Rule 14 (Summons)

Summons

The summons is issued by the court in a civil case to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant or the person being sued. This allows the defendant to participate in the court
proceedings, and be subject to its processes and judgments. Essentially, it satisfies the
requirement of due process.

Modes of service of summons

There are four (4) modes of serving summons:

[1] personal service;

[2] substituted service;
[3] constructive service (by publication); and
[4] extraterritorial service.

What are the purposes of summons?

For actions in personam:

[1] To acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and

[2] To give notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against him.

For actions in rem and quasi in rem, it is NOT to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant but
mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.

Personal service. Rule 14, Sec. 6. Service in person on the defendant. Whenever practicable,
the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If there are two (2) or more defendants,
each one of them should be served a copy of the summons and the complaint.

Substituted service. Rule 14, Sec. 7. If for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot personally
be served with summons within a reasonable time, service may be effected: 1) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or 2) by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In substituted service, it is immaterial that the defendant does not in fact receive actual notice.
This will not affect the validity of the service.

For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established:

[1] Personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

 [2] Efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
[3] The summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at
the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place
of business.

Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. “Several attempts” means
at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite
why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed
or accepted.

If diligent efforts were undertaken by the Sheriff to serve summons upon the defendant but he
was prevented from effecting such service by the defendant himself, summons shall be deemed
properly served and that the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Cure of defect in service of summons. Defendant’s filing of a motion for resetting of the
hearing of the motion for execution effectively cured the defect of the substituted service of
summons. Although the substituted service of summons on defendant is patently defective as
the sheriff’s return does not contain any statement with regard to the impossibility of personal
service, said defect was cured by his voluntary appearance therein. An appearance in whatever
form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. A
resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, must be personally served with
summons as provided under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Constructive service (by publication). Service upon a defendant where his identity is
unknown or where his whereabouts are unknown.

Rule 14, Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave
of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order.

Please remember that when the defendant is a resident of the Philippines, service of summons
by publication is allowed in any action, even in actions in personam. Hence, this can be allowed
in a suit for collection of sum of money, which is an in personam action.
Service upon residents temporarily outside the Philippines. Rule 14, Sec. 16. Residents
temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of
court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.

In any suit against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent from the country, the
defendant may be served by substituted service because he still leaves a definite place of
residence where he is bound to return.

In addition, extraterritorial service [by personal service effected out of the Philippines OR by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order] may be resorted to with leave of court.

Extra-territorial service, when allowed. Rule 14, Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. Extraterritorial
service of summons is allowed where the action is against a non-resident defendant who is not
found in the Philippines and the action:

[1] Affects the personal status of plaintiffs;

[2] Relates to or subject of which is property in the Philippines (real or personal) , in
which the defendant has claim, lien or interest, actual or contingent; or
[3] In which relief demanded consists wholly, or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein; or
[4] Property of defendant has been attached within the Philippines

To be effective, extraterritorial service of summons must be with leave of court and only through
any of the following means:

[1] Personal service;

[2] By publication (and copy of the summons and order of the court must be sent by
registered mail to the last known address);
[3] Any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. (Rule 14, Sec. 15).

Go v. CA,

G.R. No. 244681, March 29, 2023

Facts: A petition for certiorari filed by Vicente C. Go, who challenged the cancellation of his levy
on execution over a property in Quezon City. The property was previously sold by Spouses
Francisco and Ma. Teresa Bernardo to Spouses Rafael and Rosario Colet in 2005, but the sale
was not registered until 2012. Go obtained a favorable judgment against the Bernardos and
other defendants in a civil case for a sum of money in 2008, and levied the property in 2011. He
bought the property at an auction sale, but failed to consolidate his title. Spouses Colet filed a
complaint for quieting of title against Go in 2013, alleging that they were the rightful owners of
the property. Go was declared in default for not filing an answer, and the RTC QC ruled in favor
of Spouses Colet in 2015. Go filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, claiming
that the RTC-QC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of the RTC-Manila's decision,
and that his levy had preference over the unregistered sale. The CA dismissed the petition for
being procedurally and substantially defective.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment
for being procedurally and substantially defective

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by Vicente C.
Go against Spouses Colet and others. The Court held that there was valid service of summons
by publication on the petitioner, and that the respondents' interest in the property was superior
to the petitioner's levy on the property. The Court found that the sheriff exerted diligent efforts to
serve the summons personally on the petitioner, but the latter evaded service by giving different
and inconsistent addresses. The Court also found that the respondents bought and acquired
ownership over the property in 2005, six years before the levy was made in 2011, and presented
proof of their purchase and possession. The Court applied the rule that a judgment debtor can
only transfer property in which he has interest to the purchaser at a public execution sale.

