A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW ON CASUS BELLI AND FUTURE OF RUSSIAN

‘SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION’ IN UKRAINE

In a dramatic and major escalation of Russo-Ukrainian conflict, simmering since 2014,

Russian forces invaded Ukraine under authorization of a ‘special military operation’ by Russian
President Putin in February 2022. In the settings of a democratic and liberal world order in
general and enhanced European interdependence in particular, likelihood of such a human
caused catastrophe is unimaginable and unthought of. The so-called special military operation of
Russian troops has caused Europe’s largest refugee crisis (Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation,
n.d.) since World War II besides killing thousands of military and civilian individuals, energy
and food supply chain crisis around the world. Furthermore, a serious debate to counter this
Russian authoritarianism is underway specially in the western societies because of the grave
consequences of such misadventures to the world peace.
A retrospective view on the underlying causes of the confrontation is important to better
understand the current war and predict the future of this possibly avertible conflict. After going
through the course readings, class discussions of the learned and experienced instructor and some
fore knowledge, I have endeavored in this analytical paper to build a neutral argument. My
additional consultations for composing this analysis are also attached in the reference. Post-cold
war disintegration of former United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) and thereafter Russian
policy making has been taken as a reference point to write on.
In the present age of social media and hyper connectivity which has resulted into
merciless transparency and opinion building from the masses, Putin has been mimed extensively
as another Hitler in the making. Since there is a lot of semblance to the Hitler’s rule in Germany
after the World War I and Putin lead Russia and the military conflict he had initiated to wage. A
closer examination of the argument reveals that a lot of commonality exits between the both.
Even the thought of another Hitler in present day sends chill waves through the spine of any
rational and peace-loving mind. The devastations of World War II are still fresh and has
enhanced the West’s paranoia on the invasion. Even the debates are also high to propose
measures for getting rid of Putin ruling Russia. But the real questions are how this Hitler was
born in Putin? What will he do next? and How to stop him?
Rise of Nationalism in Russia. The United States (U.S) led confrontation and
power struggle for world dominance after World War II resulting into soviet disintegration is no
hidden truth. Keeping this in the hind sight, the US dominated machinery of world order after the
soviet disintegration proposed measures to counter the further resurgence of communism,
particularly in Western Europe. By providing both economical and democratic support, to the
newly created former USSR states, Russia’s western influenced reformers of the early 90s were
largely able to create an economic change they thought off. However, Russia was a different
story due to varying dynamics of its territory, population and being the historical power hub of
communism. The ‘shock therapy’ treatment under President Yeltsin and his support from
American advisors and global creditors was able to electrocute the Russian economy in
embracing capitalism. But this unmatched transfer of state assets to private owners created a new
powerful and corrupt elite ‘oligarchs’ within the Russian society (Rosalsky, 2022). Consolidation
of power with these handful few who had only benefited themselves from plundering the Russian
state created a strong nationalist sentiment.
All these good intent actions of the US administrations and policy makers came with a
price. These were certainly not very successful in creating a positive narrative for the new
Russia. Over time, disillusion with this idealized view of the west increased and public
opinion in the Russian state became more and more nationalistic and anti-West and particularly
U.S. By the time Putin’s rose to power during late 90s, the easy approach for Russia appeared to
be for nationalism to provide the state with an ideology while centralization would contain it
from getting out of hand. The constitutional changes introduced by Putin since his two decades
in power, continued this dual path of greater concentration of power and emphasis on national
identity and sovereignty (Campbell, 2020).
Threat from NATO Expansion. Besides putting the square blame of this escalation
and war on Russia, US experts of realism and restraint have been warning for more than a
quarter‐century that continuing to expand the most powerful military alliance in history toward
another major power would not end well (Carpenter, 2022). Eastward expansion of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is argued to be just by many considering it a partnership
for peace and furtherance of shared goals. Russian apprehensions on the same are challenged to
be speculative and illogical. But considering the dominance of Russian Empire during the USSR
era over Eastern Europe, Russian nationalists argue over Russian legitimate claim over these
areas. They validate that Russia has cultural and ethnic linkages with these states and are a
natural part of Russian empire. Capitalizing on the same nationalistic sentiment at home and
unchecked by western powers, Putin kept ruling with impunity and consolidating his
authoritarianism.
