MANGOTARA, ARMON RYAN
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EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
GR 95770
FACTS:
The case centered around minor children, members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who, with the
representation of their parents, were expelled from public schools in Cebu for refusing to
participate in the flag ceremony—saluting the flag, singing the national anthem, and reciting the
patriotic pledge, mandated by Republic Act No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8 issued by the
Department of Education, claiming it against their religious beliefs. This refusal led to their
expulsion based on the rationale that such acts were considered disrespectful to the Philippine
flag and, by implication, to the country. They anchored their refusal on their sincere belief in the
biblical injunction against idolatry. The case, initially resolved in favor of the children, was
subjected to a motion for reconsideration by the State, arguing that the ruling created a religious
exemption that violated the “Establishment Clause” of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON the expulsion of Jehovah’s Witnesses from public schools for not participating in the flag
ceremony violates the “Free Exercise Clause” and the “Establishment Clause” of the
Constitution?
RULING:
The Supreme Court maintained its prior decision, emphasizing the paramount importance of
religious freedom and ruling that the expulsion of Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge was unconstitutional.
DOCTRINES:
Free Exercise Clause: Protects individuals’ right to practice their religion freely, without undue
interference from the government, unless the practice poses a clear and present danger to public
safety, peace, or order.
Establishment Clause: Prohibits the government from establishing an official religion, favoring
one religion over another, or unduly preferring religion over non-religion, or vice versa.
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OMA VS IDCP
GR 153888
FACTS:
Petitioner, Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP), seeks a declaration of nullity
of Executive Order (EO) No. 46, s. 2001 and prays for a prohibition against the respondents, the
Office of the Executive Secretary and the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), from implementing
the said EO. IDCP, a non-governmental organization operating under Department of Social
Welfare and Development License No. SB-01-085, provides voluntary services to the Filipino
people, especially to Muslim communities. In response to the need to certify food products as
halal and based on requests from halal food producers, the petitioner formulated internal rules
and procedures in 1995. These were based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for analyzing food,
inspecting it, and issuing halal certifications. EO 46 designated respondent OMA to oversee the
implementation of halal certifications. Subsequently, OMA warned Muslim consumers to
purchase only products with its official halal certification. It argued that products without this
certification had not been properly analyzed and could contain pork or its derivatives. OMA also
sent letters to food manufacturers, urging them to obtain halal certification exclusively from
OMA, warning that failing to do so would violate EO 46 and Republic Act No. 4109. As a result
of OMA's actions, IDCP lost revenue because food manufacturers stopped seeking certifications
from the petitioner. IDCP claims that EO 46 was issued hastily, without consulting Muslim
organizations like itself, and thus filed a petition for prohibition.
ISSUE:
WON EO 46 unconstitutional?
RULING:
Yes, classifying foods as halal or not is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encraoched the religious freedoms of Muslim organization like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food are fit for consumption.
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ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter, was accused of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for
living with a man, Luciano Quilapio, Jr., who was not her husband, and having a child with him.
This was despite her being a widow and her partner being legally married to another. Escritor, a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, argued that their living arrangement was in accordance with
her religious beliefs and approved by her congregation. She presented a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness," a religious document allowing for such unions in specific circumstances. The case
was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to determine the sincerity and
centrality of Escritor's religious belief, to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to
override her religious practice, and to show that the state's approach was the least restrictive
means possible to achieve its interest.
ISSUE:
WON the state's interest in upholding the institution of marriage and the integrity of the judiciary
outweighed Escritor's right to free exercise of religion.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint against Escritor, finding that her
right to free exercise of religion prevailed. The Court found that the sincerity and centrality of
Escritor's religious belief were undisputed. While acknowledging the state's interest in upholding
the institution of marriage and the integrity of the judiciary, the Court found that the government
failed to demonstrate a "compelling state interest" that outweighed Escritor's right to free
exercise.
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DOMINADOR L. TARUC. V. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ
GR 144801
FACTS:
The petitioners, lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del
Norte, sought the transfer of their parish priest, Fr. Rustom Florano, due to alleged animosity
between them and the family of Fr. Florano's wife, who belonged to a political party opposed to
petitioner Dominador Taruc. Their Bishop, Porfirio de la Cruz, denied their request, finding the
reason insufficient.
The situation worsened when Taruc organized an open mass to be celebrated by a priest not
belonging to the diocese, Fr. Renato Z. Ambong, during the town fiesta. The Bishop tried to
dissuade Taruc, as Fr. Ambong's credentials were questionable. Despite this, Taruc proceeded
with the open mass.
As a result, Bishop de la Cruz expelled/excommunicated the petitioners from the PIC for
disobeying authority, inciting dissension, and threatening to forcibly occupy the parish church.
The petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo, but he only advised Fr. Florano to step down
voluntarily. The new Bishop, Rhee M. Timbang, also refused to transfer Fr. Florano. The
petitioners continued their religious activities with Fr. Ambong, who had been restricted from
performing priestly functions in the PIC parish of Socorro.
The petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against the Bishop and
other respondents, claiming that their expulsion was illegal as it was done without trial, violating
their right to due process.
ISSUE:
WON the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of
members of a religious institution?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the courts do not have jurisdiction in such cases. The Court
emphasized the principle of separation of Church and State, citing the Constitution's protection
of freedom of religion. The Court held that matters related to doctrinal and disciplinary
differences within a religious institution are best left to the discretion of the officials, laws, and
canons of the organization
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RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO
FACTS:
Tony Q. Valenciano filed a complaint with the Supreme Court regarding the conduct of Catholic
masses in the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He claimed that this practice
breached the principle of separation of Church and State and violated the prohibition against
using public funds for religious activities. Additionally, he argued that the masses disrupted court
operations, caused inconvenience to employees and litigants, and created a bias in favor of
Catholic litigants. The Supreme Court referred the issue to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for assessment. After investigating and reviewing reports from the judges involved, the
OCA recommended dismissing Valenciano's complaint and allowing the masses to continue,
subject to certain regulations.
ISSUE:
WON the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violate
the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State and the prohibition against the
appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any religious group?
RULING:
The Supreme Court concurred with the Office of the Court Administrator's (OCA) findings and
denied Tony Q. Valenciano's request to ban religious ceremonies in the Quezon City Hall of
Justice and other halls of justice nationwide.
The Court ruled as follows:
No Union of Church and State: The Court held that allowing masses in the halls of justice did not
constitute a union of Church and State. It noted that the Constitution recognizes the religiosity of
Filipinos and permits religious practices as long as they do not violate the non-establishment
clause.
No Compelling State Interest: The Court found no compelling reason to prohibit the masses. It
observed that the masses were conducted during lunch breaks, did not interfere with court
proceedings, and did not hinder the performance of judiciary staff.
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Accommodation, Not Establishment: The Court explained that permitting the masses was a form
of "accommodation," respecting judiciary employees' right to practice their religion without the
government endorsing or establishing any specific religion.
The Court also emphasized that no part of the building should serve as a permanent place of
worship, and religious symbols should only be displayed during religious ceremonies.
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SPARK VS QUESZON CITY
GR 225442
FACTS:
Following a nationwide campaign to implement curfews for minors, several local governments
in Metro Manila, including Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas, began strictly enforcing their pre-
existing curfew ordinances. These ordinances restricted minors from being in public places
during specific late-night hours. The Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) and
individual petitioners challenged these ordinances, arguing they violated the constitutional right
of minors to travel. They pointed to instances of minors being apprehended based on appearance
alone, without proper identification or age verification, and argued that the ordinances' limited
exemptions unfairly restricted legitimate minor activities during curfew hours.
ISSUE:
WON the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments violate the constitutional right of
minors to travel, specifically, by imposing restrictions that were not narrowly tailored to serve
the government's compelling interest in promoting juvenile safety and preventing juvenile crime?
RULING:
The Supreme Court found that the Quezon City Ordinance was constitutional but declared the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances unconstitutional. The Court recognized the right to travel as a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. While acknowledging the government's
compelling interest in protecting minors and preventing juvenile crime, the Court ruled that the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances were not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. Their limited
exceptions did not adequately protect the minors' rights to association, free exercise of religion,
and other freedoms.
MANGOTARA, ARMON RYAN
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GENUINO VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
GR 197930
FACTS:
Efraim and siblings were issued HDOs and WLOs by the Secretary of justice. These orders were
based on pending investigations and cases against them involving charges of malversation,
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and plunder. These orders effectively
restricted their right to travel. These orders were bsed on DOJ Circular No. 41 which states that
the Secretary of Justice may motu proprio in the interest of national security public safety and
health may issue such orders.
ISSUE:
WON DOJ Circular No. 41 was unconstitutional?
RULING:
The court ruled that it was indeed unconstitutional and declared all the issuances Null and Void
on the basis of violating the Right to travel and the restrictions to right to travel must be
grounded in specific legal enactments and not merely on administrative issuances.
MANGOTARA, ARMON RYAN
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RICARDO C. SILVERIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR 94284
FACTS:
Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violating the Revised Securities Act in 1985. He was
released on bail but repeatedly failed to appear for scheduled arraignments, claiming to be
abroad. This led to the cancellation of his bail bond twice and the issuance of warrants for his
arrest. The prosecution, arguing that Silverio was a flight risk, filed a motion to prevent him from
leaving the country. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals upheld the
decision.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err in issuing an order preventing Silverio from leaving the country based on
his failure to appear for arraignment? Specifically, did this order violate his constitutional right
to travel, which is only limited by national security, public safety, or public health?
