研究論文 RESEARCH ARTICLES

前提の取り消しについて
－否定，スコープ，視点との関連における分析－
On the Cancellation of Presuppositions:
Interactions with Negation, Scope, and Perspectives

水田 洋子 MIZUTA, Yoko
● 国際基督教大学
International Christian University

前提，取り消し，否定，スコープ，視点
presupposition, cancellation, negation, scope, perspective

ABSTRACT

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The notion of presupposition plays an important role in explaining the meaning of utterances. It is commonly
introduced as a precondition to be met in order for a sentence to be true or false, or in order for an utterance
to be felicitous. However, in discourse, presuppositions are cancelled in various ways. Why and how are they
cancelled if they are ‘preconditions’? This paper examines major examples that illustrate apparent irregularities
in the cancellation of presuppositions and analyzes the various factors at work. To that end, semantic and
pragmatic analyses are given in relation to negation, scope, and perspectives. It is argued that: 1) the alleged
property that ‘presuppositions survive under negation’ should be modified to: ‘presuppositions survive under

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the reversal of the truth value’, 2) when the scope interpretation of the negation is switched from a narrow-
scope to a wide-scope, the presupposition in the former interpretation may not survive in the latter, 3) apparent
irregularities in the behavior of factive predicates (e.g. ‘to know’, ‘to realize’) are attributed to scope ambiguity
between the embedded sentence and certain operators such as conditionals and tenses, 4) presupposition
involves spaces other than the real world and perspectives other than that of the speaker. Presuppositions are
in fact preconditions in one sense or another. However, these can be met not only in the real world and from
the speaker’s perspective, but in different spaces and from different perspectives triggered by the context. This
accounts for the dynamism and apparent irregularities of presuppositions.

1. Introduction presupposition, mentioning that presuppositions

survive under negation. If we take this literally,
The notion of presupposition plays an important we may think that the presupposition at issue
role in explaining the meaning of utterances. The should remain in the second sentence, just as in its
notion is traditionally introduced as a precondition affirmative version.
to be met in order for a sentence to be true or false Atlas (2001) gives a similar example:
(from a logical/semantic perspective), or in order
for an utterance to be felicitous (from a pragmatic (4) The king of France isn’t bald. -- There is no
perspective). In the classical examples below, the king of France.
a-sentence presupposes the b-sentence:
As he mentions, the presupposition of the first
(1) a. The king of France is bald. sentence (i.e. the existence of the king of France) is
b. There is a unique king of France. explicitly cancelled in the second sentence. But no
(2) a. John stopped smoking. further explanation is given.
b. John was smoking. Now the question is why the second sentence can
be uttered felicitously at all. If the presupposition
H o w e v e r, i t i s a r g u e d t h a t i n d i s c o u r s e is in fact a semantic or pragmatic precondition in
presuppositions are apparently cancelled in various the sense of a requirement for the sentence or the
ways. To take just one example from Huang (2007): utterance, then why can it be cancelled? Do the
sentences remain truthful and utterances felicitous?
(3) There is no king of France. Therefore the king Our question concerns the basic property, or even
of France isn’t bald. the definition, of presupposition expressed in terms
of ‘precondition’. Thus, clarification is needed about
According to Huang, the second sentence above the conditions on cancellation from both theoretical
does not presuppose that there is a king of France, and educational perspectives.
‘because the putative presupposition is defeated by This paper examines major examples which
the contradictory proposition that there is no king illustrate apparent irregularities of the cancellation
of France, which has already been established in phenomena and analyzes the factors at work. To that
the immediate discourse context’ (p.81). However, end, semantic and pragmatic analyses are given in
Huang, just as many others, introduces ‘constancy relation to negation, scope, and perspectives.
under negation’ as one of the basic properties of

