University of Mindanao - College of Legal Education

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Case Digests

RULE 127 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Case Title Remarks Citation Assigned to Done

1. People v. Marti G.R. No. FERENAL, RAYMOND

81561

2. People v. Grey G.R. No. FREDELUCES, DANESSA

180109 FAITH

3. Mustang Lumber v. CA G.R. No. GANADOS, ROLDAN

104988

4. Santos v. Pryce Gases G.R.No. GUDMALIN, BERNALD

Inc., 165122

5. Roan v Gonzales G.R. No. LABITE, ADRIAN GALO

71410

6. People v. Breis G.R. No. MACHUTES, JULIE-ANN

205823

7. Luna v. Plaza G.R.No. MARTINEZ, CORNELIO III

27511

8. People v. Tuan G.R. No. MATA, FAUSTINE VIOL

176066

9. Uy v. BIR G.R.No. PONTILLO, GLEENA

129651

10. Yao v. People G.R.No. PRADO, MARENEL

168306

11. Alvarez v. CFI G.R. No. RAPISURA, COLEEN

45358

12.Prudente v. Judge Dayrit G.R. No. RESTAURO, IAN VONN

82870 KRISTOFFER

13. People v. Veloso G.R. No. ROYO, ARCHIE JADE

L-23051

14. Quelnan v. People G.R. No. SINSONA, ANGEL MAE

166061

15. Worldwide Web G.R. No. TORREVILLAS, JOVANEY

corporation v. People, 161106
16. Columbia Pictures v. flres, G.R. No. TRINIDAD, KEVIN GLENN
78631

17. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No.

L-64261
VELEZ,
ABEGAIL JOY
MARCHIE ✔️
18. People v. rbio, G.R. No. ABELA, WOM LIB
L-35500

19. Veridiano v. People, GR NO. AMIGO, ALISSA MAE

200370

20. People v. Racho GR No. ARADANAS, SITTIE

186529 AKIMA

21. People v. Aruta, GR No. ASLOR, NORMIEL

120195

22. Lui v. Matillano GR No. AUDIENCIA, BJ ☑

141176

23. Valeroso v. Ca, GR No. AURELIO, FATIMA

164815

24. People v. Nuevas GR No. BENABAYE, SHEENA

170233 MAE

25. Valdez v. People GR no. BESIN, JIEZEL MAE

170180

26. Caballes v. CA GR No. CANEDO, KARINA

136292

27. People v. Vinecario GR No. COLAMA, CHARLES

1141137 ARNIE

28. People v. Martinez GR No. DELA CRUZ, MELODY

191366

29. People v. Musa GR No. FERENAL, RAYMOND

96177

30. Malacat v. CA GR No. FREDELUCES, DANESSA

123595 FAITH

31. People v. Cogaed GR No. GANADOS, ROLDAN

200334

32. General Travel Services v. GR No. GUDMALIN, BERNALD

David L-19259
33. Asian Terminals, Inc. v. GR No. LABITE, ADRIAN GALO
Ricaforte-Bautista 166901

34. Stonehill v. Diokno GR No. MACHUTES, JULIE-ANN

L-19550

35. People v. Chhan Fook GR No. MARTINEZ, CORNELIO III

L-16968

36. Abuan v. People GR No. MATA, FAUSTINE VIOL

168773

37. Malaloan v. CA, GR No. PONTILLO, GLEENA

104879

38. Castro v. Pabalan GR No. PRADO, MARENEL

L-28642

39. MHP Garments v. CA GR No. RAPISURA, COLEEN

86720

40. Pasion v. Locsin GR No. RESTAURO, IAN VONN

L-45950 KRISTOFFER

1. People v. Marti

FERENAL, RAYMOND

Facts:

Andre Marti and his common law wife attempted to send packages to a friend in Switzerland
only to find out after that it contained bricks of dried marijuana leaves; the tabacalera cigars also
turned out to be dried marijuana leaves neatly stacked underneath the cigars after Job Reyes’
final inspection as per standard operating procedure.

Upon discovery, the latter reported said boxes to the NBI which thereafter made an inventory of
the box and contents, after signing a “receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects.

Issue: Whether the search and seizure of the effects done illegally and should be inadmissible
in evidence

Held: NO.

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State authorities.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard
operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp.
15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of
the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he
opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody
thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search

(Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23,
10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

2. People vs Grey

G.R. No. 180109 FREDELUCES, DANESSA

Facts:

Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar, his son, Francis Grey, and two others were
charge of the crime of murder for the death of Rolando Diocton. Judge Bandal denied the
motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She directed the prosecution to present, within
five days, additional evidence but later, she inhibited. Judge Navidad continued the proceedings
of the case.

After finding that probable cause was supported by the evidence on record, he issued warrants
of arrest against respondents.

The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to
personally determine the existence of probable cause. According to the CA, nowhere in the
assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him
and the personal justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively
quoted from the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that the Constitution commands the
judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of
arrest.

Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Naviadad erred in personally examining for the existence of probable
cause.
Ruling: No.

The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest is mandated by
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution. In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained
that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally
examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should
not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. This means that the judge
should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.

The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is
not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to
show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in
support thereof.

Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the
same. Judge Navidad’s Order reads:
“In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted for the
purpose of determining the sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to
justify the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, the Court perforce, made a very careful and
meticulous and (sic) review not only of the records but also the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, particularly the sworn statements/affidavits of Mario Abella, Uriendo
Moloboco and Edgar Pellina”.

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could have led Judge
Navidad to determine that the accused were given the widest latitude and ample opportunity to
challenge the charge of Murder which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of
Perjury. Likewise, his personal determination revealed no improper motive on the part of
the prosecution and no circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. Thus, he concluded that the previous
Order, denying the motion for the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct. These
statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the constitutional
mandate for personal determination of probable cause before issuing the warrants of
arrest.

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of
arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged—is the
function of the investigating prosecutor.

The personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show
the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence
in support thereof.

3. Mustang Lumber v. CA

G.R. No. 1044988 GANADOS, ROLDAN

Facts:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions.
Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R.
Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to
timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo
that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence
against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

Issue:

Whether or not the search and seizure is valid.

Ruling:

Yes.

It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was
coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different
sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search
warrant.

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1)
search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs
searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.

The Supreme Court also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by
virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be
served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in
one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the
search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant
the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.
 5. Roan v Gonzales

November 25, 1986 G.R. No. 71410 LABITE, ADRIAN

Roan’s house was searched by virtue of a search warrant and the said search was performed by
military authorities. During their search, the authorities found a Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live
bullets which they confiscated and served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of
firearms. However, the application of said search warrant was based on the accounts of two
witnesses. The applicant did not have personal knowledge of said firearm.

Facts:
1. A search warrant was issued by respondent judge (Gonzales) on May 10, 1984. Application
for the said search warrant was personally led by PC Capt. Mauro Quillosa. Together with
Quillosa were two witnesses (Esmael Morada and Jesusµohilida), who presented to respondent
judge their respective afidavits. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, as such
respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the application to ascertain
if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and swore the said
application before respondent.

2. Petitioner’s (Jose²no Roan) house was searched two days after the issuance of the search
warrant. The said search was performed by military authorities. Despite none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who conducted the search found one Colt
Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for
the charge of illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not a search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy of
one person’s house

Ruling/Decision:
1. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. There must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as described
by Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. The probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.

2. The applicant (Capt. Quillosa) was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis
of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him as required by settled
jurisprudence.

