Increasing Uncertainty

The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear

Deterrence
Jennifer Bradley

To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons
in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.
—President Barack Obama

I n his now-famous Prague speech in 2009 shortly after taking office, President
Obama laid out his vision for a world without nuclear weapons.1 Although he
had no timeline for reaching this goal, noting that it might not even occur in his
lifetime, part of the pathway to that objective involved reducing the role of nuclear
weapons in US national security strategy. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), re-
leased one year later, further defined and codified his vision for the security of the
United States and its allies.2 Five years later, some of the implications of how this
decision affects the US deterrent relationship with both Russia and China are be-
coming apparent.
Arguably, these two are the United States’ most important relationships and
should serve as the cornerstone of US nuclear deterrence policy. Although Russia
and China are not identified as adversaries of the United States, neither are they
considered allies. Potential always exists for the relationship to sour, and in the case
of Russia, that is exactly what has happened over the past year. The US decision to
meet the needs of deterrence by relying less on nuclear weapons and instead devel-
oping conventional weapons that can have strategic effects may not have had the
intended deterrent effect on Russia and China. Far from encouraging them to re-
duce the importance of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy, it may
have inspired them to rely more on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs.
Doing so could create dangerous instability in deterrence relationships.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying
the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or
departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the Air
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The Simplicity of Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory is beautiful in its simplicity. At its essence, the theory is a mili-
tary strategy in which one power uses the threat of assured retaliation to convince
an enemy not to attack. Some people have the misconception that deterrence did
not come into existence until after the invention of nuclear weapons, but it has
been used as a tool of statecraft, with varying degrees of success and failure, since
ancient times.3
The destructive power of nuclear weapons brought deterrence theory to the fore-
front of US national security strategy. In 1946 Bernard Brodie commented on this
phenomenon: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to
win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost
no other useful purpose.”4 The dawn of the nuclear age spurred a tremendous
amount of intellectual study and debate on deterrence as well as the ingredients
necessary to achieve it. Deterrence became the cornerstone of US security strategy
during the latter half of the twentieth century. However, debate on its relevance to
twenty-first-century threats continues today.

Precarious Challenge of Deterrence in Practice

As simple as deterrence is to define, its actual practice is far more complicated,
having many potential pitfalls for failure, essentially because it is a psychological
function in the mind of the adversary. Consequently, success is difficult to predict
or prove, and deficiencies may become apparent only when deterrence fails. Fur-
ther, the definition of deterrence theory is evolving to meet the challenges of the
current security environment. Scholars recognized that the Cold War deterrence
framework focused solely on deterring the Soviet Union and was inadequate to ad-
dress the national security issues of the twenty-first century. Today, because the
United States faces deterrence problems from multiple actors, our strategy needs to
be “tailored to the perceptions, values, and interests of specific adversaries.”5
An acknowledgment also exists that a cost-imposition deterrence strategy may
prove inadequate to decisively influence a foe’s decision making. The adversary
considers more factors than simply the costs associated with a contemplated action.
Rather, he compares the costs of a course of action to the benefits sought and exam-
ines the consequences of not acting. That is, even if an enemy believes that the
costs are credible and will be incurred, deterrence can still fail because he per-
ceives that the consequences of restraint are so much greater.6 This belief demands
that our deterrence strategies consider adversary perceptions of both the costs and
benefits of a course of action as well as those of restraint. Strategies should be tai-
lored to decisively influence the opponent’s decision making by credibly threaten-
ing to impose costs, deny benefits, and encourage restraint by convincing the actor
that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.7
As mentioned above, at its core, deterrence is a psychological function. Under-
standing the adversary, including his leadership characteristics, historical and cul-
tural influences, decision-making structures and processes, and national security
strategy and doctrine, is essential to crafting a deterrence strategy. Because deter-

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rence happens in the mind of the enemy, “the requirements for deterrence will dif-
fer with each party that we might try to deter and may well differ in each circum-
stance or scenario.”8 Further complicating the functioning of deterrence, the foe
must understand the United States and comprehend its threats and communica-
tions, believing that they are credible and that the United States possesses the will
to impose them.9 Failure to consider the individual characteristics of an actor dur-
ing development of a deterrence strategy increases the risks of failure.