Manotoc v. CA,

G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on
behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda ‘Imee’ R. Marcos-Manotoc for Filing,
Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment, to which Respondent Trajano seeks
the enforcement of the foreign court’s judgment against Manotoc.

Based on the complaint, trial court effected summons to the address of petitioner in Pasig
City which was received by Manotoc’s caretaker. When the petitioner failed to answer, the
trial court declared her in default.
Petitioner Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid
substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the motion were:

(1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was
not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;

(2) the party (Macky de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
representative, employee, nor a resident of the place;

(3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of
summons was ignored;

(4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and

(5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.

The trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its findings that her
residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was based on the documentary evidence of
respondent Trajano. The trial court ruled that the sheriff’s substituted service was made in the
regular performance of official duty. Trial court denied the MR of petitioner, hence, Manotoc filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

CA affirmed the findings of the trial court. CA also rejected petitioner’s Philippine passport as
proof of her residency in Singapore as it merely showed the dates of her departure from and
arrival in the Philippines without presenting the boilerplate’s last two (2) inside pages where
petitioner’s residence was indicated. The CA considered the withholding of those pages as
suppression of evidence. Thus, according to the CA, the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner as there was a valid substituted service pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court. CA further denied petitioner’s MR.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on petitioner for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction.

RULING:

NO. A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of
material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in
person. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of
the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be
assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts
and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in
the Return or Certificate of Service as required under Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 5 (dated November 9, 1989).
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a “person of suitable
age and discretion” residing in the defendant's house or residence. Thus, there are two (2)
requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and
(2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas
did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.

Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to
locate the defendant through more direct means. Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate that
there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the proceedings held before the trial court
perforce must be annulled.

De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.,

G.R. No. 194751, Nov. 26, 2014

FACTS:

Romasan Development Corporation filed separate complaints for nullification of free patent and
original certificates of title against several defendants. One of these was petitioner De Pedro.
Romasan alleged that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
236044.

Its representative, Mr. Ko, discovered that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its
Antipolo property. Mr. Ko confronted De Pedro regarding her acts but she was able to
show title and documents evidencing her ownership. It was discovered that DENR issued
free patents covering portions of respondent’s property to which the issued titles were based.

Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. The officer’s return, dated February
22, 1999 reads in part:

OFFICER’S RETURN

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of
the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above-entitled
case on the following, to wit;

1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of the
Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.

The summons and the complaint were published in People’s Balita on its April 24, May 1, and
May 8, 1998 issues. On July 15, 1999, respondent moved to declare all defendants in its
complaints, including De Pedro, in default for failure to file their answers. Respondents also
moved to be allowed to present evidence ex parte. The Regional Trial Court granted the
motions on August 19, 1999.

Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents issued to all
defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro. In so ruling,
the Regional Trial Court noted that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed an answer
to respondent’s complaints. The Regional Trial Court also noted the committee report admitting
CENRO’s irregularity in the issuance of the free patents to the defendants in the case. The
Regional Trial Court also found that the title and free patent issued to De Pedro were void

On March 30, 2000, De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion
for new trial, alleging that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000 decision on March
16, 2000

De Pedro argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person because of improper and defective service of summons. Citing the officer’s return
dated February 22,1999, De Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally served upon
her "for the reason that according to the messenger of the Post Office of Pasig there (sic)
is no person in the said given address."

Issue/s

Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro

HELD:

Yes, the decision was void.

The Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve
the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the
Return. To reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person
of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of the defendant. Otherwise, the
Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of.

In this case, the return showed no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons
personally upon petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the post office
messenger stated that there was no "Aurora N. De Pedro '' in the service address. The
return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate the petitioner's whereabouts.
Moreover, it can not be concluded that personal service was rendered impossible or could not
have been made at a reasonable time.

Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted service or service by
publication will be allowed based on such defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due
process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have
been dismissible had the petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time,
a motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the
proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment.

Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action
for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper
ground.

Petitioner insisted in her motion for a new trial that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person. She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired
her rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly discovered evidence that could have
altered the trial court decision. When her motion for a new trial was denied, she filed a petition
for certiorari, insisting that her motion for a new trial should have been granted on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over her person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to
allege any ground for a new trial. We cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals
for this denial because, indeed, lack of jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial.

What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondent’s action for
annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for
certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been
properly notified of the action involving her title to the property. Lack of jurisdiction could have
already been raised in an action for annulment of judgment.

Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari
instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily
participated in the proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to
avail bound her. Petitioner’s failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this
time was fatal to her cause. We cannot conclude now that she was denied due process.