3.It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or
pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application

6. PEOPLE VS. BREIS

G.R. No. 205823 MACHUTES, JULIE ANN

FACTS:

Appellants Regie Breis y Alvarado (Breis) and Gary Yumol y Tuazon (Yumol) were charged with
violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) as follows:

That in the afternoon of February 10, 2010, at Gov. Pack Road, this City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession, custody
and control marijuana with a recorded net weight of 8,181 grams of dried marijuana
leaves/fruiting tops wrapped in plastic and further wrapped with brown packaging tape and
placed inside a brown box, without the authority of law and knowing fully well that said dried
marijuana leaves/fruiting tops are dangerous drugs, in violation of the afore-cited provisions of
law.

The prosecution's version of the facts, provides that an informant went to the PDEA-CAR that
the accused were bound to transport a box of marijuana from Baguio City to Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. A team was formed for the entrapment of the accused composed of Mangili and
Peralta as arresting officer and seizing officer. Due to time constraints, the PDEA team chose
not to secure any warrant nor coordinate with the nearest police station. Pretending to be
passengers, Mangili and Peralta boarded the bus and they observed two male individuals whose
physical appearances fitted the descriptions given by the informant. Both agents likewise saw a
box with the markings "Ginebra San Miguel" placed in between the legs of accused Breis.

Mangili then casually asked Yumol who owned the box, the accused replied that it was theirs.
Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave but before he could do so, Peralta blocked his way
while Mangili confronted Breis and asked what was contained in the box. Instead of answering,
Breis shoved Mangili and tried to flee but Mangili was able to block his way as he was much
larger than Yumol.

After introducing themselves as PDEA agents, Mangili asked the Breis to open the box but Breis
ignored the request which made Mangili lift and open the box. He took one brick and discovered
it was marijuana. Mangili then marked the items on site. Thereafter, the team returned to the
PDEA-CAR office for documentation.

The defense's version of the facts is that they were framed up. Mangili suddenly pushed Breis
and accused asked what seems to be the problem. Mangili then asked if Breis owns the box
under the seat in front of his, Breis replied in the negative. Mangili then opened the box, got one
of the bricks contained therein, sliced the same and saw that it was marijuana. Accused Breis,
infuriated, retorted that the accusation is baseless and malicious. Both the accused were then
brought to the PDEA Office and were forced to admit ownership of the box of marijuana, but
they refused and thus they were hit with the bricks of marijuana.

The trial court and Court of Appeals gave credence to the prosecution's version, upholding the
presumption of regularity in favor of the PDEA agents and finding no evil or ill-motive on their
part. In their appeal, appellants argued that the PDEA agents did not comply with Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165, and that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of
custody over the seized items.

ISSUE:

Does the act of “shoving” (physically pushing) a PDEA Agent constitutes Resistance under
Article 151?

RULING:

YES.

The act of Breis in physically pushing IO1 Mangili and attempting to flee constitutes resistance
defined under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Before a person can be held guilty
of the crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in authority, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the person he disobeyed or resisted is a
person in authority or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in the
performance of his official duties.

As a PDEA agent, IO1 Mangili is a law enforcement agent and as such is an agent
of a person in authority as defined in the RPC. IO1 Mangili was in the act of investigating a
lead, and possibly apprehending violators of RA 9165, in accordance with the mandate of the
PDEA. He announced his identity as such agent to appellants. It may even be gleaned that
knowing that IO1 Mangili was a PDEA agent was precisely the cause of the attempted flight of
appellants.

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when
not serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not
direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC. This is because the gravity of the disobedience to
an order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by the circumstances surrounding the
act, the motives prompting it and the real importance of the transgression, rather than the source
of the order disobeyed. The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be
considered direct assault, but is resistance nonetheless.

The Court has held justified resistance to illegal or abusive acts of agents of persons in
authority. In Chan Fook,60 the Court quoted Groizard:
 A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power cannot be said
to be in the exercise of the functions of his office. The law that defines and establishes
his powers does not protect him for anything that has not been provided for.

The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is fixed. If they go
beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the latter may resist
the invasion, specially when it is clear and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive
with the excess, and should not be greater than what is necessary to repel the
aggression.

The invasion of the prerogatives or rights of another and the excess in the functions of
an office, are the sources that make for legitimate resistance, especially, in so far as it is
necessary for the defense of the persons or their rights in the manner provided for in
article 8 of the Penal Code.61

Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the performance
of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yumol. Neither
did his presence in the bus constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public transportation,
and is open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at
that point in time, only the bus was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and
the search of moving vehicles has been upheld

PRINCIPLE:

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not
serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault
under Article 148 of the RPC. This is because the gravity of the disobedience to an order of a
person in authority or his agent is measured by the circumstances surrounding the act, the
motives prompting it and the real importance of the transgression, rather than the source of the
order disobeyed.

7. SIMON LUNA v. HON. LORENZO PLAZA

November 29, 1968 G.R. No. L-27511 MARTINEZ, CORNELLO III

FACTS: The criminal action was commenced by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, PC investigator of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, by filing with respondent Municipal Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza, of the
Municipal Court of Tandag, charging the accused, herein petitioner, with the crime of murder.

Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the
form of questions and answers taken by T-Sgt. Patosa, and subscribed and sworn to before the
respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the complaint. The respondent Judge examined the
prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their
statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions
were propounded by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them.

The affiants further declared before respondent Judge that their answers were true, and were
freely and voluntarily made; that they fully understood the questions and answers, and that they
were willing to sign their respective affidavits.

The respondent Judge opined that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof. Respondent Judge
issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be accepted for the
provisional release of the accused.
The case was subsequently remanded to the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, after
petitioner filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation.

On April 5, 1967, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was
being deprived of liberty without due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and
detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of
Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his
discharge from confinement.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur rendered its decision, dated April 20,
1967, holding that respondent Municipal Judge had substantially complied with Republic Act No.
3828

ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court erred In giving absolute credence to the oral testimony of
the respondent Judge to the effect that he adopted and made his own the questions and
answers taken by T-Sgt. Patosa

RULING: In support of his first assignment of error, petitioner contends that Republic Act No.
3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a warrant of arrest, two specific duties,
to wit: (1) personally examine the complainant and witnesses with "searching questions and
answers, "which means that the judge must cross-examine them in case their affidavits are
presented; and (2) said examination must be reduced to writing and form part of the records of
the case.

Republic Act No. 3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 the following paragraph:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with
him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be
under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers."

Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be
fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath;
3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.

The first condition was fulfilled. that respondent judge adopted as his own personal examination
the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa appearing in the written statements, which he read over
again the witnesses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said
answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witnesses
answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from
adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator.

The second condition required by Republic Act No. 3828 for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by statements of the
witnesses under oath." The record also shows the following documents to have been subscribed
and sworn to before respondent Judge.

The third condition required by Republic Act No. 3828 was likewise fulfilled. The examination of
the witnesses was written down, in the form of searching questions and answers. The term
"searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the
preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe
that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant
of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to
show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching
questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the
offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the
subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the
investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status,
family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc.

Petitioner’s further contention that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of the
Constitution and of procedural due process is likewise untenable. The Constitution, in Section
1(3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. The constitutional requirement of examination of witnesses under oath was, as
shown above, fulfilled.

Petitioner’s last contention that the warrant of arrest issued was a violation of procedural due
process because of the alleged defective preliminary examination has no leg to stand on, in view
of what we have hereinbefore stated. Moreover, this Court has held that preliminary examination
is not an essential part of due process of law. Preliminary examination may be conducted by the
municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the
absence, of the accused. The record shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary
investigation before respondent Municipal Judge, and instead, he filed a petition for bail.