Reduced Emphasis on Nuclear Weapons

The first priority of the NPR was to reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation and
the threats of nuclear terrorism. Part of the road map to this goal involved diminish-
ing the reliance on nuclear weapons in US security strategy. The rationale was that
by demonstrating its commitment to downsizing the role and numbers of nuclear
weapons, the United States would “persuade our NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty] partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the
non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide against theft or
seizure by terrorist groups.”10
Part of the reasoning for this modification was the changing strategic environment
in general and the beneficial relationships with Russia and China specifically. Both
Obama’s Prague speech and the NPR called for the “end of Cold War thinking” and
extolled fundamental changes in the US-Russia relationship.11 The NPR went so far
as to say that “Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects
for military confrontation have declined dramatically.”12 For China, the NPR was less
clear on how the US-China relationship was changing for the better. Instead, it fo-
cused on interdependence between the United States and China and mutual interests
in reducing the risks associated with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.13 The notion in the NPR was that the changing strategic environ-
ment created by an improved relationship with Russia and the interdependence with
China meant that the United States no longer needed to rely on nuclear weapons to
meet its security needs with regard to these two nuclear power relationships; fur-
thermore, it maintained that this positive trajectory would continue.

Increased Emphasis on Conventional Forces

To bridge the gap between the reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and capabili-
ties needed to meet US security needs, the NPR proposed that the United States
continue to strengthen its unrivaled conventional capabilities.14 Although the report
declared that “the United States today has the strongest conventional military forces
in the world [and that] our close allies and partners field much of the rest of the
world’s military power,” it proposed additional capabilities to further increase the
strength of US conventional forces.15
One of the conventional enhancements proposed was conventional long-range
missiles. The United States began development of Conventional Prompt Global
Strike (CPGS) doctrine in 2003 and continues to pursue it today, with plans to in-

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vest approximately $2 billion between 2011 and 2016.16 CPGS could hit targets any-
where on the earth within an hour. Its weapons could be based either in the United
States or on submarines at sea, giving the US military a conventional precision-
strike capability that could be delivered in a short amount of time.17
According to the Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, the increased le-
thality and precision of advanced conventional weapons allow the United States to
hold at risk enemy targets that, at one time, were susceptible only to nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the commission observed that these weapons would have a greater
deterrent effect because they were more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Moreover,
the commission’s research showed that a significant number of targets in Russia
and China, once vulnerable only to US nuclear weapons, would be threatened by
precision conventional forces.18 Additionally, as US capabilities and investments im-
prove, more targets would become vulnerable to conventional capabilities, enabling
the administration to reduce the role of nuclear weapons even further.
The significance of the assertions of the commission’s report is the suggestion
that nuclear weapons could be replaced by advanced US conventional capabilities
having the same strategic-level effects but with more usable weapons.19 However,
missing from the report was an assessment of how Russia or China would interpret
such a change in US deterrence posture.

Foreign Perspective
The security environment has changed dramatically in the five years since the
NPR’s publication—but not for the better, as the policy document hoped for. Al-
though the downturn in the security environment cannot be correlated to the
change in US nuclear policy, some dangerous implications regarding both Russia
and China are linked to the United States’ decision to lower its emphasis on nuclear
weapons in its security strategy. Arguably, the nuclear deterrent relationships with
Russia and China are the ones most important to the United States, so it is impera-
tive to continue to monitor their health and status.
As the NPR has been implemented over the last five years and the United States
has decreased its emphasis on nuclear weapons while increasing its investment in
advanced conventional weapons, Russia and China have responded in ways that the
US government may not have anticipated. As outlined above, deterrence occurs in
the mind of the adversary, and as adjustments to deterrence policy and strategy oc-
cur, they should be evaluated to determine their effect on the enemy’s decision
making.

