Joint Publication 3-07.

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Peace Operations

01 March 2018
 PREFACE
1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess peace operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the
contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS,
normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided
more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a
multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational
doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not
ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s
doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and
doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development

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Preface

Intentionally Blank

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 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.3
DATED 1 AUGUST 2012

• Added a chapter on planning for peace operations.

• Removed a chapter on peacebuilding, condensing relevant information, and

referring readers to Joint Publication 3-07, Stability, for additional
information.

• Added a figure depicting organization of a representative peacekeeping

mission, and its relationship to the United Nations country team.

• Modified a figure depicting types of peace operations.

• Added a figure to illustrate different levels of joint force integration with other
actors.

• Added a discussion on the protection of civilians, and the responsibility to

protect.

• Added discussions of identity activities, commander’s communication

synchronization, information, and assessments.

• Replaced appendix on mass atrocity response operations with an appendix on

the protection of civilians.

• Enhances consistency among other doctrinal publications and Department of

Defense (DOD) and other US Government policies.

• Modifies, adds, and removes terms and definitions from the DOD Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms.

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Summary of Changes

Intentionally Blank

iv JP 3-07.3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

 Introduction ................................................................................................................. I-1

 Legal Basis .................................................................................................................. I-2
 Fundamentals .............................................................................................................. I-2
 Types ........................................................................................................................... I-7
 Environment and Characteristics ................................................................................ I-9
 Command and Control .............................................................................................. I-17
 Key Documents ......................................................................................................... I-18

CHAPTER II
PLANNING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

 Introduction ................................................................................................................II-1
 Planning Considerations ............................................................................................II-1
 Challenges ................................................................................................................II-27

CHAPTER III
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

 General ..................................................................................................................... III-1

 Description of Peacekeeping Operations ................................................................. III-1
 Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations ............................................................. III-1
 Peacekeeping Personnel and Peace Operations Forces ........................................... III-2
 Peacekeeping Tasks ................................................................................................. III-6
 Command and Control for Peacekeeping Operations .............................................. III-8
 Peacekeeping Planning Considerations ................................................................. III-10
 Employment ........................................................................................................... III-16

CHAPTER IV
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

 Description of Peace Enforcement Operations ........................................................ IV-1

 Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations .................................................... IV-2
 Peace Enforcement Operations Tasks ...................................................................... IV-2
 Command and Control for Peace Enforcement Operations ..................................... IV-3
 Peace Enforcement Planning Considerations .......................................................... IV-4
 Employment ............................................................................................................. IV-6

APPENDIX

A United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations............................................ A-1

B Protection of Civilians .......................................................................................B-1

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Table of Contents

C Command Relationships ....................................................................................C-1

D Points of Contact .............................................................................................. D-1
E References ......................................................................................................... E-1
F Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Fundamentals of Peace Operations ............................................................. I-3

I-2 Types of Peace Operations .......................................................................... I-7
II-1 Example Mission Organization ..................................................................II-2
II-2 Levels of Integration ..................................................................................II-6
II-3 Example Assessment Metrics...................................................................II-19
II-4 Example Assessment ................................................................................II-20
II-5 Transition Assessment..............................................................................II-21
III-1 Ground Force Support Capabilities .......................................................... III-3
III-2 Air Forces Support Capabilities ............................................................... III-4
III-3 Maritime Forces Support Capabilities...................................................... III-5
IV-1 Peace Enforcement Operations Employment Phases ............................... IV-7
B-1 Fundamentals of the Protection of Civilians ..............................................B-3
C-1 Notional Chain of Command for a Peace Operation..................................C-1
C-2 Example of Traditional United Nations Peacekeeping Force
Organization ...............................................................................................C-2
C-3 Example of an Organization for a Generic United Nations Integrated
Mission .......................................................................................................C-3

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Discusses peace operations in the strategic environment.

• Outlines the legal basis for peace operations.

• Describes the fundamentals of peace operations.

• Discusses peace operations planning considerations and challenges.

• Describes peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

• Presents the fundamentals of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

• Discusses peacekeeping and peace enforcement planning considerations

Overview

Peace Operations and the Peace operations are activities intended to build,
Strategic Environment keep, enforce, or make peace, or when necessary,
prevent conflict. They include crisis response and
limited contingency operations and frequently
involve international military missions to contain
conflict, restore peace, and shape the strategic
security environment to support reconciliation and
rebuilding, as well as to facilitate the transition to
legitimate governance. They include peacekeeping
operations (PKO), peace building, peacemaking,
conflict prevention, and peace enforcement
operations (PEO). Peace operations may be
conducted under the sponsorship of the United
Nations (UN), another international organization,
within a coalition of nations, or unilaterally.

As with all military operations, each peace

operation is unique, reflecting the political,
military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure characteristics of the operational
environment.

Legal Basis The US may conduct peace operations either

independently or as part of an international or
multinational effort. In some cases, the UN may
authorize a peace operation by a coalition or
another international organization such as the

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Executive Summary

North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the African

Union.

Fundamentals The 15 fundamentals of peace operations are:

 Consent.

 Impartiality.

 Transparency.

 Credibility.

 Freedom of Movement.

 Flexibility and Adaptability.

 Civil-Military Harmonization and

Cooperation.

 Restraint and Minimum Force.

 Objective/End State.

 Perseverance.

 Unity of Effort.

 Legitimacy.

 Security.

 Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness.

 Current and Sufficient Intelligence.

Five Types of Peace Operations PKO. PKO are undertaken with the consent of all
major parties to a dispute and are normally
designed to monitor and facilitate implementation
of an agreement to support diplomatic efforts to
reach a long-term political settlement.

PEO. PEO consist of coercive measures, including

the employment or threat of military force, to
restore peace and security or for humanitarian and
civilian protection purposes.

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 Executive Summary

Peace Building. Peace building is the long-term,

post-conflict process of creating conditions for a
lasting peace.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking is a diplomatic

process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an
otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict.

Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention consists

of diplomatic and other actions to prevent inter-
state or intra-state tensions from becoming violent.

Environment and While the circumstances of each peace operation

Characteristics are unique, the following characteristics frequently
apply to missions in complex environments:

 Political Primacy.

 Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty.

 Adversaries and Spoilers.

 Civilian Risks.

 Operational Environment.

 Duration.

 Comprehensive Approach.

 Host Nation (HN) Ownership and

Capacity.

 Multinational Cooperation.

 Commander’s Communication Strategy

 Force Protection.

 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

 Civil Disturbances.

 Transitions.

 Risks.

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Command and Control The US may participate in peace operations under

various command authority arrangements. These
arrangements might include:

Unilateral US joint operations.

Multinational operations with the US as the lead

nation.

Multinational operations with the US as a

contingent nation.

In any of these arrangements, US forces will report

to the US chain of command. However, in
multinational peace operations, the US force may
also report to the sponsoring international
organization such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, African Union, Organization of
American States, or European Union. By law, the
President retains command authority over US
forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the
President has the authority to place US forces under
the operational control of a foreign commander
when doing so serves American security interests.

Key Documents Political objectives guide the development of key

documents that provide legal authority and define
the parameters for a peace operation. Key
documents can include:

 Mandate.

 Status-of-Forces Agreement or, for UN

operations, Status-of-Mission Agreement.

 Terms of Reference.

 Memorandum of Understanding.

 Rules of Engagement (ROE).

Planning for Peace Operations

Planning Considerations Each of the joint functions is relevant for peace

operations:

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 Executive Summary

Command and Control (C2). C2 is often

challenging in peace operations because a mission
will likely include a variety of military, civilian,
and police participation from multiple nations.

Intelligence. Successful peace operations rely

upon accurate, timely intelligence to provide early
warning of risks and opportunities.

Fires. Fires are often critical during PEO, and their

employment is essentially similar to other combat
situations. They are less common during PKO,
although UN peacekeeping forces normally
include mortars in infantry battalions and, in rare
cases, peacekeeping missions may be authorized to
include artillery units.

Movement and Maneuver. In a peace operation,

a military force may be employed to provide area
security or to establish a separation (buffer) zone
between belligerents.

Protection. Forces involved in peace operations

must employ active and passive measures to
protect themselves against adversaries, accidents,
diseases, and other health and environmental
threats.

Sustainment. A key function in any military

activity, sustainment is particularly significant in
peace operations. Units are likely to be dispersed
to remote areas at the end of a long distribution
chain.

Information. The information function

encompasses the management and application of
information and its deliberate integration with
other joint functions to influence relevant actor
perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and
support human and automated decision making,
which is especially important during peace
operations.

Interorganizational Cooperation. Most peace

operations are multidimensional efforts with
military, police, and civilian components. Missions
typically interact with other international and HN

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Executive Summary

organizations including nongovernmental

organizations, other international organizations, HN
governmental agencies and security forces, the
media, and businesses, among others. Many have
no formal relationship with the peace operation, but
are instrumental to achieving the mission’s
objectives.

Commander’s Communication Synchronization.

Joint forces conducting peace operations should
integrate informational efforts that promulgate
messages, inform audiences, and influence
perceptions regarding the situation and particularly
the objectives and actions of the military force.
These efforts are increasingly critical in modern
military operations, as every statement and action
can be monitored instantly by an interconnected
world. Communication efforts can dissuade
perpetrators, influence other groups to behave
positively, inform vulnerable populations, and
increase support for the peace operation.

Asymmetric Threats. Peace operations

increasingly face threats from spoilers, armed
opposition groups, criminal groups, terrorist groups,
and, in some cases, HN security forces. Such threats
often target peacekeeping and peace building forces,
the humanitarian and development organizations
that operate in an area, and the civilian population.

Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to

Protect. Peace operations are often conducted for
the main purpose of protecting civilians from
extreme threats such as genocide or other mass
atrocities. In most cases, modern peace operations
include civilian protection as one of the key tasks of
the mandate.

Transitions and Termination. Two types of

transitions are relevant for the military force. The first
type relates to the phases or stages of an operation and
the second refers to the transfer of authorities and
responsibilities from one actor to another. As the
situation changes, so too will the authorities,
responsibilities, roles, and activities of different actors,
including the peace operations force. Transitions may
occur between an international coalition and the UN

xii JP 3-07.3
 Executive Summary

or a regional organization (or vice-versa). Ultimately,

responsibility and authority must be successfully
transitioned to capable HN authorities to enable a
force drawdown and eventual termination of the
international mission.

Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention is the

employment of complementary diplomatic, civil,
and, when necessary, military means to monitor and
identify the causes of conflict and take timely action
to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption
of hostilities.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking is a diplomatic

process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an
otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict.
Peacemaking is usually accomplished by a special
political mission that involves few, if any, military
personnel.

Peace Building. Peace building provides the

reconstruction and societal rehabilitation necessary
to resolve core conflict issues or prevent further
outbreaks of violent conflict. It promotes
reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil
infrastructure and institutions, builds confidence,
and supports economic reconstruction. The major
responsibility for peace building resides ultimately
with the HN and the civil sector, but the peace
operations force has a supporting and essential role.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA). HA refers to

efforts that relieve or reduce human suffering,
disease, hunger, or privation in an impartial manner.
While HA is provided ideally by civilian
organizations without military involvement,
military forces and other security units may be
mandated or tasked to support humanitarian actions.

Challenges Complex environments, mandates, and tasks make

peace operations inherently challenging, especially
as there will usually be gaps between the mission’s
requirements and the available resources.

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Executive Summary

Corruption may be the biggest obstacle to

developing a capable HN that can eventually
assume the responsibilities of a peace operation.

Corruption is not just an HN problem, but can also

be found in international organizations including
multinational partners, contractors, and others.
Corruption diverts resources from their intended
purposes, which can greatly undermine a peace
operation. It also empowers belligerents, threatens
responsible actors, and fosters a culture of impunity
rather than a culture of lawfulness.

A peace operation may be constrained in its

authority and responsibility. Constraints may
include limitations on where operations are
conducted, the types of operations permitted, ROE,
restrictions on activities such as intelligence
collection or the ability to conduct investigations,
and limited latitude to support some of the
nonmilitary efforts commonly associated with
peace building.

Unity of effort is another common challenge. Military

forces can help provide security so other actors have
space within which to operate; ultimately, a successful
peace operation depends upon the effectiveness of
police forces and other HN organizations assisted by
international organizations with the necessary
nonmilitary expertise. Other actors should have the
lead role for many of the required efforts.

Peacekeeping Operations

PKO consist of military support to diplomatic,

informational, and economic efforts to establish or
maintain peace in areas of potential or actual
conflict. The US has participated in and supported
many UN-sponsored PKO.

Description of Peacekeeping PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation

Operations and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the
sponsoring organization, and potential force-
contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible
truce or cease fire must be in effect, and the parties
to the dispute must consent to the operation. PKO
are conducted in an open and highly conspicuous

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 Executive Summary

manner (transparency). A main function of the PKO

force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile
actions by the disputing parties and bolsters
confidence in the peace process. PKO support
continuing peace building efforts to achieve long-
term political settlements and normalized peaceful
relations. The US may participate in PKO as a lead
nation, as a contingent force, unilaterally, or by
providing staff officers or United Nations military
experts on mission.

Fundamentals of Peacekeeping  Consent. PKO require an invitation or,

Operations at a minimum, consent of all the major
parties to the conflict.

 Restraint and Minimum Force.

Peacekeeping forces are restricted to
using force only in self-defense and in
defense of the mandate.

 Impartiality, Credibility, and

Legitimacy. While a peacekeeping force
is impartial to a dispute, it may be
mandated to support the improvement of
host government capacity.

Peacekeeping Personnel and US military personnel may perform a wide variety

Peace Operations Forces of peacekeeping functions. They may be detailed to
serve on a UN staff or other multinational staff or as
a UN military expert on mission. The US may also
participate in peacekeeping by providing officers to
UN Headquarters in New York.

Peacekeeping Tasks Peacekeeping tasks usually involve observing and

monitoring compliance with a peace agreement.
Depending on the mandate, a peacekeeping mission
may also be tasked to protect civilians, support the
provision of HA, and support nation-building
efforts.

Peacekeeping Planning The mandate, term of reference, and status-of-forces

Considerations agreement or status-of-mission agreement are
important sources of information for mission
analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders
and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing
the lessons learned from previous PKO or training
exercises. PKO may be initiated on relatively short

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Executive Summary

notice, requiring extraordinary effort to develop a

complete plan, identify, and build a headquarters
staff.

Employment PKO include separation of the parties to the dispute,

patrolling, and observing and reporting on
compliance with or violations of agreements.
Peacekeeping forces must have freedom of
movement and open access to observe, monitor, and
verify the conditions of the governing agreements.

A peacekeeping force may be employed in one of

two ways: each national contingent is allocated to a
specific operational area (OA) or the national
contingents rotate among the OAs. Normally, the
former method is preferred.

Peace Enforcement Operations

Description of Peace PEO are conducted in accordance with (IAW) a

Enforcement Operations mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and
order when consent by a major party to a conflict is
absent. They may include the enforcement of
sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of
personnel providing foreign HA, restoration of
order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties.
Peace enforcement may be conducted pursuant to a
lawful mandate or IAW international law and do not
require the consent of the HN or the parties to the
conflict, although broad based consent is preferred.
PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or
compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions.
Force is threatened against or applied to belligerent
parties to terminate fighting, restore order, and
create an environment conducive to resolving the
dispute. Although combat operations may be
required, PEO are not necessarily classified as
major combat operations and normally have more
restrictive ROE. Forces generally have full combat
capabilities, although there may be some restrictions
on weaponeering and targeting.

Fundamentals of Peace In conjunction with the fundamentals already

Enforcement Operations discussed, the following caveats apply specifically
to PEO:

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 Executive Summary

Consent. Consent of the parties to the dispute is

not a prerequisite for peace enforcement, although
some parties may extend it.

Impartiality. This fundamental still requires the

force to act on behalf of the peace process and
mandate.

Restraint and Minimum Force. A misuse of

force can have a negative impact upon the
legitimacy of the PEO. Conversely, the
appropriate use of force to prevent disruption of the
peace process can strengthen consent.

Peace Enforcement Operations Peace enforcement tasks may include some of

Tasks those conducted in PKO, as well as enforcement of
sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of
humanitarian actors, operations to restore order,
and forcible separation of belligerent parties or
parties to a dispute.

Command and Control for In most cases, peace enforcement mirrors

Peace Enforcement Operations conventional military operations and possesses
many of the same C2 characteristics. Unity of
effort is particularly important when planning
command arrangements, international agreements,
and coordination centers and cells.

Peace Enforcement Planning Many planning considerations for PEO are similar
Considerations to those for peacekeeping. The planning process for
peace enforcement is the same as for any other
military operation and begins with a comprehensive
mission analysis. US forces are normally employed
IAW a concept of operations that includes transition
from peace enforcement to peacekeeping or peace
building.

Employment Typical phases for PEO may vary for some

missions, but these phases provide a starting point
for the employment planning process:

 Preparation and Deployment.

 Establishment of Presence in the OA.

 Expansion of the OA.

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Executive Summary

 Enforcement of the Mandate.

 Transition and Redeployment.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine to plan,

execute, and assess peace operations.

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 CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

“[T]he United States has a critical national security interest in mitigating state
fragility and preventing, containing, and resolving armed conflict…. Multilateral
peace operations, particularly United Nations (UN) peace operations, will,
therefore, continue to be among the primary international tools that we use to
address conflict-related crises.”

Presidential Memorandum on United States

Support to United Nations Peace Operations
28 September, 2015

1. Introduction

a. Peace operations are activities intended to build, keep, enforce, or make peace, or
when necessary, prevent conflict. They include crisis response and limited contingency
operations and frequently involve international military missions to contain conflict,
restore peace, and shape the strategic security environment to support reconciliation and
rebuilding, as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. They include
peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace building, peacemaking, conflict prevention, and
peace enforcement operations (PEO). Peace operations may be conducted under the
sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another international organization, within a
coalition of nations, or unilaterally. The UN and other international organizations often
refer to a peace operations organization as a mission.

b. The global demand for peace operations is growing. These efforts can be effective
and legitimate mechanisms that demonstrate international support while sharing the
requisite burden. Peace operations can also be an important theme for multinational
exercises and other joint force security cooperation (SC) activities to build relationships
with partner nations for which peacekeeping is a strategic priority.

c. The US provides support for peace operations through three lines of effort:

(1) Direct contributions with funding, personnel, units, or other support.

(2) Indirect contributions including building the capability and capacity of other
contributors to peace operations.

(3) Support for systemic reform in the UN to improve the effectiveness of peace
operations.

d. As with all military operations, each peace operation is unique, reflecting the
political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the
operational environment (OE).

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Chapter I

2. Legal Basis

a. The US may conduct peace operations either independently or as part of an

international or multinational effort. In some cases, the UN may authorize a peace
operation by a coalition or another international organization such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) or the African Union (AU).

b. The Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,
herein referred to as the UN Charter, provides several means for the international
community to address threats to peace and security. Although the terms “peacekeeping”
and “peace enforcement” are not in the UN Charter, they generally describe actions taken
under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter VII (Action with Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) in the UN Charter.
Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining
peace through negotiation, enquiry, arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement, and
mediation, while Chapter VII provides the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with
a wide range of enforcement actions—from diplomatic and economic measures to the
extensive application of armed force by member nations.

c. Under Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter, the UN may

authorize regional organizations such as NATO, the Organization of American States
(OAS), the AU, the Economic Community of West African States, and the European Union
(EU) to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.

d. Additionally, some nations have negotiated multilateral agreements to conduct

peace operations independent of any permanent international forum. However, such
operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or
the UN.

For more information, see Appendix A, “United Nations Involvement in Peace

Operations.”

3. Fundamentals

Certain fundamentals apply specifically to peace operations, although not all are
necessary for success in every case. They are, nevertheless, general considerations which
are relevant in most cases. Figure I-1 depicts the 15 fundamentals of peace operations,
which are discussed below.

a. Consent. Consent of the host nation (HN) and parties to the conflict determines
the nature of the peace operation, whether the mission is peacekeeping or peace
enforcement. One side may consent in whole or in part, multiple parties may consent, there
may be no consent, or the consent may vary dramatically over time. There may be consent
at the strategic level among the party representatives signing an agreement. However,
renegade splinter groups at the tactical level, criminal groups, or violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) may oppose a peace agreement, threaten stability, or be hostile to
the mission.

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 Overview

Fundamentals of Peace Operations

 Consent
 Impartiality
 Transparency
 Credibility
 Freedom of Movement
 Flexibility and Adaptability
 Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation
 Restraint and Minimum Force
 Objective/End State
 Perseverance
 Unity of Effort
 Legitimacy
 Security
 Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness
 Current and Sufficient Intelligence

Figure I-1. Fundamentals of Peace Operations

(1) When strong consent of, or commitment by, the parties to the peace
agreement exists, a reduced military force capability is possible. Degrees or levels of
consent can change over time. The objective of the mission is to increase the consent for
the peace process by gaining broad and deep buy-in to the mission’s mandate, the peace
agreement, or the plan for governance. As consent becomes more general, the mission’s
force levels may be reduced. If the level of consent decreases, the force’s capability to
enforce compliance should increase. The promotion of consent is fundamental to attaining
the national end state in all peace operations.

(2) Joint force commanders (JFCs) should seek ways to promote consent by
giving the people, parties, and local institutions a stake in the peace process. Joint military
commissions, liaison officers (LNOs), media broadcasts, and leaders throughout the force
are key ways by which to promote consent or understand and share information.
Collaborative assessment of the conflict with community leaders can help secure local-
level consent for a peace operation. If any of the people, parties, or local institutions
become unwilling to support a peace operation, the force may no longer be capable of
dealing with the situation. New political decisions, mandates, rules of engagement (ROE),
or force compositions may be necessary. Additional capabilities and resources may be
required or the mission may need to be concluded.

b. Impartiality. Impartiality requires the force to act on behalf of the peace process
and not show preference for any faction or group over another. This fundamental applies
to the belligerents or parties to the dispute, not to possible spoilers (e.g., terrorists,
criminals, or other hostile elements outside the peace process). The force maintains

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Chapter I

impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties—employing force

because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. Impartiality should not be
confused with neutrality, as a peace operation will not necessarily affect all sides equally.
Impartiality includes using force when necessary for self-defense or in defense of the
mandate.

c. Transparency. The mission should make the parties and the populace aware of
the mandate, intentions, and techniques used to enforce compliance. Transparency
reinforces legitimacy and impartiality. A failure to communicate fosters suspicion and may
erode the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of an
operation depends. Proactive communications, planned through commander’s
communication synchronization (CCS), can facilitate transparency. Civil-military
harmonization, joint commissions, and an effective liaison system reinforce transparency.
JFCs must balance the need for transparency against the need for operations security
(OPSEC).

d. Credibility. Credibility is essential to ensure mission accomplishment. The force

should convince belligerents and other actors that it has the capability and will to
accomplish its mission. It must discharge its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as
to its capabilities and commitment. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the
highest standards of discipline, control, and professional behavior on and off duty.

e. Freedom of Movement. Freedom of movement is necessary for maintaining the

initiative. Additionally, freedom of movement for the civilian population and other actors
(such as humanitarian and development organizations and HN authorities) may be a
priority to allow the transition to peace to continue. In accordance with (IAW) most
mandates, force movements should normally be unrestricted. If belligerents interfere with
freedom of movement, the authorizing political organization may decide to change the
mandate, increase force levels, or withdraw the force.

f. Flexibility and Adaptability. The complex OEs associated with peace operations
require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility across the
range of military operations. UN mandates frequently include a wide range of tasks such
as supporting security sector reform (SSR), protection of civilians, supporting elections,
supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance (HA), and supporting the extension of
HN government authority. The array of tasks in a mandate frequently permits wide latitude
for the force. Commanders and staffs should continually reassess the changing political,
security, and social contexts and adjust missions, operations, and tasks as appropriate. The
successful transition to peace involves managing change. Forces should be able to adapt
and move from one activity to another on short notice.

g. Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation. Civil-military harmonization

enhances the credibility of the force, promotes consent and legitimacy, supports unity of
effort, and encourages the parties to the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement,
thereby facilitating the transition to civil control. It includes civil-military operations
(CMO) that coordinate, integrate, and synchronize civil and military efforts and actions to
build the peace. At the operational level, commanders should coordinate the use of joint

I-4 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

military and joint civil commissions, including representatives from all stakeholders. At
the tactical level, the timely and effective harmonization, cooperation, and coordination
between peace operations forces and civilian agencies is essential for mission success.
Military and nonmilitary organizations can facilitate cooperation through collaborative
analyses and the establishment of committees, action groups, and liaison with agencies and
organizations involved in the operational area (OA). A civil-military operations center
(CMOC) or a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) center can assist with these efforts.

h. Restraint and Minimum Force. Military force should be applied prudently,

judiciously, and with discipline. A single act could have significant military and political
consequences. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for
security, the achievement of military objectives, and the attainment of the end state. The
use of excessive force could result in civilian casualties, antagonizing the parties involved
and thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially
enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party. Commanders at all levels should take
proactive steps to train and equip their personnel for the unique aspects of a peace
operation, including the use of means to create nonlethal effects. ROE in peace operations
are generally restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political and cultural concerns. The
national laws and policies of individual multinational force (MNF) partners may be more
restrictive concerning the use of force than the MNF ROE. In some cases, the use of force
should be avoided even if technically permitted.

i. Objective/End State. Every peace operation should be directed toward clearly

defined, achievable objectives and an attainable end state. The commander should translate
strategic guidance into appropriate objectives and reflect a common understanding with
national/political authorities. Military leaders should be alert for misunderstandings
stemming from different practices and terminology used by civilian, police, and
multinational military counterparts. Additionally, military efforts should support and avoid
undermining political and other civilian objectives that may comprise the mission’s main
purpose.

j. Perseverance. The joint force should be prepared for protracted employment in

support of the mandate. Some peace operations may require years to achieve objectives.
It is important to anticipate setbacks and assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of
the long-term political objectives. Often, this will involve diplomatic, informational, and
economic measures to complement or supplement military efforts.

k. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort ensures all means are directed to a common
purpose. In peace operations, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of
international, foreign, and domestic military and nonmilitary participants; the lack of
definitive command arrangements; and dissimilar objectives. While the chain of command
for US military forces remains inviolate, command arrangements among multinational
partners may be less well-defined and may not include full command authority.
Commanders may answer to or support a civilian authority, such as an ambassador, or may
rely on civilian resources. Unity of effort among the various nations’ militaries involved
in the peace operation can be greatly enhanced with multinational planning augmentation
teams, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and coordination centers in the MNF

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Chapter I

headquarters (HQ). Additionally, even if unity of effort exists operationally, this unity may
not exist diplomatically. Therefore, even if staffs and units remain integrated and cohesive,
when faced with a decision or requirement for action, each country will evaluate the
situation with regards to national interests and take action or refuse to take action
accordingly.

Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional information.

l. Legitimacy. A peace operation’s legitimacy is based largely on the authorizing

authority (for example, the UNSC), the means used, and the objectives achieved. Different
audiences, such as the US public, other nations, HN authorities and populations, and other
interested parties, often perceive a mission’s legitimacy differently. A peace operation
perceived as legitimate, both internationally and within the HN, will have a better chance
of long-term success, while one perceived as lacking legitimacy may generate opposition.
It is also critical that partners of the peace operation, such as the HN government, are seen
as legitimate.

m. Security. The force may be responsible for securing other components of the
operation; protecting civilians; or establishing a sufficiently secure environment in which
humanitarian, development, and other actors can conduct their activities. Security may be
a combined responsibility of the force, HN security forces, and other actors. These HN
and other security actors may be particularly significant if the force has inadequate
resources to secure the entire OA and because security must ultimately be the responsibility
of the HN.

n. Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness. Personnel will need to develop

positive relationships with military, police, and civilian personnel from the HN and other
nations. This can require time, patience, open-mindedness, and emphasis from leaders at
all levels. Cultural awareness and basic language training for the OA may be important
components of pre-mission preparation.

o. Current and Sufficient Intelligence. An effective peace operation relies on the

identification, collection, analysis, and dissemination of information that supports the
commander’s situational understanding and planned operations. Intelligence remains
essential for force protection (FP), other mission requirements including protection of
civilians, and early warning of risks and opportunities. As with other joint operations,
accurate intelligence and effective operations feed each other, particularly since HN
personnel will be more forthcoming with useful information if they see positive results
from the peace operation. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
(JIPOE) will provide a detailed analysis of the OE with relevant information that will aid
in the execution of peace operations.

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.

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 Overview

4. Types

As depicted in Figure I-2, the five types of peace operations are peacekeeping, peace
enforcement, peace building, peacemaking, and conflict prevention. Military forces are
typically significant contributors to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but normally are
less prominent in the other types. A particular mission may transition over time from one
type to another as the situation changes and as specified in a revised mandate. Additionally,
a type of operation may include some tasks that are characteristic of other types of peace
operations.

a. PKO. PKO are undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute and
are normally designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement to support
diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Before PKO begin, a credible
truce or cease fire should be in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the
operation. PKO normally commence following diplomatic negotiation and agreement

Types of Peace Operations

Conflict Prevention
A peace operation employing complementary
diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military
means, to monitor and identify causes of conflict,
and take timely action to prevent the occurrence,
escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

Conflict Peacemaking Peace Enforcement

The process of diplomacy, mediation, Application of military force, or threat of its use,
negotiation, or other forms of peaceful normally pursuant to international authorization,
settlements that arranges an end to a dispute to compel compliance with resolutions or
and resolve issues that led to it. sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace
and order.

Cease Fire Peacekeeping

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all
major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and
facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire,
truce, or other such agreement) and support
diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political
settlement.

Peace Building
Stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a
society’s institutions, infrastructure, and civic life in
order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Figure I-2. Types of Peace Operations

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Chapter I

among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and the potential troop
contributing countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs). A PKO may be
primarily military in nature, such as the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei, Sudan. Most
contemporary PKO are “multidimensional” with military, police, and civilian components
and are led by a civilian head of mission (HOM). In the past, PKO were usually conducted
IAW Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter. More recently,
however, many mandates have cited Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) as the justification for the PKO,
particularly if some level of conflict remains in the OA. Formerly, the use of force in a
PKO was generally limited to self-defense, but in many contemporary missions, force is
also permitted when in “defense of the mandate.” The loss of consent from the major
parties may result in withdrawal of the peacekeeping force or a change in its mission to
peace enforcement.

See Chapter III, “Peacekeeping Operations,” for additional information.

b. PEO. PEO consist of coercive measures, including the employment or threat of

military force, to restore peace and security or for humanitarian and civilian protection
purposes. The UNSC may authorize PEO without the consent of the parties to a conflict.
PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of
personnel conducting HA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties
or parties to a dispute. However, the impartiality with which the force attempts to treat all
parties, and the nature of its objectives, distinguishes peace operations from major
operations. The purpose of PEO is not to destroy or defeat an adversary, but to use force
or threat of force to establish a safe and secure environment so peace building can proceed.
The UN Charter does not specifically mention the term “peace enforcement.” However,
the UN Charter’s language allows the UNSC to authorize military operations “as may be
necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security.” PEO are often
conducted by regional organizations or a coalition of states under a lead nation, with UN
authorization.

For additional guidance concerning PEO, see Chapter IV, “Peace Enforcement
Operations.”

c. Peace Building. Peace building is the long-term, post-conflict process of creating

conditions for a lasting peace. It strengthens HN capacities to address the root causes of
conflict; rebuilds institutions, infrastructure, and civic life; and maintains effective and
harmonious political and societal order.

(1) Peace building includes military and nonmilitary activities that foster the
elements of a stable state:

(a) Human security.

(b) Governance and rule of law.

(c) Economic and infrastructure development.

I-8 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

(d) Political settlement.

(e) Societal relationships.

(2) Peace building begins with PEO or PKO and may continue for years. Many
mandates for contemporary peacekeeping missions include tasks that address peace
building. Military support to peace building may include PKO, SC, training defense forces,
and other stability activities that establish an environment conducive to continuing the post-
conflict political process.

(3) Civilian organizations from the HN, international organizations, and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) conduct most peace building activities. For
military forces, peace building responsibilities are similar to those during stability actions.

For additional guidance, see JP 3-07, Stability.

d. Peacemaking

(1) Peacemaking is a diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an

otherwise peaceful settlement of a conflict. The process may include measures such as
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.

(2) Peacemaking is predominantly conducted through diplomatic efforts,

although these may be supported by a military force. However, such military operations
should not be referred to as “peacemaking operations.” While the military may not lead in
peacemaking, military leaders may become involved in negotiating the military aspects of
a peace agreement. This often includes face-to-face meetings with the leaders of the
warring factions.

(3) Military support to peacemaking includes provision of military expertise to

the process, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, peacetime deployments, or
other activities that influence the disputing parties to conclude a diplomatic settlement.

e. Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions

to prevent inter-state or intra-state tensions from becoming violent. Supporting military
activities may be intended to build situational understanding, deter potential belligerents,
or strengthen capacities that enhance stability. These activities will generally fall within
the following categories: early warning, surveillance, training associated with SSR,
preventative deployment, and enforcement of sanctions and embargoes.

5. Environment and Characteristics

While the circumstances of each peace operation are unique, the following
characteristics frequently apply to missions in complex environments:

a. Political Primacy. Peace operations are normally intended to achieve objectives

consistent with the HN’s political objectives. Military personnel at all levels should

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understand the objectives of the operation, strive to support them, and avoid inappropriate
actions that may undermine these objectives.

b. Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty. Peace operations often take place in

environments that are highly fluid and dynamic. In addition to the various HN and
international actors, a wide range of political, military, economic, social, informational,
and infrastructural factors create complexity. Unresolved political issues, an unclear
description or misunderstanding of a desired end state, and difficulty in gaining HN and
international consensus may cause ambiguity. Authoritative information will be elusive,
and the outcomes of mission actions and other events will always be uncertain.

c. Adversaries and Spoilers. Parties to a conflict may or may not include

professional armies or other organized groups that are responsive to a chain of command.
However, rogue, undisciplined elements or paramilitary units may be present and not
inclined to abide by others’ decisions. They may be motivated by political objectives,
extremist ideologies, or profit. Local leaders may encourage splinter groups to continue to
conduct operations while allowing themselves a degree of deniability. Groups of
irregulars, terrorist organizations, criminal groups, or other hostile elements of the
population may be present. Some adversaries may originate or operate across transregional
or international boundaries. While some may attempt to perpetuate a preexisting conflict,
they may also target the peace operation, humanitarian workers, and others attempting to
bring stability to the nation. Spoilers are leaders, and parties who believe the emerging
peace threatens their power, world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine the
peace process. In any peace operation, joint leaders must identify and understand the
motivations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of these spoilers and determine the best ways
of coopting or neutralizing them. Collaborating assessments with multiple stakeholders,
including local civil society organizations, community leaders, and NGOs, can improve
this understanding.

d. Civilian Risks. Most contemporary peace operations include a mandated task to

protect civilians or may be conducted expressly for protection of civilians. The joint force
should be prepared to monitor, prevent, and if necessary, respond to threats against
civilians, including mass atrocities. Mass atrocities or other physical threats to civilians
can erupt at any time during any operation, even in an initially uncontested PKO or HA
operation.

(1) Threats against civilians may arise during armed conflict and deteriorating
conditions in a fragile state, or when perpetrators directly and deliberately target civilians.
The outbreak of widespread violence directed against the civilian population often has
wide-ranging effects on regional stability, for example, when it results in large-scale
refugee flows across neighboring borders.

(2) A peace operations force may be required to conduct mass atrocity response
operations (MARO) to prevent or halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by
state or non-state armed groups against civilians or other defenseless groups. Many lethal
and nonlethal measures used in peace operations, such as no-fly zones, protected enclaves,

I-10 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

or separation of forces, may be applicable to MARO. This is also true of most tactical
tasks including convoy escort, direct fires, and detainee operations.

See Appendix B, “Protection of Civilians,” for additional guidance.

e. OE. A peace operation may take place in an austere area, but it is likely to occur
in highly populated urban environments as well. Logistics will likely be a major challenge
when conducting operations in remote areas over rugged terrain. Additionally, a war-torn
or impoverished country may suffer from poor air and sea ports, road networks, essential
services, and other infrastructure. The peace operations force, other international actors,
HN organizations, and the general population will likely overwhelm the limited
infrastructure that does exist.

f. Duration. Peace operations may be conducted on short notice or evolve over an

extended period of time and may require long-term commitments to resolve the issues that
led to the escalation of tension or conflict. An established time limit for a peace operation
is a high-level policy decision by the authorities that develop the mandate. On the one
hand, an operational time limit can cede the initiative to the parties to the conflict who
might then bide their time until the departure of the force. On the other hand, establishing
a fixed date for a peace operation serves notice that parties must work diligently to resolve
their differences, lest they forgo the support of the force.

g. Comprehensive Approach. Numerous organizations are involved in peace

operations. These may include other United States Government (USG) departments and
agencies, different organizations within the UN or other international organizations, the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, HN government and civil
society groups, and private organizations.

(1) Commanders should coordinate and, where appropriate, integrate military

activities with those of other agencies to optimize the effectiveness of the total effort. The
chief of mission is responsible for all USG elements in country, except those under the
authority of the geographic combatant commander (GCC). Close coordination with the
US embassy country team is essential, and the joint force may establish early liaison with
the various agencies operating in country. At the GCC level, a joint interagency
coordination group supports regular and timely collaborative working relationships with
other USG departments and agencies. At the JFC level, coordinating centers, such as
CMOCs, can harmonize USG and other organizational efforts.

(2) Because of their familiarity with the culture, language, and population
sensitivities, NGOs and civil society organizations can be valuable resources to
commanders and their staffs. However, caution is necessary to prevent any perception by
the populace or the parties to the dispute that these organizations are part of an information-
gathering mechanism. Their purpose is to address humanitarian requirements, disaster and
emergency responses, and long-term development. NGOs and international organizations
often consider their neutrality, impartiality, and independence as their primary source of
security. Civil society organizations may be local and informal, and not readily apparent
to outsiders. However, it may be possible to identify local coordinating bodies with which

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to establish contact. Commanders may also find the cultures of some of these organizations
differ markedly from military culture, and these organizations may exhibit a strong desire
to maintain a wide distance from military activities.

(3) A myriad of NGOs, international organizations including the International

Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, civil society organizations, private sector
companies, and other agencies are involved in relieving the adverse humanitarian
conditions that accompany peace operations. While civilian organizations would ideally
provide HA without military involvement, the joint force and other security actors may be
tasked to establish or maintain conditions conducive to humanitarian action. The CMOC
or a CIMIC center are specifically designed to facilitate this process.

(4) The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

coordinates with NGOs and its implementing partners, so the peace operations force should
establish liaison with the USAID mission to obtain information on the various NGOs
operating in the theater. Usually, where USAID has an enduring mission in a HN, it
maintains a system for vetting local NGOs to determine their technical and fiduciary
competence to mitigate potential risks. In most situations, the United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will synchronize the activities of
UN and other humanitarian and development organizations using a cluster system
structured to address key humanitarian sectors.

For further information on coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

For further information on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

For further information on clusters, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

h. HN Ownership and Capacity. For a peace operation to be successful outside of

traditional PKO, it is important for the HN to have the will and capability to assume
responsibility for security, governance, and development. This can be complicated when
the nation lacks effective institutions and is struggling to remedy many of the problems
that necessitated the peace operation in the first place. Peace operations forces may be
tasked to support SSR to improve HN military and police capacity, and the mission may
be mandated to help build HN capacity in other sectors. However, HN authorities may
demonstrate limited commitment to following the agendas of outsiders.

i. Multinational Cooperation. Several factors are essential for success during

multinational peace operations. Personnel should demonstrate mutual respect for ideas,
cultures, religions, and customs and maintain a professional demeanor. In many cases, the
military personnel of other nations may have useful experience in peace operations and can
provide invaluable expertise.

(1) Missions should be appropriate to each multinational partner’s capabilities

and national direction. Multinational partners should be integrated into the planning
process, thus ensuring both the perception and the reality of unity of effort. Language
requirements and linguistic support are important considerations.

I-12 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

(2) Multinational partners may seek assistance with logistics support or may be
able to contribute additional logistics support to the peace operation. Agreements need to
be established for exchangeable or transferable commodities before operations begin and
should be further developed and refined throughout the operation. Legal support will be
important in formulating and interpreting these agreements.

(3) Personal relationships and effective rapport at all levels in a peace operation
can contribute significantly to its success.

For further information on multinational coordination, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational

Operations. For NATO-led operations where the US is a TCC, see the appropriate Allied
joint publication (AJP).

j. CCS. CCS is a process that helps implement strategic-level guidance by

coordinating, synchronizing, and ensuring the integrity and consistency of strategic- to
tactical-level narratives, themes, messages, images, and actions throughout a joint
operation across all relevant communication activities. To build public support and
cooperation, it is critical for peace operations to develop and promulgate messages to a
variety of audiences effectively. A holistic and consistent approach for messaging helps
achieve the operation’s objectives. The consequence of not synchronizing actions and
messages may result in contradictions and loss of credibility for the mission.

For further information on CCS, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-61, Public Affairs;
JP 3-13, Information Operations; and Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander’s
Communication Synchronization.

k. FP. These considerations are important for planning and execution of peace
operations, particularly when the mission requires interposition of forces between former
belligerent groups or if spoilers target the force. Personnel may also be vulnerable to
accidents and illnesses because of poor infrastructure, local driving habits, and diseases
that are common in the area. Some multinational contingents to a peace operation will
concentrate more on minimizing their own casualties than other mission requirements such
as tasks in the mandate. Local perceptions of the force’s credibility and impartiality may
affect threat levels, appropriate FP postures, and the ROE.

For additional ROE guidance, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
(CJCSI) 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force
for US Forces.

l. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Ultimately, settlement, not victory, is the key in

peace operations. Settlement is achieved through a combination of actions using the
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic powers of the participants. A settlement
reached by conciliation among the disputing parties is generally preferable to a conflict
terminated by force. It is imperative that peace operations establish or sustain the
conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. It is also important to
recognize when the end state is not attainable. This may stem from such factors as a

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breakdown in political resolve by the parties to the dispute or a lack of support from the
international community.

m. Civil Disturbances. In fragile states, civil disturbances may occur concurrent to

the conduct of peace operations. While such disturbances may be likely as a population
takes advantage of democratization, violent events can be a setback to stabilization. A
well-handled situation can lead to an enhanced view of both the professionalism and
credibility of the mission, instill confidence in democratic and law enforcement institutions
involved, and result in fewer future disturbances. Civil disturbances can be effectively
managed through the following actions:

(1) Isolate the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. Use a
system of multilayered checkpoints to enable the peace operations force to limit and control
access and cull identifiable troublemakers from the population without attracting
unnecessary attention. Consider using helicopters, the employment of biometric and
forensic capabilities, and other monitoring technologies to monitor the situation and the
surrounding area.

(2) Control the situation through force presence. An appropriate show of

force at checkpoints and anticipated trouble spots, including aircraft overflights and
biometric enrollment and screening, may dissuade entry into the area by potentially
destabilizing elements. When possible, force presence should be increased before
disturbances occur.

(3) Maintain situational awareness. The peace operations force should use a
variety of information sources to identify potential civil disturbances, monitor events as
they occur, and understand the follow-on effects. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities
may provide real-time data to improve situational awareness.

(4) Integrate multidimensional, multi-echeloned actions. Military activities

should be coordinated with civilian and police efforts. They should support political
attempts to negotiate settlements to any grievances prompting the civil disturbances and
convince local media to avoid inflammatory broadcasts or to make broadcasts designed to
quell and disperse the crowds. Crowd control should include the use of nonlethal weapons,
munitions, and device capabilities. HN security forces, especially the police, should
generally participate in operations to mitigate civil disturbances. However, in some
situations, their presence may aggravate the overall situation.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an example of a transitional peace

operation. The operation began in September 1994 with deployment of the
US-led multinational force. The US operation officially transitioned to the
United Nations (UN) Mission in Haiti on March 31, 1995. However, a large
contingent of US troops continued as part of the UN mission until 1996; the
US forces commander also served as the UN force commander during that
period.

Various Sources

I-14 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

n. Transitions. Transitions are critical periods during a peace operation and relate to
an operation’s phases or the transfer of authority and responsibility from one participant to
another. Successful transitions require satisfactory conditions in the current phase and
adequate capability to ensure the demands of the next phase can be met. Transitions may
occur between military and civilian authorities or from a US-led peace operation to a UN
mission. Ultimately, a peace operation’s mission responsibilities should be transferred to
legitimate and capable HN authorities. Commanders should plan for transition and mission
termination as early as possible.

Chapter II, “Planning for Peace Operations,” further discusses transitions.

o. Risks. Peace operations pose a wide variety of risks and require mitigation
strategies to assess what can go wrong and to reduce their likelihood and consequences.
The following risks commonly apply to peace operations in general and to specific actions
that a peace operations force may consider.

(1) Ineffectiveness. Peace operations missions may be too benign, inadequately

resourced, or too late to achieve the desired objectives. Some actions may be time-
consuming and result in actions that are not sufficiently responsive. Lack of progress could
generate resentment among HN individuals who were originally supportive of the mission.
In addition to being ineffective, inadequate efforts can also weaken the credibility of the
mission, possibly encouraging—rather than discouraging—further resistance by spoilers.

(2) Escalation of Violence. The volatile situations confronting most peace

operations contain seeds for conflict. Rival groups and spoilers may resort to violence
because they perceive a window of opportunity to be closing or if they believe their survival
or power is threatened. Military efforts may inspire HN opposition groups to increase
antigovernment activities, which could prompt a harsh government response against
civilians or intervention by other external parties. In other cases, the HN might engage in
violence in violation of the mandate or agreement with contributing countries.

(3) Collateral Damage. Military actions could result in unintended casualties

which, in addition to the physical harm caused, may have adverse political and strategic
consequences. Although a force may be assigned a relatively benign mission, a heightened
FP status could result in harm to innocents whose status or intentions may be unclear. The
risk of civilian casualties increases when military forces conduct offensive operations, even
if they involve limited actions against clearly identified hostile targets. Consequently, the
employment of nonlethal weapons can mitigate the chance of civilian casualties.
Unambiguous training with lethal and nonlethal weapons and a thorough understanding of
ROE can help mitigate this risk, but even the best ROE cannot address every conceivable
situation or prevent confusion regarding their implementation.

For more information on targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(4) Mission Creep. Because of the multidimensional facets required to secure

peace (such as a safe and secure environment, good governance, rule of law, social well-
being, and a sustainable economy), peace operations could entail an extended commitment

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and an expanded mission to address root causes, inadequate capacity in a fragile state, and
a variety of challenges or second-order effects that could develop. Most mission transitions
and terminations will seek to avoid a premature departure that leaves conditions likely to
cause future armed conflict. Some situations may be so intractable that they may not be
resolved under the best of circumstances, and certainly not if the military force and its
partners are only conducting a limited effort. In some cases, a peace operations force may
become involved in broader peace building efforts once a situation is relatively stable and
nation-building efforts become more prominent.

(5) Losses. Peace operations may result in casualties or equipment losses

because of hostile actions, accidents, or other threats. In an extreme situation, a unit could
be at risk if placed in a situation beyond its capability. Such situations could also jeopardize
nonmilitary partners from the HN, NGOs, and international organizations.

(6) HN Resistance. Peace operations may generate opposition from within the
HN, resulting in the population and government becoming more intransigent or motivating
local actors to oppose foreign interference. Increased pressure from the mandate on any
issue, such as human rights reforms, may generate additional resentment. Some factions
within the HN will automatically be suspicious of the motives behind the peace operation,
and the mission may become a convenient scapegoat for the nation’s problems.

(7) Friction with Partners. The military force may disagree with other HN and
international actors regarding objectives, methods, burden-sharing, mandate interpretation,
or other issues. Some actors may contend that the mission is doing too much, not doing
enough, or doing things incorrectly. Others, including contributors to the peace operation,
may be influenced by constituencies skeptical about the mission, particularly if there are
setbacks.

(8) Negative Second-Order Effects. Even if largely successful, a peace

operation may result in HN dependence upon external participants. It could also benefit
one identity group at the expense of others. A peace operation may motivate an influx of
foreign fighters, and setbacks could encourage violent acts by spoilers. Second-order
effects are difficult to predict, but leaders should try to anticipate and mitigate them.
Humanitarian workers, trusted HN personnel, and other sources can often provide insights
regarding the potential side effects of contemplated actions.

(9) Inaction. Invariably, there will be risks associated with any contemplated
action, but commanders should also be aware of the potential risks involved in not taking
action. These include the possibility that spoilers may be emboldened and the situation
could deteriorate even further, thereby requiring a more robust effort in the future.

(10) Partner Behavior. To prevent the US from appearing or inadvertently

becoming complicit in crimes or abuses committed by other countries, the PEO requires
working closely with, or providing material support to, partner nations. This could
negatively affect US efforts in a PEO but also have an effect on US strategic objectives
outside of the operation.

I-16 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

p. Opportunities. It is critical to identify potential opportunities to exploit during

any operation. The staff seeks out opportunities for action by informing the commander
throughout the planning and execution phases of a peacekeeping operation.

q. Risk Mitigation. Risk mitigation refers to efforts that prevent potential risks from
occurring, reduce their impact should they occur, and provide appropriate response when
necessary. Risk mitigation can be more effective when done in collaboration with other
actors such as HN representatives, NGOs, or USG departments and agencies. This helps
provide a comprehensive understanding of risks and mitigation efforts, including actions
that can reduce civilian vulnerabilities and respond to incidents which result in civilian
harm. However, some NGOs may be reluctant to collaborate with US forces. Joint risk
mitigation with HN security forces can be particularly important, both to identify potential
sources of harm to civilians and to enhance protection of civilians efforts. Mitigation
measures often include:

(1) Training.

(2) Adjusted force levels, deployment, or composition.

(3) Contingency planning.

(4) Designated response forces or reserves.

(5) Key leader engagement (KLE).

