 1992.

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Exhibit 11
US Car Sales – Low/Mid Sports Segment
Includes GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, Honda, European and Korean
Automakers

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

GM volume 354,070 159,909 288,534 291,634 397,071 390,448 325,785 232,344 185,279 152,460 116,179 78,418
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GM % of segment 35.3% 21.7% 30.7% 30.5% 32.6% 31.2% 27.8% 22.2% 17.9% 14.0% 10.9% 8.8%
Ford volume 225,090 227,704 171,654 141,244 169,509 157,821 167,699 172,602 247,843 294,798 235,269 177,742
Ford % of segment 22.4% 30.9% 18.3% 14.8% 13.9% 12.6% 14.3% 16.5% 23.9% 27.1% 22.0% 20.0%
Chrysler volume 22,620 26,016 108,175 127,925 203,966 215,865 166,379 180,499 184,382 182,508 159,488 108,277
Chrysler % of segment 2.3% 3.5% 11.5% 13.4% 16.8% 17.3% 14.2% 17.3% 17.8% 16.8% 14.9% 12.2%
Toyota volume 162,476 120,025 149,736 144,808 115,084 136,358 175,686 173,779 151,608 162,909 235,150 237,938
Toyota % of segment 16.2% 16.3% 15.9% 15.1% 9.5% 10.9% 15.0% 16.6% 14.6% 15.0% 22.0% 26.7%
Nissan volume 92,514 76,024 101,413 93,341 100,750 115,608 93,212 91,850 76,217 92,122 60,302 39,233
Nissan % of segment 9.2% 10.3% 10.8% 9.8% 8.3% 9.2% 8.0% 8.8% 7.3% 8.5% 5.6% 4.4%
Honda volume 50,676 43,450 37,872 41,188 114,369 133,424 146,470 120,850 104,682 81,930 78,464 55,643
Honda % of segment 5.0% 5.9% 4.0% 4.3% 9.4% 10.7% 12.5% 11.6% 10.1% 7.5% 7.4% 6.3%
Other Japanese import
volume 43,743 43,418 51,524 80,089 86,955 80,983 80,289 67,331 83,371 119,724 175,638 166,472
Other Japanese % of
segment 4.4% 5.9% 5.5% 8.4% 7.1% 6.5% 6.9% 6.4% 8.0% 11.0% 16.5% 18.7%
Korean volume 7,018 26,421
Korean % of segment 0.7% 3.0%
European import volume 52,709 41,223 30,660 35,735 29,381 20,733 15,014 6,940 3,751 867 16 0
European % of segment 5.2% 5.6% 3.3% 3.7% 2.4% 1.7% 1.3% 0.7% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Total low/mid sport 1,004,098 737,769 939,568 955,964 1,217,085 1,251,240 1,170,534 1,046,195 1,037,133 1,087,318 1,067,524 890,144
% of industry 11.4% 8.6% 11.8% 10.4% 11.8% 11.4% 10.3% 9.8% 11.1% 11.5% 10.9% 10.3%

US Car Sales - Low/Mid Sport

Thousands

450

400 GM
Ford
350 Chrysler
Toyota
300
Nissan
250 Honda
Other Japanese
200 European

150

100

50

0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

Source: The Automotive Industry, Bernstein Research, September 1992.

IESE Business School-University of Navarra 23

Este documento es una de las 60 copias autorizadas para utilizar en el Programas IPADE, Dirección de Operaciones, Francisco Arenas Ballester, 2018, 2018-04-05

P-1100-E Porsche: The Crisis of 1992

Exhibit 12
US Car Sales – High Sports Segment
Includes GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, Honda, European and Korean
Automakers

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

GM volume 36,507 29,039 22,477 28,144 30,424 37,956 33,027 25,437 23,281 23,928 22,690 17,472
Para uso exclusivo de Isabel Sahagún Pedraza del programa MEDE 2023-2025.

GM % of segment 29.9% 27.2% 23.3% 22.5% 24.1% 28.2% 27.1% 29.3% 38.0% 36.7% 34.9% 21.6%
Ford volume
Ford % of segment
Chrysler volume 2,791 6,600 19,549
Chrysler % of segment 4.3% 10.1% 24.2%
Toyota volume 9,371
Toyota % of segment 11.6%
Nissan volume 71,533 63,791 57,260 71,144 73,101 67,409 52,936 33,566 19,357 26,387 22,095 14,903
Nissan % of segment 58.7% 59.8% 59.5% 56.8% 57.8% 50.0% 43.5% 38.7% 31.6% 40.5% 34.0% 18.4%
Honda volume 1,074 1,940
Honda % of segment 1.7% 2.4%
Other Japanese import volume 1,527 11,777
Other Japanese % of segment 2.3% 14.6%
Korean volume
Korean % of segment
European import volume 13,915 13,918 16,532 25,893 22,962 29,380 35,722 27,831 18,688 12,075 11,081 5,789
European % of segment 11.4% 13.0% 17.2% 20.7% 18.2% 21.8% 29.4% 32.1% 30.5% 18.5% 17.0% 7.2%
Total high sport 121,955 106,748 96,269 125,181 126,487 134,745 121,685 86,834 61,326 65,181 65,067 80,801
% of industry 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 1.0%

US Car Sales - High Sport

Thousands
80

70
GM
60
Chrysler
50 Toyota
Nissan
40 Honda
Other Japanese
30
European
20

10

0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
-10

Source: The Automotive Industry, Bernstein Research, September 1992.

24 IESE Business School-University of Navarra