Russian Perspective
Much was made in the NPR of the improved dealings between the United States
and Russia. With the end of the Cold War rivalry, the United States no longer
needed to rely on nuclear weapons to meet its security needs. Further, even though
it recognized the policy differences that remained between both nations and that
Russia continued to modernize its nuclear forces, the growing cooperation between

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the United States and Russia on shared interests as well as the low probability of
conflict was enough for the NPR to declare that Russia was no longer an enemy.20
As glowingly as the NPR painted the affiliation between the United States and
Russia, it is clear that Russia did not view the relationship in the same light. Anti-
Americanism has a long tradition in the former Soviet Union and continues in mod-
ern Russia. Prior to the US-led “reset” in US-Russia relations in 2009, Russian leaders
consistently referred to the United States as their principal adversary.21 Further, the
Russians believed they were under threat by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), led by the United States.22 This perception of the United States remained
consistent after the reset, and, in fact, the relationship has deteriorated.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s conventional military capabilities
atrophied and deteriorated. In 2000 to compensate for perceived conventional
weakness, Russian military doctrine potentially lowered the threshold for nuclear
use, declaring that Russia “keep[s] the right to use nuclear weapons in response to
the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD [weapons of mass destruction] against
Russia or its allies, as well as in response to large-scale conventional aggression in
critical situations for Rus­sian national security.”23 Russia released an updated nu-
clear doctrine just prior to the release of the NPR. It did not significantly raise the
threshold for nuclear use, observing that Russia reserved the right to use nuclear
weapons “in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the
use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”24
Russia has witnessed the United States and its allies use their conventional mili-
tary power successfully and repeatedly since the first Gulf War in 1991. The dichot-
omy between the United States’ and Russia’s conventional military power has led
Russia to depend on its nuclear forces to deter not only nuclear attack but also con-
ventional conflict with the United States. Further, as the United States develops
conventional weapons capable of executing strategic missions, coupled with missile
defenses, Russian leaders fear that such developments would negate their ability to
retaliate and successfully deter the United States.25 The latest version of Russian
military doctrine, released in 2014, articulates this fear: “The creation and deploy-
ment of global strategic antiballistic missile systems that undermines the estab-
lished global stability and balance of power in nuclear missile capabilities, the im-
plementation of the ‘prompt strike’ concept, intent to deploy weapons in space and
deployment of strategic conventional precision weapons” are among the major for-
eign threats.26
Russia places very high value on its nuclear arsenal. Without it, Russia’s leader-
ship recognizes that the nation is fundamentally weak. Its status as a nuclear peer
to the United States makes it “a state of significance, interest, or consequence.”27 As
such, Russia has made modernizing its strategic forces one of the country’s highest
priorities. Part of this modernization program includes development of a class of
nuclear weapons eliminated with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty in 1987. Evidence of a Russian treaty violation dates back to 2007, but
the United States did not formally charge Russia with misconduct until 2014.28 The
treaty banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between
500 to 5,000 kilometers. Such missiles can execute short-warning attacks on strate-
gic targets throughout European NATO countries.29

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The value that Russia places on its status as a nuclear power was brought into
sharp relief after its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. On multiple occa-
sions, Russian leadership used nuclear signaling, such as President Vladimir Putin
declaring that “Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations” as a way of de-
terring the United States and NATO from intervening.30 Further, Russian foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia could deploy nuclear weapons to Crimea
without violating international law since the region was now part of Russia.31 Russia
continues to signal with its nuclear weapons, conducting large-scale nuclear exer-
cises, probing the defenses of NATO allies with nuclear-capable bombers, and issu-
ing statements regarding Russia’s nuclear readiness.