We find that the trial Judge committed no error when he held that, based upon the facts shown
during the hearing of this case, respondent Municipal Judge had substantially complied with the
requirements of the law - specifically Republic Act 3828 - before issuing the warrant of arrest in
this case.

8. People vs. Tuan

G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010 MATA, FAUSTINE VIOL

Facts:

Two separate informations were filed before the RTC against accused Estela Tuan for Illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm.

The CIDG Team found nine bricks of marijuana and firearms after searching the room on the
first floor in the presence of Magno (accused’s father) and Pascual (accused’s neighbor).
However, Accused-appellant explained that the room where the bricks of marijuana was found
was previously rented by boarders. Magno also testified that when the search was conducted,
the search warrant was not shown to him. The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty as
charged.

The appellate court affirmed RTC’s conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of
marijuana but acquitted her of the charge for illegal possession of firearm simply because the
records were bereft of evidence that the gun supposedly confiscated was unlicensed.

Issue: Whether the search warrant was valid

Held: Yes. The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and
protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which
provide:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases ours.)

Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid down
the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it
must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant
were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and
examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and
Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and
fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to be
searched and things to be seized.

A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case.

Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for
accused-appellant’s residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the
applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for
Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also
arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places
in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.41 In the case at bar, the address and description of the
place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house
located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a
structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for
accused-appellant’s house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of
the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against the
accused-appellant.
 9. Uy v. BIR

October 20, 2000 G.R. No. 129651 PONTILLO, GLEENA

Facts:

In September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the BIR that Unifish and Frank
Uy were engaged in activities, constituting violations of the NIRC. Abos, who claimed to be a
former employee of Unifish, executed an affidavit, stating that Unifish is selling thousands of
cartons of canned sardines, without issuing receipts. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263
of the Internal Revenue Code.

Petitioners assail the validity of the warrant issued, for the search of the premises of
Unifish, contending that there are inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched,
and lack of particularity in the description of the things seized, praying for the return of the items
seized by virtue thereof.

In the address stated in the search warrant, the caption indicates "Hernan Cortes St.,
Cebu City", while the body indicated "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City".

The things to be seized are as follows: 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers,
Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official
Receipts; 2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists[,] Stock Cards; 3. Unregistered Delivery
Receipts; 4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices; 5. Sales Records, Job Order; 6.
Corporate Financial Records; and, 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks.

Issue:

Whether the search warrant was NOT valid.

Ruling:

The petition is DENIED. The Court upheld the validity of the search warrant; but the BIR
is ordered to return to petitioners, all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to
petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales
invoices.

The search warrant having inconsistently identified the city, where the premises to be
searched, is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case.

The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when
a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the
specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.

Insofar as the warrant authorizes the search and seizure, xxx, the warrant remains valid.
The search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off,
without destroying the whole warrant.
 10. Yao v. People

June 19, 2007 G.R. No. 168306 PRADO, MARENEL

Facts:

Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION (MASAGANA),

an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products. Private respondents
Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two
of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Petron is the registered
owner in the Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LPG
products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to
refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its trademarks.

Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename,
trademarks, symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
(Shell International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection with the
production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the
Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute
SHELLANE LPG containers and products.

On 3 April 2003, (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search
warrant with the RTC, Cavite City, against petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA
compound for alleged violation of Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of “The Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines.” The two applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that
per information, belief, and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually
producing, selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned
by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without
authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities.

MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor
Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine. It claimed that it is the owner of the said motor
compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these items were used in the operation of its
legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business interests.

RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party claimant whose rights were
violated as a result of the seizure since the evidence disclosed that petitioners are stockholders
of MASAGANA and that they conduct their business through the same juridical entity.

CA affirmed RTC’s decision

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the complaint is directed against MASAGANA gas
corporation, acting through its officers and directors, hence MASAGANA gas corporation may
not be considered as third party claimant whose rights were violated as a result of the seizure.

Ruling:

No. It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an

entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However, when the notion
of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in the case of two
corporations merge them into one. In other words, the law will not recognize the separate
corporate existence if the corporation is being used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful
objectives.

This non-recognition is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity or disregarding the fiction of corporate entity. Where the separate corporate entity is
disregarded, the corporation will be treated merely as an association of persons and the
stockholders or members will be considered as the corporation, that is, liability will attach
personally or directly to the officers and stockholders.

As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are utilizing the latter in
violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, petitioners
collectively and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same person for liability
purposes. Consequently, MASAGANA’s third party claim serves no refuge for petitioners. The
law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized.

Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a
separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search warrants is still valid.

Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine and the GASUL and
SHELL LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the crime, or the
evidence of the commission of trademark infringement. These were the very instruments used or
intended to be used by the petitioners in trademark infringement. It is possible that, if returned to
MASAGANA, these items will be used again in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron
and Pilipinas Shell.

11. Alvarez vs. CFI

January 29, 1937 G.R. No. L-45358 RAPISURA, COLLEEN

Facts:

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented
to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In
his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of
his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant
which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay
time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said
warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at
seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of articles. The
search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who
stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals
of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the
search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that
the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized
articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for
having disobeyed the order of the court. The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed
another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of
the Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a search
warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and deposit
of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an
ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited some documents and
papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly verified by
oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit it
presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and
prayed that said agent be directed to filed the documents in question immediately.

On September 10, 1936, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and,
consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any
contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury
Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the unextendible period of two (2) days from the
date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1,
should not be returned to the petitioner. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by
the court is illegal based on the following grounds:

● the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the
affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but
that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom
he considered reliable.
● it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.
● the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58
authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits
that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched.
● he lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized.
● the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with
evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him
for violation of the Anti-usury Law.
Issue:

WON the warrant for the search and seizure of articles were valid?

Ruling.

NO. The provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and
seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
constitutional guarantees whole and in their full force. The search and seizure made are illegal
for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the
petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the
warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury
Law. The warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the
affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated,
neither could the search and seizure be made at night. Although it is not mandatory to present
affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter
has personal knowledge of the facts, when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the
facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that
he may determine whether probable cause exists. For the foregoing considerations, the search
warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the respondent court authorizing the
relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal.

12. Prudente vs. Dayrit

December 14, 1989 G.R. No. 82870 RESTAURO, IAN VONN

FACTS:

On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila an application for the issuance of a search warrant. In his application for search warrant,
P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally
possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the
said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines.
 2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore,
believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned or any
agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties:

On 1 November 1987, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by
P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct
8 Commander.

In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando Yusay, a member of the searching
team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's
office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.—M33
Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live);
and (c) one (1) pc.—PRB—423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).

On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts
which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said
witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a
general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and
that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of
Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.

On March 9, 1988 respondent Judge issued an order, denying the petitioner's motion and
supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the
order dated 20 April 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was probable cause to satisfy the issuance of a search warrant.

HELD: No.

For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be PROBABLE CAUSE, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection
with one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in
the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. This probable cause must be shown to
be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been
informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and
explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact."

In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired
knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons. Moreover, a perusal
of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent
Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers.” Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.

13. People vs. Veloso

ROYO, ARCHIE JADE

14. Quino vs. People

July 6, 2007 G.R. No. 166061 SINSONA, ANGEL MAE

Relevant Facts

Sometime in 1996, the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) was tasked to
implement a search warrant to a certain Bernard Lim for probably possessing MA HCI (Shabu).
The team was escorted to the unit by the security officer (Punsaran), upon arrival at the place to
be searched, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door, which was later identified
as Quelnan. The team presented the search warrant and proceeded with the search. In the
presence of Quelnan and Punsaran, they found on top of a bedroom table 3 pieces of
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was later examined as
Shabu. The next day, Quelnan was arrested for violation of Sec. 16 Art. III of RA 6425.