(6) CCS.

(7) Elevated or delegated decision authority.

(8) Modified ROE.

(9) Reduced or expanded information sharing with other actors.

6. Command and Control

a. The US may participate in peace operations under various command authority

arrangements. These arrangements might include:

(1) Unilateral US joint operations.

(2) Multinational operations with the US as the lead nation.

(3) Multinational operations with the US as a contingent nation.

b. In any of these arrangements, US forces will report to the US chain of command.

However, in multinational peace operations, the US force may also report to the sponsoring
international organization such as the UN, NATO, AU, OAS, or EU. By law, the President
retains command authority over US forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the
President has the authority to place US forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a

I-17
Chapter I

foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests. Within the limits
of OPCON, a foreign commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside
the OA agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign commander separate units, divide
their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the US forces’ internal
organization. The greater the anticipated US military role, the less likely it will be that the
US will agree to have a non-US commander exercise OPCON over US forces. Ordinarily,
any large-scale participation of US forces in a PEO likely to involve combat will be
conducted under US command authority.

c. In the same manner US forces or personnel operate under the ultimate authority of
the President, other contributing countries abide by their own national authorities.
Countries working with or under the US in a PEO may operate with caveats and seek
direction from their leaders, regardless of any prior agreements or mandate for the peace
operation.

7. Key Documents

Political objectives guide the development of key documents that provide legal
authority and define the parameters for a peace operation.

a. Mandate. The UNSC establishes the scope for UN-sponsored peace operations
through a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR), which is often referred to
as the mandate for the operation. Peace operations sponsored by organizations other than
the UN may be based on treaties, accords, resolutions, or agreements of international
organizations, often with authorization by a UNSCR under Chapter VIII (Regional
Arrangements) of the UN Charter.

b. Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) or, for UN Operations, Status-of-Mission

Agreement (SOMA). These agreements, negotiated between the HN and the sponsoring
organization on behalf of the participating countries, establish the detailed legal status of
peace operations forces and involve close coordination among the Department of State
(DOS), combatant commanders (CCDRs), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Authority to negotiate a SOFA is held at the
national level. Some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint
Staff and CCDRs. Neither the commander nor the staff has such authority without specific
approval or delegation from higher authority. Considerations for entering into any
negotiations or agreement with another nation should include the consult of the staff judge
advocate. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5530.3, International Agreements,
assigns responsibility for controlling the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with
foreign governments and international organizations by DOD personnel, components,
commands, or other organizational elements. US forces remain subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, as administered by the appropriate US commander.

c. Terms of Reference (TORs). TORs are developed to govern implementation of

the peace operation based on the mandate and the situation and may be subject to approval
by the parties to the dispute. The TORs describe the mission, command relationships,
organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and

I-18 JP 3-07.3
 Overview

responsibilities of the military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the peace
operation. When the US is a participant in a peace operation, TORs are coordinated with
the CJCS, DOD, and DOS before final approval by the Secretary of Defense.

d. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). In the context of a peace operation, an

MOU is an agreement between the sponsoring organization and contributing countries
concerned primarily with logistics and administrative matters such as financial
management of the peace operation.

e. ROE. In peace operations, well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly

disseminated ROE can make the difference between mission success and failure. ROE,
together with rules for the use of force, define when and how force may be used. All
commanders assess threat capabilities and make recommendations for specific ROE
through the chain of command.

(1) US commanders should be aware that peace operations forces from other
nations may interpret ROE differently than US forces or may be required to operate under
different ROE. During NATO operations, the applicable NATO ROE will authorize the
participating nations to publish supplemental ROE guidance based upon national
requirements. Commanders and their staffs must understand the limitations of other MNFs
and develop solutions during planning to prevent confusion during a crisis.

(2) For PKO, the ROE may be highly restrictive and limit the use of force to self-
defense of the force and protection of the mission. In PKO authorized under Chapter VII
(Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the
UN Charter, however, the ROE may permit the use of force under a wider variety of
circumstances, such as to protect civilians from imminent violence.

(3) In PEO, the ROE are less restrictive concerning the use of force than in
peacekeeping situations, but tailored to the situation. Restraint will still be a primary
consideration since the transition to peace may be easier when the applications of force
remain proportional and appropriate.

For additional information, refer to CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/
Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

I-19
Chapter I

Intentionally Blank

I-20 JP 3-07.3
 CHAPTER II
PLANNING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

“To be successful, UN [United Nations] peacekeeping missions today and in the

future must be capable of defending themselves, protecting civilians, and
carrying out their mandate in the context of a very dynamic security environment.
In short, to meet what I believe will be a growing demand for more complex peace
operations, we’re going to need to adapt. Meeting the growing demand for a
wide range of peacekeeping operations requires a robust set of capabilities and
capacities…. [T]hey include: strong civilian and military leadership teams; staff
capacity to design missions with clear objectives, end states, and measures of
effectiveness; effective command and control; well-trained forces at the brigade,
at the battalion, and at the company level; and appropriate enabling capabilities
to include intelligence, air and ground mobility, logistics, counter IED [improvised
explosive device] capability, engineering, and medical capability.”

General Joseph F. Dunford

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Introduction

While planning for peace operations is similar in many respects to planning for other
military operations, this chapter highlights the essential aspects of planning for
multidimensional peace operations.

2. Planning Considerations

a. Application of Joint Functions. Each of the joint functions is relevant for peace
operations. In many cases, their application will differ slightly from other joint operations.

(1) Command and Control (C2). C2 is often challenging in peace operations

because a mission will likely include a variety of military, civilian, and police participation
from multiple nations. Higher-level staffs will normally be multinational, with English as
the official language. At lower levels, another language may be used.

(a) Typically, UN missions will be organized as depicted in Figure II-1, and

missions conducted by other international organizations will often follow the same
structure. The HOM is usually a civilian holding the title of special representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG). In rare cases where the mission includes all UN agencies in
the country, the HOM may be designated as the executive representative of the Secretary-
General (ERSG). A multidimensional mission has military, police, and civilian
components. In an integrated mission, the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator
of the adjacent UN country team also holds a deputy SRSG position in the mission.
Civilian-led state or province coordinating offices normally report directly to the mission
HQ.

II-1
Chapter II

Example Mission Organization

United Nations Peacekeeping Mission United Nations

Country Team
SRSG
(Head of Mission)

JOC DSRSG
Political DSRSG
JMAC Affairs RC/HC

Director Force Police Civilian State/

Mission Commander Commissioner Component Province
Support Coordinators

 Individual  Political Affairs United Nations

JLOC Sector IMTs Humanitarian and
Commanders Police Rule of Law

Development
 Formed  Gender Organizations
Police Units
 DDR
 Regional
Battalion Headquarters  Mine Action
Commanders
 Elections
 Protection of
Civilians
 Returns/
Reintegration
 HIV/AIDS
 Human Rights
 Civil Affairs

Legend
AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome IMT integrated mission team
DDR disarmament, demobilization, and JLOC joint logistics operations center
reintegration JMAC joint mission analysis center
DSRSG deputy special representative to the JOC joint operations center
Secretary-General RC resident coordinator
HC humanitarian coordinator SRSG special representative to the Secretary-
HIV human immunodeficiency virus General

Figure II-1. Example Mission Organization

(b) Multinational sector HQs are usually brigade-level organizations. Their

subordinate organizations are usually national, although some may be composite units from
two or more countries.

(c) Interoperability is frequently a challenge because of different languages,

equipment, and doctrine. Radio and computer communications are usually nonsecure,
although some nations will have their own secure systems and use them internally.

(d) Effective C2 is challenging in peace operations, as vague or multiple

lines of authority may exist. National governments may impose caveats on the military
forces they contribute. For example, caveats may restrict when, where, or how they can be

II-2 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

employed. Commanders and planners should be aware of such caveats. A functional

relationship will also have to be developed with other partners such as HN security forces.
In many situations, military commanders may be directly subordinate to civilian
authorities. This may require an adjustment for commanders whose previous experiences
have been as subordinates to other military officers.

For information on UN C2, see the United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook.

(2) Intelligence. Successful peace operations rely upon accurate, timely

intelligence to provide early warning of risks and opportunities. Intelligence enables
situational understanding of the OE, including civilian vulnerabilities and threats.
Intelligence activities and effective peace operations are mutually reinforcing, as civilians
will provide information more freely when they can do so safely and if it further enhances
their well-being. In turn, focused, timely intelligence should drive operations that improve
conditions within the OE.

(a) Many UN personnel avoid the use of the term “intelligence,” as it implies
operations against hostile or potentially hostile forces. Additionally, HN consent can be
jeopardized if a peace operation is known to involve intelligence operations. As impartial
actors, UN organizations often prefer using the term “information.” Most UN missions
have a joint mission analysis center to analyze information and provide assessments of the
OE and specific issues of concern.

(b) Intelligence activities, including information sharing, can be challenging

in multinational peace operations. It is imperative commanders decide and communicate
early their broad intent regarding information sharing. DOD policy effectively mandates
a bias to share rather than withhold information whenever possible, making write-to-
release and born-unclassified approaches effective norms for activities such as peace
operations. JFCs should consult their foreign disclosure officials. Nonetheless, it is
important to sufficiently protect sources and methods of information acquisition. Joint
forces must also consider their own OPSEC and counterintelligence efforts against
adversaries who are attempting to collect information on them, possibly by using covert
agents or civilians whom the force is attempting to protect. Political and resource
constraints may limit a unit’s ability to obtain and exploit accurate, timely intelligence.

For more information on intelligence, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and
National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(3) Fires. Fires are often critical during PEO, and their employment is essentially
similar to other combat situations. They are less common during PKO, although UN
peacekeeping forces normally include mortars in infantry battalions and, in rare cases,
peacekeeping missions may be authorized to include artillery units.

(a) When authorized and available in PKO, fires are normally limited to
defensive situations, although they could be employed under other circumstances such as
to protect civilians from imminent threats. Concerns about collateral damage and

II-3
Chapter II

disproportionate response will frequently constrain the use of fires even if they are
permitted under the ROE.

(b) Some UN peacekeeping missions are authorized the use of attack

helicopters which have been employed to provide fire support in crisis situations.
Peacekeeping forces do not normally include naval gunfire assets, combat aircraft,
missiles, rockets, or armed unmanned aerial systems. Such capabilities may exist in
military forces that operate in parallel with UN peacekeeping missions.

For more information on fires, see JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

(4) Movement and Maneuver. In a peace operation, a military force may be

employed to provide area security or to establish a separation (buffer) zone between
belligerents. During peace enforcement, as well as some robust peacekeeping situations,
military forces may be used to defeat or neutralize armed groups such as spoilers who
refuse to abide by a peace agreement or who are targeting civilians or mission assets.

(a) Some of the primary peacekeeping tasks for military forces include
patrols, observation posts and checkpoints, cordon and search, convoy escort, and quick
response to sudden crises. Units also conduct outreach and military engagement activities
and encourage situational awareness as part of their normal operations.

(b) Military forces may conduct other supporting tasks such as disarmament
and demobilization, protection of critical infrastructure, crowd management, detention, and
evacuation of civilians. Units may conduct their primary and supporting tasks in
conjunction with international or HN police, other military forces, or UN civilian
specialists.

(c) UN training scenarios and contingency plans often use a four-stage

framework for the use of military force.

1. Prevention (threat of spoiler violence is present but low).

2. Preemption (probability of spoiler violence is serious or high).

3. Response (spoiler violence is ongoing or impending).

4. Consolidation (spoiler threat has subsided; counteraction operations

terminated).

For more information on force employment in UN peacekeeping missions, see the United
Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (Volumes I and II).

(5) Protection. Forces involved in peace operations must employ active and
passive measures to protect themselves against adversaries, accidents, diseases, and other
health and environmental threats. Additionally, the mission’s success will also likely
depend on protection of civilians and protecting other mission assets, humanitarian
workers, other actors, or critical infrastructure. Effective FP helps preserve the capability

II-4 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

to achieve mission objectives. However, concern about FP may result in a cautious posture
that ultimately reduces operational effectiveness or jeopardizes civilian well-being.

(6) Sustainment. A key function in any military activity, sustainment is

particularly significant in peace operations. Units are likely to be dispersed to remote areas
at the end of a long distribution chain. Poor transportation, weak power infrastructure,
extreme climates, and inadequate essential needs (such as potable water) will add to the
challenge and increase security concerns. Additionally, the political or diplomatic
environment may constrain force levels, including sustainment capacity. Therefore, other
sustainment sources may be necessary (e.g., operational contract support [OCS],
acquisition and cross-servicing agreements [ACSAs], and other nation logistics.)

(a) Many multinational partners do not have the same robust logistics
capabilities as the US. Without adequate logistics support, units will be insufficiently
resourced and will consequently spend an inordinate amount of effort attending to their
own internal needs while placing less emphasis on primary mission tasks. Robust military
operations will require extensive logistics support, which could result in a drain on limited
infrastructure already being used by other actors such as NGOs. Indirectly, these effects
can negatively impact civilian welfare, such as driving up wages and prices or reducing the
availability of already-scarce resources.

(b) In some emergency situations, the military force’s logistics resources

may be used to support other participants or to provide essential goods and services to
needy civilians, many of whom may seek security and support from military forces. Other
unique logistics requirements, such as security lighting and long-range acoustic hailing
devices for large numbers of displaced personnel, should be anticipated.

(c) Military engineering units, medical units, water purification units,

military bands, and other units can support societal reconstruction during peace operations.

For more information on sustainment, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and the United Nations
Peacekeeping Missions Military Logistics Unit Manual.

(7) Information. The information function encompasses the management and

application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to
influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and
automated decision making, which is especially important during peace operations. The
information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive
nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations.
This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of
friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of all military
activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end state.

For more information on US role in medical and health service support during peace
operations, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

b. Interorganizational Cooperation. Most peace operations are multidimensional

efforts with military, police, and civilian components. Missions typically interact with

II-5
Chapter II

other international and HN organizations including NGOs, other international

organizations, HN governmental agencies and security forces, the media, and businesses,
among others. Many have no formal relationship with the peace operation, but are
instrumental to achieving the mission’s objectives.

(1) Different levels of interaction include coexistence, communication,

information sharing, formal coordination, and collaboration. As shown in Figure II-2,
higher levels of interaction may be possible when military forces share objectives and a
common higher authority with other actors and a mutual level of trust exists. In some
cases, it is only possible or necessary to understand each other’s objectives, requirements,
capabilities, limitations, procedures, and terminology. However, closer coordination is
particularly critical for successful peace operations; an important example is close
integration with local police forces to ensure stability. The different levels of interaction
are usually voluntary and may be depicted as follows:

(a) Coexistence. Multiple groups are present in an area but do not interact
or communicate with each other. This may be the case with certain groups who do not
want any affiliation with the military.

(b) Communication. Parties have periodic contact, such as at meetings that

may occur, but do not share substantive information on a regular basis, if at all. Parties
may be able to contact each other if necessary (e.g., if they have cell phone numbers for
each other). When parties do not share any common interests, direct communication may

Levels of Integration

Coexistence Communication Information Formal Cooperation/

Sharing Coordination Collaboration

Different Similar
Objectives Objectives

Different Higher Common Higher

Authority Authority

Lack of Trust Close Trust

Uncooperative Cooperative
Attitudes Attitudes

Unwilling to Willingness to
Commit Commit
Resources Resources

Figure II-2. Levels of Integration

II-6 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

not even be possible. In cases where no direct communication exists, messages may be
relayed through intermediaries such as civilian personnel associated with the mission or
HN officials.

(c) Information Sharing. Parties share substantive information

periodically, but such exchanges are likely to be circumspect and may not occur on a
regular basis. Exchanged information is likely to be limited to matters of extremely high
mutual concern. For example, an NGO may be willing to provide some information
regarding a mass atrocity that has occurred, but unwilling to share details about its planned
operations.

(d) Formal Coordination. Parties regularly exchange information on a

wide range of topics, to include some planned operations, generally answering most
requests for information when they are reasonably able to do so. The parties may find it
beneficial to meet on a routine basis and may invite outside representatives to attend their
own internal meetings.

(e) Cooperation or Collaboration. The highest level of interaction entails

cooperation or collaboration which could include jointly conducted planning and
operations, collocation of organizations, exchange of liaisons, and other measures to
achieve more effective integration. In a loosely collaborative relationship, military forces
may occasionally provide direct security for the other actors (e.g., convoy escort). In some
collaborations, the interaction will be closer and more routine (e.g., sharing of contract
vendors).

(2) Role of Humanitarian and Development Organizations. Humanitarian

organizations provide essential needs such as protection, food, water, shelter, and medical
support to vulnerable populations. Development organizations focus on longer-term
programs, such as institutional capacity building of HN ministry counterparts and local
NGOs and civil society organizations. Both types of organizations are critical in peace
operations and may be part of the UN country team or national government organizations
(such as USAID). NGOs conduct much of the humanitarian and development work, either
as independent actors or as implementing partners of the UN, USAID, or other bilateral or
multilateral donor agencies and institutions. Most humanitarian and development
organizations attempt to maintain neutrality and independence from military forces and
prefer situations in which sufficient security exists such that they can conduct their
activities without consultations with security actors.

(3) Cluster System. In parallel with peace operations, and in other scenarios
such as natural disasters, the UN country team often employs a cluster system to coordinate
humanitarian and development activities of UN agencies, NGOs, and local organizations.
Clusters are based on functional sectors such as health, nutrition, protection, and
emergency shelter. Although it is a voluntary system, each cluster has a lead coordinating
agency and provides the following:

(a) Support for service delivery.

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Chapter II

(b) Decision-making information.

(c) Planning and strategy development.

(d) Advocacy.

(e) Monitoring and reporting.

(f) Contingency planning and preparedness.

(g) Capacity building.

For further information on clusters, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

For further information on coordination with other participants, refer to JP 3-08,

Interorganizational Cooperation.

c. CCS. Joint forces conducting peace operations should integrate informational

efforts that promulgate messages, inform audiences, and influence perceptions regarding
the situation and particularly the objectives and actions of the military force. These efforts
are increasingly critical in modern military operations, as every statement and action can
be monitored instantly by an interconnected world. Communication efforts can dissuade
perpetrators, influence other groups to behave positively, inform vulnerable populations,
and increase support for the peace operation. Communication is also essential to managing
expectations and mitigating the effects of incidents that result in civilian harm.

(1) Messages may be strictly informative or instructional. For example, they

could describe recent operations or explain to vulnerable civilians how they might improve
their security. Other messages could be intended to influence the opinions and actions of
an audience. For example, they may attempt to convince bystanders to assist the military
force and not support perpetrators. Still other messages may be intended to “name and
shame” spoilers, call attention to their actions, and potentially dissuade them from
undesired behavior in the future. Messages may be intended to have long-term
significance, or they could address immediate issues such as recent events (positive or
negative) or disinformation promulgated by adversaries. Examples of enduring messages
could include:

(a) The joint force is committed to protection of civilians.

(b) The joint force is not intended to occupy the HN and will remain only as
long as its presence is required for security and stability.

(c) The mission is supported by the international community, as well as

responsible HN actors.

(d) Spoilers who deliberately attack civilians or internationally sanctioned

peacekeepers are committing war crimes and will be held accountable.

II-8 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

(e) It is important to establish a safe and secure environment that does not
foster sexual violence, threats to children, or other threats to civilians. The HN and
international security forces should not tolerate such acts.

(2) Liaison. The joint force should establish liaison with parallel international
and HN security organizations. Whether full or part-time, LNOs can help synchronize
communication with other actors. Liaison may be conducted at multiple echelons during
a peace operation. In rare circumstances, such as during a natural disaster, it may be
appropriate to liaise with humanitarian organizations. The CMOC may be an effective
venue for conducting liaison with local authorities and civilian agencies.

(3) Public Affairs (PA). Effective PA efforts require an understanding of the

audiences, messages, and available methods. These three variables will likely result in
different approaches, as a single effort will seldom be effective. Audiences may include
the general civilian population in the HN and its subsets (such as women); HN leaders;
victim groups; NGOs; perpetrators (leaders or followers); and other potential adversaries,
bystanders, positive or negative actors, the media, international audiences, and domestic
leaders and populations in coalition states or TCCs. Messages are also promulgated to
subordinates in the form of PA guidance to ensure consistency and facilitate wider
dissemination.

(4) Information. The CCS process should ensure relevant information is

incorporated into every operation to shape the OE. An effective CCS process will magnify
the impact of other actions; similarly, other actions can enhance information. A
command’s CCS process both informs outside audiences and enables subordinates to
advance important messages effectively during their own activities. Information sharing
will be critical to deter and preempt threats when indicators suggest that violence against
civilians is imminent. The joint force should integrate informational efforts of other
partners as much as possible, while nesting within those of the HN political authorities.
Higher military and political echelons may have a robust staff capability often lacking at
lower levels.

(5) Cyberspace and Social Media. Although peace operations often occur in
undeveloped countries or those ravaged by conflict, websites and social media can still
reach relevant audiences in many situations and, if possible, should be created in different
languages. Audio and video recording and editing equipment can provide extremely
valuable capabilities to such venues.

(6) KLE. KLEs offer important ways to coordinate with other actors and to
support CCS. Specific KLEs can have a variety of purposes such as to foster relationships,
clarify intentions, establish desired conditions to support future efforts, convey messages
(including promises, threats, condolences, or apologies), or address problems confronting
the peace operation.

d. Asymmetric Threats. Peace operations increasingly face threats from spoilers,

armed opposition groups, criminal groups, terrorist groups, and, in some cases, HN security

II-9
Chapter II

forces. Such threats often target peacekeeping and peace building forces, the humanitarian
and development organizations that operate in an area, and the civilian population.

(1) VEOs often pose the greatest threat to a peace operation. They may form
after a peace operation has been initiated and could originate from within the country or
from a different country. It is common for a homegrown organization to develop linkages
with a wider global or regional terrorist network.

(a) These organizations may pursue political objectives such as securing

power in a nation or forming an independent state. Some may pursue extremist religious
goals. Additionally, such organizations may be intent on targeting members of other tribes,
ethnicities, religions, or other identity groups.

(b) VEOs may attack members of a peace operation, international aid

workers, HN security personnel and other officials, innocent civilians, and any others
viewed as collaborating with the peace operation or rival groups. They may also attack
critical infrastructure or soft targets such as schools and marketplaces. These groups may
employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortars and rockets, sniper rifles, and other
military grade or improvised weapons, as well as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). They
may ambush convoys, including those of humanitarian workers, and may attempt to kidnap
personnel for ransom or for use during negotiations or as human shields. Small and isolated
members of a peace operations force may be vulnerable to these practices. These tactics
and methods may be employed by any group, including hostile members of the HN’s
security forces or employees of contractors that are opposed to the peace operations force.

(2) In addition to VEOs, other transnational threats may include criminal groups
that seek to exploit the HN’s fragility. Frequently, they are involved in illicit economic
activities such as human trafficking and smuggling of drugs, weapons, and natural
resources, including valuable minerals and endangered species. In some cases, they may
consist of rebel groups that have established sanctuaries in a neighboring country.

(3) UN peace operations forces do not normally have a robust capability to

counter IEDs or other asymmetric threats. Often, they do not have the intelligence assets
needed to identify threat networks and usually lack technologies that can locate and negate
IEDs or other improvised threats. A peace operation may involve a small UN Mine Action
Service office to provide some expertise regarding education, victim assistance, and mine
clearing. Additionally, a force operating in an especially high-risk area may include
explosive ordnance units. When operating in parallel with a UN mission, US joint forces
will likely have superior counter-IED and counter threat network capabilities that can help
redress the UN mission’s gaps in this area.

e. Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect. Peace operations are

often conducted for the main purpose of protecting civilians from extreme threats such as
genocide or other mass atrocities. In most cases, modern peace operations include civilian
protection as one of the key tasks of the mandate.

II-10 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

(1) Civilians comprise the majority of the victims in most modern conflicts, and
they remain at risk during peace operations in post-conflict settings. Military forces
safeguard civilians by avoiding civilian harm during their operations and by conducting
actions, including the employment of capabilities that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects,
with the specific intent to improve civilian security.

(2) Protection of civilians refers to efforts that reduce civilian risks from physical
violence; secure their rights to access essential services and resources; and contribute to a
secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term.

(a) The UN approach to civilian protection consists of three tiers of action:

1. Tier 1—Protection through dialogue and engagement.

2. Tier 2—Provision of physical protection.

3. Tier 3—Establishing a protective environment.

(b) Protection of civilians entails three fundamentals for joint forces during
any military operation:

1. Understand civilian risks.

2. Protect civilians during operations.

3. Shape a protective environment.

(c) Local and international unarmed civilian protection efforts may exist to
promote protection of civilians through nonviolent means such as interpositioning,
protective accompaniment, and monitoring. The organizations performing these activities
may predate the peace operation and may be effective partners of the peace operations
force.

See Appendix B, “Protection of Civilians,” for further information. Also, refer to JP 3-07,
Stability; Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians; the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)/United Nations Department
of Field Support (UNDFS) policy, The Protection of Civilians in United Nations
Peacekeeping Missions; and the UNDPKO/UNDFS, Protection of Civilians: Implementing
Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions.