Chinese Perspective
The NPR paid much less attention to the deterrent relationship between the United
States and China. Whether this tack was a function of asymmetry in the size of the
two nuclear arsenals remains uncertain. China’s nuclear arsenal is significantly
smaller than that of the United States, but the NPR did acknowledge that China
lacks transparency regarding its nuclear programs and is undertaking a wholesale
modernization, both in quality and quantity, of its nuclear weapons arsenal. The
policy document points out that China’s future strategic intentions were unclear re-
garding both the strategy and doctrine that guide its nuclear deterrent force, as well
as the eventual size and scope of those forces. The NPR addressed the interdepen-
dence between the United States and China, “their shared responsibilities for ad-
dressing global security threats,” and the need to promote strategic stability with
China without ever defining the necessary ingredients for strategic stability or how
it can be realized.32
China maintains a “no-first-use” policy for its nuclear weapons. That is, the coun-
try bases its deterrence on the ability to have a secure second-strike capability—a
policy consistently in effect since China acquired nuclear weapons in 1964.33 Al-
though US policy makers debate the veracity of China’s no-first-use pledge, that na-
tion’s small nuclear force supports a counterstrike capability.34 However, the size
and capability of that force are changing to meet China’s security needs. Further, its
no-first-use promise appears under debate in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
According to Maj Gen Yao Yunzhu, “Speculations on a possible change to the [no-
first-use] policy have not been conjured up without reason.”35
Why the potential change in China’s nuclear posture and doctrine? According to
Chinese military writing, the United States is the main nuclear adversary that
China must account for, and “China views advances in . . . [US] ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance], conventional precision strike, and missile de-
fense capabilities as potential threats to the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.”36 It
is not the United States’ advanced and superior nuclear capabilities that China per-
ceives as undermining its nuclear deterrent but US advances in conventional capa-
bilities.
How then did China react to the NPR’s call to reduce US reliance on nuclear
weapons and invest in conventional capabilities to bridge that gap in America’s se-
curity needs? Chinese civilian and military strategists have regularly and consis-

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tently communicated their concern about a US conventional attack negating China’s
strategic deterrent prior to the US release of the NPR in 2010.37 After publication of
that document, Chinese analysts suggested that the US decision to invest in con-
ventional capabilities such as CPGS was part of the United States’ desire to seek “ab-
solute security” and maintain its military supremacy. Chinese analysts fear that
these advanced conventional capabilities designed by the United States to meet its
nuclear deterrence needs are not constrained by the “nuclear taboo” and, in fact,
are more usable.38
The Chinese believe that the very usability of advanced conventional weapons
designed to perform a deterrence role actually undermines nuclear deterrence and
causes other nations to rely more on their nuclear weapons arsenals because they
cannot compete with the United States conventionally. Chinese analysts also fear a
global conventional-weapons arms race, and some analysts warn that “a world free
of nuclear weapons may open the door to the resumption of a large-scale conven-
tional war.”39
The most worrisome development from China comes from The Science of Military
Strategy (December 2013), published to inform Chinese military professionals of
how the “People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perceives military development in China
and around the world” and to offer a framework for the PLA to address them.40 In
that publication, the authors outline China’s concern that its limited nuclear force
is vulnerable to a first strike that would negate any ability to execute a retaliatory
strike. To address this issue, the authors suggest that China may decide to launch on
warning of an impending nuclear attack.41 Such a decision increases the possibility
of an accidental nuclear launch, given the difficulties in characterizing the type of
incoming attack or the dangers of a malfunction in the early warning system.
Finally, the NPR repeatedly calls for the need to promote strategic stability with
China. However, although that concept has been used in the context of nuclear re-
lations for decades, it has no common, universally accepted definition.42 Further, it
also means that China’s concept of what constitutes strategic stability may be differ-
ent than that of the United States, possibly leading to a misunderstanding. Chinese
scholars have recognized this disconnect, noting that US “experts have not given se-
rious consideration to what the true meaning of strategic stability is, and have not
adequately prepared to achieve strategic stability with China.”43
Although it is not the only component of strategic stability, the Chinese perceive
changes in the US nuclear posture as a threat to that stability.44 Specifically, Chi-
nese analysts have repeatedly insisted that US advanced conventional capabilities,
including CPGS coupled with ballistic missile defense, represent a direct threat to
China’s secure second-strike capabilities. Therefore, Chinese analysts perceive a
major contradiction in the NPR. “Advocacy for military capabilities that are seen to
be detrimental to strategic stability in the same document that promotes strategic
stability ultimately represents a circular logic” that if not addressed will make it dif-
ficult for China to participate in talks meant to promote strategic stability.45