Quelnan in his defense averred that he is not residing in the said unit, but he is the registered
owner of the said unit, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee beginning May 1996. That he was
there during the search for he was collecting the rent. That he was forced to sign some
documents at gunpoint, handcuffed and brought to PARAC Office. Two days later, he was
brought to Makati Prosecutor's Office for inquest and a case was filed against him.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine
(9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, modifying however the penalty
to be imposed on petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of
arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as
maximum

Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the
validity of the warrantless arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto in possession of the subject shabu justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue
arises, that of the validity of the enforcement of the search warrant as basis for the presence of
the police operatives in the Cityland Condominium unit.

Ratio Decidendi
Whether or not the search Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search
warrant was properly warrant in that despite the knowledge that petitioner was not
enforced provided that he the subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded
was not the subject of the anyway with the search and his resulting arrest. According to
search warrant. him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a
search warrant is issued for the search of specifically
described premises and not of a person, the omission of the
name of the owner or occupant of such property in the
warrant does not invalidate the same.

This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the
requisites for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search

warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that the search
warrant must name the person who occupies the described
premises.

Yes, there is no provision of law that requires the search

warrant must name the person who occupies the described
premises, that where the search warrant is issued for the
search of a specifically described premises only and not for
the search of a person, and failure to name to owner or
occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant
does not invalidate the warrant.
A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the
police officers were ordered to make an immediate search of
the premises mentioned and to seize and take possession of
shabu. Furthermore, they were directed to bring "persons to
be dealt with as the law may direct." While petitioner may not
be the person subject of the search, the fact that he was
caught in flagrante delicto necessitated his valid warrantless
arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioner's name was not
indicated in the search warrant is immaterial.
Whether or not Quelnan petitioner insists that his apprehension cannot be considered
was validly arrested in flagrante delicto because he was not in possession of the
without warrant. forbidden drug.

In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the

following essential elements must be established:

(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug;

(b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted

authorities; and

(c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a

regulated drug

Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on

his person but in the bedroom of the subject premises,
appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the
only person in said premises. Moreover, at the time of entry
of the searching team in the subject premises, appellant was
half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court
correctly concluded, only "indicates extreme familiarity and
gives the impression of he being at home" in the premises,
of which he was the registered owner

In support of the appellate court's ruling, the Solicitor

General maintained that petitioner was in constructive
possession of the subject shabu by citing several
circumstances showing petitioner's control and dominion
over the same.

First, the shabu was found on top of a table in Unit 615 of

Cityland Condominium when and where only petitioner was
present inside the premises.

Second, petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the

condominium.
Third, petitioner admitted that he was at the subject
premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee.

Fourth, petitioner was found naked from the waist up by the

police operatives upon entering Unit 615. The Solicitor
General stresses that petitioner's actuation of being naked
from the waist up while opening the door to greet visitors is
natural only to someone who owns the premises.

Fifth, Unit 615 is a studio unit with a divider and a sala.

There was no room with a door to be closed and locked
which can prevent petitioner from having free access to the
shabu found on the table.

Yes, Quelnan was arrested inflagrante delicto. In the

prosecution of illegal possession of shabu the following
requisites must be present:
1. the accused is found in possession of a regulated
drug;
2. the person is not authorized by law or by duly
constituted authorities; and
3. the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.

That there must be intent to possess the drug, which

includes actual possession or constructive possession.
Actual possession exist when the drug is immediate physical
possession or control of the accused, while constructive
possession exist when he drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion over the place where it is found.

Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police

operatives are obligated to apprehend him even without a
warrant of arrest.
 15. Worldwide Web Corporation vs People

G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014 TORREVILLAS, JOVANEY

FACTS:

Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search
warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of
Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4
located at Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet
Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at Pasig City. The applications alleged that
petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation
of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or
Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and
Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection
Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.

Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with address
at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.11
However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the
occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC.12
These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers
of WWC.

Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly
revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign
exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the
prejudice of the government.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be
searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers
that would be taken.14

The RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were
issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various
items.

The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital
Region Police Office.

PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the
nature of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered
released to petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground that it had failed to
get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

PLDT appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and
declared the search warrants valid and effective.28

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.29 Among the points raised was
that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the
RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.30

Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31 and Planet
Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated the two Petitions.33

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the
acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.

HELD:

YES.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing
courts when the finding has substantial basis.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the
objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched."42

There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the issuance of search
warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of
exercising their judicial function.44 They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the
offender.45

The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search warrants on
25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the
witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of
petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb
the finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the application for the
search warrants.

Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali
that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not
of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business committed by
means of the alleged toll bypass operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the
taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the
consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons
or the use of force upon things.48

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act
of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the
thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business
from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct
this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution
directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft
are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the
dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The
purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised
of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held
liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection
without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila
Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters,
jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water,
electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or
conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen
or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon
conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)

The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of
probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the search warrants, the test calls
conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or
Capwire to complete the international calls.

A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him
based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents
clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they
committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential
or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a
nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53

On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not
cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the
test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to
look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines,
which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate
falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in
the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55

On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial
judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the
issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search
warrants are general warrants.
 16. Columbia Pictures vs Flores

June 29, 1993 G.R. No. 78631, TRINIDAD, KEVIN GLENN

FACTS:
As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI
agents conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them
respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or
disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). After an
NBI agent was able to have copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th Century
Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT,
the NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject Search
Warrant No. 45 which reads:

“TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI Senior Agent
Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that
there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.
No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been
committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network,
Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko
are responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner
Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of MPAA member
Company Titles) the following properties to wit:

(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being reproduced or
retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of accounts bearing
and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the
reproduction/retaping business of the defendants;
(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be
used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes
which they are keeping and concealing in the premises above-described, which should
be seized and brought to the Undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day between 8:00
A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the undersigned
immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs.”
In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI
agents found and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively
distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment, television sets,
paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order,
return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters.
FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by
virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had the right
possess the seized reproduction equipment, which are not illegal per se, but are rather
exclusively used and intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale, lease, distribution
or possession for purposes of sale, lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated
video tapes.”
Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and
under special instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its right
to possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in serious doubt, the lower court
ordered the return of the “television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT.

ISSUE:
Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?
RULING:
[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the respondent Judge
Flores.]
NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of
the search warrant.
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the Court has
previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In 20th
Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the lower court lifting the
search warrant issued under circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A
striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No.
45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost
identical description as the warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:
(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale,
rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described.
On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in 20th Century
Fox:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they
were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general
which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store.
The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to
include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in
the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.
The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
the immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own
erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be gleaned from his
statement that “. . . the machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used
in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said
with moral certainty that the machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the
mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As
already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in
certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such, it
has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s) and
paraphernalia(s).”

17. BURGOS vs CHIEF OF STAFF

December 26, 1984 G.R. No. L-64261 VELEZ, MARCHIE

FACTS:

Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued two
search warrants directed to law enforcement officers to search and seize the offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" with the addresses No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City for allegedly publishing
articles that incite subversion.

The officers seized all the printing machines, motor vehicles, office equipment and other
articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers, as well as numerous
documents and other written literature alleged to be in the possession of petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper.

Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be

issued for the return of the seized articles. They also questioned the validity of the warrants on
the following grounds: (a) Judge Pano failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation
of the applicant and his witnesses. (b)The two search warrants pinpointed only one place. (c)
Articles belonging to co- petitioners were also seized although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone (d) Real properties were also seized. (e) The application
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of the members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group under Col. Abadilla could not gave provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

In defense, the respondent law enforcement officers sought to dismiss the petition on the
following grounds: (a) The petitioners should have filed a motion to quash the search warrants
first before Judge Pano before challenging their validity. (b) It should be dismissed on the ground
of laches because the petitioners only filed the case after an unreasonable length of time. (c)
Burgos is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants since he had used
and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in a criminal case against him.

ISSUE:

a. Whether there was a valid search warrant?

b. Whether general description of the things to be seized is enough to constitute

probable cause to validate the issuance of a search warrant and seizure?

RULING:

a. No. The two search warrants were issued without probable cause and are void for lack of
particularity. The search warrants issued are in the nature of general warrants.
Jurisprudence prohibits general warrants such as the case of Stanford v. State of Texas. To
satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the
application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar, nothing specifically
subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D No.
885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. In the words
of the Chief Justice Concepcion, “It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict
anybody” of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision thereof.

b. Mere generalization of the probable cause for issuance of the search warrant will not
suffice.

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that Burgos “is in possession documents
which were continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion” is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

18. People vs. Rubio

ABELA, WOM LIB

19. MARIO VERIDIANO vs. PEOPLE

June 7, 2017 G.R. No. 200370 AMIGO, ALISSA MAE

Facts:

· At about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3

Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a
certain alias “Baho” who was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo
City to obtain illegal drugs.

·PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3 Alvin
Vergara who were both on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and
PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

· The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They chanced upon
Veridiano at around 10PM inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna.
They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.

·The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana.” PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.
Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to
the police station.

·At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who
also placed his initials. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which
he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime
laboratory. The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.

·RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession
of marijuana.

·Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally
 arrested." The CA rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.

·The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having
marijuana in his possession.

·Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.

·Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petition was granted.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner

Ruling:

Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot
be reversed."78For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally
infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest
because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting
that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.92 The rule requires
that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime
was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule.94 An arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is
committed up to the point of arrest.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of
the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police
officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support
a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime
has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that the petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal
knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless
search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be
surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed
with clear and convincing evidence.134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be
"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the
accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar
activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the
search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the
accused.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag
containing marijuana seized from the petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary
principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his
conviction, the petitioner must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case
No. 16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
 20. PEOPLE VS RACHO

August 3, 2010 G.R. No. 186529 ARADANAS, AKIMA

FACTS:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities
who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m.,
appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and
would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The
team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around
3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the
bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter
was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as
he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a
white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the
confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory
examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:

1) Can appellant assail, for the first time on appeal, the legality of his arrest and the validity of
the subsequent warrantless search?

2) Is the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search admissible in evidence
against him?

RULING:

1) No. He can no longer question the validity of his arrest but the subsequent warrantless search
is not valid. He is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he
never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. It is his first time to raise
the issue. He actively participated in the trial of the case and voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.

2) No. The sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him. It was confiscated during a warrantless search incidental to an unlawful
arrest. There was no sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest because
appellant herein did not perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, was
actually committing, or was attempting to commit an offense. The tip or “reliable information”
alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.

A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

. Search of evidence in “plain view;”

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

21. People vs. Aruta

April, 1998 G.R. No. 120915 ASLOR, NORMIEL

Facts

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain
“Aling Rosa” would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, with a large volume of
marijuana. Acting on said tip, Abello assembled a team. Said team proceeded to West
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon 1988 and deployed themselves near
the Philippine National Bank building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in
the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that
the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked “Cash Katutak.” The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket
to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the
confiscated marijuana leaves.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant’s
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in
evidence. The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on
the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items
seized to avoid pre-judgmen. RTC convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos
and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

RULING:

NO. The right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which
allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be
strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by
law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic
and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and
was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime.
There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no
probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The
seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which
provides that:

RULE 113, RULES OF COURT

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search
of accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not
having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically
follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

22. LIU vs. MATILLANO

May 27, 2004 G.R. No. 141176 AUDIENCIA, BJ

FACTS:

Sometime in September 1987, then 17 year old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his father’s
older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur.
Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a
monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was
located at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to
close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the
store in the mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned
by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Ben’s nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and
Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.

Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house of his
aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested
until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, but Kiao told him
that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of October.
Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to
return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiao’s house.

Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben
reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit
wherein he alleged that after Lariosa’s employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he
discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit
because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United
Products Enterprise Store.

An incident occurred wherein Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that
he had stolen Ben’s money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort
room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into
confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call
to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) directed Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft
case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was directed to coordinate
with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for
the mission. He then left the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the corner of
Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the
residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen
door to gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties
therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of
a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the
warrantless search.

An information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa with
robbery with force upon things. The RTC in this case acquitted Lariosa of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosa’s confession through force and
intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.

Lariosa’s parents on the other hand, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for
robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli
Lui, et al.

The Regional Trial Court ordered the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to
prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court
gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano
voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject
items to them. The Court of Appeals later reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:

Whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house,
as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family?

RULINGS:

NO. The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns
drawn and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house
of the respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over
her vehement protests, and because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she might be harmed,
respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the
second floor of their house.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED.
There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There
must be proof of the following:

a. that the right exists;

b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of said
right;

c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is
to be valid.

Furthermore, Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him
by Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely
tasked in the said order to “follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the
METRODISCOM, Davao City.” The petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to
commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as violation of domicile as defined in Article
128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

ART. 128. Violation of domicile — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order,
shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects
found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having surreptitiously entered said
dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by
consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did
not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties.
However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui
threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the
house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not
have waived his constitutional right.

The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for
damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP
Garments vs. CA.

23. Valeros vs. CA

September 3, 2009 G.R. No. 164815 AURELIO, FATIMA

FACTS: NACHURA, J.

SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police District
Command, received a dispatch order2 from the desk officer. The order directed him and three
(3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador against
petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.

Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Unlawful Manufacture,
Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments) have in
his possession and under hi s custody and control cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver bearing
serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo. Without first having secured the necessary
license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing
Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition tucked in his waist.

Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a
certification that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of
a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.

On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified
for the defense. That he was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who
pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room. The raiding team tied his hands and
placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked
the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha
akong baril sa loob!

Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the
raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?

RULING:The court answered in negative.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon... probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the
person, house, papers, or effects of any individual any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section... shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized
instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police... who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances;

8. Search of vessels and aircraft; and

9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations.
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches
and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
the latter's reach in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach.

A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.

Phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed
him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands.

The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's
guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence...
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr. and People v. Leangsiri:

"plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused.

Serves to supplement the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure...
the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something... incriminating at last emerges. Order is too high a price to pay
for the loss of liberty.

Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who

conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of
their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and the government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the
Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.

24. People vs. Nueva

G.R. No. 170233 BENABAYE, SHEENA

Facts:
Police officers Fami And Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and monitoring of
illegal drug trafficking in Olongapo City, Came across Juses Nuevas, who they suspected to be
carrying drugs. Upon inquiry, Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which contained marijuana
leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. He then informed the officers of two other persons
who would be making marijuana deliveries.
The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates, Reynaldo Din
and Fernando Inocencio, could be located. Reynaldo Din was carrying a plastic bag which
contained marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. When the police officers
introduced themselves, Reynaldo Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to them. After the
items were confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the police office.
Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all
three accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who
escorted all three to the Fiscal’s office where they were informed of the charges against them.
The three found guilty by the trial court, and the cawse was automatically elevated to the
CA for review. However. Nuevas withdres his appeal. Thus, the case was considered closed and
terminated as to him. The CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers valid?