George Kennan, the man considered as intellectual father of America’s containment
policy during the cold war, predicted the beginning of a new cold war with Russia when asked
regarding first round of NATO expansion as early as in a May 1998. In an interview to New
York Times, he stated that expanding NATO is likely to inflame nationalist, anti-western and
militaristic tendencies within Russia and would likely to end with drastic effects for US (Nast,
2022).
Resolve Test of Putin’s Russia. Putin has been issuing warnings and raising red
flags consistently to the West that he views NATO’s expansion to Russia border as an existential
threat. Moreover, he also demonstrated his resolve with the use of force twice since the 2008
Georgia war and then in 2014 during annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea (Davis, 2022). Putin views
on the proposal of Ukraine’s inclusion into NATO were expressed very openly in his July 2021
article where he wrote “the Ukraine-NATO question wasn’t negotiable” (Varadarajan, 2022). He
further explains that Ukrainians and Russians are one people. Another reason for Putin’s hardline
approach on Ukraine is his likely fears that allowing Ukraine to join NATO may open doors for
western democratic development in the country. This can have negative effects on his rule as
many possibilities of development may open for Russian people including a thought of Russia
joining NATO as well. Afterall Putin considers himself as the supreme wherein he has been able
to reign for the last two decades. Ukraine becomes a natural priority and a test case for Putin, as
this conflict’s outcome is definitely going to decide the future of Putin’s power and ideology of
Russian supremacy.
Underestimation of The West. Another fact which seems to have encouraged Putin
in his military mis-adventure is his underestimation of the West. He has certainly been
disillusioned by the believe that NATO may never fight Russia over Ukraine. This notion is
supported by two ideas; one NATO’s own rules state that no country should be granted
membership unless doing so contributes to the security of the North Atlantic area (NATO, 2016).
Secondly; to become a European Union member, a country must close 35 arduous ‘chapters’
dealing with everything from judicial independence to aligning foreign policy with the EU and
deep economic and financial changes. The process moves slowly. North Macedonia and Albania
were made candidate countries in 2005 and 2014 respectively. Neither country has been
permitted to open accession negotiations with the bloc yet (Norman, 2022). Current situation of
active conflict in Ukraine, with all its internal and external chaos and fallouts, is likely to
undermine, not strengthen, the alliances by offering immediate membership to Ukraine (Coffey
& Kochis, 2020).
The conflict has entered into its fifth month, it’s termination in the near future is least
likely. The material and moral support extended to Ukraine so far by the West is enough to keep
the fighting going on but yielding of any definite results is not possible. The question of the
extent of support being provided to Ukraine vis-à-vis the possibility of further expanding the
conflict with Russia is important one. It seems to be a show of nerves which is likely to be slow
and steady, both opponents trying to tire each other out. Moreso, a question of political and
financial sustainability of the conflict for all participants. Interest across the West in Ukraine
conflict already seems to be declining, which is evident from Google searches and front-page
media coverage (Kyiv, Moscow Are Both Racing against Time in Ukraine, Says Former U.S.
Defense Official, n.d.).
Creating Space for Conflict. As fighting continues, the war has also
raised tough and far-ranging questions for the Russians as well as the European Union, with its
leaders forced to grapple with its broader fallouts; from rising energy prices, a simmering global
food crisis, inflation, and a massive refugee crisis. Putin seems to have calculated his options
well. Despite the odds and a very slow pace of the progress, he still seems to be determined to
continue his special operation.
