PARENT’S SUBSTANCE USE ALONE IS NOT

SUFFICIENT TO ASSERT JURISDICTION

Dep’t of Human Services v. J. J. B. 291 Or. App. 226 • “We have repeatedly
recognized on several occasions that a parent’s substance abuse alone is not sufficient
to assert jurisdiction, even when a child is aware of it. Reversing jurisdictional
judgment based on parents methamphetamine use due to lack of evidence of current
threat of serious loss or injury”.
3. Dept. of Human Services v. D. S. F. , 246 Or. App. 302, 314, 266 P.3d 116
(2011) • Reversing jurisdictional judgment based on mother’s use of
methamphetamine and marijuana due to lack of evidence that mother used drugs
while caring for the child or that her drug use had any effect on her parenting”.
4. Dept. of Human Services v. D. S. F. , 246 Or. App. At 313-14, 266 P.3d 116.
(2011) • “Evidence that a child has been exposed to a parent exhibiting the adverse
effects of intoxication is not, in and of itself, a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction
over a child. Rather, DHS must prove that the parent is abusing drugs or alcohol, or
exposing a child to drugs or alcohol, in a way that puts the child at risk of serious
harm.”
5. Dept. of Human Services v. A. W. , 276 Or. App. 276, 278, 367 P.3d 556 (2016)
• “To establish jurisdiction, DHS must present evidence sufficient to support a
conclusion that the child’s condition or circumstances expose the child to a current
threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized.”
6. Dept. of Human Services v. S. D. I. , 259 Or. App. 116, 121, 312 P.3d 608
(2013). DHS must establish the “type, degree, and duration” of the harm at issue.
.”

9. Dept. of Human Services v. D. T. C. , 231 Or. App. At 554-55, 219 P.3d 610,
Evidence of father’s serious alcohol abuse, of which the children were aware, did not
create jurisdiction because of the absence of evidence of resulting danger to the
children.
10. Dept. of Human Services v. J.H. (in re K.M.P.) 425 Or. App P.3d 791 (2018)
“On this record, the evidence was insufficient to assert jurisdiction over K based on
mother’s substance abuse”.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE A PARENT

The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent’s right to “the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children” is an interest
“far more precious” than any property right. May v. Anderson (73 S. Ct. 840 1952).
No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as
the bond between parent and child. Carson v. Elrod 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D.
VA (1976). Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not
absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of
proving which rests on their government. Elrod v. Burns (96 S. Ct. 1976)

Parent’s interest in custody of their children is a liberty interest which has received
considerable constitutional protection; a parent who is deprived of custody of his or
her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss
deserves extensive due process protection. In the Interest of Cooper (Kansas 1980)

A parent’s right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the
fact that the parent’s achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend
significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child’s
corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from
the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult.
LFranz v. U.S. Case Law 8 707 F 2d 582, 595-599; US Ct App (1983).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that severance in the
parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with rigorous protections for
individual liberty interests at stake. Bell v. City of Milwaukee (7th Cir. 1984). The
parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment. 746 f 2d 1205, 1242-45; US Ct. App 7th Cir WI (1985). The
rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character
that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a
fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14.
Doe v. Irwin (US. D. C. of Michigan 1985).
A parent’s right to care and companionship of his or her children are so fundamental,
as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. In re J.S. and C. 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at
489.
The liberty interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of
one’s children and, thus, a state may not interfere with a parent’s custodial rights
absent due process protections. Langton v. Maloney (527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn.
1981). Parents have a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of
legal bond with their children. Matter of Delaney (617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma 1980). A
parent’s right to the custody of his or her children is an element of “liberty”
guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Matter of Gentry 369 NW 2d 889, MI App Div (1983).

Santosky v. Kramer (102 S. Ct. 1388 1982) • Even when blood relationships are
strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their
family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights
have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that clear and
convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance were needed to terminate
parental rights. 455 US 745 (1982)

Stanley v. Illinois (92 S. Ct. 1208 1972) • The Court stressed, “the parent-child
relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection.” A parent’s interest in the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a
constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for
personal meaning and responsibility. 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208 (1972)

DUE PROCESS CASE LAWS

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) • State intervention to terminate the
relationship between a parent and a child must be accomplished by procedures
meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause. 452 US 18, Malik v. Arapahoe Cty.
Department of Social Services (10th Cir. 1999)

May v. Anderson (73 S. Ct. 840 1952) • The United States Supreme Court noted that
a parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her
children" is an interest “far more precious” than any property right. 345 US 528, 533;
73 S. Ct. 840, 843 (1952)
1.
2. 2. Santosky v. Kramer (102 S. Ct. 1388 1982) • Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable
destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family
affairs. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that clear and convincing evidence
rather than a mere preponderance were needed to terminate parental rights.
455 US 745 (1982)
3.
4. 3. Stanley v. Illinois (92 S. Ct. 1208 1972) • The Court stressed, “the
parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” A
parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or
her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of
family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. 405 US 645,
651; 92 S Ct 1208 (1972) DUE PROCESS CASE LAWS
5.
6. 4. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) • State intervention to
terminate the relationship between a parent and a child must be accomplished
by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause. 452 US 18,
7.
8. 5. Malik v. Arapahoe Cty. Department of Social Services (10th Cir. 1999)
•Absent extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial
association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-
deprivation procedures. An ex-parte hearing based on misrepresentation and
omission does not constitute notice and an opportunity to be heard. •
Procurement of an order to seize a
9. 18. Malik v. Arapahoe Cty. Department of Social Services (10th Cir. 1999)
•Absent extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial
association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-
deprivation procedures. An ex-parte hearing based on misrepresentation and
omission does not constitute notice and an opportunity to be heard. •
Procurement of an order to seize a child through distortion, misrepresentation
and/or omission is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. • Parents may assert
their children’s Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of their children as well as
asserting their own Fourteenth Amendment claim.

10.19. Morris v. Dearborne (5th Cir. 1999) • Right to Procedural Due Process
Violated: The state denied the plaintiff the fundamental right to a fair
procedure before having their child removed by the intentional use of
fraudulent evidence during the procedure.
LP
11. 20. Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) • A due-process violation occurs when a
state-required breakup of a natural family is founded solely on a “best interests”
analysis that is not supported by the requisite proof of parental unfitness. 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978)