(3) The Responsibility to Protect. The responsibility to protect reflects the

expectation that states must protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes such as genocide,
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It includes prevention,
response, and rebuilding measures undertaken by individual governments and the
international community. The UN recognizes three supporting pillars of the responsibility
to protect:

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Chapter II

(a) Pillar 1—A state’s responsibility to protect its population from mass
atrocities.

(b) Pillar 2—The international community’s responsibility to assist states in

the prevention of mass atrocities.

(c) Pillar 3—The international community’s responsibility to take action

when a state is failing in its responsibility to protect. This may entail a wide range of
measures including MARO.

f. Transitions and Termination. Two types of transitions are relevant for the
military force. The first type relates to the phases or stages of an operation and the second
refers to the transfer of authorities and responsibilities from one actor to another. As the
situation changes, so too will the authorities, responsibilities, roles, and activities of
different actors, including the peace operations force. Transitions may occur between an
international coalition and the UN or a regional organization (or vice-versa). Ultimately,
responsibility and authority must be successfully transitioned to capable HN authorities to
enable a force drawdown and eventual termination of the international mission.

(1) Effective transitions require, first, a manageable situation conducive to the

transition and, second, actors capable of accepting their new responsibilities and
authorities. As much as possible, transitions should be planned in advance and coordinated
with the different stakeholders. It will be necessary to obtain as much concurrence as
possible while managing expectations. Transitions should occur based upon actual
conditions rather than planned timelines. Conditions will likely differ in the various
regions of a country, and it may be advisable to conduct local or regional transitions
incrementally based upon the particular circumstances. It is also possible that transitions
in one particular sector (such as governance) may occur before others.

(2) During peace operations, military forces may approach transitions similarly
to reliefs in place or mission handovers. Transitions can be sequential, with an incremental
transfer of units, locations, or functions. Alternatively, the entire transition can occur
simultaneously. In all cases, transitions should maintain security, as instability and civilian
risks can increase during and after transitions. Depending upon the circumstances,
transitions could include the following general steps:

(a) Preparation. Outgoing and incoming participants jointly develop a

transition plan. Outgoing participants provide information and necessary orientations.
Incoming participants conduct necessary training and other organizational preparations.
PA activities and CCS efforts will help set the conditions for the transition and should
emphasize stability and civilian protection in relevant messages.

(b) Tutorship. Incoming participants are incorporated into operations while

the outgoing participants retain authority and responsibility. The incoming participants
gradually perform a more prominent role. The main objective of this step is to accustom
the incoming participants with the situation, operations, responsibilities, and authorities.

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 Planning for Peace Operations

(c) Formal Transition. The incoming participants assume responsibility

and authority. In some situations, this will be seamless, with conditions remaining
essentially unchanged from those immediately before the formal transition. In other cases,
the outgoing participants will leave no residual influence or presence.

(d) Mentoring. In some situations, the outgoing participants will remain

(often with reduced presence) to provide advice and assistance.

(e) Reachback Support. After transition has occurred, it may be desirable

for the incoming participants to be able to contact the outgoing participants for a variety of
purposes, such as to provide any necessary historical information.

(3) Over time, military commanders will assume a diminished role in supporting
and enabling civilian organizations. Similarly, international efforts will recede as HN
actors develop the capacity to assume responsibility and authority. Transitions can result
in instability and heightened risks to civilians. If poorly managed, transitions may generate
grievances and, potentially, renewed conflict due to lack of progress in areas such as
governance and development.

(4) Effective transitions are difficult to manage. One challenge may be

establishing and progressively achieving meaningful yet reasonable objectives, based on
requirements and the means available to address them. Another challenge may be building
and maintaining consensus. Different stakeholders must support the transitions, which will
frequently require compromises. There are apt to be pressures to transition too quickly and
inertia that results in transitions not occurring quickly enough. Yet another challenge may
be effectively merging ongoing top-down and bottom-up efforts. Finally, military
commanders and planners should ensure mutual understanding of transition expectations
prior to initiation of projects not essential to the core mission.

g. Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention is the employment of complementary

diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes
of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of
hostilities. Designated conflict prevention efforts can include fact-finding missions,
consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. It is also an implied task for many
peacekeeping missions and other post-conflict operations.

(1) Many stability activities support conflict prevention, as they help address the
root causes of conflict. The establishment of a safe and secure environment, with the
presence of capable and legitimate security forces, can prevent conflict. Other security
activities that support the delivery of essential services, ensure good governance and the
rule of law, and foster social well-being and economic growth can reduce grievances that
might lead to conflict.

(2) Military forces support conflict prevention during shaping activities, as well
as deterrence and combat operations. SC activities can improve the credibility of HN
security forces. Stability activities (as discussed above) can help reduce drivers of conflict.
Monitoring activities can provide early warning of potential conflict which, in turn, can

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Chapter II

permit diplomatic remedies. Military presence, including preventive deployments and

shows of force, can deter would-be belligerents. These deployments could occur locally
within an ongoing peace operation or internationally with the deployment of a new force,
such as the 1995 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia.

h. Peacemaking. As discussed in Chapter I, “Overview,” peacemaking is a

diplomatic process aimed at establishing a cease fire or an otherwise peaceful settlement
of a conflict. Peacemaking is usually accomplished by a special political mission that
involves few, if any, military personnel.

(1) Even if a peace agreement has been concluded at higher levels between major
belligerents, it is possible the leaders of these groups do not have effective control over
subordinate elements, splinter groups, or potential spoilers of the peace process. In such
cases, peacemaking efforts may be incorporated within other peace operations, especially
peacekeeping missions authorized under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the
UN Charter.

(2) During other peace operations missions, peacemaking activities will usually
be conducted by the mission’s civilian leadership using the UN’s good offices and
mediation roles to strengthen a peace settlement. Military leaders could supplement these
efforts with their own KLE with HN security forces, non-state armed groups, and other
local groups. Military forces may be used to provide security for peacemaking processes
and monitor related activities.

i. Peace Building. Peace building provides the reconstruction and societal

rehabilitation necessary to resolve core conflict issues or prevent further outbreaks of
violent conflict. It promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructure
and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction. The major
responsibility for peace building resides ultimately with the HN and the civil sector, but
the peace operations force has a supporting and essential role. Because the peace
operations force and civil efforts are inextricably linked, harmony and synchronization are
imperative. Peace building usually begins during PKO or PEO and continues after they
are concluded.

(1) The planning considerations in peace building are generally the same as those
in stabilization efforts. Essential to ensuring the population’s well-being and to preclude
grievances that could cause a return to conflict, peace building includes military and
nonmilitary objectives, activities, and actors working to establish the following elements
of a stable state.

(a) Human Security. In peace operations, military forces, as well as

international and HN police forces, are directly involved with establishing and maintaining
a safe and secure environment. A safe and secure environment follows the cessation of
large-scale violence, the establishment of public order, and the achievement of a legitimate
state monopoly over the means of violence, physical security, and territorial security.

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 Planning for Peace Operations

(b) Governance and Rule of Law. Transparent, accountable, and effective

governance is critical to maintaining an effective peace settlement. Good governance
entails the provision of essential services, stewardship of state resources, political
moderation and accountability, and civic participation and empowerment. Effective rule
of law ensures civilians are protected from human rights violations and crimes (including
violent acts), authorities behave properly, and criminals are deterred and held accountable.
It includes just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice,
and a culture of lawfulness. Transitional justice mechanisms are likely to be important to
establish accountability for past crimes while providing a basis for reconciliation and a
positive future.

(c) Economic and Infrastructure Development. Deprivation results in

civilian suffering including malnutrition, exposure, and illness. Along with basic needs
such as food, water, shelter, and medical care, the population must be provided the
requirements for human dignity such as human rights, opportunities for education and
employment, and hope for the future. Without adequate economic growth and
infrastructure, problems such as unemployment, inflation, and shortages can result in
grievances that foster violence and spur criminal activity, including corruption among
government officials. A sustainable economy results from macroeconomic stabilization,
control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace, and employment
generation.

(d) Political Settlement. A desirable political settlement ensures political

power is organized and exercised without resorting to violence. However informal, it is
the foundation of a political process and must be accepted by elites and the wider society,
while bringing in groups that may have previously been excluded. A peaceful, just, and
accepted political settlement is the most important indicator of stabilization in a post-
conflict nation.

(e) Societal Relationships. A stable state requires harmonious relationships

between diverse identity groups. Societal well-being includes a variety of issues from the
equitable provision of necessities to fostering attitudes in which different groups are
tolerant of each other. Peace operations may require the return and resettlement of
dislocated civilians (DCs) and social reconstruction.

(2) Military Support to Peace Building. Military forces can assist and provide
structure for cease fire mechanisms that support a peace agreement which may be vague
and lacking specificity. For long-term peace building, the military will most likely focus
on establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment to protect civilians and
provide the secure space necessary for other actors to operate effectively. In many cases,
the military can support these actors with personnel, equipment, communications,
information, or supplies. In situations of last resort, military forces may need to perform
nonmilitary functions until other actors are adequately established and prepared to assume
responsibility. Some military activities may have an impact beyond peacekeeping or peace
enforcement. For example, repair of infrastructure such as bridges and roads can improve
military operations and logistics, but can also mitigate the isolation of civilians in remote
areas and assist government and humanitarian access, the return of displaced persons, and

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Chapter II

the restoration of services and trade. Military forces in peace operations may also be
involved in important peace building activities such as SSR; disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR); and providing security for elections.

For additional information, see JP 3-07, Stability.

j. HA refers to efforts that relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or

privation in an impartial manner. While HA is provided ideally by civilian organizations
without military involvement, military forces and other security units may be mandated or
tasked to support humanitarian actions. HA includes the distribution of food, water,
shelter, medical care, and other items (such as blankets or cooking materials) to provide
for essential needs, as well as the associated coordination, logistics, and communications.

For more information on US military medical planning considerations, see JP 4-02, Joint
Health Services.

(1) The diverse organizations that may deliver HA include UN agencies,

international organizations, local NGOs, contractors, and the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, each with a different governing and accountability structure.
Many organizations delivering goods and services are multi-mandated, providing both
short-term HA and long-term recovery and development assistance which often contributes
to the sustainability of a state. Some humanitarian organizations may be very concerned
with remaining neutral and independent to gain or retain access to communities in need.
In addition to providing goods and services (for example, clean water, sanitation, food, and
shelter), some humanitarian organizations also provide programs such as rights education,
local conflict mediation and trust building, monitoring, reporting, and advocacy.

(2) Relevance to Peace Operations. Peace operations environments are often

accompanied by acute needs for essential goods and services. Civilians may flee a threat,
thus losing their access to livelihoods, services, and support networks. Belligerents may
destroy sources of food, water, and shelter or otherwise purposely restrict access to
essential services. Effects of conflict may be exacerbated by natural disasters such as
droughts or flooding. Lack of access to clean water, medical services, and other essential
needs can harm more civilians than physical violence. Moreover, lack of access to basic
goods and services may undermine an individual or communities’ ability to rebound from
conflict. Additionally, competition over scarce essential goods and services can be a root
cause of or contribute to further conflict and violence against civilians. Therefore, it is
vital to foster an environment conducive to HA to support effective peace operations. This
requirement could accompany other military operations and may at times be the military’s
most important task to prevent widespread human suffering.

(3) Military Support to HA. Generally, a military force’s primary role is to help
provide secure space so humanitarian actors may operate based on objective and apolitical
human needs. In some situations, the military may have more direct involvement. For
example, units may be asked to provide escorts for humanitarian actors. In such cases,
humanitarian use of military assets should seek to comply with international guidance
designed to safeguard humanitarian participants and the people they seek to assist. Where

II-16 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

humanitarian organizations are not present or able to provide assistance, military forces
may be temporarily involved in the actual delivery of essential goods and services until
other participants are able to assume the role. While they may become directly involved
in HA as a last resort, military units normally contribute to an environment conducive to
humanitarian action when they:

(a) Establish and maintain general security to provide space in which

humanitarian organizations can operate.

(b) Provide situational awareness regarding such issues as the location,

number, and condition of civilians in need.

(c) Provide information on potential threats.

(d) Provide communications support.

(e) Support planning efforts.

(f) Provide security at storage sites and during transfer operations,

transportation, and distribution.

(g) Improve or build infrastructure capacity for transportation and delivery

of HA.

(h) Provide transportation support (including helicopter transport and

airfield operations).

(i) Provide equipment (such as materiel handling equipment) and operators.

(j) Support and conduct public information dissemination.

(k) Provide required technical expertise with selected military personnel or

units (e.g., medical, construction, water purification, mortuary affairs, or interpreters).

(l) When humanitarian organizations are not present or able to provide

assistance, initiate HA efforts and transition to other organizations when they are
established.

(4) HA Funding. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding may
be available, but its uses are narrowly defined by public law and DOD policy. Difficulties
often arise from commitment of resources prior to ensuring understanding of those legal
and policy restrictions.

For more information, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

k. Assessments. Operation assessment to support a peacekeeping operation requires

a continuous process that supports decision making by determining progress toward
accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state.

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Chapter II

(1) Purpose of Assessments. The purpose of the assessment activity is to

develop, adapt, and refine plans and for making campaigns and operations more effective.
Mission analysis is required to first understand the situation and identify problems,
capabilities, and gaps that need to be addressed to support mission accomplishment. The
assessment also evaluates the performance and effectiveness of the military force (and
other relevant actors) to determine if any changes are required to the peace operation.
Changes could include revision of the mission, modifications in the military force’s
employment, additional training or resources, or rebalancing of operational activities as the
peace operation progresses.

(2) Sources of Information. Information can be obtained from the intelligence

community and military reporting channels, but other sources can be even more valuable,
including civilian agencies, NGOs, the media, and the local population. Many human
rights organizations monitor conflict situations, and their reports are often readily available.
These can be particularly useful for analyzing trends and gaining familiarity with a
situation at the outset of a peace operation. Military leaders must carefully handle
information they receive from NGO representatives in the field, as it could jeopardize the
NGOs’ status as neutral actors. Normally, the military should not attribute information to
the NGOs and, in some cases, it may be advisable to delay any use of the information
obtained from these sources.

(3) Many organizations may be reluctant to cooperate with the military due to the
risk to their neutrality. It may be more effective for the military to interact with them
through civilian intermediaries, and units should generally treat them as protected sources
and refrain from attributing information to them. Local leaders and members of the
population can be excellent sources of information, particularly when they believe that
their well-being and that of their families will be preserved. Effective peace operations
will make the population more forthcoming with information, which in turn will improve
the effectiveness of future operations. However, units should be aware that individuals
may have ulterior motives for providing information (such as to undermine a rival), so they
should be cautious about trusting a source completely. Any information received should
be cross-checked with other sources when possible.

For more information on intelligence, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01, Joint and
National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment; and JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

(4) Assessment includes monitoring, evaluating, and recommending or directing

action.

(a) Monitoring includes a continuous tracking of the situational variables

discussed in this section and is supported by such measures as unit reports, coordination
with other actors, KLE, LNO reports, intelligence activities, polls and surveys, and a wide
variety of other information sources. Monitoring focuses particularly on pre-determined
commander’s critical information requirements, intelligence requirements (IRs), and
indicators.

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 Planning for Peace Operations

(b) Evaluating involves the development of metrics to help evaluate

progress. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) answer the question “are the desired effects
being created?” Measures of performance (MOPs) answer the questions “are directed
actions being accomplished?” or “are we doing things right?” Indicators are information
items that help determine the status of MOPs and MOEs and should be measurable
(quantitatively or qualitatively), collectable, and relevant. Nonmilitary indicators may
partially depend on information from other actors, such as humanitarian organizations.
Figure II-3 depicts examples of metrics to assist with assessments.

(c) Recommending or directing action involves application of MOEs,

MOPs, and other indicators to inform decision making. MOEs can be useful criteria for
decisions to progress to another phase of an operation, conduct transitions, or make
significant changes to plans and operations. MOPs can be used as criteria to change
procedures or shift the allocation of resources. In some cases, the commander will be able
to direct the action required. In other cases, because of a lack of authority, responsibility,
or capability, the commander will provide recommendations to superiors or other actors
such as HN officials.

(5) Figures II-4 and II-5 provide an example of how assessments can support
decisions to conduct a transition, relative to the five peace building elements discussed
previously.

Example Assessment Metrics

Outcome:
Effect, objective, or end state
 Safe and secure environment

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)

Criterion related change in behavior, capability, or operational environment:
 Decrease in attacks against civilians
 Public perception of security improved

Measures of Performance (MOPs)

Criterion related to task accomplishment; often answerable by “yes” or “no”
 Local armed group of perpetrators neutralized
 Police station in city X operational

Indicators
Informational item related to MOEs or MOPs:
 Number of weekly attacks against civilians in city X
 Number of monthly patrols vicinity city X by host nation security forces
 Number of trained detectives in city X police force
 Number of matches against the Biometrics Enabled Watch List

Figure II-3. Example Assessment Metrics

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Chapter II

(a) Figure II-4 addresses an assessment of “cessation of large-scale

violence,” which is one of the conditions for human security. While the current situation
is deemed satisfactory, there are some concerns with transition preparations from the
“initial response” stage. Overall, the status is good.

Example Assessment

Stability Element: Human Security Overall

Condition: Cessation of Large-Scale Violence
Stage: Initial Response G
Date: 23 April 20xx

G Current Situation

G Peacekeeping force deployed: yes

G Ceasefire implemented: yes
Y Monitoring and control measures in place: nearly complete
G CCS planned and implemented: yes
Y Violent incidents (past week): 2
Y Conflict casualties (past week): 3 killed, 4 wounded

Y Transition Preparations

G DDR program planned: yes

Y SSR program planned: nearly complete
G Mine clearance planned: yes
Y Host nation military prepared: partial
G New civilian authorities identified: yes
O New civilian authorities prepared: partial

Remarks
Incoming civilian authorities need facilities and communications. Host nation
regional military headquarters lacks effective C2. Peacekeeping force does not
have access to northern district.

Legend
C2 command and control DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
CCS commander's communication synchronization SSR security sector reform

Figure II-4. Example Assessment

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 Planning for Peace Operations

(b) Figure II-5 depicts a consolidated assessment of multiple conditions.

While human security generally exists, more progress is required in other elements before
a low-risk transition from the initial response stage can occur.

Transition Assessment

Overall: Orange Initial Response Transformation Sustainability

Human Security G Y Y
Large Scale Violence G Y G
Public Order Y G Y
State Monopoly of Violence Y O Y
Physical Security G G G
Territorial Security G Y G

Governance and Rule of Law O O O

Provision of Essential Services R O R
Stewardship of State Resources O R O
Political Moderation and Accountability Y Y Y
Civic Participation and Environment G O O
Just Legal Frameworks Y O O
Public Order R O O
Accountabiliity to the Law R Y O
Access to Justice R O R
Culture of Lawfulness Y O O

Economic and Infrastructure

Development R O O
Macroeconomic Stabilization R O O
Illicit Economy/Economic Threats Y O O
Market Economy Sustainability O Y Y
Employment Generation R O R

Political Settlement O O O
Ceasefire Agreement G O Y
Political Agreement Y O O
Transitional Justice R R R

Societal Relationships R R R
Basic Needs Services R R R
Education B B B
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Y O O
Social Reconstruction Y R O

Legend
Green (G) satisfactory current situation
Yellow (Y) minor concerns, but transition possible
Orange (O) moderate concerns, transition risky transition preparations
Red (R) major concerns, transition should be delayed
Black (B) extreme problems, current conditions untenable overall status

Figure II-5. Transition Assessment

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Chapter II

(6) An assessment framework should be a tool that supports effective operations;

it should not be a burden that impairs them. In some cases, an elaborate framework is
unnecessary because the commander’s understanding is sufficiently comprehensive or
because the situation is so urgent that such a framework is infeasible. Developing and
maintaining assessment frameworks can require extensive resources—especially
personnel—that may be diverted from more critical activities. Assessment frameworks
can also cause units to focus on generating “good” numbers by whatever means possible.
For example, if a unit is evaluated on the number of daily patrols it conducts, the result
may be a large number of brief excursions rather than a few extended multiday patrols that
might have better operational effect. Information on the ground is often incomplete or
questionable, particularly when it is impossible for a unit to monitor every event in a large
OA. As information is reported to progressively higher echelons it may be misinterpreted
as being completely accurate and complete. Nevertheless, lack of an effective and systemic
assessment framework can result in poor situational understanding, ill-advised operations,
and poor information sharing with other organizations.

l. Other Considerations

(1) Inclusive Security. Peace operations may be conducted to protect and secure
the human rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups, which often include women,
children, the elderly and infirm, and certain identity groups.

(a) Women, peace, and security is an internationally recognized term that

includes protective and participatory dimensions and addresses the disproportionate and
unique impact of conflict on women. Sexual violence, and other gender-based violence,
frequently occurs during conflict and in fragile societies. It is usually, but not always,
directed against women and girls. The protective dimension mitigates harm, exploitation,
discrimination, abuse, conflict-related sexual violence, and human trafficking, while
holding perpetrators accountable. This protective dimension also addresses access to HA,
relief, and recovery and protection of human rights. Human trafficking and sexual
exploitation and abuse are particularly damaging when conducted by personnel in peace
operations. Gender issues also include women’s participation in a nation’s political,
economic, and security sectors and institutions, as women are vital to establishing peace
and maintaining future stability. This participatory dimension helps to safeguard women’s
interests and results in greater stability. Institutions are more effective and societies are
more stable when women are integrated rather than marginalized. Executive Order 13595,
Instituting a National Action Plan On Women, Peace, and Security, which promulgated
the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, directed
implementation of the plan throughout the federal government. DOD subsequently created
an implementation guide to support the United States National Action Plan on Women,
Peace, and Security and prescribed incorporation of the plan’s objectives into relevant
documents. When appropriate, peace operations should integrate the following five
objectives from the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security:

1. National Integration and Institutionalization. Peace operations

should contribute to gender-responsive policies in conflict-affected environments and
support the integration of women into HN positions of responsibility.

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 Planning for Peace Operations

2. Participation in Peace Processes and Decision Making. Peace

operations support prospects for an inclusive, just, and sustainable peace by promoting and
strengthening women’s rights, effective leadership, and substantive participation in peace
processes, conflict prevention, peace building, transitional processes, and decision-making
institutions in conflict-affected environments.

3. Protection from Violence. Peace operations should protect women

and children from harm; exploitation; discrimination; and abuse, including sexual and
gender-based violence and trafficking in persons and hold perpetrators accountable in
conflict-affected environments.

4. Conflict Prevention. Peace operations support the promotion of

women’s roles in conflict prevention; improve conflict early-warning and response systems
through the integration of gender perspectives; and assist efforts to invest in women’s and
girls’ health, education, and economic opportunity to create conditions for stable societies
and lasting peace.

5. Access to Relief and Recovery. Peace operations support the

distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected disasters and crises. This
includes ensuring safe, equitable access to HA.

(b) Child Protection. Peace operations should set conditions that prevent
children from becoming victims of violence, exploitation, neglect, and abuse and allow
them to grow into healthy and productive adults. Comprising up to fifty percent of the
population, children are particularly vulnerable to armed conflict because their needs for
care are greater, they are dependent upon others to provide that care, and they have greater
vulnerabilities than adults. They particularly suffer from the impact of dislocation and
disruption to their normal lives. Children are exposed to a variety of threats including
malnutrition; disease; psychological harm; separation from or loss of their families;
physical attack; unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO); sexual abuse; child pornography;
abduction; forcible conscription as slaves, laborers, or child-soldiers; or auxiliaries, such
as lookouts, smugglers, suicide bombers, or messengers. Girls are especially marginalized
in some societies and may even be sold into bondage by their families.

1. While the protection of children is a distinct area of focus, it should

also be integrated into all other peace operations activities. The military force primarily
has a supporting role, as other actors are better able to provide for the unique needs of
children. Units may modify their methods and objectives if they know that an adversary’s
forces include child-soldiers.

2. Generally, it is best for children to remain with their immediate or

extended families. This is not always possible, however, and children may end up in foster
homes, orphanages, or gangs or wander alone or in small groups. While many orphanages
are reputable and do their best to care for the resident children, others have squalid
conditions in which children do not receive adequate care and are subjected to exploitation
and abuse. Schools should be an early priority to care for and develop children while
establishing a normal environment for communities.

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Chapter II

3. Child welfare should be deliberately incorporated into peace building

efforts. In addition to improving the current environment, it is an important investment
that will pay dividends as children become adults (often within the timeframe of a peace
operation). It is particularly important to develop institutional capabilities to deal with
children, such as training juvenile specialists within police forces. While military forces
will have limited ability to affect these outcomes directly, they can support and enable the
creation of effective institutions such as schools, orphanages, juvenile justice systems,
recreational opportunities, and medical care. This is done primarily by ensuring a secure
environment within which HN actors, NGOs, and international organizations such as the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) can operate. Military forces can also identify
and report needs, monitor progress, and emphasize the importance of child protection with
HN counterparts. Civil-military task forces may be established to care for and reintegrate
abandoned or abducted children and child-soldiers.