Ruling:
No. The warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers is not valid.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed
as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
 Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
The court also stated the neiither could the searches be justified under the plain view
doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas
and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In
Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a
blue cloth.In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein." It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was
made with his consent. In Din’s case, there was none.

25. Valdez vs People

November 23, 2007 G.R. No. 170180 BESIN, JIEZEL MAE

FACTS:

On June 26, 2003, Valdez was charged with violation of Sec. 11 par. 2(2) of RA 9165. He was
found to be in possession, control and custody of dried marijuana leaves (more or less
25grams) wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper.

PROCEDURE:

· On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.

· Three barangay tanods (Bautista, Aratas, Ordono) were presented.

o Rogelio Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30pm of March 2003, he

was conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Brgy. San
Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union with Aratas and Ordono. They noticed that
Valdez, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus.
 - Tanods observed that Valdez appeared to be suspicious and seemed to
be looking for something. They approached him but he attempted to run
away.

- They chased him, put him under arrest and brought him to Brgy.
Captain Mercado’s house.

- Valdez’s bag allegedly contained: a pair of denim pants, 18 pieces of

eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane.

o Bautista’s testimony was corroborated by Aratas and Ordono.

Cross-examination:

- Aratas admitted that he brought out the contents of Valdez’s bag before
he was taken to Mercado’s house. At Mercado’s house, he claimed that
Valdez himself brought out the contents of his bag upon Mercado’s order.

- Ordono testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open

Valdez’s bag and it was then that they saw the bag’s contents.

o Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya) was also

presented by the prosecution. He maintained that the specimen allegedly
confiscated tested positive of marijuana (23.10 grams). However, he could not
identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping.

· Petitioner Valdez’s contentions:

o Denied charges.

o At around 830pm of March 17, 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in
Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting the bus, he went to his friend’s house
to drink water then he proceeded to walk to his brother’s house.

o Ordono (cousin of his brother’s wife) approached him and asked him where he
was going. He then asked to see the contents of his bag. It was at this point that
Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting the bag, he was restrained by
the tanods and took him to Mercado’s house. Aratas carried his bag until they
reached the house.

o At Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself.
They took out a wrapper which turned out to be marijuana. Valdez denied
ownership thereof.

o He claimed that he was threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did

not give up the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to
apprehend such person. When he declined, he was brought to the police station
 and charged with the instant offense.

· RTC rendered judgment against Valdez and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate
imprisonment from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor (minimum) to 15 years of reclusion
temporal (maximum) and to pay P350,000 fine.

· Petitioner appealed to CA.

· CA affirmed the challenged decision. It found no reason to overturn the presumption of

regularity in favor of the three barangay tanod.

· In his appeal, Valdez prayed for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argued for the first time that the warrantless arrest effected
against him was unlawful and the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise
contrary to law and that the seized marijuana leaves are inadmissible for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.

· On appeal is the CA decision affirming RTC La Union judgment finding petitioner Arsenio
Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165.

ISSUES:

1. WON the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and
that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law? YES.

2. WON the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being
the fruit of a poisonous tree? YES.

RULING:

To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to

ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on
which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:

1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (in flagrante delicto)

2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
 to be arrested has committed it; (hot pursuit) and

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a

penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. (escaping prisoner)

Based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
obtained at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not
committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners
warrantless arrest.

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present:

1. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.

Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding
his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached
him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with
personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run
away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.

It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely
observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their
approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt.

In People v. Shabaz that flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation
as it does to a nefarious one.

A stop-and-frisk situation, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons

outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.

Accordingly, Valdez’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they
were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.

When Valdez was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto
committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Hence, it cannot therefore be
reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.

The prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and
how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged “consent.”

The inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful
search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find
that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken
from Valdez’s bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must
concur:

1. proof that the transaction took place; and

2. presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The
existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity
of the corpus delicti.

The evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.

In the case at bar, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all
the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must result in Valdez’s acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio
Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his
continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.
 26. Caballes vs CA

January 15, 2002 G.R. No. 135292 CANEDO, KARINA

Facts:

Petitioner Caballes was charged with the crime of theft. The information dated Oct 16, 1989
reveal that in Municipality Laguna, Caballes took and carried cable conductors owned by
National Power Corporation.

During the arraignment Caballes pleaded not guilty and the trial ensued. The facts established
that police officers spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with kakawati leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the police officers flagged down the
vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant who did not answer when asked what was loaded in
the jeep, and appeared pale and nervous.

In defense, Caballes said that he is a driver and resident of Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent
since January 1998. He testified that on the date June 28, 1989 he was driving the passenger
jeepney when he was stopped by certain Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport the
conductor wires. He told Fernandez that he had to wait until his last trip for the day from Santa
Cruz. He dropped by NARCOM headquarters and ifnormed Sgt. Callos that something unlawful
was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that
the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.

He told the police officers that arrested him that the owner of the cables was Resty Fernandez
but the police did not believe him and locked him up in the jail for a week.

The RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of theft. This was affirmed

by the CA.

Issue: Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?

Held: No.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;8
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless
search;11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.13

It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at
bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from
the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the
prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1.nêt

I. Search of moving vehicle

The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of
a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.17

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause.18 Still and all, the important thing is that there was
probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined
by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.20

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military
or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,21 for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.
A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.29

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able
to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.

II. Plain view doctrine

It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.38

It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden
underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was
loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.40

III. Consented search

Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with
the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He
claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was
given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there
was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a

personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence

This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was
orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter
fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the
request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive

searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.55

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained
the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look
at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that
by uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be
allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing,
nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for
his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is
doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja
was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he
answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only
after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect
the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was
asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his
consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner
for permission to conduct the search.

Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the

warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and
failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and
held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:

"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen,
the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy
Caballes is ACQUITTED
 27. PEOPLE v. VINECARIO

G.R. No. 141137 COLAMA, CHARLES

FACTS:

On the night of April 10, 1995, police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle
with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble, Gerlyn Wates sped
past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer
asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was only a mat.

The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant opened the bag it turns out
that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police station and later to
Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials without the assistance of
counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed
to read.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700
grams of marijuana violated their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD:

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped
and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle
are or have been instruments of some offense.

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as
valid, because of the existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from
a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.

In light of Vinecario et al.‘s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having
been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated
on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario,
when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a
member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the
backpack were instruments of some offense.
 28. PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 191366 DELA CRUZ,MELODY

Doctrine:

Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.

Facts:

Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along
Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that
a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz , and
members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City.

As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria)
coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused
Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez)
in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open
plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of
used aluminum foil.

The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were
seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp.
Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic
sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test
and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RTC held the accused guilty of the crime Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Social
Gatherings. The CA supported the findings of the lower court.

Issues:

1. WON the evidence against the accused are admissible (No)

2. WON chain of custody has been established (No)
Held:

1. No.

The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons
of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects as provided by Sec. 2, Art. III, of
the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following
instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant — (i) warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.

Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances
under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the
case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit,
basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of
these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and
seizure based solely on an informer’s tip.

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of
the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable
ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not
prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.

Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid
intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search
cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a
customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.

As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge
that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to
commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales
in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an
offense.

2. No.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the
existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established. The chain of custody
requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are
removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the
accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.

