SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 161237

PERFECTO MACABABBAD, JR.,*
DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY
HIS HEIRS SOPHIA
MACABABBAD, GLENN M.
Present:
MACABABBAD, PERFECTO
VENER M. MACABABBAD III
AND MARY GRACE
MACABABBAD, and SPS. CHUA
SENG LIN AND SAY UN AY, QUISUMBING, J. Chairperson,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,

- versus - VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

FERNANDO G. MASIRAG,
FAUSTINA G. MASIRAG,
CORAZON G. MASIRAG, LEONOR
G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M.
GOYAGOY,

Respondents.
FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY,
PURA MASIRAG FERRER-MELAD,
and SANTIAGO MASIRAG,

Intervenors- Respondents.

Promulgated:

January 14, 2009

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Perfecto

Macababbad, Jr. (Macababbad) and the spouses Chua Seng Lin (Chua) and
Say Un Ay (Say) (collectively called the petitioners), praying that we nullify
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration that followed. The assailed decision reversed the
dismissal Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, remanding the case for further trial.

BACKGROUND

On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando),

Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag
(Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the
respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint against Macababbad, Chua
and Say. On May 10, 1999, they amended their complaint to allege new
matters. The respondents alleged that their complaint is an action for:

quieting of title, nullity of titles, reconveyance, damages and attorney’s

fees against the defendants [petitioners here] x x x who cabal themselves
in mala fides of badges of fraud dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentations,
bad faith, under the guise of purported instrument, nomenclature
“EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT WITH SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF
 PORTION OF REGISTERED LAND (Lot 4144)”, dated December 3,
1967, a falsification defined and penalized under Art. 172 in relation to
Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, by “causing it to appear that persons (the
plaintiffs herein [the respondents in this case]) have participated in any
act or proceeding when they (the plaintiffs herein [the respondents in this
case]) did not in fact so participate” in the “EXTRA-JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT WITH SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF PORTION OF
REGISTERED LAND (Lot 4144” – covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1946) [sic].

The amended complaint essentially alleged the following:

The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan

(Pantaleona) were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the
Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1946. Lot No. 4144 contained an area of
6,423 square meters.

Pedro and Pantaleona had eight (8) children, namely, Valeriano,

Domingo, Pablo, Victoria, Vicenta, Inicio, Maxima and Maria. Respondents
Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of
Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and
Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of
their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their
parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto,
informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They
immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter.

The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document

entitled “Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of
Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967” (hereinafter referred
to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents
were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document purportedly
bore the respondents’ signatures, making them appear to have participated in
the execution of the document when they did not; they did not even know
the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to
Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00. Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was
cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names of its new owners
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408, presumably after the
death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the supposed sale to
Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.
Despite his exclusion from TCT No. 13408, his “Petition for another
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408,” filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982.

Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his

name and sold other portions to third parties.

On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT
No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a
subdivided portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May
23, 1972, TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name.

Based on these allegations, the respondents asked: (1) that the

extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale be declared null and void ab initio
and without force and effect, and that Chua be ordered and directed to
execute the necessary deed of reconveyance of the land; if they refuse, that
the Clerk of Court be required to do so; (2) the issuance of a new TCT in
respondents’ name and the cancellation of Macababbad’s and Chua’s
certificates of title; and (3) that the petitioners be ordered to pay damages
and attorney’s fees.

Macababbad filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on July

14, 1999, while Chua and Say filed an “Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss” on September 28, 1999.
 On December 14, 1999, the RTC granted the motion of Francisca
Masirag Baccay, Pura Masirag Ferrer-Melad, and Santiago Masirag for
leave to intervene and to admit their complaint-in-intervention. The motion
alleged that they have common inheritance rights with the respondents over
the disputed property.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered

its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order dated May 29, 2000 on
the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the
property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad,
had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead
indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona
and the persons who have already acquired title to portions of the
subject property in good faith.

The respondents appealed the RTC’s order dated May 29, 2000 to the
CA on the following grounds:
I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE NATURE

OF APPELLANTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION AS THAT DESIGNATED
IN THE COMPLAINT’S TITLE AND NOT IN (SIC) THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground

that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of law that
should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that
their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus fell within
the purview of the CA’s appellate jurisdiction.