4. Leaders should emphasize the importance of child protection, and

personnel should be trained regarding expected standards of behavior and the situations
they are likely to encounter. The capture of child-soldiers should be addressed in the plan
prior to such operations. For example, child-soldiers that are captured should be separated
from other combatants and given the necessary physical and psychological support to be
reintegrated into society. Unit plans and operations may account for the likelihood that
child-soldiers will be encountered, but the practical impact on tactical operations may be
limited due to the difficulty in determining whether an armed and deadly adversary is a
child or not.

5. Military units may conduct missions that are specifically related to

child protection, such as to secure schools or clear UXO. Other activities, such as routine
patrols, can also support the protection of children by being alert for indicators that child
protection is deficient. These indicators may include the prevalent behavior of children,
the presence of abandoned children or abducted children who have escaped their captors,
and information obtained from interviews. Units should be alert for child abuse in
institutions such as orphanages and hospitals; this can be mitigated by interacting with
patients and orphans while caretakers are not present. In addition to creating the space for
child specialists to work, units can respond to identified problems by coordinating for
necessary civilian support, if reasonably available. For example, many UN missions will
include child protection advisors on their staffs. Ultimately, child abuse should be
addressed as a criminal matter by an HN legal apparatus that is capable of handling such
incidents.

(c) A peace operation should safeguard other groups that may be vulnerable.
Ethnic, religious, and other identity groups may become victims of violent acts including
mass atrocities. DCs may encounter violence when they seek to return and reclaim their
homes. Military forces should anticipate such problems and ensure adequate security is
provided to these groups. This may require physical protection as well as coordination
with other actors and effective CCS.

(2) HN Capacity. Ultimately, the HN must have the capacity to assume the
responsibilities of a peace operation, to include sustaining a safe and secure environment

II-24 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

in which civilians are protected from different threats while fostering good governance, the
rule of law, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. These efforts will depend upon
capable HN actors from the military, police, and civilian sectors. One of the most
significant efforts is the improvement of HN policing, and military forces may be able to
contribute to this and other nonmilitary capacity building activities.

(a) HN capacity has short-term, mid-term, and long-term dimensions;

realistic objectives should be determined accordingly. Plans for immediate HA needs (such
as providing food or creating security units that are comprised of members of an ethnic
group) could differ from lasting developmental goals (such as self-sustaining infrastructure
or security forces that are ethnically integrated and represent the society’s cross-sections).

(b) Military forces will be mostly concerned with the capacities of military
and other security actors, but should not ignore capacities related to non-security sectors.
In some cases, military forces can support other international actors who in turn are
attempting to improve HN institutions. In other cases, military forces may directly assist
in improving HN capacity and capability. One of the objectives of coordination with other
participants should be an increase in collective capacity to protect civilians.

(c) HN actors will have diverse requirements, and military forces may be
limited in their authorities and resources regarding the support they can provide. Generally,
military forces can help build partner capability and capacity in any of the following ways:

1. Provide advisors and mentors. In addition to providing technical

assistance on security affairs, advisors should emphasize such issues as respect for human
rights, the proper treatment of civilians, civil-military relations, and enforcement of the rule
of law.

2. Assist with development of administrative and logistics systems

(such as pay, training, maintenance for security forces).

3. Monitor and, if necessary, restrain other actors regarding protection

of civilians and human rights.

4. Assist with assessing, planning, and monitoring efforts to achieve any

of the peace operation’s objectives.

5. Provide or upgrade facilities and bases from which other actors may
operate.

6. Provide security for other actors.

7. Provide transportation, communications, medical, or other logistics

support to other actors (either on a routine or emergency basis).

8. Provide personnel augmentation to other actors.

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Chapter II

9. Support and reinforce efforts of other participants through CCS and

military engagement.

10. Enable scientific collaboration from the forensics and biometrics

communities.

(3) Technology. Many contingents in multinational peace operations are not

technologically advanced, lacking equipment such as night vision devices and adequate
communications. When they are available, the usefulness of such items is hampered by
lack of adequate training and maintenance systems. UN peace operations have recently
begun improving technological capabilities, and related US contributions can be
particularly valuable.

(a) Monitoring and Surveillance. High-resolution day and night sensors,

radars, and optics can provide early warning of crises and improved situational awareness
on the ground and from the air and space. Some missions may have a limited number of
unmanned aerial systems, though their use may be constrained by the HN.

(b) Protection. Some missions will face asymmetric threats and may need
to employ various technologies to counter IEDs, UASs, and indirect fire weapons.
Technologies may also be employed to support the protection of civilians.

(c) Sustainment. Asset tracking technologies can monitor the status of

inventories and distribution. Emerging energy technologies and water purification and
recycling systems can greatly reduce supply requirements and enable the flexible
repositioning of UN forces in remote areas. Biometrics as a receipt verification protocol
can dramatically limit black marketeering or other fraudulent receipt of relief supplies.

(d) Identity Activities. During peace operations, commanders employ

identity activities to help establish a safe and secure environment, reinstitute proper
governance, and manage resources. Biometrics capabilities support vetting and screening
activities, encourage participation in representative government, enhance physical security
and access, and strengthen efforts to protect the civilian population. It can support rule of
law, victim identification, and response to atrocities.

For more information, refer to Joint Doctrine Note 2-16, Identity Activities.

(e) Nonlethal Weapons. The ROE should address use of nonlethal

weapons, and US forces should be trained in the proper use of all nonlethal weapons to be
employed in the operation. Nonlethal weapons and other means that can create nonlethal
effects can support the commander’s objectives during peace operations.

For more information, refer to ATP 3-22.40 (Field Manual [FM] 3-22.40)/Marine Corps
Tactical Publication (MCTP) 10-10A (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 3-
15.8)/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (CGTTP) 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

II-26 JP 3-07.3
 Planning for Peace Operations

Nonlethal Weapons; JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks; and Army Training Circular
3-19.5, Nonlethal Weapons Training.

3. Challenges

a. Complex environments, mandates, and tasks make peace operations inherently

challenging, especially as there will usually be gaps between the mission’s requirements
and the available resources. Gaps create mission risks, which can be mitigated by
prioritizing objectives, efforts, locations, units to support, vulnerable populations to
protect, and actors to influence; economizing in noncritical areas; flexibility and
adaptability; and measures to improve or increase capabilities and capacities.

b. Corruption may be the biggest obstacle to developing a capable HN that can

eventually assume the responsibilities of a peace operation. Often, a fine line exists
between corrupt activities (such as bribes, misappropriation, and nepotism) and legitimate
practices (such as gifts, reallocation of resources, and patronage) that may have different
levels of cultural acceptability, with varying interpretations among local, international, and
even partner nation actors. Corruption is not just an HN problem, but can also be found in
international organizations including multinational partners, contractors, and others.
Corruption diverts resources from their intended purposes, which can greatly undermine a
peace operation. It also empowers belligerents, threatens responsible actors, and fosters a
culture of impunity rather than a culture of lawfulness.

c. A peace operation may be constrained in its authority and responsibility.

Constraints may include limitations on where operations are conducted, the types of
operations permitted, ROE, restrictions on activities such as intelligence collection or the
ability to conduct investigations, and limited latitude to support some of the nonmilitary
efforts commonly associated with peace building. These constraints may originate from
the mission’s political leadership, the mandate, the political leadership and laws of the
nations that provide forces, SOFAs, and the laws and authorities of the HN.

d. Unity of effort is another common challenge. Military forces can help provide
security so other actors have space within which to operate; ultimately, a successful peace
operation depends upon the effectiveness of police forces and other HN organizations
assisted by international organizations with the necessary nonmilitary expertise. Other
actors should have the lead role for many of the required efforts. This assortment of actors
will have different interests and objectives, and their willingness to cooperate with the
military force will vary. Additionally, they will be responsive to different lines of
authority. Although a comprehensive approach resulting in unity of effort is widely
understood to be vital, achieving it will be a difficult challenge in the best of circumstances.

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Chapter II

Intentionally Blank

II-28 JP 3-07.3
 CHAPTER III
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

“Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”

Dag Hammarskjold
Secretary-General of the United Nations 1953-1961

1. General

PKO consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to

establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The US has participated
in and supported many UN-sponsored PKO.

2. Description of Peacekeeping Operations

a. PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties
to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before
PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire must be in effect, and the parties to the dispute
must consent to the operation. PKO are conducted in an open and highly conspicuous
manner (transparency). A main function of the PKO force is to establish a presence that
inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace
process. PKO support continuing peace building efforts to achieve long-term political
settlements and normalized peaceful relations. The US may participate in PKO as a lead
nation, as a contingent force, unilaterally, or by providing staff officers or United Nations
military experts on mission (UNMEMs). These personnel may be categorized as UN
military observers, UN military LNOs, or UN military advisors.

b. Once the UNSC mandates a PKO, the UN generally requires at least six months to
generate and deploy forces to the OA. As such, a single nation or multinational bridging
force is often necessary to maintain stability until the UN reaches full operational
capability. Bridging forces can be generated from a group of nations operating from a
common interest (with one country often designated as lead nation); a regional security
organization, such as NATO, AU, or EU; or a single national contingent. Political will and
national interest play large roles in a nation’s level of participation in a PKO or bridging
force. Often, the same nations participating in a bridging force will continue to serve in
the UN PKO. C2 poses the biggest challenge when shifting from the conflict period to the
bridging force and finally to the UN.

3. Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations

a. Consent. PKO require an invitation or, at a minimum, consent of all the major
parties to the conflict. The peacekeeping force remains effective only with this consent,
which includes recognition of the host government’s authority.

b. Restraint and Minimum Force. Peacekeeping forces are restricted to using force
only in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. A major challenge during peacekeeping

III-1
Chapter III

is effectively dealing with situations of extreme tension and violence without becoming a
party to the conflict. When the OE does not permit restraint, a mission change or a mandate
change should be requested.

c. Impartiality, Credibility, and Legitimacy. While a peacekeeping force is

impartial to a dispute, it may be mandated to support the improvement of host government
capacity. This can be problematic if the peacekeeping force is perceived as favoring one
of the parties concerned, as the trust of the other party will be compromised or lost. Once
lost, the peacekeeping force will find it difficult to implement the mandate. Demonstrated
impartiality is essential to establish and maintain the legitimacy of the PKO.

4. Peacekeeping Personnel and Peace Operations Forces

US military personnel may perform a wide variety of peacekeeping functions. They

may be detailed to serve on a UN staff or other multinational staff or as a UNMEM. The
US may also participate in peacekeeping by providing officers to United Nations
Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York.

a. UNMEMs are traditionally deployed unarmed to observe, record, and report, and
are prohibited from bringing Service or privately owned weapons and ammunition into the
mission area. Decisions authorizing exceptions to this practice are made at UNHQ in New
York, following a request from the HOM through the United Nations Secretary-General
(UNSG), based on a security risk assessment. Military observers serve as members of an
observer group and carry out such tasks as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local
negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations. Their presence is intended to
be sufficient to deter violations. By providing accurate, up-to-date, and impartial reports,
UNMEMs help reduce the number of claims and counterclaims by the disputing parties.
UNMEMs rely strongly on their impartial status and a permissive peacekeeping
environment. In scenarios where a military force is also present, the UNMEMs work in
conjunction with the military force but usually in a separate observer or advisory
organizations reporting to the force HQ. The Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) is the
DOD executive agent for DOD personnel support to UN missions, IAW DODD 2065.01E,
DOD Personnel Support to the United Nations. As such, SECARMY is responsible for
the administration of personnel support to the United States Military Observer Group
(USMOG). DODD 2065.01E charges the SECARMY with the following in relation to
DOD personnel supporting the UN:

(1) Oversees all DOD personnel assigned to the UN through the Commander,
USMOG, so mission requirements, administrative requirements or control, and logistics
demands of the personnel are met.

(2) The USMOG Commander, acting on behalf of SECARMY, assumes

responsibility for implementation. When directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, SECARMY coordinates with the Secretaries of other Military Departments and
heads of DOD agencies to provide personnel to support peace operations. US UNMEMs
perform observer duties under the control of the observer group chief of staff (COS) or
commander designated by the sponsoring organization. When detailed as UNMEMs, US

III-2 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

personnel do not normally report to the GCC. Pursuant to Department of Defense

Instruction (DODI) 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, GCCs exercise tactical
control for FP for DOD personnel assigned to the UN in their respective geographic areas
of responsibility.

b. The force size and mix will vary depending on the mission, mandate, and threat in
the OA. Peacekeeping forces may include units or personnel with specialized abilities such
as language skills, engineering, decontamination, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
identity activities (forensic-enabled intelligence, biometrics-enabled intelligence,
document and media exploitation), military information support operations (MISO), and
civil affairs (CA) operations. Peacekeeping forces should be mobile, capable of self-
defense, and self-sufficient until logistic resupply channels can be established. The JFC
should ensure there are sufficient female personnel across those forces. Additionally, the
JFC should advocate for sufficient female personnel from the PCC.

(1) Ground forces may supervise or assist in the separation of opposing sides to
establish a buffer zone (BZ) or demilitarized zone (DMZ). The peacekeeping force
controls and surveys the line of demarcation, which facilitates the disengagement and
withdrawal of disputing party forces, discourages infiltration confrontations, and assists in
resolving local disputes. Ground operations will involve observation and monitoring of
military and paramilitary units within a specified area. Military police (MP)/security force
units, in particular, have experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances while
controlling escalation. Their image as a police force, rather than a combat force, may help
defuse tensions. Ground force support capabilities include those in Figure III-1.

Ground Force Support Capabilities

 Observing, monitoring, and reporting  Supervising truces and cease fires

 Maintaining public order and  Intelligence, surveillance, and
protecting civilians and public reconnaissance
officials
 Crowd control
 Support to elections
 Negotiation and mediation
 Delivery and protection of
humanitarian assistance efforts
 Interposition between parties to the
conflict
 Manning of checkpoints and
patrolling
 Demobilization and disarmament

 Force protection
 Personnel recovery

 Medical support
 Inspection of facilities

 Limited construction of critical

 Training
infrastructure  Operational contract support

Figure III-1. Ground Force Support Capabilities

III-3
Chapter III

(2) Air forces conduct air and space operations, which provide the speed, range,
and flexibility to rapidly cover large areas. Air forces can meet a wide range of
peacekeeping operational requirements. These include the air forces’ support capabilities
listed in Figure III-2.

(3) Maritime forces provide support capabilities listed in Figure III-3. They
support the HN in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the coastline, and support to
build the HN’s maritime capabilities. They also conduct or augment ground and air forces
support capabilities (e.g., delivery of humanitarian aid, combat air patrol, intelligence
collection, medical evacuation, personnel recovery [PR]). Additionally, maritime forces
can provide harbor movement control and port security to safeguard vessels, harbors,
waterfront facilities, and cargo. Maritime forces may also conduct operations on inland
waterways. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) may provide additional support
capabilities to improve port security capacity and maritime governance through its
International Port Security Program. Activities to improve port security are conducted by
many entities including other USG departments and agencies and international
organizations. Additionally, the International Port Security Program helps present a
principal face to international trading partners who are often confused by the myriad of
security inspections (e.g., customs, agriculture, or immigration) by various entities.

For more information on medical evacuation, see DODI 6000.11, Patient Movement, and
DODI 4515.13, Air Transportation Eligibility, for guidance on movement of non-DOD
traffic on DOD transportation assets. For more information on the USCG’s International
Port Security Program, see Commandant Instruction 16618.7, International Port Security
Program.

(4) Special operations forces (SOF) can play a significant role in peacekeeping
because of their unique capabilities, training, and experience. SOF often have detailed

Air Forces Support Capabilities

 Airlift  Airspace control

 Intelligence collection capabilities  Early warning of hostile actions
 Command and control of air  Delivery of humanitarian aid
operations
 Aeromedical evacuation
 Communications and information
gathering
 Deterrence of hostile actions

 Aerial refueling
 Protection

 Personnel recovery
 Logistics

 Air traffic control support

 Resupply

 Joint fire support

 Airfield operations

 Combat air patrol

 Positioning, navigation, and timing

Figure III-2. Air Forces Support Capabilities

III-4 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

Maritime Forces Support Capabilities

 Port security and port safety  Maritime search and rescue

services
 Medical treatment and holding
 Sea control and harbor defense
services
 Coastal and riverine patrol and
surveillance
 Maritime law enforcement
 Seabasing
 Environmental protection and
pollution prevention, migration,
 Escort for shipping
monitoring, and response  Neutral location for negotiations
 Vessel traffic control and aids to  Protection of offshore and onshore
navigation assets
 Reflagging of merchant vessels  Maritime interception operations
 Training (law enforcement, search  Monitor and enforce exclusive
and rescue, environmental economic zones
protection, port safety and security,
waterway management, and  Mining operations and clearing
maritime safety) waterborne minefields
 Port visits  Secure holding facility

Figure III-3. Maritime Forces Support Capabilities

regional knowledge of cultures and languages, as well as experience working with

indigenous forces. In working by, with, and through local partners, SOF can make
significant additions to the intelligence picture for the commander. SOF can form small,
versatile, self-contained units that can rapidly deploy and provide a full spectrum of air,
ground, and maritime support with links to space-based assets. SOF capabilities are
particularly important in peacekeeping to enable an understanding of the complexity of
operating in cross-cultural environments. SOF, when properly directed, can support
sensitive missions such as reconnaissance and capture operations targeting war crimes
suspects. Due to limited numbers of SOF personnel and high demand for their use,
commanders should ensure tasks are appropriate for SOF employment.

For further guidance on special operations capabilities, refer to JP 3-05, Special

Operations.

(5) MISO can assist in facilitating cooperation between the disputing parties,
their supporters, and the peacekeeping force. MISO can help create favorable attitudes and
behavior on the part of disputing parties and uncommitted segments of the population. For
example, MISO may provide the capability to develop, produce, and disseminate a wide
variety of products to inform all parties about the role of the peacekeeping force, the
requirements of the mandate, locations of critical services, and information that can assist
in bridging cross-cultural gaps between peacekeeping forces and indigenous populations.

For additional information on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support

Operations, and CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

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Chapter III

(6) In peacekeeping, CMO are conducted to foster a cooperative relationship

between military forces, participating civilian organizations, and the governments and
populations within the OA. When conducting CMO, the commander may employ a
number of military capabilities with many different indigenous populations and
institutions, international organizations, NGOs, and HN organizations. Among these
capabilities are military information support (MIS) teams and CA forces. CA assist
commanders in conducting CMO and are technically qualified and experienced in six
functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and
welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. CA teams can provide the
following support: area assessments (including input of all applicable data into the
commander’s common operational picture); cultural awareness training; liaison and
coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous forces; advice and assistance in
handling DCs; coordination of host-nation support (HNS); and the establishment of
CMOCs. CMO require careful consideration and planning to prevent the risk of appearing
partial to one or more disputing parties.

For additional information on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

5. Peacekeeping Tasks

Peacekeeping tasks usually involve observing and monitoring compliance with a peace
agreement. Depending on the mandate, a peacekeeping mission may also be tasked to
protect civilians, support the provision of HA, and support nation-building efforts.

a. Observation and Monitoring. Observation and monitoring tasks are performed

primarily by unarmed UNMEMs, but may also be performed by other peacekeeping forces.
In either case, they help ensure the agreements are followed by the parties to the dispute.
UN observer groups may also use civilian personnel or police as observers. The success
of these missions depends on the willingness of the disputing parties to comply with the
terms of the accord or agreement. This willingness may exist because UNMEMs have
established a visible presence and are able to detect violations of agreements. Typical
observation activities include:

(1) Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violation of

the governing agreements. Agreements may include treaties, truces, cease fires, arms
control agreements, or any other binding agreements between the disputing parties.

(2) Investigating alleged ceasefire violations, boundary incidents, and

complaints. This may include incidents, unauthorized troop movements, and construction
or reinforcing of defensive positions. An investigation provides evidence regarding
violations of the agreements and may involve negotiation or mediation, to include direct
dialogue between the disputing parties.

(3) Negotiating and mediating. UNMEMs may undertake negotiations on

behalf of the disputing parties to mediate low-level disputes. Reconciliation of differences
at the lowest possible level often contributes to the overall success of the peacekeeping
mission.

III-6 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

(4) Conducting regular liaison visits within the OA. Disputes thrive on
rumors, uncertainty, and prejudice. Liaison visits establish a presence to build confidence
in the agreement, maintain personal contact, and allow for a timely and routine exchange
of information with disputing parties, the HN, local civilian officials, NGOs, international
organizations, the peacekeeping mission, and other actors.

(5) Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces

within the OA. This requires periodically visiting forward positions to observe and report
on the disposition of forces of the disputing parties.

(6) Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military

equipment specified in the relevant agreements.

b. Supervision and Assistance. Peacekeeping forces undertaking these tasks require,

in most cases, large service-support organizations, equipment, and finances. In addition to
the tasks performed by UNMEMs in observation missions, peacekeeping forces may
perform the tasks described below:

(1) Supervising ceasefires. Once a ceasefire is arranged, peacekeeping forces

may observe and report on the disputing parties’ compliance with a ceasefire. If the
mandate so specifies, the force may have to deploy on the territory of more than one nation
to perform its mission. The tempo and outcome of diplomatic activities taken to establish
a credible ceasefire are often unpredictable, and negotiations to constitute and insert a
peacekeeping force may occur simultaneously.

(2) Supervising disengagements and withdrawals. If required, establishment

of a BZ between disputed parties is a high priority to help ensure an uneventful
disengagement and withdrawal. Peacekeeping forces may mediate disagreements in the
positioning of the disputing parties’ forces, verify troop and equipment dispositions, and,
if authorized, provide assistance to the civilian population in the BZ.

(3) Supervising detainee exchanges. At any stage in the resolution of a dispute,

peacekeeping forces may supervise and assist in detainee exchanges between the parties.

(4) Supervising demobilization and demilitarization. The parties to the

dispute may agree to demobilization or demilitarization of their forces. Peacekeeping
forces may supervise and assist in these activities and provide progress reports to the
sponsoring organization.

(5) Assisting civil authorities. Peacekeeping forces may assist civil authorities
in such functions as supervision of elections, establishment or restoration of the rule of law,
transfer of authority, partitioning of territory, evacuation, convoy escort, or the temporary
administration of civil functions. CA units, in coordination with the CMOC, can provide
advice and assistance in the execution of these functions.

(6) Assisting in the maintenance of public order. Peacekeeping forces may

assist in the reestablishment or maintenance of public order. The responsibility for public
order rests primarily with civilian police. However, military assistance may be required if

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Chapter III

there has been a breakdown in the civil police structure or if the situation exceeds the
police’s capacity to control it.

(7) Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. Although

FHA is not a peace operation, it may be necessary for peacekeeping forces to provide
security for, as well as to supervise the offloading and transfer of HA supplies until FHA
operations are fully established. It may also be necessary for peacekeeping forces to
provide transportation, security, or communication support for international organizations,
NGOs, and other agencies. CA teams provide the commander a resource to plan,
coordinate, and improve new or existing assistance programs in support of FHA.

For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

6. Command and Control for Peacekeeping Operations

C2 relationships are established prior to the PKO in the appropriate operation plan
(OPLAN), order, directive, or other authoritative correspondence. With continual mission
analysis and revised plans crucial in any military operation, the C2 relationships may be
adjusted to the situation.

a. US Policy. The President retains command authority over US forces assigned as a

contingent to a multinational peacekeeping force. The US contingent commander remains
within the US chain of command. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider
placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a multinational force commander
(MNFC).

b. UN Policy. UN PKO are established by the UNSC and fall under its authority.
The UNSG reports to the UNSC on the organization, conduct, and direction of the
operation. The UNSG implements UNSCRs or mandates and monitors all UN
peacekeeping missions. The UNSG will appoint a UN peacekeeping force commander and
a UN HOM. The force commander is a military officer from a nation not involved in the
dispute, whose qualifications are acceptable to the UNSC. Additionally, the force
commander must also be acceptable to the HN and all the parties to the dispute.

(1) The HOM is normally a professional diplomat and is frequently designated

as the SRSG. The UN peace operations force commander is responsible to the HOM for
ensuring military activities support the mission.

(2) The US contingent commander may be under the OPCON of the UN

commander. However, US forces will remain within the US chain of command.

c. MNF HQ. Although the UN has standard organizations for force HQ, each will
likely have some unique features. A force HQ staff is normally organized as follows:

(1) The MNFC’s personal staff normally consists of a military assistant; a legal
adviser; medical adviser; a military public information officer; a provost marshal; a chief
security advisor; and specialists on gender, child protection, and conflict-related sexual
violence. Each MNFC will also normally have a deputy commander.

III-8 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

(2) The MNF military staff normally consists of a COS; a deputy COS; and
functional staff elements such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans,
communications, training, engineer, and civil-military coordination. The military staff
may also include air operations, maritime operations, LNOs, and other functions.
Linguists, interpreters, and translators should be included to facilitate communications.
Smaller missions will normally have a deputy COS for operations, and larger missions will
likely have deputy COSs for operations, operations support, and personnel, evaluation, and
training.

