The Comintern was established in 1919 to promote the global proletarian revolution while protecting

Soviet Russia. However, its dual role often led to conflicts between revolutionary rhetoric and pragmatic
state interests. This tension became evident during Lenin’s compromise at Brest-Litovsk in 1918, where
he prioritized Soviet survival over revolutionary goals. This decision highlighted the Bolsheviks’ need to
secure their regime amidst external threats from Japan and the Entente powers. From its inception, the
Comintern’s objectives were inherently ambiguous, blending the ambitious pursuit of global revolution
with the immediate necessity of safeguarding Soviet state power.

Early attempts to spread revolution through uprisings in Germany and Poland failed, exposing the
limitations of revolutionary momentum outside Soviet borders. These failures forced the Bolsheviks to
adopt a more cautious approach, recognizing the independence of Baltic states and supporting national
liberation movements. These strategies often contradicted Marxist principles by allying with bourgeois
forces, but they were deemed essential for survival amidst geopolitical isolation. This balancing act
underscored a recurring theme: while the Bolsheviks aspired to prioritize international revolution, the
demands of Soviet security often took precedence. The military failure in Poland further highlighted the
need to recalibrate revolutionary fervor without jeopardizing the fragile Soviet state.

The death of Lenin in 1924 marked a turning point, as Stalin consolidated power and subordinated the
Comintern to serve Soviet state interests. This transition transformed the organization from an instrument
of global revolution into a vehicle for Stalin’s political dominance. The process of Bolshevising
international Communist parties evolved into Stalinization, enforcing strict loyalty to Soviet priorities.
This centralization not only suppressed ideological diversity but also aligned global Communist
movements with the shifting needs of Soviet foreign policy, reducing their autonomy and revolutionary
potential.

Soviet foreign policy under both Lenin and Stalin frequently balanced ideological goals with realpolitik.
This pragmatism was exemplified by the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, where the USSR collaborated with
Weimar Germany to counterbalance Western hostility. In China, Soviet support for Sun Yat-sen’s
Guomindang initially aimed to challenge Western imperialism, but the relationship deteriorated when
Chiang Kai-shek purged Communists in 1927. These events revealed the limitations of aligning with
nationalist movements whose objectives often diverged from Soviet interests, leading to significant
setbacks in Soviet influence abroad.

As Stalin tightened his grip on the Soviet state, the Comintern increasingly became an extension of his
authority. Skeptical of its value, Stalin repurposed it to consolidate power domestically and manage
foreign relations strategically. Policies such as rapid industrialization and forced collectivization reflected
his overarching goals but often undermined international revolutionary solidarity. Stalin’s hostility toward
Social Democracy, which he labeled as “social fascism,” further alienated Soviet-aligned Communist
parties from potential allies, contributing to the fragmentation of the global left and isolating the USSR
ideologically.

The rise of Fascism in the 1930s necessitated a strategic shift in Soviet foreign policy. The Comintern
adopted the Popular Front strategy, which sought alliances with non-Communist forces to oppose Nazi
Germany. This approach saw some success in France, where diverse political factions united against the
Fascist threat. However, the strategy faced considerable challenges in Spain and China, where internal
divisions, logistical difficulties, and mutual distrust undermined its effectiveness. While the Popular Front
demonstrated the USSR’s willingness to adapt its tactics, the broader impact was limited by ideological
rigidity and geopolitical constraints.

Stalin’s pragmatism was further demonstrated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, a non-aggression
agreement with Nazi Germany. This pact divided Poland and secured Soviet borders, providing Stalin
with time to strengthen Soviet defenses. However, Stalin misjudged Hitler’s intentions, believing the
agreement would delay conflict with Germany. This miscalculation left the USSR vulnerable,
culminating in the German invasion in 1941. Stalin’s focus on consolidating territorial gains in Eastern
Europe was distracted from the growing threat posed by Nazi Germany, exposing the flaws in his
strategy.

By the onset of World War II, the Comintern had been fully transformed from a revolutionary vehicle
into a tool of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin’s autocratic control. This shift alienated global
Communist movements, undermined the USSR’s ideological credibility, and constrained its ability to
lead international socialism genuinely.

Following World War II, the Soviet Union initially pursued a cooperative approach as part of a global
Great Power condominium. However, this quickly shifted to a binary worldview under Stalinist ideology,
framing the world as a struggle between socialism and capitalism. Domestically, the ideal of the "New
Soviet Man" (NSM) dominated, enforcing ideological conformity. Cultural dissenters, such as authors
and intellectuals critical of Soviet norms, faced severe repression. Internationally, the Soviet Union
pushed Eastern European allies to adopt Stalinist principles, culminating in the establishment of the
Cominform in 1947 to enforce ideological uniformity across the socialist bloc.

Under high Stalinism, fear of deviation dominated both domestic and foreign policy. Internally, purges
targeted groups perceived as sympathetic to Western values, including Jewish intellectuals. Eastern
Europe was tightly controlled through political purges, forced Stalinization, and surveillance, with show
trials used to eliminate dissent, as seen in Hungary's Rajk Affair. Relations with China, while closer, were
marked by a hierarchical dynamic. Stalin supported Mao Zedong's Communist forces cautiously,
reflecting an ambivalence about the broader revolutionary potential of non-European allies.

Stalin's death, however, marked the beginning of a new era of reform and moderation. The rigid doctrine
of the NSM was abandoned, and tolerance for diversity increased both domestically and internationally.
Khrushchev initiated the process of de-Stalinization, which aimed to dismantle the oppressive structures
and practices of Stalin’s regime. His "Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 publicly
denounced Stalin’s cult of personality and the purges, leading to the rehabilitation of many victims of
Stalin’s policies. This marked the beginning of the "Thaw," a period characterized by greater tolerance for
public discussion and a more open atmosphere in Soviet politics. The abolition of fabricated accusations,
such as the Doctors' Plot and Mingrelian Affair, further symbolized the shift away from Stalinist
repression. Khrushchev attempted to move toward collective leadership while still retaining significant
personal authority, marking a departure from Stalin’s hyper-centralized control. Despite making
agriculture his primary domestic avocation, he continued to receive inflated statistics on harvests, yields,
and technological innovation throughout his tenure as General Secretary.

His relations with Eastern Europe reflected a shift away from Stalin’s rigid control. He allowed for
"national roads to socialism," as evidenced by the reconciliation with Yugoslavia's Tito, but clamped
down on deviations he deemed threatening, such as the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. Khrushchev also
sought to redefine the Soviet Union's relationship with China, but ideological differences with Mao
Zedong strained the Sino-Soviet alliance, particularly as Khrushchev’s tolerance for diversity in socialism
conflicted with Mao's dogmatic approach.