THE CA DECISION

The CA ignored the jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioners in

their motion to dismiss, took cognizance of the appeal, and focused on the
following issues: 1) whether the complaint stated a cause of action; and
2) whether the cause of action had been waived, abandoned or
extinguished.

The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTC’s dismissal of
the complaint. On the first issue, it ruled that the complaint “carve(d) out a
sufficient and adequate cause of action xxx. One can read through the
verbosity of the initiatory pleading to discern that a fraud was committed by
the defendants on certain heirs of the original owners of the property and
that, as a result, the plaintiffs were deprived of interests that should have
gone to them as successors-in-interest of these parties. A positive deception
has been alleged to violate legal rights. This is the ultimate essential fact
that remains after all the clutter is removed from the pleading. Directed
against the defendants, there is enough to support a definitive adjudication.”

On the second issue, the CA applied the Civil Code provision on

implied trust, i.e., that a person who acquires a piece of property through
fraud is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property came. Reconciling this legal provision with Article
1409 (which defines void contracts) and Article 1410 (which provides that
an action to declare a contract null and void is imprescriptible), the CA ruled
that the respondents’ cause of action had not prescribed, because “in
assailing the extrajudicial partition as void, the [respondents] have the right
to bring the action unfettered by a prescriptive period.”
 THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

The Third Division of this Court initially denied the petition for
review on certiorari for the petitioners’ failure to show any reversible error
committed by the CA. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition. In
their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners clarified the grounds for
their petition, as follows:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE

JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON AND RULE ON THE APPEAL TAKEN
BY THE RESPONDENTS IN CA-GR CV NO. 68541.

In the alternative, ex abundanti cautela, the petitioners alleged other

reversible errors summarized as follows:

 The RTC dismissal on the ground that indispensable parties were not
impleaded has already become final and executory because the CA
did not pass upon this ground;

 The respondents' argument that there was no failure to implead

indispensable parties since the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona
who were not impleaded were not indispensable parties in light of the
respondents' admission that the extra-judicial settlement is valid with
respect to the other heirs who sold their shares to Perfecto
Macababbad is erroneous because innocent purchasers for value of
portions of Lot 4144 who are also indispensable parties were not
impleaded;

 The CA erred in reconciling Civil Code provisions Article 1456 and

Article 1410, in relation to Article 1409;

 The CA erred in saying that the Extra-judicial Partition was an

inexistent and void contract because it could not be said that none of
the heirs intended to be bound by the contract.

The respondents argued in their Comment that:

 The appeal was brought on mixed questions of fact and law involving
prescription, laches and indispensable parties;
 The non-inclusion of indispensable parties is not a ground to dismiss the
claim;

 The respondents’ action is not for reconveyance. Rather, it is an action to

declare the sale of their respective shares null and void;

 An action for the nullity of an instrument prescribes in four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud. Discovery was made in 1999, while the complaint
was also lodged in 1999. Hence, the action had not yet been barred by
prescription;

 Laches had not set in because the action was immediately filed after
discovery of the fraud.

OUR RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit.

Questions of Fact v. Questions of Law

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. A question of law may be resolved
by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. No examination
of the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a
question of law. The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which
necessitate a calibration of the evidence.

The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from

the appellant’s notice of appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief
as appellant in the appellate court. In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents
manifested their intention to appeal the assailed RTC order on legal grounds
and “on the basis of the environmental facts.” Further, in their Brief, the
petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had
prescribed and that they had “slept on their rights.” All these indicate that
questions of facts were involved, or were at least raised, in the respondents’
appeal with the CA.

In Crisostomo v. Garcia, this Court ruled that prescription may either

be a question of law or fact; it is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsity of an allegation of fact; it is a
question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
given state of facts. The test of whether a question is one of law or fact is not
the appellation given to the question by the party raising the issue; the test is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing
or evaluating the evidence. Prescription, evidently, is a question of fact
where there is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as the
date when the period to bring the action commenced to run.

Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals instructively tells us too that a summary or

outright dismissal of an action is not proper where there are factual matters
in dispute which require presentation and appreciation of evidence. In this
cited case whose fact situation is similar to the present case, albeit with a
very slight and minor variation, we considered the improvident dismissal of
a complaint based on prescription and laches to be improper because the
following must still be proven by the complaining parties:

first, that they were the co-heirs and co-owners of the inherited property;
second, that their co-heirs-co-owners sold their hereditary rights thereto
without their knowledge and consent; third, that forgery, fraud and deceit
were committed in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Confirmation of Sale since Francisco Ingjug who allegedly executed
the deed in 1967 actually died in 1963, hence, the thumbprint found in the
document could not be his; fourth, that Eufemio Ingjug who signed the
deed of sale is not the son of Mamerto Ingjug, and, therefore, not an heir
entitled to participate in the disposition of the inheritance; fifth, that
respondents have not paid the taxes since the execution of the sale in 1965
until the present date and the land in question is still declared for taxation
 purposes in the name of Mamerto Ingjug, the original registered owner, as
of 1998; sixth, that respondents had not taken possession of the land
subject of the complaint nor introduced any improvement thereon; and
seventh, that respondents are not innocent purchasers for value.

As in Ingjug-Tiro, the present case involves factual issues that require

trial on the merits. This situation rules out a summary dismissal of the
complaint.

Proper Mode of Appeal

Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can
be imputed on the respondents for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the
CA through an ordinary appeal. Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases

decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.

In Murillo v. Consul, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three
(3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal
or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered
by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3)
petition for review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The
third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
law.
Prescription

A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the

plaintiff’s cause of action based on the allegations of the complaint and the
documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on
prescription hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to
the resolution of this issue, but not the other facts of the case.

Unfortunately, both the respondents’ complaint and amended

complaint are poorly worded, verbose, and prone to misunderstanding. In
addition, therefore, to the complaint, we deem it appropriate to consider the
clarifications made in their appeal brief by the petitioners relating to the
intent of their complaint. We deem this step appropriate since there were no
matters raised for the first time on appeal and their restatement was aptly
supported by the allegations of the RTC complaint. The respondents argue in
their Appellant’s Brief that:

x x x Although reconveyance was mentioned in the title,

reconveyance of which connotes that there was a mistake in titling the
land in question in the name of the registered owner indicated therein, but
in the allegations in the body of the allegations in the body of the instant
complaint, it clearly appears that the nature of the cause of action of
appellants, [sic] they wanted to get back their respective shares in the
subject inheritance because they did not sell said shares to appellee
Perfecto Macababbad as the signatures purported to be theirs which
appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneo[u]s Sale of
Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) were forged.

As appellants represented 2 of the 8 children of the deceased

original owners of the land in question who were Pedro Masirag and
Pantaleona Talauan, the sale is perfectly valid with respect to the other 6
children, and void ab initio with respect to the appellants.

The respondents likewise argue that their action is one for the annulment of
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale bearing their forged signatures.
They contend that their action had not yet prescribed because an action to
declare an instrument null and void is imprescriptible. In their Comment to
the petition for review, however, the respondents modified their position and
argued that the sale to the petitioners pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement
of estate and sale was void because it was carried out through fraud; thus,
the appropriate prescription period is four (4) years from the discovery of
fraud. Under this argument, respondents posit that their cause of action had
not yet prescribed because they only learned of the extrajudicial settlement
of estate and sale in March 1999; they filed their complaint the following
month.

The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the relevant prescriptive
period here is ten (10) years from the date of the registration of title, this
being an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust.