Sarol v. Sps. Diao,

G.R.No. 244129, December 9, 2020

Facts:

● Petitioner Eleonor Sarol purchased a parcel of land in Guinsuan, Poblacion,

Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental from Claire Chiu in 2007.
● Sarol claims to have paid a total of P2,000,000 for the property.
● On July 20, 2011, the Deed of Sale was executed, and Sarol was issued a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in her name.
● Sarol left the Philippines to reside in Germany and left her father and a caretaker to
manage the property.
 ● Respondents Spouses George Gordon Diao and Marilyn Diao claim that their property is
adjacent to the land purchased by Sarol.
● They discovered that there was an overlap in the survey of the properties, with 464
square meters of their land included in Sarol's property.
● In 2015, the Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dumaguete City, seeking to cancel the contracts related to Sarol's ownership of the
property and to reconvey the 464-square-meter portion to them.

Issue:

● Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Sarol's person through the proper service of
summons.

Ruling:

● The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sarol and declared the Decision and Writ of
Execution issued by the RTC null and void.
● The Court found that there was a defective service of summons, and as a result, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Sarol's person.

Ratio:

● The Court emphasized that the proper service of summons is crucial in acquiring
jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent and ensuring due process.
● The summons and alias summons were served at an incorrect address, which was not
Sarol's place of residence.
● Sarol's place of residence was in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental, as indicated in the
Deed of Sale and TCT.
● Therefore, the service of summons should have been made in Tamisu, Bais City.
● The other modes of service of summons, such as substituted service and service by
publication, were not successfully executed.
● The Sheriff's Return of Summons and Alias Summons did not indicate that substituted
service was made according to the requirements of the rules.
● The RTC erred in allowing service of summons by publication because none of the rules
for such mode of service were applicable.
● Due to the defective service of summons, the RTC lacked jurisdiction over Sarol's
person.
● The Decision and Writ of Execution issued by the RTC were declared null and void.
● Sarol's petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was
deemed proper, as lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for such a petition.
 Interlink Movie House v. CA

G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018

DOCTRINE/S:

Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or
through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the absence of service
or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and void.

Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

FACTS:

22 July 2008: A complaint for sum of money and damages was filed by Interlink (petitioner)
against Expressions and Bon Huan (respondents) for the recovery of its unpaid rentals resulting
to the alleged breach of its lease of contract.

26 September 2008: Sheriff Muriel certified that the summons were served on the respondents
together with the copy of the complaint at the office of the company’s president on 24
September 2008.

5 January 2009: A motion to declare in default the respondents was filed by Interlink for their
failure to file an answer.

6 January 2009: Respondents alleged that the service of summons was defective, thus, RTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over them.

2 March 2009: RTC denied Interlink’s motion to declare defendants in default and agreed that
the summons was not served in accordance with the rules on summons, thus, a new set of
summons must be issued and served to the respondents.

15 May 2009: Sheriff Muriel certified that a new set of summons was served at the office of
Expressions’ president.

25 June 2009: Another motion to declare the defendants in default was filed by Interlink.

Respondents alleged that the second service of summons was still defective since the person
who accepted the same was not in any way connected with Expressions.

10 February 2010: RTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default and allowed
Interlink to present evidence ex parte. That there was substantial compliance with the service of
summons.

RTC: Interlink was able to prove its claims against Expressions and Bon Huan.
 CA: Annulled the RTC decision on the ground that the second service of summons was
defective, thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of the respondent. – NO.

2. Whether or not there was a valid service of summons – NO.

HELD:

It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of
summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the
absence of service or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is
defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against
him is null and void.

In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of
summons.

Personal service is effected by handling a copyof the summons to the defendant in person, or, if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant is a domestic private
juridical entity, service may be made on its president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel. It has been held that this enumeration is
exclusive. Service on a domestic private juridical entity must, therefore, be made only on the
person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If the service of summons is
made upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11, the same is invalid.

Respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to its
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel. It is
further undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made upon Ochotorina,
who was merely one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those officers
enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void
and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over Expressions.

Even assuming arguendo that the second service of summons may be treated as a substituted
service upon Bon Huan as the president of Expressions, the same did not have the effect of
giving the trial court jurisdiction over the respondents.
It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases,
substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with a competent person in
charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, and
personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have
unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons.

In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was not shown. The 15 May 2009
sheriff's return reveals that Sheriff Muriel attempted to serve the second summons personally
only once on 11 May 2009. Clearly, the efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to
establish that it was impossible to personally serve the summons promptly. Further, Sheriff
Muriel failed to cite reasons why personal service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that
Ochotorina told him that Bon Huan was then attending to business matters, and that he was
assured that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. They are enjoined to make their best efforts to accomplish personal
service on defendant. Sheriff Muriel clearly failed to meet this requirement.

PETITION IS DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.