In the case at bench, the Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse
non-compliance. The suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the
requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory and taking
photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case
of warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness
of the situation may have had should have dissipated by the time they reached the police
station, as the suspects had already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been
held that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from
immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at their place of
seizure, as it is more in keeping with the law’s intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value.

This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items.

Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is
instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the
matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when
these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest.
Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons
from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery
or theft.

In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be irregular.
When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of regularity
cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO.
03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the
accused and ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined
for any other lawful cause.

29. PEOPLE vs. MUSA

FERENAL, RAYMOND

30. MALACAT vs. CA

G.R. No. 123595 FREDELUCES, DANESSA

31. PEOPLE v. COGAED

G.R. No. 200334 GANADOS, ROLDAN

Facts:

At about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan "received a
text message from an unidentified civilian informer" that one Marvin Buya "[would]be
transporting marijuana".

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI Bayan ordered SPO1
Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The
jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male
passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.
Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao
told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for
their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing
three bricks of what looked like marijuana. "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao
and brought them to the police station.

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his
younger brother’s friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed
alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things,
which included a travelling bag and a sack." Cogaed agreed because they were both going to
the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac
asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. SPO1 Taracatac
then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. Thereafter, SPO1
Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station. These facts were
corroborated by an eye witness, Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot
where Cogaed was apprehended.

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." The bags were
also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.

The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about to do
so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding
the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did
not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."

Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal
and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant.
Ruling:

No.

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this
provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after
asking searching questions and answers. Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is
an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law
enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the
Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate
warrant. This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with
all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal
behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or
carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of
one’s person and effects.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For
there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless
arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Both elements were
missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police
officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the
last allowable warrantless arrest.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Cogaed’s silence or lack of
aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the
police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry
the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent,
and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better.
However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our
Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the
society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
 32. GENERAL TRAVEL SERVICES VS. DAVID

GUDMALIN, BERNALD

33. Asian Terminals, Inc vs. Bautista-Ricafort

October 27, 2006 G.R. No. 166901 LABITE, ADRIAN

FACTS:

Noel Tabuelog, Ernesto de Jesus, Norma Pondevida, Renato Claros, Ernesto M. Chua, Cecilia
T. Saulog, Jenelita S. Napárate, Rodolfo F. Mago, and Amalia C. Edamura are duly-licensed
importers of vehicles imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the
shipment arrived at the Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded and stored
them at Asian Terminals, Inc.
Later, the importers with the RTC of Parañaque City, against the Secretary of Finance, Customs
Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. RTC
granted the application for a writ of replevin on a bond.
When the Sheriff and policemen arrived at the warehouse to take custody of the vehicles, they
were prevented by the customs police, claiming that the District Collector of Customs had
jurisdiction over the vehicles. Later on, the District Collector of Customs agreed to transfer the
custody of the vehicles to the RTC, on the condition that the required taxes, dues, and other
charges be paid.
The defendants, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an Omnibus Motion13, seeking
the reconsideration of the RTC Order granting plaintiffs’ plea for a writ of replevin. It likewise
prayed that the writ of replevin issued by the court be quashed on the ground that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the vehicles subject of seizure and detention before the Bureau of Customs.
The OSG declared that the Bureau of Customs which had custody of the vehicles through ATI
"had exclusive jurisdiction over said vehicles and on the issues of the seizure and detention
thereof."
On December 1, 1998, the ATI filed a Third-Party Claim before the RTC over the shipment,
alleging that it had a lien over the vehicles. The Bureau of Customs opposed this. On appeal,
the CA dismissed ATI’s petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction to grant the writ of replevin.

RULING:
NO. As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 35 (1995), Regional Trial Courts
are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
proceedings.

It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters
even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

The Court further explained: It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and
Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act
Creating the Court of Tax Appeals,” specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of
any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the
Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn,
is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the
Court of Appeals. The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such
proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the
government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the
State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.

The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents
herein, issue the writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had
already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC should have
dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of respondents (plaintiffs
below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted
without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof.

It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is a proceeding
against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e.,
directed against the res or imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of their
importation. In this proceeding, it is, in legal contemplation, the property itself which commits the
violation and is treated as the offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or conduct
of the owner.
 34. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

G.R. No. L-19550 MACHUTES, JULIE ANN

FACTS:

Officers of the government, hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors and

Respondent-Judges issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statement and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

As “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or
“used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the
applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.”

PETITIONERS contention:

● Petitioners alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court­–because:
1. They do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized
2. Cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized
3. The warrants were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them
4. The searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner
5. The documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants
6. The aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that,
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. (Invoked
Constitutional provision regarding unreasonable searches and seizures)

● Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction and prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and/or representatives from using the
effects seized, or any copies thereof in the deportation cases, and that in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring
the same null and void, and commanding the respondents to return to petitioners the
 things that were seized.

RESPONDENTS contention:

● Respondent prosecutors alleged that:

1. The contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law
2. The defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent
3. Relying upon Moncado vs. People’s Court, Respondent-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners

The Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by virtue of a resolution, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned; but the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether the search warrants and the searches and seizures with regard to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residence of petitioners are valid and may be used as evidence
against the petitioners?

HELD:

NO. The decision in the Mondaco case must be abandoned. Most common law jurisdictions
have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"—as alleged in the
aforementioned applications—without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
codes.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted—to outlaw the so­called general warrants.

Indeed, the non­exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent 'evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of
a given crime by the party against 'whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other
hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not 'justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners,
as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty­nine (29) places, offices
and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

It is so ordered.
 35. PEOPLE vs. Chhan Fook

MARTINEZ, CORNELIO III

36. Abuan vs. People

G.R. No. 168773 October 27. 2006 MATA, FAUSTINE VIOL

Facts:

Abuan was charged for violating RA 6425, as amended, by the MTC and recommended the
filing of an information against her. During the pre-trial, Abuan rejected the prosecution’s
proposal for her to admit the validity of the search warrant that in such enforcement, 57 sachets
of shabu were found in her house and later confiscated by the policemen. She maintained that
the warrant was invalid and that any material allegedly confiscated from her house was
inadmissible in evidence. Further, she declared that the sachets found in her home were merely
“planted” to implicate her when she refused to entrust the properties of her family to the care of
his son.

On March 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision finding accused guilty of the charge. It
declared that she failed to prove that it was her brother who manipulated the unfortunate events.
Neither was she able to prove the ill motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the
search.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner insists that, based on the records, she sought to suppress the search warrant
throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. She rejected the prosecution’s offer to admit
the validity of the search warrant and even filed a motion to suppress the search. She was thus
not proscribed from filing her motion to suppress the search warrant even after the arraignment.

In its Comment, the OSG maintains that the search warrant is valid. It insists that the CA
correctly ruled that the requisites of a valid search warrant were present, noting that the
Executive Judge conducted searching questions and answers on the person of Marissa
Gorospe. It asserts that, in applying for a search warrant, a police officer need not possess
personal knowledge regarding an illegal activity; it is the witness who should possess such
personal knowledge, and upon whose testimony under oath probable cause may be established.

The OSG maintains that petitioner in effect waived whatever objections she had regarding the
validity of the search warrant. It points out that she never questioned the warrant before the
court which issued the same, never questioned nor moved for the quashal of the warrant before
her arraignment. And while petitioner was allowed to present evidence on the alleged invalidity
of the search warrant, this did not cure her omission or inaction in raising the issue at the proper
time.

Petitioner likewise maintains that contrary to the allegations of the OSG, she did not waive her
right to question the validity of the warrant. She could not have done any better under the
circumstances at that time because all the evidence against Gorospe was made known and
available to her only after her arraignment.