We believe and so hold that the respondents’ amended complaint

sufficiently pleaded a cause to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale, as they claimed in their amended complaint.
Without prejudging the issue of the merits of the respondents’ claim and on
the assumption that the petitioners already hypothetically admitted the
allegations of the complaint when they filed a motion to dismiss based on
prescription, the transfer may be null and void if indeed it is established that
respondents had not given their consent and that the deed is a forgery or is
absolutely fictitious. As the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate
and sale has been raised and is the primary issue, the action to secure this
result will not prescribe pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

Based on this conclusion, the necessary question that next arises is:
What then is the effect of the issuance of TCTs in the name of petitioners?
In other words, does the issuance of the certificates of titles convert the
action to one of reconveyance of titled land which, under settled
jurisprudence, prescribes in ten (10) years?
 Precedents say it does not; the action remains imprescriptible, the
issuance of the certificates of titles notwithstanding. Ingjug-Tiro is again
instructive on this point:
Article 1458 of the New Civil Code provides: "By the contract of
sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself of transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent." It is essential that the
vendors be the owners of the property sold otherwise they cannot dispose
that which does not belong to them. As the Romans put it: "Nemo dat
quod non habet." No one can give more than what he has. The sale of
the realty to respondents is null and void insofar as it prejudiced
petitioners' interests and participation therein. At best, only the
ownership of the shares of Luisa, Maria and Guillerma in the
disputed property could have been transferred to respondents.

Consequently, respondents could not have acquired ownership

over the land to the extent of the shares of petitioners. The issuance of a
certificate of title in their favor could not vest upon them ownership of
the entire property; neither could it validate the purchase thereof
which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the
evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the
holder any better title than what he actually has. Being null and void,
the sale to respondents of the petitioners' shares produced no legal
effects whatsoever.

Similarly, the claim that Francisco Ingjug died in 1963 but

appeared to be a party to the Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of
Sale executed in 1967 would be fatal to the validity of the contract, if
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Contracting parties must be
juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated
otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be
a party capable of contracting and party capable of being contracted with.
Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the
time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and
therefore null and void by reason of its having been made after the death
of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The
death of a person terminates contractual capacity.

In actions for reconveyance of the property predicated on the

fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio, a
claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. "The action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe." Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is
a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not
courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside
legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate
of Art. 1410 of the New Civil; Code conferring imprescriptibility to
actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches
cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right,
and petitioners can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of
time.
We have a similar ruling in Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban.

The respondents’ action is therefore imprescriptible and the CA

committed no reversible error in so ruling.

Laches

Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has

never reached the presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for
its consideration were merely the parties’ pleadings. Laches is evidentiary
in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.
Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss
the respondents’ complaint.

Non-joinder of Indispensable parties is not a

Ground for a Motion to Dismiss

The RTC dismissed the respondents’ amended complaint because

indispensable parties were not impleaded. The respondents argue that since
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale was valid with respect to the
other heirs who executed it, those heirs are not indispensable parties in this
case. Innocent purchasers for value to whom title has passed from
Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say are likewise not indispensable
parties since the titles sought to be recovered here are still under the name of
the petitioners.

We also find the RTC dismissal Order on this ground erroneous.

 Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither
misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action, thus:

Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither

misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court on motion of any party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed
and proceeded with separately.

In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a
party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the
action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may
order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff
opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties.
If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is
directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to
amend is the action dismissed.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as

those who are parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that
the courts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if
his interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ interest.
 In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to
be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only
relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua
and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is
for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and
sale, all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a
complete resolution of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist
on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an
order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in
light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for
the immediate dismissal of the action.

In relation with this conclusion, we see no merit too in the petitioners’

argument that the RTC ruling dismissing the complaint on respondents’
failure to implead indispensable parties had become final and executory for
the CA’s failure to rule on the issue. This argument lacks legal basis as
nothing in the Rules of Court states that the failure of an appellate court to
rule on an issue raised in an appeal renders the appealed order or judgment
final and executory with respect to the undiscussed issue. A court need not
rule on each and every issue raised, particularly if the issue will not vary the
tenor of the Court’s ultimate ruling. In the present case, the CA ruling that
overshadows all the issues raised is what is stated in the dispositive portion
of its decision, i.e., “the order of the lower court dismissing the case is SET
ASIDE and the case is remanded for further proceeding.”

In sum, the CA correctly reversed the RTC dismissal of the

respondents’ complaint.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for
review for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
 Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Macababbad is spelled Macabadbad in some pleadings.
In view of the death of Macababbad, the Court of Appeals ordered that he be substituted by his legal heirs
and representatives Sophia Macababbad, Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and
Mary Grace Macababbad in its Resolution dated September 20, 2001; see Annex “A” of the Motion for
Reconsideration; rollo, p. 160.
Rollo, pp. 31-39.
Id., pp. 40-41.
Id., pp. 93-94.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 5487; id., pp. 40-41.