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2. Preliminaries Earlier work (Karttunen 1973, Stalnaker
1973) argued that the answer to the question
As a basis for the discussions to follow, a brief above is determined by the linguistic devices
summary of major approaches to presupposition is used (conjunctions, constructions, words and
given below. phrases). They are classified into three types: holes
(which let the presuppositions at a lower level go
2.1 Semantic and pragmatic presuppositions through to a higher level), plugs (which block off
the presuppositions), and filters (which behave
(5) a. The king of France is bald. differently, depending on the context). The main
b. There is a unique king of France. focus of this framework is the systematic behavior
c. The individual in question is bald. of presuppositions. However, irregularities are
observed with holes and plugs too, as mentioned in
Russell (1905) argued in the framework of logic the literature (Levionson 1983, Huang 2007, among
that sentence (5a) asserts both (5b) and (5c). For others).
Russell, therefore, if either (5b) or (5c) is false, then Gazder (1979) argued that presuppositions will
(5a) is false. be cancelled when they are inconsistent with other
Strawson (1950), in contrast, distinguished discourse elements which are given a higher priority.
between two levels: in order for sentence (5a) to He proposes a hierarchy of discourse elements, as in
be true or false, (5b) should be true. Under this (6) below. In his theory, a presupposition is cancelled
condition, (5a) asserts (5c). For Strawson, therefore, when it is incompatible with the participants’
when the precondition (5b) is not met, sentence background assumption, for example.
(5a) has no truth value, instead of being false. Thus,
the evaluation of (5a) has three cases; true, false, (6) Gazder ’s (1979) hierarchy of discourse
or no truth value (‘truth value gap’). This kind of elements
precondition for the proposition having a truth value Background assumptions > Contextual factors >
is called a semantic presupposition. Semantic entailments > Conversational implicatures
The notion of pragmatic presupposition was > Presuppositions
then employed, first as a background assumption
shared by discourse participants and then in a more 2.3 Dynamic semantic theory
sophisticated manner (references herein). It was Recent works analyzed various phenomena
observed that the hearer often ‘accommodates’ concerning presupposition in the framework of
the presuppositions after the utterance is made. dynamic semantic theory of context change (Lewis
Cancellation and accommodation illustrate the 1979, Heim 1983, 1992, Chierchia and McConnell-
dynamism of presuppositions in the discourse. Ginet 2000, Kadmon 2001, among others).
It is also often observed that necessary
2.2 Projection problem presuppositions are added into the knowledge of
A central concern in the theory of presupposition discourse participants after the utterance is made, in
since 1970’s has been so called projection problem. order to make the utterance felicitous. This kind of
It addresses the question: In what conditions are phenomena is called accommodation.
presuppositions of smaller components inherited Both cancellation and accommodation are
onto a larger unit in the sentence or the discourse? explained in terms of the updates made on the

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common ground of discourse participants. formedness of a proposition, rather than the presence
or absence of its truth value.
3. Presupposition, negation, and truth value
3.2 Alleged ‘constancy under negation’
Let us first examine how negation is related to It is a common understanding that presupposition
presuppositions. survives under negation (Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet 2000, Kadmon 2001, Huang 2007, and other
3.1 The status of semantic presupposition references herein). In (9), for example, both (9a) and
Semantic presupposition as a condition for the its negation (9b) presumably presupposes (9c):
presence of the truth value (either true or false)
is considered to be part of lexical semantics (9) a. John stopped smoking.
of the linguistic element (e.g. words, phrases, b. John didn’t stop smoking.
constructions), because it is triggered on a c. John was smoking.
conventional, rather than conversational, basis.
I argue that it is a semantic counterpart of well- Now let us consider the following.
formedness of a proposition. It is not whether the (10) A: F red stopped smoking after the health
proposition has a truth value but whether it is in fact checkup. Did John stop smoking too?
licensed as a proposition. B: No, he didn’t. Actually, he never smoked. He
Huang (2007) mentions that ‘when a went on a diet, though.
presupposition is queried, the relevant lexical A: Oh, that’s good.
presupposition trigger is frequently queried in an
explicit way’, providing examples including the B’s utterance does not raise a problem. The
following (p.67, fn. 2. Italics are by Huang.) first sentence negates (9a)a being true, and it is
ambiguous:
(7) a. The king of France is bald. (11) a. T he presupposition (9c) is met and John
b. T he king of France? But is France not a continued to smoke.
republic? b. The presupposition (9c) is not met.
(8) a. The boy cried wolf again.
b. W hat do you mean by ‘again’? The boy Note that (11a) indicates (9a) is false, whereas
didn’t cry wolf before. (11b) indicates it has no truth value. Here, we find
that negation in natural language in the form of
I analyze that these questions are meta linguistic ‘{It is not the case / It does not hold} that S’ (S is
ones concerning the use of the expressions at issue. a sentence), ‘not Pred’ (Pred is a predicate), and so
They reflect the speaker’s attempt either to indicate forth, does not just reverse the truth value between
the inappropriateness (i.e. ‘semantic ill-formedness’) true and false, like logical negation, but involves
of the expressions in focus or to modify the truth value gap.
statement to a semantically complete (i.e. ‘well- So called narrow scope negation assumes that
formed’) proposition. Therefore, the reply may also the presupposition is met and negates the predicate.
be, for example, ‘The prime minister of France, Wide scope negation, on the other hand, denies
you mean? Yes, he is bald’. These examples support that the proposition is true, leaving the status of the
the view that presupposition concerns the well- presupposition open. Thus wide scope negation