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that:
- Valid Restriction: Preventing Silverio from leaving the country was a valid restriction
on his right to travel. The Court emphasized that an accused facing criminal charges who
has violated bail conditions by failing to appear in court can be restricted from leaving
the country to ensure his availability for trial.
- Inherent Power of Courts: The Court has the inherent power to use all means necessary
to carry out its orders in criminal cases. This includes preventing an accused from
leaving the country to ensure he can be dealt with according to law.
- Purpose of Bail: The purpose of bail is to ensure an accused's appearance in court.
Preventing an accused from leaving the country serves this purpose and protects the
rights of the People of the Philippines to have criminal prosecutions proceed to finality
without undue delay.
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The Court also addressed the argument that the 1987 Constitution limited restrictions on travel to
national security, public safety, or public health. It clarified that while this is true for
administrative authorities, the inherent power of courts to ensure the effective administration of
justice is not limited by these specific grounds.
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MARCOS VS HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
GR 88211
FACTS:
The case arose in the aftermath of the 1986 People Power Revolution, which ousted Ferdinand E.
Marcos from the presidency and forced him into exile. The country was in a state of flux,
grappling with the consequences of Marcos's rule: a substantial national debt, a weakened
economy, and lingering political instability. The lingering threat of communist and separatist
movements, combined with the Marcos family's history of power and influence, fueled concerns
that their return could exacerbate existing tensions and destabilize the nation further.
Despite facing accusations of corruption and human rights abuses, Marcos, on his deathbed,
expressed a desire to return to the Philippines to die. However, President Corazon Aquino,
recognizing the potential risks to national security, made the decision to bar the Marcos family
from returning to the country.
The Marcos family, asserting their constitutional right to return to their homeland, filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition, challenging the President's decision. They argued that their
rights to travel and liberty of abode, enshrined in the Bill of Rights, had been violated by the
President's actions. They contended that they had a fundamental right to return to the Philippines,
free from arbitrary restrictions, and that the President's decision was unjustified and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Did President Aquino, in barring the Marcoses' return, violate their constitutional rights to travel
and liberty of abode? Could the President, without a specific law authorizing her to do so, restrict
the Marcoses' right to return to the Philippines?
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld President Aquino's decision, finding that the President's inherent
powers to protect the nation's interests, particularly during times of crisis, outweighed the
Marcoses' individual rights to travel and liberty of abode.
The Court recognized the inherent power of the President to act decisively in the face of threats
to national security. It acknowledged that while the Constitution guarantees the rights to travel
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and liberty of abode, these rights are not absolute and can be restricted in the interest of national
security and public safety. The Court concluded that the President, in her determination that the
Marcoses' return posed a significant risk to national security and stability, had a factual basis for
her decision and acted within her authority.
MANGOTARA, ARMON RYAN
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GUNDANI VS SENGA
GR 170165
FACTS:
Brigadier General Francisco Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan, both officers in
the Philippine Marines, were invited by the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
to testify regarding the conduct of the 2004 elections. This invitation stemmed from concerns
about alleged election fraud and the surfacing of an audio recording purportedly of a phone
conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an election official.
Before traveling to Manila to attend the Senate hearing, Gudani and Balutan had to secure travel
authority from their superiors at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. While
they were awaiting authorization, they received an order from the AFP Chief of Staff, Lieutenant
General Generoso Senga, "per instruction" of President Arroyo, prohibiting them from testifying
before Congress without the President's prior approval.
Despite this order, Gudani and Balutan traveled to Manila and testified before the Senate. The
basis of their decision to disobey their superiors was their belief that it was their duty to
cooperate with the Senate's investigation. They asserted that the President's directive violated
their constitutional right to travel in order to fulfill their civic duty to appear before a legislative
body.
ISSUE:
Did the President's order to the AFP officers, preventing them from traveling to Manila to testify
before the Senate, violate their constitutional right to travel?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the President did not violate the officers' constitutional
right to travel by restricting their movements. The Court emphasized:
Military Discipline and Chain of Command: The Court upheld the principle that military
personnel must obey orders from their superior officers. Even though the officers might be
obligated to travel to fulfill a Senate summons, they were ultimately bound to follow the orders
of the President, their Commander-in-Chief.
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This passage emphasizes the importance of obedience to the military chain of command
as a cornerstone of military discipline. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is a
serious offense punishable by court-martial. The Court said that soldiers cannot be
allowed to disregard orders based on their own interpretation of right or wrong, as this
would undermine discipline and authority. Further, these touches on restrictions on free
speech and mobility for soldiers. A superior officer can limit a soldier's ability to speak
out on certain matters, demonstrating that even free speech is subject to limitations in the
military context.