The respondents also impleaded the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan as a nominal party being the
custodian of all land records.
Rollo, pp. 76-93.
Id., pp. 44, 78.
Underscoring supplied, parenthetical notes ours.
Rollo, pp. 76-92.
Id., p. 59.
Id., pp. 60-63.
Id., p. 62.
Id., pp. 64-65.
TCT No. 13408 identified the following owners: CHUA SENG LIN, married to SAY LIN AY - 1/8;
GUILLERMO TAMBAUAN; VICTORIA DAYAG, married to FELICIANO TAMBAUAN;
ESTEBAN DAYAG, married to LUISITA CATOLIN; IRENE DAYAG, married to ELADIO TUPPIL;
MARGARITA DAYAG; GABINA DAYAG, married to GASPAR CARANGMIAN, Jr. - 1/8; PURA
GOYAGOY; LUCIA MASIRAG, married to ACKING RONDOLOY; CORAZON MASIRAG, married
to FRANCISCO CASIPAG - 1/8; PETRA TUGAD; JUAN MASIRAG, married to LEONILA
BAACAY; PEDRO MASIRAG - 1/8; CLARO FERRER; PEDRO FERRER, married to ANGELA
CORDON; PURA FERRER, married to DANIEL MELOD - 1/8; BRAULIO GOYAGOY; LEONCIO
GOYAGOY, married to ISABEL BADEJOS; PROCOPIO DAYAG; GENOVEVA DAYAG, married
to HERMIGILDO CATOLIN; ESTANISLAO DAYAG, married to TEOFISTO STO. TOMAS;
MAGNO DAYAG, married to VILMA MARAMAG; ISABEL DAYAG, married to ROGELIO
MABBARONG - 1/8; DOMINGO MASIRAG, married to PRIMA DANAN - 1/8.
Rollo, pp. 68-69.
For example, the sale of Lot No. 4144-C to Nestor E. Calubaquib, evidenced by a Deed of Sale of a portion
of Registered Land, Annex “H” of the Complaint; id., pp. 68-69.
Id., p. 67.
Id., pp. 93-94.
Id., p. 94.
Id., p. 109.
Penned by Justice Mario L. Guarina III, with the concurrence of Justice Martin S. Villarama and Justice
Elvi John S. Asuncion.
The CA, in note 10 of its decision stated that “A further consideration has been raised by the appellees to
the effect that this appeal should have been brought to the Supreme Court. We note, however, that this
issue was already discussed before another Division of our Court through a motion to dismiss appeal and
was denied.” A perusal of the resolution denying the motion to dismiss (see Annex “A,” Motion for
Reconsideration [Re: Resolution dated January 28, 2004]; rollo, p. 160) shows that the issue of whether
the appeal should have been taken to this court, not the CA, was not discussed.
Rollo, p. 35.
Id., p. 38.
Id., p. 136.
Id., p. 138.
Id., p. 142.
Id., p. 143.
Ibid.
Id., p. 147.
Id., p. 148.
Id., pp. 167-170.
Suarez v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 124512, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 74.
Regalado, Florenz, D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 2000 ed., p. 596.
Ibid.
Ibid., citing Bernardo v. CA, 216 SCRA 224 (1992).
Ibid.
Rollo, pp. 95-96.
Id., pp. 107-112.
G.R. No. 164787, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 402.
Ibid.
G.R. No. 134718, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 435.
Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK-9748 dated March 1, 1990; See also Macawiwili Gold Mining
and Development Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 602.
Halimao v. Villanueva, A.M. No. 3825, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 1.
Rollo, p. 110.
Supra note 43. Underscoring supplied.
G.R. No. 155133, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 343.
Abadiano v. Spouses Martir, G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008.
G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 17, Sec. 3.
Cortez v. Avila, 101 Phil. 205 (1957).
Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157065, July 11, 2006, 494 SCRA 535.
Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113.
Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 53.
See Novino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-21098, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 279.