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allows for two cases: 1) the presupposition is met does not remain. When a focus is on ‘smoking’, the
and the proposition is false, or 2) the presupposition presupposition is ‘John was doing something (to
is not met and the proposition has no truth value. stop)’, instead. When the whole VP ‘stop smoking’ is
To deal with wide scope negation formally, we in focus, the presupposition in question may or may
could introduce non-bivalent semantics with a truth not hold, context-dependently. (See Atlas 2001 for a
value gap introduced. An alternative approach is relevant example and discussion.)
to attribute the truth value gap case to the unique
property of natural language negation. We could (13) a. John did not STOP smoking. He STARTED
consider that presupposition concerns the semantic smoking.
well-formedness of the proposition (i.e. whether b. I thought John STARTED smoking. Did he
the sentence in fact expresses a proposition) and STOP smoking?
that natural language negation concerns both well-
formedness and truth value. In the latter approach, The observation is summarized as follows:
therefore, logical negation in propositional semantics (14) F ocused element in ‘stop smoking’ and the
is not affected, because propositional semantics presumable presupposition
applies only to (well-formed) propositions. I propose Focused element Presupposition
to take the latter approach, because it does not STOP smoking N. A.
require any change in propositional semantics and stop SMOKING John was doing something
also does justice to the notion of presupposition. STOP SMOKING (John was smoking)
Now, let us examine the claim that presuppositions
survive under negation (‘constancy under Thus, the idea of ‘constancy under negation’ is
negation’ in Huang’s term). We just found in the defeated from a pragmatic perspective too.
above that presuppositions survive under narrow
scope negation, which in turn assumes that the 3.4 W  hat’s going on behind the cancellation
presuppositions in question hold. It is now clear of presupposition?
that the idea of ‘constancy under negation’ makes a A question arises: why does it lead to the
circulatory argument. cancellation of presupposition, instead of resulting
The correct statement is the following: in infelicity? Relevant remarks can be seen on
the constraints on accommodation, which is the
(12) ‘ Constancy under the reversal of the truth addition of presuppositions to the common ground as
value’: If a presupposition q holds for a true required in the discourse. Chierchier and McConnell-
proposition p, then it also holds when p is false. Ginet (1990) argues: ‘if the presupposition required
is inconsistent with what is already in the common
3.3 Focus and presupposition ground, the utterance is infelicitous, because its
Now let us examine how focus may affect the presupposition cannot be accommodated by simple
presupposition, in the case of ‘stop smoking’. addition to the existing common ground.’ (p.294)
At the semantic level, ‘stop smoking’ conventionally Soames (1979) mentions the same point: ‘what is
triggers the presupposition that the subject individual accommodated must be uncontroversial’.
was smoking. It is interesting to see the situation In this light, we could consider that if a new
at the pragmatic level. When a focus is on ‘stop’, statement is incompatible with earlier statements
as in (13a), the presupposition ‘John was smoking’ including their presuppositions, then a natural

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option would be give up making the new statement. be preserved or not.
However, our observations indicate that a higher Here is an example taken from Chierchier and
priority can be given to the new statement than the McConnell-Ginet (1990):
incompatible presuppositions in the current discourse
without causing a problem. The literature provides (16) a. If Bill discovers that syntax is easy, he will be
examples to illustrate this point but does not explain delighted.
why this works. b. Syntax is easy.
Let us see what is going on in the example below: c. I f I discover that syntax is easy, I will be
delighted.
(15) The king of Bhutan isn’t bald: he is young. The
king of France isn’t bald: there is no king of They observe that: ‘Sentence (16a) seems
France. generally to need (16b) for felicity. Hence (16a)
presupposes (16b). But in special circumstances this
The last part of this utterance sounds tricky, but it presupposition can be cancelled (for instance, if the
still works. The first half of the utterance concerning context makes it clear that the speaker doesn’t know
the king of Bhutan presupposes and entails the whether syntax is easy).’ (p.286) In contrast, (16c)
existence of the king. In the second half, the hearer does not presuppose (16b), given that the discovery
is invited to presuppose the existence of the king. of (16b) is hypothetical. Chierchier and McConnell-
But the sentence itself allows for another, marked Gine consider that this illustrates the irregularity of
case, in which the presupposition is not met. The last the status of the ‘factive’ predicate: in the case of the
sentence reveals the fact that there is no such king. first person subject, the verb ‘discover’ is not factive.
By uttering the last sentence, the speaker Kadmon (2001), in contrast, argues that there
switches from the default interpretation with a is nothing special about the behavior of factive
narrow scope negation to the marked interpretation predicates.
with a wide scope negation. Note that precisely Supporting Kadmon’s view, I propose below an
speaking the presupposition in the narrow- account on the basis of scope ambiguity. My point
scope negation interpretation is not cancelled is that the requirement for the embedded proposition
but remains unchanged. What is cancelled is the remains unchanged, that is, it should be true, but that
narrow-scope negation interpretation. As a result, it needs not be in the real world. My account is based
the presupposition there disappears. The term on scope ambiguity between embedding and some
‘cancellation of presupposition’ covers a wide range operator such as conditional, modal, and tense.
of phenomena including those like the current Let us first see a traditional example in which
example. the reference of the NP ‘a linguist’ is ambiguous
between the specific and unspecific reading:
4. A
 pparent irregularities with factive
predicates (17) Mary wants to marry a linguist.