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Implications for Nuclear Deterrence

A gulf exists between how the United States and Russia/China view the value of
nuclear weapons. These adversarial perceptions are well documented, predating
the development and release of the NPR, but were not taken into account during
drafting of the new policy. The US decision to rely less on nuclear weapons to meet
its national security needs, instead bridging the gap with advanced conventional ca-
pabilities, did not have the desired effect on our adversaries. Instead of inspiring
confidence, it reinforced some of their worst fears.
The NPR overstated the improvement in US-Russia relations, and the US declara-
tion that Russia was not an enemy did not consider how Russia viewed the relation-
ship. Failure to take into account that country’s deep-seated suspicion of the United
States invalidated the NPR’s assumption that improved ties would allow the United
States to rely less on nuclear weapons. Further, US policy and Russian policy do not
agree on the usability of nuclear weapons. The US desire to decrease the role of
nuclear weapons and compensate with conventional weapons suggests that US pol-
icy makers do not feel that nuclear weapons are usable. However, this perception
contrasts with Russia’s nuclear doctrine and statements, which have been consis-
tent for well over a decade, that these weapons are quite usable. These differences
are further emphasized as the United States debates unilateral reduction in nuclear
capabilities while Russia violates a landmark arms-control treaty to increase the
types and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to gain a strategic advantage.46 This situ-
ation creates a dangerous divide that has the potential for miscalculation and deter-
rence failure.
Both Russia and China are concerned with US use of advanced conventional ca-
pabilities in a strategic manner to negate their nuclear deterrent. According to the
NPR, the United States has the strongest conventional capabilities in the world and
an alliance system that further augments those capabilities. America has also dem-
onstrated its willingness to use conventional power repeatedly over the last 25
years. The very usability of conventional precision-strike weapons capable of creat-
ing effects once reserved only for nuclear forces undermines deterrence by creat-
ing or reinforcing perceptions in our adversaries that their nuclear forces are vul-
nerable and that the United States may have an incentive to strike them. Both
China and Russia are reevaluating their nuclear doctrines and relying more on
nuclear weapons to counter this perceived threat.

Conclusion
From nuclear weapons’ pinnacle of importance at the end of the Cold War to to-
day, the United States has steadily decreased the attention paid to its nuclear arse-
nal and strategy, but nuclear deterrence has not decreased in its overall impor-
tance. It is clear that our adversaries place much more value in their nuclear
arsenals than does the United States, precisely to deter America’s unmatched con-
ventional power. The US decision to rely more on conventional weapons to achieve
nuclear deterrence has created dangerous potential for miscalculation in its deter-
rent relationships with Russia and China.