(3) The civilian staff, provided by the UN Secretariat in New York, at a

minimum, consists of a chief administrative officer. The chief administrative officer is
responsible for the direction of all administrative matters having financial management
implications, as well as for the overall direction of the force’s administration.

For more information on UN military staff organization and procedures, refer to the
UNDPKO/UNDFS Force Headquarters Handbook.

d. Command. The MNFC may be given OPCON over US and other military units
assigned to the peacekeeping force. The MNFC will ensure the national contingent
commanders perform assigned tasks consistent with the mandate and the peacekeeping
force’s mission.

(1) A national contingent consists of a nation’s entire contribution. National

contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary action within their own
contingents, IAW their national military law. The authority for national contingent
commanders to carry out their national laws in the HN’s territory should be included in the
SOFA and/or SOMA for the peacekeeping mission. The MNFC may discuss a major
disciplinary breach with a contingent commander or, if applicable and warranted, may refer
the matter to the SRSG.

(2) Each contingent commander is responsible for accomplishing assigned tasks,

communicating changes in the situation, and responding to the needs and the directives of
the MNFC. Figure C-1 in Appendix C, “Command Relationships,” shows a notional chain
of command for a peacekeeping mission.

e. Commander’s Directive. The MNFC’s directive should clearly outline who is

empowered to give orders to contingents and under what circumstances. US contingent
commanders may issue directives based on their own mission analysis and the MNFC’s
directive. An MNFC’s directive should include:

(1) The degree of C2 the MNFC has over national contingents by covering such
topics as:

(a) Appointment and authority of the peacekeeping force commander.

(b) Applicability of national laws and regulations to personnel in the various

contingents.

III-9
Chapter III

(c) Support responsibilities and procedures.

(2) Appointment of subordinate commanders, especially those detached from the

main body.

(3) Individuals authorized to issue directives and instructions to the unit, as well
as under what circumstances.

(4) Subunit OAs and tasks.

(5) Methods of operation and deployment.

(6) Reserve forces.

(7) States of readiness.

(8) Succession to command.

(9) Location of forces and unit HQ.

(10) Peace operations force composition.

(11) Identification; for example, the wearing of peace operations force distinctive
identification (headgear, badges, and armbands) and marking of vehicles and positions.

(12) Duration of duty and policies on liberty and rest and recuperation (R&R).

(13) Relationship with the host government; its local administration, armed
forces, and police; and other organizations and agencies in the OA.

(14) Powers of search and seizure and rights of entry.

(15) Media relations, including guidance on when and through whom operational
information may be provided.

(16) FP measures, to include information and communications security.

(17) Off-duty regulations and restrictions.

(18) Biometric sharing agreements.

7. Peacekeeping Planning Considerations

a. The mandate, TOR, and SOFA or SOMA are important sources of information for
mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable
insights by reviewing the lessons learned from previous PKO or training exercises. PKO
may be initiated on relatively short notice, requiring extraordinary effort to develop a
complete plan, identify, and build a HQ staff.

III-10 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

b. SOPs for PKOs are especially useful given their extended duration, multinational
contingent participation, and specific cultural and environmental considerations.

c. When practical, the JFC should consider having the staff develop an area
information handbook to orient joint force members to the mission; OA; history of the
conflict and its parties, religious, cultural, and economic factors; and other important
information about the environment in which they will be operating. Other sources include
country team personnel, PA, intelligence personnel, foreign area officers, CMO, MISO,
and SOF.

d. Successful planning and employment requires detailed coordination at all levels.

Therefore, LNOs should be identified to assist the commander and staff as they coordinate
plans and actions among the peacekeeping contingents, the UN or other international
organizations, NGOs, other agencies, and local authorities. The latter may include military
leaders, local officials, customs, transportation authorities, and police. A CMOC provides
a venue for coordination between the military and these organizations.

e. Logistics. There are some differences in how logistic support is provided in PKO.
Consequently, logisticians’ involvement in the planning process from the very beginning
will help to ensure mission success. The ad hoc and multinational nature of PKO demands
careful and detailed logistic planning. This is particularly true in UN-sponsored PKO.

(1) In UN PKO, the deployed elements of UNDFS comprise a mission support

directorate that makes arrangements for goods and services common to all the contingents,
such as for water, some food items, fuel, and billeting. It may be provided directly or
reimbursed. However, the UN requires time to contract for this support. Consequently,
and to the extent possible, when peacekeeping forces initially deploy, they should be self-
sufficient for a minimum of 60 days. National contingents are responsible for all logistic
support that is unique to their requirements. Normally, US forces will be supported through
a combination of scheduled US resupply, contracted support, HNS, and UN logistic
support. Other logistic considerations for multinational operations include the possibility
of role specialization and a lead nation provider for certain classes of supply or services.

(2) In non-UN-sponsored operations, a single nation may be responsible for

planning and coordinating logistic support for the peacekeeping force. For example, in the
MNF and observers in the Sinai Peninsula, the US is responsible for logistic support to all
national contingents, to include supply, transportation, maintenance, communications,
small arms maintenance, movement control, financial management, postal, health services,
EOD, and mortuary affairs. However, many of these requirements may be satisfied
through commercial contracts and require reimbursements from the participating or
requesting nations or agencies.

For more information on US role in health service support during humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations, see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(3) OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and
construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations through the

III-11
Chapter III

related contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management

functions. Planning for contracted support has also become increasingly critical due to the
recognition that, in some operations, supplies and services delivered through contracts
may, when planned and executed properly, have positive impacts on the civil-military
aspects of the operation or campaign. OCS will generally be necessary in PKO and may
include theater support contracting through a Service or joint contingency contracting
support organization or from a Service management external support contract such as the
Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Navy Global Contingency
Construction Multiple Award Contract and Global Contingency Service Multiple Award
Contract, or the Air Force’s contract augmentation program. Effective advance parties
include contracting personnel to assure the necessary level of support for the US contingent
force. Planners should also be aware that, in some regions, reliability and timeliness of
contractor performance may not be the same as in developed areas. When the US
participates in UN PKO, direct coordination between US military planning staffs and UN
planners should be authorized to ensure effective and responsive support to US forces.
While various countries have their own contracting authorities and funding, efficiencies
may be realized through the co-location of contracting offices. Additionally, the use of
contractors includes contractor management for the oversight of contractor personnel and
associated equipment.

For further guidance on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(4) For UN PKO, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the
UN. The UN issues detailed guidance explaining the logistic support provided by the UN
and the procedures for participating nations to follow to receive reimbursement for other
support. US units that participate in UN PKO must provide a detailed accounting for all
costs incurred in the operations to justify UN reimbursement. UN and US or MNF
standards for various types of logistic support may be different, and special costs and
complications may ensue. Early determination of these differences is important and
specific agreements should spell out exactly who is to provide specified support to whom,
for what period, and in what quantities. CA and CMO staff should be involved in
coordinating and tracking any logistics or logistics activities involving HN or civilian
personnel.

(5) PKO are often conducted in austere theaters where there may be limited or
inadequate air and seaport facilities. If the HN has insufficient capability or capacity to
support offloading at their ports, US support personnel should deploy before the scheduled
arrival of the US contingent force. In some cases, existing facilities may require expansion
or new facilities constructed to handle incoming forces. It may also require joint logistics
over-the-shore operations. Repositioning of additional materials handling equipment may
also be necessary.

(6) Logistic planners will also determine if existing bilateral HNS agreements
containing logistic support provisions applicable to the sustainment of US contingent
forces are adequate. If not in existence, logisticians should be actively involved in their
formulation—a process that may take 12-24 months. Activation of HNS agreements are

III-12 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

not necessarily automatic during PKO. Approval by the concerned governments may be
necessary.

For detailed information on multinational logistic planning, refer to JP 4-08, Logistics in

Support of Multinational Operations.

f. Intelligence and Information Gathering. The overt collection of information that

is readily available or observable can provide significant intelligence. Use of the term
“intelligence” in the context of UN peacekeeping can be politically sensitive. However,
the UN recognizes the value of focused, fused information analysis to enhance the MNFC’s
situational awareness. Intelligence support can also assess the needs of the population;
infrastructure; and the effects of politics, history, and culture. Commanders and their staffs
should seek to share information and intelligence, within appropriate guidelines and
OPSEC considerations, with other contingents of the multinational peacekeeping force,
and selected international organizations and NGOs, while protecting sources and methods.

For further guidance on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

g. Communication Systems. Attention to cybersecurity during the planning phase

will facilitate cross domain (network) information transfer and decrease the potential for
DOD system compromises. Units must protect systems even in unclassified peacekeeping
environments. Additionally, interoperability and bandwidth requirements and capabilities
should be addressed.

For additional information, see JP 6-0, Joint Communication Systems.

h. FP. FP is a high priority for a deployed peacekeeping force. Strict impartiality, as

previously mentioned, may reduce the threat to the force. ROE are also essential to provide
for appropriate action to protect the force. The US contingent commander sets and enforces
standards of physical security for US forces in coordination with the peace operations force
commander and the supported CCDR. Some FP considerations include the following:

(1) Coordination with HN civil police, supporting MP units, CA teams, and MIS
units.

(2) Terrorism poses serious threats for the peacekeeping mission. Effective
antiterrorism (AT) training and measures should be planned and executed to reduce this
threat. Adequate precautions will protect personnel, positions, HQ, transportation assets,
infrastructure, facilities, and billets.

For further guidance on AT, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

(3) The peacekeeping force may become a target for criminal activity or
dissatisfied or desperate people.

(4) Vulnerability to attacks with mines, IEDs, UASs, rocket propelled grenades,
or indirect fires.

III-13
Chapter III

(5) Peacekeeping forces may have limited ability to check the backgrounds of
local employees. US law prohibits providing funds to the enemy per Title 10, United States
Code (USC), Section 2302.

(6) Peacekeeping forces may have limited communications-security capabilities.

(7) The FP plan should be modified at irregular intervals to avoid predictable

behavior patterns that can be exploited by adversaries.

(8) Units should plan and train for PR scenarios.

For further guidance on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(9) Units should be trained with capabilities that produce lethal and nonlethal
effects to enable escalation of force and FP.

(10) Commanders and staffs should consider protection measures necessary to

mitigate adverse effects to personnel, equipment, and critical assets from chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards and toxic industrial materials. The
risk to the force could stem from CBRN attacks or supporting the final disposition of
contaminated or infected human remains.

For further guidance on CBRN, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

i. Peacekeeping Reserve Forces. Although a multinational peacekeeping force may

designate a reserve force, the US contingent commander may also designate a US reserve.
Reserves should be sufficiently armed, trained, equipped, funded, advantageously located,
and mobile. When employed, the reserve will normally deploy in a high-profile,
nontactical manner with the UN or MNF force markings or flags clearly displayed.

j. Contingency Planning. Contingency planning in peacekeeping missions is

challenging because UN organizations typically do not have robust planning staffs.
Additionally, UN organizations are reluctant to formally consider politically sensitive,
hypothetical scenarios, particularly if doing so would undermine HN consent or
perceptions of the UN’s impartiality. Peacekeeping forces may develop plans and SOPs
for different states of readiness and potential situations such as evacuation, response to
disasters, handling of displaced persons, or other situations.

(1) The peacekeeping force HQ will normally have three states of readiness:
normal vigilance, increased vigilance, and full alert. Each increase in the state of readiness
will be complemented by restrictions on R&R, training, and certain operations. Changes
in the states of readiness are normally implemented only by the peacekeeping force
commander. In an emergency, a US contingent commander may order a higher state of
readiness, but must immediately inform the peacekeeping force HQ.

(2) A peacekeeping force may need to be evacuated if armed conflict breaks out
or the disputing parties withdraw consent. This may occur in part of the mission area and

III-14 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

evacuation of the entire force may be ordered by the appropriate authority, in extreme
situations. If ordered to evacuate, the peacekeeping force commander is responsible for
the safe and timely evacuation of the peacekeeping force, visitors, observer groups in the
area, and personnel affiliated with the sponsoring organization. The peacekeeping force
may also be directed to evacuate other personnel such as humanitarian workers, third
country nationals, or HN persons at risk. The US contingent commander plans for the
possibility the US contingent may need to be evacuated unilaterally. In this instance, the
US contingent commander coordinates with the peacekeeping force HQ to determine if the
contingent’s positions and tasks are to be transferred to another organization or abandoned.
The US contingent commander coordinates evacuation plans with the supported GCC who
has responsibility to evacuate the US contingent. Evacuation plans include specific
instructions for destroying critical items, equipment, and other assets that cannot be
removed. Every attempt should be made to evacuate medical supplies and equipment.
Those items which cannot be evacuated will be abandoned; however, such abandonment
is a command decision. Medical supplies and equipment are protected under the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions and may not be intentionally destroyed.

(3) Contingency plans may be developed to address response procedures for

potential natural or man-made disasters. CA and MISO can provide the interaction with
civilian authorities and relevant indigenous populations and institutions. Personnel
accountability procedures should also be addressed for all personnel, including military,
DOD civilians, and civilian contractors under their control.

(4) DCs can pose significant challenges, and contingency plans for any
emergency should address the likelihood of increased numbers of DCs. The TORs and
SOPs should include considerations for DC support. Commanders must determine the
capability of care required to support these operations, especially preventive medicine, and
should consider the fiscal authority to render HA. A determination must be made regarding
the eligibility of personnel for care by the peacekeeping force. MP, CA teams, and MIS
teams are trained to assist in these activities.

For more information on DCs, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(5) Handling of requests for asylum should be outlined in the peacekeeping force
SOPs or other documents available to commanders. Granting requests for asylum can
compromise the impartiality of the peacekeeping force.

(6) Mass Atrocities. A peacekeeping force may be required to prevent or

respond to mass atrocity situations, possibly to take action against perpetrators if authorized
by the mandate. In most recent UN missions, peacekeepers are mandated to protect
civilians within their capabilities and areas of employment.

See Appendix B, “Protection of Civilians,” for additional information on MARO.

k. Special Considerations. A number of special considerations apply to PKO.

(1) Peacekeeping personnel will be required to conduct many independent

actions with a high degree of professionalism, self-discipline, flexibility, patience, and tact.

III-15
Chapter III

(2) Peacekeeping personnel will encounter differences in cultural norms, work

ethics, and standards of professionalism among other national contingents; these
differences require understanding and respect. National participants in peacekeeping
missions are expected to conform to UN standards of conduct. However, US forces must
always comply with US standards based on US law and regulations, even where more
relaxed UN standards exist.

(3) The peacekeeping force will have an impact on the local economy. Although
the presence of the peacekeeping force may stimulate growth in the local economy,
commanders must also be aware of the potential negative impacts on the economy,
including after the peacekeeping force departs. Policies may be developed to reduce these
impacts, such as regulating the amount of dollars US personnel are allowed to convert to
local currency and paying local civilians hired to support the US contingent force the
prevailing wages for the area. The policy on leave, pass, liberty, and R&R should also
consider these economic impacts.

(4) Peacekeeping forces may wish to avoid the development of elaborate base
camps and support facilities that could lead to a perception of a planned permanent
presence by the local population.

(5) Coordination with other USG departments and agencies, international

organizations, NGOs, civil society organizations, and UN agencies will be an important
part of the PKO.

(6) Medical assistance to the local population or other contingents may become
part of the mission, requiring advanced planning for legality and procedures, as well as
avoidance of marked improvements to quality of life that would not be sustained following
conclusion of the peace operation.

For more information on US role in medical support planning with progression of PKO,
see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(7) Nonlethal weapons give commanders a wide array of options in developing

and implementing measured responses to a given situation. Use of nonlethal weapons
requires special training to ensure they are properly used and effectively integrated with
lethal weapons and other capabilities. Nonlethal weapon usage during any escalation of
force situation may reduce HN civilian casualties, which is of strategic importance due to
the nature of the PKO and the need for forces to gain the trust of the local citizens.

For more information on the employment of nonlethal weapons, refer to ATP 3-22.40 (FM
3-22.40)/MCTP 10-10A (MCWP 3-15.8)/NTTP 3-07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGTTP 3-93.2,
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nonlethal Weapons.

8. Employment

a. PKO include separation of the parties to the dispute, patrolling, and observing and
reporting on compliance with or violations of agreements. Peacekeeping forces must have

III-16 JP 3-07.3
 Peacekeeping Operations

freedom of movement and open access to observe, monitor, and verify the conditions of
the governing agreements.

b. A peacekeeping force may be employed in one of two ways: each national

contingent is allocated to a specific OA, or the national contingents rotate among the OAs.
Normally, the former method is preferred. Peacekeeping depends on accurate human
intelligence (HUMINT) and other information derived from the civilian population, which
require time and involve the entire peacekeeping force.

(1) Assignment to a Specific OA

(a) The key advantage to this approach is that each national contingent
develops in-depth knowledge of the terrain and community in its specific OA. This results
in continuity in collecting and processing information. Additionally, useful relationships
are developed with the local authorities of the host government, police, and leadership of
the parties to the dispute. Peacekeeping forces become attuned to the normal activities in
the area and consequently can quickly detect changes to normal routines. Forces become
well-acquainted with the local forces and are able to recognize and prohibit military
personnel of the opposing forces from passing through checkpoints.

(b) The disadvantage is that national contingents may become overly

familiar with the people in the area due to habitual contact and as a result may liberally
interpret agreements and enforcement policies in their OA. This may lead to a perception
of partiality and compromise mission accomplishment. If actual or perceived inequities
exist, the parties to the dispute may request an exchange of contingent forces. An
additional risk is that, over time, the force may become complacent in its tactical mission
execution.

(2) Rotation Among OAs

(a) The key advantage is that each contingent obtains a working knowledge
of more than one area. The potential for forces to become overly familiar with parties to
the dispute is also reduced.

(b) There are several disadvantages. A national contingent may not have
sufficient time to acquire an in-depth knowledge of the area or community. Important
background information gathered by a national contingent may not be effectively passed
to succeeding national contingents due to language differences and different ways of
operating. Rotation may also disrupt logistic operations and HUMINT collection efforts.
With each rotation of national contingents, even slight differences in how the peacekeepers
operate may cause concern among the local populace.

c. Separation of Parties to the Dispute. Many PKO will require the contingent
forces to supervise the orderly disengagement and withdrawal of the parties to the dispute.
Direct intervention by peacekeeping forces may be required to defuse sensitive or
potentially explosive situations. It will also give the disputing parties the confidence that
their withdrawal will not be exploited by other parties.

III-17
Chapter III

For additional information, see ATP 3-07.31/MCTP 3-03B (MCWP 3-33.8)/AFTTP 3-

2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

III-18 JP 3-07.3
 CHAPTER IV
PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

“Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it.”

Theodore Roosevelt
June 2, 1897

1. Description of Peace Enforcement Operations

a. PEO are conducted IAW a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order
when consent by a major party to a conflict is absent. They may include the enforcement
of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel providing FHA, restoration of
order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. Peace enforcement may be conducted
pursuant to a lawful mandate or IAW international law and do not require the consent of
the HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. PEO use
force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions.
Force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore
order, and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although combat
operations may be required, PEO are not necessarily classified as major combat operations
and normally have more restrictive ROE. Forces generally have full combat capabilities,
although there may be some restrictions on weaponeering and targeting.

For more information on targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

b. Peace enforcement is normally governed by UN Charter Chapter VII (Action with

Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), and
conducted by a regional organization or lead nation designated by the UN. In rare
situations, PEO may be conducted under the basis of collective self-defense by a regional
organization, a lead nation-led coalition, or unilaterally by the US because they do not
require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, and to that end, they may appear
to disregard state sovereignty.

c. In PEO, the use of force is not limited to self-defense and includes the use of force
to implement UNSC mandates. Protection of civilians is a likely component of such
mandates authorizing the use of force, and may be the mission’s primary objective.
Mission-specific ROE define the manner in which force should be applied.

d. Where PEO occur within the context of an international or non-international armed

conflict, the law of war will govern the conduct of all parties, including uses of force and
treatment of any detainees.

Further guidance on the law of war can be found in DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War
Program, and the Department of Defense Law of War Manual.

e. Contingent forces may have to fight their way into the conflict area and use force
to physically separate the combatants.

IV-1
Chapter IV

f. The OA will normally include civilians who pose special considerations such as
threat identification, collateral damage, civilian casualty mitigation, and other issues
associated with DCs.

g. Commanders must consider several factors in multinational PEO. Some

multinational partners may not have a vital national interest at stake in the conflict or may
face certain dilemmas regarding their involvement. Consequently, the partners’ resolve
may be reduced by factors such as casualties, protracted involvement, or financial costs.
Some MNFs may not possess sufficient military capacity or capabilities to conduct
effective peace enforcement. The challenge to the commander is to constitute a force
capable of coordinated and sustained operations, as required.

2. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations

In conjunction with the fundamentals already discussed in Chapter I, “Overview,” the

following caveats apply specifically to PEO:

a. Consent. Consent of the parties to the dispute is not a prerequisite for peace
enforcement, although some parties may extend it. While such consent should translate to
the tactical level, it may not be observed by independent local groups or those that do not
abide by their higher leaders’ decisions.

b. Impartiality. This fundamental still requires the force to act on behalf of the peace
process and mandate. Because peace enforcement entails coercion against some parties,
PEO may not be perceived as impartial. CCS should develop themes and messages to
counter these perceptions.

c. Restraint and Minimum Force. A misuse of force can have a negative impact
upon the legitimacy of the PEO. Conversely, the appropriate use of force to prevent
disruption of the peace process can strengthen consent. The commander uses situational
understanding to include cultural, sociological, religious, and ethnic aspects to determine
how best to apply military force. The amount and type of force used should be no more
than is necessary and proportionate to resolve and defuse a crisis. It must be limited to the
degree, intensity, and duration required to remove the threat and prevent further escalation.
Forces should be trained, equipped, and proficient in the use of both lethal and nonlethal
weapons to minimize civilian casualties.

3. Peace Enforcement Operations Tasks

Peace enforcement tasks may include some of those conducted in PKO, as well as
enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian actors,
operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a
dispute.

a. Enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones includes a broad range of possible

tasks. Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, even when endorsed
by the UNSC, have traditionally been considered acts of war and should posture their forces
accordingly.

IV-2 JP 3-07.3
 Peace Enforcement Operations

b. PEO contingent forces may be tasked to provide protection for FHA operations.
This could include protection for international organizations, NGOs, other government
departments and agencies, and other military personnel who are providing FHA. Such
protection may include establishing secure base areas, protecting routes or corridors for the
transport of HA supplies, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties
oppose the delivery of HA supplies by international organizations, NGOs, or other
agencies, forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic
support. The CMOC, when established, may serve as the focal point for requests for
support from US forces.

c. Operations to restore order are conducted to halt violence and support, reinstate, or
establish civil authorities. They are designed to restore stability to the point where
indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority.

d. A peace enforcement mission may be tasked to separate belligerent parties or to

neutralize belligerents that threaten civilians or refuse to comply with a peace process.
These tasks can pose high risks to the contingent force and may involve reducing the
combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties. The contingent force will
normally retain the right of first use of force and will require offensive combat capabilities,
combat support, and combat service support. The objective is to force the belligerent
parties to disengage and withdraw. Subsequently the peace operations force may be tasked
to establish a BZ or DMZ.

e. Peace operations forces may be required to conduct detainee operations. Forces

must plan to employ appropriate assets to support this requirement. These tasks will
become critical as a mission transitions from peace enforcement to peacekeeping.

4. Command and Control for Peace Enforcement Operations

In most cases, peace enforcement mirrors conventional military operations and

possesses many of the same C2 characteristics. Unity of effort is particularly important
when planning command arrangements, international agreements, and coordination centers
and cells.

a. For both unilateral and multinational operations, US forces will normally be

structured as a joint task force. The composition of this force will depend on the mission,
concept of operations (CONOPS), and the threat.

b. For multinational PEO, forces may operate under a lead nation, a parallel, or a
combination command structure.

(1) In the lead-nation command structure, one nation’s commander directs or

leads the multinational partners in the accomplishment of the peace enforcement mission.
This approach also includes situations in which the UN, another international organization,
or an alliance is conducting an operation and all participating countries are within the
international mission. A UN mission is usually under the leadership of a civilian SRSG.
Lead-alliance command structures, such as NATO, are governed by standardization
agreements with national elements under the direction of a multinational HQ element. The

IV-3
Chapter IV

lead nation or organization normally provides the commander, the basic staff, the
preponderance of the forces, and the communications to control operations. This helps
achieve unity of command and unity of effort and facilitates mutual understanding of the
mandate by all partners. If the US is the lead nation, the US supported GCC or a
subordinate commander will normally be designated as the commander.

(2) A parallel command structure exists when some participating nations retain
autonomous control of their forces. This may be appropriate in situations wherein an
international organization (such as the UN) establishes a peacekeeping mission and a
separate nation or coalition conducts PEO against VEOs, noncompliant armed groups, or
other spoilers. Commanders must develop a means for coordination among the participants
to achieve unity of effort. This can be accomplished through coordinating councils
between parallel organizations.

(3) Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist
simultaneously in peace operations. This combination occurs when two or more nations
serve as controlling elements for a mix of multinational organizations or coalitions.
Coordinating mechanisms need to be established to synchronize operations.