Factive predicates are so called because they In the example above, Mary may have a specific
require, and thus presuppose, that the embedded linguist in mind (i.e. a specific reference) or she
proposition be true. However, they exhibit has no idea about who it will be (i.e. an unspecific
irregularities as to whether the presupposition should reference).

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 This ambiguity of the sentence is attributed to the presupposition is introduced, and 3) the point in
scope ambiguity of the NP ‘a linguist’. When the discourse.
NP has a narrow scope under the modal operator Chierchier and McConnell-Ginet’s (2000) gives a
‘want’, the NP refers to an unspecific linguist in the good example which illustrates the point:
hypothetical world introduced by the modal. When
the NP has a wide scope beyond the modal operator, (19) A, noticing the open door:
the NP refers to a specific linguist in the real world. Was it you who opened the door to the
My analysis of (16c) goes along the same porch? I closed it at lunch time.
lines. Now the scope ambiguity is seen between B: Well, it wasn’t me who opened it, because I’ve
the if-conditional and the embedded sentence, been gone all afternoon, and it wasn’t Joan
(16b). Chierchier and McConnell-Ginet’s (1990) who opened it, because……, and it wasn’t any
observation that ‘sentence (16a) seems generally of the kids who opened it, because…., and I
to need (16b) for felicity’ indicates that (16a) is strongly suspect that nobody opened it – there
more likely to have a wider scope than the if-clause, was a lot of wind this afternoon, you know.
licensing it as a presupposition of the whole
sentence. This interpretation is only more typical, The it-cleft sentence ‘it wasn’t me who opened
not required. The other interpretation is also possible it’ triggers a presupposition that somebody opened
where (16a) is under the scope of the conditional the door, and yet speaker B ends up with saying that
and (16b) is not presupposed. The following version he doubts it. One way of explaining this example
illustrates the point: is, as Chierchier and McConnell-Gine argue, that B
tentatively takes the presupposition required by the
(18) I f Bill discovers that syntax is easy, he will it-cleft sentences, and then defeats it after examining
be delighted. If Bill discovers that syntax is all the possibilities.
difficult, he will be in a trouble. An alternative account is that the presupposition
in question is speaker A’s. B tentatively takes over
Example (18) above does not require, and even the presupposition from A’s perspective, while
allow for, a presupposition that syntax is easy/ providing counterevidence to it. B eventually defeats
difficult is true. Still, as a semantic presupposition, the presupposition. There is no contradiction if B
syntax being easy/difficult should be true in the doubted the presupposition from the beginning.
hypothetical world introduced by the conditional. Chierchier and McConnell-Ginet (2000) discuss a
Now let us consider (16c). Here, for the sake of constraint on the presupposition cancellation in the
the consistency about the speaker’s knowledge, the following.
only plausible interpretation would be that (16b) is
not presupposed. (20) J im does not know that Ann is unfaithful,
because she isn’t.
5. Perspectives
‘To assert (20) in a context that contains nothing
Among other contextual elements, the following about Ann’s fidelity before the utterance occurs
have a crucial effect on the status of presupposition: in very odd indeed, since it makes the hearer
1) the bearer of the presupposition (e.g. the accommodate by adding the proposition that is
speaker, the hearer), 2) the space into which the explicitly denied in the because clause.’ (p.387)

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This kind of example is often given as a simple of lexical semantics, it cannot be cancelled. How
illustration of presupposition cancellation, but their then can we explain a variety of presupposition
observation makes a step forward. cancellation phenomena? I analyzed that semantic
To have a closer look at the situation, let us now presuppositions can be met not only in the real world
suppose the following dialogue: from the speaker’s perspective but in various kinds
of space and time and from different perspectives.
(21) A: Does Jim know that Ann is unfaithful? This holds for pragmatic presuppositions as well.
B: No, he doesn’t (know that Ann is unfaithful), The literature reduces such phenomena to the
because she isn’t. cancellation of presuppositions. However, they are
better understood as shifting from the default space
In this sequence, B’s utterance sounds fine. (i.e. the real world) and the default perspective (of
What is the difference from (20)? We can explain the speaker) to some other ones. The dynamism
it by considering the perspective from which of presupposition concerning cancellation and
the presupposition is introduced. In (21), the accommodation is attributed to the contribution of
presupposition ‘Ann is unfaithful’ is introduced by the pragmatic factors in the discourse as mentioned
speaker A by means of the factive verb ‘to know’. above.
In his reply, B first takes A’s perspective and
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