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 The United States has fallen into a “mirror imaging” trap by assuming that other
nations place the same low value on nuclear weapons that it does and that they
have the same priority of reaching “Global Zero.” The Obama administration has
even gone so far as to recommend unilateral nuclear reductions, which were made
outside arms-control negotiations with Russia.47 Part of this policy is that other
nuclear-armed nations will follow the US example and choose to reduce the size of
their nuclear arsenal. This assumption does not take into account how our oppo-
nents interpret their security environment and the role that nuclear weapons play
in safeguarding their interests.
Relations with other nuclear powers have been fairly cooperative and benign
since the end of the Cold War. Crises that arose were managed, and peaceful solu-
tions have been negotiated, contributing to the mistaken belief that nuclear weapons
are no longer relevant. However, could it be that those weapons encourage leaders
to be benign and cooperative?48 In 1946 J. Robert Oppenheimer reflected that “it did
not take atomic weapons to make man want peace. But the atomic bomb was the
turn of the screw. It has made the prospect of war unendurable.”49 That is, far from
being unusable, nuclear weapons are used every day to encourage compromise in
international relations because failure to compromise may lead to the unthinkable.
In drafting the NPR, the US government failed to consider the perceptions of our
adversaries or to tailor strategy to the unique threat that each poses. As we have
pointed out, deterrence is a psychological function in the mind of the adversary.
Failure to acknowledge and account for how our enemies view their security envi-
ronment, their relationship with the United States, their unique history and culture,
or the value they place on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs has made
our deterrence relationships potentially less stable. Increasing our emphasis on
conventional weapons that adversaries view as more usable and a threat to their
nuclear arsenals has caused them to feel insecure. To counter this trend, they have
modernized and increased the size of their arsenals and rely more on nuclear
weapons to meet their security needs.
Nuclear deterrence has always been a risky proposition, and the fact that it has
not failed in the past 70 years may have as much to do with our deterrence strategy
as plain luck. But as risky as relying on nuclear deterrence is, it is still the “least
bad” option and has not lost its relevance. Therefore, it is important that we strive
to understand our adversaries as we develop and implement our nuclear-deterrent
strategies so that we do not undermine its effectiveness. Nuclear deterrence may be
much more fragile than any of us realize. It is imperative that we do not take the
“nuclear taboo” for granted by assuming that our adversaries place the same value
on the relevance of nuclear weapons that we do.
Finally, in 1960 Herman Kahn came under heavy criticism for his book On Ther-
monuclear War (Princeton University Press, 1960) in which he outlined the possibil-
ity of enduring a nuclear war, reducing its likelihood, and coping with the conse-
quences. In response to the criticism, he wrote, “In our times, thermonuclear war
may seem unthinkable, immoral, insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not
impossible.”50 Today, because it is still not impossible, we must continue to think
and learn about the complexities of these issues as the strategic environment

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changes, and we must make the effort to understand our adversaries in order to
maintain and nurture nuclear deterrence today and in the future. 

Notes
1. “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic” (Washington,
DC: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 April 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
2. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
April 2010), http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
3. Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to
the Twenty-First Century (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), 20.
4. Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1946), 76.
5. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, version 2.0 (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, December 2006), 3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts
/joc_deterrence.pdf.
6. Gen Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly 3, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 34.
7. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 3.
8. M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?,” Strategic Forum, no. 225 (January 2007): 3.
9. Keith B. Payne, “Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,“ Strategic
Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 14.
10. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 7.
11. “Remarks by President Barack Obama.”
12. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, iv.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 17.
15. Ibid., 45.
16. Kevin Kallmyer, Assessing Implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011), 16, http://csis.org/files/publication/110826
_NPR_Imp.pdf.
17. Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background
and Issues, CRS Report R41464 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 6 February 2015), 1,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.
18. Global Zero, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strat-
egy, Force Structure and Posture (Paris: Global Zero, May 2012), 2, 11, http://www.globalzero.org/files
/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf.
19. Ibid., 6.
20. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 4, 15.
21. Ariel Cohen and Helle C. Dale, “Russian Anti-Americanism: A Priority Target for U.S. Public Di-
plomacy,” Heritage Foundation, 24 February 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02
/russian-anti-americanism-a-priority-target-for-us-public-diplomacy.
22. Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name,” in Rus-
sian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, Future, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, November 2011), 468–69, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1087.pdf.
23. Dale R. Herspring, “Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship,” in
Blank, Russian Nuclear Weapons, 9.
24. Jonah Friedman, “Russia’s Nuclear Forces and Doctrine,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 19 July 2011, http://csis.org/blog/russias-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-doctrine.