Issue:

1. Whether petitioner waived her right to question the search warrant and the admissibility of the
substances and paraphernalia confiscated from her house based on said warrant.

2. Whether the search warrant was valid

Held:

1. Petitioner did not waive her right to file a motion to quash search warrant and for the
suppression of the evidence seized by the police officers.

Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. – A
motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court.

The Court ruled in the Malaloan case that the motion to quash the search warrant which the
accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress the resolution of the court not on the
motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress evidence shall be subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court. A motion to quash a search warrant may be based on
grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized
are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant. Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the
court may hear the motion, as follows:

When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

In the present case, petitioner reserved her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62 when
she filed her motion for bail in the RTC. The public prosecutor conformed to the motion. During
pre-trial in the RTC, petitioner rejected the prosecution’s proposal for her to admit the validity of
Search Warrant No. 98-62, insisting that it was void. In her motion to suppress, petitioner
averred that the search warrant is void for the following reasons: lack of probable cause; failure
of the Executive Judge to ask searching questions on Gorospe; and the evidence seized by the
police officers on the basis of the search warrant are inadmissible in evidence. She likewise
prayed that the search warrant be nullified, and that the evidence seized by the policemen on
the basis of said warrant be suppressed.

Petitioner was ready to adduce evidence in support of her motion, but the court declared that
this should be done during the trial. Petitioner thus no longer assailed the ruling of the trial court
and opted to adduce her evidence at the trial. She likewise objected to the admission of the
search warrant and the evidence confiscated by the police officers after the search was
conducted. It bears stressing that the trial court admitted the same and she objected thereto. It
cannot, therefore, be said that petitioner waived her right to assail the search warrant and object
to the admissibility of the regulated drugs found in her house.

2. The search warrant was valid and the articles, paraphernalia and regulated drugs found
in petitioner’s bedroom and confiscated by the police are admissible in evidence.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of
probable cause but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the records
supporting the Judge’s decision to issue the search warrant. The reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the Judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, and
once ascertained that the Judge had substantial basis for concluding that a search would
unearth evidence of a wrongdoing, the determination of probable cause must be upheld. In the
absence of any showing that the Judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the
personal examination he so conducted on the affiants/deponent before him, there is no basis for
doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search warrant
issued by him based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers
based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents clear and convincing
evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant made a deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition or testimony which is essential or
necessary to a showing of probable cause. Such evidence must focus on the state of mind of
the affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation. The
requirement that a search warrant not issue but upon probable cause would be reduced to a
nullity if a police officer and his informant are able to use deliberately falsehood allegations to
demonstrate probable cause and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that
the ploy succeeded. However, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police
officer or government informant will not invalidate a search warrant. And even if the police officer
or government informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the
truth in his or her affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish
probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable cause.
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was not a resident or transient of Barangay
Sapang, even if true and credible, is not at all material or necessary to the determination of
probable cause. Whether petitioner and Gorospe were dealers of Avon Cosmetics as of May 5,
1998 may be relevant to the issue of whether there was factual basis for the finding of probable
cause by the Executive Judge against petitioner; however, petitioner’s evidence to prove his
claim is tenuous and does not warrant the quashal of Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the
suppression of the evidence seized after the enforcement of the search warrant.

Petition DENIED.

37. MALALOAN V. CA

May 6, 1994 G.R. No. 104879 PONTILLO, GLEENA

Facts:

1st Lt. Salboro of CAPCOM Northern Sector, filed with RTC-Kalookan City, an
application for search warrant, in connection with an alleged violation of PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions), perpetrated at Fairview, Quezon City. The Judge of
RTC-Kalookan City issued a search warrant.

Members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of
the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education
and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property
Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized
and taken during the search.

All the 61 persons found within the premises searched, were brought to Camp Karingal,
Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of petitioners, EILER
Instructors, who were indicated for violation of PD 1866, in a criminal case filed before
RTC-Quezon City.

Issue:

Whether a court may NOT take cognizance of an application for a search warrant, in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the
warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The petition is DENIED. A warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes a

process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name
of the "People of the Philippines", signed by a judge, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant
is in the nature of a criminal process, akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued
by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained
by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.

A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules, to respond only to
an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof.

This Court, pursuant to its authority granted by law, has defined the territorial jurisdiction
of each branch of a Regional Trial Court over which the particular branch concerned shall
exercise its authority. From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a
warrant to search that place." We reject that proposition. These "circulars" were issued by the
Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search
warrants filed "only" in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and
"only" with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the
Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue
search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal
case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that
only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to
search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is
pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction
to issue the search warrant.

No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no
such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. There is no provision as to the extent of the
territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises
specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court.

The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to
detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or
prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for
the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more
onerous, if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of
jurisdiction through decisional dicta.

We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the
territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional
question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement
authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application
for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a
process, not an action.
Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated
safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search
warrant, and all these have to be observed, regardless of whatever court in whichever region is
importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day
lifetime of the warrant would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only
because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless
there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so.
 On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to
contend now and then, with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and
influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to
obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook
the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their
examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further
well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the
court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:

This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information, which is of
utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant, is secured (against) where the issuing
magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the
region, where the place to be searched is located.

38. CASTRO v. PABALAN

April 30, 1976 G.R. No. L-28642 PRADO, MARENEL

Facts:

Respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the
belief that petitioners Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not even
indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La
Union, "have in possession narcotics and other contraband.

Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of
Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his
witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.

Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer. No complete description of the
goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina
and not in Padasil.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Pabalan failed to abide by both the Constitution and the procedural law in
terms of the existence of a probable cause.

Ruling:

Yes. The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As was
admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the
residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil
when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina.

He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to
the premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient
gravity to call for its invalidation. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would
explain why the searching party felt it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds
of goods, including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself would have them return.
What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional provision, the
elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court
is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory
character and therefore must be strictly complied with.

Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search
warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Here
reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic
term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable
statutes.

39. MHP Garments vs. CA

September 2, 1994 G.R. No. 86720 RAPISURA, COLEEN

Facts:

On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scout uniforms and other scouting supplies."

Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner
corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the
Philippine Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel,
and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman,
Quezon City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any
warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents'
stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were
issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner
corporation for safekeeping.

Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money
and damages. In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private
respondents. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth
Division, affirmed the Decision with modification.

Issue:

WON the warrantless search and seizure was valid?

Ruling:

NO. In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court,
a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following circumstance:

Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were
illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time
are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a
surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary
and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the
supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the
information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for
petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of
time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so,
they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search
and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause
for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search
and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed
their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary
that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of
private respondents.

While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the
complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not
exculpate petitioners. Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent
court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly,
they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was conducted with
the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the
seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he
was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation
which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and
de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint
for unfair competition.

40. PASION vs. LOCSIN

June 20, 1938 G.R. No. L-45950 RESTUARO, IAN VONN

FACTS:

Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store
of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other
papers relating to her activities as usurer."

The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and
there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia
keeps and conceals in her house and store, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and
other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such
cases made and provided."

On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to
the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's
bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined
at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing
cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor
issued by him to Salas.

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who
subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases
against Pasion de Garcia for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after
seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of
the documents seized.

By motion, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in
the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, Judge
Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion for the reason that though the search
warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrant is valid by reason of waiver of constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

RULING: No. Warrant was declared null and void.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference
to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the
property to deliver the same to the corresponding court.

Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He
did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses,
if any.

Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the
assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the
properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.
Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases
against Pasion de Garcia.

Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against Pasion
de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not
without basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac.

In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to
the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right.