 This can be attributed to two factors. Foremost, being an authoritarian, he is at liberty to
decide what his objectives are and what victory will be like. Despite a grinding halt to his
offensive operation, Putin is never going to accept that he is losing rather he ended where he had
planned to (Military Strategist Warns Not to “Underestimate Russia’s Might” despite More
Commitments from West, n.d.). Secondly, the reluctance by the West in accepting Ukraine
within its ambit and avoiding direct confrontation with Putin has provided a window of
opportunity for Putin to settle Ukraine issue. As many member states of NATO and European
Union are deeply skeptical that Ukraine would be ready to join them for many years, given its
problems with corruption, lack of judicial independence and political instability. Security
vulnerability of the European states and the possible long-term presence of Russian forces on
Ukrainian soil has also complicates Ukraine’s bid to join NATO or EU (Norman, 2022).
Manipulation of Economic Levers by Putin. Putin has incorporated Russian
supply of gas, oil and food chain to complete Europe as a very potent diplomatic tool in his
calculation. Putin is constantly reminding the European leaders that he has his finger on the gas
tab - and the fate of European economies in his hand (Bennhold & Eddy, 2022). Recent
comments and softening up of tone for a possible dialogue by US and French Presidents also
backs Putin’s thoughts. It is most likely that financial equation of the likely sanctions imposed on
Russia by the West were already catered for by Putin. Currently, the effects of the imposed
sanctions do not seems to be making a huge impact on Russia. China and India (strategic partner
of US in Asia) have beefed up their Russian imports of oil and gas; neutralizing the punishment.
Outcome of The Conflict. Although Ukraine seems to be no match to the Russian
military and economic might, the resistance they have put on is commendable. Ukrainian forces
are desperately trying to keep the Russian forces from capturing the highway that runs southwest
to northeast, from Bakhmut to Lysychansk. Closing that road, which Ukrainian officials have
dubbed the ‘road of life’ for Donbas would allow Russian forces to close off a bulge, or salient,
whose tip is at Syevyerodonetsk (Is Ukraine Losing the War? Depends on How You Look at It.,
n.d.).
The military objectives of Russia may or may not be attained but is most likely to win the
tactical battle and declare a victory in all its purposes. However, strategically Russia seems to
have lost the war. Putin has in-fact united the West in particular; a complete opposite of his
strategic aim. World has come together to oppose the devastation which Putin has unleashed on
the people of Ukraine. Whatever sentiment he had in Ukraine, also seems to be gone. Ukraine
has unified to oppose his tyranny. Economically, the space has reduced for Russia.
A serious debate is underway of how to get rid of Putin? There may be only two
possibilities at the moment. A coup which may seems to be unlikely at the moment but can be a
plausible opportunity. Or a mass uprising by Russian people against the rising hardships and
economic turmoil Putin is creating for Russia by western sanctions (Varadarajan, 2022).
However, fresh news of retreat by Ukrainian forces from contested town of Severodonetsk and
its likely fall to Russian troops may bring a renewed optimism in the Russian camp whereas
adversely affect the moral in the Ukrainian backed western camp.
Conclusion. Irrespective of the outcome of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the
effects of war will be far reaching. The conflict will be a water shed event in world political and
power arena. As a famous African proverb goes; ‘when the elephants clash, it is the grass that
always suffer’. Only history will be the witness and guardian of the resultant outcome of the mis-
adventure of Russia and handling of this crisis by the West. Destruction and sufferings caused to
the Ukrainians will certainly take lifetime to heal and forget. Effects of economic sanctions on
Russian economy and people will definitely start to take its toll. Political and economic resolve
of the West and Russia will be put under pressure. Surging supply chain crisis of energy
resources like gas and oil to the western economies from Russia will force a search for
alternatives which may not be cheap. Looming food supply crisis coupled with the refugee
situation is definitely not going to be easy for handling. The fragile balance of a peaceful world
order is once again in a state of disturbance. In all the best assumptions, it is hoped and wished
that the current imbalance comes to a quick and early normal or the future ahead is only bleak
with far more sufferings to offer.
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