July–August 2015 | 81
 25. Dan Gouré, “How Barack Obama’s Vision of a Nuclear-Free World Weakens America’s Security:
Russia, Deterrence, and Missile Defense,” Heritage Foundation, 10 September 2010, http://www.heritage
.org/research/lecture/russia-deterrence-and-missile-defense.
26. “Russia’s New Military Doctrine Lists NATO, US as Major Foreign Threats,” RT News, 26 Decem-
ber 2014, http://rt.com/news/217823-putin-russian-military-doctrine/.
27. Gouré, “Barack Obama’s Vision.”
28. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,” New York Times, 28
July 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-cruise-missile-in
-violation-of-treaty.html?_r=0.
29. “Statement by the Secretary General on the INF Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 30
July 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_111823.htm.
30. Greg Botelho and Laura Smith-Spark, “Putin: You Better Not Come After a Nuclear-Armed Russia,”
CNN, 30 August 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/29/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index
.html?hpt=hp_t1.
31. Sergei L. Loiko, “Russia Says It Has a Right to Put Nuclear Weapons in Crimea,” Los Angeles
Times, 15 December 2014, http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-82295028/.
32. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, v, 4–7.
33. Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, “China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence,” Air and Space Power Journal
24, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 27–30, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/spr10
/aspj_en_2010_1.pdf.
34. Stephanie Spies, “China’s Nuclear Policy: (No) First Use?,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 20 October 2011, http://csis.org/blog/chinas-nuclear-policy-no-first-use.
35. James M. Acton, “Debating China’s No-First Use Commitment: James Acton Responds,” Carn-
egie Endowment for International Peace, 22 April 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/22
/debating-china-s-no-first-use-commitment-james-acton-responds.
36. Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, February 2015), 123, http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR893/RAND_RR893.pdf.
37. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and
Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), viii.
38. Lora Saalman, China & the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (Beijing: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, February 2011), 22.
39. Ibid.
40. Gregory Kulacki, The Chinese Military Updates China’s Nuclear Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Union
of Concerned Scientists, March 2015), 1, http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03
/chinese-nuclear-strategy-full-report.pdf.
41. Ibid., 4.
42. For a detailed discussion on strategic stability, see Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson,
eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press,
February 2013).
43. Saalman, China & the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 27.
44. Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe, “Ties That Bind: Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Relation-
ship,” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 130, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files
/TWQ_13Winter_Fingar-Jishe.pdf.
45. Saalman, China & the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 26.
46. For a detailed analysis of Russian treaty violations, see Dr. Mark B. Schneider, Confirmation of
Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty, National Institute Information Series no. 360
(Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, February 2014), http://www.nipp.org/wp-content
/uploads/2014/11/Confirmation-of-Russian-Violations-of-the-INF-Treaty8.pdf.
47. Baker Spring, “Disarm Now, Ask Questions Later: Obama’s Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Heritage
Foundation, 12 July 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/disarm-now-ask-questions
-later-obamas-nuclear-weapons-policy.
48. Patrick M. Morgan, “The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today,” Contemporary Se-
curity Policy 33, no. 1 (April 2012): 85–107.

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49. Jonathan Stevenson, Thinking beyond the Unthinkable: Harnessing Doom from the Cold War to the
Age of Terror (New York: Penguin Group, 2008), 6.
50. Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 21.

Jennifer Bradley
Ms. Bradley (BS, Eastern Oregon University; MS, Missouri State University) joined the
National Institute for Public Policy as an analyst in 2007. She currently provides on-site
support at United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate as
part of the Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group in Omaha, Nebraska. She is re-
sponsible for conducting adversary-specific deterrence analysis to support strategy and
plan development. Prior to joining the National Institute, Ms. Bradley worked as a mar-
ket research associate for Lockheed Martin Missile Defense Systems.

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