For further guidance on multinational C2, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

5. Peace Enforcement Planning Considerations

Many planning considerations for PEO are similar to those for peacekeeping. The
planning process for peace enforcement is the same as for any other military operation and
begins with a comprehensive mission analysis. US forces are normally employed IAW a
CONOPS that includes transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping or peace
building.

For information on campaign planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

a. Mission Analysis. Peace enforcement requires awareness of political factors,

constraints, and restraints. Determined by the national objectives and end state specified
in strategic guidance and UN mandates, termination criteria focus on the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security. IRs are normally greater in peace
enforcement than in peacekeeping since the potential for hostilities is higher and the level
of detail of information required to support decision making, including FP issues, is greater.
Accurate intelligence and comprehensive mission analysis will be the basis for determining
the structure and composition of the force.

b. Intelligence

(1) In addition to standard threat indicators and order of battle, commanders and
staffs should analyze the root causes of the conflict and how best to address them, as well
as those factors that will help commanders to influence the population.

IV-4 JP 3-07.3
 Peace Enforcement Operations

(2) The commander requires warning intelligence that can provide indications of
a deteriorating situation or resumption of hostilities. As part of the JIPOE, probable
courses of action of belligerents should be developed and analyzed.

(3) The inclusion of identity activities can help to remove anonymity from those
displaying hostile intentions within the OA.

c. Fire Support. Fire support is regulated by the ROE, and a prime consideration is
the need to minimize collateral damage. In most cases, the objective is to compel or coerce
the belligerents to disengage, withdraw, and comply with the mandate. Fire support is
often intended to suppress and neutralize targets, rather than destroy them.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting.

d. Logistics. Logistic planning and support in PEO include the considerations

addressed in Chapter III, “Peacekeeping Operations.” Peace enforcement, especially when
accompanied by active combat, may complicate the work of other agencies, such as
international organizations and NGOs. Consequently, the demand for food, water,
billeting, waste disposal, movement control, environmental and safety concerns, and
medical support may increase substantially above the force’s own requirements if large
numbers of DCs must be supported until humanitarian operations are fully established.
Contracted support, coordinated through the OCS process, along with multinational
support and HNS, should be considered when planning operations support. In some
operations, contracted support may be considered a primary choice of support, especially
in operations that require a minimal uniformed footprint due to the establishment of force
caps seen in some recent operations. CA and the CMOC can enhance this effort and should
be included in the logistic planning effort. Some general considerations for the commander
include:

(1) Logistics may have to support both the peace operations force and an FHA
effort. Coordination with international organizations and NGOs will facilitate this support.

(2) The JFC should ensure planning for mission termination or transition to PKO
or peace building activities is considered and accomplished early in an operation. Staffs
should assess what logistics infrastructure, materiel, capabilities, and equipment will
remain in place for use by follow-on forces or organizations. Additionally, staffs should
assess the close-out of contracts or transfer of contract capability to civil authorities. The
subordinate commander’s OCS integration cell is normally responsible to ensure the
contract support drawdown progresses according to plan. Contract support drawdown
milestones are reported, tracked, and analyzed to ensure the overall plan is progressing on
approved timelines. Planning for redeployment should be considered throughout the
operation and is best accomplished through the same time-phased process by which
deployment was accomplished.

IV-5
Chapter IV

(3) UN and multinational peace operations will vary with respect to logistical
authorities and arrangements. Areas that must be clarified include funding, ACSAs, and
mutual support agreements.

(4) A joint logistics center can provide necessary logistical control and
coordination functions.

For additional information, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. For more information on the
US role in the provision of health service support during changing operational demands,
see JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

e. FP. Peace enforcement missions face a greater threat than those conducting other
types of peace operations. In addition to the FP considerations in any peace operation,
commanders in peace enforcement missions will likely need to address AT measures
because of the potential threat from VEOs. Consideration should also be given to PR
planning and training in anticipation of an isolating event occurrence. Additionally,
international organizations, NGOs, other government departments and agencies, the media,
and others may request some form of protection from military forces.

For additional information on FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

For further information on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

f. Mobility and Survivability. To ensure a mobile and survivable force, both

engineer and CBRN defense forces provide essential support during peace operations.

(1) Engineer Forces. Engineers may play a major role in supporting successful
peace operations. While mobility and countermobility tasks may be appropriate, many
engineer tasks may be more civic than combat-oriented.

(2) CBRN Defense Forces. Commanders should consider the requirement for
CBRN defense forces in support of peace operations if there is evidence that belligerent
forces may employ such capabilities. In addition, when properly authorized under the
ROE, commanders can employ riot control agents as an alternative to deadly force in
certain situations. A mix of different units (decontamination units/CBRN reconnaissance
elements) are often necessary to achieve the proper balance. CBRN staff officers may
advise on commercial CBRN threats, as well as on the collection, packaging, storage,
disposal, and clean-up of hazardous materials or wastes.

6. Employment

Typical phases for PEO are shown in Figure IV-1. While the sequencing may vary
for some missions, these phases provide a starting point for the employment planning
process. Figure IV-1 also illustrates how the phases correspond to phases of a notional
joint operation model similar to that discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

a. Preparation and Deployment. Mission analysis, available forces, and factors

such as available HNS will influence deployment decisions. In most cases, PEO will

IV-6 JP 3-07.3
 Peace Enforcement Operations

Peace Enforcement Operations Employment Phases

Establishment
Preparation Expansion Enforcement
of Presence in Transition
and of the of the
the and
Deployment Operational Mandate
Operational Redeployment
Area
Area

Figure IV-1. Peace Enforcement Operations Employment Phases

require crisis planning. However, the joint planning community may be able to select from
forces and capabilities using an existing OPLAN and time-phased force deployment list,
time-phasing their entry.

For more information on the joint deployment and redeployment process, see JP 3-35,
Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

b. Establishment of Presence in the OA. In this stage, military forces occupy and
secure a presence in the OA and establish security for follow-on elements.

(1) Some activities conducted during this phase are to:

(a) Make contact with USG departments and agencies, international

organizations, local military and paramilitary organizations, and civil authorities.

(b) Establish surveillance over the planned points of entry.

(c) Conduct activities to reduce the risk to the force, including information
activities to prepare the HN and its population for the arrival of forces and subsequent
actions.

(d) Provide updated situation reports prior to the entry of follow-on forces.

(2) The situation will dictate the nature of the initial entry forces. An unopposed
entry arranged through diplomatic actions and coordination with HN or local authorities is
preferred. Preservation of the HN infrastructure is a key consideration in this stage. If a
forcible entry is required, it should be conducted IAW JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry
Operations, and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

c. Expansion of the OA. In this stage, forces within the OA continue to expand their
coverage to gain information on belligerent dispositions. Staffs continue to update their
information on the area and revise their assessments for operational requirements. Forces
continue to arrive and, when possible, theater support contracting can be used to offset the
amount of logistic support required. Air and maritime operations continue and may involve
the establishment and enforcement of exclusion zones.

IV-7
Chapter IV

d. Enforcement of the Mandate

(1) Separation of Belligerent Parties. Depending on the threat and the level of
cooperation by the belligerents, the PEO force conducts operations to compel the
belligerents to disengage and withdraw. This may involve shows of force, demonstrations,
or combat operations with synchronized air, ground, maritime, and SOF actions. The
objective is to establish a BZ between the belligerents. As the belligerent forces disengage
and withdraw, lines of demarcation will be established to identify the forward limits of the
belligerent forces. The resulting space between these lines of demarcation constitutes the
BZ. If the belligerent parties show no inclination to consent to the formation of a BZ, the
PEO force may be required to establish one forcibly. In doing so, the commander considers
the belligerent forces’ dispositions and territorial advantages or disadvantages, as well as
historical or cultural considerations. Even after the situation has stabilized, belligerent
parties may still demonstrate animosity toward each other and perhaps the PEO force.
Therefore, the peace enforcement mission must remain prepared to engage in combat.

(2) Support of Political Mediation. The JFC must thoroughly understand the
political aims behind the peace enforcement mission and the impact of all actions on the
resolution of the conflict. Military support may involve monitoring the compliance of
belligerent parties with agreements; provisions of a mandate; or other constraints,
restraints, or provisions regarding their activities.

(3) Establishment of a DMZ. Negotiations may eventually transform the BZ

into a DMZ, as stipulated in a formal agreement. DMZs are created to neutralize certain
areas from military occupation and activity. Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimed by
two or more sides in the conflict and where control by one could constitute a direct threat
to the others. Lines of demarcation define the boundaries of a DMZ. These boundaries
must be easily recognizable and, ideally, should not run counter to locally accepted political
or cultural divisions. The airspace over a DMZ is denied to the aircraft of the belligerents.

(4) Maintaining Separation of Belligerent Parties. The PEO force may

conduct security operations such as screening, combat and reconnaissance patrolling, and
cordon and search, and may establish checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement
into and within the BZ or DMZ to maintain the separation of belligerent parties.

(5) DDR of belligerent parties can occur concurrently with PKO and PEO.
Repatriation and resettlement are integral parts of the DDR process.

For additional information on DDR, see JP 3-07, Stability.

e. Transition and Redeployment. Effective peace enforcement planning includes

the conditions for the eventual exit of the force. This will usually be expressed as part of
the end state of the operation and will be as much of a political consideration as a military
one. Once the belligerent parties agree to stop fighting IAW a ceasefire or a truce, the stage
is set for transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping and peace building. The
commander must develop a redeployment CONOPS to identify how forces and materiel
will redeploy and how contracts supporting the force will be closed out or transitioned to

IV-8 JP 3-07.3
 Peace Enforcement Operations

civil authorities. This redeployment CONOPS is especially relevant and useful if force
rotations are envisioned to sustain a long-term operation. The commander may not yet
understand all planning factors to fully develop this CONOPS, but, by using the best
available information for redeployment requirements, timelines and priorities, the
efficiency and effectiveness of redeployment operations may be greatly improved.

For more information on the joint deployment and redeployment process, see JP 3-35,
Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

IV-9
Chapter IV

Intentionally Blank

IV-10 JP 3-07.3
 APPENDIX A
UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

1. General

a. The primary responsibility of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and

security. The UN Charter provides the TOR for the various elements in fulfilling this
responsibility. Article 36 in Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the UN Charter
is the usual basis for the UN to conduct traditional PKO. Chapter VII (Action with Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter
provides the authority for PEO and is also often cited as the basis for robust PKO in
unstable environments.

For more information, see the UN home page at http://www.un.org/en/index.html.

b. Historical

(1) UN peacekeeping has evolved as a series of ad hoc practical mechanisms to

help contain armed conflicts and settle them by peaceful means. The mechanism devised
by the UN to ensure international peace and security is outlined in Chapters VI, VII, and
VIII of the UN Charter. During the Cold War, the UN conducted traditional UN
peacekeeping missions. These missions were primarily political operations, supported by
the military and dependent upon the consent and cooperation of the belligerents. They
were usually restricted to the interposition of unarmed observers or lightly armed UN
peacekeepers between warring states and contingent upon the following conditions:

(a) A cease fire agreement was in place.

(b) The parties to the conflict fully consented to their deployment.

(2) The objectives of traditional “UN peacekeeping” were generally limited to

simply reporting conditions following the political agreement.

(3) Modern UN peacekeeping activities, often referred to as multidimensional

missions, may be authorized under Chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter. The military
component is only one part of a comprehensive political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and
economic effort. Military objectives may include supporting other government
departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs in the provision of
humanitarian aid, the organization and protection of elections, the supervision of
government functions, the disarmament and demobilization of a large number of parties,
the repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees, the protection of safe areas, restoration of
national government and institutions, and other tasks. The environment of today’s
integrated mission can be considerably more complex than that of traditional UN
peacekeeping, and is often characterized by unstable intrastate conflicts.

2. United Nations Headquarters Organization

The UNHQ has two departments involved in planning and executing PKO:

A-1
Appendix A

a. UNDPKO is the operational arm for all UN peacekeeping and is responsible for the
conduct, management, direction, planning, and preparation of those operations. The
Under-Secretary-General for PKO provides policy guidance and strategic direction and for
the day-to-day operational matters affecting peacekeeping. UNDPKO also provides
support for several missions under the Department of Political Affairs.

(1) Under the Under-Secretary-General for PKO is the military advisor to the
UNSG and the Office of Military Affairs. Two key offices within the Office of Military
Affairs are the Military Planning Service (MPS) and the Force Generation Service (FGS).

(2) UNDPKO also contains the Office of Operations; the Office of Rule of Law
and Security Institutions (including the Police Division); and the Policy, Evaluation, and
Training Division.

(3) UN MPS takes the UNSG’s recommendations and the UNSC strategic-level
guidance, provided through a UNSCR, and interprets this into military tasking. MPS
transposes the UNSCR into a military CONOPS, which in turn generates the force
requirements and ROE. FGS facilitates member nation pledges for military units to
participate in UN PKO. FGS ensures that TCCs and PCCs have the requisite equipment
as dictated by the force requirement. However, FGS does not have the responsibility to
ensure the contingents receive proper training. TCCs and PCCs ensure their pledged units
can carry out the tasks outlined in the CONOPS and Statements of Unit Requirements.

b. The UNDFS provides logistics, administration, and information and

communications technology support for peacekeeping and field-based special political
missions. Through the Global Field Support Strategy, the UNDFS strives for efficiency
and effectiveness, reduced mission footprints, reduced mission start-up time, and improved
quality of goods and services to the field. UNDFS supports its mission from regional
service support centers at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, and the regional support
base in Entebbe, Uganda.

3. Subordinate United Nations Organizations

Other UN organizations concerned with peace operations include the following:

a. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR has
a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. Coordination
with the UNHCR is critical for any HA effort.

b. UNOCHA. UNOCHA’s mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and

principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors.

c. UN Disaster Management Team. The appointed UN resident coordinator has a

crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at the country level and coordinates
with international and local organizations as required. The UN disaster management team
is the primary agency responsible for coordinating assistance to persons compelled to leave
their homes because of natural and other disasters.

A-2 JP 3-07.3
 United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations

d. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP conducts long-

term programs to eradicate poverty, develop national institutions, and build resilience.
Much of the UNDP’s work addresses potential root causes of conflicts.

e. World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP is an operational, relief-oriented

organization. It provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
risk-reducing development programs. Targeted food aid is special subsistence aligned to
a special segment of the population. It should be noted that the WFP coordinates the
logistics cluster and may be a useful in-theater contact organization for forces conducting
peace operations.

f. UNICEF. UNICEF is a relief-oriented organization that attends to the well-being

of children and women, especially child health and nutrition.

g. World Health Organization. The World Health Organization is primarily

involved in long-range programs. It provides advice and assistance in all aspects of
preventive and curative health care.

h. Food and Agriculture Organization. The Food and Agriculture Organization is

an organization also involved in long-range programs. It provides technical advice in
reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries.

4. Overview of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine

a. In 2008, UNDPKO produced a capstone doctrine entitled United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. This UN publication discusses the
core functions, success factors, and key lessons of UN PKO.

b. The publication provides three core functions for a multidimensional PKO within
the broader context of an international effort:

(1) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the state’s ability
to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

(2) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and
supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.

(3) Provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international actors
pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

c. In line with other principles or fundamentals from a variety of nations and alliances,
UNDPKO recognized three basic principles of PKO:

(1) Consent of the parties.

(2) Impartiality.

(3) Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

IV-3
Appendix A

d. Experience since 1990 shows the success of multidimensional UN peacekeeping is

consistently dependent on a number of other factors, including legitimacy, credibility, and
promotion of national and local ownership.

e. The UN capstone doctrine also emphasizes several key lessons from PKO:

(1) There must be a peace to keep. UN PKO can only succeed if the parties on
the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process.

(2) Positive regional engagement is essential. Many of the crises before the
UNSC are regional in character, and the attitude of neighboring states can be as important
in determining the viability of a peace process as the commitment of the local parties.

(3) The UNSC must provide its full backing to a peacekeeping mission.

(4) A UN peacekeeping mission must be given a clear and achievable mandate

with resources to match.

f. The UN capstone doctrine describes three broad phases of UN PKO:

(1) Mission start up.

(2) Mandate implementation.

(3) Transition (hand-over, withdrawal, and liquidation).

g. UNDPKO has also developed doctrinal manuals for a variety of peacekeeping units
such as infantry, engineers, reconnaissance, signals, and others. These documents explain
tasks, procedures, and standards that units may be expected to accomplish during PKO.

5. Integrated Assessment and Planning

a. In 2013, the UN introduced the integrated assessment and planning (IAP)

framework to support the planning of multidimensional UN PKO. The IAP is the
authoritative basis for planning all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of
existing plans. The IAP assists the UN system to arrive at common strategic objectives for
a mission by bringing together all relevant UN participants and external actors. The IAP
ensures appropriate agencies and organizations play a part in the development of the
planning, the important concerns and issues are considered, and the necessary authorities
and accountabilities are in place to produce an integrated plan. If a UN country team is in
place, it will be an active participant in the IAP.

b. The IAP has two parts, strategic assessment and strategic planning.

(1) Strategic assessment is conducted to formulate or reformulate UN strategic

engagement in countries where conflict is present, imminent, or could reoccur. It is
conducted by an integrated task force (ITF) and consists of a conflict analysis; the
identification of priority objectives; and the development of strategic options, which could

A-4 JP 3-07.3
 United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations

include a maintenance of the status quo or a new or revised UN strategy. The strategic
assessment provides recommendations to the UNSG, policy committee, or the UNSC.

(2) After adoption of a UNSCR, the mandate is promulgated and the ITF
conducts strategic planning to develop a directive to the UN’s senior field leadership,
normally the SRSG or ERSG and the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator. The
directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of
structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning parameters. Based on the
mandate and the directive, field leadership continues strategic planning by developing an
integrated strategic framework document. This framework articulates priorities,
programmatic functions, timelines, and responsibilities for the integrated UN approach.

c. Establishing the Force Commander and HQ. Upon the approval of the mandate
and the budget plan, the UNSG will ensure negotiations commence with the disputing
parties and the HN for preparation of the SOFA. The UNSG, with the approval of the
UNSC, appoints the HOM and other senior mission leaders. The HOM determines the
further delegation of authority in the field on behalf of the UNSG. The UNSG appoints
the chief of the military component in UN peacekeeping (the force commander or chief
UNMEM), who holds appropriate authority over all military units and personnel in the
mission area in the light of operational requirements. A SRSG, supported by political and
mediation staff, conducts diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

d. Participating Member-State Preparations. Participating member-states

negotiate their contributions to the peace operation with the UN through a MOU. Many
nations have training centers to prepare their units and have permanent organizations to
coordinate their contributions to UN peace operations. Joint forces may be involved in
assisting the countries as part of a GCC’s SC activities. The US Global Peace Operations
Initiative program, managed by DOS and DOD, and the DOS’s Africa Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance program build peace operations capacity in many
countries.

e. Reception and Service Support. The UN Office of Mission Support will usually
deploy an advance party to establish reception and service support arrangements for the
operation. The UN will plan, organize, and direct the deployment of the force to the theater.

f. OPCON. The operational chain of command for peace operations will be from the
unit commander through any intermediate commanders to the HOM, usually the SRSG. In
certain cases, the US forces may be placed under OPCON of a foreign commander, but
command is exercised only by the US chain of command.

6. Key United Nations Documents

a. UN Mandate. The UN mandate is central to all peace operations and comes

directly from UNSCRs. It will normally be specific as to the tasks to be undertaken and
provide the general outlines of the mission’s size and composition.

IV-5
Appendix A

b. UNSG’s Directive to HOM, Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian

Coordinator. The UNSG will issue a strategic planning directive stating the broad
strategic objectives, as well as the proposed form and scope of a peace operation.

c. Integrated Strategic Framework. The senior field leadership develops this

document, which provides the basis for detailed operational planning and includes the
following:

(1) Main findings from previous integrated assessments of the conflict and
challenges to peace consolidation, the UN role, and comparative advantages.

(2) Peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for national capacity
development and institution building.

(3) Programmatic, functional, and OAs requiring an integrated approach, with

agreed form and depth of integration.

(4) Results, timelines, responsibilities, and other relevant implementation

arrangements, including coordination mechanisms.

(5) Monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or benchmarks of

progress.

d. Force Commander’s Guidance. The Under-Secretary-General for PKO will

issue the force commander’s guidance. This is also referred to as an SOP (or standing
order). Upon receipt of the force commander’s guidance from UNDPKO, the force
commander will prepare more detailed regulations and operating procedures.

e. UN ROE. The ROE for a mission are developed at the UNHQ and support
UNDPKO/UNDFS guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The equivalent police document is the directive on the
use of force and applies to all armed police personnel and units in the mission.

For additional information and an up-to-date listing of ongoing PKO, see the UN
peacekeeping home page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.

A-6 JP 3-07.3
 APPENDIX B
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

1. General

a. The protection of civilians applies during military operations. Regardless of an

operation’s primary objective, the protection of civilians is an important legal, military,
diplomatic, political, and moral consideration. It may encompass efforts that reduce
civilian risks from physical violence; secure their rights to access essential services and
resources; and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the
long-term. In addition to physical protection from imminent violence and provision of
necessities, protection of civilians includes setting broader enabling conditions that
enhance human security and mitigate grievances that can result in renewed conflict and
other potential future threats to civilians.

b. The achievement of US strategic objectives depends on the joint forces’ ability to

minimize harm to civilians in the course of operations and, potentially, their ability to
mitigate harm caused by other parties. The law of war requires that belligerents take
feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of war and military occupation.
Joint forces must ensure civilians are not the object of attacks and must ensure civilians are
spared and protected during conflict.

c. In many operations, the population’s support may be the center of gravity or

otherwise indispensable for mission accomplishment. Some joint operations, such as the
2011 Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya, were
specifically conducted to protect civilians. Strategic objectives of most joint operations
typically include security, stability, a sustainable peace, and other favorable conditions that
contribute to civilian well-being. Potential civilian victims and observers around the world
expect joint forces to take every precaution to ensure military operations spare the civilian
population from harm, including measures to mitigate harm caused by other state or non-
state parties to conflict.

d. Under the law of war, civilians who have protected status include persons who are
not members of their country’s armed forces or other arms-carrying forces. Modern
conflicts often take a far greater toll on civilians than they do on combatants. They can
become casualties through incidental harm from military operations, are often directly
targeted by combatants, and suffer from deprivations resulting from conflict. Civilians are
also at risk in unstable environments in which joint forces conduct other military
operations, even if these operations do not primarily involve combat. Examples include
peace operations, FHA, and post-conflict operations characterized by stability activities.
Most peacekeeping missions conducted or authorized by the UN include mandates to
protect civilians.

e. Joint forces will likely be part of a comprehensive effort that includes other actors
whose activities are often the most significant for creating an enduring environment in
which civilians are protected. These actors include HN, international, and
nongovernmental civilian, police, and military organizations that address security,

B-1
Appendix B

governance, rule of law, humanitarian requirements, and developmental needs. Though

they may agree about the general desirability of protecting civilians, these various actors
may employ entirely different methods to achieve very dissimilar objectives.

f. Depending on the situation, protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a

mission or a supporting task. Effective protection of civilians depends on adaptive units,
a command climate that emphasizes its importance, and leaders who make timely and
appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground. Joint forces must have an
operational concept and ROE that prioritize protection of civilians, and they must account
for it in the joint planning process. Regardless of the operation, joint forces will likely
protect civilians in two general ways:

(1) Avoid Civilian Harm. Joint forces act IAW the law of war and other relevant
bodies of law to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, joint forces avoid undermining
efforts by other actors that improve human security, and they assess to what extent their
presence, movements, activities, messages, and associations may put civilians in harm’s
way.

(2) Perform Deliberate Actions to Protect Civilians. Joint forces conduct

offensive, defensive, and stability activities expressly intended to mitigate harm to
civilians, including operations that create an environment conducive to protection of
civilians.

2. Protection of Civilians Fundamentals

a. Figure B-1 depicts three fundamentals for protection of civilians. Joint forces
should understand factors related to civilian risks, conduct operations to protect civilians,
and help shape the surrounding environment to support and sustain protection of civilians.

b. Understand Civilian Risks. Leaders must maintain situational awareness of

civilian threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the relevant actors, dynamics, and other
variables that comprise the OE. The staff’s analysis of the political, military, economic,
social, information, and infrastructure systems will contribute to understanding those
threats to civilians and identify ways to protect them.

(1) Civilians are potentially at risk from armed conflict (including insurgencies
and civil wars), genocide, ethnic cleansing, other mass atrocities, government repression,
post-conflict instability, intercommunal conflict, widespread predatory violence, or mob
violence. Civilians may also suffer from other forms of targeted violence including
terrorism and sexual violence, and human trafficking, as well as displacement and impeded
access to HA and essential services. To mitigate these risks, joint forces must understand
the relevant civilian vulnerabilities and the threats to civilians’ well-being.

B-2 JP 3-07.3
 Protection of Civilians

Fundamentals of the Protection of Civilians

Protection of
Civilians

Protect Civilians Shape a

Understand During Protective
Civilian Risks Operations Environment

 Civilian vulnerabilities  Secure vulnerable civilians  Stability functions

 Threats to civilians  Neutralize perpetrators  Unified action
 Operational environment  Mitigate civilian casualties  Commander’s communication
 Actors  Joint functions synchronization
 Dynamics  Women, children, and other  Local communities
 Intelligence vulnerable groups  Humanitarian assistance
 Assessments  Mass atrocity response  Security sector reform
operations  Disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration
 Transitional justice

Figure B-1. Fundamentals of the Protection of Civilians

(2) Civilian vulnerabilities depend upon many factors, including individual and
group identity, environmental considerations, and unavailability of services such as
healthcare and emergency food distribution. Ethnic or sectarian violence may target certain
groups within a population, rendering those more vulnerable than others.

(3) Civilians may be intentionally targeted by an adversary, and those near

military targets may be vulnerable to collateral damage. DCs who flee their homes may
be particularly vulnerable to violence, coercion (such as forced recruitment into armed
groups), sexual violence or exploitation, disease, starvation, and crime. Some groups may
be more vulnerable in certain contexts, including women, children, elderly or infirm
individuals, or males of fighting age.

(4) Vulnerable civilians may attempt to mitigate their risks in different ways,
such as fleeing a dangerous situation; collaborating with perpetrators; mobilizing for self-
defense; seeking support from other actors that may provide security or other assistance;
or engaging in prostitution, crime, or the sale of essential items.

(5) Threats consist of individuals or groups with the capability, intent, and
opportunity to harm civilians. Specific threats vary in terms of their dimensions, type, and
perpetrators’ objectives. In some cases, perpetrators may be ideologically motivated to
destroy or displace a victim group they see as an enemy. In others, perpetrators may pillage

B-3
Appendix B

and forcibly obtain fighters and slaves from vulnerable civilians. Perpetrators may also
attack civilians as a means to achieve other objectives. For example, civilians may be
targeted during terrorist attacks, civil wars, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies to
degrade the will of an adversary.

(6) Joint forces will have to influence (and, in many cases, should be influenced
by) a wide range of other actors that may be categorized as friendly security forces,
adversaries, vulnerable civilians, bystanders, negative actors that enable violence against
civilians, and positive actors that mitigate civilian risks. These categories may overlap and
could change over time. For example, a particular ethnic group could be both a perpetrator
and victim of violence against civilians. In many situations, joint forces will operate in
support of other actors, such as the HN government, whose efforts are more important for
protecting civilians. In some instances, the operation may be politically aligned with a
state or non-state party that does not adhere to the law of war and is responsible for abuse
and mistreatment of the civilian population.

(7) Additionally, it is important to comprehend dynamics such as evolving

strategic guidance and mandates, the type of conflict, the strategic logic and motivations
of perpetrators, the impact of joint operations, changing vulnerabilities and threats that
relate to protection of civilians, resiliencies, emerging opportunities to enhance civilian
security, and changes in the OE or among the actors.

(8) The OE will feature a complex and evolving relationship between these
variables, requiring accurate intelligence, efficient information management based on the
commander’s critical information requirements, and effective assessments of the situation
and trends. Other actors concerned with protecting civilians, such as humanitarian
organizations, may be reluctant to exchange information when this could compromise their
neutrality, confidentiality, or operational security. However, it may be possible to develop
formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms that improve joint and partner efforts
to protect civilians.

c. Protect Civilians during Operations. Joint forces must mitigate their potential to
cause civilian casualties or other harm. Additionally, they may be required to protect
civilians, neutralize threats to civilians, and mitigate other forms of civilian harm. While
planning, preparing for, and conducting operations, units must routinely and proactively
integrate the protection of civilians. Failure to do so can convey the message that violence
against civilians is acceptable.

(1) Approaches. Some operations, such as patrols, checkpoints, support for HA,
or evacuation of noncombatants and civilians, may be specifically intended to protect
vulnerable civilians. This may include lethal and nonlethal actions to deter, compel,
neutralize, or otherwise influence perpetrators. Operations will often be conducted for
another purpose, but may have a secondary effect of protecting civilians. Routine
application of joint functions (C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and
maneuver, protection, and sustainment) should account for civilian protection, with plans
and procedures adjusted as appropriate.

B-4 JP 3-07.3
 Protection of Civilians

(a) The joint force will likely employ a mix of offense, defense, and stability
actions to protect civilians. It can use one or more of the following general approaches:

1. Area Security—secure a large area with sufficient force deployed in

unit sectors.

2. Shape-Clear-Hold-Build—systematically secure limited areas and

expand to other areas when able.

3. Separation—establish a DMZ or similar BZ between perpetrators

and vulnerable populations.

4. Safe Areas—secure concentrations of vulnerable populations such as

camps for DCs.

5. Partner Enabling—provide advisors, equipment, or specialized

support such as deployment or air support to partner nations, HN forces, or victim groups.

6. Containment—influence perpetrator behavior with strikes,

blockades, or no-fly zones when perpetrators display aggression towards civilians.

7. Defeat Perpetrators—attack and defeat perpetrator leadership

and/or capabilities.

(b) More than one approach may be employed simultaneously or

sequentially, and it may be appropriate to emphasize different approaches as the operation
progresses or in different parts of the OA. For example, the containment approach may be
appropriate as an initial effort when an immediate response is critical.

(c) Joint forces or partnered security forces can be deployed to prevent or

preempt violence against civilians when indicators suggest a possible threat. They can be
used to monitor a situation; support negotiation or other efforts by nonmilitary actors;
establish a presence to deter or intimidate potential perpetrators; prepare for contingencies;
or conduct limited operations to protect vulnerable civilians or neutralize perpetrators,
including peace operations, preemptive actions, or preventive deployments.

(2) Civilian Casualty Mitigation. Historically, civilian casualties have been

tragic but frequent consequences of conflict. Harm to civilians has a damaging impact on
mission accomplishment, and joint forces frequently conduct operations in complex and
populous environments. Joint operations are increasingly transparent and evaluated by
external actors, and joint forces are expected to uphold the highest standards in an
environment where the enemy will make false accusations and seek to exploit mistakes.
While civilian casualty mitigation has a foundation in law and in principles of humanity,
adherence to the law of war is the minimum standard. Civilian casualty mitigation directly
affects the success of the overall mission, and even tactical actions can have strategic and
other significant second-order effects. Efforts to minimize and address civilian casualty
incidents support strategic imperatives and are also of key importance to the profession of
arms.

B-5
Appendix B

(a) The avoidance of civilian casualties is more than a legal obligation; it is

also good practice that supports the mission. It is important to appreciate that civilian
casualties can be mitigated through training, preparation, and other efforts that begin long
before a particular incident and should continue even after an incident has occurred.

(b) Civilian casualties refer to civilians who are either killed or wounded as
a result of armed conflict. They could include members of the local population, civilians
from NGOs, representatives from international organizations, and other civilian agencies.
Civilian casualties comprise a subset of collateral damage which consists of incidental
damage to civilian personnel and property incurred while conducting lawful military
operations during conflict. Unacceptable collateral damage may occur when insufficient
distinction is made, the proportionality analysis is not used, or feasible precautions are not
exercised by one or more of the belligerents. Civilian casualties may also arise from enemy
actions against civilians and their property either through deliberate targeting or the
excessive use of force.

(c) The law of war, which includes the principles of military necessity,
distinction, proportionality, honor, and humanity, contains the following considerations:

1. It is unlawful to direct attacks against civilians or civilian/protected

objects. Civilians and civilian/protected objects enjoy this protection unless they directly
participate in hostilities.

2. In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to

spare civilians. Military units and their security partners must take feasible precautions to
minimize collateral harm to civilians and civilian/protected objects.

3. It is unlawful to conduct an attack that may be expected to cause

collateral damage that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.

(d) In many cases, failure to prevent civilian casualties will undermine

national policy objectives as well as the mission of joint forces, while assisting the enemy.
Additionally, civilian casualties can incite increased opposition to joint forces. Focused
attention on civilian casualty mitigation can be an important investment to maintain
legitimacy and ensure eventual success.

(e) Joint forces may establish civilian casualty tracking and response cells to
address the high occurrence of civilian casualties in armed conflict and serve as an example
to HN security forces of the need to protect civilians and ensure accountability for
casualties. Such civilian casualty mitigation structures must be coupled with strong
command support, comprehensive investigations, transparency, accountability, making
amends, and adjustment of tactics, when possible, following incidents resulting in civilian
casualties. Without these elements, mitigation efforts will not be successful and will be
viewed as insincere.

(f) Commanders should account for the different imperatives that include
defeating the enemy, preserving the force, and fulfilling obligations and expectations to

B-6 JP 3-07.3
 Protection of Civilians

keep civilians from harm. While they are often complementary, they can also require
tradeoffs; for example, a high FP posture may increase the chances of accidental civilian
harm. Short- and long-term mission objectives will dictate how to balance these
imperatives.

(3) Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Child Protection

(a) JFCs should focus on the elimination of conflict-related sexual violence

and the protection of children from threats—including their recruitment as child soldiers.
These often overlooked problems are critical to address since it is impossible to have a
secure environment and adequate protection of civilians when atrocities of these types are
rampant.

(b) Conflict can have a significant impact on women and girls as they suffer
a loss of livelihood, displacement, separation from their family, food insecurity, and the
loss of traditional networks. Equally, sexual and gender-based violence, with its associated
psychological trauma, can often be used as a tactic of war. Rape not only inflicts terror
and humiliation on individuals, it can also be used as a deliberate strategy to target and
destabilize communities. Rape can also have long-lasting economic, social, and health
impacts on the state and surrounding region. Men and boys can also be victims of sexual
violence.

(c) Associated foreign personnel will be vetted for human rights abuses prior
to the US conducting theater contracting in the HN.

(4) MARO. Joint forces may be required to participate in MARO. A mass

atrocity refers to widespread and often systematic acts of violence against civilians by state
or non-state armed groups, including killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, or
deliberately inflicting conditions that result in serious bodily or mental harm.

(a) MARO may be directed for the specific purpose of mitigating such
activities, or it may occur within the context of other complex situations such as civil wars
or insurgencies. MARO efforts include offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to protect
vulnerable populations or neutralize perpetrators.

(b) Commanders should be prepared within their capabilities to monitor,

prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocity situations in all operations. Addressing
the sources of instability may contribute to preventing mass atrocities.

For more information, see Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning
Handbook.

d. Shape a Protective Environment. In addition to understanding and operating

within an OE, leaders must determine how to shape it in ways that enhance protection of
civilians. These shaping efforts are conducted through stability activities, military
engagement, effective risk mitigation, CCS, and programs including SSR, DDR, and
transitional justice.

B-7
Appendix B

(1) Effective and lasting civilian protection ultimately depends on effective

application of the joint stability functions (security, FHA, economic stabilization and
infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation). Other actors (including
domestic and international political, police, humanitarian, and developmental
organizations) will have primary responsibility, authority, and capability for many of the
necessary actions. Often, joint forces will at most be limited to a supporting and enabling
role.

(2) Stability functions are often related to peace building and development, and
they usually must be pursued as parallel, mutually supporting efforts. Inadequate
stabilization can result in civilian harm or inflame grievances that result in further conflict
and place civilians at increased risk. In many cases, there will be tensions and tradeoffs
between short-term goals and long-term outcomes, as well as a potential tension between
protection of civilians and other objectives. Joint forces are primarily involved with
establishing a safe and secure environment so other actors such as government or
nongovernmental agencies can conduct their stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

For more information on stability functions, see JP 3-07, Stability.

(3) Protection of civilians usually requires contributions from a wide variety of

military and nonmilitary actors (both local and international) that are not subordinate to a
common authority and do not necessarily share the same objectives. A comprehensive
approach to protecting civilians is generally the most effective. Military and nonmilitary
actors should integrate military and nonmilitary means to achieve shared objectives, with
the common understanding that, in the long term, many of the nonmilitary considerations
are the most important. Ultimately, HN institutions must be capable of assuming the
primary responsibility to protect civilians. It is particularly important to understand civilian
protection from the local population’s perspective. To the extent possible, plans and
operations should be integrated with those of other actors. Local community efforts are
also critical for protection of civilians.

3. Challenges to the Protection of Civilians

a. While conducting operations to protect civilians, military forces will confront

tradeoffs and challenges that require difficult choices. Most problems will be situational
in nature and defy a blanket solution. For example, peace and stability are important
objectives, but so too is an environment in which basic human rights are protected and
violators are held accountable. Adversaries may commit violent acts against civilians if
they believe they will not be held accountable for previous crimes. Additionally, if they
fear being brought to justice, they may continue or escalate attacks on civilians. Other
tradeoffs include the role of HN and external actors, the pursuit of short-term and long-
term goals, and balancing protection of civilians with other mission objectives.

b. The joint force and any partners will likely confront protection of civilians
requirements that exceed their capacity. In addition, joint forces will likely be challenged
by HN corruption, constraints with respect to civilian authorities and responsibilities, and
difficulties in achieving unity of effort among the diverse participants.

B-8 JP 3-07.3
 APPENDIX C
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. The following figures (C-1, C-2, and C-3) are extracted from the UN Standard
Training Module and depict the possible UN chain of command and UN peacekeeping
organizational structures a US commander may encounter. Nations will rarely relinquish
national command of their forces, if ever. As such, forces participating in a multinational
peace operation will typically have at least two distinct chains of command: a national

Notional Chain of Command for a Peace Operation

Secretary General (if UN-sponsored)

or
Director (if non-UN-sponsored)

Peace Operations Executive Agent and/or

Force Geographic
Commander Combatant Commander
1 2

Military Staff Personal Staff Civilian Staff

3 4 5

Observers

Non-US National Non-US National US National

Contingent Contingent Contingent
Commander Commander Commander

Non-US Sector Non-US Sector US Sector

Commanders Commanders Commander(s)

Non-US Unit Non-US Unit US Unit

Commanders Commanders Commanders

Notes:
1. May or may not be US command
2. Will always be US command
3. Normally consists of a Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, and an operations staff
4. Normally consists of a military assistant, a political advisor, a legal advisor, a public affairs officer,
an interpreter(s), and liaison officers from the armed forces of the parties in the conflict
5. Provided by the UN Secretariat for UN-sponsored operations

Legend
UN United Nations operational control coordination/liaison (as required)

Figure C-1. Notional Chain of Command for a Peace Operation

C-1
Appendix C

Example of Traditional United Nations Peacekeeping

Force Organization

Special Representative
of the
Secretary-General

Peace Operations Chief Police Chief

Force Commander Commissioner Administrative Officer

Formed Military Units

(Battalion, Convoy, Civilian Police United Nations
Logistics, Health Service Monitors Civilian Administration
Support)

Figure C-2. Example of Traditional United Nations Peacekeeping Force Organization

chain of command and a multinational chain of command. Although in certain

circumstances US forces may be placed under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the
US chain of command will remain inviolate, running from the President to the supported
JFC.

2. Traditional UN peacekeeping forces normally have as their main element a military

component. Civilian staff and police may be present, and all are supported by a civilian
administration component. These missions tend to maintain their structure and
organization with only minor changes for the duration of the mandate. The UN Military
Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus are
examples of traditional UN peacekeeping organizations.

3. Multidimensional, integrated UN peacekeeping missions involve the entire UN

system. These missions are multidimensional in that they have military, police, and
civilian components. They are integrated in that they are to some degree linked to the
humanitarian and developmental organizations in the UN country team. Normally, this
linkage occurs through the dual-hatting of a deputy SRSG to the mission, who is also the
resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator of the UN country team. The human
rights, civil administration, and public information offices, among many others, support
peace efforts and have larger organizations and resources than in traditional peacekeeping
missions. The OEs tend to be more fluid and difficult to predict, requiring continuous
reassessments of the mandate. Reorganization and redeployment are common in these
operations. Recent examples of these missions include the UN Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali, and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission

C-2 JP 3-07.3
 Command Relationships

Example of an Organization for a Generic United Nations

Integrated Mission

SRSG
(Head of Mission)

(P) DSRSG DSRSG

HC/RC

Chief of Director of
UNDP UNOCHA
Staff Administration

Chief of UNICEF
JOC JLOC JMAC CDU
Integrated
Services UNHCR

OHCHR
Police Force WFP
Commissioner Commander
WHO

National
Formed Organizations
Police
Police and NGOs
Advisors Sector
Units Logistics
Commander Element

Legend
CDU conduct and discipline unit UN United Nations
DSRSG deputy special representative of the UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Secretary-General UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for
HC humanitarian coordinator Refugees
JLOC joint logistics operations center UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
JMAC joint mission analysis center UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination
JOC joint operations center of Humanitarian Affairs
NGO nongovernmental organization WFP World Food Programme
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human WHO World Health Organization
Rights
P principal UN authority
RC resident coordinator UN operational control
SRSG special representative of the Secretary- UN tactical control
General coordination

Figure C-3. Example of an Organization for a Generic United Nations Integrated Mission

in the Central African Republic. Figure C-3 is an example of a generic UN

multidimensional integrated mission organization.

C-3
Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

C-4 JP 3-07.3
 APPENDIX D
POINTS OF CONTACT

Joint Staff/J-7/Doctrine Division

Website: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail Support: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone number: 703-692-7273 (DSN 222)

Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-5

At the time of this publication:
Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division Global Policy and Partnerships
Comm: 703-695-3838 (DSN 225)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

At the time of this publication:
Stability and Humanitarian Affairs
Comm: 571-256-4937

US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

At the time of this publication:
Mailing Address: 22 Ashburn Dr. Carlisle, PA 17013
Website: http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu
Comm: 717-245-3722/3409 (DSN 242)

US Military Observer Group (USMOG)

At the time of this publication:
Mailing Address: HQ DA G-3/5/7
2530 Crystal Drive, Suite 7166 Arlington, VA 22202
Website: https://g357.army.pentagon.mil/OD/USMOG-
W/SitePages/Home.aspx
Comm: 703-545-7050 (DSN 865)

US Mission to the United Nations

At the time of this publication:
Military Staff Committee
Mailing Address: 799 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017
Website: https://usun.state.gov/
https://usun.state.gov/contact
Comm: 212-415-4480/4000

D-1
Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

D-2 JP 3-07.3
 APPENDIX E
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07.3 is based upon the following primary references.

1. General

a. United Nations Participation Act of 1945 as amended (Title 22, USC, Section 287).

b. Executive Order 10206, Providing for Support of United Nations’ Activities

Directed to the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

c. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (Title 22, USC, Chapter 32).

d. Title 10, USC.

e. National Security Strategy.

f. National Disclosure Policy-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure
of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International
Organizations.

g. Presidential Policy Memorandum on United States Support to United Nations

Peace Operations.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. Defense Strategy Review.

b. DODD 2065.1E, Assignment of Personnel to United Nations Missions.

c. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and
NLW Policy.

d. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.

e. DODI 455.13, Air Transportation Eligibility.

f. DODI 6000.11, Patient Movement.

g. Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Publications

a. National Military Strategy.

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces.

E-1
Appendix E

c. CJCS Guide 5260, A Self-Help Guide to Antiterrorism.

d. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

e. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

g. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

h. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

k. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

l. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

m. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

n. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Environments.

o. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

p. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

q. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

r. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

s. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

t. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

u. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

v. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

w. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

x. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

y. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

z. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

aa. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

E-2 JP 3-07.3
 References

bb. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

cc. Joint Doctrine Note 2-16, Identity Activities.

4. Multi-Service Publications

a. ATP 3-22.40 (FM 3-22.40)/MCTP 10-10A (MCWP 3-15.8)/NTTP 3-

07.3.2/AFTTP 3-2.45/CGTTP 3-93.2, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Nonlethal Weapons.

b. ATP 3-07.31/MCTP 3-03B (MCWP 3-33.8)/AFTTP 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

c. Army Training Circular 3-19.5, Nonlethal Weapons Training.

5. Multinational Documents

a. Charter of the United Nations.

b. Geneva Conventions of 1949.

c. North Atlantic Treaty.

d. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: Preventative Diplomacy,

Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, Report of the UNSG, 1992.

e. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of

the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,
1995.

f. Brahimi Report, Lakhdar Brahimi, Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations Report to the General Assembly and Security Council, 21 August 2000.

g. The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the

Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Report of
the Secretary-General, 2 September 2015.

h. Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on

Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, 9 December 2014.

i. Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping, Report of the

Secretary-General, 1 April 2015.

j. Performance Peacekeeping: Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and

Innovation in UN Peacekeeping, 22 December 2014.

k. Report of the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations. Uniting Our

Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, 17 June 2015.

E-3
Appendix E

l. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, March 2014.

6. Multinational Publications

a. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.

b. Canada, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, Peace Support Operations.

c. United Kingdom, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, The Military Contribution to

Peace Support Operations.

d. AJP-3.4.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support.

e. Allied Tactical Publication-3.4.1.1, Peace Support Operations Techniques and

Procedures.

7. Service Publications

a. FM 3-07, Stability.

b. Commandant of the Coast Guard Instruction 16618.7A, International Port Security

Program.

c. ATP 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians.

8. Other Publication

Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook.

E-4 JP 3-07.3
 APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Mr. Allen
(Dwight) Raymond, US Army (PKSOI); Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. William
(Marshall) Mantiply, Joint Staff J-5; technical review authority, Mr. Maxwell Kelly, NDU;
LtCol Matthew Robbins, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division; and Mr. Larry
Seman, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 01 August 2012.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

F-1
Appendix F

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume I, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/ (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-
ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.

F-2 JP 3-07.3
 GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AJP Allied joint publication
AT antiterrorism
ATP Army techniques publication
AU African Union

BZ buffer zone

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCS commander’s communication synchronization
CGTTP Coast Guard tactics, techniques, and procedures
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CONOPS concept of operations
COS chief of staff

DC dislocated civilian
DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DMZ demilitarized zone
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DOS Department of State

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

ERSG executive representative of the Secretary-General
EU European Union

FGS Force Generation Service (UN)

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FM field manual (Army)
FP force protection

GCC geographic combatant commander

HA humanitarian assistance
HN host nation

GL-1
Glossary

HNS host-nation support

HOM head of mission
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence

IAP integrated assessment and planning

IAW in accordance with
IED improvised explosive device
IR intelligence requirement
ITF integrated task force

JFC joint force commander

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JP joint publication

KLE key leader engagement

LNO liaison officer

MARO mass atrocity response operations

MCTP Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MIS military information support
MISO military information support operations
MNF multinational force
MNFC multinational force commander
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
MOU memorandum of understanding
MP military police (Army and Marine)
MPS Military Planning Service (UN)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO nongovernmental organization
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

OA operational area
OAS Organization of American States
OCS operational contract support
OE operational environment
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs
PCC police contributing country
PEO peace enforcement operations

GL-2 JP 3-07.3
 Glossary

PKO peacekeeping operations

PR personnel recovery

R&R rest and recuperation

ROE rules of engagement

SC security cooperation
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status-of-forces agreement
SOMA status-of-mission agreement
SOP standard operating procedure
SRSG special representative of the Secretary-General
SSR security sector reform

TCC troop contributing country

TOR term of reference

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UN United Nations
UNDFS United Nations Department of Field Support
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMEM United Nations military expert on mission
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCR United Nations Security Council resolution
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United State Code
USCG United States Coast Guard
USG United States Government
USMOG United States Military Observer Group
UXO unexploded explosive ordnance

VEO violent extremist organization

WFP World Food Programme (UN)

GL-3
 PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

buffer zone. 1. A defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing
or belligerent forces have been excluded. Also called area of separation in some
United Nations operations. Also called BZ. (JP 3-07.3) 2. A designated area used
for safety in military operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-01)

conflict prevention. A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and,

when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take
timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

demilitarized zone. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

disengagement. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

line of demarcation. A line defining the boundary of a buffer zone used to establish the
forward limits of disputing or belligerent forces after each phase of disengagement or
withdrawal has been completed. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

mass atrocity response operations. Military activities conducted to prevent or halt mass
atrocities. Also called MARO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

minimum force. Those minimum actions, including the use of armed force, sufficient to
bring a situation under control or to defend against a hostile act or hostile intent, where
the firing of weapons is to be considered as a means of last resort. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operations to restore order. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

peace building. Stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society’s institutions,
infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally
pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or
sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-07.3)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken, with the consent of all major parties to a
dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire,
truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term
political settlement. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of

peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it.
Also called PM. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

GL-4 JP 3-07.3
 Glossary

peace operations. Multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency
operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to
contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation
and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Also called PO.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

public diplomacy. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

relief in place. An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit
is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced
elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the
incoming unit. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-07.3)

GL-5
Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-6 JP 3-07.3
 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-07.3 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

l JP published and continuously l Joint doctrine development
assessed by users community (JDDC) submission to fill
l Formal assessment begins extant operational void
24-27 months following l Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
publication end analysis
l Revision begins 3.5 years l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
after publication validation
l Each JP revision is completed l Program directive (PD) development
no later than 5 years after and staffing/joint working group
signature l PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
l JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
Maintenance command, JS directorate)

Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION

Approval Development

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

l JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 l LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
l JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
l JSDS prepares JS staffing package
l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l FD comment matrix adjudication
l JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature l JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
l Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
l FC joint working group